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<td>15 May 1980 per DoDD 5200.10 document marking; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980</td>
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (8 Aug 68) FOR OT RD 682317 26 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group, Period Ending 30 April 1968-(U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

AD392384

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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1 Incl

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  US Army Limited War Laboratory
  US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
  2d Battalion, 138th Artillery
  16th Combat Aviation Group
1. (c) SECTION I, OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

a. (c) GENERAL

(1) The quarter commenced with the 16th Group's two battalions, the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion and the 212th Combat Support Battalion, heavily engaged in providing aviation support to suppress the enemy's Tet Offensive in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The heaviest fighting was concentrated in and near the City of Hue, which was one of the main objectives of the VC and NVA forces. The gunships of the 212th Combat Support Aviation Battalion were extensively instrumental in providing support to the ground forces during this battle.

(2) In addition to the many extra flying hours required, each unit was required to increase its internal security to protect their assets against enemy ground and standoff fire attacks. Additionally, concurrent effort was applied to improving the defensive posture and alert procedures of all units.

(3) A warning order attaching the 308th Combat Aviation Battalion was received on 9 March 1968. The order called for the 308th Battalion to be detached from its parent unit, the 12th Combat Aviation Battalion and be attached to the 16th Combat Aviation Group effective 15 March 1968, with operational control invested to the 10th Airborne Division. Attachment became effective as the units passed North of 14 degrees 30 minutes North latitude. The 308th Combat Aviation Battalion completed its move from the III Corps area to the vicinity of Hue Phu Bai in the I Corps area and was declared fully operational on 12 April 1968.

(4) C Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry was redesignated F Troop, 8th Cavalry on 1 April 1968. With the change of designation, the unit became organic to the Americal Division.
AVGM-SC
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April, RCS CSFR-65 (R1) (U)

(5) Corps Aviation Company (Provisional) was assigned to the 16th CAG on 12 March 1968. It was further attached to the 212th CSAB on 14 March 1968. The unit is stationed at Hue Phu Bai with the mission to provide aviation support for the headquarters element of the Provisional Corps Viet Nam.

(6) Throughout the quarter, the Group Headquarters continued to fill its personnel vacancies and improve its facilities. As equipment became available, the need to depend on subordinate units was decreased. Due to the Group having command less operational control of the assigned battalions, planning of operational activity was minimal. Primary effort continued to be directed towards the development of complementing OPNAV in support of those issued by higher headquarters. Key staff officers and non-commissioned officers continued to visit each of the assigned units to obtain first hand information relative to problems, status and condition of equipment and overall personality of the commands.

(7) Army Aviation Elements (AAE's). The Group's three AAE's continued to provide necessary liaison and timely recommendations concerning the most effective and appropriate utilization of Army aviation to the CC III Marine Amphibious Force, CC First Marine Air Wing and the CO I Corps Advisory Group.

(8) Utilization. With the exception of the time spent in moving the 30th CAB from III CTZ to I CTZ, the Group's units were continually engaged in combat aviation support activities. Other items such as civic action projects and training were integrated into daily activities.

(9) Enemy activities. On 25 Feb and 4 March, Marble Mountain Air Facility, location of the 16th Combat Aviation Group Headquarters, was attacked by fire with 64 122mm rockets. Fire was accurate and damage consisted of the complete destruction of five (5) buildings, to include the 212th Battalion Headquarters, one (1) OV-1 and one (1) UH-1D destroyed, 19 aircraft and 21 vehicles damaged to varying degrees.

b. (U) TRAINING. The 16th CAG, in coordination with First Marine Air Wing, has initiated a program to qualify O-1 pilots as Tactical Air Controllers airborne (TAC). This is accomplished by on the job training with qualified personnel from the 1st and 3rd Marine Division and is accomplished in 3 to 4 weeks. The TAC qualification of O-1 Army Aviation adds versatility and flexibility to the visual reconnaissance program.

c. (U) AVIATION SAFETY. The Group has flown 52,677 hours during the quarter, with an accident rate of 15.2 per 100,000 flying hours. There were
subject: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April, 1968 (K1) (U)

eight (8) major accidents; seven UH-1s and one O-1 type aircraft. Five were caused by poor pilot technique and two by suspected material failure. Total accident experience is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident Type</th>
<th>L/H</th>
<th>F/H</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Accidents</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Accidents</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forced Landings</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Precautionary Landings</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
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d. (U) Casualties. The Group casualties during this quarter were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>160</td>
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e. (U) Organization.

