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AGAM-P (M) (7 Aug 68) FOR OT RD 682321 26 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Corps Artillery (Provisional) Vietnam, Period Ending 30 Apr 1968 (U)

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Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
AVII-AT 22 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Corps Artillery (Provisional) Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968. RCS GS FOR (RI)

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1. (c) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. Organization:

      (1) Corps Artillery (Provisional) Vietnam (PCV Arty) was formed on 10 March 1968 by CSARV General Order 1053, dated 9 March 1968. Non-divisional artillery units operating in the northern portion of I Corps Tactical Zone came under OPCON of PCV and continued operational activities in progress. Personnel assigned to the headquarters, representing almost every major unit in RVN, began arriving on 10 March 1968. Major commands were also levied for equipment.

      (2) At the time of activation, the major operations in the Corps Zone included J.E. STUART, KENTUCKY, LANCaster II, SCOTLAND, and NAPOLEON. During the reporting period PCV Artillery participated in 51 days of tactical operations.

      (3) The first artillery unit to be placed directly under PCV Artillery control was Battery C, 3d En, 18th Artillery. Units which became part of PCV Arty during the report period were as follows:

      | UNIT                        | DATE PCV ARTY ASSUMED OPCON |
      |------------------------------|-----------------------------|
      | Btry C, 3d En, 18th Arty     | 12 March 1968               |
      | H& S, C & Svc Btry, 2d En, 11th Arty | 15 March 1968             |
      | Btry B, 2d En, 11th Arty     | 20 March 1968               |
      | Btry A, 1st En, 83d Arty     | 22 March 1968               |
      | H& S, C & Svc Btry, 1st En, 83d Arty | 23 March 1968             |
      | Btry C, 6th En, 16th Arty    | 23 March 1968               |
      | Searchlight Section, G/29th Arty | 20 April 1968              |

      (4) On 12 April 1968, PCV Arty assumed OPCON of the following units:

      108th Arty Gp

      8th En, 4th Arty (-)(175SP) GP-4

      Downgraded at 3 year intervals

      DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

      DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10
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6th Bn, 33d Arty (105 T)
1st Bn, 40th Arty (105 SP)
1st Bn, 44th Arty (-)(40mm AA SP)
2d Bn, 94th Arty (175 SP)
Btry G, 65th Arty (.50 Cal Hog)
Btry F, 2d Bn, 36th Arty (TAE)
235th FA Radar Det
238th FA Radar Det
26th FA Radar Det
255th FA Radar Det
Btry D, 1st Bn, 83d Arty (8" SP)
5th 155 Gun Btry (155/8" SP) (PHJ)
1st 8" How Btry (8" SP)(FIF)

b. Significant activities.

(1) At the time of the activation of FCV, the elements of FCV were pursuing low intensity offensive/defensive operations in AO's assigned prior to 10 March 68. FCV major offensive operations began on 1 April and included Operations CAWJU II, FEGUSUS, and EKUANUK/LAI SON 216.

(2) Phase I Offensive (Operation CAWJU II: 1 April to present). FCV Arty heavy artillery (1st Bn, 83d Arty (-) and 8th Bn, 4th Arty (-) was deployed to support operations of the 101st Abn Div along ROUTE 547 and 547A extending into the A SHAU VALLEY. A progressive buildup of heavy artillery began on 31 March 1968 with a 175mm gun platoon at FSB BASTOGNE (YD620.95). A complete 175mm battery closed into BASTOGNE on 10 April 1968. The posture for the last 11 days of the report period was one 175mm battery and one 175mm/8" battery. FSB BASTOGNE also had a 155mm and 2-105mm divisional batteries. The decision on the artillery mix at FSB BASTOGNE was based on the need to interdict enemy logistical activities in the A SHAU VALLEY (YD5030 to YD610), which could be reached only by the 175mm gun. FSB BASTOGNE was activated primarily as a 155mm base. One battery was planned for interdiction. When FCV decided to commit 1st Air Cavalry Division to a raid in the A SHAU VALLEY, an additional battery was planned to support the air assaults. The second battery went in, but with two of its pieces rebarreled to 8" to provide a precision destruction capability to support 101st Airborne Division operations between BASTOGNE and the A SHAU VALLEY. The 2-6" howitzers proved very useful and at the end of the report period action was in progress to convert 2 more 175mm guns to 8" howitzers as the need in the A SHAU VALLEY declined. The 101st Airborne Division opened a series of mutually supporting fire bases (BOYD, GRUIMO, RIAUANGHAN, and VEGELA) to facilitate placing fires in the HUE-PHU BAI, ROUTE 547 and A SHAU VALLEY areas.

