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30 Apr 1980 DoDD 5200.10; OAG D/A ltr 30 Apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th
Battalion (AN)(SP), 60th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April
1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the
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tions.

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4th Battalion, 60th Artillery
AWK-AP-S3


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1. SECTION I (C) Significant Organization or Unit Activities.

a. General

(1) The 4th Battalion (AW)(SP) 60th Artillery with attached Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery, remained assigned to I Field Force Vietnam, attached to 1 Field Force Vietnam Artillery and further attached, less operational control, to 41st Artillery Group at the beginning of the reporting period. Battery B (SLT) 29th Artillery, remained attached, less operational control to 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery. Effective 17 February 1968, 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery, with attached Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery, was detached from 41st Artillery Group and fully attached to I Field Force Vietnam Artillery.¹

(2) The battalion, with attachments, operated at widely separated locations in support of maneuver and artillery units of the United States and Free World Military Assistance Forces throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone and the I Corps Tactical Zone.²

(3) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery was attached to I Field Force Vietnam Artillery and located at Camp Townes, Qui Nhon area. Battery A was assigned to 4th Battalion (AW)(SP) 60th Artillery. Operational control of the 1st AW Platoon was exercised by 5d Battalion, 506th Infantry, in the Phan Thiet area. Operational control of the 2d AW Platoon was exercised by 6th Battalion, 52d Artillery, in the Tuy Hoa/Ninh Hoa area. Battery B was assigned to the 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery. The 1st AW Platoon was located in the Qui Nhon area with operational control of 110 Section exercised by Qui Nhon Sub-Area Command; operational control of 120 and 140 Section exercised by 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery; operational control of the 130 Section was exercised by 41st Artillery Group.

¹ See Incl 1
² See Incl 2

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
The 2nd AW Platoon was located in the Pleiku/Dak To area with operational control of 210, 220 and 230 Sections exercised by 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery, 4th Division Artillery. Operational control of 240 Section was exercised by 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery, 52d Artillery Group in Pleiku, Dzong. Battery C was assigned to 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 52d Artillery. The 110 and 130 Sections of the 1st AW Platoon remained temporarily attached to the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) and were located in Quang Tri, I Corps Tactical Zone. Operational control of 120 and 130 Sections and 2nd AW Platoon was exercised by the 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery. These two sections and the platoon were deployed from the vicinity of Song Son, south to Go Boi. Battery D was assigned to 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery. Operational control of the 1st AW Platoon was exercised by 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery, 4th Division Artillery, in the area southeast of Pleiku. The 2d AW Platoon was located south of Pleiku with operational control of 210 Section exercised by 3rd Battalion, 6th Artillery; operational control of 220 and 230 Sections was exercised by 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery; operational control of 240 Section was exercised by 4th Division artillery. The 240 Section was located at Kontum.

Battery E (M.G), 41st Artillery was attached to 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery. The six machine gun sections were further attached to Batteries of the 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery, with operational control exercised as follows: Section A attached to Battery A with operational control of the 1st and 2d Squads exercised by Tuy Hoa Sub-Area Command; operational control of the 3d and 4th Squads exercised by 175th Airborne Brigade in the Tuy Hoa area. Section B was attached to Battery C with further temporarily attached to the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile), in Quang Tri, I Corps Tactical Zone. Section C was attached to Battery D, with operational control exercised by the 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery, and deployed in the Song Son area. Section D was attached to Battery E with operational control of 2d, 3d, and 4th Squads exercised by 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery, and operational control of the 1st Squad exercised by 5th Battalion, 26th Artillery, in the Pleiku area. Section E was attached to Battery F, with operational control exercised by 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry, in the Phu Thiet area. Section F was attached to Battery G with operational control of 1st, 2d and 4th Squads exercised by 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery, in the An Khe area and operational control of the 2d Squad exercised by 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, in the Dak To area.

Battery B (SFL), 29th Artillery, remained attached to I Field Force Vietnam, further attached to I Field Force Vietnam Artillery and further attached to 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery. The 1st, 2d, and 3d Searchlight Platoons were attached to Batteries B, C, and A respectively, with operational control exercised as follows: 1st Platoon to 4th Division Artillery located in Dak To/ Pleiku area; 2d Platoon, minus four Searchlights to 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery in the Song Son/Go Boi area. Four searchlights were temporarily attached to 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) located in the Quang Tri area, I Corps Tactical Zone; 3rd Platoon

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to various United States and Republic of Korea forces located on the coastal plains from the junction of Highways 1 and 5B (Crossroads) south to Phan Thiet.

(6) In addition to the TO&E authorization of 64 M42AI (Dusters) and 24 M-55 (Quads), the Battalion employed four additional Dusters and three additional Quads by Battery E (HQ), 41st Artillery personnel. These Dusters were employed for defensive support by the Qui Nhon Sub-Area Command at critical installations within the immediate area surrounding Qui Nhon. One Duster supported Battery C, 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery, in conjunction with one Quad at the fire support base near Ky Son Mountain. One Quad supported 6th Battalion, 84th Artillery. The remaining Quad alternated its defensive missions between Camp Tomes and Lane Army Heliport.

(7) Elements of the Battalion participated in the following major operations: MACARTHUR, PATRICK, WALKER, BOLLING, MANG HO 11 in the II Corps Tactical Zone and PEGASUS in the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Intelligence

(1) The wide dispersal of the Battalion's elements and the TO&E under which it was organized precluded effective and efficient centralized intelligence efforts. Close coordination was maintained with all supported units to insure receipt of correct intelligence on the local area of operations and the timely evaluation of information contributing to the intelligence collecting effort.

(2) The intelligence gathering function of the Battalion S-2 was concentrated in the Qui Nhon area. Intelligence information was gathered by daily liaison visits to the ROK Capitol Infantry Division, Qui Nhon Sub-Area Command, Special Forces Detachment, B-22 MACV Sub-Sector Advisory Team 27, Naval Intelligence Officer, 22d Infantry Division (ARVN), 504th Military Police Battalion, 8th Transportation, Lane Army Air Field, 51st and 54th Military Intelligence Detachments. Information gathered from these sources was forwarded to higher headquarters in the Battalion's daily intelligence summary. Intelligence regarding the II Corps Tactical Zone was received in daily INTSUMS and weekly PERINTREPS, from Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam.

(3) A complete Enemy Order of Battle was maintained and kept current by the S2 officer. The order of Battle file contains names, locations and strength of every known NVA/VC unit down to company size in the II Corps Tactical Zone. Each enemy unit's AKA (also known as) designation and a roster of officer personnel is also maintained.

(4) The Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) was requested to support the Battalion Intelligence effort by providing pattern analysis studies of enemy units and tactical scale studies of certain geographical areas in the II Corps Tactical Zone. The pattern analysis study contains
the history of enemy units. The tactical scale studies contain information concerning geology, soil analysis, weather and vegetation classification of all geographical areas in Vietnam. These studies, when received, will provide invaluable information for consideration when employing the weapon systems and searchlights.

(5) Batteries received intelligence for their particular area of employment through briefings and reports prepared by their supported units. Intelligence in the form of Spot Reports was forwarded by the batteries to the Battalion S2 for evaluation and inclusion in the Battalion INTSUM as appropriate.

c. Operations and Training Activities.

(1) Operations

(a) All operational elements of the 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery and attached Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery, and Battery B (SIT), 29th Artillery, were engaged in tactical operations during each of the 90 days of this reporting period. The fire units' primary employment continued to be perimeter defense with supplemental missions consisting of convoy escort; route, strongpoint, work-party and bridge security; and search destroy fire support and mine sweep team security with maneuver elements. Supporting fires were provided through interdiction, counterfire, reconnaissance by fire, confirmed target engagement, and on-call fire. Searchlights continued to be employed in support of critical installations and position areas, performing missions in the visible and infrared modes on a programmed and on-call basis. The type and number of supporting fires and searchlight missions performed during this reporting period are as follows:

**DUSTER (M42A1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>AMMUNITION EXPENDED (40MM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
<td>3221</td>
<td>122,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterfire</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance by fire</td>
<td>1262</td>
<td>13,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Training &amp; On-Call)</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>6,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL MISSION</strong></td>
<td>5785</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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QUAD (M-55)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>APPOSITION EXPENDED (.50 CAL)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>399,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterfire</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>14,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance by Fire</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>170,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>108,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Training &amp; On-Call)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12,789</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Missions:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,084</strong></td>
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</table>

SEARCHLIGHT (AH/MSS-3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visible</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>H &amp; I</td>
<td>17,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Call</td>
<td>2,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrared</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H &amp; I</td>
<td>10,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Call</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Missions:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) As a follow-up of activities reported last quarter, Automatic Weapons and Searchlight employment was again examined to determine if the employment derived maximum utilization of the capabilities of the weapon systems and searchlights. With the exception of a few instances, the Automatic Weapon and Searchlight employment was sound. The problem encountered in the employment of these elements was due to lack of knowledge on the part of supported unit commanders. After Battery or Battalion personnel explained the capabilities and limitations of the weapon systems and searchlights, errors in employment were corrected. It was then determined that a third informational letter on AW and Searchlight employment considerations be distributed to supporting units. The intent of the letter is to continually improve AW and Searchlight support. This Headquarters also established a policy for liaison to be conducted with supported unit commanders by battery commanders or platoon leaders upon initial employment with a new unit. It is envisioned that this personal contact and the informational letter will enhance the utilization of Automatic Weapons and Searchlights.

3. See Inc 3

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(c) Automatic Weapons employment in the II Corps Tactical Zone demonstrated a need for flexibility. During this quarter, artillery units were continually moving which required AW support for convoys and fire base defense. Also, maneuver elements conducted various operations of short duration which required Automatic Weapons for search and destroy activities and blocking fire support. In several instances, the Battalion was unable to render support as requested because operational control of Dusters and Quads was exercised by other units. In order to achieve flexibility in Automatic Weapons support, this Headquarters forwarded an Automatic Weapon/Searchlight Organization for Combat to CO, IFFORCEV-ARTY which recommended that operational control of certain elements be exercised by 4th Battalion (AW) (SP), 60th Artillery. This recommendation is pending at this time. It is envisioned that AW and Searchlight elements will continue to perform present mission assignments in respective areas of operation. With operational control exercised by this battalion, flexibility for contingencies will be gained throughout the II Corps tactical zone.

(d) A chronological sequence of events and actions occurring during this period is attached at Inclosure 5.

