**AD NUMBER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

**LIMITATION CHANGES**

**TO:**
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

**FROM:**
Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 15 MAY 1968. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff Force Development (Army), Attn: FOR-OT-RD, Washington, DC 20310.

**AUTHORITY**

AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980 AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
DISCLAIMER NOTICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (26 Jul 68) FOR OR RD 682181 20 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 10, U. S. C., sections 735 and 736. Its transmission or the revelation of the contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OR RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training materials

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command

Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Armor School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Missile and Munitions School
US Army Ordnance School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
OSD(USA), Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Defense Documentation Center
Planning Research Corporation

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED; NOT releasable to foreign nationals

CONFIDENTIAL
Commanding Generals
US Army Materiel Command
I Field Force Vietnam Artillery
USAF Air Ground Operations School
Commanding Officers
336th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo)
2d Battalion, 138th Artillery
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, IFFORCEV Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSPCM-65 (R1)

i. (C-NOFOR) Section I. Operations: Significant Activities

a. (C) General

(1) During the period 1 Feb 68 through 30 Apr 68 IFFORCEV Artillery continued to support US, FNNIF, ARVN, SF, RF, PF and CIDG forces in II CTZ.

(2) IFFORCEV Artillery units, totaling two artillery groups, eleven battalions, four separate batteries, and six detachments supported all major operations in II CTZ to include Operations BOLLING, McLAIN, MACARTHUR, and PERSHING (PATRICK/COCHISE). ROK forces in the 9th and CRID areas of responsibility were supported during Operations Mang Ho 10 and Mang Ho 7. ARVN forces were supported in operations conducted by units of the 22d and 23d ARVN Division, 24th STZ and provincial defense units. Organizational structure of the command appears at inclosure 1.

(3) During the ORL reporting period serious personnel problems surfaced. Following is a discussion of problems encountered and measures employed to correct the situation:

(a) The lack of qualified field artillery lieutenant colonels to fill vital artillery positions in I Field Force Vietnam is a severe deterrent to accomplishment of the mission of artillery in II Corps Tactical Zone. Chronic shortages of experienced cannon artillerymen to command battalions and to perform as senior staff officers precipitate serious disruptions of personnel assignments each time an incumbent completes his tour. Two recent examples are the Battalion Commander, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery who departed for CONUS on 16 April without a programmed replacement and the Force Artillery S3 who departs on 18 May, again without a programmed replacement. The loss of these two key individuals has necessitated a series of stop gap emergency assignments and reassignments within Force Artillery to fill the vacancies created by these known losses.

(b) It is obvious that this type of turbulence among the most important artillery command and staff positions is not conducive to strong organizations and professional performance. The lack of experience of the younger artillery officers demands that senior commanders and staff officers be
selected carefully from officers with outstanding records and broad backgrounds in tube artillery. A study of artillery captains and lieutenants assigned to Force Artillery during the past eight months reveals that more than 60% of these officers have had no prior firing battery experience. It is necessary to thrust these young leaders into positions that demand technical knowledge, judgment and great attention to detail. Because they lack the needed experience it falls to battalion commanders and senior staff officers to compensate for their deficiencies and thus assure that accurate and timely artillery support is provided to maneuver forces. It is not prudent to entrust command of battalions or key staff positions to any but the most highly qualified tube artillerymen. The need to extract maximum effectiveness from each round fired and to assure the safety of friendly forces demands that only the very best occupy these important assignments. Surprisingly, the number required is not great. A total of ten artillery battalion commanders and five staff officers in the grade of lieutenant colonel are required each year to meet the needs of I Field Force Artillery. They have not been forthcoming and it is necessary to juggle the available assets at much too frequent intervals to patch the holes in the command and staff structure.

(a) A detailed study of aviation support available for the force artillery was conducted during this ORLL reporting period. Following is a short discussion of the subject:

(a) All aircraft have been deleted from current TOCEs of IFFORCEV artillery units and are consolidated into aviation units. 18 each 01 aircraft have been allocated from these resources to support IFFORCEV artillery units on a daily basis. These aircraft are integrated in artillery target acquisition plans of supported units.

