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IN ACCORDANCE WITH
DOD 5200.1-R & EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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  2d Battalion, 138th Artillery
  1st Battalion, 40th Artillery
Commandant of the Marine Corps (A03H10)
Section 1. (C) Significant Unit Activities (U)

1. (C) General

a. The battalion remains assigned to the 108th Artillery Group with the following mission: General Support of 3d Marine Division, Reinforce the fires of 12th Marine Regiment, in order Direct Support of designated United States Army, United States Marine Corps, or Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) elements. At the beginning of the reporting period, the firing batteries were positioned at TRUE SOF (ID 215573), TENG SOF LAI (ID 982542) and the DONG HA COMBAT BASE. On 29 March, Battery H, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines (105M-91011) was placed under the operational control (OPCON) of this battalion. From 29 March until 17 April, one firing battery occupied various positions in the vicinity of CAMP EVANS (ID 596316). From 17 April throughout the remainder of the reporting period, one firing battery was positioned at QUANG TRI (ID 312544). During the reporting period, the battalion fired in support of the 3d, 4th, and 9th Marine Regiments, and the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion of the 3d Marine Division, the 3d Squadron 5th Cavalry (4th US Infantry Division) the 2d Regiment (ARVN), the US Advisory Team at CAM LO, elements of the 101st Airborne Division, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and numerous resupply convoys.

b. Increasingly large units of North Vietnamese Army (regular) troops were active throughout QUANG TRI PROVINCE and in the Demilitarized Zone. Viet Cong activities have also continued. Enemy activity was very heavy during the early part of the reporting period (the TET offensive period) with heavy mining of roads, ambush activity, and many rocket and mortar attacks on all battery positions. US Army, US Marine and ARVN forces mounted operations up to multi-battalion size and ARVN forces have been particularly aggressive in conducting operations within their areas of operations. Forward observers from the battalion have accompanied infantry and cavalry units during many of these operations. Because there are sufficient US Marine air observers to use available aircraft time, battalion air observers did not fly during the period.

Heavy emphasis has been placed on the strengthening of
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primary and secondary defensive positions in the fire bases and within the battalion base camp area. Increased fortification of protective bunkers for personnel and ammunition had a very high priority, while improvement of existing living quarters was continued.

d. Staff visits and frequent informal inspections by the Battalion Commander continues to ensure a high state of unit readiness and adherence to overall doctrinal guidance provided by Department of the Army Field and Technical Manuals, with particular emphasis on gunnery techniques as outlined in FM 6-40.

e. The battalion continues to use the high burst method of registration exclusively. This technique is used in conjunction with the AN/FPS-41 Counter Mortar Radar where satisfactory observation posts are not available or when survey parties are otherwise occupied. Registrations are conducted concurrently with meteorological flights and subsequent mortar messages, received these times each day, are used for computation of current net plus VE QFT settings. To check the accuracy of these settings, the counter mortar radar is used to spot rounds fired during the H&I program.

f. The table of organization and equipment for this battalion was changed from TBN 6-4655 to MTOE 6-466, 467, and 4690 (MARPAC 1/68, on 15 April 1968.

2. Operations and Training Activities.

a. Plans. Current plans for the battalion are:

(1) To provide artillery support in defense of DONG HA COMBAT BASE.

(2) To be prepared to move firing batteries to any location in QUANG TRI PROVINCE.

(3) To provide one firing battery at THON SON LIAM to reinforce the fires of the US Marine Corps artillery battalion in Direct Support of that area.

(4) To conduct training as outlined by United States Army Republic of Vietnam (USARV) training directives, with sufficient section training to insure that all units and individuals are capable of performing their missions.

(5) To maintain administrative control over 235th, 236th, 239th, 240th, 243rd, and 250th Artillery Detachments (Radar) which provide counter mortar surveillance for the 12th Marine Regiment at DONG HA COMBAT BASE and the GID LINH outpost (ID 213745); 1st Battalion, 11th Marines at KHE SANH (ID 84949); 1st Battalion, 12th Marines at CAMP J.D. CARNOLL (ID 069555); 1st Battalion, 13th Marines near QUANG TRI (ID 313745); and the 2d Battalion 12th Marines near X, TOT BONG (ID 13495).