(e) Significant events

30 January to 28 March 1968. Six Quads, under operational control of 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery performed convoy escort for 8th Transportation Group and other unit convoys on highway 19 between An Khe and Pleiku. Three Quads, (E15, E17, E19) based at Camp Enari, escorted convoy east to An Khe each morning and west to Pleiku each afternoon. Three Quads, (E16, E23, E26), based at Camp Radcliff, escorted convoys west to Pleiku each morning and east to An Khe each afternoon. The Quads also provided camp security at their respective base camps each night. During the 59 days on escort duty, seven enemy ambushes were effectively engaged by quick action and devastating fire power provided by the Quad crews. The average ammunition expenditure per Quad per ambush was 1431 rounds. Five Quad crew members were wounded in action. Quads were credited with eleven enemy killed in action, by body count. On 28 March 1968, the Quads, performing convoy escort highway 19, were given the mission to provide route security on Highway 19, by recommendation of the traffic coordinator. The recommendation was made to counter enemy staging ambushes on convoys in areas east and west of Nam Giang pass. The three Quads, based at Camp Radcliff, were assigned sectors of responsibility between An Khe and Nam Giang pass. The three Quads, based at Camp Enari, were assigned responsibilities between Pleiku and Nam Giang pass. Each Quad formed a security team with a tank or APC (armored personnel carrier) and was also assigned as a reaction force in their respective sectors.

25 March to 3 April 1968. In cooperation with 1st Battalion, 56th Infantry (mechanized), on 25 March, Battery G, mounted a Quad (E11) on a M113 Armored Personnel Carrier. This experimental concept was devised to enable the Quad to accompany the mechanized infantry on search and destroy operations within the Cochise area of operations. Initial tests of the "Leprechaun," as it

4. See Incl 4
5. See Incl 6
was nicknamed, demonstrated that the M113 provided an adequate platform for the Quad and that the maneuverability of the M113 was not degraded. Advantages gained were mobility for the Quad and greater basic load ammunition capacity (30,000 rounds VS 10,000 rounds). The Quad on the M113, could lay down fire to within 50 meters of the front and sides of the carrier. An additional man in the Quad crew was required to pass ammunition from inside the APQ through the top hatch door to the cannonners. On 31 March 1968 the "Leprechaun" supported a search and destroy mission conducted by 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry (Mech). Contact was made with an enemy force of unknown size at 1515 hours in the vic of LZ Uplift. All (Leprechaun), engaged the enemy with maximum firepower with undetermined results. Two cannonners were wounded by gun shots in the ankles. It was then determined to add a two foot high armor plate on each side of the APQ to provide protection for the cannonners. On 2 April 1968, at 1705 hours, the "Leprechaun" was accompanying Company A, 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry (Mech) in column, returning to LZ Uplift. The Leprechaun was the fifth vehicle in the column. A mine was detonated beneath the M113 which completely disabled the M113 and Quad. Three men, a Company A driver, and two Battery E, 41st Artillery, Quad cannonners, were killed as a result of the mine detonation. The mine consisted of a shape charge weighing 80-100 pounds which was detonated by a command device. The M113 and the Quad were not recoverable and were destroyed the next day by EOD personnel.

5 April 1968. Quads E 7, E 8, E 10, and searchlights 43 and 44 were lifted to LZ Snapper, 7 kilometers south of the Khe Sanh Marine Base. The mission of the Quads and searchlights was perimeter defense of LZ Snapper, which was utilized by the lst Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) during Operation Fargonde. Quads lifted E & I were missions.

28 April 1968. Quads E7 and E8 and searchlights 43 and 44 were airlifted to LZ Cecille, in the A Shau valley, to provide perimeter defense of fire support bases utilized by 2d Battalion, 15th Artillery.

4 April 1968. Commanding General, INFORCE-artillery announced the concept for employing the 6th Battalion, 84th Artillery (155 toed), in the II Corps Tactical Zone as a "Swing Battalion". The mission of the Battalion was to move throughout the II Corps Tactical zone supporting maneuver elements and reinforcing Artillery, when and where required. The 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery, was directed to support the Swing Battalion with automatic weapons and searchlights during its move and operations. The concept of the automatic weapon and searchlight support was recommended to INFORCE-Artillery. The Battalion's first operation, having been in country 3 weeks, was to move from the An Khe area to the vicinity of Tru Ky and establish a fire support base in the Cochise AO. The 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery, was directed to provide 2 Duster sections, 2 Quads and 2 searchlights to support the Battalion. Duster sections 3120 and 3140, Quads E27 and E14, searchlights S47 and S51 were drawn-down from mission assignments in the Cochise AO and placed in support of the Swing Battalion by 42, 6th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery.

6. See Incl 7
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20 April 1968. 6th Battalion, 84th Artillery was directed to move to a position 5 kilometers west and 10 kilometers north of Qui Nhon, establish a fire support base and reinforce fires of the Capitol Division Artillery (ROK) in support of operation Maeng Ho 11. The Dusters, Quads and Searchlights supporting the 6th Battalion, 84th Artillery were to continue support of the Battalion. The 6th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery, was directed to support the ROK maneuver elements with six searchlights. Five Searchlights were drawn-down from mission assignments in the Cochise AO and one searchlight was drawn-down from its mission assignment in the Tuy Hoa area and assigned the support mission.7

(f) Operational control

The wide dispersion of the Battalion's organic and attached elements throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone and in the I Corps Tactical Zone presented problems in the area of command and control, troop welfare in regard to pay and personal problems, supply of repair parts and communications. The distance between most Northern and most Southern fire units is 248 air miles and the distance between the Eastern and Western fire units is 100 air miles in the II Corps Zone. The distance from Base Camp to the elements in Quang Tri is 210 air miles. Several of the elements are located at positions which are not accessible by road. The aircraft support provided(one helicopter, two days per week) was inadequate to accomplish coordination visits with supported units, timely payment of troops, and transportation of repair parts. The Battalion continued to utilize the AN/GRC-19 radio pending receipt of the AN/GRC-106 radio. Communication with subordinate units was marginally adequate due to the distance involved, the inherent maintenance problems, and limited capabilities of the AN/GRC-19.

(2) Training Activities.

(a) The training requirements for the Battalion's personnel are conducted at squad and section level by the batteries because of the wide dispersion of fire units and Searchlights.8 Individual training records are maintained at the Battery Headquarters.

(b) During this reporting period, various training programs for special areas of interest were conducted. The Battalion did not conduct basic unit or advanced unit training because of mission commitments.

(c) Replacement training for 85 personnel, received through the infusion program, was conducted as the personnel arrived at the Battalion's Base Camp. The formal training was conducted under the auspices of the Battalion S-3 Officer prior to making replacement assignments to the batteries. A synopsis of the Replacement Training Program is at inclosure 10.

(d) Six men attended the Unit Armorer's Training Course conducted by Technical Representatives of the 1st Logistical Command. The...
special interest area of this training course was care, cleaning and maintenance of the M16A1 Rifle,
(a) Six officers (1st and 2nd Lieutenants) attended a five-day Forward Observer Training Course conducted by 2nd Battalion, 17th Artillery as directed by O2, IFFORCN-Arty. This is a continuous training program for all Lieutenants newly assigned to IFFORCN-Arty units. A training program is also conducted and required for all newly assigned Lieutenants, for the Fire Direction Officer. This Headquarters has requested relief from the FDO training requirement due to the nature of this unit's mission. The 20 training course is considered beneficial to officers assigned to this organization.
(f) One officer attended the Civil Operation and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) Advisory Orientation course sponsored by MACV. The scope of the course was not applicable to units of battalion size or smaller. Most periods of instruction were based on Division, Field Force and Corps Tactical Zone levels of operation.
(g) A six day training program was conducted by the Battalion S-4 for purposes of training battery personnel in PM procedures. A synopsis of the training program is at enclosure II.

d. Logistics.

(2) Support: No change occurred in the status of logistical support for the battalion during the reporting period. Logistical support of all classes of supply was maintained for organic and attached units located at Camp Tometes. Quarters and Classes I, III, and V supplies, as a minimum, are the responsibility of major subordinate commands in whose area the elements of this battalion are deployed. TMC and TA 50-001 items are provided to all battalion personnel by the S-4. Supplies not available through the major subordinate commands are also supplied by this battalion's S-4, in order to ensure that a combat ready posture is maintained by all elements.
(a) Support was rendered by the agencies listed at enclosure 12.
(b) Support rendered in Classes I, III, and V supply categories was considered adequate during this reporting period.
(c) Support rendered in Class II and IV supply categories was considered inadequate during this reporting period. The 56th Field Depot, Qui Nhon, provided non-expendable and expendable supply support. The expendable supply support was unsatisfactory. For the period, 1 February 1968 through 30 April 1968, 224 requisitions were submitted and only 99 were filled. The support provided by the Maintenance Support Company, 5th Maintenance Battalion, for repair parts was unsatisfactory. For the period, 1 February through 30 April 1968, 1500 requisitions were submitted and only 277 were filled.
Ball requisitions were marginally satisfactory. Cut-off '67 of the "Red Ball" requisitions, 101 were filled.

(a) During this reporting period, a study was made to determine whether the PLL should continue to be maintained at Battalion level or be relocated at each of the Automatic Weapons Batteries. Battery E (M2), 1st Artillery was not considered for establishing a PLL because its elements are attached to the Automatic Weapons Battalion. Battery 3 (M2), 29th Artillery was considered for establishment of a PLL. As a result of the study, it was determined that the PLL would be relocated at Battery level.

(2) Maintenance.

(a) Maintenance concepts in RVN differ significantly from normal. Experience during the last quarter indicated that a shortage of repair parts exists and support units do not react in a minimum amount of time to effect repairs. Consequently, battalion and battery maintenance sections often performed services and repairs allocated to depot maintenance.

(b) Selective or controlled cannibalization was frequently utilized for replacement of ammunition and automotive parts on the M42A1, i.e.: top and bottom covers, right and left extractors, hatch catches, magneto, and mufflers. This was due, in part, to the apparent shortage of these repair parts and incorrect data previously recorded in the PLL. The controlled cannibalization has caused, and will continue to cause, difficulty in turning in combat losses to classification and salvage points.

(c) Coordination was effected, through the Director of Maintenance, Qui Nhon, with the 56th Maintenance Battalion to rebuild M42A1 engines. Twenty-one engines for rebuilding are on hand in the 326th salvage yard.

(d) Maintenance activities during this reporting period included the following: technical inspection of all weapons; weapons carriers, and wheeled vehicles by Battalion and Battery maintenance personnel; replacement of 26 M42A1 engines and 3 M42A1 transmissions due to unservicability.

(3) Supply. Major items of equipment turned in, received, and due out during the period, 1 Feb 1968 to 30 April 1968, are listed at enclosure 14.

(4) Ammunition. The following number of rounds were fired by 68 Dusters (M42A1) and 27 Quad (M-55) employed by this Battalion during this reporting period:

9. See Incl 13
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

TYPE AMMUNITION: TOTAL ROUNDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40MM</td>
<td>192,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caliber .50</td>
<td>705,517</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Base Camp Development.

(a) This headquarters was informed at the beginning of this reporting period that the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Headquarters Sections of Battery E, 41st Artillery and Battery B, 29th Artillery, would move to Camp Radcliff, An Khe. On or about 20 February 1968, this Headquarters was informed to be ready to move to Camp Radcliff and be operational at that location within 48 hours after receipt of the movement order. A reconnaissance was conducted and an area at Camp Radcliff was located. A forward element was dispatched to the new position to prepare the existing buildings for occupancy and coordinate engineering assistance for wiring buildings, reconstruction and road work.