(b) Air observers are an essential part of the effort to improve the effectiveness of artillery fire. With the increase of the number of aircraft available for observation of artillery fire, a corresponding increase in missions fired by air observers has been noted. Since the beginning of March, a gradual decline has been detected in the average number of aircraft supporting per day. This figure is derived from the total number of hours flown for the unit by 01 aircraft, considering that an aircraft can be expected to provide 5 hours of support per day. Along with this decrease in the number of aircraft supporting per day, the number of missions fired is falling off correspondingly. This is indicative of the importance of a sufficient number of aircraft available to obtain targets to be fired upon by artillery.

(c) Exploitation of the range capability of heavy artillery is dependent upon the increased use of aerial observers. Heavy artillery is positioned to deny the use of remote regions as assembly areas and havens by the enemy. Heavy artillery units in II C2Z as positioned presently can cover roughly 40% of the Corps Tactical Zone. This coverage represents one fifth of the area of South Vietnam. In addition, heavy artillery plays an economy of force role, since it covers areas which are impossible for ground troops to reach.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, IFFORCEV Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(d) The 13 each O1 aircraft allocated to support IFFORCEV Artillery were distributed originally among 10 battalions. Another battalion, 6th Bn, 34th Arty, arrived in II CTZ on 24 March 1968. This unit forms the nucleus of the mobile artillery strike force (see para 1c (4) below). It will be employed as a battalion in support of ARVN and NVA F operations throughout II CTZ and will not establish permanent or semi-permanent base areas. In addition to the mobile artillery task force, IFFORCEV Artillery units are being deployed in support of highly mobile ARVN Ranger operations in the remote areas of the southern four provinces of II CTZ. The mobility and offensive nature of these operations would be enhanced by the availability of readily responsive O1 aircraft.

(e) As a stop-gap measure it is recommended that two O1 or TOH aircraft be allocated to each battalion and three additional to each group headquarters pending assignment of aviation sections in accordance with current TOE's.

(5) On 17 February 1968, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW-SF) with attached Battery E, 41st Artillery (Ib) and Battery B, 29th Artillery (SLA), and Headquarters Battery, 8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 26th Artillery were relieved from attachment to 41st Artillery Group and attached directly to this headquarters.

(6) The IFFORCEV Artillery Command and Inspection Program continues pursuant to the newly published IFFORCEV Art Reg 20-1, 20 March 1968. Units evaluated during the ORLL period were: 5th Bn, 26th Arty (19 Feb); 4th Bn, 60th Arty, Btry E, 41st Arty and Btry B, 29th Arty (11 Mar); Hq Btry, IFFORCEV Arty (22 Mar); 5th Bn, 27th Arty (25 Mar) and 6th Bn, 32d Arty (6 Apr).

(7) The current Firing Battery Evaluation Program was revitalized with publication of IFFORCEV Art Reg 350-2, 24 March 1968. Evaluation teams have been organized at this and subordinate group headquarters in order to verify that firing elements of the cannon are functioning in a precise and efficient manner and that safe and accurate fire is being delivered. The FBC and firing battery are evaluated quarterly in individual and section proficiency. Maintenance of howitzers, fire control equipment and ammunition is also investigated. Performance of all elements of the gunnery chain during a live fire mission receives primary emphasis.

(8) The 6th Bn, 8th Arty (155mm towed) arrived in country on 24 March 1968 at the port of Qui Nhon. The battalion was met by Major General W.R. Force, Acting CG, IFFORCEV and Brigadier General James G. Killough, CG, IFFORCEV Artillery. MG Force delivered the welcoming address. The battalion moved to its base camp at Camp Radcliff where an intensive in-country orientation and training program was conducted 25 March through 7 April 1968. Attached to IFFORCEV Arty with further attachment to 41st Arty Gp, the battalion was first employed tactically on 3 April 1968 in COCHISE 40. See paragraph 1c (4) below for details.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-AT-D

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, IFORCEV Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(9) USAFPLC General Orders 185 and 191 implemented reorganization of 105mm towed and self-propelled howitzer battalions under G series standardized HTOE effective 1 April 1968. Generally, these HTOE support observer, fire direction liaison and S3 sections. Light and heavy battalions will reorganize effective 15 June 1968.