(1) The 16th Combat Aviation Group is organized as follows: See Inclosure 1 for station list:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16th CAG</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th CAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212th CAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>306th CAB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Key Personnel:

(a) Group Headquarters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>SSN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>COL Daniel G. Gust</td>
<td>036330</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCO</td>
<td>LTC Thorvold K. Torgersen</td>
<td>069818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>MAJ James A. Boyd</td>
<td>04021916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>MAJ Herndon Godfrey Jr</td>
<td>01935345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>LTC Charles S. Steen</td>
<td>066513 from 1 Jan 68 to 9 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LTC Ronnie H. Cory</td>
<td>065207 from 13 Mar 68 to present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>MAJ Franklin K. Harris</td>
<td>089499</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Unit Commanders:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>LTC Carroll C. Issacs</th>
<th>SSN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14th CAB</td>
<td>LTC Carroll C. Issacs</td>
<td>0F100091 from 7 Aug 67 to 6 Feb 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LTC Ray M. Carson</td>
<td>OF0106541 from 7 Feb 1968 to present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Operational report of headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April, AVS CSFOR-65 (ii) (U)

212th CSAB  LTC  Wilbur A. Hiddleton 070141

30th CAB  LTC  Onore E. Case OFO108132 from 22 Dec 1967 to 9 Mar 1968
LTC  Charles S. Steen 066513 from 10 Mar 1968 to present

(c) Unit strength as of 30 April 1968:

(1) Military:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Subordinate Unit</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EM</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>84</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>109</td>
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</table>

(2) Civilian:

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<th>3D NAYL CONTRACTOR</th>
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<tr>
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<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth</td>
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(d) Aircraft status of 30 April 1968:

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<tr>
<th>UH-1D</th>
<th>U-21</th>
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<tr>
<td>Auth</td>
<td>2/2</td>
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<tr>
<td>O/H</td>
<td>2/1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) Operational results as of 30 April 1968. See Inclosure 2.

2. (U) SECTION II __ JOBS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. (U) PERSONNEL:

(1) Personnel Qualification.

(a) OBSERVATION. Personnel received for the Group Headquarters were in some cases recent school graduates, and others not proficient in their MOS.

(b) EVALUATION. The problems involved in activating a new headquarters requires trained and experienced personnel to accomplish this mission in minimal time. A trained and experienced cadre was provided, but filler personnel, to a large extent, were non-qualified and inexperienced. This experience gap created unnecessary problems in establishing an efficient functioning headquarters.
AVCH-SC

May 1968

Subject: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group for Period ending 30 April, 1968

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That replacement centers exercise more care in the selection of personnel for newly formed units.

b. OPERATIONS:

(1) Fly Away Program:

(a) OBSERVATION. During the Tet Offensive, OV-1 aircraft were operated from safe haven airfields out of country. In addition, O-1 aircraft stationed at outlying AWI strips were flown to more secure bases.

(b) INSTRUCTION. During the periods of intensified enemy mortar and rocket threats, the removal of aircraft from the threatened area is desirable. Whenever this can be accomplished and still perform the mission, the aircraft should be evacuated. During the Tet Offensive, the Group's OV-1 aircraft operated from safe haven airfields with no deterioration in mission performance.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Evacuation plans commensurate with mission requirements be formulated and executed.

(2) Alert Status:

(a) OBSERVATION. During periods of increased tension, alert conditions often vary numerous times during the night.

(b) EVALUATION. It is a common occurrence for the alert condition to change numerous times during the night. This creates unnecessary movement of troops to and from the bunkers. Consequently, this creates increased fatigue of individual soldiers, increased confusion and an increased vulnerability to hostile attack. Bunkers at fixed locations should be constructed so that off duty personnel will have space in which to rest.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. When troops are sent to bunkers where conditions permit sleeping, they should remain there for the remainder of the night.

c. (U) Training:

(1) Tactical Air Controller Airborne (TAC-A)

(a) OBSERVATION. The 16th C.G., in coordination with the First Marine Air Wing, has developed a program to qualify Army O-1 aviators as Tactical Air Controllers Airborne, or TAC-A's, as they are referred to. Thus far, there are 24 who are qualified on orders to direct marine tactical air strikes. During the reporting period, 107 strikes were conducted by Army TAC-A's.

(b) EVALUATION. Army O-1 aviators trained as TAC-A's add to
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AVCH-SC
15 May 1968
SUBJ: CT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group
for Period Ending 30 April, RCS CO:FOR-65 (HI) (U)

the depth, versatility and flexibility of the visual reconnaissance program. The program also assists the Marines in filling their shortage of TACA's, and provides responsive and timely heavy firepower to be applied against targets of opportunity.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all O-1 aviators assigned to the Visual Reconnaissance Program operating in the I Corps Tactical Zone be qualified as TACA's.

d. (U) INTELLIGENCE. None.
e. (U) LOGISTICS.