(b) As a result of the pending move, no major improvements were initiated during the first two months of the reporting period. Only maintenance of existing facilities was scheduled and accomplished to include painting of several buildings, construction of a sump system for the Mess Hall, remodeling of offices, and construction of several fighting bunkers in the Headquarters Battery sector of responsibility.

(c) As of 1 April 1968, it appeared that the move of the base camp would be pending for an indefinite period of time. Therefore, the following improvements were accomplished during the month of April:

1. Establishment of a water supply point within the confines of Camp Townes, at one of the three existing wells. In coordination with area engineers, (Pacific Architectural and Engineering Company), a pump has been installed and the capacity of the well is being evaluated at this time.

2. Construction of a small arms range (150' long and 30' wide) to be utilized for zero and familiarization firing.

3. Remodeling of the Post Exchange building which increased the usable floor space by 900 square feet; remodeling of another building of 400 square feet to be utilized as a PX annex.

4. To improve the compound's defensive posture, five fighting bunkers were reburied and a supplementary barbed wire fence barrier was erected between guard towers 3 and 5. Using a bulldozer, depressions were filled, hedgerows were removed and fields of fire cleared outside of the perimeter to 50 meters beyond the perimeter fence. Additional real estate was acquired on the north side of the compound for purpose of extending the perimeter in this area.

(11)
April 1968

Civil Action during the past quarter, this Battalion renewed the Friendship Program which had diminished considerably during the TET and post-TET periods of January and February. Although enemy activity greatly hindered the Civic Action projects in the Tuy Phuoc District, the majority of the people and GVN officials remained highly receptive to our aid. The MACV Advisory Team, in this district, has been enthusiastic about the Civic Action program, and was very cooperative in providing ideas.

(1) The Battalion Medical Section treated 106 general medical patients at Camp Townes, and conducted MEDCAPS at the Tuy Phuoc Sub-sector Headquarters. Emergency service for 38 accident victims was provided at the Battalion Dispensary. The Battalion Surgeon presently visits the Medical Clinic in Tuy Phuoc on a regular schedule.

(2) The TET and post-TET offensive conducted by VC/NVA units throughout Tuy Phuoc Sub Sector resulted in the destruction of many dwellings. The displaced and homeless families had a great and immediate need for materials and tools to reconstruct the houses destroyed by the enemy. For this the most significant Civic Action project conducted by this organization during the quarter was furnishing building materials and tools to needy families in the Sub-Sector. Contributions consisted of: 2760 bd-ft lumber, 21 bags of fertilizer, 1 saw, and 1 "T" square. Battalion personnel spent a total of 52 man days in Civic Action projects.

(3) During this quarter, commodities and sundry items were distributed among R-5/F families and to the MACV Tuy Phuoc Sub Sector Advisory Team for further distribution. These items consisted of used children's clothing, candy and chewing gum. During the month of April, the Battalion Chaplain visited the Qui Nhon Support Command Elementary School, a new project now underway. The purpose of the visit was to establish liaison with the school principle to determine how the Battalion could assist them. Plans and projects to aid the fundamental school are pending. In addition, battalion personnel voluntarily contributed $320.47 to the TET Aggression Relief Program.

f. Personnel

(1) The 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery, Battery B (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery authorized and assigned strengths as of 30 April were as follows:
S U J E C T: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

4th Bn, 60th Arty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF WO FM AGG</td>
<td>OFF WO FM AGG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 3 658 698</td>
<td>34 3 725 762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 0 115 117</td>
<td>1 0 120 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 0 144 151</td>
<td>4 0 140 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS 46 3 917 966</td>
<td>39 3 985 1027</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Gains and losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GAINS</th>
<th>LOSSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF WO FM AGG</td>
<td>OFF WO FM AGG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 3 201 236</td>
<td>37 3 249 289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 0 20 22</td>
<td>2 0 36 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 0 34 41</td>
<td>3 0 42 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS 41 3 255 299</td>
<td>42 3 327 372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) This battalion was overstrength 69 enlisted men as of the last day of the reporting period. However, these individuals owe replacements for 102 enlisted men that rotate during the month of May 1968.

(4) As of 30 April, this battalion was short 1 Major, 3 Captains, and 3 Lieutenants.

(5) During the period 1 February 1968 through 30 April 1968, the battalion Personnel Section out-processed 360 men returning to CONUS and in-processed 275 replacements.

(a) Of the 22 officers received during the reporting period, 9 or 40.9% were not trained in automatic weapons and had no prior experience in automatic weapons.

(b) Of the 154 enlisted men received as replacements for MOS 13F during the reporting period, 19 or 12% were not trained and had no prior experience in automatic weapons.

(6) A shortage of 30 NCO's in grade E6 and 46 NCO's in grade E5.

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qualified by training or experience in automatic weapons, presently, exists in this battalion. During the recent turn-over of personnel, qualified NCO's rotated and lower grade personnel were assigned as replacements. Also, 55 men with a primary MOS other than 13F are filling supervisory positions. The following actions have been initiated by the Battalion to counteract these deficiencies:

1. Conduct a training program including formal and OJT type training.

2. Submission of a list of unauthorized MOS, now assigned to the Battalion, as an effort to exchange these personnel for those qualified in MOS 13F.

3. Requisition of appropriate MOS.

4. Reclassification of those personnel readily grasping MOS 13F concepts as a result of training.

(7) The following awards and decorations were presented during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star w/V</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal w/V</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFFV Certificate of Achievement</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 98
The following is a listing of judicial and non-judicial actions taken during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARTICLE 15</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCM</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCM</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Casualties during the reporting period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of Battle Wounds</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in Action</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing in Action</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Battle</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rest and Recuperation: Quotas were not all utilized because of personnel rotation during this reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HAWAII</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HONG KONG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAHLIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOKYO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANGKOK</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SINGAPORE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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LOCATION

TAIPRI
AUSTRALIA

TABS
MAR
APR

15
26
55

(b) In-Country Rest and Recuperation (Vung-Tau)

LOCATION

MAR
APR

2
4

(11) The morale of the Battalion's and attached batteries' personnel continued to be excellent.

(12) Religious Activities:

(a) A Protestant worship service was conducted weekly at the Camp Townes Memorial Chapel by the Battalion Chaplain. The average attendance at those services was thirty. Protestant services were also conducted by the Chaplain at various element positions throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone and in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The average attendance at these services was twelve.

(b) Two Memorial Services were conducted for the following named personnel who were killed as a result of hostile action while in the service of their country:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ASN</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>BTRD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WOODLAND, Thomas S.</td>
<td>US51666358</td>
<td>Btry E, 41st Arty</td>
<td>2 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANCHEZ, Thomas S.</td>
<td>US54720626</td>
<td>Btry E, 41st Arty</td>
<td>2 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICHOLASSEN, James E.</td>
<td>RA15666358</td>
<td>Btry E, 41st Arty</td>
<td>15 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The 4th Battalion (AW)(SP) 60th Artillery Memorial Plaque, honoring those men who have lost their lives in the service of their country, was dedicated at services conducted on 10 March 1968.

(d) Activities added to the Battalion's religious program included a Chapel choir and a weekly Bible study period.

(e) Coordination with 41st Artillery Group Chaplain was made for the conducting of Catholic Mass at Camp Townes each week.

(16)
(15) Medical:

(a) During the reporting period, the Battalion Surgeon made the following visits to the field and administered the inoculations as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATES OF VISITS</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>INOCULATIONS GIVEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 Mar 68</td>
<td>LST Beach, Phu Tai, Go Boi</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Mar 68</td>
<td>Phu Hiep, Dong Tre</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Mar 68</td>
<td>Bong Song, LZ Uplift, LZ English, LZ Laranie, LZ Goromno, LZ Lo Boi</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Mar 68</td>
<td>Camp Enari, LZ Oasis, Rock Quarry, Artillery Hill</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Mar 68</td>
<td>Camp Enari, Pl Leai Klaem</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-28 Mar 68</td>
<td>Phan Thiet, LZ Jury, LZ Betty, LZ Partlott</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Apr 68</td>
<td>LZ Laranie, LZ Pony, LZ Selem</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Apr 68</td>
<td>Camp Radoliff</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Apr 68</td>
<td>Camp Enari</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Apr 68</td>
<td>Camp Radoliff</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Base Camp Operations Included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>AGGREGATE TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Out Patients Visits</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartered Patients</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Admissions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inoculations</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspections</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Aid Station was without a Surgeon from 8 February to 5 March 1968.*

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(a) Other Patients Seen:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Health and Disease Disorders:

1. Five men out of an average strength of 1113 contracted malaria during the reporting period.

2. Fifteen man days were lost as a result of foot disorders caused by improper foot and boot care. Twelve men suffered hearing degradation as a result of not wearing ear plugs while working around generators, serving on crew served weapons, and firing small arms. The latter was the cause of the majority of the cases.
2. (c) SECTION 2: LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. PERSONNEL
   None

b. OPERATIONS

(1) COUNTERFIRE BY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS

   (a) Observation. Automatic weapons performing perimeter defense duties should have the capability of immediate counterfire in event of mortar/rocket attacks on the position.

   (b) Evaluation. Artillery units supported by automatic weapons adhere to the SOP that automatic weapons will not return fire unless clearance is obtained from the battery PDC. Automatic weapons have the capability to bring fire on mortar/rocket positions with pinpoint accuracy. During the time spent obtaining clearance to fire in event of mortar/rocket attack, the position is subjected to damage to equipment and injury to personnel by incoming mortar/rocket rounds. Counterfire by automatic weapons usually stop mortar/rocket attacks.

   (c) Recommendation. That artillery and other units supported by automatic weapons enable immediate counterfire by automatic weapons when under mortar/rocket attack without having to obtain clearance.

(2) IMMEDIATE REACTION DRILLS BY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS CREWS

   (a) Observation. Automatic weapons crews should establish and practice immediate reaction drills to bring fire on the enemy in event of ambush or other hostile action as an automatic response.

   (b) Evaluation. A recent incident demonstrated the fact that automatic weapons crews trained for immediate reaction to hostile actions precluded disaster when one of two Dusters on convoy escort hit a mine. In spite of dense smoke, dust and apparent confusion resulting from the mining incident, both Dusters were able to counterfire the hostile small arms after the mine detonation and break a well planned ambush.

   (c) Recommendation. That immediate reaction drills be emphasized in training by automatic weapons crews in Advanced Individual Training and Basic Unit Training.

(3) INTRICATE LIAISON WITH SUPPORTED UNITS

   (a) Observation. Automatic weapons personnel must conduct a thorough liaison visit with commanders of supported units immediately upon occupation of the position.

   (b) Evaluation. Recent experience has demonstrated that
all supported units are not aware of the capabilities and limitations of automatic weapons. This has resulted in improper employment and failure to render logistical support. Consequently, firepower capabilities are not utilized to the maximum extent and automatic weapons are unable to participate in sustained operations due to lack of resupply.