(6) To conduct limited scale civil affairs operations in the villages around the DONG HA COMBAT BASE with increased
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emphasis on coordination of civil affairs with the local (2d ARVN Regiment) host nation military commander.

b. Operations.

(1) The battalion has continued Direct, Reinforcing, and General artillery support. It has participated in operations Scottland, Lancaster II, Kentucky II, Saline II, California, Highrise, Rice, and some 20 ARVN operations.

(2) Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters Battery, and Service Battery have remained in base camp at the DONG HA COMBAT BASE. The firing batteries have spent little time at DONG HA COMBAT BASE and two have served at THON SON LAM and two at TRUC SON.

(3) Battery A began the reporting period with a mission of reinforcing the 1st Battalion 12th Marines under OP00N of that battalion, with five howitzers at THON SON LAM and one howitzer at DONG HA COMBAT BASE under the control of this battalion. Between 23 February and 27 February, the five howitzers at THON SON LAM were returned to DONG HA COMBAT BASE and placed under OP00N of this battalion with the mission of General Support of 3d Marine Division, Reinforcing the 12th Marine Regiment. On 19 March the battery moved to TRUC SON and assumed the mission of Direct Support 2d ARVN Regiment. On 27 March the battery returned to DONG HA COMBAT BASE. Between 28 and 29 March, the battery moved to CAMP EVANS with the mission of Reinforcing 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery, 101st Airborne Division. This mission was accomplished from many firing positions and firing was done by battery, platoon and section at separate sites. On 17 April Battery A(1) moved to QUANG TRI with four howitzers and was placed under OP00N of 3d Battalion, 12th Marines to reinforce the fires of that battalion. One platoon returned to DONG HA COMBAT BASE under operational control (OP00N) of this battalion with the mission of General Support, 3d ARVN Regiment.

(4) Battery B began the reporting period at DONG HA COMBAT BASE under OP00N of this battalion with the mission of General Support of 3d Marine Division, Reinforcing 12th Marine Regiment. Between 23 and 27 February the battery moved five howitzers to THON SON LAM and was placed under OP00N of 1st Battalion 12th Marines with a mission of reinforcing that battalion. The battery remained in that status with five howitzers at THON SON LAM and one howitzer at DONG HA COMBAT BASE for the remainder of the reporting period.

(5) Battery C started the reporting period at TRUC SON under OP00N of this battalion with the mission of Direct Support of 2nd ARVN Regiment. The battery returned to DONG HA COMBAT BASE on 19 March and assumed the mission of General Support of 3d Marine Division, Reinforcing 12th Marine Regiment. On 27 March the battery went back to TRUC SON to resume the mission of Direct Support of 2nd ARVN Regiment. The battery spent the remainder of the reporting period at TRUC SON.
(6) The types of missions have remained the same as previously reported. As in the last report, the battery at THON SON has received the most lucrative targets and the best surveillance of target effects. It has fired in close support of joint US Marine and ARVN operations as well as operations conducted solely by ARVN units. On 14 February 1968, Battery C was credited with 10 confirmed enemy KIA. On 11 and 12 February the battery was credited with 44 confirmed enemy KIA. On 7 March the battery was credited with 45 confirmed enemy KIA.

(7) The firing battery at THON SON IAM continued to have the newest significant missions, firing mostly at suspect enemy positions with little or no surveillance. Increased enemy activity in the DONG HA area resulted in more lucrative targets for elements in base camp. On 2 February 1968, Battery B fired 910 rounds in support of US Advisers at CAM LO and was credited with 51 confirmed enemy KIA. This support broke the attack of a reinforced battalion attempting to overrun the District Headquarters.