(10) A Combined Artillery Conference was chaired by BG Kellogg on 4 April 1968 at Camp Rudliffe, An Khe. Attendees included senior US, ROK and ARVN artillery commanders and staff officers. The purpose of the seminar was to discuss artillery deployment in II CTZ and to present for discussion and refinement a mobile artillery task force concept (see para 3 (4) below). This artillery conference proved invaluable as a sounding board for artillery deployment philosophies and did much to strengthen relationships among ARVN, ROK and US senior artillerymen.

(11) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, IFORCEV Artillery underwent the IFORCEV General Inspection on 5 April 1968. Rating awarded was Satisfactory (only ratings of Satisfactory and Unsatisfactory are considered). BG W.R. Peers and all members of the inspection team were highly complimentary of the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery.

(12) On 23 April 1968, COL E.J. Brugger, Team Chief of CONARC Liaison Team visited the command. Purpose of visit was to solicit recommendations for improvement of CONARC training as applies to requirements in RVN. COL Brugger was briefed by the DHO, SR and S3 at this headquarters and then visited 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery and 52d Artillery Group.

b. (C) Intelligence

(1) Intelligence Workshop/Conference

(a) The first IFORCEV Artillery Intelligence Workshop/Conference was conducted on 16 April 1968 at the 6th BN, 32d Arty. The purpose of the conference was to provide guidance and recommendations for improvement of intelligence operations of all artillery units with IFORCEV, and to provide an open forum for discussion of problems encountered at various levels within artillery units. Attendees included intelligence representatives from all artillery units with IFORCEV. Guest panelists from the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV), USARV, IFORCEV, II Corps, and 4th Inf Div conducted discussions and presented briefings in four workshops, each of which was attended on a rotating schedule by groups of intelligence representatives.

(b) Availability of aerial reconnaissance systems and application of results of aerial reconnaissance to targeting procedures at battalion level were addressed in one workshop by representatives of IFORCEV G2 Air and II Corps G2 Air. Techniques of collecting, recording, evaluating and applying targeting data at artillery group/battalion level were discussed in a second workshop by representatives of CICV, IFORCEV Artillery, II Corps and 4th Inf Div Artillery. A demonstration of targeting procedures employed by CICV also was presented to all groups in the second workshop. During the third workshop, surveillance representatives from USARV, IFORCEV Artillery and 4th Infantry Division G2 Air discussed surveillance capabilities.
available to all artillery units, demonstrated recommended utilization of maps, overlays and aerial photographs in surveillance planning and execution and reemphasized the importance of productive surveillance efforts. In the fourth workshop, three representatives from CICV explained the mission and operations of the Intelligence Center and outlined in detail what support is available to all units and methods to be used in requesting CICV data. A briefing on enemy order of battle in II CTZ was also presented during this workshop.

(c) At the conclusion of the four workshops a general seminar session was held. Attended by all panelists and intelligence representatives, highlights of the day’s discussion were reviewed, and final recommendations, based on ideas generated throughout the day, were presented.

(d) Due to the enthusiasm generated, ideas exchanged and difficulties resolved during the Workshop/Seminar, similar conferences will be conducted quarterly.

(2) Meteorological Compatibility Studies. Because of the wide dispersion of artillery in the II CTZ and limited meteorological assets, employment of metro sections requires close monitoring. During the ORIL reporting period meteorological compatibility studies were conducted in order to insure metro stations are employed efficiently and providing widest possible coverage. These studies revealed:

(a) Meteorological conditions between Tuy Hoa and Ninh Hoa are compatible, thereby releasing one metro station for employment elsewhere.

(b) Compatibility in the Bong Son/Phu Cat area resulting in the employment of only one metro station at LZ English. Previously there were stations at both Bong Son and Phu Cat.

(c) An improved metro coverage plan for the western portion of II CTZ employing metro sections at Oasis, Soui Doi, Kontum and Dak To. As a result, complete coverage is available throughout the central highlands and Highway 19E to include the Mang Yang Pass.