(c) Recommendations. That automatic weapons battery commanders/platoon leaders/section leaders conduct initial liaison visits with supported unit commanders to fully explain the capabilities and limitations of automatic weapons, recommend employment for best possible defense posture and inform supported commanders of the support which must be rendered to automatic weapons elements. This headquarters prepared an automatic weapon/searchlight employment information letter and distributed it to supported commanders during a previous reporting period. This letter has been revised and will be distributed again. A copy of this letter is attached as Inclosure 3.

(4) PREPARATION AND USE OF RANGE CARDS

(c) Observation. It is imperative that automatic weapons crews prepare range cards and annotate them with standard information and information pertaining to no-fire zones.

(b) Evaluation. On several occasions, automatic weapons were not able to identify no-fire zones when required to counterfire suspected or actual enemy mortar/rocket positions. This resulted in time wasted while the squad leaders requested this information from the supported units.

(c) Recommendation. That automatic weapons crews identify no-fire zones, use fire direction equipment associated with Duster or Quad and determine azimuths and elevations of no-fire zones; that this information be annotated on respective range cards; that range card preparation training be conducted in Advance Individual Training or Basic Unit Training. This headquarters has prepared and distributed range card samples to all automatic weapons units for guidance. The sample range card is attached as Inclosure 15.

(5) MINING INCIDENTS

(a) Observation. Numerous mining incidents in the Kontum-Poloi-Klang area demonstrate that the Viet Cong are crafty adversaries. Mines have been placed on road shoulders, road centers and intersections. Plastic mine devices are also utilized.

(b) Evaluation. Due to use of plastic mine devices, engineer mine sweeps are not insurance that a road is free of mines. The enemy's placement of mines does not always follow a set pattern. Plastic type mines and irregular placement causes difficulty in discovering mines.
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(a) Recommendation. That personnel refrain from using unswept roads. Personnel using swept roads are continually alert for any digging or tampering with road surfaces or shoulders, unusual markings, rock patterns, or arrangements of peculiar vegetation near the road indicating possible markings for mines as a warning for enemy forces.

(6) TRAILERS FOR DUSTERS

(a) Observation. Dusters do not afford sufficient space for carrying personal gear or protective materials from a closed base position to a new position.

(b) Evaluation. Duster crews supporting artillery units, which continually move from one base position to another during extended periods, are hampered by the lack of available space for carrying equipment and materials required for personal welfare and protection. A trailer authorized for each Duster would alleviate this problem.

(c) Recommendation. That each Duster be authorized a 1¿ Ton Ammunition Trailer, H332, for purposes of carrying personal welfare and protective materials. The trailer, H332, affords additional carrying space, low silhouette, and trackability when towed by a Duster. This headquarters has published and distributed a loading plan indicating what and where equipment is to be carried on the Duster. This plan will support the Duster crew for a period of four days. The trailer, required for longer periods, has been requisitioned. This plan is attached at Enclosure 16.

(7) INCREASED MOBILITY FOR QUADS

(a) Observation. Present 2½ Ton truck prime mover for the Quad limits the mobility of Quads to established road networks and hard surfaced areas.

(b) Evaluation. In the present configuration, Quads mounted on 2½ Ton Trucks cannot effectively support maneuver elements on search and destroy missions or range with self propelled artillery units when operating off established road networks and hard surfaced areas. Mounting the Quad on a full tracked, self propelled vehicle will enable the Quad to range with maneuver and self propelled elements.

(c) Recommendations. That a full tracked, self propelled vehicle be evaluated as the prime mover for the Quad. This headquarters has requested temporary loan of three Cargo Carriers, Self Propelled, H548 for test and evaluation. This request has been approved by I Field Force Vietnam Artillery and I Field Force Vietnam and forwarded to USNV.
c. TRAINING

(1) TRAINING CONDUCTED AT UNIT LEVEL

(a) Observation. Because of the wide dispersion of battery elements, only on-the-job training can be effectively conducted at the battery level.

(b) Evaluation. Mandatory training required for all personnel include 9 subjects annually, 2 subjects monthly and 1 subject weekly for a total of 65 hours per month. (See inclusion 9) Batteries are not able to effectively conduct the formal training required because of mission commitments and wide dispersion of elements. Battalion level training could be conducted for the annual subjects during replacement in-processing and training. The monthly and weekly subjects could be conducted by using handouts. Records of training could be maintained by the respective batteries.

(c) Recommendation. That organizations with similar employment conduct training as outlined in the above evaluation. This headquarters is presently revising its training program along this concept.

d. INTELLIGENCE

c. OPERATIONS

(1) SUPPORT OF AUTOMATIC WEAPON/SEARCHLIGHT ELEMENTS

(a) Observation. As currently employed, automatic weapons/searchlight elements are not capable of supporting themselves nor do parent units have the capability to provide required logistical support.

(b) Evaluation. In some instances, required supplies of Class I, III, and V items were not received by automatic weapon/searchlight elements because the supported unit did not assume this responsibility and the parent unit was not capable of effecting re-supply. Parent units of automatic weapon/searchlight elements do not have the continuous supply trains that are available to the supported units. Supported units should be required to render support and provide Class I, III and V supplies to automatic weapon/searchlight elements.

(c) Recommendations. That units supported by automatic weapon/searchlight elements be required to supply Class I, III, and V items to those elements. This headquarters is resolving this problem by liaison visits with supported units.

(2) LOCATION OF PLL FUNCTION

(a) Observation. PLL functions located at battalion

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(b) Evaluation. Excessive equipment down time was experienced due to transportation of required repair parts from consolidated PLL at battalion level to the using unit because of the wide dispersion of elements throughout the II and I Corps Tactical Zones. Certain critical items were not on hand when required because of authorized stockage for consolidated PLL.

(c) Recommendation. That PLLs be maintained at the battery level. Corrective action taken in view of the recommendation was training of battery personnel as PLL clerks and transferring PLL to the battalion level. The estimated date for 50% fill of battery PLLs is 1 June 1969.

3) EXCESSIVE DEADLINE TIME

(a) Observation. Equipment was deadlined due to insufficient resupply of repair parts.

(b) Evaluation.

1. The delay experienced in returning deadlined equipment to operational status was due to inadequate supply of repair parts caused by the following:

a. Incorrect demand data recorded in PLL because controlled and uncontrolled cannibalization was the major source of repair parts. This resulted in PLL having a maximum zero balance of 35%.

b. Lack of sense of urgency in obtaining requisitioned parts by supply and support agencies. During this reporting period, only 175 items were received for 1500 requisitions.

2. Corrective action taken by this organization included:

a. A technical inspection of all organic equipment of the battalion and attached units to identify shortages.

b. Establishment of a system for controlled cannibalization and recording of correct demand data.

c. Coordination of an M2A1 engine rebuild project with U.S. Army Support Command, Qu' Nhon.

d. Preparation and submission of a list of repair parts, considered combat essential, based on experience. This list is attached as Inclusion 17.
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2. Establishment of a continuous monitoring system and parts requisition procedures to include review of status of each requisition on a monthly basis.

3. Coordination with support agencies to provide a secure container for parts received by the agency and awaiting pick up by the battalion.

4. Continuous personal contact by Battalion S-4 personnel with support agencies.

(c) Recommendation. That continuous emphasis by placed on obtaining repair parts supplies at all command levels.

f. ORGANIZATION

(1) ATTACHED PERSONNEL

(a) Observation. Personnel of Battery E (M2), 41st Artillery, and Battery 2 (M2), 29th Artillery, attached to automatic weapons batteries add an additional supervisory and administrative burden on the M4 battery commander.

(b) Evaluation. An AW assistant platoon leader, given the supervisory and administrative responsibility for attached machine gun and searchlight personnel, will alleviate this problem within the AW battery.

(c) Recommendation. That an AW assistant platoon leader be assigned responsibilities for supervisory control and administration of personal, medical and financial items of attached machine gun and searchlight personnel; that machine gun and searchlight personnel be detached from automatic weapons batteries administrative control and support be exercised by parent units; that operational control of Quad and Searchlights be exercised by AW batteries. Above recommendations will be explored and the concept adopted if feasible in the near future. The M42A2 "G" series is presently under study at higher headquarters which changes the present organization of Duster battery and Quad battery to a Duster/Quad battery which will solve this problem.

g. OTHER

(1) QUALIFIED MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL (TRACK MECHANICS-MOS 63020)

(a) Observation. Track mechanics, MOS 63020, assigned to this organization are qualified to perform maintenance on M-48, M-50, and M13 vehicles. Little of this knowledge is applicable to the M42A1 vehicle.

(b) Evaluation. Because assigned track mechanics have little knowledge applicable to the M42A1 vehicle, four to six weeks is required for an on-the-job training program. The training time required has a detrimental effect on the battalion's maintenance posture.
Corrective action taken included utilization of a maintenance contact team for purpose of performing track maintenance at site of widely dispersed element locations. This concept has reduced excessive equipment down time.

(c) Recommendation. That the feasibility of a school established to train personnel on the M42A1 vehicle be evaluated.

(2) QUALIFIED MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL (TURRET MECHANICS-M42A1)

(a) Observation. Turret mechanics, MOS 45F20, assigned to this battalion are qualified to perform maintenance on the M-55, M-109, and M-109 vehicles and not on the M42A1 vehicle.

(b) Evaluation. Because assigned turret mechanics have little knowledge applicable to the M42A1 vehicle, an on-the-job training program for a four to six week period must be conducted to qualify these personnel on the M42A1 vehicle. The training time required has detrimental effect on the battalion's maintenance posture. The turret mechanics assigned were not trained as MOS 45F20 for automatic weapons turret mechanics. This battalion should receive the turret mechanics trained at Fort Bliss.

(c) Recommendation. That a procedure be established to identify turret mechanics trained at Fort Bliss and assign these personnel to automatic weapons battalions.

(3) AN/VRC-66 RADIO CABLE CONNECTION IN M42A1

(a) Observation. On many battalions within the battalion the co-ax antenna cable connection on the AN/VRC-66 radio has been broken.

(b) Evaluation. Ammunition cans taken from the track commander's side of the storage compartment were pulled out in such away that the co-ax antenna connection was hit and the connection broken or the cable cut.

(c) Recommendation. That the casing from a L-495 trip flare be used as a shield which will give adequate protection to the connecting point where the co-ax antenna lead meets the radio. This shield can be attached to the radio by the two screws already on the radio.

(4) EXTERNAL PHONE C-2296/VRC

(a) Observation. The external phone, part of intercommunication control set C-2296/VRC, located on the rear deck of the M-42 tends to pull out easily from the control box.
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(b) Evaluation. This external phone is connected directly inside the C-296/WHO and when the phone cord is accidentally pulled out, there is no way to repair it in the field.

(c) Recommendation. That the control set and external phone cord be modified for connection similar to that on a radio and microphone cord affording a stronger connection; or that a "breakaway" connection be fabricated which would afford a joint on the cord which will break and preclude the cord being pulled from the control set.

(5) INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM - M42A1

(a) Observation. Problems have occurred with the internal communications system - M42A1 that require repairs of 3rd & 4th echelon nature.