(3) Phase II Offensive (Operation FEGUSUS: 31 March 1968-15 April 1968). The preparation and execution of Operation FEGUSUS to relieve enemy pressure in the KHE 3/67 area required maximum concentration of available artillery in the northern portion of the CTZ. The main effort was by the 1st Air Cavalry Division reinforced by an JAVN Airborne Task Force and 2 US Marine regiments. The artillery organization for combat was as follows:

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Operation MGI MSUS was an extremely complex operation involving a main effort westward, a diversionary attack by 3d Mar Div northward, and a collateral continuing offensive southwestward by 101st Abn Div. The organization for combat provided every battery to the 1st Air Cav Div (Reinf) that the road and air supply system could support. The artillery support remained thin and the margin of superiority had to come from air support. The air-artillery mix was effective. The enemy fled the scene leaving 1,000 enemy dead unburied and 800 weapons. Estimated enemy casualties were 15,000.

(4) Phase III Offensive (Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216: 19 April 1966 to present). The mission of PCVN Artillery units during this operation was to support offensive operations in the A SHAU VALLEY, DELTA JUNCTION, SONG BO VALLEY, HUE-PHU BAI area and the DMZ area. ARVN forces participating in operations during this phase consisted of the Airborne Task Force w/the ARVN Airborne 105mm howitzer battery operating along route 547 and in the SONG BO VALLEY in cooperation and coordination with the 101st Abn Div, and the ARVN 3d Inf Regt Task Force w/Battery C 12th Artillery (105)(T) operating in the A SHAU VALLEY in cooperation and coordination with the 1st Air Cav Div. The organization for combat and tasking was as follows:

(a) 101st Abn Div Arty.

1 Reinf ARVN Arty supporting ARVN Abn TF by positioning arty to fire in the ARVN Abn TF zone and by providing FO's w/bn hq.

2 Enlarge FSB : BASTOGNE to accommodate 2 btrys of heavy artillery by 182060H Apr 66.

(b) 1st Air Cav Div Arty - reinf ARVN arty supporting 3d ARVN Inf Regt TF by positioning arty to fire in the ARVN 3d Inf Regt TF zone and by providing FO's w/bn hq.

(c) 108th Arty Gp

8th Bn, 4th Arty (175)(SP)(-)
6th Bn, 33d Arty (105)(T)
1st Bn, 40th Arty (105)(SP)
1st Bn, 44th Arty (AW)(SP)
Btry G, 65th Arty (AW)(SP)
2d Bn, 94th Arty (175/8") (SP)
1. GS - Reinf 12th Marine Rgt.

2. Reinf 101st Abn Div Arty w/2-105 how T btrys.

3. Reinf 1st Air Cav Div Arty w/1-105 how T bn (-), consisting of bn hq and 1-105 how btry.

4. Reinf 1st Air Cav Div and 101st Abn Div w/Abn spt as required.

5. Provide a 175mm bn (-) consisting of bn hq & svc elements and 1-175mm gun btry. BN takes OPCON of Btry C, 1st Bn, 83d Arty (175) (SP). Mission: GS - Reinf 1st Air Cav Div Arty. O/O GS PCV. Position PSB RASTOGHI. Retube 1 plat to 8".

(d) 1st Bn, 83rd Arty (175/8") (SP) (-) w/Btry C, 3d Bn, 18th Arty (8") (SP) OPCON.

1. GS - Reinf 1st Air Cav Div Arty and 101st Abn Div Arty.

2. Initial positions PSB RASMACH, SALLY and EVANG.

3. Be prepared to displace 1 btry from LZ EVANS to LZ JACK to engage targets in RIO TRANG VALLEY.

(e) 1st 8" How Btry (F/LF): Reinf 12th Marines.

(f) 5th 155 Gun Btry (F/LF): Reinf 12th Marines.