(3) Survey. During the ORIL reporting period, survey control was extended from the vicinity of Pleiku to approximately 20 kilometers North of Ben Me Thuot. Change 2 to the II CTZ Artillery Trig List was published and distributed on 1 April 1968 adding 64 stations.

c. (C-NOFORN) Operations and Training Activities

(1) Selected Munitions. Controlled Fragmentation Munitions were released for employment in Kontum, Daklac and Pleiku Provinces by COMUSMACV in mid February 1968. Training of artillery units was accomplished by a US Army Artillery and Missile School Team headed by BG John J Kenney, Assistant Commandant USAAMS. Since receipt of the munitions in II CTZ three missions have been fired. The 4th Inf Div Arty fired on an active rocket location near Camp Enari, the 1st Bn, 92d Arty fired in defense of a 4th Inf Div fire base west
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, IFFORCEV Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

of Polei Klang and the 4th Div Arty and 1st Bn, 92 Arty engaged an NVA Bn west of Polei Klang. All missions were conducted using unobserved fire techniques and the effectiveness of fire could not be judged. Lack of suitable targets accounts for the sparse use of firecracker munitions in II CTZ to date.

(2) Arty Support for Task Force 1st Bn, 12th Inf. During the period 4 Mar-2 Apr 68, Btry E, 5th Bn, 16th Arty; Btry C, 3d Bn, 6th Arty and Btry C, 7th Bn, 15th Arty displaced to Ban Me Thuot to support operations of 1st Bn, 12th Inf in that area. Liaison was established with 23d ARVN Division and fire support coordination was provided by 3d Bn, 6th Arty and Btry C, 7th Bn, 15th Arty subsequently converted two of its 8 inch howitzers to 175mm guns to provide greater range capability and to support concurrently Special Forces operations in the Ban Me Thuot area. Upon termination of the operation, heavy artillery coverage was maintained by the replacement of Btry B, 7th Bn, 15th Arty by Btry B, 5th Bn, 22d Arty.

(3) Associate Battery Program

(a) Established on 14 March 1968, the IFFORCEV/ARVN Associate Battery Program was developed to augment existing advisory programs, improve the effectiveness of ARVN forces and develop further the channels for better coordination of fire support and mutual understanding. US divisional and force artillery units sponsor selected ARVN Artillery units in their vicinity. The program provides a responsive US headquarters from which the ARVN units can request technical assistance and aid in such areas as maintenance and training. Additionally, the personal relationships developed between associate units will provide a vehicle for the exchange of information and ideas.

(b) With the problems of Vietnamese artillerymen in mind, the specific objectives of the Associate Battery Program are to:

1. Establish close liaison between associate units.
2. Integrate US, ROK and ARVN artillery fires whenever possible.
3. Establish communications between associate units.
5. Assist in training as requested.
6. Provide for maintenance and technical support within capabilities.

(c) Although in its infancy, progress made thus far has been truly encouraging. Initial coordination and liaison visits with appropriate MACV advisors and associate ARVN artillerymen have been completed. Detailed assistance programs have been designed and implemented and initial reports indicate program goals will be attained.

(A) Mobile Artillery Task Force. Because of the great size of II CTZ and the wide dispersion of maneuver elements, force artillery battalions
have had to be employed to cover large areas, often resulting in the firing of a single battalion being dispersed over distances of 100 miles or more. With arrival of 6th Bn, 8th Arty (155mm: Towed) on 24 March 1968, the opportunity to employ and demonstrate the effectiveness of mobile artillery was apparent. Addressed at the Combined Artillery Conference of 4 April 1968 (para 1a (4) above), this concept involves employment of the battalion intact, and augmented by additional artillery assets as available. The mobile artillery task force is then employed anywhere in the II CTZ in support of maneuver unit operations where needed. The battalion may be described as an artillery reaction force, able to move on short notice to support major contacts as well as planned operations. The battalion was employed initially on 8 April 1968 in support of operation VELVET KAISER, a 173rd Abn Bde operation in the COCHISE AO. Subsequently, the battalion moved to the Qui Nhon area and supported the GRID operation XING HO 11 during the period 11-29 April 1968. Initial successes of this battalion are encouraging and verify the validity of the mobile artillery task force concept.