(1) Unit Moves.

(a) OBSERVATION. There was a lack of coordination and information involved in the movement of the 306th CAB.

(b) EVALUATION. The lack of sufficient planning time, knowledge of port facilities, adequate material handling equipment caused unnecessary delays in the movement and operational status of this battalion. Additionally, essential items of equipment were temporarily misplaced or lost when off loaded at other than the destination.

(c) RECOMMENDATION.

1 That units prepare loading plans for PCS moves to include air, land and sea movement.

2 That these plans be approved by the unit's higher headquarters.

f. (U) ORGANIZATIONAL. None.
g. (C) OTHER.

(1) Radio Relay.

(a) OBSERVATION. The U-1A aircraft retrofitted with AN/ARC-121 Repeater Net Radio has experienced excessive loss in performance.

(b) EVALUATION. The installation of the AN/ARC-121 Repeater Net Radio in the U-1A, caused the aircraft's performance to become critical at altitude. The aircraft took excessive time to climb, causing the engine
to overheat, decreasing the obtainable airspeed while increasing the stall speed. This resulted in an aircraft that was a near hazard to fly. The suspected cause was the parasite drag of the antennas installed on the wings. A letter was initiated by the Platoon Commander, 1st Platoon, 16th Aviation Company describing, in detail, the problems involved.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the AN/ARC-121 antenna installation on the U-1A, be reevaluated in view of the decreased performance experienced with the current installation.

(2) Publications.

(a) OBSERVATION. Necessary Army and intermediate headquarters publications are very slow in reaching newly arrived units to RVN. For those units formed within RVN, this also applies plus there is excessive delay in acquiring DA publications.

(b) OBSERVATION. The lack of proper publications hampers the accomplishment of the mission for both newly assigned or formed units. Units receive some publications upon arrival or when formed, but have to rely on requisitions, which they must submit for the majority of the necessary publications. This is both time consuming and difficult because of the lack of proper references from which to order.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. When new units are to be formed or to arrive in RVN, that appropriate publication packets be established.

3. (U) SECTION III. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SURVEY INFORMATION. None.

3 Inc1
1. 16th C.G. Station List
2. 16th C.G. Operation Results
3. Lessons Learned During
   VC/NA TET Offensive

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CG 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: 33 2 cys
CG 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVDA-MH 3 cys
FILE 15 cys

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JNA-C (L3 May 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group
Period ending 30 April 1968, RG 620-15 (UL)

Dr. HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, JCO 96384 JUN 27 1968

TO: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVGEO-DST, JCO 96375
Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GFCOT, JCO 96358

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) This Headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 2a(1), page 4. This problem is not peculiar to both CAG. All 1st Aviation Brigade units have experienced this problem to some degree. The problem, however, has been particularly evident in the 1st Aviation Brigade units which do not have an established base of experienced personnel to compensate for and assist in training the unqualified or inexperienced members. In many cases, improper classification and re-classification actions have resulted in personnel being awarded C5's for which they are not qualified. Additionally, the recent rapid growth of the Army has resulted in a large influx of inexperienced personnel. The need for fully qualified experienced personnel in hard skill C5's is generally recognized, particularly in units of the Brigade, since Brigade unit C5's send that the airfields contain a preponderance of hard skill C5's. More selective screening of personnel qualifications at training and replacement centers prior to awarding C5's would be a definite assist in reducing the number of unqualified personnel. Moreover, it behooves unit commanders to be more selective in awarding C5's to OJT personnel in their units and to devote additional attention to C5 for currently assigned unqualified personnel.

b. Paragraph 2b(1), page 7. The 1st Aviation Brigade concurs that the flyway program is a suitable means of passive defense in some cases and will direct subordinate units to make contingency plans for evacuation of aircraft. It must be realized, however, that these plans should be judiciously implemented since designated safe haven airfields may themselves become lucrative targets. Commanders must carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages in each particular situation before implementing such plans. It may frequently be more desirable to remain at home station even during an attack when adequate revetments and personal bunkers are available rather than to move to a "safe haven" where these facilities are not adequate for transients.

