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THRU: Channels

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development

Section I:

1. Operations

A General: Following the completion of a major deployment of the 1 ACD from BINH DINH Province and Southern I Corps Tactical Zone in late January, this reporting period covers the initiation of high intensity combat operations in QUANG TRI and THUA T'IN Provinces. It encompasses three highly successful and tactically significant operations: (1) The TET Offensive, which saw the 1 ACD preventing the seizure of QUANG TRI and assisting in the expulsion of the NVA from their foothold in Hue City (Operation Jeb Stuart 1); (2) Operation PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A which relieved the NVA pressure on the 26th Marine Regiment at KHE SANH; and (3) the entirely air-supported Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216, which disrupted NVA activities by means of a reconnaissance in force in the A SHAU Valley. In each of these operations, the applied concepts, tactics, and doctrine of the 1 ACD proved successful. 

Cordon and search in conjunction with "Swooper" operations, initiated and refined or the BONG SON Plain, were again successful in disrupting the enemy infrastructure in NVAZ; and assisted in denying the enemy refuge among the populace. In Operation Pegasus, entire battalions were airlifted over enemy strong points and assaulted on to critical terrain as the enemy's route of withdrawal. This bold move with its corresponding use of firepower had a profound effect on the enemy's will to stand and fight. In many cases he left his fortified delaying position, abandoning large amounts of supplies and equipment, and fled in small groups to the safety of Laos or to rugged uncontested terrain.

At the opposite end of the spectrum of mobility was the ground attack to relieve Hue. Using tactics more akin to breaching the SIEGFRIED LINE than to bold, dashing Cavalry charges, elements of the division attacked a strong, heavily bunkered enemy in weather that oft times precluded effective air and artillery support. The A SHAU Valley Operation was air-mobility in its finest hour. A dashing assault into an enemy bastion long denied to US Forces and against modern anti-aircraft defenses enabled the 1 ACD, entirely supported by air, to roam the valley at will for a period of almost 30 days.

During these operations, the 1 ACD demonstrated a considerable flexibility of a particular mission, the task organization of the 1 ACD expanded...
and contracted at various times during the reporting period. At its peak, during Operation PEGASUS (The relief of Khe Sanh Combat Base), the Division controlled the operations of 20 infantry battalions plus their normal artillery, air and other supporting elements. This was a World War II Corps sized force.

During the reporting period, Operation JEB STUART was officially terminated at 2400 hours 31 March 1968. The final results were:

1. Friendly: 291 KIA, 1735 WIA, 24 MIA, 26 AC's lost.
2. Enemy: 3268 KIA, 119 PW's, 585 11 C's, 148 CSWC, 1314 mines/HG, 76,837 SA ammo, 2906 lg cal rds, 89 tons rice.

Operation PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A began at 0001 hours 1 April 1968 and terminated at 0900 hours 15 April 1968. The final results were:

2. Enemy: 1044 KIA, 9 PW's, 539 11 C's, 12,086 lg cal rds, 9527 mines HG's, 261,760 SA ammo, 3,075 tons rice.

Operation DELAWARE commenced on 19 April with airdropped elements of the 3d Bde into the Northern A Shau Valley. The operation continues into the next reporting period.

B. 1st Brigade: At the beginning of the reporting period, the Brigade was oriented towards the Ba Long Valley and enemy Base Area 101. However, with the NVA threatening QUANG TRI CITY, the brigade had to rapidly redirect its effort in that direction. By the end of the first week in February, the Brigade had redeployed forces to Quang Tri, defeated the enemy force battling in the outskirts of the city, seized the initiative in the area from the enemy, and commenced pursuit operations. (see TAB A: The Battle of Quang Tri). After the Battle of Quang Tri, the brigade pursued the enemy throughout the coastal plains, Ba Long Valley, Base Area 101 and the area north of the TACH HAN River. Special emphasis was placed on joint operations with local ARVN forces. Operations were cordon and search, swooper, and hunter-killer. Psychological warfare and civil affairs teams were habitually used to support operations in populated areas. During daylight hours, search and clear operations were conducted throughout the AO to locate the enemy and capture or destroy him. At night, the Brigade used hunter-killer teams and night ambushes to seek out the enemy and to interdict his movement on trails and waterways.

On 5 April, two battalions air assaulted (one from vic Quang Tri, and one from LZ StuT to which it had been airlifted during the assault of the first battalion) into the PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A AO. The Brigade CP was established southwest of Khe Sanh at LZ Snapper and the battalions conducted immediate and aggressive combat operations against moderate enemy resistance. One battalion remained in the vicinity of Quang Tri and conducted offensive operations in the vicinity of the city in order to secure 1 ACD helicopter assets placed at LZ Sharon. On 14 April, the Brigade CP and two battalions began their withdrawal from the Khe Sanh area and by 15 April, the entire Brigade was operational in the vicinity of Quang Tri City. For the next nine days, the Brigade conducted operations in the vicinity of Quang Tri and prepared for future operations. On 24 April, the Brigade began a reconnaissance in force in the A Shau Valley with one battalion conducting an air assault into the A Shau Valley and establishing a battalion fire base at LZ Cecile, west of A Luoi. On 25 April, a second battalion of the Brigade air assaulted into A Luoi where LZ STALLION was established. The third battalion and the brigade CP were then airlifted into LZ STALLION.
During the remainder of the reporting period, the Brigade conducted reconnaissance in force operations uncovering many enemy logistical complexes.

C. 2d Brigade: Until 219 February 1968, the Brigade conducted operations in the PERWING II AO, OPCON to TFU. (See Inc B, Combat Operations After Action Report—Operation PERWING II ). On 1 March, the Brigade established a CP at LZ Jane and initiated operations with three battalions in the Jeb Stuart AO. This marked the first time the 1 ACR controlled all its organic units since July 1967. Throughout the remainder of Operation Jeb Stuart I, the Brigade conducted operations in Base Area 101, on the coastal plain vicinity of "The Street Without Joy", and along Sky King Avenue, leading from Hai Lang to the Gulf of Tonkin. Of principal concern was the security of Wunder Beach (an over-the-beach logistical facility), Sky King Avenue and OL-1 in sector. Operations on the plains were characterized by cordon and search and sweep operations in order to deny the enemy refuge in populated areas. Several combined operations with local ARVN forces assisted in initiating the destruction of the local VC infrastructure. Search and clear operations penetrated Base Area 101, and light resistance was met. On 3 April the Brigade conducted two battalion air assaults and one battalion airlift into an area Southeast of Khe Sanh. On 14 April the Brigade with two battalions assumed the responsibility for the security of Khe Sanh and on 150000 April 1968 was released OPCON 1 ACR and placed OPCON 3d Marine Division. One battalion had airlifted to Camp Evans on 12 April. For the remainder of the reporting period, the Brigade remained OPCON to the 3d Marine Division.

D. 3d Brigade: During the first month of the reporting period, the Brigade participated in the battle of Hue City. Many significant problems were encountered during the battle: poor weather, which hampered airborne operations and close air support, a shortage of supplies, all coupled with the appearance of a determined professional enemy. Although plagued by low ceilings, poor visibility, and fierce enemy resistance, the Brigade drove the determined NVA forces from their well prepared/fortified defensive positions and battled its way to the walls of the former imperial capital. (See TAB C: The Battle of Hue). With the conclusion of the Battle of Hue, the emphasis of combat operations shifted to the coastal plains Northeast of Camp Evans and Base Area 114 Southwest of Camp Evans. Offensive operations on the coastal plains were in pursuit of a badly beaten enemy and in search of enemy caches and mortar/rocket locations. During this period, the Brigade launched the first US ground offensive into Base Area 114, in months. Against only light resistance, the Brigade conducted operations to the heart of the area; however, due to the initiation of Operation Pegasus/Lam Son 2075, it was not able to fully exploit the penetration. On 1 April the Brigade initiated operations in the Pegasus/Lam Son 2075 area of operations by a series of air assaults/airlifts to the east of Khe Sanh Combat Base. The Brigade staged vicinity of Quang Tri City with one battalion assaulting from that area while the other two were deployed forward to LZ 37006 from where they were air assaulted/landed into the AO. Against moderate resistance, the Brigade conducted operations destroying NVA forces West of Khe Sanh and opening Highway 9 to Khe Sanh. On 8 April, ground elements of the Brigade reached Khe Sanh Combat Base and assumed the security mission thereof. On 14 April the Brigade was airlifted from Khe Sanh to Camp Evans where it commenced preparations for future operations in the A Shau Valley. On 19 April the Brigade initiated operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 with two battalions air assaulting into the northern portion of the A Shau Valley.
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initial entry was characterized by determined, accurate and multi-caliber anti-aircraft fire coupled with extremely marginal flying weather. Only by 23 April was the Brigade closed into the valley compared with the 4 plus hours required to close in Operation PEGASUS. For the remainder of the reporting period the Brigade conducted reconnaissance in force operations in the northern portion of the A Shau Valley and uncovered major NVA logistical and combat support complexes. Weather during PEGASUS precluded high intensity airmobile operations prior to 1200 hours whereas in DELAWARE operations were normally precluded after 3200 hours.

E. 1st Brigade, 101 Abn: During the period 1 thru 18 March, the Brigade conducted combat operations to the Southwest of Hue along Highway 547. As the Brigade established fire bases from East to West in the vicinity of Highway 547, aggressive operations were conducted to destroy enemy forces in sector. Against moderate enemy resistance, the Brigade began to successfully neutralize enemy forces. Saturation patrols and night ambushes were extremely successful. On 18 March the Brigade was returned OPCON to the 101st Abn Division.

F. 2d Brigade, 101 Abn: During the period 1 February to 10 March, the Brigade conducted operations on the coastal plain vicinity of "The Street Without Joy" and along Sky King Avenue. Of principal concern was the security of the developing over-the-beach logistical base at Wunder Beach, and the Sky King Avenue/QL-1 land LOC. Cordon and search operations in conjunction with the National Police Field Forces again proved successful as this brigade employed this 1 ACD technique. Continuous daylight retrofits and night ambushes were required along QL-1 to reduce mining incidents. On 2 March the Brigade assumed the responsibility for the southern portion of the Jeb Stuart AO and moved from the vicinity of LZ Jane to the area between Hue and the An Loc bridge to facilitate return to its parent division. In the new Brigade AO, operations were directed toward the establishment of fire bases and the conduct of search and clear operations in the populated areas north of Hue. On 10 March the Brigade returned OPCON to the 101st Abn Division.

G. 1st Marine Regiment: During the period 29 March to 15 April, the Regiment conducted operations in the Pegasus/Lam Son 207A area of operations under the operational control of the 1 ACD. On 1 April the Regiment with two battalions launched an attack along the highground to the West from Ca Lu along Highway 9. One battalion operated in an AO vicinity of LZ RD. The Regimental mission was to attack in zone destroying or capturing enemy forces and securing and assisting engineers in the reopening of Highway 9 in sector. To accomplish the mission the Regiment conducted a number of limited objective attacks against light enemy resistance. Operations were initially concentrated along Highway 9; however, as the situation developed the Regiment conducted operations several thousand meters to the North and South of Highway 9 using modified airmobile techniques. Only minimum security forces were required to protect the road and engineer work parties on QL-9. On 15 April the Regiment returned OPCON to the 3d Marine Division.

H. 26th Marine Regiment: During the period 31 March to 15 April, the Regiment, freed from its static positions in and near Khe Sanh by the 1 ACD, began operations under the operational control of the 1 ACD. As the 1 ACD advanced toward Khe Sanh by leaps and bounds, enemy activity around the besieged combat base ceased. Indirect fire attacks diminished and virtually disappeared and enemy ground troops fled from the battlefield. Thus, the Marines were able to leave their fortified positions and attack the hills to
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the North, West and South, held previously by the enemy. Only moderate resistance was encountered and the Regiment was returned OPCON to the 3d Marine Division 15 April.

I. III ARVN ABN TASK FORCE: On 7 April, in cooperation and coordination with the 1 ACD, the III ARVN ABN TF initiated joint operations in the Pegasus/Lam Son 207A area of operations. To the southwest of Khe Sanh, the TF conducted a battalion size air assault and two battalion size airlifts to LZ Snake (XD#8378). During the report period, the TF conducted a series of limited objective attacks against moderate resistance west to the Laos border. On 15 April the TF terminated operations in the Pegasus/Lam Son 207A area of operations.

II. 3d ARVN Regiment: On 29 and 30 April two battalions of the Regiment airlifted to LZ Lucy vic Ta Bat in the central A Shau Valley. The 2d Bn 1st ARVN Regiment, attached, was to follow on 1 May. Here they initiated a joint reconnaissance in force operation in cooperation and coordination with the 1 ACD. The operation continues into the next reporting period.

K. 196th Light Infantry Brigade: On 20 April the Brigade arrived at Camp Evans and was placed OPCON to the 1 ACD. Given the mission to secure Camp Evans and conduct combat operations in the vicinity, the Brigade utilized 1 ACD aviation assets to accomplish the required tasks. Areas of principal concern were the security of QL-1 in sector, and the rocket belt vicinity of LZ Jack. Extensive operations were conducted against sporadic light resistance to the southwest of Camp Evans while numerous patrols, night ambushes, and reinforced bridge security positions discouraged enemy attempts to interdict QL-1 in sector.

L. 1-9 Cavalry: During the report period, the Squadron continued to conduct reconnaissance of the Division area of operations and to provide support to the Brigades on a mission basis. Initially, C Troop was assigned the Northern portion of the AO and B Troop was assigned the Southern portion. As a rule, C Troop supported the 1st Bde and 2d Bde 101 Abn, while B Troop supported the 3d Bde. D Troop provided convoy security on QL-1 between Quang Tri and Camp Evans. On 17 Feb A Troop departed the Peshine II AO and joined the Squadron in the Jeb Stuart I AO. This marked the first time the Squadron had operated with all organic resources since 5 April 1967. During the remainder of the report period, the concept of operations assumed the familiar role of one troop in General Support of each brigade. The Squadron continued to conduct intensive first and last light reconnaissance around Camp Evans, LZ Sharon, LZ Jung and the Hunter Beach Complex. Except for special operations, emphasis of reconnaissance was directed in base areas 101 and 114, Ba Long Valley, and on the Coastal Plains. In the month of April, the first half of the month saw the Squadron conducting extensive operations around the Khe Sanh Combat Base in Operation Pegasus/Lam Son 207A. Due to a total lack of tactical intelligence concerning the area in and around Khe Sanh, the 1-9 Cav commenced reconnaissance operations on 26 March vic of LZ STUB and ultimately extending west of Khe Sanh to acquire hard intelligence and to destroy enemy forces, anti-aircraft positions, and resources with artillery, tactical air, and B-52 air strikes. The combination of 1-9 Cav recon resources working with massive fire support assets provided a classic example of fire and maneuver once the 1 ACD maneuver battalions were integrated into the operation on 1 April. When the operation came to a close on 15 April, the Squadron initiated extensive reconnaissance in the A Shau Valley in Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 in the same manner as in Operation Pegasus.
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M. Combat Support Elements:

(1) Division Artillery submitted by separate report.

(2) 11th Aviation Group: Headquarters, 11th Aviation Group operated from Camp Evans until 30 March 1968, and then displaced to LZ Stud in support of Operation Pegasus. On 3 April the CP returned from LZ Stud to Camp Evans. Significant operations in which the 11th Aviation Group participated were:

(A) JEB STUART I (1 February-31 March):

(1) During February, priority of aviation support went to the 3d Brigade during the Battle of Hue. 3d Brigade elements were involved in heavy contact throughout the month. Aviation support was severely hampered by extremely adverse weather. This was further aggravated by hostile fire, mortar/rocket attacks and a low availability of mission ready aircraft. Lightning Bug missions were conducted nightly along Highway 1-1 to reduce mining incidents and NVA movement along the road.

(2) As the weather improved and the Battle of Hue ended in the first part of March, the number of combat assaults increased throughout the AO. When the 2d Brigade was deployed into the Pershing AO, four RRFs were required on a daily basis (one to each divisional brigades and one to the 2d Bde, 101st Airborne Division). Aviation assets were deployed in depth throughout the AO to disperse resources and to ensure maximum responsiveness for the supported units. Numerous emergency resupply missions were required. One resupply conducted for the 1st ARVN Division in the vicinity of Quang Tri (YD34629) resulted in 28 NVA KIA by 729th Gunships.