The organization for combat was designed to provide the main weight of heavy artillery around the main enemy base area, BASE AREA 114, covering more than 100 square kilometers and centered 18 km west of HUE. 101st Abn Div operated against the flanks and rear of BASE AREA 114 and its extensions into HUE and the coastal plains. The 175mm guns were disposed to support the 1st Air Cav Div in the A SHAU VALLEY, to support forces still operating in KHE SAINH, and to provide counterbattery fires across the DIZ. In no case except around BASE JAC 114 and in the A SHAU VALLEY was the density of heavy artillery adequate for the mission assigned. BASE AREA 114 and the A SHAU VALLEY were the areas of main concentration. However, the paucity of heavy artillery in the KHE SAINH and DIZ area precluded delivery of adequate counterbattery fires.

(5) The organizational structure of PCV Artillery as of 30 April 1968 is shown at enclosure 1.

c. Major Problem Areas.

(1) Paucity of Artillery Assets

(a) General. The major problem facing PCV Artillery was fighting a major battle against a modern army while using counter-guerrilla artillery force levels. A division artillery is the minimum artillery support a division requires when engaged in light combat. The divisions in PCV were not engaged in light combat. They habitually went into the offensive inferior in manpower against an enemy operating from his own
Prepared ground. The enemy in PCV is well armed with modern individual and crew served weapons, and is uniquely supported in some areas by tanks and heavy artillery. PCV Artillery began the report period with no medium artillery because the two Army divisions in PCV had no organic medium artillery and required immediate, permanent reinforcement by the two medium battalions in PCV to meet the minimum standard of divisional artillery. PCV Artillery had no medium artillery, inadequate heavy artillery, inadequate automatic weapons artillery, and barely adequate light artillery.

1. The Army divisions in PCV operate over large areas of responsibility. In order to obtain 155mm coverage, the divisions have on many occasions deployed 155mm batteries as individual platoons. This is extremely undesirable because the battery does not have enough FDC personnel to operate 2 FDCs 24 hours per day safely and efficiently. Further, the battery is the minimum fire unit to engage a minimum battlefield target. The platoon fire for effect volley is subminimal in effectiveness.

2. The Corps Artillery, with no medium artillery to thicken the fires of the divisional artillery, is unable to execute that vital portion of its mission. The Corps Artillery requires at least one medium battalion with which to reinforce the divisional artillery.

(b) Heavy Artillery.

1. Counterbattery. North Vietnamese artillery firing across the DMZ and Laotian border has harassed forward combat bases, river traffic, and airfields. The few corps artillery 175mm guns are the only weapons which can trade blows with 152mm gun-howitzers, 100mm guns, 122mm guns, and 130mm guns. Frequently only one platoon or one piece is available to execute counterbattery fires that should be delivered by battalion mass fires. Though provided with the minimum essential close support artillery, the American forces are outgunned by NVA long range artillery and are on the artillery defensive.

2. Heavy artillery support for troops. American forces on the offensive find their quarry on ground he has prepared with heavy field fortifications. Reduction of these fortifications requires 8" artillery. To achieve coverage of their numerous operations, commanders have sought to split the 4 Army 8" batteries in PCV into Platoons. The consequences in terms of FDC efficiency and safety, and in terms of the effectiveness of the fire for effect volley, are the same as previously described for medium artillery. Minimally adequate 8" support, in the form of one battalion available to support each division, is essential in northern I Corps if excessive casualties are to be avoided.

(c) Automatic weapons. M42 twin 40mm guns have again proved very useful equalizers for close support of reconnaissance forces, road convoys, and mine clearing teams. At night they strengthen perimeter defenses. They are in great demand in northern I Corps. One battalion for the corps is completely inadequate. The M16 quad cal .50 machine gun is a superb weapon for securing landing zones. It has found further employment, when mounted on a truck, as a convoy security and counter-ambush weapon. The one battery in PCV meets approximately 1/3 of the requirements.
(2) Lack of Aircraft.

(a) Provisional Corps was organized w/o a corps artillery aviation battery and with only a portion of the corps aviation company. The aircraft available are insufficient to support the needs of the command group in the corps headquarters and one courier run. There are no aircraft for units of the corps artillery to use. None of the aviation sections in the group or battalions of the corps artillery have received aircraft or pilots.

(b) Command and Control. The units of corps artillery are spread over 9000 square kilometers. Battalion commanders and staffs often go for weeks without visiting their batteries. Battalion supervision of technical matters such as FOG procedures, maintenance, service of the piece, local defense, and communication is minimal. Battalion influence & responsiveness w/ respect to mail, replacement, R & R, emergency leave, personnel problems are likewise minimal.

