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SECTION I - OPERATIONS

Significant Activities

1. (C) INTRODUCTION: This Operational Report - Lessons Learned covers the period 1 February through 30 April 1968. During this period the Blackhorse Regiment conducted operations within its Tactical Area of Responsibility (TACR), Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI), and in the provinces of Long Khanh, Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh, Hau Nghia, Binh Duong, and Phuoc Long. (See Map, Incl 10.)

The regiment conducted operations throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone while under the operational control of Headquarters, II Field Force, Vietnam. Operations were characterized by a continuous parcelling out of squadrons and troops at various times to the 1st, 9th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, 101st Airborne Division, 199th Light Infantry Brigade, and the 18th and 25th ARVN Infantry Divisions. During the quarter the Regimental Headquarters was successively located at Long Binh, Bien Hoa, Blackhorse Base Camp, Phuoc Vinh, and again at Bien Hoa as the quarter closed.

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment conducted three regimental size operations: ADAIRSVILLE (1 Feb - 23 Mar), ALCORN COVE (21 Mar - 7 Apr), and TOAN THANG (8 - 30 Apr). Operation ADAIRSVILLE was a reconnaissance in force and security operation directed to counter the ambitious TET offensive in the Saigon/Long Binh/Bien Hoa area. Operation ALCORN COVE was a continuation of the security operations in the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area and the area around the Blackhorse Base Camp as well as a reconnaissance in force operation in coordination and cooperation with the 18th and 25th ARVN Infantry Divisions in Hau Nghia Province. Operation TOAN THANG was initially an extension of all missions of ALCORN COVE followed by a reconnaissance in force operation in Phuoc Long Province and War Zone D and finally a security operation in the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area. Units of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment were continuously engaged with enemy forces throughout this quarter.
Continued emphasis was placed on support of the Revolutionary Development program and on strengthening RF/PF outposts in the Regimental TACO.

On 12 Mar the Regimental Commander, Colonel Jack MacFarlane was wounded in battle while directing a 3rd Squadron action against a reinforced enemy battalion 15 miles west of Saigon. The Executive Officer, LTC John F. McArdle, assumed command and was replaced by Colonel Leonard D. Holder on 15 Mar. Colonel Holder was killed in an accidental helicopter crash near Long Binh on 21 Mar. Again, LTC McArdle assumed command of the regiment and was replaced on 22 Mar by Colonel Charles R. Gorder, who was in command when the period closed.

On 21 Apr Colonel Gorder briefed General Harold K. Johnson, the Chief of Staff, on the regiment’s operations.

2. (C) ORGANIZATION: The basic structure of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment remained the same throughout the reporting period. However, there were five changes in the assignment of supporting units since the last reporting period. The 46th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) was reassigned 15 Feb to the 25th Infantry Division. The 11th AA Platoon, 2nd Civil Affairs Company, was reassigned on 1 Mar to MACV. The 33rd Chemical Detachment was reassigned on 17 Mar to Provisional Corps, Vietnam. The 398th Transportation Detachment and the 9th Signal Detachment were attached to the Air Cavalry Troop on 8 Apr. (See Organizational Structure, Incl 1.) There were numerous personnel changes of commanders and key staff officers. (See Roster of Commanders and Key Staff Officers, Incl 2.)

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

a. General: During the reporting period, the regiment was employed over a large part of the III Vietnamese Corps Tactical Zone. Operations were conducted in the following Viet Cong areas:

   (1) Viet Cong Sub-Region E-1
   (2) Viet Cong Sub-Region E-2
   (3) Viet Cong Sub-Region E-4
   (4) Viet Cong Sub-Region E-5
   (5) Viet Cong Ba Bien Province
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(6) Viet Cong U-l Province

(7) War Zone "D"

b. Order of Battle: (See Sketch—Order of Battle, Incl 8.)

(1) The enemy's ambitious 1968 TET offensive caused the regiment to move to the vital Long-Bien-Bien Hoa area at the beginning of the quarter. To counter the enemy aggression, the squadrons fanned out into the VC Sub-Region E-1, VC Sub-Region E-2, VC U-l Province, and VC Ba Bien Province. Initial contacts were made in VC U-l Province on 1 Feb when L Troop, 3rd Squadron, flushed an unknown size, unidentified enemy force on the outskirts of Bien Hoa City. E Troop and F Troop, 2nd Squadron, contacted enemy units north and northwest of Bien Hoa Air Base on 3 Feb. A prisoner of war stated that the opposing force was the 3rd Battalion, 274th VC Regiment.

(2) By mid-February, elements of the 11th ACR had expanded the counteroffensive to VC Sub-Region E-2 and VC Sub-Region E-4. Enemy intentions to initiate an expected second-wave attack were characterized by two major requirements: maintaining lines of communication for mandatory resupply and maintaining advantageous positions near the population centers. The 2nd Squadron, operating east of the Long Binh Post on National Highway 1, was astride a known enemy line of communication near the Hung Nghia Village. This route links enemy activity between War Zone D and the Hat Dich Secret Zone. The 3rd Squadron, operating with elements of the 25th ARVN Infantry Division west of Saigon near Duc Hoa Village, encountered various enemy units which displayed surprising aggressiveness by initiating several contacts against superior forces. Enemy units identified in these actions were elements of the 272nd VC Regiment, the 267th Main Force Battalion, and the 269th Main Force Battalion. The enemy also displayed a surprising anti-aircraft capability. This support probably came from units of the 69th VC Artillery Command and from a newly identified 12th AA Battalion, which a prisoner of war indicated was working with the 267th MF Battalion and the 269th MF Battalion. Enemy actions were initiated from well-fortified positions.

(3) At the close of the reporting period, the regiment moved to VC Military Region 10 to interdict a newly constructed enemy logistical route running south from Cambodia just east of Song Be. Important logistical losses were imposed on the enemy. Most notable was the capture and destruction of 155 pack bicycles, probably from the Transportation Battalion, 86th Rear Service Group, which operates in the area. The regiment then turned south and attacked through the length of War Zone D. Various
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base camps were overrun, but elements of the 5th VC Division situated in the area elected not to contest the raid into their established enclave.

(4) Although most contacts occurred with unidentified enemy forces, throughout the quarter, these enemy units were identified in contact:

(a) 1st Battalion, 272nd VC Regiment, 9th VC Division
(b) 2nd Battalion, 272nd VC Regiment, 9th VC Division
(c) 1st Battalion, 274th VC Regiment, 5th VC Division
(d) 2nd Battalion, 274th VC Regiment, 5th VC Division
(e) 3rd Battalion, 274th VC Regiment, 5th VC Division
(f) 267th MF Battalion
(g) 269th MF Battalion

c. Major Engagements: There were 18 major engagements involving elements of the regiment. (See OPCON Status of Regimental Units, Incl 3)

(1) 011334H Feb 68, YT010120: L/3/11th ACR and B/2/506th Inf received sniper fire from an unidentified VC force. Fire was returned and an unknown number of VC responded with small arms, artillery, and RPG fire. A light fire team supported US troops. Contact was broken at 011615H. Results: 8 US WIA; 36 VC KIA (BC).

(2) 031220H Feb 68, YT003178 - YT003185: E/2/11th ACR was notified by the VN National Police that an estimated 100 VC located at the above coordinates desired to surrender. The enemy resisted with heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. E/2/11th ACR returned fire, and TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Results: no friendly casualties; 47 VC KIA (BC).

(3) 180335H Feb 68, XT720960: L/3/11th ACR received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from elements of the 272nd VC Regiment. Fire was returned, and artillery and light fire teams supported. Contact was broken at 180902H. Results: 3 US WIA; 24 VC KIA (BC), and 1 VC POW.
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(4) 231800H Feb 68, XT722000: L/3/11th ACR received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unidentified VC force of unknown size. Fire was returned, and TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Contact was broken at 231945H. Results: 1 US KIA, 5 US WIA; 37 VC KIA (BC).

(5) 291615H Feb 68, XT926172: F/2/11th ACR received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from elements of the 3rd Battalion, 274th VC Regiment. Fire was returned, and artillery supported. Results: 1 US KIA, 8 US WIA, 2 ACAV destroyed, 1 tank damaged; 23 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC POW; 1 SA weapon, and 6 grenades were captured.

(6) 090100H Mar 68, YS4497: Blackhorse Base Camp received 40 rounds of 81mm mortar fire resulting in 9 US WTA and one building slightly damaged. All rounds impacted in the areas occupied by the 27th Engineer Battalion and the 551st Light Maintenance Company. Firing ceased at 090129H. Light fire teams and counter mortar fire were employed with unknown result.

This mortar attack was believed to have been a deception to cover the attack on Cam Ky Village which began at 090145H Mar. This attack by an unidentified VC force of unknown size succeeded in overrunning the RF Observation Post resulting in 4 RF KIA, 2 RF WIA and 29 RF MIA. The VC captured 2 crew-served weapons and 19 small arms weapons. The enemy also destroyed 4 radios. Most of the RF MIA returned either to the village or Blackhorse Base Camp. The Xuan Loc Sector Adviser reported that the RF Observation Post apparently radioed for help once, but the transmission was either misunderstood or garbled. Thus, no reaction force was dispatched, and news of the attack was not obtained until the following afternoon. Additionally, two civilian trucks detonated AT mines on Interprovincial Route 2 on 10 Mar. Both trucks were destroyed, and three Vietnamese were killed. These mines were undoubtedly intended to delay a reaction force from Blackhorse Base Camp to Cam Ky Village.

(7) 120940H Mar 68, XT560009: M/3/11th ACR apprehended 10 VC POW, detainees, and evacuated 1300 pounds of rice. At 1255H, M/3/11th ACR received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from elements of the 267th MF Battalion and the 269th MF Battalion. Fire was returned, and TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. M/3/11th ACR reinforced. Sporadic contact continued into the early morning hours. Results were: 1 US KIA, 25 US WIA, and 4 tanks damaged; 36 VC KIA (BC), 10 VC POW; 31 RPG rounds, 12 RPG boosters, 1 ton tetracol, and 400 pounds rice evacuated; 30 bunkers destroyed. COL Jack MacFarlane, Regimental CO, was one of the wounded in this engagement.