(5) Calibration Program: The USARV calibration team calibrated ROK and US artillery units in the 9th ROK and GRID areas of operation and in the HOI MIN AO during the period 10-22 April 1968. The number of tubes calibrated in each major unit is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>105mm</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>8&quot;</th>
<th>175mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th ROK Div Arty</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP ROK Div Arty</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFFORCEV Arty</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320 Arty</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Relocation of 5th Bn, 27th Arty: In order to expand US artillery coverage in the four southern provinces of II CTZ, the 5th Bn, (105mm: Towed) 27th Arty was deployed from the vicinity of Phu Hiep to Phan Thiet on 13 April 1968. Currently, the firing batteries are located in Binh Thuan, Tuyen Duu and Phuoc Loc Provinces. Assigned a general support mission, the battalion has been tasked to establish liaison with and offer assistance to ARVN artillery and maneuver units, CIDG camps and Task Force. 31 Bn, 506th Inf. One firing battery is in direct support of the ARVN 2nd Ranger Op.

(7) Assistance to SF/CIDG Camps

Recent visits to Special Forces/CIDG camps in II CTZ have shown the need for improved coordination with supporting artillery. To correct the situation, US IFFORCEV established a program on 13 April 1968 designed to improve artillery support to SF/CIDG operations. Under this program, artillery units maintain close liaison with assigned camps and provide advice and assistance in the following areas:
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-AT-D 15 May 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, IFFORCEV Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

1 Defensive fire planning to include pre-firing defensive concentrations by organic and/or supporting artillery.

2 Artillery support for SF/CIDG operations within the TAOR.

3 Maintenance for CIDG howitzers and training of crews.

4 Training for Special Forces personnel in observer and fire direction procedures.

5 Communications, ammunition, survey and expendable supply support within capabilities.

(b) Although too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this new program, it is expected to result in more responsive fire support for SF/CIDG operations and technical, maintenance and training assistance for CIDG howitzer crews and fire direction centers.

(b) Liaison. During the period of this report a detailed evaluation of liaison officer employment was conducted. The nature of the missions of IFFORCEV Artillery units requires liaison be established with a large number of varied types of agencies to include US, ARVN and ROK maneuver and artillery forces; SF/CIDG camps; sector and sub-sector headquarters and installation defense commands. Although only 17 liaison officers are TOE authorized within IFFORCEV Artillery it was necessary to establish liaison with 34 agencies in order to insure effective fire support. Duties of these liaison officers range from clearance of artillery fires to fire support coordination.

(9) Training for Newly Assigned Lieutenants. Forward Observer and Fire Direction Officer Training Courses conducted respectively by 41st Arty Gp at An Khe and 52d Artillery Gp at Pleiku have been in operation since January 1968. Both courses have undergone several modifications during this CRLL period in efforts to improve the quality of instruction presented and to better accomplish the mission of orienting newly arrived lieutenants in II CTZ to insure a safe transition into combat operations. During this reporting period there were 125 Forward Observer School graduates and 82 graduates from the Fire Direction Officer Training course.

(10) Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE)

(a) In order to assist units in II CTZ that do not possess an extensive targeting capability, FSCE increased targeting efforts beginning in February. Over one thousand targets were developed during the month including 301 Hangfire targets. Special analyses were completed for the Vinh Than Valley area, Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa, 18th NVA Regt, the Pleiku area, 3d NVA Div and 95th NVA Regt. A greater use of CICV targeting information was begun and the first results of this effort were passed to units in the field during February.

(b) In February the FSCE assumed responsibility for targeting Arc Light strikes which had been handled previously by the IFFORCEV G2. All records, administration and followup responsibility were transferred to FSCE.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-67-D
15 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, IFFOCEV

Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(c) The second in a series of fire support coordination meetings was held on 13 February in the FSCE. Representatives of FSCE, Army Aviation, DASC A and G3 Air attended. Results included a recommendation that staff visits to subordinate units be conducted to identify individual coordination problems.

