**UNCLASSIFIED**

**AD NUMBER**

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**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

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**LIMITATION CHANGES**

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**AUTHORITY**

12 May 1980 per DoDD 5200.10 document marking; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (26 Jul 68) FOR OT RD 682137 15 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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US Army Aviation Test Activity
10th Combat Aviation Battalion
2d Battalion, 138th Artillery

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1. Section I (C) Significant Organizational Activities
   a. (C) General
      (1) Mission: The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion provides aviation support as directed by the Commanding Officer, 17th Combat Aviation Group in support of airborne operations designed to search out and destroy the insurgent enemy and to extend governmental control of the population; to provide general aviation support as directed by the Commanding Officer 17th Combat Aviation Group; to I Field Forces, Vietnam (IFFORCEV), Deputy Senior Advisor (DSA) II Corps and 5th Special Forces Group; to provide command and control of the assigned and attached units as directed by the Commanding Officer, 17th Combat Aviation Group.
      (2) Organization: The assigned aviation companies remained the same during this period. The 134th Assault Helicopter Company was attached to the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion and remains under operational control at the end of the reporting period. See Inclosure 1.
      (3) Primary Staff Changes: On 10 April 1968 Major Ronald L. Baker, O1000993, assumed the duties of Battalion S-3 from Lt Col Clarence Brooker, O68221.
      (4) Assigned companies in the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion are commanded as follows:
         (a) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment is commanded by Major Donald M. Dawkins, O5309790.
         (b) The 61st Assault Helicopter Company is commanded by Major Alvin E. Walker, O95640.
         (c) The 92nd Assault Helicopter Company is commanded by Major Eugene G. Miller, O68621.
         (d) The 192nd Assault Helicopter Company is commanded by Major Charles W. Emrick, O788294.
         (e) The 196th Assault Support Helicopter Company is commanded by Major John R. Smith, O4004602.
         (f) The 243rd Assault Support Helicopter Company is commanded by Major Bobby R. Latham, O1881057.
         (g) The 281st Assault Helicopter Company is commanded by Major Donald R. Ruskauf, O85371.
b. (C) Intelligence

(1) Physical Security: Continuous improvement of the defense for the Dong Ba Thin area marked this reporting period.

(a) The lighting projects for aircraft parking areas are now complete. Both Flanders Heliport and CH-47 area at Dong Ba Thin East are guarded by fixed posts which can observe the approaches into those areas and greatly enhance the battalion's defenses against attack by sappers.

(b) All sectors of the perimeter for which the battalion is responsible now have adequate perimeter lighting. In addition, the battalion installed lighting on 1800 meters of perimeter defended by the Koreans.

(c) A larger share of the defense of Dong Ba Thin has been assumed by the battalion. Three hundred meters of perimeter have been added to the 10th Battalion's sector. The battalion has established a road block on the south end of the post along Highway QL-1 which bisects the Dong Ba Thin Complex.

(d) The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion units at Dong Ba Thin have received familiarization training in the weapons used on the perimeter. A series of classes have been conducted for the Battalion Duty Officers. This program of instructions includes training in calling for artillery fire, adjusting illumination, defense plans, and guard mount.

(e) All the defenses of the DBT/CRB area are now coordinated by a CTOC run by the 18th Engineer Brigade. All intelligence and security officers of the area meet daily at the CTOC to exchange information.

(2) (C) Counterintelligence

(a) Daily Intsums from IFFV are now received by teletype and arrive at the battalion in two days.

(b) The use of organic teletype capability has been increased to accelerate the dissemination of information.

(c) A more comprehensive intelligence SOP incorporating the changes as required by USARV Reg 380-5 and 1st Avn Bde, 17th CAG Reg 380-5 has been prepared.

(d) There has been continued emphasis on countering intelligence and counterintelligence training, with particular attention given to the orienting of newly assigned personnel.

c. (C) Operations and Training Activities

(1) Plans: At the close of the reporting period the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion was coordinating the missions of assigned aviation units from its base camp at Dong Ba Thin. A forward TOC was located at LZ English near Dong Son on 28 February and is coordinating the activities of three separate operations for the 173rd Airborne Brigade: Operation Cochise with the 61st AHC and the 196th ASHC, Operation Walker with the 131th AHC and the 196th ASHC, and Operation Bolling with the 134th AHC. General Support to the II Corps Tactical Zone continued to be a primary mission of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion.