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(8) 121230H Mar 68, YT310055 - YT309052: G/2/11th ACR, H/2/11th ACR, and B/3/187th Inf received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from an unidentified VC force of unknown size. Fire was returned, and TAC Air and artillery supported. Contact was broken at 121650H due to a forest fire initiated by friendly munitions. Results were: 12 US WIA; 14 VC KIA (BC).

(9) 130010H Mar 68, YT305096: F/2/11th ACR received 60mm and 82mm mortar fire and a probing attack from elements of the 3rd Battalion, 27th Inf Regiment. Fire was returned, and artillery and light fire teams supported. Results were: 1 US KIA, 8 US WIA; 8 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC POW; 1 M60, 18 AT rounds, 870 rounds of small arms ammunition, and ½ pound of documents captured.

(10) 151000H Mar 68, XT 595068; M/3/11th ACR engaged elements of the 272nd VC Regiment. The enemy returned small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire. TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. The 2/3/49th ARVN Inf reinforced. Contact was broken at 151903H. Results were: 7 US WIA, 5 ARVN KIA, 14 ARVN WIA; 1 ACAV destroyed, 2 tanks moderately damaged; 81 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC POW; 3 ATRL, 8 AT rounds, 5 crew-served weapons, and 13 small arms weapons captured.

(11) 161110H Mar 68, XT621032: 51st ARVN Ranger Battalion engaged an unidentified estimated VC battalion. The enemy returned with small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire. TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. I/3/11th ACR and L/3/11th ACR reinforced. Contact was broken at 161930H. Results were: no US casualties; ARVN casualties are unknown but were reported as light; 95 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC POW; 5 crew-served weapons and 13 small arms weapons captured.

(12) 171505H Mar 68, XT600063: M/3/11th ACR and two companies of the 49th ARVN Inf Regiment received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from an unidentified, estimated VC company. TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Heavy contact was broken at 171845H. Light, sporadic contact continued until 172152H. Results were: 5 US WIA; 4 ARVN KIA, 2 ARVN WIA; 50 VC KIA (BC); 1 small arms weapon captured.

(13) 201150H Mar 68, XT606056: L/3/11th ACR, M/3/11th ACR, and elements of the 4/49th ARVN Inf Regiment received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 27th Inf Regiment. TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Contact was broken at 201921H. Results were: 1 US KIA, 5 US WIA; 7 ARVN KIA, 13 ARVN WIA; 112 VC KIA (BC); 8 small arms weapons, 3 crew-served weapons, 34 AT rounds, 2 mines, and 1 pound of documents captured; 57 bunkers were destroyed.
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(14) 281207H Mar 68, XT134125: L/3/11th ACR, M/3/11th ACR, and elements of the 3/49th ARVN Infantry and 34th ARVN Rangers received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from the 1st Battalion, 272nd VC Regiment. Fire was returned, and TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Contact was broken at 281940H. Results were: 2 US KIA, 5 US WIA, 15 ARVN KIA, 21 ARVN WIA; 57 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC POW; 3 crew-served weapons, 11 small arms weapons, and 24 AT rounds captured.

(15) 011256H Apr 68, XT625057: 1/3/11th ACR and the 2/49th ARVN Infantry received small arms, and unidentified mortar fire from an unidentified VC force of unknown size. Sporadic contact continued into the early morning hours. TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Results were: 2 US KIA, 4 US WIA; 5 ARVN WIA; 3 ACAV slightly damaged; 73 VC KIA (BC), 5 VC POW; 11 small arms weapons, 6 crew-served weapons, 24 AT rounds, and 4 pounds documents captured; 10 structures and 5 bunkers were destroyed.

(16) 190145H Apr 68, YU342170: B/1/11th ACR and the 1/18th US Infantry received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from an unidentified VC force of unknown size. TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. The enemy broke contact at 191055H and withdrew to the north. Results were: 3 US KIA, 21 US WIA; VC casualties are unknown.

(17) 262358H Apr 68, YT313264: G/2/11th ACR, 1/18th US Infantry OPCON to the 11th ACR), and A/168th Engineer Battalion received small arms, automatic weapons, RPG, and mortar fire from the 1st Battalion, 274th VC Division. Fire was returned, and TAC Air, artillery, light fire teams, and flareships supported. Contact was broken at 260050H. Results were: 2 US KIA, 27 US WIA; 1 bridge boat sunk, 1 bridge truck destroyed, 1 bridge heavily damaged, 2 widge trucks moderately damaged, 2 bridge trucks lightly damaged, 1 1/2-ton truck destroyed, 1 3/4-ton moderately damaged, 1 5-ton truck moderately damaged, 2 low-boy trucks moderately damaged, 1 ACAV moderately damaged; 9 VC KIA (BC), 16 VC KIA (Poss), 2 VC POW; 5 small arms weapons, 2 crew-served weapons, 27 AT rockets, 800 rounds small arms ammunition, and 22 grenades captured.

(18) 290105H Apr 68, XT593148: 1/3/11th ACR and elements of the 25th Engr Bn received 22 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. Counter mortar was fired with unknown results. 1/3/11th ACR swept the area at first light on 30 Apr with negative results.

d. Intelligence Sources:

(1) General: The extensive areas covered by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during the reporting period required a large amount of intelligence from higher headquarters and from units which had previously

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operated in the areas. Consolidated intelligence data from II Field Force, Vietnam, the 1st Infantry Division, and the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) provided a sound basis for operations in VC Sub-Region E-l and VC Military Region 10.

(2) Agent Reports: This source usually comprised the most voluminous source of intelligence information during operations in remote areas, notably Military Region 10. Although agent reports declined as a potential source of intelligence in central and southern III CTZ, they remained the major source of intelligence information. As in the past, these reports were largely inconclusive unless substantiated by other intelligence sources.

(3) Casual Reports: In the wake of the TET offensive, reports from casual civilian informants increased markedly. This obviously stemmed from the threat to civilian life and property. Casual reports tended to be highly exaggerated. As with agent reports, this source was largely unreliable unless confirmed by other intelligence outlets.

(4) Airborne Sensor: Infra-red camera and Side-looking Airborne Radar was integrated into a pattern map that traced intelligence information from various sources. Infra-red was often unreliable as a reconnaissance sensor because of numerous local fires. SLAR was effective in isolating enemy movement, although most patterns which developed were not in the immediate regimental area of operation or interest. The E-63 Personnel Detector continued to be employed extensively with effective results. The People Sniffer was primarily employed to confirm or deny intelligence information. Additional uses were missions conducted over and adjacent to objective areas just prior to reconnaissance in force operations, as well as missions to precede march columns to detect possible ambush sites.

(5) Visual Reconnaissance-Photography: These intelligence sources were primarily responsible for uncovering a newly-constructed enemy supply route extending south from Cambodia, just east of Song Be. Once this route was discovered, II Field Force Vietnam ordered the 11th ACR to interdict it. Visual reconnaissance continued to provide indications of enemy movement and base areas. This information was integrated with other portions of the intelligence collection cycle, as reported by the Air Cavalry Troop and the Forward Air Controllers. B/3/17th Cavalry was OPCON to the 11th ACR for a short period and provided data on Interprovincial Route 322 and the Dong Nai River in preparation for operations in War Zone D. Photography was used extensively for planning purposes. The Regimental Handheld camera program (541st MI Det) also aided the reconnaissance and planning effort.

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(6) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol: The 11th ACR LRRP missions again provided reliable intelligence data. Various base areas and indications of enemy movement were noted on two occasions. One significant sighting of approximately 100 enemy provided conclusive evidence of Viet Cong logistical activity and movement in the vicinity of Hung Nghia Village.

e. Enemy Losses:

(1) The following enemy losses were credited to regimental units while operating under regimental control:

(a) 267 VC KIA (BC)
(b) 87 VC KIA (Poss)
(c) 14 VC POW
(d) 39 Detainees
(e) 35 Small arms weapons captured
(f) 13 Crew-served weapons captured
(g) 2 mortar rounds, 14 artillery rounds, 1604 small arms rounds, 81 AT rounds, 45 grenades, 34 mines captured/destroyed
(h) 145 structures, 47 sampans, 1536 fortifications destroyed
(i) 5.5 Tons grain captured
(j) 30.25 Pounds documents captured

(2) The following enemy losses were credited to regimental units while under the operational control of other US units or in direct support of ARVN units:

(a) 651 VC KIA (BC)
(b) 10 VC KIA (Poss)
(c) 16 VC POW
(d) 8 Detainees
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- 68 Small arms weapons captured
- 38 Crew-served weapons captured
- 15 Mortar rounds, 27 artillery rounds, 1074 small arms rounds, 193 AT rounds, 113 grenades, and 38 mines captured/destroyed.
- 10 structures, 146 fortifications destroyed
- 2.1 Tons grain captured
- 14.25 Pounds documents captured

4. (C) COMBAT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

a. Analysis and Evaluation:

(1) The troopers of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment inflicted heavy losses on the enemy during Operations ADAIRSVILLE, ALCORN COVE, and TOAN THANG, conducted from 1 Feb through 30 Apr 68. The enemy suffered significant losses of personnel, weapons, food, and ammunition supplies as the result of continuous pressure brought to bear by the combat power of the regiment. The Blackhorse Regiment amply demonstrated the flexibility and mobility of its organization by furnishing combat elements OPCON to various units throughout III Corps Tactical Zone to include bolstering the combat power of the 101st Airborne Division, the 1st Infantry Division, the 9th Infantry Division, the 25th Infantry Division, and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. In addition various resources of the regiment were placed in direct support of the 18th Infantry Division (ARVN) and the 25th Infantry Division (ARVN). Working in close coordination and cooperation with these allied units greatly benefited both the ARVN and US units involved while inflicting heavy losses on the insurgent enemy forces.

