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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (7 Aug 68) FOR OT RD 682133 23 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th
Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance
with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should
be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days
of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the
Army realises current benefits from lessons learned during recent opera-
tions.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned
Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons
Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the
reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the
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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

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US Army Aviation Test Activity
2d Battalion, 138th Artillery
11th Combat Aviation Battalion
OPERATIONAL REPORTS

3

LEARNED

EXEMPLA PROSPERERE

IIITH CBT AVN BN

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion
Ending 30 April 1968 (TGS GSPOR-65)(R1)(U)

(U) Under provisions of AR 525-15, AR 370-5 and USARV Reg 525-15, the Quarterly Operational Report - Lessons Learned is submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

KILLARD BURKE
CPT, INFANTRY
Adjutant

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1 copy to CO, 3rd Armed Sqdn, 17th Air Cav
1 copy to CO, 7th Armed Sqdn, 1st Air Cav
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion for period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

SET DISTIBUTION

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. (U) During the period 1 February - 30 April 1968 there have been no changes or additions to the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion's missions.

b. (U) Organization.

(1) The 391st Quartermaster Detachment was assigned to the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion on 11 March, 1968 (See inclosure 1, General Order 17). The 391st Quartermaster Detachment operates the Army Aviation Logistic Activity (AATL) at Song Be, IN (YU 1407). The mission of the 391st Quartermaster Detachment is to provide and operate aircraft refueling and rearming service for the Song Be area.

(2) The organization of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion at the close of the reporting period is attached as inclosure 2.

c. (U) Command and Staff.

(1) Significant changes in the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion Command and Staff structure during this reporting period are shown below:

COMMANDER

(a) On 22 April, 1968, LTC William F. Bauman, 068430, replaced LTC William A. Hobbs, 085769, as Battalion Commander.

STAFF

(b) On 10 February, 1968, Maj Clarence D. Wilks, 075318, replaced LTC Paul L. Stansel, 0931035, as Battalion Executive Officer.
(c) On 1 March, 1968, Maj Ronald A. Brooks, O4031349, replaced Maj William H. Smart, 02388825, as Battalion S-2.

(d) On 2 April, 1968, Cpt Monte R. Veal, OF106860, replaced Cpt Donald A. Williamson, 093001, as Battalion S-4.

(e) On 18 April, 1968, 1LT Sterling L. Linton, 05333255, replaced Maj Ronald A. Brooks, O4031349, as Battalion S-2.

**UNIT COMMANDERS**


(g) On 16 April, 1968, Maj William H. Jarvis, OF106663, replaced Maj Richard A. Lilly, 084491, as Commanding Officer of the 128th Assault Helicopter Company.

(h) On 21 April, 1968, Maj Lee C. Smith, 083994, replaced Maj Robert P. St. Louis, 073886, as Commanding Officer of the 173rd Assault Helicopter Company.

(2) The current Command and Staff structure is shown in inclosure 3.

_d. (U)_ Unit Strengths as of 30 April, 1968:

(1) Military:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subordinate Unit</th>
<th>Officer Auth</th>
<th>O/H</th>
<th>WO Auth</th>
<th>O/H</th>
<th>Auth</th>
<th>O/H</th>
<th>Total Auth</th>
<th>O/H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHD</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>177</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128th AHC</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>310</td>
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<tr>
<td>162nd AHC</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173rd AHC</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213th ASHC</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 11th CAB         | 87           | 82  | 189     | 145 | 1037 | 1094| 1313       | 1321|
(2) Civilian:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subordinate Unit</th>
<th>DAC Auth O/H</th>
<th>V/N Auth O/H</th>
<th>3d NAT Auth O/H</th>
<th>Contractor Auth O/H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHD</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>9 36</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8 20</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162nd AHC</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>10 8</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173rd AHC</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>10 6</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st ASFC</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>17 17</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th CAB</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>54 87</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. (U) Aircraft Status as of 30 April 1968 - See inclosure 4

f. (U) Operational Results as of 30 April 1968 - See inclosure 5

g. (U) The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion was engaged in supporting tactical operations each day during the entire period of this report. Continuous training of all new personnel was accomplished by the subordinate units, concurrently with their normal assigned missions.

h. (U) Personnel, Morale, Discipline and Information.

(1) Personnel Records. The volume of records maintained at this headquarters during the reporting period totaled 1314. Processing totals were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Processed</th>
<th>Out Processed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer 19</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO 23</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1 331</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 373</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Awards and Decorations. The following awards and decorations were processed through this headquarters during the reporting period:

CONFIDENTIAL
Submitted Award Received
34 Distinguished Flying Cross 14
4 Soldiers Medal 2
41 Bronze Star Medal 23
1965 Air Medal 1876
81 Army Commendation Medal 71
38 Purple Heart 28
7 Certificate of Achievement 10

2170 Total 2024

1. (C) Intelligence. During a recent mortar attack, directed against the Phu Loi Base Camp, it was noted that the Viet Cong had varied their tactics considerably. Rather than firing mortars over a large area, the Viet Cong fired two concentrated volleys into separate areas. This tactic indicates that the enemy may be trying to obtain maximum damage by concentrating his fires in a small area as opposed to an area coverage employed in the past.

2. (C) Plans, Operations and Training.