(c) Target acquisition. One fixed wing aviation company supports PCV. It can fly up to 110 hours per day - roughly enough for a reinforced division. There is no helicopter support available to Corps Artillery. Aircraft to register batteries, to inspect possible targets, to cover road movements and to conduct destruction missions are rarely available. The few available aircraft are fully committed to visual reconnaissance and adjustment of fire for troops in contact.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluation, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel - None

b. Operations.

(1) Item: Shortage of Weapon Calibration Means.

(a) Observation. No facilities are available in PCV Artillery to calibrate artillery weapons when required.

(b) Evaluation. Only one ordnance calibration team is operating in-country. During the reporting period none of the weapons destroyed by enemy action and subsequently replaced nor any weapons receiving new tubes were calibrated.

(c) Recommendation. That a calibration capability be provided each corps artillery.

(2) Item: Requirement for Artillery Automatic Weapons Units.

(a) Observation. Artillery automatic weapons support for PVC is inadequate.

(b) Evaluation. Originally one M42 battalion and one M55 battery was allocated to support a US Marine Division. Since the original AW deployment, two more divisions have arrived in the zone now controlled by PCV.
The density of vital installations requiring defense, the increased number of convoys, the addition of two army divisions, and the increased number of offensive combat operations in an area of principal enemy effort require additional automatic weapons. M42s serve on perimeter defense during the night and protect convoys, guard mine sweeping operations, and support offensive sweeps during the day. M55s serve on perimeter defense in forward airheads inaccessible by road and, when mounted on trucks, fulfill the offensive/defensive roles described for the M42s. A minimum of one M42 battalion and one M55 battery should be provided each division. A request has been submitted to III IAF for additional AI units.

(c) Recommendation. That one M42 battalion and one M55 battery support each division deployed against main force NVA units.

(3) Item: Lack of Organic Aircraft.

(a) Observation. PCV Artillery was organized w/o corps artillery aviation battery.

(b) Evaluation. The ability of PCV Artillery and its subordinate headquarters to command and support the Corps Artillery is severely attenuated by a total absence of aircraft. The group and the battalions are authorized aircraft but none have been issued. The corps artillery aviation battery was not authorized. The corps operates over 9000 square kilometers. There are 22 batteries in the corps artillery. Most are accessible by air only or over insecure roads. Battalion GPs are normally 10 to 30 miles from battery positions. There is no reliable means available to register, to acquire targets, to conduct destruction missions, or to perform counterbattery surveillance. Further, the ability of the battalion commanders and staff to supervise and support their batteries with staff visits, critical supplies, mail, and movement of critical personnel is almost none-existent. Corps artillery has a vital need for fixed and rotary wing aircraft to discharge its responsibilities properly.

(c) Recommendation. That activation of a corps artillery headquarters include activation of a corps artillery aviation battery.

c. Training.

(1) Item: Inadequate liaison to Supervise Training.

(a) Observation. The widespread deployment of corps artillery units and the lack of transportation makes supervision of training extremely difficult.

(b) Evaluation. The rapid turnover of junior officer and enlisted personnel due to infusion and rotation requires close, continuous supervision of training by battalion commanders and operations/training staff officers. Initial inspections by the corps artillery staff of a few batteries has revealed departures from fundamentals that could reduce accuracy and safety. The insecure state of the roads and complete lack of aircraft in corps artillery has limited the ability of commanders and staffs to visit their units to maintain standards of proficiency.
(e) Recommendation. That the aircraft and pilots authorized for corps artillery units be provided as a matter of the highest priority.

d. Intelligence.

(1) Item: Target Information Center.

(a) Observation. PCV Artillery has organized a Target Information Center to operate as a part of the Fire Support Coordination Element.

(b) Evaluation. The Target Information Center (TIC) operates around the clock in close liaison with units capable of attacking targets with artillery or naval gunfire, or with aircraft. The TIC has target data available for engagement as attack means become available. The TIC has assisted in fruitful employment of fire support means and efficient attack of the most threatening enemy concentrations. (See Incl 2).

(c) Recommendation. That a target information center be considered in organizing the FSCF at Corps/Field Force level.

e. Logistics. None.

f. Organization.