(2) The enemy, though badly beaten in the initial phase of the TET offensive, continued to mount offensive operations against the regiment. These operations were carried on simultaneously with sporadic sniping, claymore, and mining operations against friendly forces. In addition, the enemy stubbornly defended his base areas when attacked, especially in Hau Nghia Province. Indications were that, though he suffered a large setback from his losses in late Jan and early Feb 68, the enemy had not been completely defeated or demoralized.
b. Area of Operations: Operations this quarter were conducted entirely within the III Corps Tactical Zone and covered six different provinces (Long Khanh, Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh, Hau Nghia, Binh Duong, and Phuoc Long). (See Operational Map Sketch, Incl 9 and 10)

c. Operations:

(1) Operation ADAIRSVILLE (1 Feb – 23 Mar) was conducted as a continuation of actions begun with the enemy TET offensive. On 31 Jan 68, the regiment was redeployed from positions in War Zone C to reinforce the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex which was under heavy attack. Initial missions on 1 Feb were for the 1st Squadron to secure Hq, II Field Force, Vietnam; 2nd Squadron to secure III Corps Prisoner of War compound (YT0413), Troop G OPCON to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade; and for 3rd Squadron to secure ARVN III Corps Headquarters and Honour Smith Compound. The 1st Squadron continued security missions in and around Hq, II Field Force from 1-15 Feb with negative enemy contact. In addition Troop A was placed in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 18th ARVN Infantry Division, from 3-5 Feb to drive the VC from positions around Thu Duc vicinity YT9299. Troop B was placed OPCON to II Field Force Forward CP at Tan Son Nhut Air Base from 5-10 Feb and OPCON to the 9th Infantry Division from 10-20 Feb. On 15 Feb the 1st Squadron minus moved to Blackhorse Base Camp to release elements of the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, from security in and around the base camp. Squadron missions included security of Blackhorse, convoy security between Long Binh and Blackhorse, security of II FFV in Long Binh, security of the rock quarry at Gia Ray vicinity YT6211, security of engineer work parties on National Highways 1 and 2, and direct support operations with the 18th ARVN Division. Troop K was placed OPCON to the 1st Squadron on 22 Mar to assist in securing the land clearing teams along National Highway 1. On 2 Feb the 2nd Squadron became OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division and remained in that status until Mar 6 when they became OPCON to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. On 22 Mar the 2nd Squadron was released from the 199th and became OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division and remained so until 6 Apr. Throughout the period of OPCON to these various units, the squadron had numerous encounters with the enemy, inflicting heavy personnel and materiel losses on the insurgents. The 3rd Squadron minus conducted security operations in and around the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex from 1 Feb until 24 Feb. Troop K remained at Loc Ninh OPCON to the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division until 11 Feb when the troop returned to squadron control at Long Binh. Troop I became OPCON to the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, on 5 Feb and moved to Phu Loi (YT6165), remaining OPCON until 17 Feb. On 7 Feb the squadron minus became OPCON to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade and remained in that status until 23
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Feb when they became OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division. On 1 Mar the
squadron minus was released OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division and placed
in direct support of the 25th ARVN Division. The squadron established Fire
Support Base Buffalo vicinity X5697 and began working in close coordina-
tion and cooperation with the 25th ARVN Division, conducting reconnaissance
in force operations and joint ambush patrols nightly. The squadron continued
to operate in this general location throughout the remainder of Oper-
ation ADAIRSVILLE, releasing Troop K OPCON to the 199th Light Infantry Bri-
gade from 10-17 Mar. On 18 Mar Troop K was placed OPCON to 1st Squadron,
11th ACR. The 3rd Squadron, conducting operations jointly with elements
of the 25th ARVN Division, had almost daily contact with varying size en-
emy forces inflicting heavy losses of personnel and equipment on both lo-
cal force and main force VC units throughout the remainder of Operation
ADAIRSVILLE. The harmony and cooperation with which the two forces worked
together in combat indicated the proficiency which can be attained by US
and ARVN units working together.

(2) Operation ALCORN COVE (21 Mar - 7 Apr) involved security op-
erations in and around Blackhorse Base Camp (YS4496) and the Long Binh/
Bien Hoa complex and providing regimental units in direct support of the
25th ARVN Infantry Division and the 25th ARVN Infantry Division. The 2nd
Squadron became OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division at 220600H Mar 68 and
remained OPCON until 6 Apr. Missions of the 1st Squadron reinforced in-
cluded providing one troop minus in direct support of the 1st ARVN In-
fantry Division, providing screening forces for the security of Black-
horse Base Camp, conducting offensive operations against enemy forces in
areas adjacent to Blackhorse Base Camp, providing one platoon for security of
Gia Ray Rock Quarry (YS6211), providing reaction forces for convoys on
Highway 1 between Blackhorse Base Camp and Long Binh, providing one troop
for conduct and security of land clearing operations along Highway 1, pro-
viding one platoon OPCON to Hq, Commandant, II FFV, as a reaction force in
defense of Hq, II FFV, and providing one platoon for security of the Dong
Tan River bridge at YT015055. The 3rd Squadron was placed in direct sup-
port of the 25th ARVN Infantry Division to conduct operations in the 25th
ARVN Division TAQI in close cooperation and coordination with ARVN forces.
During ALCORN COVE security operations, the 1st Squadron had no signifi-
cant contact with enemy forces. Sporadic sniping and mining incidents
continued to occur in the Regimental TAQI in addition to sporadic contacts
with squad size VC forces. The major accomplishment during Operation
ALCORN COVE in the Blackhorse TAQI was the clearing operation along Na-
tional Highway 1. More than 1,100 acres of jungle vegetation were cleared
from the sides of the highway by land clearing teams of the 20th Engineer
Brigade. Troop K OPCON to the 1st Squadron provided security for the em-

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The clearing operation denied the VC use of the road for taxation purposes by removing any concealment they may have gained from the vegetation. The operation also denied the VC ambush sites and enhanced overall security of the highway from Long Binh to Xuan Loc. The 3rd Squadron operating in close cooperation and coordination with the 25th ARVN Infantry Division dealt heavy blows to the enemy in several contacts during Operation ALCORN COVE. ALCORN COVE was a successful operation. Simultaneously clearing routes and conducting offensive operations against the enemy, the regiment made good progress in opening roads and establishing rapport with ARVN units in joint operations while inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.

(3) Operation TOAN THANG (8 - 30 Apr) was initially an extension of all missions of ALCORN COVE. The 2nd Squadron returned to Blackhorse Base Camp on 6 Apr under regimental control and subsequently assumed all missions of the 1st Squadron (see para (2) above) on 10 Apr. The 1st Squadron conducted maintenance and training in preparation for future operations from 10-14 Apr. On 11 Apr the 3rd Squadron was released from the mission of direct support to the 25th ARVN Division and conducted a tactical road march during the hours of darkness from Fire Support Base Buffalo vicinity Duc Hoa (XS5996) to Blackhorse Base Camp (YS4396) via Saigon and Long Binh. From 11-14 Apr the squadron conducted maintenance and training in preparation for future operations. At 150200H Apr the Blackhorse Regiment minus the 2nd Squadron commenced a move that covered over 115 miles through dense jungle, bamboo thickets, and unimproved roads for operations targeted on enemy forces and logistical activities deep into VC Military Region 10. Moving along an axis through Long Binh, Phu Cuong (XT8214), Phuoc Vinh (XT9548), Dong Xoai (YT0375), Bunard (YT2789), the regiment minus moved at will through enemy dominated areas, seizing objective 1 at Tap Tak (YU2000) and objective 2 at Bunard. The regiment minus, reinforced with the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, then began reconnaissance in force operations in AO Allons, having daily contact with small groups of enemy of no significant size. Numerous enemy base camps were located and destroyed in the area of operations. Operating in extremely rough jungle terrain, the Cavalry again demonstrated its determination to accomplish the mission. Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges were continuously employed to cross streams and ravines in the area. A major VC supply road was located and as plans were being formulated for its permanent interdiction, the regiment received orders from Hq, II FFV, changing its mission. Again demonstrating the inherent mobility and flexibility of armor, the regiment minus quickly evacuated stockpiled supplies assisted by C-130 aircraft, CH-47 helicopters and CH 54 Sky Cranes and commenced the move to the new AO. The 3rd Squadron on
22 Apr departed on a mission OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division and moved rapidly to Phu Loi (XT8616) for future operations. The regiment minus attacked south from Dong Xoai (YT0375) to destroy VC/NVA forces in the new area, AO Peach, deep in War Zone D. After penetrating War Zone D with negative enemy contact, the Regimental Forward CP was relocated on the banks of the Dong Nai River vicinity YT253280. The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, conducted an airmobile assault into AO Peach vicinity YT310260 and secured the southern bank of the Dong Nai River in preparation for a deliberate river crossing by the Blackhorse Regiment minus. The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, reinforced by elements of the 2nd Squadron which moved into AO Peach from Blackhorse Base Camp via Highways 1 and 20, secured A Company, 168th Engineer Battalion, bridging operations across the Dong Nai River. The 1st Squadron conducted reconnaissance in force operations in AO Peach locating eight enemy bunker complexes and capturing valuable equipment and ammunition supplies. On 25 Apr the 900-foot float bridge was completed and at 0605H the Blackhorse Regiment minus began crossing and continued its march into the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area to provide security and ready reaction forces in the wake of intelligence information indicating a renewed offensive by major VC/NVA units. Missions included securing Widow's Village (YT051), III Corps Prisoner of War Compound (YT0412), the Dong Nai River bridge (YT0105), and providing ready reaction forces to HQ, II FFV, for employment anywhere in the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area. On 26 Apr Task Force 1-18th Infantry was released OPCON, and operations in AO Peach ceased. The regiment minus remained in the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex continuing OPCON to II FFV as part of Campaign TOAN THANG. The 3rd Squadron minus remained OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division at Phu Loi with I Troop OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division vicinity XT607148. The 2nd Squadron continued operations from Blackhorse Base Camp as the reporting period ended.

(4) Operation KITTYHAWK (15 Feb 67 - 21 Mar 68) was a continuing operation consisting of the pacification and security of Long Khanh Province, the security of Blackhorse Base Camp, and the escort of logistical convoys within the Blackhorse TACR. This operation, which was initiated 15 Feb 67 under guidance provided by II Field Force, Vietnam, Campaign Plan for 1967, was terminated on 21 Mar. The missions listed in previous Operational Reports - Lessons Learned under Operation KITTYHAWK were incorporated in Operations ALCORN COVE and TOAN THANG during this reporting period.

d. Training:

(1) Unit training, maintenance, on the job training, and weapons familiarization and zeroing were conducted throughout the quarter. A spe-
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A formal course of instruction was conducted to familiarize the tank crews with the M60A2 tanks which arrived during the quarter.