(b) Evaluation. Repairs of the M42A1 internal communications system cannot be made by battery communication section because of lack of training, schematics of system, and equipment for troubleshooting. The schematics of the system are needed to troubleshoot and determine what repairs are required.

(c) Recommendation. That schematics, repair and maintenance manuals be obtained. This Headquarters forwarded a letter to the USSAREH requesting these items. As a result of this letter, a civilian representative of electronics command, working out of the office of the Director of Maintenance, Qui Hom, is assisting in this matter.

(6) MALARIA PREVENTION

(a) Observation. Prevention of malaria continues to be a problem and is a matter for training, indoctrination, and command emphasis.

(b) Evaluation. Malaria prevention items such as medicine, mosquito netting, and insect repellent are readily available. Each man is issued a mosquito net, insect repellent and advised to take oral medicines for prevention of malaria. Each individual is required to annotate a roster indicating he has taken malaria prevention oral medicine. A command letter was published by this headquarters outlining malaria prevention measures to be followed by units of this command. Even with these precautions, both vivax and falciparum malaria is being contacted by men of this organization.

(c) Recommendation. That indoctrination periods pertaining to malaria preventative measures be included in all phases of training.
(7) INFECTIONS OF THE FEET

(a) Observation. Prevention of foot infection continues to be a problem and is a matter of training and indoctrination.

(b) Evaluation. Common foot infections such as infected blisters and abrasions are caused by improper foot hygiene, fit and care of boots.

(c) Recommendation. That indoctrination periods pertaining to prevention of foot infection be included in all phases of training.

(8) USE OF EAR PLUGS

(a) Observation. Prevention of ear damage by use of ear plugs is a matter for continual training indoctrination and command emphasis.

(b) Evaluation. Degradation of hearing is occurring with increased frequency because personnel are not wearing ear plugs when exposed to loud or continuous noise such as gun firing, generators, helicopters and small arms firing. The most frequent cause of ear damage during the reporting period was small arms firing.

(c) Recommendation. That use of ear plugs when working on crew served weapons, generators, riding in helicopters and firing small arms receive emphasis in all phases of training.

-17 Incl-

Inc 14, 7, 8, 12, 14 and 17
Withdrawn, HQ, DA
DISTRIBUTION:
2-CINCPAC
ATTN: GPO-PF
3-USN
ATTN: AVHGC (DST)
5-CM, IFF:CG
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ATTN: G-3
1-CG, UNITED STATES ARMY TEC CENTER
ATTN: GST TEC BDE
1-1ST BN, 44TH ARMY
1-5TH BN, 2ND ARMY
1-FA STAFF SECTION 4TH BN 69TH ARMY
1-FA BN 4TH BN 69TH ARMY

(27) CONFIDENTIAL
AVFA-AT-D (30 April 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AW), (SP), 60th Artillery,
Battery E (HI), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery
for Period Ending 30 April 1968 (RCS: CSFOR) (R1)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350 4 JUN 689

TO: Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

1. (C) Reference paragraph b(1)(c), section 2, page 19, Counterfire by Automatic Weapons. Nonconcur. Clearance for field artillery and/or automatic weapons fire should always be obtained unless a target is positively identified as enemy and is jeopardizing the security of US or allied personnel.


3. (C) Reference paragraph b(3)(c), section 2, page 20, Initial Liaison with Supported Units. Concur.

4. (C) Reference paragraph b(4)(c), section 2, page 20, Preparation and Use of Range Cards. Concur.

5. (C) Reference paragraph b(5)(c), section 2, page 21, Mining Incidents. Concur.


7. (C) Reference paragraph b(7)(c), section 2, page 21, Increased Mobility for Quads. Concur.

8. (C) Reference paragraph c(1)(c), section 2, page 22, Training Conducted at Unit Level. Nonconcur. In addition to providing lesson plans in the form of handouts for wide distribution, battery officers must either present or closely supervise the presentation of mandatory training.


10. (C) Reference paragraph e(2)(c), section 2, page 23, Location of PLL Functions. Concur.


13. (C) Reference paragraph g(1)(c), section 2, page 25, Qualified Maintenance Personnel (Track Mechanics – MOS 63C20). Concur.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (AN), (SP), 60th Artillery, Battery E (ME), 41st Artillery and Battery B (Siff), 29th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968 (RCS: CSFOR) (R1)


16. (C) Reference paragraph g(4)(c), section 2, page 26, External Phone C-2296/VRC. Concur.

17. (C) Reference paragraph g(5)(c), section 2, page 26, Internal Communications System M42A1. Concur.

18. (C) Reference paragraph g(6)(c), section 2, page 26, Malaria Prevention. Concur.

19. (C) Reference paragraph g(7)(c), section 2, page 26, Infections of the Feet. Concur.

20. (C) Reference paragraph g(8)(c), section 2, page 26, Use of Ear Plugs. Concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

GERALD G. YOUNG
Major, Artillery
Adjutant
TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam,
ATTN: AVINC-DST, APO 96375

(T) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsements and makes the following recommendations and comments:

a. Reference paragraph 1d(1)(d) Section 1 page 10, Prescribed Load List: Establishing the PLL at battery level was one of the topics discussed at the Logistics Seminar held at HQ lFORSVCV on 6 June 1968. The Director of Supply Qui Nhon Supply Depot is aware of the problem and some improvements will be noted by 30 June 1968.

b. Reference paragraph 1d(2)(b) Section 1 page 10, Turn-in of Combat Loss Vehicles. No problems should be encountered if AR 735-3 and USA RV Reg 735-3 are adhered to in turning in combat loss vehicles.

c. Reference paragraph 1d(2)(c) Section 1 page 10, Kh2A1 Engine Rebuild: There is a program in CONUS for the Kh2A1 engine rebuild. Unserviceable engines should be turned-in through logistical channels to preclude future shortages.

d. Reference paragraph 2e(3) Section 2 page 23, Excessive Deadline Time: Concur with the recommendation, however this unit's current deadline rate is only about 7% compared to the iACV standard of 15%

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT C. GABBARD

COPY FURNISHED:

I FORSCV Arty
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AVHGC-EST (30 Apr 68) 3d Int (U) CPT Arnold/ms/LSN 4485
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Battalion (N) (SP) 60th Artillery, Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery and Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery For Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS GSFOR (RL).

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 6 JUL 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning increased mobility for quads, page 21, paragraph b(7): Concur that the 2½ ton Truck Mounted Quad .50 Machine Guns are inadequate for deployment in cross-country missions; however, M148 Carrier assets are currently not available to support this requirement. Assets to fill known TOE shortages are expected to arrive in-country over the next ninety days.

b. Reference item concerning qualified maintenance personnel (Turret Mechanics - MOS 45F20), page 24, paragraph g(2)(c): Concur. The present procedure is to screen the DA Form 20 of each replacement with MOS 45F20 to determine the service school attended. This procedure insures that personnel who attend course number 642-45F20-A (Fort Bliss, Texas) are assigned to major subordinate commands that have an automatic weapons battalion.

c. Reference item concerning external phone C-2296/VRC, page 25, paragraph g(4). A USAECOM equipment representative in the Qui Nhon area will visit the unit, evaluate the problem and submit a Technical Assistance Report to USAECOM. The representative will, if possible, make an on the spot correction as an interim measure. Unit should submit an Equipment Improvement Report (EIR) in accordance with paragraph 3-7.4, TM 38-750.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ, 4th Bn, 60th Arty
HQ, I FFORGEV

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GPOP-DT (30 Apr 68) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of PQ, 4th bn, 60th Arty Btry E (MG) for Period Ending 30 April 1968. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. Shortt
Capt, AGC
Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL

FOR

DE

RR

TR

TO

CONFIDENTIAL 02-0246 FROM .VE-.T-.D

SUJB: .ARTILLERY ORGANIZATION FOR COISET (U)

(c) EFFECTIVE 170001H FEB 68, THE FOLLOWING CHANGES ARE MADE:

4/60 ARTY, WITH B/41 ARTY AND B/29 ARTY ATTACHED, IS DEPACHED FROM 41ST ARTY GP AND ATTACHED FULLY TO I FFORCEV ARTILLERY.

HDB, 8/26 ARTY IS DEPACHED FROM 41ST ARTY GP AND ATTACHED FULLY TO I FFORCEV ARTILLERY.

GP4

ET

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S U B J E C T: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (RCS-CSFOR) (R1)

KEY TO DISPOSITION MAP

4th Bn, (4W) (SP), 60th Arty
with
Battery B, (MG), 41st Arty
and
Battery B, (SIT), 29th Arty
attached

1. QUANG TRE
   4-DUSTERS
   1-QUAD
   1-SLT

2. CAMP EVANS
   3-QUADS
   3-SLTS

3. LZ ENGLISH
   2-DUSTERS
   2-QUADS
   1-SLT

4. PHONG SON
   2-DUSTERS
   2-SLTS

5. LZ ORANGE
   2-DUSTERS

6. LZ PONY
   2-DUSTERS

7. LZ UPLIFT
   HQ 4/60 Arty
   HQ 1/3/60
   4-DUSTERS
   3-QUADS

8. MUI CAT
   2-DUSTERS
   1-QUAD
   1-SLT

9. QUIL HIGH
   HQ 4/60 Arty
   HHB 4/60 Arty

10. BINH KEB
    2-DUSTERS

11. AH KEB
    3-QUADS

12. XUNG THE
    3-DUSTERS (1 COMBAT LOSS)
    1-SLT

13. TUY HOA
    2-DUSTERS
    4-QUADS
    3-SLTS

14. MUI HIEP
    HQ 4/4/60
    4-SLTS

15. WHITE HORSE
    1-SLT

16. PHAN RANG
    2-SLTS

17. PHAN THIET
    8-DUSTERS
    4-QUADS
    2-SLTS

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## Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (RSC-GSPC) (R)

### Disposition as of 30 April 1968

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SUBJECT: Employment of AW and Searchlights in Vietnam

TO: See Distribution

I. GENERAL

1. The 4th Battalion (AW)(SP), 60th Artillery and attached Battery E (MG), 41st Artillery completed one year in the Republic of Vietnam on 12 March 1968. Battery B (SLT), 29th Artillery was attached to the Battalion on 2 January 1968. Lessons learned through experience during operations are outlined herein to assist in future planning and employment of the Gun, AAA, SP Twin M-42 (Duster), Mount Machine Gun Caliber .50, (M-55) and the Xenon Searchlight AH/MSS-3.

(a) Employment of organic weapons has been characterized by wide dispersion of units. Presently, elements occupy 63 locations from Phan Thiet north to Quang Tri and from Qui Nhon west to Dak To, in support of 45 separate maneuver elements and artillery units. This dispersion of elements naturally causes liaison, support and control problems which are alleviated with the assistance of supported commanders. Recommendations are offered throughout the text of this letter to aid similar type units and supported units in acquiring maximum Automatic Weapon and Searchlight effectiveness.

(b) The Duster Battalion and Quad Battery are being employed in the direct support role; however, crew proficiency of air defense engagement procedures are continually stressed.