(a) The Battalion Operations Center (BOC) completed a remodeling of its facilities during this period. Existing control facilities, communications equipment, charts and maps have been relocated or re-positioned in order that a two man BOC team can efficiently control and monitor all Battalion operations. A multi-purpose console was designed to house all telephones, mission schedules, assignment documents, radio speakers, and channel selector units. The console is capped with plexiglass to facilitate recording of pertinent information over the working documents. The communications arrangement enables one person to monitor numerous FM, FM-Secure and UHF radio nets. When peak periods of activity occur, both BOC personnel have at their reach all available facilities, maps, documents, and communications equipment necessary to make immediate decisions or render any assistance to the air mission commanders. (See enclosure 6, BOC Photograph)

(b) The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion continues to maintain a Liaison Officer with the First Infantry Division on a permanent basis. As the battalion provides in excess of 65 percent of its aviation assets in support of the First Infantry Division, the Liaison Officer is
able to furnish the BOC with early notification of future operations, additional support requirements, and items of general interest which may affect the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion. The Liaison Officer assists the Division’s Army Aviation Element in their planning for airmobile operations and insures proper utilization of all aircraft assigned to a Division support mission. During tactical operations, the Liaison officer alerts the BOC to sudden emergencies or additional requirements, permitting the Battalion to respond with maximum preparedness in a minimum amount of time.

(2) (C) Operation.

(a) During the reporting period, the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion supported the First Infantry Division on the following major operations: Lam Son 68, Quyet Thang and Toan Thang.

(b) Operation Lam Son 68 began 1 February 1968 and terminated 31 March 1968. Due to the increased tempo of the war, initiated with the "Tet Offensive", numerous combat assaults were conducted daily. In support of this operation the assault helicopter companies of this battalion flew 10,783 sorties, 23,309 passengers and 3,499.8 hours.

(c) Elements of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion supported primarily the First Infantry Division during Operation Quyet Thang (Resolve To Win) from 21 March 1968 through 9 April 1968. Daily combat assault operations were conducted resulting in 4,773 sorties and 12,650 passengers flown in 1,544.3 hours.

(d) Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory) was a II Field Forces directed operation involving all allied units in the III Corps Tactical Zone. This operation began on 9 April 1968 and continues at present. To date, support given to the 1st Division in their area of responsibility is as follows: 14,091 sorties, 30,265 passengers, 5,683.8 tons cargo and 1,197 hours.

(e) The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion conducted 207 combat assaults utilizing ten or more lift aircraft during the month of February (Tet Offensive). One of particular interest was conducted less than 1000 meters north of the Phu Loi perimeter. On 1 February 1968, elements of the 1/28 Infantry and 1/4 Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division located an enemy force while on a screening mission near the Phu Loi base camp. The enemy was well equipped and dug in for a long siege. Due to the open terrain surrounding the enemy position, friendly units were pinned down and repeated ground assaults were repulsed by intense automatic weapons, rocket propelled grenades and mortar fire. The decision was made to air assault reinforcements into the area. The
173rd Assault Helicopter Company transported these troops into the battle under the cover of artillery and gunship fire. Gunships remained on station after the lift and laid down an intense volume of fire while the friendly forces assaulted the enemy position. This was the turning point of the seven-hour battle and the retreating enemy left 277 dead. Numerous mortars, machineguns and ammo caches were found on a sweep of the battle field the following day.

(c) The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion's involvement in the Tet Offensive is attached as inclosure 7 (Documentation of Army Aviation Operations).

(3) (c) Training.

(a) Specialized training was continued throughout the reporting period by utilisation of allocations to Army Aviation Mobile Technical Assistance Program and special courses. The enlisted personnel increased their technical knowledge of helicopter maintenance through attendance of AAMTAP courses in B, C and D model UH-1 helicopters. Fourteen allocations to CH-47 AAMTAP courses were filled. Three enlisted men attended the AAMTAP supply course and two quotas were filled for communications courses.

(b) Seven quotas were filled by officers and warrant officers for the Jungle Environmental Survival School held in the Philippines. Two of the battalion's flight surgeons have attended this course and have incorporated this training into aero-medical classes given to pilots and crew members. In addition, comprehensive survival training programs have been initiated at the unit level.

(c) XM-229/XM-429 NETT: During the past quarter, members from each company of this battalion attended a course of instruction on the XM-229 and XM-429 weapon system presented by a new equipment training team from Picatinny Arsenal. The training was primarily oriented to the members of the armed helicopter platoons from the assault helicopter companies, however, other key personnel attended. The training was given in two phases:

1 The first phase consisted of classroom instruction. The equipment was introduced and its capabilities, characteristics and employment restrictions were thoroughly discussed. All gunship pilots and crew attended this phase of instruction. In addition, all ammunition handlers and their supervisors received the instruction.

2 Approximately one week later, the training team returned to complete the course of instruction with actual components. This phase of instruction included rocket assembly with proper torque equipment, arming the helicopter, engaging the target and practice
firing. One light fire team from each of the assault helicopter companies participated in the practice firing of these weapons. Ammunition handlers and their supervisors as well as crew members assembled the weapon components under the supervision of the training team.

2. This Battalion is now prepared to accept these weapon components whenever authorized to do so by higher headquarters.

(d) During the reporting period, the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion was assigned the mission of presenting in-country orientation and flight training to members of the 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry. The orientation consisted of aero-medical, aviation safety, intelligence and operational briefings. The pilots and crews from "A" Troop were dispersed throughout the Battalion for two weeks of flight training. Each aviator received an in-country orientation checkride and flew the maximum amount of time possible on operational missions during the training period.