(2) Replacement training was conducted throughout the quarter to prepare new replacements to assume their duties as cavalry troopers. The training was conducted in a six-day cycle. Monthly attendance during the quarter was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>176</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) In addition to the normal replacement school training, tenant units of Blackhorse Base Camp sent personnel to familiarization classes in the function and operation of the Cal. .50 machinegun. This instruction was offered to improve the operation and maintenance of the Cal. .50 machineguns used in perimeter defense.

(4) A special course of instruction on the M16 rifle was conducted during the month of March for unit armorer personnel. Fifty-five personnel attended.

(5) Specialized Training:

(a) Recondo School: The regiment sent 12 personnel from the Air Cavalry Troop (Aero-Rifle Platoon) to the MACV Recondo School.

(b) NCO Academy: The 9th Division NCO Academy provides basic techniques of military instruction and leadership traits to the NCO's and potential NCO's of the regiment. During the quarter, 33 Blackhorse personnel attended the academy.

(c) Jungle Environment Survival School: A three-day course conducted at Clark Air Force Base, Philippine Islands, was made available to aviation personnel of the regiment. During the quarter, three aviators attended the course.

(d) Aircraft Maintenance: The Army Maintenance Technical Assistance Program (AAMTP) School, 765th Transportation Group, Vung Tau, administered in-country training to 17 mechanics from the regiment and attached units during the quarter.
5. (C) COMBAT SUPPORT:

a. Artillery

(1) General: The organic howitzer batteries of each squadron provided close and continuous artillery support throughout the quarter. In addition reinforcing artillery support was utilized on the following occasions: Elements of the 1st Infantry Division Artillery at Lai Khe provided convoy coverage along National Highway 13 during the regiment’s tactical road march of 31 Jan – 1 Feb to the Long Binh-Bien Hoa area in response to the TET offensive; the 199th Light Infantry Brigade also provided artillery support in the Long Binh area; the organic artillery elements of the 25th Infantry Division (ARVN) supported the 3rd Squadron during Operation ADAIRSVILLE; the 54th Artillery Group provided continuous coverage for the logistical convoys between Long Binh and the Blackhorse Base Camp.

(2) Missions: The following type missions were fired during the reporting period:

(a) Defensive Concentrations
(b) Observer Adjusted
(c) Harassing and Interdicting
(d) Navigational (Marking) Rounds
(e) Preparations
(f) Preplanned Fires on Call
(g) ARVN Support

(3) Ammunition Expended: 155 ammunition expended by organic batteries during the quarter was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>HE</th>
<th>Illumination</th>
<th>WP</th>
<th>Smoke (Yellow)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>8324</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>7943</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>8052</td>
<td>1084</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(4) New Technique: During this quarter, maximum benefit was derived from coordination visits to ARVN and Province Headquarters obtaining Specified Strike Zones for the 11th AGR Area of Operations. Using Specified Strike Zones, the need for ARVN or Province Civil Clearance was eliminated, allowing fires requested by the supported commander to be delivered with minimum delay.

b. Army Aviation:

(1) Employment: The army aviation elements supported the regiment with 15 OH-23G, 12 UH-1D, and 19 UH-1C. The OH-23G support was that of command and control, reconnaissance, artillery adjustment, and liaison between the regiment and the squadrons. The UH-1D aircraft were employed primarily for command and control, the insertion and extraction of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol, and the daily Blackhorse courier flight. The UH-1C gunships were deployed to all areas where elements of the regiment anticipated or were experiencing enemy contact. In addition, these aircraft provided convoy cover and reconnaissance and strip alert for mortar retaliation.

(2) Training: In-country orientation and training of newly-assigned aviators was completed before these personnel were released for operational missions. Instrument training was conducted in the UH-1D when mission commitments permitted. Nine aviators completed the USARV qualification course on the OH-6A aircraft at Vung Tau. At the end of the quarter, each squadron had two qualified OH-6A pilots, and there were four qualified OH-6A pilots in the Air Cav Troop.

(3) Construction: Significant new construction during the quarter included the new ten-point POL facility located at the edge of the airstrip and the parking apron on the northeast side of the taxi-way.

(4) Safety: Safety and correct pilot and crew techniques were stressed during the quarter. The limitation of one passenger per OH-23G aircraft was maintained. Emphasis was placed on the hazards of approaches and landings in rough, hastily cleared locations which were frequently encountered in the areas of operation. Dust was a particular hazard during the reporting period, and much command emphasis was placed on methods of overcoming its dangers.

(5) Results: (See Army Aviation Statistical Summary, Incl 4.)

c. Chemical:
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(1) General: The chemical support of regimental operations was provided by the 33rd Chemical Detachment until 15 Mar 68 when the detachment was reassigned to the Provisional Corps, Vietnam. The regimental chemical section (1 CPT, 1 E-7, and 1 E-5) was augmented with two additional personnel (E-3), two E-63 personnel detectors (modified), and two M9 power driven decontaminating apparatuses.

(2) A total of 11 E-63 Personnel Detector missions were conducted.

(3) During the reporting period, 150 hectares of the base camp perimeter were defoliated.

(4) On 10 Apr 68 three E-158 CS Canister Clusters were employed (with unknown results) in conjunction with a sniffer mission.

d. Air Force: During this quarter, the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) provided continuous support to the Blackhorse Regiment. While providing support to the 3rd Squadron on Operation ADAIRSVILLE, great success was realized in using tactical aircraft to route entrenched enemy troops. While supporting the regiment during Operation TOAN THANG, the Forward Air Controllers developed numerous targets for destruction by artillery and air. They also provided close support when required. During this quarter, the FAC Command track remained co-located with the Regimental Command Post while the pilots flew out of Blackhorse using Song Be as a refueling stop. (See Air Force Statistical Summary, Incl 5.)

e. Engineer Activity:

(1) General: During the reporting period, elements of the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) participated in Operations ADAIRSVILLE, ALCORN COVE, and TOAN THANG, while providing direct combat engineer support to elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(2) Operations:

(a) ADAIRSVILLE: With the outbreak of the TET offensive, the elements of the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) moved with the 11th ACR into the Long Binh-Bien Hoa area. The 1st Platoon, 919th Engineers, was given the mission of emplacing 3,000 meters of barrier material around "Widows Village", (TTO511), consisting of one belt of triple standard concertina. The 3rd Platoon gave direct support to the 2nd Squadron while it conducted operations north of Bien Hoa along the Dong Mai River. The platoon built approaches and assisted in one of the largest assault river
crossings to date on 17 Mar at YTO41186. The platoon assisted in the crossing of some 150 vehicles through the use of Landing Craft Medium (LCM) boats. Both track and wheeled vehicles were enabled to cross the river. The 3rd Platoon participated in operations with the 3rd Squadron east of Long Binh and south of Highway 1 and destroyed some 50 enemy fortifications. Elements of the 919th Engineers provided continuing combat support on Operation ADAIRSVILLE while participating in reconnaissance in force operations.

On 3 Mar the 3rd Squadron, accompanied by the 2nd Platoon, 919th Engineers, moved west of Saigon to Vinh Loc and then farther west to Duc Hoa, to support the 25th ARVN Infantry Division. During reconnaissance in force operations, the platoon destroyed over 1500 enemy fortifications. The platoon also received the mission of building helicopter revetments. During this period, the 3rd Platoon, accompanying the 2nd Squadron, 11th ACR, was on operations in the Iron Triangle. The platoon discovered and destroyed 100 enemy bunkers and 115 feet of tunnel complexes. The platoon prepared and supervised the launching of Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges at some 30 sites. During this period, the 1st Platoon conducted mine sweeping operations south of Blackhorse Base Camp, in the vicinity of Cam Ky. The platoon found seven anti-tank mines, which were destroyed. The roads and culverts between Blackhorse Base Camp and Cam Ky were repaired.

(b) TOAN THANG: On 15 Apr the Headquarters, 1st and 2nd Squadrons, and elements of the 919th Engineers moved to conduct operations in the Song Be area. This operation was unique in that 75% of the route from Phước Vinh to the Regimental Alternate Command Post (Bunard), in the Song Be area, had not been traveled in more than 15 years. Several obstacles were encountered, including blown bridges and bomb craters. The 1st Platoon, utilizing the company's organic M48A3 tank-dozer, prepared sites and supervised the launching of three AVLB's on the initial move into the area. In conjunction with this operation, the 2nd Platoon prepared sites and supervised the launching of two AVLB's. The regiment moved 130 miles in less than 20 hours, on a road that had not been used in over a decade. The elements of the company provided direct combat engineer support in reconnaissance in force operations, destroying over 300 enemy fortifications. With the movement of the 11th ACR back through War Zone D, the company was given the mission of negotiating all obstacles, and moving the regimental elements through with speed. The 1st Platoon assisted in launching 14 AVLB's as well as preparing two ford sites.
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(3) Regional Force/Popular Force Upgrading and Training: The company continued its upgrading support by releasing over 300 rolls of concertina and provided technical assistance in the placement of this material.

(4) Base Camp Development: The rear detachment during this period accomplished extensive work on the perimeter of Blackhorse Base Camp. The barrier materials were replaced and over 1000 meters of field of fire were cleared around the perimeter.

f. Signal

(1) One significant organizational change took place during the reporting period with the formation of a Regimental Message/Communications Center. This has provided the regiment with better control in handling all incoming and outgoing messages.

(2) Upon receipt of the first increment of the AN/GRC-166 SSB Radios (17 each), the Regimental Command/Air Request Net (Voice) and the Regimental Administrative/Logistical Net (Voice) were established. These two nets provided a long-range voice radio capability and have reduced the voice traffic volume on the FM radio nets. The formation of the Administrative/Logistical Net (Voice) also provided the squadrons with the capability of contacting base camp from their field locations.