(c) Inclosure 1 provides characteristics and capabilities to assist in Automatic Weapons and Searchlights.

(d) Inclosure 2 provides recommended mission assignments for Automatic Weapons and Searchlights.

II. EMPLOYMENT

2. When properly employed in defensive and offensive roles, the Duster and Quad have proven to be formidable weapons for support of maneuver and artillery units. Considerations and recommendations for utilization of the Duster, Quad and Searchlight are listed below:

a. DUSTER
AVGK-AF-S3
SUBJECT: EMPLOYMENT OF AW AND SEARCHLIGHTS IN VIETNAM

26 April 1968

(1) The supersensitive point detonating fuze and flat trajectory of the 40mm projectile are key factors in positioning the weapon. Dense brush or foliage will cause detonation of the projectile. Tracer burn out of 40mm ammunition occurs between 3500 and 4500 meters which limits effective range. Consequently, fields of fire should be free of restriction by brush or trees to at least 3500 meters, where possible.

(2) Commanding terrain positions are recommended for the Duster, allowing utilization of full 6400M traversing capability and engagement of targets at maximum range. Alternate positions for the Duster provide flexibility to the defensive configuration. Preplanning concentration and programmed H & I fires on an irregular basis provides a deterrent factor for the perimeter.

(3) Employment in pairs is recommended for better coverage, mutual support, limited recovery capability, and section integrity for support of search and destroy operations, route and work party security and defensive support.

(4) The Duster is not recommended for convoy escort missions because long moves and low speeds have proven harmful to engines and transmissions. Due to the age of the chassis, it lacks the speed and durability of newer carriers which should be considered when operating with self-propelled artillery or armor units.

b. QUAD

(1) Employment of the 2½-ton Truck Mounted Quad is similar to Duster employment in many respects. However, the prime mover limits the mobility to hard surface areas and established road systems.

(2) The Quad is an area saturation weapon and is very effective in foliage and heavy brush areas.

(3) When emplaced in a defensive area, selection of alternate positions enables maneuverability within the position for purposes of massing fires and covering all routes of approach.

(4) Like the Duster, preplanned concentrations for the Quad add to the H & I program and the overall deterrent factor when in defensive positions.

c. SEARCHLIGHT

(1) The searchlight, when utilized in a defensive position, is recommended to be employed on high ground enabling coverage of the entire position area.

(2) The Searchlight, reciprocally laid with Automatic Weapons, offers a strong deterrent factor. Searchlight infrared detection, illumination and Automatic Weapons engagement, simultaneously, provide the defensive with a surprise capability for gaining the offensive.
SUBJECT: EMPLOYMENT OF AW AND SEARCHLIGHTS IN VIETNAM

To achieve maximum effectiveness of Automatic Weapons and Searchlights, supported unit commanders are encouraged to include section or squad leaders in intelligence or operations briefings. The information received will provide Automatic Weapon and Searchlight personnel with the introduction necessary for range cards, preplanned fires, and locations of friendly forces and provide quick reaction time in providing on-call missions. When included in operations planning of supported units, Automatic Weapons and Searchlight personnel will be able to advise supported commanders on matters such as employment, ammunition requirements, supply needs and personnel changes. This will enable a closer working relationship and control procedures.

(4) To insure continuous and effective support, supported commanders should provide Class I, III, and V items for supporting Automatic Weapons and Searchlight personnel and to assist in maintenance within the supported unit's capabilities.

(5) It is recommended that supported commanders schedule H & I and Recon by Fire firing for Automatic Weapons. This practice will enhance crew performance and insure weapons are functioning properly. If possible, a free-fire zone should be established for Automatic Weapon training and test firing.

(6) It is imperative that Dusters, Quads and Searchlights be positioned within the defensive perimeters to preclude these elements being overrun and lost to the defense, in the event of attack. This is especially important for ground mounted Quads. When ground mounted, the Quad has no mobility and it must be provided adequate support and protection by ground troops and covering fire by other crew served weapons. Ground mounted Quads should not be placed so near the perimeter that it is within hand grenade distance from the enemy.

III. MAINTENANCE

3. Because of the inherent maintenance problems of the Duster and Quad, time is required for performance of crew maintenance and maintenance services. These weapon systems, as all equipment, must be continually maintained in order to provide support to their maximum capabilities. Duster and Quad crews will perform required maintenance in the available time and during mission assignments. Maintenance services are scheduled quarterly and require 72 hours for performance for the Duster. Thirty hours are required for the Quad and 2½-ton Truck services.

(2) To expedite repair parts resupply for Automatic Weapons and Searchlights, supported units are encouraged to initiate requisition and work order actions through their direct support maintenance agencies. This action will eliminate excessive equipment down-time caused by transportation of required parts from the Battalion's Base Camp. In the near future, this problem will be alleviated because PLLs will be established at each battery with associated ASIs.
AVGK-AF-S3
SUBJECT: EMPLOYMENT OF AW AND SEARCHLIGHTS IN VIETNAM

(3) Dusters, when employed in pairs (by sections), have a limited recovery capability. One Duster can tow another for distances as far as 10 kilometers. Greater distances cause undue engine wear of the towing Duster. Also, a wrecker is required to change and service engines and transmissions. This Battalion is authorized only one wrecker and is augmented by one VTR. In view of the dispersion of Dusters throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone, it is impossible for this Battalion to support all elements with VTR or wrecker support when required. It is, therefore, required that supported unit commanders assist Duster crews by providing wrecker support for maintenance services and repairs and vehicle recovery within their capabilities.

(4) In order to preclude excessive down time for Dusters and Quads due to minor repairs, maintenance services required for the weapons systems should be considered by supported commanders in regard to frequency of their mission assignments. Section and Squad Leaders will know the status of their equipment, when services are scheduled, and will be able to advise supported commanders of their maintenance requirements.

IV. SUMMARY

4. The information contained herein is intended to aid the commander in employment of Automatic Weapons and Searchlights supporting this operation. Close adherence to recommended mission assignments will greatly enhance the support rendered by those elements. The requests made in regard to maintenance support, which can be effected by the supported unit commander, will aid in maintaining continuous operation of the weapon systems and Searchlights. Staff Officers, Battery Commanders, and Platoon Leaders of this organization, will make frequent liaison visits with supported unit commanders to assist in employment aspects and effect coordination action for maintenance and support requirements.

s/Paul E. Schultz
t/PAUL E. SCHULTZ
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
Special
2 Incl

as
AUTOMATIC WEAPONS DATA

M-42

1. Each firing battery is composed of two platoons, four sections per platoon, 2 M-42s per section. (total 16 M-42s)

2. Each M-42 is armed with 2 40mm guns and 1 M-60 Machine Gun.

3. Rate of fire: Maximum, 240 rnds/min; Sustained, 100 rnds/min.

4. Effective Range: 3500 Meters (limited by self-destruction ammunition)

5. Ammunition:
   a. Type: 40mm, HE-T or HEI-T, SD, MK 11, M/fuse, PD, MK 27.
   b. Basic load: 480 rounds on carriage (480 more may be towed)

6. Vehicle
   a. Full-tracked, gasoline driven, air-cooled engine.
   b. 140 gal. fuel gives operating range of 35 to 100 miles depending on terrain conditions.
   c. Speed: Up to 45 mph on improved roads, 25 mph in cross-country operations.

7. Weight: 25 tons (airlift by C-124 or C-141)

M-55

1. The M-55 battery is composed of six sections, four squads per section, 1 M-55 per squad. (total 24 M-55s)

2. Each M-55 has four caliber .50 Machine Guns on the mount.

3. Rate of fire: Maximum 450-500 rnds/min; per .50 cal.

4. Effective range: Point targets, 1830 meters; area targets, 6750 meters.

5. Ammunition
   a. Type: .50 Cal
   b. Basic load: 10,000 rnds on the prime mover, 10,000 towed.

6. Prime mover: 2-ton truck

7. Weight
   a. Mount only: 3200 lbs.
   b. Mount, basic load, crew: 8,000 lbs. (carried by 1 CH-47)
   c. M-55 complete (truck, mount, basic load, crew w/equipment): 26,204 lbs. (carried internally by C-124, C-130, C-141)

Incl 1
1. Each Searchlight battery consists of 3 platoons with 12 lights per platoon. (total 36 Searchlights)

2. Effective range:
   a. White light: 3-5000 meters.
   b. Infrared: 2-3000 meters.


4. Weight: 1.5 tons complete (carried by 1 CH-47)

5. Beam width:
   a. Focus: 12º
   b. Spread: 120º

6. Traverse limits: 6400º

7. Elevation limits: +540º; -380º

8. Continuous operation: 2 hours; cool for 30 minutes (visible mode)
RECOMMENDED MISSION ASSIGNMENTS

1. Suitable AW missions:
   a. Tactical missions
      1) Road security
      2) Perimeter defense
      3) Search and destroy (M-42 only. 2½ ton Prime Mover for M-55 limits mobility to hard surface areas and established road systems)
      4) Work party security
      5) Strong point security
      6) Convoy escort (M-55) should be utilized. Long moves at low speeds prove excessively harmful to M-42.
      7) Air transportable (M-55 only)
      8) M-42 waterborne operations on-board LCM
      9) Blocking and destruction missions
   b. Fire missions
      1) Interdiction
      2) Counterfire--during AW or mortar attacks
      3) Recon by fire
      4) Confirmed target locations
      5) Indirect fire and unobserved fire

2. Considerations for choice between the M-42 and M-55.
   a. The M-42 is preferred for:
      1) Point targets
      2) Close-in fires at heavier targets i.e., bunkers, building, etc.
      3) Indirect fires
   b. The M-55 is preferred for:
      1) Firing near friendly positions in under brush or heavy foliage.
2) Saturation fires
3) Blocking fires

3. Unsuitable missions for AW
   a. Cavalry operations, such as screening and reconnaissance missions
   b. Cross country movement at low speeds or in jungle terrain
   c. Convoy escort of heavy artillery batteries and extended road marches are not recommended for M-42, Dusters
Chronological Sequence of Major Actions and Events for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968. (Reference: Daily SITREPS, 4/60)

4 Feb 68 1650 hrs: 1st Bn, 30th Arty Surgeon was fired upon at BR92-252 (approx 15 rounds). At 1630 hours the 19th S & S BN (F381248) was fired on by small arms and automatic weapons fire from the VPC of BR92-252. The 8th Transportation Group dispatched reaction force. In the resulting firefight 18 US/FMAF vehicles were pinned down on Highway 63 by the enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire from the same general area. Armed helicopters from Lane Army Airfield engaged the enemy position. EN GDHR dispatched M-42 and Quad 50 reaction force and extracted personnel pinned down by the enemy fire. After personnel were extracted and returned to Camp concrete, artillery fire was called in and adjusted from Camp concrete observation post. 4/8/17 fired 41 rounds of 105mm HE.
Assessment: Undetermined.