(e) Aviator standardization and training has differed little from the previous reporting period. Newly assigned aviators receive individual instruction, orientation flights and proficiency checkrides prior to being released for missions. Comprehensive checkrides must be passed by individuals before being designated as aircraft commanders and 90 day standardization checkrides are completed as required. All training has been weather oriented with the advent of the forthcoming monsoon season.

k. (U) Logistics.

(1) (U) Unit Supply - All supply and logistical transactions within the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion are conducted at company level. Each subordinate unit maintains its own property books, including separate books for their supporting detachments. Having their own Unit Identification Code (UIC), each prepares and processes all supply and logistical requisitions. Follow-up action is accomplished by unit supply personnel and assistance is provided by the Battalion S-4 Section when needed.

(2) (U) S-4 Section - The Battalion S-4 supervises all unit supply activities, consolidates reports as necessary and provides liaison to higher headquarters. The S-4 section aids the units with particular problem areas such as motor maintenance, basic loads, POL products, weapons, base development, fire prevention and materiel readiness. The S-4 staff personnel conduct frequent assistance visits to the units.

1. (C) Maintenance.

(1) (C) During the past three months, the Battalion has experienced higher total flying hours and average hours per UH-1 aircraft than in previous reporting periods. Battalion units had assigned during this period an average of 24 UH-1B and C aircraft averaging 59.3 flying hours
each per month, 68 UH-1D's averaging 105.3 hours each per month and 20
CH-47's averaging 58.6 hours each per month. The CH-47 unit had a total of 12
of the extensive 12th Periodic Inspections come due of which four were performed by the unit and eight were performed by the contract Boeing Vertol team.

(2) (C) The assault helicopter companies received 16 UH-1 replacement aircraft in an effort to maintain a level of 23 UH-1D and eight UH-1B and C aircraft per company. The UH-1D average airframe hours per aircraft increased 131 hours each during the period. In the beginning, 60 UH-1D's averaged 1633 airframe hours each and at the end 57 UH-1D's averaged 1764 hours each. At the end of the period, the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion was short a total of 13 UH-1D and 1 UH-1C aircraft. The lack of float UH-1D and UH-1C aircraft in the direct support aircraft maintenance company and lack of replacement aircraft is causing an increasing workload on the assault helicopter companies.

(3) (U) Two UH-1D and two CH-47 safety of flight inspections were received during the period of February 1968 through April 1968, which required temporary grounding of the aircraft. The inspections were completed without adverse effect on operational commitments.

(4) (U) Back up direct support maintenance for two of the assault helicopter companies assigned to the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion was shifted from the 605th Transportation Company at Phu Loi to the 20th Transportation Company at Cu Chi. This has resulted in a more equitable distribution of the back up support work load with an associated decrease in down time for the assigned aircraft.

(5) (U) Two civilian sheet metal repairmen were assigned for operational control to each of the four direct support detachments on 26 February 1968. This has resulted in a reduction of the number of aircraft going to the back up support companies plus a reduction in the amount of deferred sheet metal repairs on assigned aircraft. This action has also resulted in filling the gap left by insufficient assigned TOE sheet metal repairmen.

(6) (C) The only road to one of the outlying units of this Battalion is not secure and requires transporting all aircraft repair parts by air. Initially, Air Force CV-2 aircraft transported most of the bulky and heavy components. Requests for these aircraft were made through II FFV and many times the aircraft were not made available. As a result, repair parts were becoming back logged at the direct support unit. For responsiveness, which is vital, CH-47 aircraft from this battalion were tasked to transport bulky and heavy items. Smaller and lighter parts were carried by the unit in their UH-1D maintenance helicopter. Initially, internal transport was attempted by use of CH-47. This resulted in extensive periods of ground time, averaging 30 to 45 minutes at origin and destination. Since we were using "dead head" time of mission aircraft, this was unacceptable. Experimentation with sling loads revealed the UH-1D and CH-47 helicopters could carry lighter less bulky items and heavier more
bulky items respectively. As components arrive at the DSU, they are rigged into a sling load. Battalion Operations Center notifies the CH-47 unit of this and at the earliest opportunity, a CH-47 picks up the load and delivers it to the unit. Upon return, the same CH-47 can usually backhaul the unserviceable repairables to the DSU. This only adds five or ten minutes to the total mission time of the aircraft and keeps serviceable and unserviceable repairable parts constantly moving. The sling load proved successful and since has reduced to a minimum the back log of serviceable components at the DSU as well as retrograde unserviceable repairable components in the unit.

(7) (U) The output of project ZTR (Avionics Retrofit Program) has fallen behind during this reporting period due to lack of retrofit kits for the 1967 UH-1D's and CH-47's. From 1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968, a total of 17 UH-1D's, two UH-1C's and one CH-47 aircraft have been completed. One UH-60, eight UH-1D's, and five CH-47 aircraft remain to be retrofitted. On 15 April, 1968, the ZIS portion of the Avionics Retrofit Program was started. This portion is the installation of the radio mount in the radio compartment and control head on the pilots console.

(8) (U) The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion's Aircraft Maintenance Statistical Summary during the reporting period is shown as enclosure 8.

m. (U) Aviation Safety.

(1) (U) Procedures. Safety is a command responsibility. The Aviation Safety Officer of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion works directly for the Battalion Commander as a Special Staff Officer. The Battalion Commander has given his full support and actively takes part in the Aviation Safety Program. The present safety program within the Battalion differs little from any other safety program with the exception of the outstanding degree of command emphasis and support given to it.