On several occasions during the month, the stand-by flare ship was requested by units in contact. Weather conditions precluded VFR flight: consequently, the aircraft was given a GCA vector to the site of the engagement. After contact was established with the ground commander, flares were released and then adjusted by the ground unit. On 22 March the 29th ARVN executed a CA with simultaneous touch downs of three 5+2 flights southeast of Quang Tri around an enemy complex. Throughout March, planning was in progress for Operation Pegasus. The quartering party closed at LZ Stud (XD 01183) on 24 March and the tactical CP closed on 30 March.

(B) PEGASUS (1-15 April):

(1) Pre-Assault: On 24 March the quartering party moved to LZ Stud and began work on command and communications bunkers. Reconnaissance of the area and proposed LZ sites were conducted by commanders and flight leaders. The assault elements of the 3d Brigade were pre-positioned at LZ Pedro. On 30 March the 11th Aviation Group moved to LZ Stud and operation control was transferred from Camp Evans on 31 March.

(2) Initial Assault: D Day commenced on 1 April with the 3d Brigade air assaulting and airlifting into the Pegasus AO, while the 1st Marine Regiment attacked with 2 battalions west from Da Lu along Highway 9. One battalion of the 3d Brigade air assaulted and a second battalion airlifted to LZ MIKE. The third battalion of the Brigade air assaulted into LZ GATES (XD 932/32). On 2 April (D+1) the battalion which was previously airlifted to LZ MIKE assaulted at (XD 894/03) and established LZ THER. The 2d Brigade, on 3 April, (D+2) air assaulted one battalion and airlifted one battalion into LZ WHARTON (XD 878/63) while the third battalion of the Brigade air assaulted into LZ THER (XD 893/48). On 5 April (D+4), the 1st Brigade air assaulted one battalion and airlifted a second battalion into LZ SNAPPER (XD 844/37). The ARVN Airborne Task Force assaulted/airlifted into LZ SNAKE (XD 810/68) on 7 April (D+6).
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(3) Extraction: The 1st and 3d Brigades of the 1ACD and the ARVN Airborne Brigade began withdrawing from the Pegasus AO on 11 April. This extraction was conducted by a combination of Air Force Aircraft using the Khe Sanh and LZ Stud airstrips, organic aircraft, and vehicle convoy. The main command element of the 11th Aviation Group displaced to Camp Evans on 14 April. The rear operations element ceased operations at LZ Stud on 15 April.

(4) Communications: During preliminary planning for this operation it was readily apparent that serious communications problems would be encountered. LZ Stud was sited in a bowl shaped mountainous area located 54 kilometers from Camp Evans. A relay site was established on Hill 440, just west of Stud; however, reliability problems persisted. Equipment shortcomings reduced the effectiveness of the AM voice/RTT net. In all probability this system would have provided effective and reliable communications if the AM equipment had been operating.

(C) JEB STUART II (16-18 April): Routine support was provided to the Division during this period. In addition, support was provided to the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, OPCON to the 1 ACD. This period was utilized to improve aircraft availability and plan for Operation Delaware.

(3) 13th Signal Battalion: During the reporting period, the 13th Signal Battalion provided communications to the Division Task Organization for:

(a) Operation Pershing II: 1-29 Feb (BIGH DIM Province)
(b) Operation JEB Stuart I: 1 Feb-30 Mar
(c) Operation Pegasus/Lam Son 207A: 31 Mar-15 Apr
(d) Operation JEB Stuart II: 16-18 Apr
(e) Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216

During the month of February, the Battalion continued to provide communications support for the 1 ACD in operations Pershing II and JEB Stuart I. Direct communications were maintained with the 21 Brigade at LZ Uplift and the 1st Provisional Battalion at Camp Radcliff using AM radio. Motor messenger service was also provided to the Div AG at Camp Radcliff. An Air Signal Courier made daily runs between Khe and Phu Bai via C-7A Aircraft. At the Division CP (Camp Evans), the following services were provided:

1) FM Radio (Secure and non-secure)
2) AM Radio (Voice and secure teletype)
3) Telephone switching system
4) Communication Center (Secure teletype)
5) Motor messenger service

Although communications commitments continued throughout the month, there were no serious difficulties encountered.

During the month of March, plans were finalized for Operation Pegasus/Lam Son 207A. A Sub-area signal center was deployed to Camp Evans to provide telephone service at that location. The deployment of Signal equipment for Operation Pegasus presented major difficulties. The location of the Division CP at LZ Stud, and surrounding terrain required the use of a relay site, Hill 440, to the west. The relay site was secured by ground forces on 26 March, but enemy contact precluded night operation until 29 March. Additionally the site required extensive earth work prior to emplacement of signal equipment. Provisional Corps signal equipment was moved to the hill by Division aviation assets. After installing Corps Tropo and VHF systems on the hill, extreme difficulty was experienced in establishing the Corps circuits. Major items of equipment failed (TRC-97 transmitter and
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generators) and inexperienced operators on the Corps VHF systems could
not establish the required circuits. At the request of the Division Sig-
nal Officer, more experienced Corps personnel were flown in to get the
circuits established. This effort on Corps systems took supervisory effort
away from the divisional systems. In spite of these difficulties, the
Division CP had switchboard service, radio circuits and VHF systems to the
Brigades/Regiments prior to the Division CP displacement from Camp Evans.
Even after displacement, Corps teletype circuits and TOC hot lines had not
been established. Work continued on these circuits and satisfactory service
was received four days after the Division CP had displaced.

Operation Delaware began with the establishment of an FM radio and a
VHF relay site on "Signal Mountain" (Hill 1487). Long Range Patrol, engineer
ers and signal personnel were inserted on the hill top to secure a communi-
cations radio relay site for the operation. Non-flyable weather delayed
operations for two days. Once the site was secured and cleared, relay
communications for the Division TOC CP were installed. Difficulties were
encountered in airlifting communications equipment to the relay site
throughout the period due to non-flyable weather. A qualified pathfinder
was assigned to control air traffic on the third day of operations. The
relay site was also used as a weather station and artillery fire base.
Communications personnel were employed throughout the period in assisting in-
fantry units in defense of the area.

Six automatic FM radio-retransmissions sets and two VHF radio relay
sets were installed on the site to maintain FM radio and telephone commu-
ications between units operating in the A Shau Valley and LZ Evans.

On 29 April 1968, a Division TOC CP was established at LZ Stallion.
No serious difficulties were encountered during this move. The following
communications were installed:

(1) FM radio (secure and non-secure) to all major sub-
ordinate commands.

(2) AM radio (voice and secure teletype) to all major
subordinate commands.

(3) VHF radio telephone communications to the two com-
mitted Brigades, 3d ARVN Regt and LZ Evans.

(4) Switchboard and telephone service at LZ Stallion.

(4) 8th Engineer Battalion: During the reporting period the tacti-
cal operations in the Jeb Stuart AO. In the latter stages of this quarter,
Operations Pegasus (1-15 April 1968) and Delaware (19 April to the present)
increased the tactical scope, causing a similar increase in engineer support.
Initially, all available resources were committed in support of OC-1, de-
vloping new landing zones and fire bases, and preparing installations in the
new AO. Elements that had remained in the Pershing AO to support the
2d Brigade returned to the battalion in late February. Extensive work
was done on major LZ's to develop helicopter lager, refuel, and rearm fac-
ilities without detracting from the direct support provided to the maneuver
battalions engaged in tactical operations. Construction was initiated on
three airstrips during the reporting period. At Camp Evans, a 150x3100'
strip was completed by mid April for C-130 aircraft, with work still in
progress on a parking apron. At LZ Stud, a 150x2500' strip was built to
support Operation Pegasus (1-15 April) and at LZ Stallion, a strip presently
being constructed in support of Operation Delaware (19 April-present).

Elements of Mobile Construction Battalions 1, 5 and 10 provided engineering
support to the 1st Air Cavalry Division throughout the reporting period.
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being joined by the 11th Engineer Battalion (USMC) during Operation Pegasus. In addition, the 14th Engineer Battalion, 45th Engineer Group, has initiated operations in support of the Division by daily mine sweeps and the placement of D Company in direct support of Division elements at Camp Evans.

2. Discussion and Analysis of Major Operations

(a) Operation JEB STUART I (17 Jan-31 Mar 1968);

(b) Operation PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A (1-15 April 1968);

(c) Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216 (19 April-continuing) (for task organizations see TAB D).

A. JEB STUART I.

(1) General: TOE, attached, and supporting units of the 1 ACD conducted combat operations in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces during Operation JEB STUART I. The enemy TET offensive was conducted during Operation JEB STUART I and consequently the Division was engaged in heavy contact on numerous occasions. The Battle of Hue, which lasted the entire month of February (See TAB C), was one of the two very significant contacts in the JEB STUART AO. Results of the battle were 404 enemy KIA, 15 captured, and 187 weapons captured or destroyed. The other significant contact was the Battle of Quang Tri (See TAB A). In contrast to the Battle of Hue, the Battle of Quang Tri lasted only seven days. Results of the battle were 900 enemy KIA, 300 weapons captured or destroyed with the City of Quang Tri never being occupied by the enemy. The month of February was a critical period of the war in the First Corps Tactical Zone. The enemy launched what he believed to be an offensive capable of an easy victory, whereas in reality he met defeat. One major item which attributed to the enemy's defeat was his lack of understanding and appreciation of the 1 ACD's flexibility, mobility and firepower—a unit whose presence in the ICTZ he had certainly not anticipated.

With the conclusion of the enemy TET offensive, there was a significant decline in enemy contacts. During the reporting period, the enemy was attempting to regroup his fighting posture while avoiding detection or actual contact with the forces of the First Team. In order to deny respite to the enemy, the 1 ACD quickly initiated pursuit operations following the enemy on the coastal plain and deep into known enemy base areas. During the month of March, the 1 ACD penetrated Base Area 101 with 99 reconnaissance missions and 77 offensive operations. Base Area 114 was penetrated by 48 reconnaissance missions and 14 offensive operations.

(2) Other significant actions occurring in the JEB STUART I AO were:

(a) On 2 February, an aircraft from B Troop, 1-9 Cav, in support of the 3d Brigade in the vicinity of Hue, became the target of intense ground-to-air fire. The aircraft was hit and crash-landed in enemy-controlled territory. The crew escaped serious injury, but was immediately engaged by small arms fire. While the crew was being extracted by a Marine helicopter (CH-46), another aircraft engaged the enemy resulting in 15 KIA's. In scattered contacts throughout the remainder of the day, the troops killed an additional 20 enemy resulting in a total of 35 enemy KIA for the day.

(b) On 7 February, aircraft of C Troop, 1-9 Cav, while performing first light reconnaissance around Dong Ha, observed a well fortified area at coordinate YD 194610. The area was engaged resulting in 12 NVA KIA. Exploiting the area of contact, C Troop 1-9 Cav continued to develop the situation and in scattered contact in the vicinity of YD 200621, the troop engaged and killed another 41 NVA.

(c) On 16-17 Feb, A/1-9 Cav and B/1-8 Cav engaged in heavy contact with elements of the 803d Regt, 324th Division vicinity YD 433403.
Results of the engagement were 29 NVA KIA and 4 AK-47, 2 SKS Captured, and 1 RPG destroyed. Friendly losses were 9 KIA, 5 WIA from 1-8 Cav and 2 KIA from 2-20 Arty. At 161400H February, A/1-8 Cav and B/1-8 Cav were combat assaulted vic YD 435508 to conduct search and clear operations to the Northwest. As soon as the ground elements deployed, the scout team working with B/1-8 Cav received S/A fire northwest of the company's location. ARA received extensive ground fire from this same location resulting in 2 US KIA. Arty and air strikes were employed again. The enemy and these were followed by a ground attack. Both companies continued to meet heavy resistance and at 1900H withdrew into a mutually supporting night FOB. Artillery was fired into the contact area all night long and the following morning an artillery TOT was fired followed by employment of CS, followed by a ground attack. TAC air could not be employed on 17 February due to marginal weather conditions.

(d) On 18 February 1966, at 0107H, vicinity YD 392544, C/1-8 Cav while in a night perimeter was attacked by the 5th Company, 803d Regt, 324B Div. An OP observed 40 individuals moving toward the perimeter. The OP was withdrawn and the enemy was engaged with artillery. At the same time the perimeter came under 60mm mortar, B-40 rocket, and small arms fire. At 0145H a UH-1H flareship came on station. At 0215H the fire ceased and an emergency resupply ship was brought in which drew enemy fire. A medevac ship took out 4 WIA at 0235H. At 0245H the perimeter again came under sporadic mortar and small arms fire. Artillery engaged a suspected target at YD 391550. At 0240H a Moonshine (USAF C-130) replaced the UH-1H flareship. All firing ceased at 0300H. At 0415H, a 2d Moonshine came on station. At first light a check of the area revealed 6 NVA KIA, 6 AK-47, numerous drag marks (body), and 3" of documents. Friendly casualties were 4 US KIA and 4 US WIA. During the day the unit found 2 more NVA KIA and 5 B-40 rockets, 150 rounds of S/A ammo, 19 Chicom grenades, 26 AK-47 magazines, 1 carbine mag, and assorted NVA equipment.

(e) On 19 February at 1530H, in a combined search and clear operation vicinity YD 363610, A/1-12 and C/1-12 Cav came into heavy contact with an estimated NVA Company. After initial contact was established the units pulled back and artillery was fired into the contact area. TAC air could not be employed due to marginal weather conditions in the target area. Both companies continued the attack through the area killing 8 NVA. ARA ships engaged several groups of enemy in hedgerows who were trying to evade the contact area and accounted for 38 NVA KIA and destroyed 3 light machine guns.

(f) On 22 February at 1500H vicinity YD 315505 A & C/1-3 Marines, acting in response to a report from the Senior Sector Advisor of Quang Tri, conducted a cordon and search operation with a PRU team, resulting in the capture of 5 hamlet cadre and 17 hamlet guerrillas.

(g) At 1303H on 24 February vicinity YD 382594 first brigade scouts in support of B-12 Cav killed 11 NVA and captured 2 9mm pistols, 1 PPS-43 SMG, assorted web gear, and Chicom grenades.

(h) On 1 March, 1-501 Abn made contact with an unknown size enemy force north of the An Lac Bridge on the Song Bo River. Sixteen NVA were killed by the airborne troopers who were supported by ARA, tube artillery, 1-9 Cav gunships and tactical air strikes.

(i) On 2 March, 1-7 Cav made contact with an unknown size enemy force vic YD 6211, killing 12 NVA and capturing two pistols and two rifles.
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(j) On 10 March, a last light recon team from 1-9 Cav working in the foothills near Base Area 114 spotted an advance party of a possible regimental size unit on a well used trail. The NVA soldiers were immediately taken under fire and the area was marked by smoke. An AH-1G (Cobra) was sent to the area in support of the recon team. After 20 minutes of aerial rocket and machine gun fire from the three ships, 32 NVA soldiers were killed. Although late in the day, a decision was made to insert an infantry platoon of 1-9 Cav to exploit the action. While on the ground, the infantry captured 3 weapons and one pack. Movement was detected around them, and to keep from being decisively engaged, they were extracted without incident. The recon team covering the extraction killed 7 more NVA.

(k) On 13 March, C/2-7 Cav in a village at YD 558473 killed 5 NVA. The company received 60mm mortar fire with neg casualties. In the same area the company captured several tons of rice hidden in false graves.

(l) At 250900H Mar 68, A/1-8 Cav assaulted two separate LZ's: one on the south and one on the north of the hamlet of Thon Xuan Duong. Upon landing, both LZs were Green. At 0918H units on both LZs were receiving heavy fire from all directions. ARA and Brigade Scouts were on station and engaged the areas. The third platoon of D/1-8 Cav which had conducted a "Swooper" operation vic of YD 387558 earlier moved by foot to a position vic YD 395553. D (-)/1-8 Cav further south, attempted to move to the west to rejoin its sister units; however, intense SA, AW & B-40 rocket fire prevented this. Following the unsuccessful maneuver of D/1-8, A/1-8 and C/1-8 conducted coordinated attacks supported by A/1-9 Cav, artillery, ARA and GS to link up with the two platoons. The attempt failed because of intense enemy fire. Artillery, ARA, and gunships continued to engage the area. A/1-8 (-) and C/1-8 were resupplied by logships and established defensive positions in the center of a village. Contact remained sporadic until 1930H when it was broken. During the hours of darkness, illumination was provided by "Spooky" and by "Moonshine." The target area was engaged by artillery throughout the night. POM's captured earlier in the day indicated that the companies were in contact with the K-14 Main Force Bn minus its heavy weapons company. A search of the battle area the following morning revealed that the enemy had exfiltrated in small groups to the northeast. Results of the battle were: 276 NVA KIA, 6 small arms weapons and 1 LMG captured.

B. PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A

(1) General: Operation PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A will become a classic example of fire and maneuver combining artillery, tactical air and B-52 arc light strikes with a massive employment of troops using airmobile tactics and techniques. In the operation, the mission of the 1 ACD and its non-divisional units, was to relieve Khe Sanh Combat Base; re-open QL-9 from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh; and destroy enemy forces in the PEGASUS AO. To accomplish the mission, the 1 ACD was augmented by the following non-divisional units: 1st Marine Regiment, 26th Marine Regiment, III ARVN Airborne Task Force, and the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion. Although the enemy may have initiated a withdrawal of troops prior to Operation PEGASUS, it soon became evident he had no intention of allowing the combined force to march to Khe Sanh unopposed. He had established successive blocking positions, oriented toward the East, on critical terrain astride QL-9. Based on the organization of these delaying positions a conventional attack westward along QL-9 would not only have been costly in casualties, but would have taken a much longer period than 1 week to reach the desired objective, Khe Sanh.

On 14 March engineer construction began on a 150' x 2500' airstrip and a logistical complex at LZ STUD. By 29 March the strip was opened for C-7A
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Traffic and by 7 April the strip was capable of receiving C-133 traffic. On 26 March (D-6), 1-9 Cav supported by tube artillery from 12 STUN, TAC AIR, and responsive B-52 arc light strikes, commenced its reconnaissance efforts west of Ca Lu. As no tactical intelligence of value was available on the Khe Sanh area, 1-9 Cav had to acquire sufficient information on the enemy and the terrain in order for the tactical plan to be completed. In arcs of ever increasing distance west from Ca Lu and 12 STUN, 1-9 Cav pinpointed enemy concentrations and anti-aircraft sites and immediately brought to bear on these varied ordnance. By 1 April, sufficient intelligence concerning the enemy had been obtained, his anti-aircraft weapons neutralized, and the 1 ACD prepared to launch its massive heliborne assault. On 1 April, the 1 ACD commenced the attack toward Khe Sanh with the 1st Marine Regiment conducting a ground attack west from Ca Lu along OL-9 and the 3d Brigade, 1ACD, air assaulting two battalions and airlifting one battalion onto critical terrain behind the initial enemy delaying positions, about half way between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh Combat Base. On 3 April, the 2d Brigade, 1 ACD, air assaulted two battalions and airlifted one battalion to the Southeast of Khe Sanh and on 4 April one battalion of the 26th Marine Regiment emerged from its static defensive position and attacked and seized Hill 471, south of Khe Sanh Combat Base. On 5 April, the 1st Brigade, 1 ACD, air assaulted one battalion and airlifted a second battalion to the Southwest of Khe Sanh. On 7 April, the III ARVN ABN TF air assaulted one battalion and airlifted two battalions to the west of Khe Sanh near the Laoction border. The rapid employment of allied troops along the entire length of the enemy's line of communication/withdrawal had a devastating effect on his morale. In many instances, enemy forces left their well designed delaying positions abandoning large quantities of supplies and equipment, and attempting to evade back in to Laos or on to rugged, uncontested terrain. With the enemy on the run and the allies in hot pursuit, the enemy could retaliate only with indirect fire from Laos—the only offensive means available to him at the time. Although largely ineffective, the enemy launched repeated rocket/mortar/artillery attacks against many of the established allied fire bases. On 8 April sky troopers of the 1ACD were welcomed by the 26th Marine Regiment at the Khe Sanh Combat Base. On 12 April Highway 9 was opened from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh and by 15 April the operation was terminated. Part three of the 1ACD mission had not been completed, but the importance of disabling the 1 ACD to the A Shau Valley overrode this consideration.

(2) Significant actions occurring in the PHONGSIRI/LAM SON 2071 area of operation were:

(a) On 4 April elements of the 26th Marine Regiment established Hill 471, south of the Khe Sanh Combat Base, and repulsed a determined enemy counter attack. Results were: 122 NVA KIA.

(b) On 5 April, A/1-9 Cav at XD 829348 and XD 826352 spotted and engaged NVA in fortified positions and in the open. Results: 53 NVA KIA.

(c) On 6 April as the 2-7 Cav continued to attack west along OL-9 toward Khe Sanh Combat Base, the battalion encountered numerous pockets of enemy resistance. Results of a continuous day of fighting were: 42 NVA KIA, 30 IWO, 10 CWG.

(d) On 7 thru 10 April, the 2-5 Cav conducted attacks in the vicinity of the old French Fort (XD 883382) against determined enemy resistance. Results were: 43 NVA KIA, 15 CWG, 53 IWO.

(e) On 7 April, A/1-9 Cav at XD 823345 spotted and engaged NVA troops both in the open and in fortified positions. Results were: 42 NVA KIA.
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(f) On 08 April, elements of the III RVN 13N TF at LZ SNAKE came under a mortar and ground attack. Artillery, ARA, and direct fires assisted in the defense of the LZ. At 0630, contact broke. Results were: 72 NVA KIA.

(g) On 10-11 April, elements A/1-9 Cav discovered a large ammo cache and a truck loaded with ammo and supplies. Air strikes were placed into the area. The next day, while conducting a BDA of the area, elements of A Troop observed armored vehicle tracks which led to the discovery of two well camouflaged tanks. The tanks were destroyed by airstrikes along with 15 NVA KIA.

(h) On 11 April, the 1-12 Cav attacking toward the Lang Veil Special Forces camp made contact with an enemy force of unknown size at XD 78537, resulting in 27 NVA KIA. The next day upon entering the Special Forces Camp the 1-12 Cav killed 13 more NVA and captured 11 C3W and 10 LW.

C. DELAWARE/LAM SON 216

(i) General: Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216 began on 19 April 1968. The operation was preceded as in Operation PEGASUS, by the employment of the 1-9 Cav in an intelligence acquisition role as tactical intelligence on the A Shau Valley was again conspicuous by its absence. Pin-pointing and destroying anti-aircraft weapons using artillery, tactical air, and B-52s were again modus operandi. At the end of three consecutive good flying weather days, sufficient intelligence had been acquired and anti-aircraft positions neutralized to initiate the operation. Based on intelligence provided by the 1-9 Cav, the initial assault was changed from vicinity A Luc to the vicinity of the northwestern end of the valley. The operation was designed as a "Reconnaissance in force" directed against the enemy and his supply areas located in the A Shau Valley. For public information purposes, the operation was dubbed a "spoiling attack." Two battalions of the 3d Brigade air assaulted into the Northern portion of the A Shau Valley on 19 April. Hampered by extremely bad weather in the objective area, the entire Brigade was not closed until 23 April and this only after fantastic feats of airmanship under IFR conditions performed by the aviators of the 11th Avn Group, 1-9 Cav, 2-20 ARA and brigade aviation platoons. On 24 April one battalion of the 1st Brigade air assaulted into LZ CIRCLE vic A Luc and by 25 April the entire Brigade was deployed in the central portion of the A Shau Valley. On 29 April one battalion of the 3d RVN Regt air lifted to LZ LUCY, vic Ta Bat, and by the end of April the majority of the Regiment was conducting operations in the South/Central portion of the A Shau Valley. On 29 April the forward Division command post was established at A Luc and by the end of the report period engineer reconstruction of the airfield at A Luc was virtually complete.

(2) Significant Actions occurring in the DELAWARE/LAM SON 216 area of operation to date:

(a) The night of 19 April, 5-7 Cav observed what they reported to be a large convoy of 60-100 trucks near LZ Tiger. Artillery engaged resulting in a large secondary explosion.

(b) On 25 April, at XD 312075, A/1-7 Cav found three flat bed trucks and three 37mm anti-aircraft guns. The trucks and guns were all in working condition, 300 rds of ammo were present.

(c) On 26 April, near LZ Tiger, D/5-7 Cav encountered an estimated platoon size enemy force. There were 12 NVA KIA.

(d) On 30 April, near LZ Tiger, C/5-7 Cav found four 37mm anti-aircraft weapons with 500 rounds of ammunition. No enemy resistance was encountered.

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Section II. Lessons Learned
A. Personnel: None
B. Operations,
   (1) Use of CS
      (a) OBSERVATION: CS continuous to be an effective means to route and disorganize the enemy.
      (b) EVALUATION: The use of CS against enemy positions can cause the enemy to leave making them a more vulnerable target to organic and artillery fires.
      (c) RECOMMENDATION: That units employ CS at every opportunity and have protective masks readily available.
   (2) Enemy Mortar and Rocket Firing
      (a) OBSERVATION: The enemy possess the capability to mortar and rocket friendly installations anywhere in the AO.
      (b) EVALUATION: One of many methods for quickly locating these locations is to utilize the intersection method.
      (c) RECOMMENDATION: That every soldier be trained to be particularly alert for enemy mortar and rocket flashes. Upon sighting flashes, a soldier should immediately take an azimuth reading to the flash and render a report through his command channel.
   (3) Armor Seats in LOH
      (a) OBSERVATION: There is a need for better armor seats in the OH-6A helicopter.
      (b) EVALUATION: The armor seats in the LOH are designed so that there is approximately a 2 inch gap where the back seat and front seat junction. The chances of having a round come through this gap is remote however, it has happened, resulting in serious injury to the pilot. The observer successfully landed the aircraft preventing a loss of crew and aircraft.
      (c) RECOMMENDATION: That armor seats be redesigned, closing the gap in the seat.
   (4) Recovery Aircraft
      (a) OBSERVATION: In the past, it has been a common practice to have a flight leader responsible for all downed aircraft. Normally when a flight consisted of 12 or more aircraft, the battalion maintenance aircraft accompanied the flight.
      (b) EVALUATION: These procedures have proven inadequate where there is intensive enemy activity and large flights of aircraft involved. When the flight consists of 12 or more UH-1's, a minimum of two recovery aircraft are necessary to extract downed crews (troops). Relieving the flight leader of this responsibility insures he can devote his full attention to his mission. The presence of recovery aircraft also enhances crew morale.
      (c) RECOMMENDATION: That two (or more depending on size of flight) recovery aircraft be assigned to any 12 UH-1 or larger flight.
   (5) Supporting Fires for Log Aircraft
      (a) OBSERVATION: During the Battle of Hue, 10 aircraft were continuously exposed to hostile fire while carrying supplies to the ground units. Numerous aircraft were hit and several shot down. Coordination was made with the supported unit for covering fires during the approach, unloading and departure of the log aircraft.
      (b) EVALUATION: Supporting fires included representative weapons of all calibers to include artillery, Gun-target lines and flight
routes were coordinated. The log aircraft called in his position at pre-
scribed points and the fires were fired as appropriate. Screening smoke
could also be used effectively to cover a mission.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this technique be publicized and used
as required.
(6) CH-54 IFR Operations
(a) OBSERVATION: CH-54 sling loads must be properly secured
during IFR operations.
(b) EVALUATION: The CH-54 is capable of carrying sling loads
under IFR conditions; however, certain limitations are imposed in the in-
terest of safety. Single point suspension loads are unsatisfactory; however,
loads can be carried IFR with the four point hook-up by securing the load
with aircraft hoist. In addition loads can be carried in the crane rod
(maximum of 9,000 pounds) under IFR conditions.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That CH-54 sling loads be secured using
the four point hook-up or by use of the crane pod during IFR operations.
(7) Dual Aircraft for Log Missions
(a) OBSERVATION: As a result of extensive hostile ground to
targeting, single aircraft missions in and out of field positions should
be avoided.
(b) EVALUATION: Flying log aircraft in pairs obviously re-
quires additional planning and coordination by logistics control team at
each battalion. However, when log aircraft fly dual missions, instant crew
recovery can be accomplished in the event one of the aircraft goes down.
Flight following is enhanced and simplified as the aircraft are mutually
supporting.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That dual log ships be used when dictated
by the tactical situation and as aircraft availability permits.
(8) Medevac at Night in Poor Weather
(a) OBSERVATION: Medevac by helicopter can be accomplished
during periods of darkness and poor weather in cases of extreme emergency.
(b) EVALUATION: Techniques were developed during the reporting
period to conduct medevac at night during periods of poor weather in cases
of extreme life or death emergencies. Search lights are utilized and a line
of constant artillery illumination is fired to the vicinity of the PZ. At
the PZ ground illumination is utilized to guide the medevac helicopter on
its last leg. Artillery illumination continues in a line to guide the
helicopter back to its own pad where rotating beacons are used to guide
the returning helicopter.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this technique be utilized when applicable.
(9) Mine Sweep Procedures
(a) OBSERVATION: Many units establish a procedure for mine
sweeps and then never deviate from it.
(b) EVALUATION: This action has the advantage of assuring the
commander a thorough, well controlled sweep. However, it also gives the
enemy the advantage of being able to predict movements. He is then able
to place his mines and booby traps to inflict maximum damage.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units engaged in daily mine sweeps
alter their methods of sweeping from different directions and on a non-
scheduled basis.
(10) Command Detonated Mines
(a) OBSERVATION: In Northern I Corps Zone, the enemy is
employing numerous command detonated mines in conjunction with conventional
mine warfare.
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(b) EVALUATION: Command detonated mines render considerable damage to mine sweep teams. On more than one occasion, individuals of sweep teams who have discovered a mine and are about to uncover it have literally been blown to pieces by command detonated mines.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the security element work at least 100 meters to either flank and forward of the sweep team and execute a vigorous search for the enemy while one man is placed in either ditch with a grappling hook dragged behind him on the ground.

(11) Spot Mine Sweeps
(a) OBSERVATION: The use of engineer troops in the lead vehicle of a convoy to provide a spot mine sweep has proved quite effective.
(b) EVALUATION: This method of mine sweep can be used by a tactical commander over routes normally traveled by friendly troops but accessible to the enemy during periods of darkness. However, if the speed of the convoy is in excess of 10mph, the spot mine sweep loses its effectiveness and cannot provide the desired safety to the convoy.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: The tactical commander be informed of the spot mine sweep concept.

(12) Hasty Repair of Runway Soft Spots
(a) OBSERVATION: Quick repair of small portions of forward airfields supporting a limited tactical operation is a necessity.
(b) EVALUATION: The backhoe, model 3414 can be effectively used to scoop out centralized soft spots that do not meet the bearing requirements established under MACV criteria. By replacing the poor material with river run or a suitable substitute, the danger area can be quickly erased.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the 3414 backhoe be included in the initial lift of equipment for rehabilitation of existing airfields.

C. Training
Sling Out for Engineer Equipment
(a) OBSERVATION: During Operation PEGASUS and DELWARE, it became evident that personnel were not proficient in breakdown and rigging for sling out of all types of airmobile equipment.
(b) EVALUATION: These operations emphasized the need for constant training of personnel in all aspects of sling out.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units conduct training of all personnel in proper sling out techniques and that riggers from the 15th 96 BN present training as necessary to each unit within the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

D. Intelligence
(1) Overt Liaison Contact (CI)
(a) OBSERVATION: An effective liaison program between intelligence agencies is required.
(b) EVALUATION: By positioning personnel in large cities in areas within the Division AO, and in those cities in the Division TACI where there are a number of allied intelligence agencies, an effective liaison program has been established, which has resulted in the effective and timely transmission of intelligence information from numerous sources not previously available. This is particularly noticeable in the areas of Quang Tri and Hue.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: The practice of establishing permanent liaison teams should be incorporated in the intelligence program.

(2) Translations by AVN Interpreters
(a) OBSERVATION: A requirement exists to insure accurate translation of intelligence documents.
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(b) EVALUATION: Because of the language barrier existing between US and SVN personnel, interpreters are assigned to the CI Section, 191st MID. Their duties frequently require them to translate intelligence reports from SVN agencies. Because there is no way for US personnel to determine the completeness of the translation, the document, after being translated by one interpreter, is given to a second, who has no knowledge that the document has been previously translated. By comparing the two translations, a better assessment of the completeness of the translation can be made.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this double check system be SCP in translation of intelligence data where SVN personnel serve as interpreters.