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c. Paragraph 2c(1), page 6, 1st Aviation Brigade concurs with the recommendation. It is further recommended that C-1 aviators in all four C-1's be knowledgeable in procedures for directing tactical air strikes. Army aviators have effectively directed air strikes in all C-1's when Air Force FAC's were not immediately available to control strikes. In April 1968, CIB-6-C directed that Army C-1 pilots become familiar with these procedures and be allowed to direct the T.C. when FAC's were not reasonably available to perform the functions. Additionally, it was directed that Air Force FAC's become familiar with procedures for directing artillery fires when Army C-1's were not reasonably available to perform that function.

d. Paragraph 2e(1), page 6, 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters is requiring all units to prepare movement plans for movement by air or surface and a combination of both.

e. Paragraph 2g(1), page 6, "Blade" or "Shark's Fin" type antennas have been procured from Collins Radio Inc and arrived in RVN during the first week of June 1968. One radio relay (ARC-121) U-14 will be retrofitted with these antennas and emission tests and flight tests will be performed during June. The drag problem will be solved. There is a high probability that the emission test will be successful with a minimum of directional effect due to the omnidirectional characteristics of this antenna.

f. Paragraph 2k(2), page 7, Acquisition of publications for newly arriving units is a function of the host unit. Activation of new units in-country will require designation of a unit to requisition necessary publications.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/John D. Mixsell, Jr.
CPT, AG
Assistant Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL
AVHGC-DST (15 May 68) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group  
for Period Ending 30 April, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)  

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375  
28 Jun 1968  
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558  

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 16th  
Combat Aviation Group.  

2. Concur with report as submitted.  

FOR THE COMMANDER:  

C. S. NAKATSUKASA  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General  

Cy furn:  
HQ 1st Avn Bde  
HQ 16th Cbt Avn Gp
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 16th Cbt Avn Gp for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>APO Code</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chu Lai</td>
<td>14th CAB</td>
<td>APO 96374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21st RAC (212th CSAB)</td>
<td>APO 96374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>71st AHC</td>
<td>APO 96374</td>
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<td></td>
<td>176th AHC</td>
<td>APO 96374</td>
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<td></td>
<td>178th ASHC</td>
<td>APO 96374</td>
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<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>16th CAB</td>
<td>APO 96337</td>
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<td>282nd AHC</td>
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<td>Dau Pho</td>
<td>174th AHC</td>
<td>APO 96374</td>
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<td>220th SAC (212th CSAB)</td>
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<td>200th ASHC</td>
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Incl 1
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<tr>
<th>Subordinate Unit</th>
<th>Sorties Flown</th>
<th>Troops Lifted</th>
<th>Cargo Lifted (Tons)</th>
<th>Enemy KIA</th>
<th>Structures Dam Dest</th>
<th>Sampans Dam Dest</th>
<th>Acft Cnfnmd Loss</th>
<th>Aircraft Damaged*</th>
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<td>0 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Aircraft Damaged: 1 UH-1D, 1 U-21
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned During VC/NVA TET Offensive

TO: Commanding General
1st Aviation Brigade
ATTN: AVBA-C
APO 96348

LESSONS LEARNED – VC/NVA TET OFFENSIVE

SECTION I – Planning and Preparation Which Affected the Command’s Readiness Posture upon Initiation of the TET Offensive.

a. Item: Physical Security Plans

b. Discussion: This command was not at any increased condition of readiness upon the start of enemy activities. The group was engaged in routine operational and administrative functions. The only significant enemy activity prior to 29 January in any area occupied by elements of this group was at Chu Lai on 27 January when an enemy mortar attack was conducted at 2300 hours on the cantonment area of Headquarters, 14th CAB. There were no casualties and no significant damage was reported. Each unit of the group is tenant at a U.S. installation except for one 0-1 platoon located at Quang Ngai and one 0-1 platoon located at Hue Citadel. All units had standing operation procedures to be taken in event of alert. All units had defensive plans integrated into area defense plans. Most areas had been exposed to enemy mortar and rocket attacks in the past so when the TET offensive commenced the units had sound, workable plans and procedures to guide their actions. It should be noted; however, that there was no indication on the evening of 29 January that an increased readiness posture was necessary. When the first rounds landed that evening the alert conditions went from normal to attack in progress. Although the attack was sudden, personnel responded in a calm manner and within minutes after the mortar attack, the interior perimeter was manned. Exterior perimeters are always manned so defense against ground attack is always present.
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned During VC/NVA TET Offensive

14 February 1968

Lesson Learned: Responsiveness to quick changing conditions of alert status is an essential training goal, but there is no substitute for prior warning of suspected enemy activity. Although few casualties were sustained during the surprise mortar and rocket attacks on installations, there could have been many if the attacks had been directed toward the cantonment areas. Fixed installations are dependent upon notification from intelligence agencies so that conditions of increased readiness can be initiated.