(2) (U) Publications. The Aviation Safety Officer publishes a monthly letter which includes notes and tips on aviation safety, latest changes in procedures, safety slogans, etc. Distribution is made to platoon level.

(3) (U) Training. Each individual company has an outstanding training standardization program to qualify newly assigned pilots for in-country missions and eventually as aircraft commanders.

(4) (U) Inspections. A minimum of once each quarter the Battalion Safety Officer conducts a survey of subordinate units utilizing the United States Army Board for Aviation Accident Research (USABAAR) Safety Survey Check List. These surveys are made a matter of record and follow up action is taken on all deficiencies.
(5) (U) Accidents. There has been a gradual increase in the accident rate during the past ninety days, though the overall accident rate is still below the Army-wide average. Over 75 percent of the accidents were caused by pilot error while the remainder were caused by material failure. There have been eight major accidents, seven incidents, eight precautionary landings, nine forced landings, three combat damage, and one combat loss reported within the past ninety days. The following is a list of the accidents and incidents reported during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>INCIDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engine failure</td>
<td>Maintenance error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tail rotor strike</td>
<td>Quill assy failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost RPM</td>
<td>Vehicle antenna strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost control</td>
<td>Lost RPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangar bearing failure</td>
<td>Engine failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main bearing failure</td>
<td>Transmission failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tail rotor failure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot overcontrolled</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCED LANDINGS</th>
<th>PRECAUTIONARY LANDINGS</th>
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<tr>
<td>FOD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engine failure</td>
<td>Cracked manifold line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bearing failure</td>
<td>Transmission cracked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tail rotor failure</td>
<td>Oil press hose failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasket failure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) (U) The safety goal established by the Battalion Commander for the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion is zero (0) accidents. The total flight time for reporting period is 29,432 hours for an overall accident rate of 27.2/100,000 hours.

n. (U) Surgeon.

(1) (U) At present each of the assault helicopter companies have a Flight Surgeon and medical detachment as part of their organization. All problems which cannot be handled at the detachment level are referred to the clearing company, which is located within their base camp. Emergency med-evac is conducted by organic unit aircraft when the situation warrants. Med-evac patients are normally processed through the clearing station. All detachments within the battalion provide medical coverage on a twenty four hour basis. Each detachment has a medical bunker and is capable of functioning during rocket, mortar or ground attacks.

(2) (U) Active programs are under way throughout the battalion to:
(a) Improve sanitary standards by the use of field medical teams, thereby reducing the incidence of communicable diseases.

(b) Reduce the incidence of venereal disease through education programs.

(c) Religious and Personnel Services.

(1) Religious Services. Due to the fact that numerous Roman Catholic personnel are on duty during Mass on Sunday morning, an additional Mass has been started at 1930 hours on Sunday evenings. The Battalion Chaplain has added two services for the men of this command. These services have been prompted by the fact that the men sometimes must carry out a mission at the time worship is scheduled.

(2) Personnel Services.

(a) A religious library, including many devotional books, is being formed in the chapel.

(b) Correspondence courses on the books of the Bible are being disseminated for individual worship and Bible study.

(d) Military Civic Action.

(1) Military Civic Action is closely related to Revolutionary Development. All activities which will bring the Republic of Viet Nam to a state of economic, political, and sociological stability fall under Revolutionary Development.

(2) The recent Tet Offensive has prompted many fund drives to assist the thousands of refugee victims. The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion personnel contributed 8,118 $VN to the Tet Assgression Relief Project (TARP). The Trilateral Fund Drive to afford the civilian employees of the battalion an opportunity to contribute to their less fortunate countrymen, is presently under way and to date totals over 5,000 $VN. Each company of the battalion has assisted its own employees in recovering from the Tet aggression.

(3) Assistance in the form of clothing and money has been received from Mrs. Daly's 6th grade history class, Lakeland Middle School in Mohegan, New York. The children worked at odd jobs to earn money for donation to a needy organization in the Republic of Viet Nam. The donations will be presented to an orphanage in the near future.
2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel.

(1) (U) Item: Junior officer and warrant officer promotions.

(a) Observation: Officer and warrant officer personnel records should be managed so as to provide prompt promotion on the eligibility date.

(b) Evaluation: It has been found that some junior officers and warrant officers have not been promoted promptly due to failure to accomplish timely processing of recommendations for promotion.

(c) Recommendation: That DA Form 78, Recommendation for Promotion, be initiated and partially prepared during in-processing of First Lieutenants, Second Lieutenants and Warrant Officer (W-1). The partially prepared recommendations should then be placed into suspense files forty five days prior to promotion eligibility date. This system prevents the possibility of failing to submit a completed DA Form 78 at the proper time to insure expeditious processing.

(2) (U) Item: PCS Orders.

(a) Observation: In excess of one hundred PCS Special Orders are initiated each month by the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion.

(b) Evaluation: Considerable time is consumed daily preparing special orders for PCS personnel. The transaction code format used is identical for all PCS orders.

(c) Recommendation: That preprinted transaction code formats be made for PCS reassignments to CONUS and PCS moves within the command. At the time an individual is reassigned, the only typing required would be the variable responses to be overprinted on the prepared transaction code lead lines. A significant time saving and more expeditious production of orders is thereby accomplished.

b. (C) Operations:

(1) (C) Item: Repeated use of landing zones.