(d) Although the number of HINGFIRE type targets diminished, there were over one thousand targets developed and passed for firing during March.

(e) Staff visits were conducted at 3d Bn, 4th Inf Div in AO PATRICK on 2 and 4 March 1968 for the purpose of explaining targeting procedures and assisting with coordination problems the unit encountered after assuming responsibility for the new AO.

(f) Special analyses were completed on the 5th NVA Div, 95B Regt, 1st NVA Div, and 32d and 33d NVA Regts during March 1968.

(g) Artillery and ARC Light coordination and the rules of engagement against watercraft received emphasis during March 1968. An IFFOCEV regulation on rules of engagement against watercraft was published in April and an IFFOCEV regulation covering artillery and ARC Light coordination was drafted and initial staffing completed during April.

(h) A study group consisting of the AFSC, G3 Air and a G2 representative, visited MACV for the purpose of discussing recent changes in ARC Light procedures. As a result of increased emphasis in ARC Light strikes and the requirement for follow up information, the AFSC and G3 Air visited 3d Bn, 506th Inf, 4th Div and 173d Abn Bde in April 1968. These coordination visits centered on identifying problems and providing information on ARC Light policies and procedures. Additional visits are planned with both ROK Divisions.

(ii) Ammunition Expenditure Analysis:

(a) Since the SITREP format was changed on 25 December 1967 to classify ammunition expenditures according to meaningful categories, a large amount of useful data has been gathered. The system developed to record and analyze this data is:

1 Number of rounds and missions fired by each battery in each target category are extracted daily from the SITREPs, recorded and added to previous expenditures.

2 The total number and percentages of rounds and missions fired in each target category are tabulated weekly by battalion, AO and caliber.

3 An analysis is made of the weekly cumulative data in which expenditures are compared with those of previous weeks and also with the level of activity in the area concerned.

(b) The weekly analyses have proven to be a useful management tool in many areas.

CONFIDENTIAL
1 Command emphasis has been applied to improve the method of expenditures of particular units. As a result, a significant shift has been noticed in expenditure from the interdiction category to the more profitable target categories, such as confirmed and acquired.

2 Data obtained has been useful in determining the requirements for repositioning of artillery units.

3 The analyses provide information upon which recommendations on allocation of artillery ammunition is based.

(c) Artillery units down to battery level are being encouraged to make an analysis of their expenditures much the same as has been done at this headquarters. As a guide, a copy of one week's ammunition analysis was reproduced and distributed to all major US artillery headquarters, battalions and batteries in II CTZ.

(12) Training. Personnel of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I FFORCEV Artillery were engaged in 90 days of mission oriented operations. Required mandatory and on the job training was conducted concurrently for 63 days.


d. (U) Personnel

(1) Personnel and administration strength figures of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery on 30 April 1968 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auth</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asg</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for duty</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Rest and Recuperation data for the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quotas received</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotas utilized</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage utilized</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Awards & Decorations. The following awards and decorations were processed during this period for units of I Field Force Vietnam Artillery:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, IFFORCEV Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, CSOS CSFOR-65 (R1)

 Legion of Merit 4 4 3
 Bronze Star (V) 15 0 16
 Bronze Star 53 45 56
 Soldiers Medal 2 1 11
 Air Medal (V) 2 0 0
 Air Medal 21 19 16
 Army Commendation Medal (V) 1 8 1
 Army Commendation Medal 81 61 38
 Purple Heart 30 26 6

(4) Accidents. The following accidents were recorded during this period for units of I Field Force Vietnam Artillery:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicular</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Morale and Discipline: Morale and discipline have continued to be excellent through the reporting period.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel. None

b. (C) Operations

(1) Fire Support Coordination

(a) OBSERVATION: In areas where more than one free world military force is operating, fire support means are not always integrated properly.

(b) EVALUATION: In some portions of II CTZ ROK, ARVN and US Forces are operating with organic artillery while general support artillery, naval gunfire and TAC Air are also available. Each province in II CTZ is building a Combined Tactical Operations Center but without an integral combined fire support coordination agency each commander will continue to be inclined to use only that fire support most responsive to him.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Liaison officers from the artillery of each FWMAF, ARVN artillery and air force as appropriate should form the nucleus of a fire support coordination agency at each provincial tactical operations center.