(3) Processing Wounded Prisoners
(a) OBSERVATION: Many PW's having information of intelligence value are evacuated through medical channels.
(b) EVALUATION: During the reporting period, there were at least 9 PW's of interest to the division who were evacuated through medical channels.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: In order to insure that no intelligence of value is lost, the following should be accomplished:
1. Tag WIA PW's in same manner as other PW's.
2. Units should submit spot reports on WIA PW's through normal channels.
3. Medical facilities should notify nearest FW element immediately upon receipt of a WIA FW.

(4) Limitation of AN/FFS-4 Radar
(a) OBSERVATION: The AN/FFS-4 Radar cannot provide full coverage in rainy weather.
(b) EVALUATION: The AN/FFS-4 Radar does not give satisfactory results when employed in the rain.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That efforts be made to obtain AN/FFS-5 Radar to replace the AN/FFS-4.

(5) Complete Capture Data on IPW's.
(a) OBSERVATION: Prisoners of war are frequently improperly documented.
(b) EVALUATION: In order to insure timely and accurate interrogation of detainees, it is necessary to provide the interrogator with as much information about the detainee and circumstances of capture as possible.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: Detainees should be evacuated to Div PW with complete capture data and any documents and weapons in their possession at time of capture. Capturing unit should tag each detainee using MACV form 365 (Detainee Card) or a facsimile thereof. Information should include: DTG of capture, location of capturing unit, circumstances of capture, name and any weapons or documents found on detainee. If at all possible, documents and weapons should be evacuated with the detainee. Division PW Cage has received many detainees during this reporting period with incomplete or no capture data.

(6) Falsified Documentation by the NVA/VC
(a) OBSERVATION: The NVA and VC have been falsifying GVN official documents, such as identity cards.
(b) EVALUATION: Information developed during the recent TET offensive reveals that the NVA/VC have been most successful in duplicating official GVN documentation such as identity cards. To date, there has been no report of US documentation being falsified. However, the NVA/VC have the apparent capability.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION: Commanders should be alert to report any incidents of suspected falsification. Reports should include samples of the suspected documentation and all suspects should be retained until the documentation is verified.

(7) Reaction to LRP Team contacts,
(a) OBSERVATION: Findings of LRP Teams are often not exploited.
(b) EVALUATION: Recently a LRP Team made contact with an estimated two NVA squads. The supported unit was unable to react to the contact and consequently the 1/9 Cav immediately extracted the team and two NVA.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: As future situations similar to this may be expected to arise, it is recommended that the supported unit react by air lifting a platoon and one empty slick to orbit near area of contact. Thus airborne, the commanders can make an immediate evaluation of the situation and if warranted drop the platoon in to reinforce the team in contact and develop the situation.

(8) Rapid Evacuation of PW's to Division Collection Point.
(a) OBSERVATION: Prisoners must be evacuated to intelligence agencies as rapidly as possible.
(b) EVALUATION: PW's must be evacuated as soon as feasible to the Division Collection Point to allow for detailed interrogation. Captured units and subordinate headquarters should exploit the PW's for immediate information of tactical value and expedite evacuation of the PW's to Division IPW.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: Failure to rapidly evacuate PW's causes unnecessary inquiries from higher HQs and denies the Div HQ valuable timely intelligence information. Therefore, a procedure that provides for rapid evacuation must be established.

E. Logistics

(1) Pre-stock of supplies prior to operations.
(a) OBSERVATION: Combat operations can be facilitated by pre-stockage of supplies for major operations.
(b) EVALUATION: Prior to the initiation of Operation PTQASIUS a 3 day stockage objective of all classes of supplies was pre-positioned at LZ Stud. This pre-stockage enabled the operation to commence without logistic difficulties. However, the Division was required to use organic resources to establish a significant amount of this pre-positioning because of the lack of FSA support. This resulted in utilization of organic resources and manpower which would have otherwise been used for internal preparation of units and equipment for entry into the operation.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: Whenever possible supplies should be pre-stocked at a forward supply base prior to the initiation of operations in a new area. The FSA support agency should perform the pre-stockage mission with organic resources thus permitting the division to prepare its resources for entry into the operation.

(2) FSA support.
(a) OBSERVATION: FSA support must be provided in each forward operational area.
(b) EVALUATION: On Operation DELAWARE an FSA was requested to support the two brigades and the ARVN Regiment operating in the A Shau Valley. This request was not granted by 1st Log Cuij the only support provided was augmentation for the FSE. This arrangement was unsatisfactory.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: Whenever a brigade or larger size element of the division operates in a new area an FSA must be provided to supply wholesale delivery of Class I, III, and V.
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(3) Clearance of drop zones.
   (a) OBSERVATION: Drop zones must be cleared of heavy vegetation prior to use.
   (b) EVALUATION: On Operation DELAWARE supplies were air dropped on a drop zone which was overgrown with elephant grass and underbrush. As a result bundles were extremely difficult and sometimes impossible to recover. Many were lost and never recovered.
   (c) RECOMMENDATION: Prior to using such an area for a drop zone it should be cleared by burning if possible.

(4) Limiting stockage.
   (a) OBSERVATION: Supply stockage must be monitored and controlled according to plan.
   (b) EVALUATION: On Operation DELAWARE a large stockage of supplies, particularly Class V, was built up. When the order came to begin extraction, a massive effort was required to back-haul this stockage.
   (c) RECOMMENDATION: In all operations, but particularly those which are of limited duration in remote areas, the supply stocks must be closely monitored and controlled so that excessive stockages do not occur which could cause problems in tactical redeployment.

F. Organization

(1) Crew Member's Individual Weapon
   (a) OBSERVATION: The .38 caliber pistol is considered unsatisfactory for aircraft crew members.
   (b) EVALUATION: Recent operations in the ICTZ have shown that when confronted by a well equipped and supplied enemy, a downed crew may have to defend themselves for an extended period prior to extraction. Most crew members have requested and carried shotguns, M-16 rifles, and assorted surplus weapons. The unit TOE's do not allow for the issuance of more than one weapon to an individual. If an aircraft is forced down, the requirement for greater range and firepower exists.
   (c) RECOMMENDATION: That the CAR 15 or M-16 be the TOE individual weapon.

(2) Authority for Fourth Line Company
   (a) OBSERVATION: The recognition by Combat Development Command of an urgent need for a fourth line company in the 8th Engineer Battalion emphasizes the requirement for an immediate operation change.
   (b) EVALUATION: In the early stages of operations in the JEB STUART I AO, there were no additional engineer units available on a general support basis for the division. Consequently, general support was obtained by removing some of the direct support available to each committed brigade. A similar situation occurred in Operation PEGASUS and is being experienced now in Operation DELAWARE. The battalion cannot deliver the effective direct support needed on a continuing basis by the brigades without a general support capability. The fourth line company would solve this problem.
   (c) RECOMMENDATION: That TOE 5-215T be immediately revised to reflect the necessary changes.

(3) Firebase Sets
   (a) OBSERVATION: Operations PEGASUS and DELAWARE established requirements for the airmobile engineer equipment necessary to open new landing zones and fire bases.
   (b) EVALUATION: A fire base set of engineer equipment is comprised of an airmobile dozer (12,000-16,000 lbs) and a backhoe, model 3414. These two pieces of equipment have proven to be essential in the developing of fire bases in the tactical areas of operations. Since the committed brigade
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

usually open at least two fire bases, a requirement exists to increase the equipment authorization for these two items.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That TOE 5-215T be immediately revised to reflect an increase in 3414 to size authorized to enable each line company to employ two each on a continuing basis. That the number of authorized dozers be delivered to the unit, i.e. six are authorized and only two are on hand.

G. Miscellaneous

(1) O2B Tape Missions (Psyops)
(a) OBSERVATION: Many 9th ACS O2B tape missions were cancelled due to artillery fire.
(b) EVALUATION: On many occasions, after the O2B aircraft arrived at the Brigade AO, the pilot was denied entry into the AO to broadcast over target area. Many of the missions were cancelled after clearance into the AO was continually denied.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: The tactical situation permitting, every effort must be made by fire support coordinators to clear psyops aircraft into the AO.

(2) Use of Military Police Personnel
(a) OBSERVATION: When a division deploys, there is an increased need for military police personnel.
(b) EVALUATION: When the 1st Air Cavalry Division assumed its mission in the JEB STUART I AO, it undertook the security of Highway 1 and Sky King Avenue. Since these were the major supply routes within the JEB STUART I AO and were also important links in the supply system of I Corps, a major effort had to be mounted by the division to insure the safe and orderly flow of traffic along these roadways. In order to move traffic in an orderly manner on these restricted roads, a disproportionate amount of the division's military police resources had to be committed to the task. In order to alleviate this drain on men and equipment, augmentation of additional military police was requested from the 18th Military Police Brigade through the USARV Provost Marshal. Although initially approved, the augmentation was later diverted to support the forming of the Provisional Corps Vietnam.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: When divisions are deployed to areas that require military police to assume roles beyond those for which they are designed, attachment of the required additional military police should be furnished upon deployment. If this is accomplished, the additional personnel are capable of receiving full logistical support from the division from the outset. Likewise, the division is capable of successfully performing the mission required.

(3) Location for Polygraph Examinations
(a) OBSERVATION: A requirement exists for convenient access to polygraph facilities.
(b) EVALUATION: During the conduct of certain Reports of Investigation, the polygraph is utilized. It is a valuable tool when properly utilized by investigator personnel. Trained operators of this instrument are located at the Long Binh Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Group (Provisional), 18th Military Police Brigade. These qualified examiners conduct the polygraph examination upon approval of the Provost Marshal, USARV. These polygraph examiners will not conduct the examination in the field or in an area that is mutually convenient to both parties. In the case of the 1st Cavalry Division, it would be advantageous to be able to conduct such examinations in Da Nang; instead of having both the
investigator and the subject travel to Long Binh and return. Adequate facilities exist in convenient locations throughout Vietnam and the equipment is designed in order that it may be carried to such areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The Criminal Investigation Group adopt the policy of conducting polygraph examinations in mutually convenient locations. It is recognized that careful site selection should be employed but adequate facilities appear to exist in many of the Criminal Investigation Detachments.

(a) Maintenance of Control by Military Police During Base Development
(b) OBSERVATION: Military Police assistance is often required early in base development.
(c) EVALUATION: The development of a base facility that will encompass a command post, airhead and supply element requires the early employment of military police in order to establish and then maintain control throughout the complex as it expands. Traffic regulation at such a complex becomes a matter of concern as the supply facilities expand and an increasing volume of trucks have to be positioned, off-loaded as rapidly as possible, and then dispatched for the return trip that same day to the supply point. Military police are required during this stage to establish and then maintain control throughout the area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That military police be programmed to arrive at the site of proposed command posts in sufficient time to develop and then implement effective traffic and personnel controls. By being included among the first elements to arrive, a logically developed plan can be implemented and then enforced.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CONRAD L. STANSBERRY
CGL, GS
Chief of Staff

* TAB A: The Battle of Quang Tri
** TAB B: Combat Operations After Action Report - Operation PERSHING-I

TAB C: The Battle of Hue
TAB D: Task Organization
TAB E: Weather and Terrain
TAB F: Enemy Activity
TAB G: Aerial Surveillance
TAB H: Intelligence Support Units
TAB I: Summary of G-1 Activities
TAB J: Strength Report
TAB K: Casualty Report
TAB L: Replacement Report
TAB M: Units in the 1st Air Cav Div

**** TAB N: Key Personnel Roster
TAB O: Enlistment, Promotions
TAB P: Awards and Decorations

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*Withdrawn, Hq, DA; published separately as CAAR 68X050

**Withdrawn, Hq, DA; published separately as CAAR 68X051

***Withdrawn, Hq, DA; published separately as CAAR 68X052

****Withdrawn, Hq, DA
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) The inclosed OGL, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), is forwarded IAW USAVR Reg 525-15.

2. (C) Comments on Section I, Operations: Significant Activities, are listed below.

   a. Item: Page 3, para ID. Due to the general nature of the statement, it cannot be determined what specific supply shortages existed or the reasons therefore. However, temporary shortages of Class II and Class IV supplies existed during the Battle of Hue City.

   b. Item: Page 7, para 1M(2)(B)(4). The main difficulty encountered was one of interface of teletype circuits on US Army Tactical VHF-Carrier Systems with UNI TRC-97 tropospheric scatter systems. The problem was resolved when more experienced personnel were committed to assist in establishing the circuits. The experience gained will be valuable in preventing similar difficulties during future joint communications operations.

3. (C) Comments on Section II, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations, are listed below.


   c. Items: Armor seats in LOH, page 14, para B(3). Concur with recommendation. The reporting unit should submit an equipment improvement recommendation (EIR) IAW para 3-7.4, TM 38-750.

   d. Item: Recovery aircraft, page 14, para B(4). Concur when feasible. Crew recovery must be made as the mission permits. Mission requirements have priority over either aircraft or crew recovery. Many cases may arise where assets will not permit use of two or more aircraft for recovery. Thus, a hard and fast rule cannot be applied to the number of aircraft assigned to this type mission.

   e. Item: Supporting fires for log aircraft, page 14, para B(5). Concur. This procedure is discussed in Chapter 3, Section IV of 1st Avn Bde Operations Manual.


   g. Item: Dual aircraft for log missions, page 15, para B(7). Concur when feasible. Aircraft availability permitting, the use of dual aircraft greatly improves the flight following and is considered a crew morale factor of great importance.
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h. Item: Evacuation at night in poor weather, page 15, para B(8). Concur in principle. In a valid emergency all possible means of illumination may be used. However, each case will differ because of terrain, capability of the artillery, the enemy threat along the route of flight and the proficiency of flight crews. This does not appear to be a flight technique applicable to a variety of circumstances. Because of the hazards of disorientation and inadvertent instrument flight, such missions should be performed only by instrument rated crews with proficiency in night flying.

i. Item: Mine sweep procedures, page 15, para B(9). Concur. Daily mine sweeps should alter their methods by sweeping from alternate directions and at varying times. Also, mine sweep personnel should sweep the same area daily; this allows detection of minute changes in terrain.


k. Item: Spot mine sweeps, page 16, para B(11). Concur. Spot mine sweeping operations will be performed by engineer personnel only after dismounting from their vehicle.


m. Item: Sling out for engineer equipment, page 16, para C. Concur.


c. Item: Translations by AVN interpreters, page 16, para D(2). Concur in principle. The practice of translating each document twice is a waste of time and assets. A spot check could be performed occasionally and serve the same purpose.


q. Item: Limitation of ANPPS-4 radar, page 17, para D(4). Concur. The ANPPS-5 radar is coming into the inventory. Responsibility for requisition is incumbent upon the unit authorized this equipment by TOE.

r. Item: Incomplete capture data on IPW's, page 17, para D(5). Concur.

s. Item: Falsified documentation by the VC/VA, page 17, para D(6). Concur. Commanders should be advised by their intelligence officer as to the importance of this information being reported.

t. Item: Reaction to LRP team contacts, page 18, para D(7). Concur. Rapid reaction to significant LRP team contacts will increase the value of the information received.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

u. Item: Rapid evacuation of PAVN's to division collection point, page 18, para D(8). Concur.

v. Item: Freestock of supplies prior to operations, page 18, para E(1). Concur.

w. Item: FSA support, page 18, para E(2). Nonconcur. The support furnished for Operation DELAWARE included both FSA (wholesale) support by Task Force Langley and augmentation for the Forward Support Element (FSE). Wholesale supply support forward is dependent upon establishment and security of lines of communications. These conditions were not sufficiently established to permit another forward FSA to contribute to the mission of Operation DELAWARE.


y. Item: Limiting stockage, page 19, para E(4). Concur. Such controls are most effectively exercised by FSE's and provide savings in supply expenditures and manpower, and provide for timely movement of priority supplies with reduced expenditures of transportation assets.

z. Item: Crew member's individual weapons, page 19, para F(1). Concur. This change can be requested by 1TOE submission.

aa. Item: Authority for fourth line company, page 19, para F(2). Concur. This change can be requested by 1TOE submission.

ab. Item: Firebase sets, page 19, para F(3). Concur. This change can be requested by 1TOE submission.


ad. Item: Use of military police personnel, page 20, para G(2). Concur. In the initial deployment of a division to an area that does not have area military police, additional military policemen should be attached to the division to aid in handling missions beyond the division's capability. Once area support has been established these military police should be returned to their parent units. This procedure was followed with the 1st Cav Div (AM), but only after they had been in the new location several weeks.

ae. Item: Location for polygraph examinations, page 20, para G(3). Nonconcur. The frequency of use by the divisions of the polygraph and the requirements of a suitable location for administering the examinations (air conditioning, soundproofing, steady current and good lighting) do not warrant the establishment of temporary testing locations. The centralization of polygraph equipment and personnel at Long Binh allows for its most efficient use.