(8) The deployment of countermortar radar detachments, which are attached to this battalion, remains the same as previously reported with the exception that the 238th and 240th detachments were exchanged to provide relief for personnel at KHE SANH. The 240th detachment was especially commanded for support rendered during the edge of KHE SANH.

(9) The battalion was credited with 1078 enemy KIA (Confirmed) at the close of the period and had fired 470,062 rounds since 27 October 1966.

c. Training

(1) Training is conducted on a daily basis with emphasis on on-the-job training.

(2) Familiarisation firing of all types of small arms continues to take place on a monthly basis.

(3) All personnel receive periodic refresher training on perimeter defense procedures and on the employment of warning devices and obstacles. The claymore mine continues to be a weapon with which soldiers must be frequently familiarised.

d. Chemical. The battalion chemical noncommissioned officer continues to inspect CBR protective equipment and teach classes concerning operation in a CBR environment. Enemy use of riot control agents in scattered incidents and the vulnerability of all battery positions to enemy rocket and artillery fires requires the presence of operational protective equipment. The modified TOE eliminates authorization of the CBR NCO and CBR equipment except individual protective masks.

4. (C) LOGISTICS

a. Shortages of Material. A critical shortage of Tubo,
Pneumatic, NSN 2110-051-9450, Size 1100-20, has developed. Tube, Pneumatic, NSN 2610-196-7381, Size 900-20 has been used as a substitute by this unit. The performance obtained from the substitute tube is comparable to that of the required tube.

b. Shortage of Parts. One howitzer was inoperative at IS Maintenance from 25 March 1968 to 7 May 1968 due to lack of a Recoil Seal, NSN 5330-515-6605 even though the part had been ordered on Red Ball Express number 6071-050.

c. The receiver-transmitters (RT-524) and the radio (AN/VRC-46) listed as short in the previous report are still short.

d. All radar detachments now have the two FU 107A/U generator sets which they are authorized.

5. (U) MEDICAL

a. Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP)

(1) A suggested practice is that of selecting a Vietnamese from the village or hamlet visited and pausing long enough for the interpreter to teach his instructions for the proper use of several basic medications such as aspirin, vitamin pills and drops, antibiotic ear drops and antihistamines. Advantages are:

(a) The interpreter can then be used solely to take histories from patients, thus expediting the program.

(b) The Vietnamese volunteer adds each week to his knowledge of medication and thus becomes more helpful.

(c) The people of the village or hamlet are given a sense of identity with the project and a feeling of participation in it.

(2) When dispensing soap on MEDCAP for the treatment of skin infections or other use, issuing half bars furnishes only enough for one week, benefits more patients, avoids waste, and decreases the likelihood of the item being sold or traded.

(3) Misuse of medication is a frequent observation on MEDCAP. Medications issued to Vietnamese civilians should be given in no greater quantity than that sufficient to last until the next MEDCAP. Among other things, this reduces the likelihood of an overdose of medication especially in children. Also, use of non-labeled containers for medicines decreases the possibility of use of these medications by the enemy should they fall into his hands.

b. Field Expedients. Combat troops should be made aware of the potential use of belts as tourniquets. Some obvious assets of this article of clothing are:

(1) Ready availability
(2) Width tends to prevent tissue damage.

(3) Large or small enough to fit any extremity.

(4) Easy to adjust and fix tension.

(5) Of course, as with any tourniquet, employment for the control of hemorrhage should be limited to those cases in which hemorrhage cannot be controlled by elevation of the injured part and point pressure. In this unit in two cases of traumatic limb amputation prompt use of belt tourniquets were perhaps life saving.

c. Following minor surgery on the phalanges, the finger of a latex surgical glove makes a neat compressive dressing (cot) to cover the other bandages. This prevents both hematomas formation in and beneath suture lines and keeps dressings from immediately becoming blood soaked and septic. Removal of the cot approximately 30 minutes later prevents tissue damage from prolonged vascular compromise.

d. Patients wearing plaster casts or bulky bandages on extremities should be encouraged to save and use plastic bags (often issued with laundry, etc) for cast and bandage coverings whenever in rain, shower bath, or other wet places. Much unnecessary loss of time for patient and medical supplies occurs through lack of care for these protective dressings.