(1) Item: Status of Corps Artillery Units.

(a) Observation. Artillery units assigned to field artillery groups and placed OPCON to other commands experience difficulties with tactical, administrative and logistical relationships.

(b) Evaluation. Units placed under OPCON of another headquarters are placed under a commander for assignment of tactical tasks. OPCON does not include responsibility or authority for administration, discipline, internal organization or training. This relationship is unacceptable when applied to Army artillery units for long periods of time. Battalions and separate batteries in PCV Artillery are assigned to 4 different groups - all but one of which are in other corps zones and inaccessible for all practical purposes. If it is anticipated that these units are to be employed in a tactical area for an extended period, assignment to an appropriate headquarters in the area would provide a more acceptable solution. Units could be attached to headquarters as required to accomplish tactical missions.

(c) Recommendation. That non-divisional artillery units to be employed in a tactical area for an extended period be reassigned to a headquarters in the area of employment.

(2) Item: Use of Field Artillery Group Headquarters.

(a) Observation. The field artillery group headquarters, though conceived as a mobile tactical headquarters, is in use in Vietnam as an administrative headquarters.
(b) Evaluation. By organization and equipment, the field artillery group is fitted to exercise tactical control and administrative supervision over 2 to 6 attached field artillery battalions. The mix of battalions attached to the group varies with the mission assigned. In PCV, 5 battalions, 2 separate batteries and 6 radar detachments are assigned to 108th Artillery Group. This situation has existed since the group arrived in Vietnam. The group became a fixed base administrative headquarters—a function for which it is neither equipped nor manned. Its ability to handle a rapidly changing spectrum of units and missions has atrophied. The system is common in Vietnam and it has caused complications. For example, PCV Artillery includes battalions or individual batteries assigned to 23d, 41st, and 54th Artillery groups. Pay records, replacements, R & R, promotions, and awards are handled by the groups even though the units are separated from parent organizations by many miles, several hours and torturous communications.

(c) Recommendation. That consideration be given to relieving the field artillery group headquarters of active participation in personnel and administrative matters so that it can be employed as intended as a tactical headquarters.

(3) Item: Target Acquisition Capability.

(a) Observation. PCV Artillery was organized without a target acquisition battalion.

(b) Evaluation. There is in PCV one target acquisition battery with radar, survey, sound base and flash base capability. The survey capability is not sufficient to perform the amount of survey required in the Corps area in support of the division artillery survey sections. The target acquisition battery does not have a survey information center capability. The counterbattery capability of the target acquisition battery enables it to cover roughly 1/3 of the zone in which the Corps confronts enemy artillery. The countermortar capability of the target acquisition battery and of the direct support artillery battalions is augmented by 6 independent radar detachments. The battery does not have a radar staff officer to coordinate the employment of the 24 radars throughout the Corps zone. To partially compensate for the most important deficiencies PCV has requested a radar officer, a survey officer and personnel and equipment for 2 survey sections and a survey information center.
(c) Recommendation. That activation of corps artillery headquarters include assignment of a target acquisition battalion.

2 Incl s/ L.H. Caruthers, Jr.
1. PCV Org Structure t/ L.H. CARUTHERS, JR.
2. Target Into Center BG, USA

Commanding

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10 - PCV, Arty S-3 File
TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 94375

1. (U) The inclosed ORL, HQ, Corps Arty (Prov) Vietnam is forwarded IAW USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (C) Comment on Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities. Item: Paucity of artillery assets, page 4, para 1c(i)(a). HQ, PCV has directed that 155mm batteries will not be deployed as separate firing platoons.

3. (C) Comments on Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations, are listed below.

   a. Item: Shortages of weapon calibration means, page 6, para 2b(1). Concur with recommendation. When requested, M36 chronographs are issued to Army divisions. A calibration capability will exist through mutual cooperation among division artillery and corps artillery units.

   b. Item: Requirement for artillery automatic weapons units, page 6, para 2b(2). Concur. The increased number of maneuver elements has placed a serious strain on artillery automatic weapons. All non-divisional artillery units presently supporting maneuver divisions must be retained under PCV control if the maneuver element departs from PCV area.