AVII-GCT
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

4. (U) Comment on Operation PERSHING II, Tab F, page 13, para 12b(2), concerning resupply of non-IEE Class II and IV. Such resupply is the result of timely demands based on anticipated expenditures.


FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. L. NURDIN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

Cy fern:
DA, ACSFOR
CG, 1st Cav Div
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco, 96375 15 JUL 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division.

2. Concur with report as submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy curb:
HQ PCV
HQ 1st Cav Div
GPOP-DT (13 Jun 68) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Air Cav Div for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 AUG 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

CPT, AGC
Asst AG
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

TAB D: Task Organization

1. On 1 February the assignment of maneuver bn's in the 1 ACD was as follows:

A. 1st Bde
   1-12 Cav
   1-8 Cav
   1-5 Cav
   1-502 Abn

B. 2d Bde 101 Abn
   1-501 Abn
   2-501 Abn

C. 3d Bde
   2-12 Cav
   1-7 Cav
   5-7 Cav

2. On 17 February, the 1st Bn, 3d Marine Regt placed OPCON to the 1st Bde.

3. On 22 February, 2-7 Cav which had been OPCON to the 2d Bde in the Pershing II AO, AL to Quang Tri, A/F and became OPCON to the 1st ACD in the Jeb Stuart AO.

4. On 29 February, the 1st Bn, 3d Marine Regt, was released OPCON 1st Bde placed OPCON 3d Marine Regt.

5. March:

A. .Headquarters, 2d Bde arrived Camp Evans; placed OPCON 1 ACD.

B. ... 2-14 Abn and 2-5 Cav released OPCON 2d 101; placed OPCON 2d Bde 1 ACD.

C. 1-501 Abn released OPCON 1st Bde and 2d Bde 101 Abn respectively; placed OPCON 3d Bde.

D. 2-12 Cav and 2-7 Cav released OPCON 3d Bde; placed OPCON Division.

6. 2 March:

A. 2-8 Cav (-) arrived Jeb Stuart AO; placed OPCON 1st Bde.

B. 1-5 Cav released OPCON 1st Bde; placed OPCON 2d Bde.


D. 1-501 Abn released OPCON 2d Bde 1 ACD; placed OPCON 2d Bde 101 Abn.

E. 2-7 Cav and 2-12 Cav released OPCON Division; placed OPCON 3d Bde.

7. On 7 March, the 1st Bde 101 Abn (1-327 Abn, 2-327 Abn, 2-502 Abn) placed OPCON 1 ACD.

8. 10 March:

A. 1 ACD released OPCON III MAF; placed OPCON Provisional Corps Vietnam.

B. 2d Bde, 101 Abn released OPCON 1 ACD; placed OPCON 101st Abn Div.

9. On 16 March, 2-12 Cav released OPCON 3rd Bde; placed OPCON 2d Bde.


11. On 20 March, 3d Plt A Trp 3-5 Armored Cav released OPCON 1 ACD; placed OPCON 101 Abn Div.

12. On 26 March, 2-1 Marine released OPCON 1 ACD.

13. 29 March:

A. 1st Marine Regt with 2-3 Marine battalion placed OPCON 1 ACD.

B. 2-1 Marines released OPCON 1 ACD; placed OPCON 1st Marine Regt.


15. On 31 March, 26 Marine Regt placed OPCON 1 ACD.

16. On 31 March the Task Organization (maneuver battalions) of the 1 ACD were as follows:

TABD

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
TAB D: Task Organization (Cont)

A. 1st Bde
   1-3 Cav
   2-3 Cav
   1-12 Cav

B. 2d Bde
   1-5 Cav
   2-5 Cav
   2-12 Cav

C. 3d Bde
   1-7 Cav
   2-7 Cav
   5-7 Cav

D. 1st Marine Regt
   1-1 Mar
   2-1 Mar
   2-3 Mar

E. 26th Marine Regt
   1-26 Mar
   2-26 Mar
   3-26 Mar
   8-9 Mar

17. On 7 April, the 3d ARVN ABN TF entered the PEGUSUS/LAM SON 207A area of operations and initiated joint operations in coordination and cooperation with 1 ACD.

18. 11 April:
   A. 1-12 Cav released OPCON 1st Bde, 1 ACD; placed OPCON 2d Bde 1 ACD.
   B. 2-12 Cav released OPCON 2d Bde 1 ACD; placed OPCON 2d Bde 101 Abn.

19. On 14 April, 2-12 Cav released OPCON 2d Bde 101 Abn; placed OPCON 3d Bde 1 ACD.

20. 15 April:
   A. The 26th Mar Regt, 1st Mar Regt and 2d Bde (-) (1-5 Cav, 2-5 Cav), 1 ACD released OPCON 1 ACD; placed OPCON 3d Mar Div.
   B. 3d ARVN ABN TF terminated operations in PEGUSUS/LAM SON 207A area of operations.

21. 18 April:
   A. 2-12 Cav released OPCON 3d Bde; placed OPCON 1 ACD.
   B. 4-31 Inf placed OPCON 1 ACD.

22. 20 April
   A. 196th Light Inf Bde with 2-2 Inf and 3-21 Inf Bn's placed OPCON 1 ACD.
   B. 1-31 Inf released OPCON 1 ACD; placed OPCON 196th Lt Inf Bde.

23. On 29 April, 3d ARVN Regt with 1-3 Bn, 2-3 Bn and 2-1 Bn joined the 1 ACD to conduct joint operations in the A Shau Valley.

24. On 30 April the assignment of maneuver Bn's of the 1 ACD was as follows:
   A. 1st Bde
      1-8 Cav
      2-8 Cav
      1-12 Cav
   B. 3d Bde
      1-7 Cav
      2-7 Cav
      5-7 Cav
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
TAB D: Task Organization (Cont)

C. 196th Lt Inf Bde
   2-1 Inf
   3-21 Inf
   4-31 Inf

D. 3d ARVN Regt*
   1-3 ARVN
   2-3 ARVN
   2-1 ARVN

E. 1 ACD Control
   2-12 Cav

* Conducting joint operations in cooperation and coordination with 1 ACD
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TAB E: Weather and Terrain

1. JEB STUART I (Feb-Mar). Crachin weather resulting from a moderately strong northeast monsoon affected the JEB STUART AO from 1 Feb to 27 Feb. Some clearing was evidenced on the last two days of the month, although moderate early morning fog was present on those two days also. Significant effects of the crachin were: ceilings were less than 1500 feet greater than 50% of the time (much of this was less than 500 ft); visibility less than or equal to 3 miles about 60% of the time, and less than 5 miles 85% of the time; measurable precipitation fell on 20 days with a trace record on one other; temperatures were 10 degrees below expected maximums but were within one or two degrees of expected minimums; relative humidity remained at its annual high (90-100%).

The previous record, to our knowledge, for persistence of crachin weather was 22 consecutive days. This occurred along the Red River Delta, which is the area of maximum crachin activity, statistically. Although only 2.49 inches of precipitation accumulated during the month almost no evaporation took place due to heavy cloud cover and high relative humidity. Additionally, the daily range of temperatures was only 5-7 degrees when 10-15 degree range was expected. Relating this abnormal crachin weather to the global weather picture it appears, from data available, that the month of February was more severe than average in many parts of the northern hemisphere. This seems especially true on the east coasts of the continent. Since crachin weather and its initiator, the northeast monsoon, have their origins in the continental air mass of east Asia, any departures from within this air mass reflect, in the local day-to-day weather in areas down stream from the source region. This seems to be a case much in evidence throughout the JEB STUART AO in the month of February.

During the first two weeks of March, moderate on-shore flow brought low stratus and fog conditions throughout the JEB STUART AO. Ceilings were 500' at night but generally raised to 1500' to 2000' during daylight hours. Visibilities were poor at night and in the morning (4-2 miles), and increased to 4-5 miles in haze during the day. The latter part of the month was characterized by southerly flow during which overall conditions improved. Occasional occurrences of stratus still brought ceilings of 700'-1,000', and ground fog was common but daylight ceilings averaged 3000'. Haze continued to limit visibility to 5-6 miles. The extreme and mean temperatures were: Max 94/87; Min 62/70. Rain fell on 12 days with accumulation of 2.21 inches. Average relative humidity was 87%.

2. PEGASUS, JEB STUART II, DELAWARE (April). Operation PEGASUS and Operation JEB STUART II were relatively unaffected by weather. Fog and low stratus limited operational hours to the period 0800-2000 hours on many days. However, during these hours ceilings of 2000' or better and visibility of 5 miles or greater were predominant. Showers fell on 6 days but the accumulation did not significantly affect operations. Operation Delaware was adversely affected by a late-season frontal passage on D+2. Accompanying the passage were very low ceilings, fog, and intermittent drizzle and showers. These conditions persisted for four days. As the frontal system dissipated conditions improved somewhat with daylight ceilings 2000' to 3000'. Even these ceilings tended to partially obscure some of the higher peaks. Night time fog and low stratus persisted throughout the month's end. Precipitation accumulation was not a significant factor.

Maximum temperatures for April: Extreme 98, mean 83; minimum temperatures for the month: extreme 62, mean 73. Rainfall: Coast 2.67 inches; mountains 3.53 inches. Mean Relative Humidity 87%. 

TAB E
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

TAB F: Enemy Activity

1. JEB STUART I (Feb-Mar). Prior to launching the TET Offensive, the 812th Rogt, 324th NVA Division moved from the west to Base Area 101 to participate in the attack on Quang Tri City. Other participants already in the Quang Tri area were the 816th Regt, 8th NVA Regt, and the 10th Sapper Bn. The 6th Regt was operating from Base Area 114 in the vicinity of Hue. The newly formed 6th Regt operated in the Phu Loc area. The 12th Sapper Bn and the Hue City Sapper Bn operated to the west of Hue City under the control of Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region 80. The 30th LF Bn was operating South and West of Hue.

The unsuccessful attack of Quang Tri City was launched at 0300 hrs 31 January. The principle reasons for its failure were poor coordination, lack of reconnaissance, and underestimation of the 1st ACD's capabilities. Approximately 700 were killed. After the attack part of the 812th Regiment moved to the Thac Ma River area South and East of Hai Lang. Other elements returned to Base Area 101.

The enemy attack on Hue City achieved surprise and was successful in seizing a major portion of the city. As pressure from allied elements increased the enemy was forced back along the western wall. The 816th Regt, 8th NVA Division, which had moved from the Hai Lang Forest, arrived in Hue to reinforce on 17 February. It passed south of Khe Sanh, through the Ba Long Valley, through Base Area 101 and 114, through the La Chu area and arrived at Hue on 22 and 23 February. The 7th En entered the city on 22 Feb. Elements of the 7th En entered on the following day. The 29th Regt, 325th NVA Div, had also moved from the Khe Sanh area to reinforce enemy elements of Hue. The pressure exerted from the west of Hue initiated on 21 Feb by the 1st ACD, dispelled any enemy hope of permanently holding Hue. On 25 Feb enemy elements vacated the city with the 8th Regt, 90th Regt (-) and 29th Regt (-) moving to the west and southwest of Hue and the 4th Regt moving south to the Nam Hue area was controlled by the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region 80 which was located southwest of the city.

Enemy losses in the battle are presently carried at over 5000 killed. Since the battle of Hue City elements of the 29th Div, 325th NVA Div have moved east along the coast from the Cam Lo area toward Cua Viet. Within the JEB STUART I, the enemy has been concerned with the evacuation of the Hue area and protecting supply routes along the Thach Ma and Song Bo Rivers for supply of Base Area 101 and 114 (southwest) respectively. Enemy construction on Route 547 from A Shau Valley to Hue City and indications of large movements of fresh units and replacements show the determination of the enemy to attempt large scale attacks in the Quang Tri-Hue Area.

KIA-NVA/VC 1,543/150; CAPTURED-NVA/VC 32/9; WEAPONS- SA/CS 351/106

During the first 2 weeks of March the enemy continued to reorganize, reinforce, and resupply in preparation for a renewed offensive. Operations against allied units initially appeared to be harassment in nature, characterized by stand off attacks by rocket and/or mortar fire, interdiction of communications routes, and extensive use of mines and booby traps in areas critical to friendly supply activities. The enemy increased his activity in the A Shau Valley and along Route 547 to establish a large logistical base and a secure communications route west of Hue. The numerous rocket positions oriented toward US and allied installations, and a decrease in normal activity indicate the imminence of a renewed offensive.

TAB F

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1965

TAB F: Enemy Activity (Cont)

In addition to normal supply and security movements the enemy began repositioning units in preparation for renewed offensive action. The 5th RN moved from Base Area 101 to the coastal plains area northeast of Hai Lang and Quang Tri City, and conducted population control operations in preparation for the attack on Quang Tri City. The 2d RN, 3/3d RN moved southeast from the Quang Tri City area and joined the remainder of the 3/3d Regiment in the vicinity of Hue. This move was accomplished in less than 36 hours.

During the last two weeks of March the Allies launched aggressive attacks against known and suspected enemy concentrations, with the 1st ACD attacking into Base Area 101 and Base Area 114, the 101st Abn Div attacking northwest of Hue and southwest of the city along Hwy 547, and 1st ARVN Division attacking west, north, and south of Hue and west into the staging area north of Hwy 547. ARC Lights, Air Strikes and Naval Gunfire were employed against known enemy concentrations. The Allies quickly gained the initiative, disorganized the enemy, and forced the enemy to abandon his plans for an offensive, at least temporarily.

KIA-NVA/VC 852/207; CAPTURED- NVA/VC 36/42; WEAPONS- SA/CS 225/37

2. PEGASUS, JEB STUART II, DELAWARE (April). During the reporting period, the First Team completed two operations and continues in a third. The first fifteen days of April, during Operation Pegasus/Lam Son 207A, the enemy continued withdrawing from the Khe Sanh area, with large segments of his estimated 16 battalion force moving to the west into Laos. Operations against allied forces consisted primarily of delaying tactics for the first week, degenerating into full-scale retreat from the vast firepower of the airmobile forces. The enemy was forced to abandon large amounts of equipment, weapons and ammunition in order to salvage his waning troop strength, seriously depleted by incessant B-52 strikes immediately prior to, and during the early phases of the operation. The enemy offered little or no resistance to allied efforts to open Highway 9; those contacts that materialized were prevented out of desperation upon being trapped by the highly mobile allies. In the later phases of the operation the enemy reacted primarily with standoff rocket and artillery attacks, many from the sanctuary of Laos. The new special forces camp to the west of Lang Vei was stubbornly defended by an estimated battalion, as was the prominent terrain features of Hills 881 North and 471. The enemy took full advantage of holding high ground to delay allied advances to the Laotian border.

Operation JEB STUART II brought the First Team back to the coastal plains to bolster security for the 1st Air Cavalry Division base areas. The enemy conducted reconnaissance and resupply missions in preparation for a second offensive against Quang Tri and Hue City. High level coordination meetings were disclosed through numerous agent reports and many prepared rocket launching sites appeared completely encircling Camp Evans. Simultaneously, the enemy continued their efforts at opening a main supply route from the A Shau Valley to the mountainous area west of Hue City.

The last eleven days of the month of April, the enemy increased his repositioning activity considerably, moving large forces into Base Areas 101 and 114, as well as gathering supplies to support a planned offensive. The A Shau Valley became an area of deep concern to the enemy as the allied forces air assaulted into the long-time logistical complex and base area. The enemy had provided an excellent air defense capability for the valley with at least two battalions of anti-aircraft guns, ranging in size from 12.7mm through
**SUBJECT:** Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

**TAB F:** Enemy Activity (Cont)

37mm. Their cache locations were defended in a semi-balanced condition with weighted area coverage, concentrated on forced avenue of approach. The enemy took full advantage of adverse weather conditions by exercising strict fire disciplines firing at all high flying and larger aircraft, regardless of altitude, with all air defense weapons available.

At the end of the reporting period, the enemy offered only token resistance in the A Shau Valley, seemingly being content with occupying the highly mobile allies in that area and willingly giving up military stores for the advantage of being able to maneuver large fighting forces into Base Areas 101 and 114, ostensibly for the purpose of initiating another offensive.