4 Feb 68 2040 hrs: Dusters D141 and D142 enroute to fire base approximately 10 km west of Oasis were ambushed at Z3013319 by an unknown size force using small arms. The Duster fired 202 rounds. Results: 1 NVA KIA. Negative damage or casualties to US personnel.

5 Feb 68 1640 hrs: Quads E15, E17 and E18 while performing convoy escort for 124th Trans Bn were ambushed by an unknown VQ force on Highway 19 in the Hang Giang Pass. the Quads expended 6200 rounds in support of the convoy. Negative assessment.

7 Feb 68 Duster P277 was ambushed VIO 8934479. Duster E231 fired and expended 50 rounds. Results: 3 enemy KIA. Negative damage or casualties.

8 Feb 68 Quad E19 and E22 located near LZ Betty was employed in a search and destroy mission in which several fortifications were destroyed resulting in 3 NVA KIA.

11 Feb 68 0845 hrs: Duster D112 hit mine VIO Z409343 enroute to check point 33 for daily strongpoint security mission. 2 WIA treated and returned to duty. 1245 hours VIO Z4152324 while being towed by M-88 VTR, Duster D112 hit a second mine causing extensive damage, resulting in combat loss.

12 Feb 68 Duster A111, A122 and Quad E19 while on search and destroy mission in support of 3/506 Infantry near Phan Thiet VIO 89828082 received credit for 17 enemy KIA.

25 Feb 68 2015 hrs: Duster C221 while performing bridge security observed unknown size VQ force gathering in a church

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V10 BR575957. Duster fired one confirmed mission expending 236 rounds resulting in church being destroyed. Assessment: undetermined. Duster C121 while performing perimeter defense at LZ English observed a suspected VC camp. Duster fired one reconnaissance by fire mission expending 736 rounds. VIC BS658236. Results: 4 enemy KIA.

28 Feb 68 Duster B211 and B212 fired five reconnaissance by fire missions to Operation Sub-Area Command V10 of C6422, C6312, C6311 and C63021. In the V10 of C6303324 four enemy bunkers destroyed. Three were destroyed and one partially destroyed. Three lean-to type shelters were destroyed. 40mm shells cleared away the foliage. Area believed to be the Base Camp of the 210 VC BN. No enemy fire was returned during the operation.

3 Mar 68 0245 hrs: Duster E211, E212, B221, D141, B231 and B232 received 81mm mortar, 122mm rocket and recoilless rifle attack at Bk 70 to VIO YB988167. Dusters fired counterfire mission expending 974 rounds resulting in 1 enemy KIA.

4 Mar 68 0930 hrs: DUSTER B221 located V10 of YA876456 Polei Djereng fired one mission expending 73 rounds at enemy mortar position. Mortars silenced at time. On 5 March Duster B221 received credit for destroying 82mm mortar position.

4 Mar 68 1055 hrs: Duster A221 in support of Special Forces and CIDG personnel on a search and destroy mission V10 CQ 939733 discovered 2 NVA hiding in bush. Enemy engaged with Duster's Machine Gun. Assessment 1 NVA KIA, one probable KIA, 1 NVA flag captured.

5 Mar 68 2100 hrs: Duster 221 received an undetermined amount of incoming rocket, mortar, and small arms fire V10 YA876456 southeast of Polei Djereng. Mortar and recoilless rifle rounds impacted 10 meters in front of Duster's position, wounding 4 EM. All EM were treated and returned to duty. Duster fired 1 counterfire mission expending 300 rounds. Assessment: Mortar fire silenced.

7 Mar 68 2100 hrs: Duster A111, A112 and A121 fired 8 H & I missions expending 96 rounds at suspected enemy location VIO AN60680 near LZ Betty. Assessment: 7 enemy KIA (by body count).

8 Mar 68 Quad E16, E23 and E26 fired one counterfire mission expending 10,000 rounds. Rounds were on convoy escort duty for the 6th Trans Group when convoy was ambushed on the Hays Giang Pass V10 BR5345. Quad E26 received 1 round in right door. Negative casualties.

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12 Mar 68 1430 hrs: H103 fixed one confirmed mission expending 586 rounds 770 CR070336 and CS086226. Assessment: 14 small structures destroyed, 7 large structures destroyed.

13 Mar 68 0200 hrs: Duster 0211 on bridge security VIO LZ Lowboy V10 E592100; observed 3 VC setting explosives on bridge. Dn-14 crew fired M-79 and M-60 weapons. Assessment: 1 confirmed enemy KIA and 2 possible enemy WIA.

15 Mar 68 1330 hrs: Troops E16 and E22 were ambushed while on convoy escort with 8th Trans Bn on Highway 19 VIO ER1752. Quad fired 300 rounds silencing ambushers with unconfirmed enemy KIA, 1 US WIA (Btry E, 41st Arty)


20 Mar 68 1000 hrs: Duster D241 enroute to Kontum hit anti-tank mine VIO 2432581. Sniper fire commenced and was silenced after Duster D241 fired 70 rounds in counterfire mission. Negative casualties.


31 Mar 68 1315 hrs: Quad E11 on search and destroy mission in support of 1st Bn 50th Infantry contacted unknown size enemy force VIO of BR97732. Quad E11 engaged the enemy. Assessment: Undetermined. 2 US WIA (E11 personnel) evac to 85th EVAC Hospital.

1 Apr 68 0730 hrs: Quad E15 mount was air lifted to VIO YA939912

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1 Apr 68 1630 hrs: Airco dump VIC YA939912 received incoming mortar rounds. Fire spread to Quad E15 causing minor damage. Majority of all Quad E15 equipment destroyed. Quad crew personal clothing and equipment destroyed. Negative casualties. Quad E15 operational.

1700 hrs: 2200 hrs: Quad E15 received undetermined number of incoming mortar rounds and sniper fire VIC YA93912. Quad E15 returned counterfire mission expending 4000 rounds. Negative damage to equipment or casualties.

2 Apr 68 1700 hrs: AFO with Quad E11 mounted returning in column from infantry operation in support of 1st Bn, 50th Infantry hit mine VIC of BR999763. EFO Thomas S. Woodland, EFO Pablo B. Sanchez, E/41, KIA. AFO and Quad combat loss.

4 Apr 68 1345 hrs: Quad E15 mount received incoming mortar rounds VIC of YA171198. 1 US WIA (E/41).

5 Apr 68 0800 hrs: Dusters B121, B122, B141 and B142, Quads E16, E27 and E28 departed Camp Townes for extensive operation in support of 6th Bn, 84th Arty VIC BR95353.

9 Apr 68 Dusters B121, B122, B141 and B142 received incoming mortar rounds VIC BR92632. Dusters fired counterfire missions expending 482 rounds in VIC of mortar flashes. Assessment: Mortar fire silenced. 1 US WIA (E/41).

9 Apr 68 0800 hrs: Workarty uncovered 3 bodies VIC BR354452 killed by .50 Caliber Machine Guns Quad E16, E23 and E26 were credited with 3 enemy KIA's by body count. Mission fired 04/1345.

10 Apr 68 0130 hrs: Searchlight S21 observed movement on perimeter VIC YA183911 Searchlight personnel fired 10 M-79 rounds. Assessment: 3 enemy KIA by body count.

0830 hrs: E25 and E26 fired counterfire in support of an EOD team working along Highway 19 in VIC of BR300452 expending 4500 rounds respectively. Assessment: Quad E25 and E26 credited with 4 enemy KIA by body count.

1230 hrs: Estimated regimental size force NVA attacked position VIC of BR300452 with recoilless rifles, AK 47's and 82-40 rockets. Attack repulsed by Infantry, artillery and airstrikes. Quads E25 and E26 fired 15,000 rounds in counterfire missions. Assessment: Quads E25 and E26 were credited with 4 enemy KIA by body count.
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15 Apr 68 1400 hrs: Quad E15 mount located just outside of their perimeter VIO of YA99934. were called upon to provide litter bearers for US Infantry unit in fire fight with undetermined size NVA force. PFC James E. Nicolaisen was separated from his unit. Search of area was conducted with negative results.

17 Apr 68 1700 hrs: PFC Nicolaisen was found KIA as a result of another sweep of the area by infantry unit.

17 Apr 68 2100 hrs: Duster A241 while on perimeter defense observed undetermined size force of VC VIO of GQ18372. Duster A241 expended 72 rounds. Assessment: 3 enemy KIA by body count.

19 Apr 68 2100 hrs: Dusters C141 and C142 in support of regular forces ambush VIO of BR776911. Fired 5 confirmed missions expending 119 and 96 rounds respectively. Assessment: 8 enemy KIA by body count.

20 Apr 68 0300 hrs: Dusters B121, B122, and B142, Quad E14, E27, and E28, Searchlights S41, S42, S46, S52 and S66 in support of 5th En, 84th Arty, Btry B 7th En, 15th Arty, Btry C, 2nd En, 17th Arty in support of 1st Inf Regiment (ROK) and 25th Inf Regiment (ROK) began mission assignment for Operation Mung Ho 11.

22 Apr 68 1655 hrs: Quad E19 returning from work party security in support of 27th Engineers hit a 105mm pressure detonated road mine VIO of AN87776 approximately 5km from Phan Thiet. Vehicle damaged. 3 US WIA (4/4/60) 2 EM treated in field and returned to duty, 1 EM will be evac to 36th Evac Hospital.


29 Apr 68 1030 hrs: Duster B121 and B132 fired one mission each, expending a total of 361 rounds, on a known enemy small arms position VIO ZA059312. The small arms were firing on a helicopter flying overhead. Assessment: Snipers silenced.

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The following reports of action were compiled from the 4th
Battalion (AW) (SP), 60th Artillery SITREPS and 8th Transportation
Group letter; subject: Synopsis of Ambush.

13 Feb 68. A convoy consisting of 198 cargo vehicles, 1
maintenance truck, 2 gun jeeps (M-60 MG), 3 gun trucks (4 M-60
MG/TRK) and Quads E17, E17 and E18 departed An Khe at 1325 hours.
At a point 200 meters east of the base of Hang Giang Pass (See
map point 1), the lead vehicles of the convoy were taken under
fire by enemy mortars and small arms. Convoy personnel immediately
returned fire in the direction of the suspected enemy positions.
The convoy commander directed E17 to engage the enemy and lay
down screening fire in the direction of the suspected enemy mortar
position while the convoy moved through the area. Tactical
Security Forces (173rd ABN) arrived within 10 minutes of the initial
contact. Air strikes were conducted. A sweep of the suspected enemy
positions was conducted after air strikes.

ASSESSMENT: Enemy casualties unknown. No US casualties or equip-
ment damage. Enemy had fired 7 mortar rounds.

4 Mar 68. A convoy consisting of 104 cargo vehicles, 4 gun
jeeps (M-60 MG), 8 gun trucks (4 M-60 MG/TRK) and Quads E16,
E23 and E26 departed An Khe at 0830 hours. At 0900 hours the convoy
was halted at CP 89 by tactical security because of enemy action
in Hang Giang Pass. At 1130 hours the convoy continued with one
Tank (1/69) and 2 APCs (173rd ABN) accompanying for additional
security. At 1145 hours (VTC BR535461) the convoy came under
heavy small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire (See map point
2). The Convoy Security Force including E16, E23 and E26 immediately
returned fire on the enemy positions which were well entrenched
in the tree line on the north side of the road. Sporadic fire was also
received from the south side of the road. A reaction force of
1 Tank, 4 APCs and 4 Gun Ships arrived within five minutes after the
initial contact. The enemy force was estimated at 50 personnel.