   c. Item: Lack of organic aircraft, page 7, para 2b(3). Concur that additional aviation assets are required. This HQ is preparing, for submission to HQ, USARV, a request to augment the PCV Aviation Company with additional aircraft specifically for support of Corps Arty. When the augmentation is approved, and the aircraft become available, the Corps Arty Commander will then have sufficient aviation assets to adequately support subordinate units, e.g., 108th Arty Gp. The need for helicopter support has become so critical that the 1st Cav Div (A), 101st Abn Div and 3rd Mar Div have been tasked to provide one helicopter a week to 108th Arty Op. (Note: HQ, Corps Arty helicopter support remains solely from PCV Aviation Co assets.) The borrowed division helicopters are an interim measure of marginal benefit to the 108th Arty Gp. The lack of helicopter support is unique to this Corps, since there is no aviation in general support.

   d. Item: Inadequate means to supervise training, page 7, para 2c(1). Concur. The requested increase in Prov Avn Co assets (see para 2c above) will partially alleviate this critical situation.

   e. Item: Target Information Center, page 8, para 2d(1). Concur.
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AVIL-GCT

30 June 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, Corps Artillery (Provisional) Vietnam, for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

f. Item: Status of Corps Arty units, page 8, para 2f(1). Concur in concept, however the administrative assets available within the Corps are insufficient to process the increased administrative volume. Recommendation for solution of this problem is contained in para 2g below.

g. Item: Use of field artillery group headquarters, page 8, para 2f(2). Before consideration could be given to relieving field artillery group headquarters of administrative and personnel matters, it would be necessary to obtain additional administrative personnel assets; however, the recommendation is valid. Recommend that HQ, PCV be provided a type A Personnel Service Company to provide administrative functions for HQ, PCV; HQ, 108th Arty Gp; and other units assigned or attached to the Corps.

h. Item: Target acquisition capability, page 9, para 2f(3). Concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. L. NURDIN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

Qf furn:
HQ, PCV Arty
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Corps Artillery (Provisional) Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968. RCS CS FOR (RI)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 12 JUL 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, Corps Artillery (Provisional) Vietnam.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning shortage of weapons calibration teams, page 6, paragraph 2b(1), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3a: Concur. The new M-36 Chronograph is programmed for issue during third and fourth quarter of CY 1968. The basis of issue, however, has been expanded to include three per Hq and Hq Btry, Infantry Div Arty, one per Hq and Hq Btry, Air Cav Div Arty, and three per Hq and Hq Btry, Field Artillery Group.

   b. Reference item concerning requirement for artillery automatic weapons (AW) units, page 6, paragraph 2b(2); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3b: Nonconcur. While both II & III CTZ's are allocated one H-42 battalion and one H-55 battery, I CTZ is provided an H-42 battalion and two H-55 batteries. In addition to these 24 extra fire units, the 1st Air Cav Div still retains 4 H-42 and 4 H-55 units which moved with it into the I CTZ. The possession of additional AW would be counter to current priorities.

   c. Reference item concerning lack of organic aircraft, page 7, paragraph 2b(3); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3c: Concur. DA policy, however, expressed in DA Confidential message 763149 ACSFOR Avn, Subj: Aviation Units for RVN, established a moratorium on providing aircraft and aviators to combat support and combat service support units deploying to RVN with aviation section authorized but not filled. This headquarters has received information indicating that aircraft are programmed for these units at a later date. Current aviation assets are being utilized to fill existing authorizations.
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AVHGC-DST (22 May 68) 2d Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Corps Artillery (Provisional) Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968. RGS US FOR (RI)

d. Reference item concerning target information center, page 8, paragraph 2d(1); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3e: Concur. However, there is already a Counterbattery Information Officer (CBIO) in a type corps artillery who heads a targeting section and publishes target lists for artillery. There is a need for one targeting section, but not two. Recommend CDC study the problem and recommend the optimum location and organization of the targeting section.

e. Reference item concerning status of corps artillery units, page 8, paragraph 2f(1); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3f: Concur. Since the end of the reporting period, all of PCV's OPCON and attached artillery units have been either assigned to PCV or to one of its major subordinate elements.