**OPERATION PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A:**
- KIA-NVA/VC 104/2 CAPTURED- NVA/VC 13/0 WEAPONS- SA/C 473/190

**OPERATION JEB STUART II:**
- KIA-NVA/VC 224/1 CAPTURED- 0/0 WEAPONS- 2/0

**OPERATION DELAWARE/LAM SON 215:** (Continuing)
- KIA-NVA/VC 133/57 CAPTURED- 1/0 WEAPONS- 548/20

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
TAB 6: Aerial Surveillance

1. Mission Statistics for the Period 1 Feb-30 Apr 68.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION TYPE</th>
<th>ASTA SCHED/COMP</th>
<th>III MFP SCHED/COMP</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>606/63</td>
<td>18/UNK</td>
<td>118 HOTSPOTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLAM</td>
<td>211/95</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>2209 MOVING TARGETS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOTO</td>
<td>237/185</td>
<td>41/23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOTO (HAND HELD)</td>
<td>9/9</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. General Comments: Aerial surveillance continued to be severely curtailed by unfavorable weather conditions and the shortage of pilots.

A. IR. During the reporting period the ASTA Platoon was able to complete only 10% of the scheduled missions. A total of 507 missions were cancelled due to weather conditions and 36 cancelled due to aircraft or sensor malfunction. The ASTA Platoon lost one OV-1C aircraft to ground fire on 6 Apr 1968. The aircraft was completely lost. No replacement aircraft has been received to date leaving the ASTA Platoon with 2 remaining OV-1C aircraft.

B. SLAM. The ASTA Platoon continued to support the Market Time operations in conjunction with the US Navy. A total of 211 missions were scheduled and 95 were completed. SLAR Operations were curtailed severely by the loss of one OV-1B aircraft during a rocket attack at Hue-Phu Bai on 26 Mar 68. A replacement OV-1B aircraft was received 21 Apr '68, but was not mission-ready until 27 Apr 68.

C. PHOTO. A total of 237 missions were scheduled during the period of which 52 are still outstanding. A majority of the missions not completed are in the A Shau Valley. A total of 9 hand held missions were conducted by the 3d Brigade in planning their assault into the A Shau. Camouflage detection film was used on 8 missions during the month of Apr and in each case excellent results were obtained. Units desiring camouflage detection missions should submit approximately 4 target areas, assigning each a priority. This will allow the use of a full roll of film.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

TAB H: Intelligence Support Units,

1. Co E, 52d Infantry (LRP). LRP support was provided throughout the reporting period in Operations JEB STUART I & II, PEGASUS and DELAWARE. A total of 66 missions were conducted during the reporting period with a total of 177 sightings of 1 or more NVA/VC. LRP teams continued to provide timely and accurate hard intelligence to the G2. The 1/9 Cav continued to support the LRP's with gunships and infantry Platoons, as required.

2. 191st Military Intelligence Detachment. The 191st MID continued to provide Order of Battle, Counterintelligence, Imagery Interpretation and Interrogation of Prisoners of War support to the Division during the reporting period. Liaison was made with existing intelligence gathering agencies as the 191st MID provided timely reports of enemy activity.

IFW and OB provided a continuing evaluation of the enemy's composition, strength, disposition, and missions through their analysis of captured documents and the interrogation of POWs. Two complete OB handbooks were disseminated during the reporting period, keeping the commanders and staffs at all levels informed of the rapidly changing enemy situation.

3. Division Radar Platoon (Provisional). The Radar Platoon provided limited support during the reporting period. The 54th Inf Radar Detachment was detached from the 1st ACR when the Division moved to I Corps. The Radar Platoon was formed with equipment and cadre personnel of the 54th Inf with a mission of providing radar support to the 1st ACR as well as training radar operators coming in the replacement stream. The Radar Platoon supported all operations during the reporting period and was deployed in Operation DELAWARE at the close of April.

4. Detachment 31, 5th Weather Sdn (USAF). The USAF continued to provide long range and daily weather forecasts to the 1st ACR. Weather was a critical factor during the reporting period as previously indicated.
1. The period 1 Feb 69 to 30 April 1969 showed an improved operating capability for the agencies and sections under the general staff supervision of the AC of S & G. All sections/Agencies continued to consolidate their activities at Camp Evans to provide better service for the division. A small element consisting of 1 officer and 1 clerk, served as G-1 Forward during Operation Burnside/Mam Son 207A.

2. The operating strength of the division remained at approximately one hundred percent of authorized. Casualties during the period included 5 Battalion commanders killed and 2 medially evacuated. Serious shortages continued to exist in Infantry and Armor Captains, Signal Officers, warrant Officer aviators (especially C-7 qualified), Infantry LNS and Artillery 131 & Hs. A staff visit to USARV JCS was made to coordinate replacements during the peak summer rotation period and discuss personnel shortages.

3. Staff visits were made to lst Cav div soldiers in hospitals throughout Vietnam. Methods were worked out to provide a more expedient system for redirecting mail.

4. Personnel Services for the division continued to expand and improve.
   a. A Post Exchange was opened at Camp Evans.
   b. A laundry operated by Vietnamese Nationals was established at Camp Evans.
   c. A central barber shop with local National barbers also opened for business.
   d. A beer and soda bulk sales outlet was established by the Division Club System.
   e. A Piaster exchange point was established.

5. The division filled all In and Out-of-Country TPM allocations during the period. As of 7 March all In-Country TPM's switched from Vung Tau to China Beach in Da Nang. The weekly allocations at China Beach increased in April from 94 to 110 per week.

6. The Custodian, Central Post Fund, traveled to Japan and negotiated contacts for CPF business to include momentoes to be presented to all members of the 1st Cav Troop in desertion Vietnam.

7. A program to reduce the number of officer, NCO and enlisted clubs at Camp Bradliff was initiated. By the end of April all but 1 officer and NCO/Enlisted clubs had been phased out of operation.

8. In March 118 offenses were processed by the Provost Marshal's office indicating a high degree of discipline, law and order throughout the division. The division continued to strictly enforce the off limits policy for all populated areas except for those personal conducting official business and tactical operations.

9. Due to contaminated water, there was an outbreak of gastroenteritis involving approximately 50% of the division during the last two weeks of April. Appropriate steps were taken to prevent a recurrence.

10. Morale in the division remained high.
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**SUBJECT:** Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
**TAB J: Strength Report**

The authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and close of the reporting period were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASGD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beginning</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>1294</td>
<td>1303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WN</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>16333</td>
<td>16273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGS</td>
<td>14234</td>
<td>18136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Close of</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>1370</td>
<td>1287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASGD</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>17392</td>
<td>17288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGS</td>
<td>19472</td>
<td>19282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
During February, March and April the division sustained the following casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>*MIA</th>
<th>NH</th>
<th>CROWN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>1755</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Represents personnel who were reported MIA during this period and who remained in MIA status as of the end of the report period.
The following is a breakout of incoming and outgoing personnel for the period February, March and April.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Replacements Received</th>
<th>Rotateses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>6104</td>
<td>3313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6756</td>
<td>3612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 12th Cav</td>
<td>HHC, 1st Cav Div</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 8th Cav</td>
<td>Co E, 52d Inf</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 8th Cav</td>
<td>HHC, 1st Bde</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 5th Cav</td>
<td>HHC, 2d Bde</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 5th Cav</td>
<td>HHC, 3d Bde</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 12th Cav</td>
<td>8th Engr Bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 7th Cav</td>
<td>13th Sig Bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 7th Cav</td>
<td>15th Admin Co</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn, 7th Cav</td>
<td>515th MP Co</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Sqdn, 9th Cav</td>
<td>504th MP Co</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHB Div Arty</td>
<td>593d MI Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 20th Arty</td>
<td>41st PI Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 19th Arty</td>
<td>42d PI Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 21st Art</td>
<td>25th Inf Plt (97)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 77th Art</td>
<td>34th Inf Plt (97)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry E, 82d Art</td>
<td>26th Chem Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Marine Gun Platoon</td>
<td>184th Chem Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 30th Art</td>
<td>191st MI Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 11th Avn Gp</td>
<td>14th Mil Hist Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th 75 Avn Co</td>
<td>478th Avn Co</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227th Avn Bn</td>
<td>262d Trans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>228th Avn Bn</td>
<td>459th S &amp; E Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229th Avn Bn</td>
<td>371st Rad Res Co</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC &amp; Band</td>
<td>62d Inf Plt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt Qdr</td>
<td>5th WEA Scdn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Med Bn</td>
<td>1st Bn, 50th Inf (Mech)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th S &amp; S Bn</td>
<td>15th TC Bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Maint Bn</td>
<td>27th Maint Bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
TAB D: Task Organization (Cont)

C. 196th Lt Inf Bde
   2-1 Inf
   3-21 Inf
   4-31 Inf

D. 3d ARVN Regt*
   1-3 ARVN
   2-3 ARVN
   2-1 ARVN

E. 1 ACD Control
   2-12 Cav

* Conducting joint operations in cooperation and coordination with 1 ACD
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 April 1982
TAB E: Weather and Terrain

1. JEB STUART I (Feb-Mar). Crachin weather resulting from a moderately strong northeast monsoon affected the JEB STUART AO from 1 Feb to 27 Feb. Some clearing was evidenced on the last two days of the month, although moderate early morning fog was present on those two days also.

Significant effects of the crachin were: ceilings were less than 1500 feet greater than 50% of the time (much of this was less than 500 ft); visibility less than or equal to 3 miles about 60% of the time, and less than 5 miles 85% of the time; measurable precipitation fell on 25 days with a trace recorded on one other; temperatures were 10 degrees below expected maximums but were within one or two degrees of expected minimums; relative humidity remained at its annual high (90-100%).

The previous record, to our knowledge, for persistence of crachin weather was 22 consecutive days. This occurred along the Red River Delta, which is the area of maximum crachin activity, statistically. Although only 2.69 inches of precipitation accumulated during the month almost no evaporation took place due to heavy cloud cover and high relative humidity. Additionally, the daily range of temperatures was only 5-7 degrees when 10-15 degree range was expected. Relating this abnormal crachin weather to the global weather picture it appears, from data available, that the month of February was more severe than average in many parts of the northern hemisphere. This seems especially true on the east coast of the continent. Since crachin weather and its initiator, the northeast monsoon, have their origins in the continental air mass of east Asia any departures from within this air mass reflected in the local day-to-day weather in areas down stream from the source region. This seems to be a case much in evidence throughout the JEB STUART AO in the month of February.

During the first two weeks of March, moderate on-shore flow brought low stratus and fog conditions throughout the JEB STUART AO. Ceilings were 500- at night but generally raised to 1500' to 2000' during daylight hours. Visibility were poor at night and in the morning (4-6 miles), and increased to 4-5 miles in haze during the day. The latter part of the month was characterized by southerly flow during which overall conditions improved. Occasional occurrences of stratus still brought ceilings of 700-1,000', and ground fog was common but daylight ceilings averaged 3000'. Haze continued to limit visibility to 5-6 miles. The extreme and mean temperatures were: Max 94/87; Min 62/70. Rain fell on 12 days with accumulation of 2.31 inches. Average relative humidity was 87%.

2. PEGASUS, JEB STUART II, DELAWARE (April). Operation PEGASUS and Operation JEB STUART II were relatively unaffected by weather. Fog and low stratus limited operational hours to the period 0800-2000 hours on many days. However, during these hours ceilings of 2000' or better and visibility of 5 miles or greater were predominant. Showers fell on 6 days but the accumulation did not significantly affect operations.

Operation Delaware was adversely affected by a late-season frontal passage on 3-4. Accompanying the passage were very low ceilings, fog, and intermittent drizzle and showers. These conditions persisted for four days. As the frontal system dissipated conditions improved somewhat with daytime ceilings 2000' to 3000'. Even these ceilings tended to partially obscure some of the higher peaks. Night time fog and low stratus persisted through month's end. Precipitation accumulation was not a significant factor.

Maximum temperatures for April: Extreme 98, mean 88; minimum temperatures for the month: extreme 62, mean 73. Rainfall: Coast 2.67 inches; mountains 3.53 inches. Mean Relative Humidity 87%.

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TAB E
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

TAB F: Enemy Activity

1. JEB STUART I (Feb-Mar). Prior to launching the TET Offensive, the 812th Regt, 325B NVA Division moved from the west to Quang Binh (P) NVA on 3 December to Base Area 101 to participate in the attack on Quang Tri City. Other participate already in the Quang Tri area were the 54th Fn, 5th NVA Regt, and the 10th Sapper Bn. The 6th Regt was operating from Base Area 114 in the vicinity of Hue. The newly formed 4th Regt operated in the Phu Loc area. The 12th Sapper Bn and the Hue City Sapper Bn operated to the west of Hue City under the control of Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region H. The 90th LF Bn was operating South and West of Hue.

The unsuccessful attack of Quang Tri City was launched at 0300 hrs 31 January. The principle reasons for its failure were poor coordination, lack of reconnaissance, and underestimation of the 1st AOD's capabilities. Approximately 700 were killed. After the attack part of the 812th Regiment moved to the Thac Ma River area South and East of Hai Lang. Other elements returned to Base Area 101.

The enemy attack on Hue City achieved surprise and was successful in seizing a major portion of the city. As pressure from allied elements increased the enemy was forced back along the western wall. The 416th Fn, 5th Regt, which had moved from the Hai Lang Forest, arrived in Hue to reinforce on 17 February. It passed south of Khe Sanh, through the Ba Lonir Valley, through Base Area 101 and 114, through the Lo Chu area and arrived at Hue on 22 and 23 February. The 7th Fn entered the city on 22 Feb. Elements of the 8th Fn landed on the following day. The 29th Regt, 3250 NVA Div, had also moved from the Khe Sanh area to reinforce enemy elements of Hue. The pressure exerted from the west of Hue initiated on 21 Feb by the 1st AOD, dispelled any enemy hope of permanently holding Hue. On 25 Feb enemy elements vacated the city with the 6th Regt, 90th Regt (-) and 29th Regt (-) moving to the west and southwest of Hue and the 4th Regt moving south to the Nam Boa area controlled by the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region which was located southwest of the city. Enemy losses in the battle are presently carried at over 5000 enemy killed.

Since the battle of Hue City elements of 803d Regt, 324th NVA Div have moved east along the coast from the Cua Viet area to a position north and northwest of Hue. The 48th and 52d Regt's of the 390th NVA Div have moved from the Cam Lo area toward Cua Viet. Within the JEB STUART AC, the enemy has been concerned with the evacuation of the Hue area and protecting supply routes along the Thach Ma and Song Bo Rivers for supply of Base Area 101 and 114 (southeast) respectively. Enemy construction on route 547 from A Shau Valley to Hue City and indications of large movements of fresh units and replacements show the determination of the enemy to attempt new large scale attacks in the Quang Tri-Hue Area.

KIA-NVA/VC 1,543/150; CAPTURED- NVA/CS 32/9; WEAPONS- SA/OS 351/106

During the first 2 weeks of March the enemy continued to reorganize, reinforce, and resupply in preparation for a renewed offensive. Operations against allied units initially appeared to be harassment in nature, characterized by stand off attacks by rocket and/or mortar fire, interdiction of communications routes, and extensive use of mines and booby traps in areas critical to friendly supply activities. The enemy increased his activity in the A Shau Valley and along Route 547 to establish a large logistical base and a secure communications route west of Hue. The numerous rocket positions oriented toward US and allied installations, and a decrease in normal activity indicate the imminence of a renewed offensive.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1964

TAB E. Enemy Activity (Cont)

In addition to normal supply and security movements the enemy began repositioning units in preparation for renewed offensive action. The 5th BN, 5th Regt moved from Base Area 101 to the coastal plains area northeast of Huế and Quang Tri City, and conducted population control operations in preparation for the attack on Quang Tri City. The 2d BN, 903d Regt moved southeast from the Quang Tri City area and joined the remainder of the 903d Regiment in the vicinity of Huế. This move was accomplished in less than 36 hours.

During the last two weeks of March the Allies launched aggressive attacks against known and suspected enemy concentrations, with the 1st ACD attacking into Base Area 101 and Base Area 114, the 101st ABN Div attacking northwest of Huế and southwest of the city along Hwy 547, and 1st ARVN Division attacking west, north, and south of Huế and west into the staging area north of Hwy 547. ARC Lights, Air Strikes and Naval Gunfire were employed against known enemy concentrations. The Allies quickly gained the initiative, disorganized the enemy, and forced the enemy to abandon his plans for an offensive, at least temporarily.