6. (C) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT:

a. General: During this quarter, the 29th Support Group continued to provide logistical support to the regiment. The 551st Light Maintenance Company and the 506th Supply and Service Company provided point distribution of Classes I through IV of supply. Class V was supplied by the 3rd Ordnance Battalion. During Operation ADAIRSVTLLE, water and ice were obtained from the Long Binh Post, and Class III was drawn from the 266th Supply and Service Battalion. During Operation TOAN THANG, Class III was drawn from the 229th Supply and Service Company at Phuoc Vinh.

b. Supply and Maintenance:

(1) Class I:

(a) Support was generally excellent during the reporting period. Minor problems were encountered in the procurement of fresh
vegetables, coffee, and certain condiments, but these difficulties were resolved.

(b) During Operation TOAN THANG, field units received A rations for the noon meal only.

(c) Water for the Forward Command Post during Operation TOAN THANG was provided by a 600-gallon per hour portable purification unit located at Bunard.

2) Class II and IV

(a) During this quarter, the regiment replaced the M48A3 tanks with the M48A2 series. A total of 54 M48A2 tanks were drawn.

(b) In order to facilitate the refueling of the M48A2 replacements, one "49C fuel truck was also drawn by each squadron.

(c) Twenty-three M113A1 vehicles were received during the quarter to replace combat vehicle losses sustained.

(d) During Operation TOAN THANG, barrier materials were flown to Bunard in C130 aircraft. 30,000 sandbags, 4 sleeves of concertina wire, and 24 sections of culvert material arrived to be utilized by troops in the forward area.

3) Class III and V:

(a) Operations made during Operation TOAN THANG revealed that an M48A2 tank consumed only one-half the amount of fuel during a reconnaissance in force mission than originally calculated. Approximately 2,500 gallons of Mogas were consumed daily instead of the 5,000 gallon projected figure.

(b) 7.62 linked ammunition, cal. .50 ammunition, and 90mm canister rounds were the Class V items in greatest demand during the quarter. Resupply of Class V items was satisfactory during the reporting period.

4) Aerial Resupply:

(a) The regiment averaged very few sorties during Operations ADAIRSVILLE and ALCCRN COVE as wheeled vehicles resupplied all elements. However, during Operation TOAN THANG, an average of 39 sorties was flown.
each day, as the 1st and 3rd Squadrons were in areas inaccessible to wheeled vehicles. The wheeled vehicles were located in the trains area in Phuoc Vinh. All resupply from Phuoc Vinh to Bunard was accomplished by air. CH-47 helicopters and C130 aircraft were utilized and were immediately responsive to the needs of the regiment.

(b) Five CH-54 Skycrane missions were flown during Operation TOAN THANG. Two damaged ACAV's were retrieved, and three flame-thrower service units were lifted out to Bunard.

(5) Maintenance:

(a) Maintenance support was provided by the 551st Light Maintenance Company during the entire period. Contact teams remained with each squadron during all field operations.

(b) Problem areas during the quarter were the unavailability of filters (fuel, oil, air) for combat vehicles, the unavailability of replacement generators of less than 15 KW capacity, and the unavailability of M60 machineguns and replacement parts.

c. Medical:

(1) The health of the command was excellent throughout the quarter. No abnormalities pertaining to the morale or psychological effectiveness of the men were noted. This was particularly noteworthy since the majority of the command had been on continuous field operations during the reporting period.

(2) The regiment sustained 94 injuries as a result of hostile action and 104 injuries not as a result of hostile action.

(3) There were 8 cases of malaria (1 Vivax and 7 Falciprium) during the quarter. Seven of these cases occurred in February.

(4) Throughout the quarter the 45th Air Ambulance Company provided the regiment with smooth and efficient air evacuation service. Of significant note was the outstanding dust off service provided to the Blackhorse Base Camp. This service which was reinstated on 23 Mar having been discontinued in Dec 67 was particularly appreciated by the regiment.

(5) The facilities of the 12th, 24th, 36th and 93rd Evacuation Hospitals as well as the 3rd Field Hospital and 7th Surgical Hospital were util-
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ized by the regiment during the quarter. The medical companies of the 1st
Medical Battalion and the 326th Medical Battalion provided support to the
units in Field locations.

(6) A preventive dentistry program (in conjunction with the Combat
Rehabilitation of All Platoons - CRAP) was initiated in each squadron aid
station to insure regular and adequate dental care.

7. (FOUO) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

a. General: At the close of the quarter the operational strength of
the regiment was 101% of authorized strength. Replacements were generally
well qualified. The shortage of Armored Personnel Specialists (MOS 11D)
was somewhat relieved through the replacement stream and the reclassification
of personnel MOS, particularly 11B and 11D. The infusion program
operated smoothly. Approximately 254 EM in grades E1 through E6 were in-
fused with the 9th Infantry Division and the Americal Division.

b. Strength:

(1) Strength figures by the month were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASCD</th>
<th>FDT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>4157</td>
<td>4239</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>4123</td>
<td>4182</td>
<td>4076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>4126</td>
<td>4187</td>
<td>4091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Hospital Returnees: During the quarter, 237 personnel were
returned to duty after being hospitalized. This figure does not include
those personnel who were treated and released immediately.

(3) Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>NEID</th>
<th>NBW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>February</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>77</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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c. MOS Shortages: During the reporting period, shortages existed in the 11D series. To offset this, 11B and 11D MOS were substituted with successful results and without impairing the combat readiness of the regiment. Many of these personnel were reclassified as 11D after serving 60 days in this MOS.

d. Replacements: The quality of the replacements remained at an acceptable level. The training cycles conducted by the replacement training school provided thorough indoctrination of replacements who were being used in other than their primary MOS. A primary purpose of the replacement training school was acclimating personnel to their new environment and conditioning their initial apprehensions of being in a combat zone. The basic program was designed to provide refresher training in basic skills and an orientation which emphasizes troop leading procedures, tactics, and safety procedures.

e. Services:

(1) Religious: During the quarter, a total of 364 religious services were conducted with total attendance of 8768. In addition to the religious services, 112 confessions, 229 communions, and 12 memorials were conducted. The 364 services were divided as follows: 217 Catholic services and 147 Protestant services. Jewish services were centered around trips to Bearcat for recent Jewish holidays. The chaplains, along with the S-1, coordinated with the Jewish Center at Bearcat for the three-day observance. A memorial service was held on 12 April in memory of the men who had died since 1 November 1967. The 9th Division Band participated in the service. The five chaplains made 70 hospital visits, 207 visits to men's quarters, 241 visits to the troop training and duty areas, and conducted 448 interviews and counseling sessions. The increase over the last quarter in visits to the troop training and duty areas was due primarily to the Easter Season.

(2) Red Cross: For the three month period ending 30 April, the Red Cross Field Unit at Blackhorse handled 1210 cases. In addition, three loans for a total of $350.00 were made. No grants were made during the quarter. A total of 112 emergency cases were processed.

(3) Red Cross Clubmobile: The Red Cross Clubmobile made 107 visits in February, 105 in March, and 117 in April. These visits included trips to the 24th and 93rd Evacuation Hospitals in Long Binh as well as visits to the wards of the 7th Surgical Hospital and 37th Medical Company.
Throughout the quarter the Clubmobile continued its program of obtaining the birthdates of men in each unit who had birthdays during the month. From this list the Red Cross girls prepared and delivered the cards.

A program was initiated during the quarter in which the Red Cross girls attended the Blackhorse Replacement Training School for one hour each week to inform the new personnel of the Red Cross facilities and services available.

Postal: The 7th APU handled 904 pouches of incoming mail to include 4632 sacks and 1162 oversized packages. Outgoing mail included 1003 pouches, 1234 sacks, and 788 oversized packages. A total of $1,660, 606.82 worth of money orders were sold for a total fee of $8,585.50. Stamp sales totaled $26,310.60, and a total of 1180 pieces of registered mail and 847 pieces of insured mail were processed.

Special Services: During the quarter Special Services provided seven theatres with movies. Approximately 600 movies were shown with an average attendance of 150 per showing. Whenever the tactical situation permitted, movies were sent to the field locations.

Ed Begley conducted a well-received handshake tour on 24 Mar. The RFC Hollywood Country and Western Show was presented on 21 Apr in the Amphitheatre attended by approximately 600 personnel.

The Special Services conducted a volleyball tournament among the six supporting units of Blackhorse Base Camp, which was won by the 27th Engineer Battalion.

Post Exchange: During the quarter the Blackhorse Post Exchange was greatly improved. Security was increased and warehousing facilities were expanded. The FX was remodeled to present a cleaner and neater appearance. A ventilation system was installed to provide customer comfort. The snack bar increased its variety of foods and beverages. (See FX Sales Figures Enclosure 6.)

Morale: A high level of morale continued throughout the quarter. The improved FX, snack bar, and Special Services activities directly contributed to the men's high morale.

Awards and Decorations:
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In addition, 149 Purple Hearts were awarded.

h. Prisoners of War: The Blackhorse detachment of the 720th Military Police Battalion processed 12 detainees during the quarter. Of these none was deemed a prisoner of war.

i. Maintenance of Discipline, Law, and Order:

(1) Courts Martial: During the quarter, the following courts martial were processed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Tried</th>
<th>Pending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

(2) Serious Incidents: There were no serious incidents reported.
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(3) During the quarter, the largest number of MP reports concerned traffic violations, with larceny second. Formal MP patrols continued around the base camp. No change in incident statistics was noted during the quarter.

j. Problems: There were no significant problems noted during the quarter.