(a) Observation: During the past several months, it was noted that certain desirable landing zones within a combat unit's area of operation have been used repeatedly time after time on current and prior operations. Many patterns are established (for example: flight routes, approach and departure axis, times, helicopter touchdown points, helicopter supply pads, etc) which should be avoided at all times in a counterinsurgency environment. As a result, on repeated instances, enemy mortar fire was received in the landing area as the helicopters were on short final, on the ground, or just departing. The Viet Cong mortar concentrations were fired with near perfect timing on each occasion. The trailing inbound flights, separated by a normal 30 second interval, had to abort the approach immediately.
(b) **Evaluation:** When helicopter landing or pickup zones are used repeatedly, maximum deviation or diversionary measures must be utilized by both the air mission and ground force commanders. Prevailing wind conditions, terrain restrictions and other considerations limit to some extent the application of necessary counter measures, however, every attempt must be made to eliminate repetitive situations. Once hostile units are able to determine that a definite pattern has been established, they possess the capability to inflict considerable damage to equipment and cause numerous casualties.

(c) **Recommendation:** Air mission commanders must always remain alert for pattern-forming situations, incorporating flight diversions as necessary. Ground commanders must be appraised of all such situations.

(2) **(C) Item:** Clearance to engage targets of opportunity.

(a) **Observation:** During the insertion of an Infantry Battalion, supporting gunships spotted two men running along a trail 300 meters from the landing zone within three minutes of the initial assault landing. Both individuals were wearing helmets and one carried a portable radio on his back. Clearance to engage the target was immediately requested by the fire team. An unidentified person broadcasted over the FM radio that they were friendly troops—not to fire on them. There were no other friendly units operating in the area. The ground commander, monitoring the actions realized they were not friendly and granted clearance to engage the target. However, by this time, the two individuals had disappeared into the undergrowth. Several days later, the ground units made contact with enemy forces equipped with various colored military uniforms and helmets. One AN/PRC-25 radio was recaptured.

(b) **Evaluation:** The delays encountered obtaining clearance to engage targets of opportunity habitually provide the enemy with ample time to escape. In order to engage targets immediately, no fire lines should be used in conjunction with airmobile assaults. Targets outside the no fire line but within the ground commander's area of operation, then can be engaged instantaneously.

(c) **Recommendation:** Control measures which will insure troop safety should be utilized to enable rapid engagement of targets by tactical air, artillery or armed helicopters.

(3) **(C) Item:** "Horseshoe" type fire support for extraction of combat personnel when under fire.

(a) **Observation:** Recently a US company was engaged in heavy contact with a superior Viet Cong Force. Darkness was approaching and contact could not be broken. Supplies were becoming critical. It was evident that the unit would have to be extracted as it was too late to insert reinforcements or prepare a night defensive position. Entrenched enemy elements were located along three sides of the pinned down US Forces in somewhat of a horseshoe configuration. Accurate rocket-propelled grenades, automatic and small arms fire was being received along the entire horseshoe perimeter. The decision to prepare for a night extraction was made at dusk. The aviation assets available were ten assault helicopters, one light fire team (LFT) and a flight of tactical jet fighters on station overhead. An additional light fire team was scrambled and a smoke ship was dispatched to the scene. When all elements were on station and coordination was complete, the extraction commenced. The flight
of tactical fighters placed CBU bombs across the base of the horseshoe during the approach of the assault helicopters into the pocket. The smoke ship and one LFT suppressed and obscured the downwind leg. The other LFT suppressed the upwind leg. At H-hour, a horseshoe of suppressive fires were brought to bear on the enemy perimeter as the troop helicopters landed. Upon landing, the flight executed a 180° turn, loaded the ground personnel and immediately departed along the approach axis. Three such lifts were conducted during which no hostile fire was received.

(b) Evaluation: The horseshoe type fire support proved extremely effective during this operation. Detailed coordination and timing is of prime importance. If only one light fire team had been available, the use of a smoke dispensing helicopter to obscure the downwind leg of the perimeter would have been highly effective while armed helicopters suppressed the upwind leg. The fire power and precision of tactical air support cannot be over-emphasized. The CBU bomblets proved very effective in a suppressive as well as destructive roles.

(c) Recommendation: That other aviation units explore the possibilities of utilizing a horseshoe type fire support plan for extraction operations if the tactical situation so dictates.

(4) (C) Airmobile operations conducted under normal rules of engagement.

(a) Observation: Numerous airmobile assaults are conducted without prior supporting fires, as air strikes, artillery preparations and/or armed helicopter prestrikes. Such assaults have periodically resulted in aviation and combat personnel being subjected to hostile fire during the landing phase of the operation. The hazards are increased by continuous reconnaissance over the intended landing zones or when armed helicopters conduct repeated low level observations and reconnaissance over the intended landing zones or when armed helicopters conduct repeated low level observations and reconnaissance as much as 15 minutes before the assault elements land.

(b) Evaluation: When the air mission commander conducts liaison with the airmobile task force commander, he must immediately determine whether or not a fire support plan will be implemented. When the air assault is to be conducted without fire support, a reconnaissance of the landing zones must be conducted at considerable distance in order not to alert hostile units in the area of an impending operation. Reconnaissance should be conducted along irregular flight paths, incorporating several altitude changes away from the area being observed. When an assault is not supported by preparatory fires, reconnaissance must be brief and thorough. The flight leaders must receive a detailed briefing. Selected flight routes should be designed so as to deceive the enemy of the intended landing site until the very last moment. Escort gunships should not precede the assault helicopters into the landing zone earlier than 30 seconds in order to mark the touchdown point for the lead helicopter. Command and control helicopters orbiting overhead may vector the flight as needed. In all cases, surprise must be the prime consideration when landing the assault forces in an unprepared landing zone. The capability to achieve surprise is limited only by the air mission commander's imagination, resourcefulness and leadership.
(c) **Recommendation:** When assaults are not supported by preparatory fires, reconnaissance must be brief and thorough. Deceptive measures and surprise are key factors which will influence the success of an operation.

 c. (U) **Training:** None.

d. (U) **Intelligence:** None.

e. (U) **Logistics:**

(1) (U) **Item:** Personal aviator flight equipment.