e. In field units where resupply is a continuous problem an 18 (or larger) gauge needle substitutes nicely for a scalpel and #11 blade when removing minor superficial foreign bodies, draining small vessels, or incising minute pustules. This practice conserves sterile incision and drainage sets for more serious problems.

f. The following system of reimmunization has proved to be a practical one for field units not having ready access to the Battalion Aid Station. Once each month, on a set day, the battery aid man with the field unit screens "shot cards" and sends a roster of these needed immunizations to the medical officer. Another identical roster is submitted to the Battery Commander and he, over the following month, rotates these men back to the rear area for immunization at the Battalion Aid Station. Thus at no one time are more than a few men lost from forward fire bases. The "two-system" system has been found necessary to insure that those needing immunizations indeed do get sent to the rear area. And though obvious, sometimes overlooked is the fact that if immunization records are checked monthly anyone due an immunization prior to the date of the next record check should be immunized. This means that in some instances immunizations must be given as much as 30 days before actual due date; but otherwise lapses in current immunity will occur.

g. First aid kits for forward observers, who are at times in the field without direct medical support for 12-15 days, become a
necessity. Small improvised kits containing insect repellent, bandages, tourniquets, water purification tablets, aspirin, antidiarrheal tablets, antimalarial tablets, mefloquine, tetracycline tablets, and an improvised snake bite kit were issued. These medical supplies are packaged to fit into the universal ammunition carrier which can be readily attached to the pistol belt. Each forward observer is instructed by the surgeon concerning the use of the aid kit and is given additional first aid information prior to going into the field. Reports by the forward observers following the missions indicate the aid kits and instructions are of great help.

6. (C) Communication

a. On several occasions jamming attempts have been made by the enemy. These have usually consisted of noise, random keying, and recorded Vietnamese music. To date these attempts have been unsuccessful even though the jamming attempts have lasted as long as four hours. This unit has been able to transmit through jamming without the use of directional antennas.

b. The face guards and antenna cable connectors for the VRC-12 Series radios are very susceptible to damage. Continued emphasis on the proper care of this equipment is an absolute must. The face guards are often used as handles by inexperienced and untrained operators. In addition care must be taken when attaching cables to the radio set. They must not be forced on the radio. Due to an aggressive training program on the part of this unit, communications equipment down time has been substantially reduced. Care of the VRC-12 Series radio should be a part of all incoming personnel orientations and instruction should be by practical exercise method.

7. (C) Personnel

a. Casualties resulting from hostile action. During the reporting period five (5) personnel from the battalion were killed and thirty (30) personnel of the battalion were wounded as a result of hostile action.

b. Casualties resulting from other than hostile action. On 14 March 1968, one (1) man was killed and two were wounded as a result of a round exploding while ramming a jammed cartridge into the breech of an M108 Howitzer. The unit had not received the M119 MWD listed in TB 750-251-4(6 Dec 67) and investigation of the accident indicated application of this MWD would probably have prevented the accident.

8. (U) Artillery. The battalion is still equipped with the M108 Self-propelled 105mm Howitzer. The M577A1 Command Post vehicle is available for the FDC of each firing battery and two are authorized for the Operations/FDC/Intelligence complex at the battalion headquarters. The battalion FDC and each battery FDC are equipped
with one Gun Direction Computer, M18 and two generators for the computer. The armor protection afforded by the M106 and M577A1 continues to be of great value in this area where enemy artillery, rocket, and mortar attacks are frequent. The rapid traverse and high rate of fire of the howitzer continues to be invaluable in close-in emergency defense of surrounded friendly forces as was demonstrated on 2 February 1968 when the battalion fired in defense of the US Advisory Team at CAB 10.

9. Other. During the reporting period (90 days) the battalion trained on 90 days, displaced on 9 days, and conducted tactical combat operations on 90 days.