8. (FOUO) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

a. General: The PSYOP program supported regimental combat operations in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh, Hau Nghia, and Phuoc Long Provinces during the quarter. There were fewer missions than usual due to the fact that during the TET counteroffensive in February and much of March, the regiment had no area of operations, and squadrons were under the operational control of other units.

b. Fifty-eight aerial leaflet missions were flown, during which 3,599,600 leaflets were dropped in support of operations. These leaflets consisted primarily of rally appeals (Chieu Hoi Program), safe conduct passes, reward leaflets, and announcements concerning the Viet Cong mining of civilian vehicles during and immediately after the TET offensive. Two ground missions distributed 9000 JUSPAO Newsletters, safe conduct passes, rally instructions, and sanitation leaflets during MEDCAPS. During 57 of the aerial missions, a combined quarterly total of 40 hours and 15 minutes of loudspeaker broadcasts were made. Most tapes were produced by the supporting PSYOP Field Team and regimental interpreters and covered specific incidents or situations. Ten and one-half hours of ground loudspeaker broadcasts were also made during MEDCAF missions.

c. Only one rallier reported to the regiment during this quarter; he was a returning ARVN soldier who had been captured by the Viet Cong a short time before.

d. The attitude of the majority of the population of Long Khanh Province remained generally favorable toward the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. However, fear of the Viet Cong or apathy continued to hamper efforts of collecting detailed information of immediate tactical value. The regiment did not operate in Binh Tuy Province during this quarter.

9. (FOUO) CIVIC ACTION:

a. General: Extensive operations outside the provinces of Long Khanh
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and Binh Tuy, the Regimental Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) caused a
reduction in the civic action projects during this quarter. Because of
operations in relatively unpopulated areas and the intensity of operations
during the VC TET offensive, the number of MEDCAP missions conducted was
limited. During the quarter, 35 MEDCAP were conducted, treating 2,250
patients.

b. Civic Action:

(1) During the quarter, the following commodities were distributed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer (captured)</td>
<td>19,000 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice (captured)</td>
<td>11,536 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foodstuffs</td>
<td>10,280 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandbags</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrap lumber</td>
<td>172,550 board ft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>30 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used tin sheets</td>
<td>2,507 sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School kits</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulger wheat</td>
<td>1800 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>68 bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culverts</td>
<td>40 - 18&quot; sections</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The majority of these materials were used for the relief of
TET offensive refugees without food or housing. Revolutionary Develop-
ment Teams and local villagers performed the actual construction.

(3) The regiment supported the 52nd Ranger Battalion Dependent
Housing Project with quantities of tin and cement. This project was be-
gun in July 1967 and had progressed slowly until February 1968 when the
TET offensive halted all construction. Since March the regiment provided
50,000 VN$ per month from its civic action fund to purchase cement for this project. Used tin was also supplied as roofing material. This aid will continue until all the projected houses are completed. All actual construction labor was performed by the ARVN Rangers.

(4) The regiment provided 200 sheets of tin to victims of an accidental Vietnamese Air Force bombing of Xuan Loc on 5 Apr 68. Other material for the rebuilding of homes came from Long Khanh MACCORDS.

(5) On 24 Apr the regiment provided 60,000 VN$ from the civic action fund to drill four wells for new RF outposts on National Highway 1.

(6) The regiment collected 35,750 VN$ for the TET Aggression Relief Project (TARP), of which 7,000 VN$ were spent. The remainder of the funds will be reserved for future civic action projects since it was not needed in Long Khanh or Binh Tuy Provinces at this time.

d. Impact Program:

(1) General: Support and improvement of RF/PF outposts continued during the quarter. The VC TET offensive had one beneficial result: it improved the receptiveness of provincial outposts toward regimental support. A shortage of sandbags throughout the quarter hindered the repair of outpost bunkers.

(2) The following types and amounts of building material were devoted to the Impact Program during the Quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbed Wire (rolls)</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concertina (rolls)</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picket, 1,333</td>
<td>Sandbag 95,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandbag, GP Tent 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin Roofing (sheets)</td>
<td>984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trip Flares, 315</td>
<td>Lumber 37,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber, 176, 452</td>
<td>Claymore, M-79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-gallon Drum, 62</td>
<td>155mm Ammo, 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm Illum, 184</td>
<td>Grenade, 253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-72 LAW, 45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Status of RF/PF Outposts: At the beginning of the quarter (1 Feb) and at the end of the quarter (30 Apr) the following number of RF/PF outposts were classified as shown: (See Standards of Evaluation
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of RF/PF Outposts, Incl 7.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Long Khanh Province</th>
<th>Binh Tuy Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Feb</td>
<td>30 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category B</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category C</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category D</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. (U) INFORMATION:

   a. General:

   (1) The events of the quarterly period provided the best news material available to the 17th Public Information Detachment since the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment arrived in Vung Tau in the fall of 1966. The detachment provided a quantity of printed and photographic releases far excelling any other quarterly period.

   (2) Operating in the regimental field location, the detachment provided escort for civilian newsmen representing the press, radio and television. Because of this outside coverage, and as a result of daily operational summaries provided to USARV Information Office by the detachment, the regiment's activities were reported in numerous major and local stateside newspapers.

   (3) A feature story on the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's move into Operation ADAIRSVILLE, written upon request from the II Field Force Information Office, appeared in the April 1968 Hurricane magazine and has been accepted for future publication in Armor and Army Digest, both army-wide publications.

   (4) 17th Public Information Detachment photographs from Operation ADAIRSVILLE were featured in double-page spreads in both The Army Reporter and The Saigon Post newspapers, as were individual photographs.

   b. Statistical Summary:
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(1) A total of 527 hometown news releases (DA Form 1526) were forwarded by 17th PID to the Army Home Town News Center.

(2) A USARV tape team interviewing Blackhorse troopers reached their goal of 150 interviews conducted, all of which were forwarded to the Army Home Town News Center.

(3) A total of 44 news releases and 68 photo releases were given general distribution.

(4) A total of 30 news representatives were provided support.

(5) A total of 20 formal press interviews or briefings held by commanders and key staff officers were arranged for the benefit of these visiting news personnel.

1L. (C) BASE CAMP DEVELOPMENT:

a. Development:

(1) The Blackhorse Regiment was absent from base camp during the reporting period. The 27th Engineer Battalion (C) continued to provide horizontal construction for self-help billets and other construction up to mid-March when the battalion began preparation for PCS movement on 30 Mar. The other major engineer projects and their status follow:

(a) Airfield parking apron - 50% complete.

(b) Airfield drainage basin - completed by PA&E.

(c) Ten-point helicopter refueling station - constructed by 27th Engr Bn and put into operation by the 506th S&S Co.

(d) Supply warehouses - completed one each for the engineer battalion area and the 1st Squadron.

(e) Service club - site prepared.

(f) Two-story billet - began as a pilot model for future self-help building by two units on base camp.

(g) Concrete maintenance pads - suspended.
(2) In order that development would not come to a complete standstill, a platoon of the 36th Engineer Battalion (C) was stationed at Blackhorse until the arrival of the 31st Engineer Battalion (C) on 20 Apr. The platoon, with limited equipment, provided some horizontal construction enabling units to continue the self-help billet program and in addition continued the vertical construction of the two-story billets.

(3) PA&E completed 63 job order requests in the amount of $58,128.00 and applied asphalt surface treatment to 70% of the interior road network. In addition the drainage system was improved with work on ditches, culverts, and headwall.

(4) The 27th Engineer Battalion was permitted to employ no more than 25% of the total battalion effort on base camp development. For the first two weeks of March this effort increased to approximately 35% but fell off sharply on receipt of PCS orders to less than 20% and in the last week of March, to less than 10%.
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SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

1. (c) LESSONS LEARNED:
   a. Personnel: None
   b. Operations:
      (1) OBSERVATION: Contact in jungle areas.
      EVALUATION: An assessment of the strength and disposition of an enemy in a heavily forested area when contact is made is extremely difficult. All combat power available cannot be concentrated on the area of contact, and the enemy is able to make excellent use of tank-killer teams to delay the advance of armored units. Dismounted infantry should be employed to precede, flank, and be integrated throughout an advancing armor formation to provide necessary security, reduce the possibility of an ambush, nullify the effectiveness of enemy tank-killer teams, and give a better estimate of the enemy's disposition.

      (2) OBSERVATION: The troop/company-sized night ambush.
      EVALUATION: When intelligence indicates that there are numerous VC resupply activities at night, it was determined that an aggressive ambush plan will disrupt this activity. The technique used was to position an ACAV troop and an ARVN company astride the known resupply route. This force would not move into position until dusk. Upon arrival at a preselected patrol base, the ARVN infantry would establish platoon-sized ambush patrols. An ACAV platoon would be assigned as a reaction force for each ambush, and four to six US personnel equipped with a PRC-25 radio and a starlight scope would be sent with each ambush platoon to maintain US communication with the patrol base.

      RECOMMENDATION: This technique, which proved successful on nine different occasions, should be used more frequently to counter VC night resupply movements.

      (3) OBSERVATION: Use of the armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) in the dry season.
      EVALUATION: On occasion in certain areas during the dry season
there is a limited need for the organic AVLB. The following field expedients were used successfully. One bridge and its launcher were located with a squadron CP. The bridge was positioned to provide overhead cover for the underground TOC. This partially eliminated the need to carry excessive quantities of fortification materials. The launcher was then equipped with a towbar and used to assist in the battlefield recovery of disabled vehicles, allowing the combat vehicles to remain in battle. To conserve tank combat strength another AVLB was used to precede squadron resupply convoys between Duc Hoa and Tan Son Nhut. It was used because intelligence indicated that any mines encountered along the route would be small but sufficient to destroy a wheeled vehicle. The launcher would detonate the mine with minimum damage.

(4) OBSERVATION: Problem of forcing CS gas into VC tunnels.

EVALUATION: When checking VC tunnel complexes with CS gas, it is often difficult to get gas to flow through the tunnel. One solution is to throw one CS grenade into the tunnel and follow it with a fragmentation grenade which lands between the CS grenade and the tunnel entrance. The ensuing explosion will cause the gas to be blown through the tunnel complex.

c. Training: None

d. Intelligence:

(1) OBSERVATION: Intelligence indicators.

EVALUATION: During the 3rd Squadron 11th ACR operations while in direct support of the 25th Infantry Division (ARVN) near Duc Hoa, there were several indicators available to the aerial observers in determining whether fortified hamlets were occupied by the VC. Some of the indicators which suggested the presence of VC were: the lack of cattle around the hamlet; makeshift houses in the rice paddies surrounding the hamlet; the presence of chickens without people tending them.

RECOMMENDATION: That aerial observers be alerted to the foregoing indicators of enemy activity.

(2) OBSERVATION: Tide data for inland rivers.