(a) **Observation:** A requirement exists that all flight personnel and noncrewmembers will wear flight gloves and helmets while participating in aerial flight. Sunglasses, Nomex flying suits are also items that each aviator should wear when flying.

(b) **Evaluation:** There has been and still remains a critical shortage of personal flight equipment within the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion. Flight gloves, through normal daily use and prevailing climatic conditions, deteriorate within three months after issue. For the most part, aviators are wearing unserviceable gloves since the supply cannot match the demand. Requisitions for reissues are always on due-out. Repair parts for the flight helmets are extremely difficult to obtain. Aviator sunglasses are nearly nonexistent in the command. The new Nomex flight suits should become available in the near future.

(c) **Recommendation:** Command assistance should be given to this problem to insure that all personnel have required protective clothing.

f. (U) **Organization:** None.

g. (U) **Aircraft Maintenance:** None.

3. **Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information:** None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MILLARD BURKE

8 Incl

1. O-O-47 Hqs. 13th CAB
2. Organization and Station List
3. Command and Staff Structure
4. Aircraft Status
5. Operational Results
6. Photo - Battalion Operations Center
7. Documentation of Army Aviation Operations
8. Aircraft Maintenance Statistical Summary
AVGO-SC (12 May 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 11th Combat Aviation
Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR - 65 (RI)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96266 22 May 1968

TO: Commanding General, II FFORCEV, APO 96266

1. In compliance with AR 525-15 and USARV Regulation 525-15, one copy of subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with all comments and recommendations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES E. LYBRAND
Major, Infantry
Asst Adjutant
AVFBG-EB-H (12 May 68) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1968, EOK CHAPOR-65 (RI) (U)

DA, SQ II FFORCENY, APO San Francisco 96266 12 JUN 1968

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVRA-O, APO 96307
       Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHEC(STR), APO 96375
       Commander, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GFCOP-SC, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This command has reviewed the attached operational report - Lessons Learned of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion and concurs with it.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

O. R. FORBY

O. R. FORBY

ILP, AGC

Adjt AG
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBA-C (12 May 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion

Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR (R1) (U)

Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, AFO 96384 JUN 2 J 1968

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: UTOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Paragraph 11(7), page 9. The ZVS program is the installation of the KY-28 mount, the KY-26 control, and a KD-736 Discrete Discriminator at each C-161L. This is the unit which precludes transmission on other radios while secure voice is being used on FM.

   b. Paragraph 29, page 15. Nomex flight suits and gloves are under strict control by USAV, but issues are being made. Ballistic helmets should become available by the end of June 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN D. MIXSELL, JR.
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion for period ending 30 April 1968, BCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 26 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. Concur with report as submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ 1st Avn Bde
HQ 11th Cbt Avn Bn
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 11th Cbt Avn Bn for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 26 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
    Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
# 11th Combat Aviation Battalion
## Aircraft Status
### Qtr Ending 30 April 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subordinate Units</th>
<th>OH-23 Auth O/H</th>
<th>UH-1B Auth O/H</th>
<th>UH-1C Auth O/H</th>
<th>UH-1D Auth O/H</th>
<th>CH-47A Auth O/H</th>
<th>U-6A Auth O/H</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>128th AHC</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162nd AHC</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173rd AHC</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213th ASHC</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th CAB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>70</td>
<td>57</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## 11th Combat Aviation Battalion
### Operational Results
*Qtr Ending 30 April 1968*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subordinate Units</th>
<th>Sorties Flown</th>
<th>Troops Lifted</th>
<th>Cargo Lifted (tons)</th>
<th>Enemy KIA</th>
<th>Structures Dam Dest</th>
<th>Sampans Dam Dest</th>
<th>#Aircraft Confirmed Loss</th>
<th>#Aircraft Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>128th AHC</td>
<td>25,591</td>
<td>46,352</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>248 110</td>
<td>4 32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>162nd AHC</td>
<td>24,229</td>
<td>45,558</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32 22</td>
<td>14 16</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>173rd AHC</td>
<td>24,646</td>
<td>51,438</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20 92</td>
<td>3 3</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>213th ASHC</td>
<td>12,581</td>
<td>38,846</td>
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<td>0 0</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHD</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>232</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>11th CAB</td>
<td>87,281</td>
<td>182,426</td>
<td>21,465</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>300 224</td>
<td>21 51</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*128th AHC Aircraft Loss: 1 UH-1D, Aircraft Damaged 3 UH-1D
162nd AHC Aircraft Loss: 1 UH-1D, 1 UH-1C, Aircraft Damaged 2 UH-1D, 1 UH-1C
173rd AHC Aircraft Loss: 2 UH-1D, Aircraft Damaged 1 UH-1D, 1 UH-1C
213th ASHC Aircraft Damaged: 1 CH-47*
SUBJECT: Documentation of Army Aviation Operations (29 January through 29 February 1968) (U)

