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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (5 Aug 68) FOR OT RD 682299
20 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 30th Artillery Brigade (AD), Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
Subject: Operational Report of 30th Artillery Brigade (AD) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RGS CSFOR-65 (Kl) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Ryukyu Islands
ATTN: RIC-OP
APO 96331

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

a. General. The 30th Artillery Brigade is authorized 3330 personnel, by HDT, and is organized as shown in Inclosure 1, with two HAWK battalions, two Nike Hercules battalions and a unique missile support organization, consisting of the 44th Ordnance Company (OCS) augmented by two Engineer DS maintenance detachments and the Ordnance DS platoons from each of the four ADA battalions. Each HAWK and Hercules battalion has four firing batteries. The brigade's primary mission is to maintain combat ready air defense forces for the Army component of the air defense of Okinawa.

b. Personnel Strength. The enlisted personnel strength of the command was critically low at the beginning of the reporting period and deteriorated to only 69 percent of the authorized strength by 30 April 1968, the end of the reporting period. The overall personnel shortage was 837 assigned and 936 operating by the end of April. The current average enlisted strength of the HAWK firing batteries was only 63 percent at the end of April, with the percentages in the lower grades running much lower. Given this critical personnel situation, CG USARYIS and Commander, 313th Air Division approved the brigade's proposals to modify some of the alert and manning level requirements for the HAWK units. This shifted the HAWK batteries on one-hour alert back to three-hour alert effective 5 April, and reduced the number of missiles and launchers immediately ready in 15-minute alert HAWK batteries, effective 18 April. If the personnel situation continues to deteriorate,
the additional measure of "mothballing" two HAWK batteries will become necessary in the fourth quarter FY 1968, and changes in the operational status of the Hercules units may also be necessary.

c. Annual Service Practice. ASP was conducted during January and February, with firing from the Yolo Point area of Okinawa. All eight Nike Hercules missiles and all of the 16 HAWKs were successful. All units passed their rated tests. This ASP saw the first use, in the USARPAC area, of the Ryan-operated Firebee/Towbee target drone system for HAWK, and there were many many problems with it at the outset, particularly concerning the ground guidance unit and the supply of Firebee guidance packages from the manufacturer in CONUS. Only one Firebee guidance package was available for the firing on 9 February, and on that date Battery D, 8th Missile Battalion (HAWK), 1st Artillery, became the first HAWK unit on Okinawa, and possibly in ASP anywhere, to successfully launch a pair of HAWK missiles simultaneously at two Towbee targets towed by a single Firebee drone.

d. Exercises. Nine Air Defense Team Training Exercises were conducted jointly with the Air Force during the reporting period. These exercises provided good training and produced useful information concerning the combat readiness posture of the Army-Air Force air defense team on Okinawa.

e. Equipment Improvement. Several major equipment modification programs were in progress during the reporting period, as follows:

(1) A HAWK system rebuild/refurbishment program which was begun in FY 67 by HICOM continued throughout the reporting period. In the long term this program will considerably improve the combat readiness of HAWK units of the command, although the use of float items in the local refurbishment project temporarily deprives the ADA units of their use.

(2) The Nike Hercules fire control system at Battery A, 1st Missile Battalion (H), 65th Artillery (Site 5) was exchanged for a rebuilt system in February as part of a HICOM program to exchange all the Nike Hercules fire control systems in this command. Five Hercules systems have now been exchanged, and the remaining three are scheduled to be completed by mid-summer 1968.

(3) Installation of an Alternate Battery Acquisition Radar (ABAR) (AI/FP-69) by HICOM at Battery D, 1st Missile Battalion (H), 65th Artillery (Site 8, 35th Air Base) proceeded to near completion during the reporting period. When fully operational, this ABAR will provide a greatly
improved target acquisition capability to the battery, and, as an important additional feature, will also provide a live video presentation to the Brigade's Army Air Defense Command Post (AADCP), located nearby.

2. (C) **Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.**

   a. Personnel.
     
     (1) **Critical Shortage of Personnel.**
     
     (a) **Observation.** Air defense tactical units should be given adequate personnel for their missions.
     
     (b) **Evaluation.** In recent months this command has experienced drastic reductions in assigned enlisted strength. This strength shortage is causing a degradation of the command's ability to carry out its assigned operational mission for the air defense of Okinawa. Unlike most other TOE combat arms units outside of actual combat, operational air defense units are required to maintain a high degree of operational readiness at all times, while still fulfilling the same type administrative requirements as all other units in a non-combat area. The impact of a serious personnel shortage in an ADA missile unit is much more significant than, for example, a field artillery unit with only a training mission. As a general rule, the Army should give ADA units adequate personnel support or relieve them of their operational missions, or inactivate them.
     
     (c) **Recommendation.** That operational air defense units be given a higher priority for assignment of personnel.

   b. Operations.
     
     (1) **HAWK Annual Service Practice - Target System Support.**
     
     (a) **Observation.** The Firebee/Towbee target drone system, although basically a good system for use in HAWK ASP firings, requires more adequate, timely logistical support than was provided at the outset of the Okinawa ASP this year.
     