EVALUATION: Elements of the regiment have conducted river crossing operations on inland rivers in the II Field Force area twice during
the past quarter. In both operations, the rivers had tidal changes of three to four feet that greatly influenced the speed and manner in which the crossings were conducted. The nearest tidal information was for the Saigon River at Saigon. Although both rivers flowed into the Saigon P'iver, the Saigon tidal chart bore no correlation to the tides at the crossing sites.

RECOMMENDATION: That a study of the river tides in the II Field Force Area be made and disseminated down to regiment level.

e. Logistics:

(1) OBSERVATION: A need exists for a full-tracked vehicle to transport the flamethrower service unit for each organic M132A1 Flame-thrower.

EVALUATION: On Operation TOAN THANG while the regiment was operating in terrain untrafficable to wheeled vehicles, it was found that the employment of the flamethrowers was extremely limited. The track-mounted flamethrower could not be accompanied in combat operations by its service unit which was mounted on a 2½-ton truck. The wheeled vehicles were located in the trains area in Phuoc Vinh during the operation and could not negotiate the terrain into the battle areas around Bunard. It was necessary to airlift the service units by C-130 aircraft or CH-54 helicopters to a forward support area. This was a time-consuming and costly manner of resupply. In order to fully utilize the combat capability of the flamethrower, a service unit must be immediately responsive for resupply. The M548 Cargo Carrier which has the capacity to negotiate the same terrain as the M132A1 Flamethrower can best be utilized to provide this resupply.

RECOMMENDATION: That nine M548 Cargo Carriers each equipped with a flamethrower service unit be issued to the 11th ACR.

(2) OBSERVATION: The level of fill of the Prescribed Load List (PLL) has been inadequate.

EVALUATION: In the past several months, the fill for the PLL has remained at approximately 50%. Each squadron has about 1500 line items; during this quarter, about 750 lines were at zero balance. During this period of extensive field operations, the need was ever present for adequate PLL. Far too many vehicles were deadlined because of the lack of PLL items. With only half of the PLL on hand, sustained combat operations were
Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68

RECOMMENDATION: That immediate attention be given to raising significantly the level of fill for PLL items.

OBSERVATION: Self-service supply.

EVALUATION: The Self-service Supply Store for Blackhorse Base Camp is operated by the 506th Supply and Service Company. The store carries 720 separate items of supply. At the end of the quarter, 536 of these items were at zero balance. As a result, the units of Blackhorse Base Camp were without the very basic office supplies necessary for day to day operation. Requisitions for the needed items have been submitted to the 506th Field Depot but have remained unfilled. The service provided by this store during this quarter showed little improvement over the service provided in July 1967 when the store was first opened.

RECOMMENDATION: That immediate action be taken to fill the outstanding requisitions of the Self-service Supply Store.

Organization:

OBSERVATION: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment has a definite requirement for a support battalion such as those organic to all other separate brigade-sized organizations in Vietnam.

EVALUATION: While this void may have been partially filled by the assignment of a 1st Logistical Command Supply and Service Company and a Light Maintenance Company to the Blackhorse Base Camp, this solution is not satisfactory. The regiment has no control over the staffing of these two organizations, nor can it direct the efforts of the companies into areas of priority based on the regiment's assessment of its requirements. These are area support units which support other organizations in addition to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and, therefore, are limited in what they can send to the field to support the regiment during field operations. When separated by distance from the Blackhorse Base Camp, all logistical paperwork must be returned from the field location for processing. Spare parts supply, salvage of equipment, and pickup of issue all become major transportation problems under this concept. Personnel, finance, and other administrative matters should be coordinated in an organic administrative company. The need for an immediately responsive support battalion was especially prevalent during this period of extensive field operations. The lack of such a support battalion seriously limits the mobility of the regi-
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RECOMMENDATION: That a support battalion comparable to those organic to other brigade-sized organizations in Vietnam should be assigned to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(2) OBSERVATION: There is a need in a Tank Company, Armored Cavalry Squadron, Armored Cavalry Regiment, for a M577 Carrier Command Post.

EVALUATION: The experience of over a year and a half of combat operations by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in RVN proves that the tank company commander needs a M577 Carrier Command Post. Habitually, squadrons operate with four teams formed by cross-attachment among troops. Lacking a M577 Carrier, the tank team commander is severely handicapped in comparison to the commander of an Armored Cavalry Troop. During this quarter infantry companies were frequently attached to the cavalry squadrons. The lack of a M577 Carrier in the tank company not only handicapped the tank company commander but limited the flexibility of the squadron commander.

RECOMMENDATION: That the request for a M577 with crew in proposed MTOE 17-27G for Tank Companies, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, submitted to the Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, on 21 Oct 67 be given immediate favorable attention.

Communications:

(1) OBSERVATION: The AN/VRC-29 RATT equipment is not satisfactory for long-distance communications over 25 miles.

EVALUATION: The power (100 watts) of the AN/VRC-29 coupled with the poor operating frequencies available make it extremely difficult to operate at distances over 25 miles. The only way communications can be maintained is with the doublet antenna and by constant transmissions to keep the frequency clear.

RECOMMENDATION: The AN/VSC-3 radio should be issued as soon as possible and a quick erect antenna be adapted, possibly a 32-foot crank-up whip antenna.

(2) OBSERVATION: A requirement exists to retransmit secure voice communications.

EVALUATION: The regiment often operates at great distances
from the control headquarters, thereby requiring FM radio retransmission facilities. At the present time, no facilities exist to retransmit secure voice. As ever increasing emphasis is being given to communications security and the use of secure voice FM equipment, this limitation becomes constantly more serious.

RECOMMENDATION: That a secure voice retransmission capability be provided the 11th ACR as soon as possible.

h. Medical:

(1) OBSERVATION: Inability to carry vaccine into the field due to lack of portable refrigerators.

EVALUATION: Regimental and squadron aid stations are in need of a portable refrigeration unit which would allow carrying vaccines in the field during combat operations. Based on experience gained on long field operations, mass immunizations can best be coordinated and administered from the forward area aid station and not through base camp medical facilities.

RECOMMENDATION: A field vaccine refrigeration capability for the regimental and squadron aid stations should be immediately provided.

i. Base Camp Development:

(1) OBSERVATION: There is a critical shortage of generators 60 KW and above at Blackhorse Base Camp.

EVALUATION: In the past eight months, PA&E has submitted job order requests for 17 generators, 60 KW and above. During the quarter, one 150 KW, one 100 KW, and two 60 KW generators have been turned in for repair or replacement. To date no action has been taken to replace these generators. The 7th Surgical Hospital does not have sufficient power to operate mission essential equipment. The Class I refrigeration facility is operating with a generator in need of overhaul. One water point is not operating due to a lack of power. The other overworked water point is powered by a generator on a temporary loan basis. The entire base camp is provided with less than 1000 KW of power.

RECOMMENDATION: That action be taken immediately to provide adequate power for Blackhorse Base Camp.

(2) OBSERVATION: A need exists for an engineer light equipment
AVT-WE
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company with an asphalt distributing capability to be attached to the 31st
Engineer Battalion (C).

EVALUATION: The dust problem at Blackhorse Base Camp is severe
and has had an adverse effect on aircraft availability. The requirement for
surface stabilization is urgent for maintenance areas, refueling point, taxi-
way, and parking apron. The base camp road networks need extensive main-
tenance work for sanitation and safety reasons for both wet and dry seasons.
In addition such a company would be invaluable to the regiment's civic ac-
tion program and for (when available) assisting in upgrading the routes of
communication in the Xuan Loc - Blackhorse area.

RECOMMENDATION: That the 31st Engineer Battalion (C) be aug-
mented by an engineer light equipment company with asphalt distributing
equipment.

(3) OBSERVATION: A need exists to complete the program of hori-
zontal and vertical construction prior to the rainy season.

EVALUATION: The 27th Engineer Battalion (C) provided hori-
zontal construction for self-help billets and other construction until it
departed Blackhorse Base Camp on 30 Mar. At present there is a 10-12 bat-
talion-month backlog of authorized and directed engineer effort at Black-
horse. Unless this backlog is eliminated, all units will again have a large
percentage of personnel in tents throughout the entire rainy season. Fur-
ther, such engineer constructed facilities as the service club, aircraft
maintenance hangars, and track vehicle maintenance areas will continue to
be postponed.

RECOMMENDATION: That Headquarters, 31st Engineer Battalion (C)
remain at Blackhorse Base Camp and a minimum of two engineer companies be
utilized full time to reduce the engineer backlog at Blackhorse.

\[Signature\]

JOHN F. MCARDLE
LTC, Armor
Acting Commander
AVFBG-RE-H (10 May 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 April 1968 RSC CSPOR-65 (RL)

DA, HQ II FFORCKV, APO San Francisco 96266 13 JUN 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Subject report is forwarded.

2. (C) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and concurs with it with the following exceptions:

   a. Para li (2), Section II. The attachment of a light equipment company cannot be justified based upon the reasons cited. Blackhorse Base Camp does have unusually severe dust problems due to the large amount of tracked vehicle traffic on post. Paving of extensive on-post areas is not considered justified at this time in light of the backlog of LOC paving on National routes. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment could increase its organic capability to control dust by obtaining an asphalt distributor or similar equipment through one or a combination of the following means: the ENSURE Program, a modification to the TOE or a temporary loan.

   b. Para li (3), Section II. While 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's self help construction capability is less than that of other combat units because of frequent requirements to operate away from its base camp, the backlog at Blackhorse Base Camp is not seriously greater than at other base camps. Base camp construction must continue to be of lower priority than combat support and LOC construction and repair. There are insufficient engineer assets in the force structure to assign an engineer battalion (-) to the sole mission of base development support.

3. (C) With reference to para li (1), Section II, it should be noted that generators continue to be in short supply throughout Vietnam. Base camp demands have outstripped planning figures primarily because of a continued growing demand for air conditioning, refrigeration and cooking equipment. Maintenance capability of R and U contractor has also not always lived up to expectations with the result that equipment failure has exceeded normal US Army experience factors.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

O. R. FOWY
ILT. AGC
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning tide data for inland rivers, page 34, paragraph 1d(1): Concur. The following actions have been taken to obtain the required data.