(2) Dispersion of Tactical Radios

(a) OBSERVATION: That FM radios and associate antennas should not be confined to one centralized area within a base camp or firing battery position.

(b) EVALUATION: Enemy attacks on artillery positions have, in some cases, caused a complete disruption of radio communication between the unit under attack and higher or lateral headquarters. This loss of communication resulted from all radios and/or antennas being damaged or destroyed by enemy explosives.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-AT 17 May 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, IFFORCEV
Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS O3FR-67 (R1)

In such instances both radios and antennas were clustered about one central location (e.g. Battery FDC or Battalion TOC) and thus were vulnerable to only a small number of mortar rounds or satchel charges. Had both the radios and antennas been dispersed throughout the position and remoted into a central location, their vulnerability to damage or destruction would have been lessened significantly.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Artillery commanders should consider dispersing FM radios and antennas within the unit area in order to lessen the likelihood of loss or damage by enemy action.

c. (U) Training. None
d. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Employment of Manpack Personnel Detector (MPD)

(n) OBSERVATION: Maneuver elements of IFFORCEV presently operate throughout II CTZ, Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD) and Manpack Personnel Detectors (MPD) (Sniffers). This combat surveillance device is employed in UH-1 type aircraft. A "Sniffer" mission employs 4 UH-1 aircraft; two gunships, one detector ship and one chase ship. IFFORCEV Arty could employ the MPD as a target acquisition means, utilizing its VR aircraft.

(b) EVALUATION: The MPD was mounted in an O1 type aircraft and used successfully in conjunction with VR missions without modification of the aircraft. The observer with the MPD in the O1 type aircraft is employed to confirm specific areas of interest revealed by targeting efforts. MPD aircraft are accompanied by an additional O1 type aircraft with an observer to assist in navigation and provide immediate artillery fire in the event the detector ship receives ground fire. An additional benefit of the MPD is the immediate employment of artillery fire on detected targets. This system would employ two aircraft whereas four UH-1 aircraft are presently employed in detector missions. Initial tests conducted recently have demonstrated the MPD to be effective as a target acquisition means.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That four MPD be allocated to this command for employment and further evaluation.

(2) Strobing Methods for the AN/MRQ-4A Radar

(a) OBSERVATION: CMR detachments in II CTZ are presently using a new strobing method for the detection and location of low angle artillery.

(b) EVALUATION: The six step procedure is as follows:

1. Mark upper and lower beam echoes.

2. Strobe the lower beam echo and record the Easting and Northing grid.

3. Determine and mark a point at the straight line distance between the first and second echo.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-AT-D

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, AFFORCEV Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RG 1585-68 (R)

1. Strobe this point with the upper beam (delta) handwheel. Record the Easting and Northing grid.

2. Compare the lower beam and \( \frac{1}{4} \) distance grids, and determine the difference between the two.

   a. If the grid INCREASED on the \( \frac{1}{4} \) distance reading, ADD the difference to the \( \frac{1}{4} \) distance grid.

   b. If the grid DECREASED on the \( \frac{1}{4} \) distance reading, SUBTRACT the difference from the \( \frac{1}{4} \) distance grid.

3. The result will be the approximate location of the weapon which fired. This procedure may not lead to accurate locations each time. It is, however, a process which is valid consistently in providing coordinates which will always give a distance closer than the normal method of strobing to the actual location of the weapons firing. The degree of accuracy will be dependent upon extrinsic parameters, since the logic of the computer is structured with a parabolic function, such as the angle of elevation of the radar and the trajectory of the shell.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: All AN/MFQ-4A radar detachment commanders should consider employment of the technique described above.

4. Scanner Motor Modification for the AN/MFQ-4A Radar

   (a) OBSERVATION: Extreme conditions of heat and humidity prevalent throughout RVN have caused overheating of the AN/MFQ-4A scanner motor.