Section 2. (U) Commanders Observations and Recommendations (U)

Part I. Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. Personnel: None

2. Operations

   a. Item: Identification of claymore mines during hours of darkness; DISCUSSION. When two or more claymore mines are emplaced for defense of a single perimeter bunker, there may be some confusion as to which activator is connected to a particular mine. This may be especially confusing during hours of darkness.

   b. Item: Employment of the Gun Direction Computer, M18 (FADAC). DISCUSSION. The Gun Direction Computer has proved very valuable in delivering accurate initial rounds. Adjustment by observers takes less rounds due to this accuracy and less ammunition is wasted in adjustment.

   c. Item: Training of operators for Gun Direction Computer, M18, DISCUSSION. During the initial stages of using the Gun Direction Computer much non-operational time was incorrectly attributed to equipment failure. Subsequent experience proved most non-operational time to be caused by lack of operator training.

      OBSERVATION. Units employing the Gun Direction Computer should conduct continuous and well supervised operator training to avoid excessive non-operational time.
3. Training and Organization: None

4. Intelligence: None

5. Logistics.

Item: Modification to Armor, Body, Fragmentation, Protective with 3/4 collar, FSN 8470-823 Series. DECISION. The seam located on the inside at the center base of the collar usually begins tearing after approximately four months wear. Hand sewing of the seam will not prevent further tearing.

OBSERVATION. That either a new material which will provide for longer wear be used for the exterior covering or that a different type of seam be used to prevent tearing at the center base of the collar. A separate EIR is being submitted on this item.

Part II. Recommendations

1. Personnel. None

2. Operations. It is recommended that:

   a. Luminous identification plates be used to identify the location of claymore mines on perimeter defenses.

   b. The Gun Direction Computer, M18, be used for all fire missions.

   c. Units conduct continuous training for operators of the Gun Direction Computer, M18.

3. Logistics. It is recommended that:

   a. Design of the Armor, Body, Fragmentation, Protective with 3/4 collar, FSN 8470-823 Series be re-examined.

   b. Tube, Pneumatic FSN 2610-196-7353, size 900;20 be issued as a substitute for Tube, Pneumatic FSN 2110-051-9440, size 1100;20.

4. Medical.

   a. MEDCAP. It is recommended that:

      (1) Vietnamese civilians, from the village or hamlet, where treatment is being given, be trained to give directions for use of common medicines.

      (2) Soap be dispensed during MEDCAP to Vietnamese civilians in half-bar quantities.

      (3) medication be dispensed in quantity enough only to last until the next MEDCAP.

      (4) Medication be dispensed in unmarked containers to assist in preventing intended use in the event the medication
falls into enemy hands.

b. Field treatment. It is recommended that the Field Medical Service School include in the FOI for General Medical Officers (MOSC 3100):

(1) All soldiers should be given instructions on how to use the web belt as a tourniquet.

(2) The finger of a latex surgical glove serves as an excellent compressive dressing (set) to cover other bandages following minor surgery on the phalanges.

(3) Patients should use plastic bags to cover casts as a protective measure against moisture.

(4) Number 18 or (larger) gauge needles are good substitutes for soap and blade when removing minor superficial foreign bodies, draining small vesicles, or incising minute pustules.

(5) A positive and detailed system of reanimation must be established in each organization.

(6) Special medical supplies or first aid kits must be improvised for use by small teams who will operate away from medical support for any extended period of time. The types of supplies must be modified based upon the combat environment.

5. Communication. It is recommended that:

a. All service schools especially emphasize the best method for countering jamming is to attempt to work through it.

b. All units include practical training on VRC-12 Series radios during incoming personnel training.

Lawrence H. D. Williams
Lieutenant Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

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AVGK-I (10 May 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
(RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)) (U)

Headquarters, 108th Artillery Group, APO San Francisco 96269 23 May 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96375
ATTN: AVHGC-DH

1. Forwarded herewith is the operational report of the 1st Battalion (105mm) (SP) 40th Artillery for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968.