f. Reference item concerning the use of field artillery group headquarters, page 8, paragraph 2f(2); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3g: Concur in principle. However, the peculiarities of the current conflict have modified the "conventional" roles and missions of every echelon in the chain of command. Required changes are normally accomplished through NCO action and USARV has recently approved a proposal to increase the 108th Group's manning from 106 to 149 personnel. Even considering its unique responsibilities in supporting those US Army artillery elements reinforcing the USMC in the DMZ area, the 108th Group generally performs the very same administrative functions accomplished by the four other field artillery groups in RVN. The Hq PCV request for a personnel service company appears to be counter to current priorities.

g. Reference item concerning target acquisition capability, page 9, paragraph 2f(3); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3g: Concur in concept only. PCV has the only target acquisition battery in-country and USARV has approved the PCV request for SIC, a staff radar officer, and two additional survey sections. USARV has studied the requirement for additional target acquisition batteries in RVN. A requirement for two more batteries has been recognized and is on the USARV priorities list. However, there are no spaces available to finance the
AVHGC-DST (22 May 68) 2d Ind (C) 12 JUL 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Corps Artillery (Provisional) Vietnam
for Period Ending 30 April 1968. RCS GS FOR (RL)

requirement at this time. This type unit is optimized for location
of enemy cannon artillery.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ, PCV Arty
HQ, PCV
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Corps Arty (Prov) Vn for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 24 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
### PCV ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE as of 30 April 1968

**CONFIDENTIAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 108th Arty Gp</td>
<td>OPCON to PCV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/4 Arty</td>
<td>Assigned to 108th Arty Gp, OPCON to PCV</td>
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<td>6/33 Arty</td>
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<td>2/94 Arty</td>
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<td>F/26 Arty</td>
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<tr>
<td>G/65 Arty</td>
<td>Assigned to 108th Arty Gp, OPCON to PCV</td>
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<tr>
<td>235th FA Radar Det</td>
<td>Assigned to 108th Arty Gp, OPCON to PCV</td>
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<td>2/11 Arty (-)</td>
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<td>G/6/16 Arty</td>
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<td>G/3/18 Arty</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st 8&quot; How Btry (PVP)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th 155. Gun Btry (PVP)</td>
<td>Assigned to 108th Arty Gp, OPCON to PCV</td>
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</tbody>
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Confidential

Incl 1

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*Downgraded at 3 year intervals. Declassified after 12 years. DO Directive 5200.10.*
The Target Information Center is organized as an integral part of the Fire Support Coordination Element. It is tasked with the mission of collecting, evaluating, producing, and disseminating target information to subordinate elements of the Corps, and keeping Tactical Operations Center personnel informed of the status of targets in the Corps area.

The Target Information Center works under the supervision of the Asst Fire Support Coordinator in close coordination with the Corps Artillery S2 and the Corps G2. The Target Information Center operates 24 hours daily with two teams on 12-hour duty shifts. Each team consists of an Artillery Intelligence Officer (Artillery branch) and one officer and one enlisted man from the Corps G2 section. The G2 personnel provide a link between the Target Information Center and G2 agencies, as well as providing technical assistance in collecting and evaluating target data.

Target information is gathered from all available sources, such as, photo interpretation reports, spot reports, VA reports, SLAR, INFRARED, SNIPER, SICOM, and I-NET. The target information center also coordinates closely with the Corps Area Light Targeting Section on exchange of targeting data and intelligence. All information is screened by the Artillery Intelligence Officer for target data and for target damage assessment purposes. All target data is recorded on target cards and is maintained as a part of a target data base. Potential target data is analyzed and assigned target numbers if confirmed. Lucrative and transient type targets are immediately passed to the FSCB for prompt engagement. Static type targets are published frequently on target lists. For the convenience of users, separate target lists are published for each major area of operation. Target lists are updated frequently by publishing changes reflecting targets deleted due to destruction or no longer being at the reported coordinates, and adding newly acquired targets. Additionally, the Target Information Center provides special target lists on selected areas on short notice for use by the Corps Tactical Operations Center or subordinate commands.

The Target Information Center maintains current information on targets located throughout the Corps area and provides target information to staff sections for planning operations. Current targets are displayed graphically on area maps showing visually significant build-ups and/or trends. The target data base maintained on all potential and confirmed targets provides statistical and historical data.
### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Corps Artillery (Provisional) Vietnam

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968**

CG, Corps Artillery (Provisional) Vietnam

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19
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>ITEM</th>
<th>SUBJECT TITLE</th>
<th>FOR OT RD</th>
<th>PAGE #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

*** PAGE #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
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