   (1) On 24 January 1968 the USARV Hydrographic Survey Team #1 (HST #1) was activated.

   (2) Tide staffs and recording tide gauges are being installed at critical points in the inland waterway system.

   (3) A plan is being formulated to perform hydrographic surveys of inland waterways on a systematic basis. This data is being plotted on 1:25,000 scale monochrome pictomap bases suitable for Ozalid reproduction and distribution to using units. The hydro data will also be incorporated into future editions of the printed pictomaps.

   (4) The responsibility for collection and dissemination of tide data currently rests with the US Navy but the subject is presently under study by MACV.

b. Reference item concerning M548 Cargo Carriers M132A1 flame thrower service unit, page 35, paragraph 2e(1). InTOE action has been taken as part of Phase II Standardization to include the M548 carrier with service unit in the flame thrower section of the HHT of each Armored Cavalry Squadron. Approval of the InTOE will provide requisition authority.
c. Reference item concerning the level of fill of the PLL has been inadequate, page 35, paragraph 2e(2): Concur. Repair parts support to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment is rendered by the 551st Light Maintenance Company (DS), a 1st Logistical Command unit. A letter is being prepared to 1st Logistical Command requesting an investigation of the high level of zero balances and correction of the problem if responsibility is within DSU or Depot; plus comparison of PLL's and ASL and reconciliation of requisitions.

d. Reference item concerning self-service supply, page 36, paragraph 2e(3): Concur. The self-service supply store is operated by the 506th Supply and Service Company, a subordinate unit of the 1st Logistical Command. A letter will be sent to the 1st Logistical Command informing them of this situation and directing them to take necessary action to insure that adequate supplies are on hand at the self-service supply store.

e. Reference item concerning a requirement for a support battalion, page 36, paragraph 2f(1). A requirement for additional combat service support is recognized for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. However, the suprased support battalion configuration is considered excessive for the needs of the ACR. It is suggested that a survey be conducted to determine the essential support required. Upon completion of the survey available assets should be screened to satisfy the requirement.

f. Reference item concerning M577 carrier command post, page 37, paragraph 2f(a). The tank company is authorized two M48A3 tanks in the headquarters section, plus three APC M113 in the company. Redistribution of assets should accommodate the requirement.

g. Reference item concerning unsatisfactory long distance communication using the AN/VRC-29, page 37, paragraph 2g. The family of HF RATT radio equipment with which Army units in RVN are equipped is in the process of being replaced. The 100 watt AN/VRC-29 is scheduled to be replaced by the 400 watt AN/VSC-3. Based on present shipping schedules and the current priority of issue in USARV units, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment should receive the AN/VSC-3 equipment during the period August and September, 1968. It should be noted, however, the AN/VRC-29, is capable of operation over distances far greater than 25 miles. Lack of successful operation over greater distances than reported indicates a major frequency interference problem of long standing, a maintenance problem and/or a lack of
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68  RCS CSFOR (Rl)

operator proficiency. Interference problems are to be reported in accord-
with USARV CEL item 56-4; none are known to have been reported by this
unit.

h. Reference item concerning secure voice retransmission facilities,
page 38, paragraph 2g(2). The KY-8 used in conjunction with the AN/VRC-12
family of FM radio equipment has provided USARV units an FM secure voice
capability since the latter part of 1966. The introduction of the HYL-
3/TSEC into this command is planned for late FY-69 and early FY-70, based
on current service testing.

i. Reference item concerning inability to carry vaccine into the
field due to lack of portable refrigerators, page 38, paragraph 2h(1).
Action has been taken to authorize the issue of FSN 4110-707-2150; Refrig-
erator, Mechanical Biological. This 2.85 cubic foot capacity refrigerator
will adequately satisfy the requirement for refrigeration of vaccines when
units are deployed during combat operations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Copies furnished:
HQ, 11th ACR
HQ, II FFORCEV
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 11th Armored Cav Regiment for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558  26 JUL 1368

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
Air Cavalry Troop
919th Engineer Company (Armored)
37th Medical Company
506th Supply and Service Company (Support)
551st Light Maintenance Company (Support)
  1st Detachment, Company B, 720th Military Police Battalion
  7th Army Postal Unit
  17th Public Information Detachment
  28th Military History Detachment
  398th Transportation Detachment
  9th Signal Detachment (Avionics Maintenance)
  409th Radio Research Unit
  541st Military Intelligence Detachment
  5th Field Team, Company B, 6th PSYOP Battalion
  202nd Military Intelligence Detachment

1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
  A Troop
  B Troop
  C Troop
  D Company
  Howitzer Battery

2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
  E Troop
  F Troop
  G Troop
  H Company
  Howitzer Battery

3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
  I Troop
  K Troop
  L Troop
  M Company
  Howitzer Battery
OPCON STATUS OF THE 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

During the reporting period (1 Feb - 30 Apr) Hq, 11th ACR remained OPCON to Hq, II Field Force, Vietnam.

The OPCON status of the squadron and subordinate units follows:

**Hq, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OPCON HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb - 30 Apr</td>
<td>11th ACR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Subordinate Units**
(When Not OPCON to Hq, 1st Sqdn)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OPCON HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 - 5 Feb</td>
<td>Trp A</td>
<td>1/18th Inf, 1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 10 Feb</td>
<td>Trp B</td>
<td>II FFV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 20 Feb</td>
<td>Trp B</td>
<td>4/39th Inf, 9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Feb - 8 Mar</td>
<td>Trp C</td>
<td>11th ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 - 14 Mar</td>
<td>Trp C</td>
<td>199th Lt Inf Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Mar - 10 Apr</td>
<td>Trp A</td>
<td>11th ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 - 27 Mar</td>
<td>Trp B</td>
<td>11th ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 - 28 Mar</td>
<td>Trp B</td>
<td>101st Abn Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Mar - 10 Apr</td>
<td>Trp B</td>
<td>11th ACR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hq, 2nd Squadron, 11th ACR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OPCON HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 2 Feb</td>
<td>11th ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 18 Feb</td>
<td>101st Abn Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Feb - 6 Mar</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 101st Abn Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 22 Mar</td>
<td>199th Lt Inf Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Mar - 6 Apr</td>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 30 Apr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Subordinate Units**
(When Not OPCON to Hq, 2nd Sqdn)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OPCON HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 - 4 Feb</td>
<td>Trp F</td>
<td>2/506th Inf</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4 - 7 Feb
7 - 9 Feb
7 - 13 Feb
24 Feb - 5 Mar
9 - 16 Mar
21 Mar - 6 Apr

Trp F
Trp G
Trp E
Trp G
Trp E
Trp F

3/187th Inf
2/502nd Inf
3/227th Inf
199th Lt Inf Bde
4/12th Inf
1/26th Inf

DATE
1 - 7 Feb
7 - 23 Feb
23 Feb - 1 Mar
1 Mar - 21 Apr
21 - 30 Apr

Hq, 3rd Squadron, 11th ACR

OPCON HQ
11th ACR
199th Lt Inf Bde
25th Inf Div
11th ACR
2nd Bde, 1st Inf Div

Subordinate Units
(When Not OPCON to Hq, 3rd Sqdn)

UNIT
Trp K
Trp I
Trp L
Trp K
Trp K
Co M
Trp I

OPCON HQ
1st Bde, 1st Inf Div
2nd Bde, 1st Inf Div
2nd Bde, 1st Inf Div
199th Lt Inf Bde
1st Sqdn, 11th ACR
1st Sqdn, 11th ACR
1st Sqdn, 11th ACR
1st Bn, 18th Inf
2nd Bn, 39th Armor

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ARMY AVIATION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

1. Sorties Flown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Command &amp; Control</th>
<th>Troop Lift</th>
<th>Cargo Lift</th>
<th>Casualty Evacuation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-23G</td>
<td>2750</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aerial Fire Support</th>
<th>Administrative</th>
<th>Reconnaissance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-23G</td>
<td></td>
<td>290</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td></td>
<td>2140</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td></td>
<td>1790</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Passengers</th>
<th>Tons Cargo</th>
<th>Hours Flown</th>
<th>Fuel Consumed (in gal.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-23G</td>
<td>1360</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>23,970</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>96,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>5170</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>78,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Results of Fire:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC killed-confirmed</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC killed-estimated</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures damaged</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures destroyed</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Ammunition Consumed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>7.62mm</th>
<th>2.75 inch</th>
<th>40mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,052,800 rounds</td>
<td>4,070 rounds</td>
<td>7,595 rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Aircraft Availability: (Expressed in percentages of assigned aircraft)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OH-23G</th>
<th>UH-1D</th>
<th>UH-1G</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## AIR FORCE STATISTICAL SUMMARY

### 1. O-1 Sorties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VR</th>
<th>FAC</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>285</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>1160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2. Tactical Air Sorties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Number of Sorties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F100</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-57</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-47</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-37</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. Ordnance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number of Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-65</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-117</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-82</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-81</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20mm</td>
<td>76,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBU</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4. BOMB Damage Assessment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KBA</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBA (Poss)</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck Bridge destroyed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footbridge destroyed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road plow destroyed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulldozer destroyed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel barrels destroyed</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal. .50 positions destroyed</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinegun positions destroyed</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary fires</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Explosions</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trails uncovered (in meters)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers destroyed</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers uncovered</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spider holes opened</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trench opened (in meters)</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military structures damaged</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military structures destroyed</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hooches destroyed</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans destroyed</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures destroyed</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures damaged</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnel entrance uncovered</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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VIET CONG ORDER OF BATTLE

MILITARY REGION 10
- Bu Nang SF Camp

WAR ZONE C
- Tay Ninh

WAR ZONE D

MILITARY REGION 6
- Bien Hoa
- Long Binh
- Blackhorse Base Camp

SCALE

0 km 50 km

* VC SUB-REGION E-2

Incl 8

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MAP OF 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT OPERATIONS
(1 Feb - 30 Apr)

CONFIDENTIAL
**OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED, HQ, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT (U)**

**UNIT:** CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

**DATE:** 10 May 1968

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PAGE #

ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT RD #

PAGE #

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