2. Concur in the recommendations made in Section 2 of the report.

David L. Jones
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding
AVII-AT (10 May 68) 2d Ind

MAJ McGhee/occ/2568

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
(RGS GSFOR-65 (RI) ) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, CORPS ARTILLERY (PROVISIONAL) VIETNAM APO 96308

TO: Commanding General, Provisional Corps Vietnam, APO 96308

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 is forwarded herewith in compliance with PCV Reg 525-2.

2. (C) The following items are particularly noteworthy in this report:

   a. The use of the AN/MTR-4 Countermortar Radar for high burst registrations and spotting rounds during H&I programs.

   b. The battalion was credited with 1078 enemy KIA (confirmed) at the close of the period. Battery C, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery has consistently delivered outstanding fire support during the report period and has been recently cited by this headquarters.

3. (C) Comment on commander's recommendations:

   a. Reference item concerning identification of claymore mines during hours of darkness, page 8, paragraph 2a. This headquarters concurs that some positive means known throughout the unit should be used to identify claymore mines installed along the perimeter.

   b. Reference item concerning Gun Direction Computer M18 (PADAC) and training of operators for the same, page 9, part II, paragraph 2. This headquarters concurs that the gun direction computer can provide rapid and accurate firing data providing operators are adequately trained to operate and maintain the equipment. Concurrent with this training is the requirement to maintain manual proficiency and to provide for a secondary check of all firing data computed. This headquarters recently published a fire direction policy letter which outlines the specific sequence of double checks required in the production of firing data.

   c. Reference item concerning the design of the armor, body, fragmentation, protective with 3/4 collar, page 9, part II, paragraph 3a. Concur.


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AVII-AT (10 May 68) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
(RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) ) (U)

e. Reference item concerning MEDCAP, page 9, part II, paragraph 4a. Concur. The techniques mentioned are accepted MEDCAP procedures.

f. Reference item concerning field treatment, page 10, part II, paragraph 4b. Concur.

g. Reference item concerning communications, page 10, part II, paragraph 5. Concur.

Z.H. CARUTHER
EG, USA
Commanding
SUJUGGCT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968, RG5 U3CR-65 (R1)

To: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

1. The included GILL, 1st Mn, 40th Arty, is forwarded IN USARVN Rep 525-15.

2. Comments on Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations, are listed below.

   a. Item: Identification of claymore mines during hours of darkness, page 8, para 2a, page 9, para 2a, and 2d Ind, para 3a. Concur.

   b. Item: Employment of the Gun Direction Computer, 1/16 (FSAC), page 8, para 2b, page 9, para 2b, and 2d Ind, para 3b. Concur.

   c. Item: Continuous training of operators for Gun Direction Computer, 1/16, page 8, para 2c, page 9, para 2c, and 2d Ind, para 3c. Concur.


   e. Item: Tube, Pneumatic, FSI 2640-096-2307, size 900:20 be issued as a substitute for Tube, Pneumatic, FSI 2610-051-9450, size 1100:20, page 4, para 4a, page 9, para 3b, and 2d Ind, para 3d. Concur. The use of Tube 900:20 as an emergency substitute for tube 1100:20 is acceptable; however, for proper functioning the proper sized tube should be used.

   f. Item: Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP), page 9, para 4a(1) – (4), and 2d Ind, para 3b. Concur, however, only enough soap and medication should be left with Vietnamese civilians to provide seven day supply. This prevents enemy from seizing large quantities of these items.

   g. Item: Field treatment, page 10, para 4b(1) – (6), and 2d Ind, para 3f. Concur.

   h. Item: Communication, page 10, para 5a, and b, and 2d Ind, para 3f. Concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. L. NURDIN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

By furn:
05 PCV Arty
09 100th Arty Cp
09 1/36th Arty
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 9 JUL 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly Period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery.

2. Concur with report as submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ PCV
HQ 1st Bn, 40th Arty
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 19 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

K. P. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG
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<td>11. Distribution</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Abstract</td>
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</table>

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68.
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

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<th>SUBJECT TITLE</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>* Subject Title</td>
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* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
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