     (b) **Evaluation.** The Firebee/Towbee system was marginal during the first six weeks of this command's Annual Service Practice, due to troubles in the ground guidance station and failure of sufficient airborne Firebee guidance packages to arrive on time. On several occasions firings were excessively delayed due to a lack of sufficient operational guidance packages, and the situation was precarious on other occasions. The U.S. "image" in this area
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 30th Artillery .irade (AD) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, ICS CSFOR-65 (Rl) (U)

is significantly affected, since large numbers of spectators attend ASP on Okinawa, including large Japanese military groups and many other significant foreigners. The situation was saved only by vigorous command action on Okinawa and responsive trouble-shooting by KICO.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That future target drone support for HAWK ASP firings have more adequate, timely logistical support to insure timely target service for the firing units. (This requires timely planning and close control supervision by KICO.)


(1) OBSERVATION. A target simulator system for HAWK live missile firings is needed and should be developed.

(2) EVALUATION. There is an existing HAWK Target Simulator system (AN/TPW-21) for non-firing training of fire control operators. At present, however, actual HAWK live missile firings, in AD or otherwise, require actual airborne targets, because of the home-on-target characteristics of the HAWK missiles, as opposed to the command guidance system used with the Hercules missiles. Target drone systems such as the contractor-operated Firebee/Towbee system used this year for HAWK ASP are costly and involve many problems. An electronic target simulator system would offer many advantages, in drastically reduced costs per shot (after the initial investment), in being relatively trouble-free and reliable, in greater flexibility, and in providing more realistic firings because 3D and supersonic target maneuvers could be employed without additional expense. Despite the homing characteristics of HAWK, it is considered that a HAWK target simulator system for live firings can be developed and should be pursued. A suggested approach would be the modification of the AN/TPW-21 Simulator Station coupled with the use of a command-controlled target simulatormitter in a modified HAWK missile nose-cone. (KIC2: This proposal with further details is also being developed for separate submission in the Army Suggestions Program.)

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That a military requirement be established for a target simulator system for HAWK live missile firings.

d. Intelligence. None.

e. Logistics. Installation of major items of air defense equipment.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 30th Artillery Brigade (AD) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)

(1) OBSERVATION. MICOM planning and programming for major ADA projects should be expanded to include all the ancillary details together with detailed contractual arrangements and funding provisions.

(2) EVALUATION. The new AN/FPQ-69 Alternate Battery Acquisition Radar (ABAR) at Battery D, 1st Missile Battalion (ML), 65th Artillery should have been fully operational many months ago. It has been plagued with difficulties in various ancillary details not adequately covered in initial planning and contractual arrangements. Examples here have included air-conditioners, ducting, other building modifications and minor construction. In such cases it cannot be assumed that adequate local funds will be available for such requirements, especially in the absence of ample prior coordination and funding programming. It is considered that, insofar as practicable, all such details should be included in a single MICOM program package for the installations of the major items and, in turn, adequately covered in the contractual and funding arrangements.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That more detailed and comprehensive package programming, including contractual arrangements and funding provisions be accomplished by MICOM prior to installation of major items of air defense equipment.

f. Organization. None.

k. Other. None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WALLACE C. ARNOLD
Major, Artillery
Adjutant

Copies furnished:
CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: CSFOR-DT
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HQ United States Army, Ryukyu Islands, APO San Francisco 96331 18 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GFCP-DT, APO 96552

(C) Subject report has been reviewed and the following comments, reference Part II, are submitted:

a. Paragraph 3a(b): The personnel shortages discussed in this paragraph are adversely affecting maintenance of material as well as the operational mission. Concur with the recommendation that operational air defense units be given a higher priority for assignment of personnel.

b. Paragraph 3d(2) and (3): Concur with the evaluation and recommendation. One possible solution to this problem would be closer coordination between HICOM and the gaining organization during the planning stage prior to installation of major items of air defense equipment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

P. C. WEDDLE
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
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GPOP-DT (15 May 68) 2d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 30th Arty Bde (AD) for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
Indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. (C) Reference 1st Indorsement, subparagraph a: As a result of
continuing personnel shortages in HAWK units, CGUSARYIS requested
approval of and CINCUSARPAC granted authorization on 3 June 1968 to
place two HAWK batteries in a caretaker status. These two HAWK
batteries are relieved from operational requirements, their equipment
is being maintained, administrative functions are being continued, and
the units can be brought to operational status within 72 hours after
receiving full complement of personnel. A high priority should be
given the recommendation that operational air defense units be given a
higher priority for assignment of personnel. This subject is an item
of interest during the DA-USARPAC personnel conference at this head-
quartters on 15 - 17 July 68.

3. (C) Reference (page 4) paragraph 2b(1)(c): Subsequent Annual
Service Practice (ASP) at SVN using the Firebee/Towbee System presented
no difficulty. A spare ground control station had been procured and
ample spare parts were available. No delay was experienced in SVN due
to target drone support.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

CPT, AGC
Astt AG

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ORGANIZATION

30TH ARTY BDE (AD)

44TH ORD CO (GUIDED MISSILE) (GS)

8TH MSL BN 3RD ARTY (HAWK)

8TH MSL BN 1ST ARTY (HAWK)

1ST MSL BN 65TH ARTY (NIKE HERC)

2D MSL BN 61ST ARTY (NIKE HERC)
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 30th Artillery Brigade**  
(Air Defense)  

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations.**  
1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968  

CO, 30th Artillery Brigade (Air Defense)
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ITEM 1

* SUBJECT TITLE

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*** PAGE #

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT RD #

PAGE #

ITEM 3

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT RD #

PAGE #

ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT RD #

PAGE #

ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE

FOR OT RD #

PAGE #

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.