   (b) EVALUATION: Depot maintenance personnel at Pleiku have developed a scanner motor modification. A simple vent pipe attached at the top of the scanner rotor will alleviate the problem of oil seepage due to overheating.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: All radar detachment commanders should consider employment of the above described modification.

   e. (U) Logistics. None

   f. (U) Organization. None

   g. (U) Other. None

JAMES G. KALEFES
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

2 Incl

DISTRIBUTION:
2-CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPCP-AT
3-CG, USARV, ATTN: AVH-4-DST
4-CG, AFFORCEV, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT (15 Jul 60) 1st Ind
SUBJ: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery IPPORCEV Artillery for Period ending 30 April 1960, RCS CTOR-65 (R1)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 56350 29 May 1960

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATT: AVHGC-77, APO 56355

(c) This headquarters concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1960 from Headquarters IPPORCEV Artillery and makes the following comments:

1. Reference paragraph 1a(d)(b). The maximum number of flying hours for the 01 aircraft is 120 hours per month. The expected flying time per day should be four hours instead of five hours as stated in the report.

2. Reference paragraph 1a(d)(e). Allocation of 01 aircraft. There are presently 126 01 aircraft to meet I1 C3 requirements for visual reconnaissance, artillery, training and support of special operations. A study is being conducted by this headquarters to determine the most efficient use of 01 aircraft.

PO: R. R. ROBERTS

[Signature]

ROBERT C. GABBARD
IU: AFG
ASSISTANT GENERAL

Conida Forward: 1
2 - ATTN: MA, RNDC 20310
1 - I Field Force Artillery
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHEC-0ST (15 May 68) 2d Ind (C) 
CPT Arnold/AHG/4465

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I FFPGCEV Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, HGU CGPRT-65 (E)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VITNAM, APO San Francisco 96475 15 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DM, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I FFPGCEV Artillery.

2. (C) Reference item concerning the lack of qualified field artillery lieutenant colonels, page 1, paragraph 1(3)(a). The shortage of experienced field artillerymen is Army-wide. Department of the Army recognizes the desirability of having command recommended lieutenant colonels on the staffs of the field force artillery headquarters, but does not have sufficient officers to support such an assignment policy. Discussions between this headquarters and Department of the Army reveal there will be no increase in the number of command recommended field artillery lieutenant colonels coming to Vietnam. However, the Artillery Branch will make every effort to assign battalion commanders to coincide with the departure of the incumbents, thus avoiding vacancies. Effort is required at all levels to distribute available command recommended field artillery lieutenant colonels throughout USAV. It is necessary for each command to periodically realign its personnel to get the best qualified officer in the job. The conditions outlined by I FFPGCEV Artillery are reflected in the other artillery commands in USAV.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C.S. NAKATSUKA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
HQ, I FFPGCEV (Arty)
HQ, I FFPGCEV

CONFIDENTIAL
GPOP-DT (15 May 68) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ and HQ Btry IFFORCEV Arty for Period Ending 30 April 1968, ECS CSPOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 5 JUL '68

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsements and concurs in the report as endorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
Artillery units attached to I Field Force Vietnam Artillery at the end of the CRLL quarter were:

**FORGEY ARTILLERY**
- 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105mm T)
- 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (175/8 inch SP)
- 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AWSP)
- Battery B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight)
- Battery E, 41st Artillery (ME)

Headquarters Battery, 8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 46th Artillery
- 77th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 237th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 241st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 242d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 243d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
- 244th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

**41st Artillery Group**
- 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm T)
- 7th Battalion, 17th Artillery (175/8 inch SP)
- 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (105mm T/155mm T Prov)
- 6th Battalion, 53rd Artillery (155mm T)

**52d Artillery Group**
- 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm SP)
- 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175mm/8 inch SP)
- 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175mm/8 inch SP)
- 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155mm T)
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, IFFV Arty

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968 (U)

CG, IFFV Arty

REPORT DATE: 15 May 1968

PROJECT NO.: N/A

OTHER REPORT NO.: 682181

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: N/A

SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY: OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

1962191.717; 1962191.717

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 1473

19
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.