ASSESSMENT: Enemy casualties unknown, 8 US WIA, including 2 Quad
cannoneers; 5 vehicles and two trailers damaged. Quads expended
25,000 rounds.

8 Mar 68. A convoy consisting of 79 cargo vehicles; 4 gun jeeps (M60
MG), 5 gun trucks (4 M-60 MG/TRK) and Quads E16, E23 and E26 departed
An Khe at 0800 hours. At 0830 hours VTC BR535445 (See map point 1),
the third gun truck in the first serial was hit by a Claymore mine.
At the same time the convoy came under heavy small arms and auto-
matic weapons fire. The Convoy Security Force including E16, E23
and E26, a company from the 173rd, operating in the immediate area
was driven back after 15 minutes.

ASSESSMENT: 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA, 1 Vehicle damaged; enemy casual-
ities not known.

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The convoy proceeded and at 0915 hours at a point 2 Kilometers west of OP 102 (See map point 2), a fuel truck in the first serial hit a mine. The vehicle was taken under enemy fire by small arms, automatic weapons and B40 rockets, which ignited the fuel. The remainder of the column came under enemy fire. The Convoy Security Force including Quads E16, E23 and E24 laid down a base of fire directed at the enemy positions while the convoy maneuvered past the burning vehicle. Tactical Security Forces arrived within 5 minutes and engaged the enemy.

**Assessment:** 1 US KIA, 1 vehicle damaged, 1 vehicle destroyed. The Quads expended a total of 10,000 rounds in both ambushes. The Quads received no casualties or damage.

**15 Mar 69:** At 1030 hours a convoy supported by Quads E16 and E26 came under small arms and Automatic Weapons fire from a bunker approximately 400 meters of the highway (See map point 3). The Quads fired 900 rounds into the bunker silencing the enemy fire.

**Assessment:** Negative US casualties or equipment damaged; 3 enemy KIA by Quads.

At 1330 the Quads were returned to An Khe providing security for a convoy when they came under fire from small arms and Automatic Weapons fire (See map point 3). The Quads directed fire into the enemy positions expending 900 rounds.

**Assessment:** 2 US WIA both from Quads. Negative US equipment damage. 6 enemy KIA.

**Conclusion:** Quads on convoy escort are utilized as a quick reaction force capable of engaging the enemy with devastating fire that saturates the enemy positions in the minimum amount of time. The Quads, irregularly placed in the column, precludes the enemy from predetermining their position and provides protection for the entire convoy. As illustrated by the above, the Quads are used to lay down screening fires while the column passes through the area. Also Quads check the enemy’s offensive against the convoy until Security Forces, helicopter gun ships, or artillery arrives at the area of ambush.
MANDATORY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

THE FOLLOWING PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION IS AN EXHECUTIVE ORDER ACCORDANCE 350-1

4TH BATTALION (AI)(ST) GSF: ARTILLERY. THE TRAINING IS CONDUCTED AT THE

SQUAD OR SECTION LEVEL BY AUTHORITY OF THIS BATTALION.

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TOTAL: 22 HOURS

* SUBJECTS MAY BE GIVEN WITH OTHER SECURITY SCAFFOLDING.

3. FOLLOWING SUBJECTS ARE CONSIDERED OF SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE TO BE
INTEGRATED INTO ALL MEMBERS OF UNIT'S VARIOUS PROGRAM:

a. COMBAT EFFICIENCY AND COMBAT SKILLS TRAINING
b. FIRST AID AND EMERGENCY CARE
   c. FIELD SANITATION
   d. MEAL PREPARATION

Inclusion 9
0. PREVENTION OF HAND INJURY
1. CHECK LOG-IN
2. REPORT THAT
3. VICTIM AND RELATIVES TO THE VICTIM'S RELATIVE PEOPLE
4. MAP READING
5. FIELD ARTILLERY OBSERVATION
6. COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES
B. NUCLEAR TRAINING Cycles:

1.  This cycle may well be utilized for the immediate
   training of individuals who are to receive the training
   cycle on the battalion level and for the completion of
   the battalion units on the company level.

2.  The cycle may well include the following, and
   instruction of M-16, M-60 machine gun, and .50
   caliber machine gun, is included continually and
   immediately.

3.  The week-end and final day long cycle training schedule will
   consist of:

   a. Local square multiple and rules (1 hr)
   b. Individual multiple and field sanitation (1 hr)
   c. Completions completion (1 hr)
   d. General care and repair of equipment (1 hr)
   e. Practical instruction on use of guns: UDR, COMBAT,
      hiking and equipment; drill and all military day
      periods.

b. The nuclear training program will extend to include the
   following subjects which will be included in module A:

   Radio training
   1 hr
   Basic fire
   1 hr
   HAZARD AND EVACUATION
   1 hr
   Recipes of var
   (code of conduct)
   1 hr
   Basic knowledge of var
   1 hr
   M-16 training
   2 additional hours

Inclusions 10
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1. In addition to regular classroom training sessions, each battery commander on-the-job training of the following subjects:

   (1) Battery employment by individual unit tactical situations.

   (2) Individual and unit location, field movements, cover and concealment.

   (3) C&I MIL. INFRACT. MG, & SP ARTillery.

   (4) Explanation and use of RMFC cards.

   (5) Unit, intercompany, and 4th battalion (Am) artillery policies and procedures.

   (6) Unit missions and objectives

INSTRUCTION 11
PLL CLERK TRAINING PROGRAM

The following formal and on-the-job training was conducted by the battalion S4 for purposes of qualifying battery personnel to perform the duties of PLL clerk.

1. Formal Training (2 Days)
   (a) Introduction to Publications (2 hrs)
   (b) Introduction to the Record of Demand and Title Insert Cards (2 hrs)
   (c) Practical Exercise on the Preparation of a PLL (4 hrs)
   (d) Introduction to the Red Ball Express and Issue Priority System (2 hrs)
   (e) Practical Exercise involving all phases of a PLL (including the demand cards, title inserts, and submitting requisitions).

2. OJT (4 Days)
   (a) Each PLL clerk prepared his respective battery's record of demand and title insert cards.
   (b) The PLL clerks prepared Red Ball Express Requisitions for Battalion Consolidated PLL.
   (c) The PLL clerks processed status cards, and made the necessary follow up for the BN Consolidated PLL.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS, 4TH BATTALION, 60TH ARTILLERY

APO 96238

AVGK-AF-84

19 March 1968

SUBJECT: Location of Prescribed Load Stock

CO, 4th Bn, 60th Arty
APO San Francisco 96238

1. REFERENCES:


b. Message, CG III INFORCEN, Artillery, AVFA-AT-3, 10-0280, DTG 20355Z Oct 67, SUBJECT: Location of PLL and Stock


d. AR-735-35 Paragraph 6-3

2. In compliance with reference 10, the following factors were considered pertaining to the location of prescribed load stock:

a. Age of equipment utilized

b. Stock of spare parts available for equipment

c. Past and present deadline rate.

d. Transportation and communication with subordinate units.

e. Wide dispersion of fire units and subordinate unit headquarters from battalion headquarters.

f. Status of PLL line items with stock located at battalion level and stock located at battery level.

g. Requirement for PLL experienced personnel with stock located at battalion level and stock located at battery level.

3. The following advantages and disadvantages were noted with the PLL remaining consolidated at battalion level:

a. ADVANTAGES:

(1) Total number of lines authorized on PLL (890) based on consolidated density and consolidated demands.

Inclosure 13
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(2) ASL at 5th Maintenance Battalion is within 20 minutes driving time from PLL location.

(3) Three PLL clerks and one supervisor can maintain consolidated PLL.

(4) PLL functions can be closely supervised at battalion level.

(5) The PLL clerks working in the consolidated PLL are trained and knowledgeable.

b. DISADVANTAGES:

(1) Long distances between consolidated PLL location and firing batteries with the attendant time losses in transporting repair parts.

(2) There is only one ASL supporting the battalion.

(3) Demand data in some cases is incorrect due to units obtaining repair parts from other sources.

4. The following advantages and disadvantages with the PLL being at battery level is listed below:

a. ADVANTAGES:

(1) The repair parts would be stocked at the location where maintenance is actually performed (reference 1d).

(2) The time losses in transporting repair parts would be reduced.

(3) The ASL's which would support the unit PLL's would be relatively close to the PLL location.

(4) Personnel in units would take more interest in the procurement of repair parts.

(5) The total number of mission essential items authorized for stocking would increase for approximately 160 lines.

b. DISADVANTAGES:

(1) The requirement for trained PLL clerks would increase from three to a minimum of six (a minimum of one clerk per PLL for Fq Btry, A Btry, G Btry, D Btry, and B Btry 29th Arty). Repair parts for B Btry, 41st Arty, would be on the PLL's of the units to which the machine gun sections are attached.

(2) An estimated 211 line items would be dropped from the unit PLL due to lower density of equipment and the reduced number of demands.
CONCLUSIONS:

a. The PLL located at battery level would be more responsive to the needs of the unit.

b. The availability of repair parts will not improve.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That a PLL be established at each unit with the exception of E Btry, 41st Arty.

b. That a training program under the direction of Lt. Mandery be established at this location.

c. That each unit select one individual to be trained as a repair parts specialist.

d. That this headquarters request permission to maintain a consolidated PLL at this location in addition to the unit PLL's.

e. That the PLL for HHD 4/60 be maintained by one of the repair parts specialists presently assigned.

ANTONIO G. GONZALEZ
CPT, Artillery
S4
ITEMS TO BE INCLUDED ON RANGE CARDS
1. Targets
2. Ranges
3. Direction/Elevation (AZ/EL)
4. Left Limit (LL)
5. Right Limit (RL)
6. Your Location
7. North Arrow
8. No Fire Zones or Outpost location of Patrols
9. Fire Unit Designation
10. Date Prepared

Inclusion 15
1. PACK W/ BED ROLL
2. 200 SAND BAGS
3. 15 6' ENGINEER STAKES
4. 3 CASES C-RATIONS IN DRIVERS COMPARTMENT
5. 5 GAL 30W OIL
6. 5 GAL WATER

NOTE: 1. PACK WILL HAVE ONE COMPLETE CHANGE OF UNIFORM MINUS BOOTS PLUS MESS KIT AND TOILET ARTICLES.
2. BED ROLL WILL CONSIST OF BLANKET & MOSQUITO NET ROLLED INSIDE OF PONCHO & ATTACHED TO BOTTOM OF PACK.

Inclusion 16
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 6th Battalion, 60th Artillery (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counter-insurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68

Co. 6th Battalion, 60th Artillery

30 April 1968

5. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.
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13. ABSTRACT

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The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

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* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

*** Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.