KIA-NVA/VC 852/207; CAPTURED- NVA/VC 36/42; WEAPONS- SA/CS 295/37

2. PEGASUS, JEB STUART II, DELAWARE (April). During the reporting period, the First Team completed two operations and continues in a third. The first fifteen days of April, during Operation Pegasus/Lam Son 207A, the enemy continued withdrawing from the Khe Sanh area, with large segments of his estimated 16 battalion force moving to the west into Laos. Operations against allied forces consisted primarily of delaying tactics for the first week, degenerating into full-scale retreat from the vast firepower of the airmobile forces. The enemy was forced to abandon large amounts of equipment, weapons and ammunition in order to salvage his waning troop strength, seriously depleted by inescapable B-52 strikes immediately prior to, and during the early phases of the operation. The enemy offered little or no resistance to allied efforts to open Highway 9; those contacts that materialized were frustrated out of desperation upon being trapped by the highly mobile allies. In the later phases of the operation the enemy reacted primarily with standoff rocket and artillery attacks, many from the sanctuary of Laos. The new special forces camp to the west of Lang Vei was stubbornly defended by an estimated battalion, as was the prominent terrain features of Hills 881 North and 471. The enemy took full advantage of holding high ground to delay allied advances to the Laotian border.

Operation JEB STUART II brought the First Team back to the coastal plains to bolster security for the 1st Air Cavalry Division base areas. The enemy conducted reconnaissance and resupply missions in preparation for a second offensive against Quang Tri and Huế City. High level coordination meetings were disclosed through numerous agent reports and many prepared rocket launching sites appeared completely encircling Camp Evans. Simultaneously, the enemy continued their efforts at opening a main supply route from the A Shau Valley to the mountainous area west of Huế City.

The last eleven days of the month of April, the enemy increased his repositioning activity considerably, moving large forces into Base Areas 101 and 114, as well as gathering supplies to support a planned offensive. The A Shau Valley became an area of deep concern to the enemy as the allied forces air assaulted into the long-time logistical complex and base area. The enemy had provided an excellent air defense capability for the valley with at least two battalions of anti-aircraft guns, ranging in size from 12.7mm through
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969

TAB F: Enemy Activity (Cont)

37mm. Their cache locations were defended in a semi-balanced condition with weighted area coverage, concentrated on forced avenue of approach. The enemy took full advantage of adverse weather conditions by exercising strict fir discrimination: firing at all high flying and larger aircraft, regardless of altitude, with all air defense weapons available.

At the end of the reporting period, the enemy offered only token resistance in the A Shau Valley, seemingly being content with occupying the highly mobile allies in that area and willingly giving up military stores for the advantage of being able to maneuver large fighting forces into Base Areas 101 and 114, ostensibly for the purpose of initiating another offensive.

OPERATION PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A:
- KIA-NVA/VC 1042/2 CAPTURED- NVA/VC 13/0 WEAPONS- SA/CS 473/190

OPERATION JEB STUART II:
- KIA-NVA/VC 224/1 CAPTURED- 0/0 WEAPONS- 2/0

OPERATION DELAWARE/LAM SON 216: (Continuing)
- KIA-NVA/VC 133/57 CAPTURED- 1/0 WEAPONS- 548/20
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

TAB G: Aerial Surveillance

1. Mission Statistics for the Period 1 Feb-30 Apr 68.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION TYPE</th>
<th>ASTA SCHD/COMP</th>
<th>III M-P SCHD/COMP</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>606/63</td>
<td>18/UNK</td>
<td>118 HOTSFOTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLAR</td>
<td>211/95</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>2209 MOVING TARGETS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOTO</td>
<td>237/135</td>
<td>41/23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOTO (HAND HELD)</td>
<td>9/9</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. General Comments:

A. IR. During the reporting period the ASTA Platoon was able to complete only 10% of the scheduled missions. A total of 507 missions were cancelled due to weather conditions and 36 cancelled due to aircraft or sensor malfunction. The ASTA Platoon lost one OV-1C aircraft to ground fire on 6 Apr 1968. The aircraft was completely lost. No replacement aircraft has been received to date leaving the ASTA Platoon with 2 remaining OV-1C aircraft.

B. SLAR. The ASTA Platoon continued to support the Market Time operations in conjunction with the US Navy. A total of 211 missions were scheduled and 95 were completed. SLAR Operations were curtailed severely by the loss of one OV-1B aircraft during a rocket attack at Hue-Phu Bai on 24 Mar 68. A replacement OV-1B aircraft was received 21 Apr 68, but was not mission-ready until 27 Apr 68.

C. PHOTO. A total of 237 missions were scheduled during the period of which 52 are still outstanding. A majority of the missions not completed are in the A Shau Valley. A total of 9 hand held missions were conducted by the 3d Brigade in planning their assault into the A Shau. Camouflage detection film was used on 8 missions during the month of Apr and in each case excellent results were obtained. Units desiring camouflage detection missions should submit approximately 4 target areas, assigning each a priority. This will allow the use of a full roll of film.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
TAB H: Intelligence Support Units.

1. Co E, 52d Infantry (LRP). LRP support was provided throughout the reporting period in Operations JEB STUART I & II, PEGASUS and DELAWARE. A total of 66 missions were conducted during the reporting period with a total of 177 sightings of 1 or more NVA/VC. LRP teams continued to provide timely and accurate hard intelligence to the G2. The 1/9 Cav continued to support the LRP's with gunships and infantry Platoons, as required.

2. 191st Military Intelligence Detachment. The 191st MTD continued to provide Order of Battle, Counterintelligence, Imagery Interpretation and Interrogation of Prisoners of War support to the Division during the reporting period. Liaison was made with existing intelligence gathering agencies as the 191st MTD provided timely reports of enemy activity.

IFW and OB provided a continuing evaluation of the enemy's composition, strength, disposition and missions through their analysis of captured documents and the interrogation of PW's. Two complete OB handbooks were disseminated during the reporting period, keeping the commanders and staffs at all levels informed of the rapidly changing enemy situation.

3. Division Radar Platoon (Provisional). The Radar Platoon provided limited support during the reporting period. The 54th Inf Radar Detachment was detached from the 1st ACR when the Division moved to I Corps. The Radar Platoon was formed with equipment and cadre personnel of the 54th Inf with a mission of providing radar support to the 1st ACR as well as training radar operators coming in the replacement stream. The Radar Platoon supported all operations during the reporting period and was deployed in Operation DELAWARE at the close of April.

4. Detachment 31, 5th Weather Sqn (USAF). The USAF continued to provide long range and daily weather forecasts to the 1st ACR. Weather was a critical factor during the reporting period as previously indicated.
SUR MT: '07-rationallR rort. for C'Mpreljl Field. Endi-ine 30 April.1Ss

TAR I: Snriar- of 1-1. Activiti.es
1. The period 1 Feb 66 to 30 April 1966 showed an improved operating capability for the agencies and sections under the general staff supervision of the AG of S, C. All sections/agencies continued to consolidate their activities for Camp Evans to provide better service for the division. A small element consisting of 1 officer and 1 clerk, served as Tl Forward during Operation Perasus/Lam Son 207A.

2. The operating strength of the division remained at approximately one hundred per cent of authorized. Key losses during the period included 2 Battalion Commanders killed and 2 medically evacuated. Serious shortages continued to exist in Infantry and Armor Captains, Signal Officers, former Officer aviators (especially O-127 qualified), Infantry 11B's and Artillery 13A & B's. A staff visit to HARRAG was made to coordinate replacements during the peak summer rotation period and discuss personnel shortages.

3. Staff visits were made to 1st Cavalry soldiers in hospitals throughout Vietnam. Methods were worked out to provide a more expeditious system for redirecting mail.

4. Personnel Services for the division continued to expand and improve.
   a. A Post Exchange was opened at Camp Evans.
   b. A laundry operated by Vietnamese Nationals was established at Camp Evans.
   c. A central barber shop with Local National barbers also opened for business.
   d. A beer and soda bulk sales outlet was established by the Division Club System.
   e. A Plaster exchange point was established.

5. The division filled all In and Cut-of-Country R&R allocations during the period. As of 7 March all In-Country R&R's switched from Vung Tau to China Beach in Da Nang. The weekly allocations at China Beach increased in April from 34 to 110 per week.

6. The Custodian, Central Post Fund, traveled to Japan and negotiated contacts for CPF business to include momentos to be presented to all members of the FIRST TEAM departing Vietnam.

7. A program to reduce the number of officer, NCO and Enlisted clubs at Camp Radcliff was initiated. By the end of April all but 1 officer and 1 NCO/EM clubs had been phased out of operation.

8. In March 11B offenses were processed by the Provost Marshal's office indicating a high degree of discipline, law and order throughout the division. The division continued to strictly enforce the off limits policy for all populated areas except for those personnel conducting official business and tactical operations.

9. Due to contaminated water, there was an outbreak of gastroenteritis involving approximately 50% of the division during the last two weeks of April. Appropriate steps were taken to preclude a recurrence.

10. Morale in the division remained high.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1966
TAB J: Strength Report

The authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and close of the reporting period were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>ENL</th>
<th>AGF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beginning of Period</td>
<td>1294</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>16333</td>
<td>18234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ASGD</td>
<td>1303</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>16273</td>
<td>18136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close of Period</td>
<td>1370</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>17392</td>
<td>19472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASGD</td>
<td>1287</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>17288</td>
<td>19181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
TAB K: Casualty Report

During February, March and April the division sustained the following casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>*MIA</th>
<th>NH</th>
<th>GROWN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>1755</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Represents personnel who were reported MIA during this period and who remained in MIA status as of the end of the report period.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
T/B L: Replacement Report

The following is a breakout of incoming and outgoing personnel for the period February, March and April.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Replacements Received</th>
<th>Rotateses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>6104</td>
<td>2312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4675</td>
<td>3612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 12th Cav</td>
<td>HHC, 1st Cav Div</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 8th Cav</td>
<td>Co E, 52d Inf</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 8th Cav</td>
<td>HHC, 1st Bde</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 5th Cav</td>
<td>HHC, 2d Bde</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 5th Cav</td>
<td>HHC, 3d Bde</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 12th Cav</td>
<td>8th Engr Bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 7th Cav</td>
<td>13th Sig Bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 7th Cav</td>
<td>15th Admin Co</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn, 7th Cav</td>
<td>515th MP Co</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Sqdn, 9th Cav</td>
<td>504th MP Co</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC Div Arty</td>
<td>583d MI Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 20th Arty</td>
<td>41st PI Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 19th Arty</td>
<td>42d PI Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 21st Arty</td>
<td>25th Inf Plt (97)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 77th Arty</td>
<td>34th Inf Plt (97)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry E, 62d Arty</td>
<td>26th Chem Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Marine Gun Platoon</td>
<td>18th Chem Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 30th Arty</td>
<td>191st MI Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 11th Avn Cp</td>
<td>14th Mil Hist Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th 75 Avn Co</td>
<td>478th Avn Co</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227th Avn Bn</td>
<td>382d Trans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>228th Avn Bn</td>
<td>459th Sig Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229th Avn Bn</td>
<td>371st Rad Res Co</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC &amp; Band</td>
<td>62d Inf Plt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt Cmd</td>
<td>5th Wea Scdn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Med Bn</td>
<td>1st Bn, 50th Inf (Mech)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th S&amp;S Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th TC Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Maint Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
TAB 2: Military Police Activities

1. During the period 1 Feb-30 Apr 68, the Office of the Provost Marshal, 1st Air Cavalry Division processed a total of 193 offenses that were committed within the 1st Air Cavalry Division's area of responsibility.
   a. Offender Statistics:
      Category
      Crimes against persons and property  31
      Miscellaneous offenses  33
      Military offenses  57
      Traffic violations  62
      TOTAL  183

      b. Comments on Offender Statistics:
         (1) Crimes against persons and property: Frauds (9) and larcenies (19) accounted for the majority of offenders within this category.
         (2) Miscellaneous Offenses: Wrongful possession and/or use of marijuana accounted for 27 offenders.
         (3) Military Offenses: This category included 30 off-limits, 9 AWOL, one careless discharge of a firearm, one losing military property through neglect, and one making of a false official document.
         (4) Traffic Violations: There were 54 individuals cited as speeding offenders during this reporting period.

2. Detainee Report:
   Category
   Returnees  12
   VC  49
   NVA  65
   Civil Defendants  116
   Innocent Civilians  739
   Total  981
1. General. During the period 1 Feb-30 Apr 68 combat service support was provided for five major operations: PERISHING, JEB STUART, PEGASUS, JEB STUART II, and DELAWARE.

2. The 2d Brigade remained in Operation PERISHING until 20 Feb and was provided combat service support by the 1st FSE collocated with the bridge at LZ Uplift.

3. Operation JEB STUART which began on 24 Jan continued until 31 March. The Division Support Command established the Logistical Control Center at Phu Bai. During the initial phase of the operation all supply support came from FLSG-A of the III MAF, Force Logistics Command located at Phu Bai. Shortly after the beginning of the operation 1st Log Command formed the Ta Nang Support Command which was to assume responsibility for logistical support of all B5 Army units in ICTZ. During the TET Offensive the LOC from Phu Bai to the division was cut because of the NVA occupation of Hue. To circumvent this, logistic support was shifted from FLSG-A to FLSG-B at Dong Ha and the operation was supported by land LOC from Dong Ha. Because of the shortage of ground transportation it was necessary to supplement the resupply received by land LOC with emergency air drop of ammunition and rations into Camp Evans. In early March, 25th General Support Group, the subordinate element of Ta Nang Support Command responsible for support of US Army units in Northern ICTZ, established a Logistical Over the Shore (LOTS) operational site at Wunder Beach and began providing resupply to the elements of the division from this source.

By the conclusion of the operation logistic support from Wunder Beach had expanded to a point where most supply requirements were filled by material from this source although some supply was still being furnished by FLSG-A and FLSG-B.

A. The 1st Brigade assumed responsibility for the Northern portion of the AO and established its base at LZ Betty. Combat service support was provided by the 2d FSE with FSA support provided by Task Force Moroz. Resupply was accomplished by land LOC from FLSG-B and Wunder Beach.

B. The 2d Brigade 101st Abn was under the OPCON of the 1st Air Cavalry Division for the first part of the operation and assumed responsibility for the central portion of the AO. The brigade established its base at LZ Jane and was provided combat service support by the 2d FSE with FSE support from Task Force Moroz. Resupply was accomplished by land LOC from FLSG-B and Wunder Beach.

C. The 3d Brigade assumed responsibility for the southern portion of the AO and established its base at Camp Evans. Combat service support was provided by the 3d FSE with FSA support provided by Task Force T cDonald collocated with the FSE. Resupply was accomplished by land LOC from FLSG-A, FLSG-B and Wunder Beach.

D. The 2d Brigade did not arrive in the JEB STUART AO until 1 March at which time they relieved the 2d Brigade 101st Abn. of responsibility for the central portion of the AO and established their base at LZ Jane. Combat service support was provided by the 1st FSE with FSA support from Task Force Moroz. Resupply was accomplished by land LOC from FLSG-A, FLSG-B and Wunder Beach.

E. The 2d Brigade 101st after being relieved from the central portion of the AO remained OPCON, moved to an area south of the 3d Brigade, and established a base at LZ Sally. Combat service support was provided by the organic FSE and resupply was accomplished by land LOC from Wunder Beach and FLSG-A. Soon after the move to the new area the 2d Bde 101st reverted to control of the 101st Abn.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
TAB AA: 0-4 Operations

4. Operation PEGASUS which ran from 1 to 15 April 1968 involved all three 1st Air Cavalry Division brigades, the 1st Marine Regiment, and the 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force.

A. Each of the 1st Air Cavalry Division brigades established its trains at LZ Stud. Prior to the operation, the FSE's were repositioned so the appropriately numbered FSE began habitual association with the corresponding brigade (the 1st with the 1st, etc.). The three numbered FSE's collocated with the brigades at LZ Stud. A provisional FSE was organized to provide support to the division units remaining at Camp Evans.

B. The 1st Marine Regiment established its trains at Ca Lu Combat Base and was provided combat service support by a Marine Shore Party Company from the 3d Marine Division.

C. The 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force established its trains at LZ Stud and was provided combat service support by the 1st FSE.