Recommendation: That intelligence collection agencies provide timely information to units advising them of probable or possible enemy activity in the area so that units can increase their readiness posture as required by the enemy situation.

SECTION II - Conduct of Operations During the TET Offensive.

1. (U) Personnel.

a. Item: Replacements

Discussion: During the period there was a noticeable drop in the flow of personnel in the replacement stream because of the shortage of air transportation from the replacement center. Replacements began to arrive again after the four day period.

Lesson Learned: The temporary loss of replacement personnel caused no hardship to the command because of the short duration involved.

Recommendation: None

b. Item: Morale

Discussion: It was expected that the requirement to man perimeters during alerts at night coupled with the normal daily work requirements during the day would reduce efficiency of the units. No noticeable degradation of capability was noted during the period or during the following week while constant vigil was continued. It was noted that the general esprit was improved during the period of tension and morale seemed to be higher than ever.

Lesson Learned: The threat of immediate danger provided a common bond among the troops. Headquarters personnel were eager to
accept the challenge of ground combat when reports indicated a ground attack was imminent.

Recommendation: None

2. (c) Operations:

a. Item: Spot Reports

Discussion: Reporting damage assessments after enemy attacks presented a problem. The information to be reported was classified and secure teletype circuits were either overloaded or inoperative. A secure HF capability to brigade does not operate. Use of the telephone proved to be the fastest method of reporting; therefore, a special aircraft damage report was devised using lines and columns to report information:

Lesson Learned: Common user secure teletype is not responsive during periods of increased operational activity. Telephone and radio is the fastest means of reporting information of an urgent nature.

Recommendation: That line item type telephonic reports be included in the brigade SOP to expedite reporting procedures during periods when area wide secure communication systems are over committed.

b. Item: Physical Security

Discussion: During the numerous mortar and rocket attacks on installations few casualties were sustained. The existence of personnel shelters within cantonment areas contributed to this result. Although shelters were considered adequate prior to attacks, units improved their shelters the day after the first attack and continued to do so throughout the period of increased readiness.

Lesson Learned: Although adequate protective shelters were constructed in advance of the attack, the importance of sound shelters was dramatically emphasized during the attack. After an attack it is always evident that improvements can be made to existing facilities.

c. Item: Fly away Plans

Discussion: During the period when enemy mortar and rocket attacks were a constant threat, OV-1 aircraft were flown out of country
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned During VC/IVN TET Offensive

to safe havens. No degradation of surveillance mission resulted and security of these expensive aircraft was assured.

Lesson Learned: A fly away plan for all types of aircraft is not always possible; however, OV-1 is capable of being flown out of country and should be evacuated during periods of increased enemy threats.

Recommendation: That OV-1 aircraft continue to be flown to safe havens during periods of increased enemy activity.

d. Item: Frequent Changes to Alert Status

Discussion: It is noted that area defense coordinators were frequently changing the alert status in response to the enemy situation. At times units would go from a normal condition to full alert three or four times during the night. Personnel were moving from barracks to bunkers throughout the night and were losing more sleep than was necessary.

Lesson Learned: During the periods of heightened tension it is better to man bunkers at dark and remain on positions throughout the night than to have personnel moving in and out of shelters. Personnel are able to sleep more and are protected from surprise attack.

Recommendation: That unit commanders maintain a readiness posture which is always equal to or higher than that established by the area defense coordinator, but that frequent changes in alert status be discouraged.

e. Item: Counter Mortar Operations

Discussion: In all cases of mortar attacks on group airfields, emergency standby gun teams were launched for counter mortar operations. When used in conjunction with base defense plans these light fire teams provide a constant retaliatory threat to enemy mortar crews.

Lesson Learned: Although the effort expended in maintaining emergency standby gun teams is considerable, these aircraft provide a valuable means for active defense of installations.

Recommendations: That continued use of standby light fire teams be emphasized as an integral part of all base defense activities.
3. Logistics

Item: Aircraft Revetments

Discussion: Although an extensive revetment building program had been completed, extensive damage to parked aircraft was sustained during mortar and rocket attacks. Almost all damage to helicopters was to rotor blades and windshields which is, of course, to be expected.

Lessons Learned: Aircraft revetments will minimize the effects of shell fragments to the major portion of parked helicopters; however, rotor systems and windshields remain vulnerable.

Recommendation: That continued emphasis be placed on construction of aircraft revetments as necessary protective requirement for all parked aircraft.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J.A. BOYD
Maj, AGC
Adjutant
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 16th Combat Aviation Group (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68

CO, 16th Combat Aviation Group
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* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

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