(U) In compliance with letter, 1st Aviation Brigade, AVBA-B, dated 4 April 1968, subject: same as above, requested information as pertaining to the Army Aviation Operations during the TET offensive is forwarded as enclosures 1 thru 3.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ MILLARD BURKE
CPT, INF
ADJUTANT

3 Incl
1. Documentation of TET Offensive
2. Statistical Data
3. Armed Helicopter Questionnaire

Incl 7
1. (U) The organization of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion during the period 29 Jan - 29 Feb 68 was as follows:

- Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (HHD)
- 128th Assault Helicopter Company (128th AHC)
- 393rd Maintenance Detachment
- 285th Signal Detachment
- 432nd Medical Detachment
- 162nd Assault Helicopter Company (162nd AHC)
- 407th Maintenance Detachment
- 450th Signal Detachment
- 758th Medical Detachment
- 173rd Assault Helicopter Company (173rd AHC)
- 408th Maintenance Detachment
- 451st Signal Detachment
- 759th Medical Detachment
- 213th Assault Support Helicopter Company (213th ASHC)
- 329th Maintenance Detachment

2. (C) a. The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion (11th CAB) has elements in three different locations in the III Corps Tactical Zone. HHD, 11th CAB, the 128th AHC, and the 213th ASHC are located at Phu Loi (X6 861156), the 162nd AHC is located at Phuoc Vinh (X6 960495) and the 173rd AHC is located at Lai Khe (X6 772381).

   (1) The 173rd AHC at Lai Khe was the first unit of this battalion subjected to rocket and ground attack during the TET offensive. At 0300 hours on 31 January 1968, Lai Khe was mortared for the first time. During the period 31 January - 29 February, Lai Khe was mortared and rocketed on the average of three times daily. The total number of rounds received was 818: 385 rocket rounds, 385 mortar rounds, 25 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 11 rocket propelled grenades, 4 106 rounds and 8 rounds of unknown type. During each of these attacks, the "Robin Hoods" scrambled a light fire team for base defense. Damage received was one UH-1C destroyed, one UH-1D heavily damaged, and one UH-1C and one UH-1D lightly damaged. It is noteworthy to mention that during this period the 173rd AHC was always able to meet its daily commitment.

   (2) The 162nd AHC located at Phuoc Vinh was mortared and rocketed on five occasions during this period. These attacks resulted in two aircraft lightly damaged and two personnel wounded. One EM was evacuated to the hospital at Long Binh.

   (3) The base camp of Phu Loi where HHD, the 128th AHC and the 213th ASHC are located, was rocketed once during this period. On 18 February at 0101 hours, the first rounds impacted. 34 rounds of rockets and mortar
fire were received between 0101 hours and 0430 hours. One UH-1C of the 128th AHC was lightly damaged. The 128th AHC supplied one light fire team for base defense.

b. During this period, the 11th CAE conducted three combat assaults that are of a particular interest.

(1) On 30 January 1968, the 128th AHC inserted the 2/506 Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in the vicinity of the northeast corner of the Bien Hoa runway (VT 0X6145). During the insertion, 250 sorties were flown while inserting 596 troops. The gunships recorded five enemy KBA while flying close support for the infantry in defense of Bien Hoa.

(2) On 1 February 1968, the 173rd AHC flew in support of the 1/28 Infantry, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. The 173rd AHC was called upon to take reinforcements to a unit in heavy contact. The landing zone located 1,000 meters north of Phu Loi base camp at XT 827191 was under intense small arms and rocket and machine gun fire. The Viet Cong were dug in for a long siege and the infantry could not assault across a large open area that lay in the route of advance. With the "Robin Hoods" bringing in reinforcements and the "Crossbows", the 173rd AHC light fire team, providing close support for the infantry, the tide of battle soon turned in favor of the "Big Red One". After seven hours of fighting, 277 enemy were dead and numerous mortars and machine guns were captured. The infantry commander in the command and control aircraft stated: "without those reinforcements brought by the 'Robin Hoods' and the deadly barrage of fire by the gunships we would have been hard pressed to survive".

(3) On 13 February 1968, the 162nd AHC was assigned to support the 4/39th Infantry Battalion, 9th Infantry Division vicinity coordinates ES 813821, immediately south of Saigon. Ten UH-1D transport ships, one spare, a command and control ship, one heavy fire team from the 162nd AHC and a smoke dispensing aircraft from this battalion comprised the task force. At 1400 hours an extraction of elements of the 4/39th was begun. The unit had been in contact all day, with an estimated battalion size Viet Cong force. Upon landing in the pickup zone at coordinates ES 813821, the troop ships were met by intense enemy fire. Chalk Two received two hits, one in the transmission casing. A rocket propelled grenade round exploded in the vicinity of Chalk Five. The aircraft received shrapnel damage in the tail boom and tail rotor. Both aircraft were able to be flown from the pickup zone, and there were negative casualties. The extraction was postponed until 1830 hours whereupon the troops were extracted from the same pickup zone to coordinates ES 784824. During this extraction one gunship took a round in the tail boom in the vicinity of the pickup zone. Altogether 36 sorties totaling 116 troops were extracted.

3. (C) The total number of airmobile operations conducted by the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion involving ten or more lift ships was 207.
4. (U) See paragraph 2: above and paragraph 3 of inclosure 3.

5. (C) The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion flew a total of 2,247 (BET) resupply missions. The majority of these were flown by the 213th ASHC. This unit flew numerous sorties of troops and ammunition in and around the Tan San Nhut/Saigon and the Bien Hoa/Lon: Binh military complexes. The majority of these sorties required armed helicopter escort due to the heavy volume of enemy automatic weapons fire being received.