D. FSA support for the operation was provided by FSA/LSA Task Force McDonald. This was a joint Army-Marine task force provided by 1st Log Command USASUPCOM-DSC and augmented by Force Logistics Command. Resupply to LZ Stud was accomplished by land LOG over Highway 9 from Wunder Beach and Dong He. All resupply forward of LZ Stud, except for the Marine regiment, was accomplished by organic helicopters. During Operation PEGASUS Task Force Langley continued to provide FSA support to the units of the division which remained at Camp Evans.

5. Operation JEB STUART II was primarily a staging exercise during which the 1st and 3d Brigades with their respective FSE's returned to their rear bases in the JEB STUART AO and began preparation for future operations. The 2d Brigade with the 2d FSE came under the OPCON of the 3d Mar Div at the conclusion of Operation Pegasus and continues to operate in the 3d Mar Div AO at the close of the reporting period.

6. Operation DELAWARE began on 19 April and continues at the close of the reporting period. It involves 1st and 3d Brigades 1st Air Cavalry Division, the 3d Regiment 1st ARVN Division and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

A. The 1st Brigade base is located at LZ Stallion with the 1st FSE collocated with the Brigade trains.

B. The 3d Brigade forward base is located at LZ Forever with the 3d Brigade Trains and the 3d FSE remaining at Camp Evans providing combat service support by helicopter from the rear base.

C. The 3d Regiment 1st ARVN Division established its base at LZ Lillian and is receiving combat service support from the 1st FSE at LZ Stallion.

D. The 196th Light Infantry Brigade established its base at Camp Evans to operate in an AO southwest of Camp Evans. Combat service support is provided by the organic FSE. The Provisional FSE continues to support 1st Air Cavalry Division units at Camp Evans.

E. FSA support provided by 1st Log Command USASUPCOM-DSC in the A Shau Valley consists of augmentation to the 1st FSE to run as ASP at LZ Stallion and to provide GR service. Task Force Langley continues to provide FSA support to all units at Camp Evans.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

TAB 895: Logistics

I. Supply and Services

A. Class I Activities: During the quarter, 4,575 tons of Class I were issued to divisional and supporting units.

B. Class II and IV:
   1. Received, processed and shipped 176 lifelines to forward elements.
   2. 13,000 tons of clothing, equipment and barrier materials were issued during the period.

C. Class III:
   1. 24 linflines were shipped for a total of 61.1 tons.
   2. A total of 245 fuel samples were analyzed; of these 192 were on grade, 30 met use of limits and 24 were off specifications.
   3. Issues of 7,286,154 gallons of fuel were made during the quarter.

D. Class V:
   1. 13 lifelines were processed and shipped to forward elements.
   2. Class V personnel destroyed 121 tons of unserviceable ammunition.
   3. Received and processed 5 ammunition malfunctions reports.
   4. Pre-USARV AGI inspections and liaison visits made to unit Class V storage facilities throughout the division.

E. Food Service Activities:
   1. Local facilities for procurement of ice were inspected in coordination with the Division Surgeon's office.
   2. Pre-USARV AGI inspections and liaison/advisory visits were conducted at messhalls throughout the division. Emphasis was placed on proper sanitation and field messins procedures.

F. Aerial Supply Activities
   1. AES personnel packed 38 Martin Baker parachutes for division aviation units and 18 B-12 parachutes were repacked.
   2. Rigger support was provided to LZ's Jane, Betty, Sharon, Stud, Stallion, and Camp Evans.
   3. Emergency resupply airdrops conducted vic Camp Evans with 79 C-130 sorties delivering 1,133 tons of supplies.
   4. A combined 16 man rigger detachment at LZ Stud was responsible for the rigging of 4,329,137 lbs of assorted supplies in support of divisional operations.
   5. A five (5) man rigger detachment was inserted into Khe Sanh to assist in sling loading 300,000 lbs of defective ammunition to a destruction site.
   6. Serviceability inspections of air items were made and necessary replacement items were issued.

G. The following supplies were issued during the quarter:
   1. Class I (Short tons)
      a. A-Rations 640.64
      b. B-Rations 1,038.77
      c. C Rations 1,822.09
      Total- 3,501.50
   2. Class II-IV (Short tons)
      a. Clothing and equipment-3,460
      b. Fortification materials 9,540
      Total- 13,000
   3. Class II (Gallons)
      a. AVGAS- 267,265
      b. JP-4- 5,085,968
      c. MOGAS- 1,044,884
      d. DF-8- 891,027
      TOTAL- 7,286,154
II. Transportation and Maintenance

A. Air transportation significant movements during the period 1 Feb-30 April 68 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ORIG</th>
<th>DEST</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>CARGO LBS</th>
<th>Pax</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>5 Feb</td>
<td>586 Sig</td>
<td>AK</td>
<td>Chu</td>
<td>C-130</td>
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<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>7 Feb</td>
<td>Div APO</td>
<td>AK</td>
<td>Phu-B</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>18,450</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>11 Feb</td>
<td>2/101 Eng</td>
<td>Phu-B</td>
<td>AT</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>376,440</td>
<td>81</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12 Feb</td>
<td>Div EL</td>
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<td>C-130</td>
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<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>24 Feb</td>
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<td>DNG</td>
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<td>PHU-B</td>
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<td>13 Mar</td>
<td>15th S&amp;S</td>
<td>AK</td>
<td>PHU-B</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>17,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>23 Mar</td>
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<td>AK</td>
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<td>1/9 Cav</td>
<td>AK</td>
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<td>C-130</td>
<td>144,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>27 Mar</td>
<td>13 Sig</td>
<td>TSN</td>
<td>OT</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>8,648</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>31 Mar</td>
<td>15 S&amp;S</td>
<td>AK</td>
<td>Phu-B</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>11 Apr</td>
<td>ARVN Rngr</td>
<td>KHE-S</td>
<td>DNG</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>12 Apr</td>
<td>ARVN Rngr</td>
<td>KHE-S</td>
<td>DNG</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>2 Apr</td>
<td>2 Bde</td>
<td>LZ Stud Evans</td>
<td>C-123</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>169</td>
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<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>13 Apr</td>
<td>2 Bde</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>C-123</td>
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<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>14 Apr</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>C-123</td>
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<td>99</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>14 Apr</td>
<td>ARVN TF</td>
<td>KHE-S</td>
<td>Phu-B</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>94</td>
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<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>15 Apr</td>
<td>ARVN TF</td>
<td>KHE-S</td>
<td>Phu-B</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>39,200</td>
<td>156</td>
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<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>15 Apr</td>
<td>2 Bde</td>
<td>LZ Stud Evans</td>
<td>C-123</td>
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<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>16 Apr</td>
<td>ARVN TF</td>
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<td>Phu-B</td>
<td>C-123</td>
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<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>17 Apr</td>
<td>ARVN TF</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>C-123</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>18 Apr</td>
<td>ARVN TF</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>C-123</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>OL</td>
<td>21 Apr</td>
<td>15 S&amp;S</td>
<td>AK</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>36,900</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<td>29 Apr</td>
<td>EOD Tm Evans</td>
<td>AK</td>
<td>C-123</td>
<td>7,160</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Air movement required because of road interdiction by enemy action.

B. Aerial resupply. Because of road interdiction by enemy action, insufficient availability of ground transportation, and weather conditions the division received emergency supplies by air drop as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>WEIGHT</th>
<th>CLASS SUPPLIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-8 Feb</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>946,615 lbs</td>
<td>Cl I, II, III, IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Feb</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>211,100 lbs</td>
<td>Cl V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Feb</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>195,900 lbs</td>
<td>Cl V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Feb</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>416,836 lbs</td>
<td>Cl V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Feb</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>255,000 lbs</td>
<td>Cl V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Feb</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>260,719 lbs</td>
<td>Cl V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Apr</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>440,000 lbs</td>
<td>Cl V</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 Apr</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>478,000 lbs</td>
<td>Cl V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Apr</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>486,000 lbs</td>
<td>Cl V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Apr</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>616,000 lbs</td>
<td>Cl I &amp; V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Apr</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>474,000 lbs</td>
<td>Cl I &amp; V</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Sea (USAF) Airlift and courier service

(1) During the reporting period cargo/passenger flights continued to serve An Khe for the movement of PCS and R&R personnel.
(2) Daily courier service was continued throughout the period with C7A between An Khe, Hue-Phu Bai, Quang Tri, Camp Evans, and LZ Stud as required.

(3) At the request of I ACD, TMA MACV established two daily C-130 flights between An Khe, Hue-Phu Bai, Quang Tri, Hue-Phu Bai, An Khe, Cam Manh Bay, for the movement of replacements, RAR, PCS, and administrative personnel which were in excess of C7A movement capability.

D. Ground Transportation. Transportation resources for division support during the reporting period were inadequate. Daily line haul transportation for the movement of supplies from supporting activities had to be augmented with organic transportation assets. Transportation support for aerial port clearance, unit movement, and local haul, was limited.

E. Ground Maintenance:

(1) Operational readiness of vehicles and equipment deadline during the reporting period was a result of the following:
   a. Lack of transportation support, causing available vehicles to be overloaded and otherwise abused.
   b. Inclement weather and lack of proper maintenance facilities.
   c. Inadequate repair parts supply because of inadequate repair parts resupply channels.
   d. Lack of emphasis on driver-operator maintenance.

(2) Road spot checks were reinstated in the JEB STUART AO during the first week of the reporting period, and has continued throughout the period.

III. Aircraft Maintenance

A. The following number of aircraft, by type, have been dropped from accountability during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ACFT</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-13S</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1B</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47A</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACH-47A</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>CH-54A</td>
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<tr>
<td>OV-1B</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OV-1C</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. The following number of aircraft by type, have been received from depot stock or other commands during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ACFT</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
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<tr>
<td>OH-1B</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>UH-1C</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>CH-47A</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47B</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>CH-54A</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OV-1B</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OV-1C</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-6A</td>
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<td>1</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
The E/1 Logistics (Cont)

C. FEED Aircraft ASL by DSU Unit % Fill

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co A</th>
<th>Co B</th>
<th>Co C</th>
<th>Co D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
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<td>69</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avionics</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>91</td>
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</table>

D. Average Mission Ready % FEED

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>CH-13S</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1B</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47A</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-54</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OV-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>V-6A</td>
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</table>

E. March Aircraft ASL by DSU % Fill

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<th>Co C</th>
<th>Co D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>79</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avionics</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>88</td>
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</table>

F. Aircraft Mission Ready % March

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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OV-1B/C</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-13S</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>86</td>
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<tr>
<td>CH-47A</td>
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<td>CH-54B</td>
<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>CH-54A</td>
<td>62</td>
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</table>

G. Aircraft Mission Ready % April

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</thead>
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<td>OH-13S</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1B</td>
<td>72</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
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<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47A</td>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td>CH-54A</td>
<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>OH-1B</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>OH-1C</td>
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<td>U-6A</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
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</table>

ASL for the month of April was not available.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarter: Period Ending 30 April 1968
TAB CC: Psychological Operations

1. General: Psychological operations were conducted in support of tactical operations to encourage popular support for the Government of South Vietnam ( SVN), to convince the civilian population in contested areas to withhold support of VC/NVA forces and to cause disaffection, defection, and reduction of combat effectiveness of VC/NVA forces. After the Tet offensive an intensive campaign was initiated to regain popular support for SVN. This campaign continued throughout all operations. During this reporting period a civilian rewards campaign was conducted to gain information about locations of enemy forces, rockets, mines and booby traps, weapons caches, and L/C's. During February psychological operations included a campaign to counter rumors pertaining to a possible coalition government in South Vietnam. During the period 8-28 Feb 68 the Chieu Hoi program was discontinued. Except for this period, an intensive Chieu Hoi campaign was conducted during the reporting period. This campaign emphasized advantages of the Chieu Hoi Program, family separations, heavy casualties, lack of adequate medical treatment, and superiority of allied firepower. During Operation JEB STUART, the Chieu Hoi campaign was directed at VC/NVA forces. In April the Chieu Hoi campaign conducted in vicinity of Khe Sanh and A Shau Valley, was directed solely at the NVA. A campaign to explain good treatment of PWS's was also conducted during all operations. One NVA atrocity in Thu Thien Province was exploited by dropping quick reaction leaflets in the immediate vicinity of the atrocity.

2. Support:
   A. The 9th Air Commando Squadron flew 512 of 1,113 tape and leaflet missions requested. Using O2B and C-47 aircraft, 51,483,000 leaflets were dropped and 21.5 hrs of loudspeaker appeal time were broadcast. Artillery fire and adverse weather conditions caused cancellations of many 9th ACS Psyops missions.

   B. The 7th Psyops BN located at Da Nang provided printing and tape support, one HB team to each Brigade, and liaison with the 9th ACS. The quality of printing was generally good. However, some delays were encountered in delivery of leaflets to Division Psyops Section. Continuous planning by Division Psyops personnel and direct coordination with 7th Psyops BN was required to insure a sufficient quantity of appropriate leaflets to support sustained operations.

   C. Each HB team provided limited Psyops exploitation using a 250 watt ground loudspeaker and a 1000 watt aerial loudspeaker system mounted on a UH-1 helicopter. The Brigade HB teams broadcast 17.1 hours ground loudspeaker time, 42 hours heliborne loudspeaker time and disseminated 1,008,170 leaflets. During period 15-30 Apr one HB team remained attached to the 2d Bde, which was OCPON to 3d Mar Division. The tactical situation, adverse weather conditions, and separation of HB teams from Brigade MAC's occasionally hampered extensive use of these teams.

   C. Armed Propaganda teams were not used extensively during this period. An acute shortage of Ho Chi Chans in I Corps limited their availability. Introduction of Armed Propaganda Teams into the Khe Sanh and A Shau Valley AO's was not considered feasible. Three two-man APT's were used with each Brigade Psyops (HB) Team for one week in March. Their use enhanced face-to-face persuasion. APT's were obtained from Guang Tri Province Chieu Hoi Center. They are most effectively employed in small groups of two or three Ho Chi Chans under direct control of the HB teams.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
TAB CO: Psychological Operations (Cont)

E. Thirty Kit Carson Scouts were assigned to the Division during this reporting period. They were employed with the infantry companies, rifle platoons and "D" Troop, 1/9 Cavalry. Their employment continued to be effective.

3. Chieu Hoi Program: An intensive Chieu Hoi campaign was continued throughout all operations. Twenty-nine (29) Hoi Chans (NVA/VC) rallied in the 1 ACR AO during this period. A minimum of 8 Hoi Chans rallied as a direct result of heliborne appeals broadcast in support of ground operations. Many of the Hoi Chans were immediately exploited for psyops by live and tape recorded messages appealing to their comrades to rally to the SVN. The messages were broadcast by heliborne loudspeaker. Leaflet messages with the same appeals were written by the Hoi Chans, and produced and disseminated by the 7th Psyops Bn and 9th ACS respectively.
The TET Offensive caused many refugees and displaced persons during the month of February. Many people were caught away from home when fighting erupted and could not move on the roads. Others fled from battle areas. In Phong Dien and Ruong Tra Districts a large number of civilians and refugees were without food because transportation could not move on the roads. This problem was solved by air lifting rice, corn meal and bulgar wheat to the respective districts. Later, foodstuffs were also air lifted to Quang Dien, Huong Dien and Hai Lang Districts. In March the refugee problem lessened throughout the AO as supply routes were reopened and the people were able to return to their homes. A major effort during this period was the relocation of approximately 3,000 people from Utah Beach to an area approximately 3 kilometers to the south-east (TD5254). Coordination was effected with Hai Lang District and Province Officials. Actual movement of people began on 22 March and took approximately one week to complete. Assistance was furnished in the way of food, MEDCAPS, lumber, and some transportation. The civic action program began to expand. Laundry facilities were opened by 3d Pde and DivARTY in Phong Dien. The Div HS Co. medics provided almost daily assistance to the Phong Dien Disbursary. Sandbag fill points continued to be operated near LZ's Evans, Jane and Betty. During Operation PEGASUS the only significant CA activity was movement of 316 refugees from the AO to the refugee camp at Cam Lo. Population within the PEGASUS AO was very sparse. To date, no native people have been found living in the A Shau Valley. In April civic action projects continued by rear elements at LZ's Evans, Jane and Betty-Sharon. At the end of April the civic action program was steadily improving and increasing throughout the AO. Cooperation from the local populace is up from February. At the beginning of the quarter a civil affairs team was attached from the 29th CA Company. This team was withdrawn on 12 March 1968 due to a reorganization of the company and relocation of teams. Loss of this team has hampered civil affairs activities. Support has not been received from CA teams attached to Province.
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Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68

CG, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

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