6. (U) The 11th CAB accomplished 16 medevac missions while carrying 151 personnel. The majority of these were accomplished by the 213th ASHC which carried 139 personnel. These missions did not require a gunship escort.

7. (U) 153 administrative missions were accomplished during this period.

8. (U) Ammunition expended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.75 in BET</th>
<th>M-40</th>
<th>7.62</th>
<th>OTHER (38 &amp; 45 cal, 5.56mm)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,739</td>
<td>7,404</td>
<td>618,130</td>
<td>1,720</td>
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9. (U) Casualty information:

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<tr>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
<th>HHA</th>
<th>ENEMY KIA</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42</td>
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</tbody>
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10. (U) Number of decorations received for the period:

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<th>DFC</th>
<th>RS</th>
<th>AN</th>
<th>ACM</th>
<th>PH</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
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</table>

11. (U) Number of recommendations for awards for the period:

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<tr>
<th>DFC</th>
<th>SM</th>
<th>RS</th>
<th>AN</th>
<th>ACM</th>
<th>PH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. (U) Not applicable.

13. (U) Statistical information: see inclosure 2.

14. (U) Armed helicopter questionnaire: see inclosure 3.
## STATISTICAL DATA (29 JAN - 29 FEB 68)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UH-1D/H</th>
<th>UH-1B/C</th>
<th>CH-47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. HOURS FLOWN</td>
<td>7,303</td>
<td>1,574</td>
<td>1,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SORTIES FLOWN</td>
<td>24,178</td>
<td>4,609</td>
<td>4,476</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. TROOPS TRANSPORTED</td>
<td>42,317</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>17,265</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. CARGO TRANSPORTED</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>6,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. AIRCRAFT DAMAGED ON THE GROUND DUE TO HOSTILE ACTION</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. AIRCRAFT RECEIVING HITS IN FLIGHT</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. AIRCRAFT SHOTDOWN</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. NUMBER OF VR MISSIONS FLOWN</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. NUMBER OF PHOTO MISSIONS FLOWN</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. NUMBER OF SLAR MISSIONS FLOWN</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. NUMBER OF IR MISSIONS FLOWN</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. NUMBER OF SAMPANS DESTROYED</td>
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</table>

Incl 2 to Inel 7.
1. (U) The primary mission of the gunships is escorting troop carrying helicopters and preparation and suppression in the landing zone during combat assaults. During the TET offensive, the gunships flew more missions than normal in close support of ground troops. Other missions performed included convoy escort, armed reconnaissance and counter mortar defense of their respective base camps.

2. (U) The missions performed by the armed helicopter call for and require immediate reaction and fires which are accurate on the first strike. The very nature of the armed helicopter makes it an ideal weapon for this type employment. The slow flight capability coupled with the amount of ordnance carried make the helicopter an ideal weapon for armed reconnaissance and convoy cover where observation and target destruction is needed.

3. (C) On two separate occasions light fire teams were the deciding factor that prevented the loss of friendly positions.
   
a. On 31 February 1968, a light fire team was scrambled to vicinity coordinates XT 881399 to assist an ARVN outpost that was under attack. The light fire team was able to drive off the enemy. They were credited with eight Viet Cong KIA.

b. On 22 February 1968, a light fire team was scrambled at 1937 hours to vicinity coordinates XT 938157 to assist another ARVN compound. After the light fire team had made several gun runs, the enemy withdrew. The light fire team was credited with repulsing the enemy and killing 25 Viet Cong.

4. (U) Yes, however to what extent is unknown. At Phu Loc, the 11th CAB is not responsible for base defense.

5. (C) An increase in speed coupled with greater maneuverability, longer endurance time and larger payload capacity would greatly increase the effectiveness of armed helicopters.

6. (C) a. The gunships of this unit are continually called upon to give close air support to infantry units that require the strike to be within 25 meters of the friendly positions. In one such case, a friendly unit had surrounded an enemy bunker from which they had been receiving heavy automatic weapons fire. Air strikes and artillery were out of the question due to the close proximity of friendly troops which were only 30 meters away. The bunker was destroyed with rockets killing 16 enemy inside of it. This occurred 9 December 1967, near Dong Tam, RVN while supporting the Vietnamese Marines working with the 9th Infantry Division. Another example was the employment of a light fire team in Saigon in support of troops working in the city. Without exception, the missions that day were strikes against enemy troops who had taken cover in the building in downtown Saigon. Artillery and airstrikes were not employed due to the proximity of innocent civilians and other buildings. These ships were employed against the single structure without indiscriminately destroying other buildings around it;
b. This unit does not have AH-1G helicopters.

7. (c) The employment of light fire teams by the units responsible for base defense undoubtedly thwarted and minimized the attacks on base camps by the Viet Cong. The continual visual reconnaissance performed by gunships prevented the enemy from moving freely through the countryside thus limiting his troop movement and resupply capability. It also prevents him from massing troops in an area due to threat of observation and subsequent destruction. The battle that was fought 1,000 meters from Phu Loi and was so greatly aided by the employment of gunships probably prevented a mass attack on that base camp. The employment of gunships in Saigon prevented the wholesale destruction of civilian property and the deaths of many innocent civilians. The employment of gunships did prevent the loss of two ARVN outposts as described in paragraph 3 above.
11th Combat Aviation Battalion
Aircraft Maintenance Statistical Summary
Qtr Ending 30 April 1968

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68 (U)

CO, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion

12 May, 1968
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

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* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
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