(2) Operations: Since 1 February the units of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion have performed a myriad of assignments. With the onset of the Tet Offensive these units were called upon to provide every conceivable type of aviation support to the ground forces as well as to protect their own airfields and heliports. Following the Tet Offensive the assigned units returned to their primary mission for general support. On 1 April three operations were begun utilizing elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and assigned and attached aviation units. The first
Operational Report for Period Ending 30 April 1968

The months operational statistics for these operations are listed below:

(a) Operational Statistics for Operation Bolling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Troops Lifted</th>
<th>Cargo Lifted (tons)</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Hours Flown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3251</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>3393</td>
<td>852</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Combat Assualts: 19

Ground Force Results:

- Enemy Losses
  - VC Killed: 622
  - NVA Killed: 0
  - VC KIA: 206
  - SA Captured: 203
  - Rice Captured: 39,838 lbs
  - Salt Captured: 2,310 lbs

- Friendly Losses
  - NVA Killed: 57
  - WHA: 215
  - MIA: 0

(b) Operational Statistics for Operation Cochise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Troops Lifted</th>
<th>Cargo Lifted (tons)</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Hours Flown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27,359</td>
<td>4159</td>
<td>10,921</td>
<td>2972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Combat Assualts: 102

Ground Force Results:

- Enemy Losses
  - VC Killed: 77
  - NVA Killed: 0
  - VC KIA: 11
  - SA Captured: 37
  - Rice Captured: 187,335 lbs
  - Salt Captured: 0

- Friendly Losses
  - WHA: 16
  - MIA: 0

(c) Operational Statistics for Operation Walker

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Troops Lifted</th>
<th>Cargo Lifted (tons)</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Hours Flown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6671</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>4428</td>
<td>1103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Combat Assualts: 32

Ground Force Results:

- Enemy Losses
  - VC Killed: 35
  - NVA Killed: 4
  - VC KIA: 16
  - SA Captured: 24
  - CSW, Rice, Salt Captured: 0

- Friendly Losses
  - NVA Killed: 15
  - WHA: 112
  - MIA: 0

Statistics compiled from Intsums and Sitreps.
Operational Report for Period Ending 30 April 1969

(d) Operations of the 61st Assault Helicopter Company

During the period 1-27 February the 61st AHCh continued its general support mission in the northern II Corps area. On 28 February the mission changed to direct support of the 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div in the Cochise AO. On 28 February the company moved to LZ English and is now operating out of that forward base. On 1 April responsibility for the Cochise AO was assumed by the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Since that time the 61st AHCh has been in direct support of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Operation Cochise.

(e) Operations of the 92nd Assault Helicopter Company

The 92nd AHCh retained its primary mission of providing general aviation support to the II Corps Tactical Zone. The majority of the missions performed have been in support of DSA II Corps. The remaining missions were primarily those of reinforcing the other assault helicopter companies in II Corps. A total of 53 separate units, elements, or activities were supported by the 92nd AHCh during this reporting period.

(f) Operations of the 192nd Assault Helicopter Company

The 192nd AHCh began this period with a concentrated effort to drive the insurgent enemy from the city of Phan Thiet. With a majority of their resources in direct support of the 3/506 Task Force, 101st Airborne, for Operation Mqalain, the 192nd AHCh expanded its efforts in March to providing additional support to DSA II Corps. The month of April found the company participating in several major airborne assaults in the flat lands and mountains surrounding Phan Thiet.

(g) Operations of the 281st Assault Helicopter Company

The 281st continued to provide aviation support to Detachment B-52, 5th Special Forces Group (Project Delta) with a portion of their assets and general support to the II Corps Tactical Zone with the remainder.

1. Operation Oasis II & III (Pleu Bai area 26 Jan - 6 Feb and 12 Feb - 29 Feb)

The aviation support on these two operations consisted of one airlift platoon, one armed platoon (minus), and one maintenance section. The mission was one of infiltrating and exfiltrating Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols. During these two operations a total of 653 hours of slick and 315 hours of gun time were flown.

2. Operation Samurai IV & V (1 Mar - 1 Apr and 19 Apr to present)

The support consisted of 6 slicks and 1 armed helicopters with the mission of providing aviation assets to the 5th Special Forces Group (Project Delta) on reconnaissance operations in the Hue Phu Bai area of the I Corps Tactical Zone. A total of 1176 flight hours were flown during these two operations.

(h) Operations of the 196th Assault Support Helicopter Company

The 196th ASHC provided both general support and direct aviation support during this reporting period. Support aircraft have been utilized throughout the Coastal Region and in the highland areas in support of CRID, 4th Infantry Division, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The 196th ASHC has provided direct support to the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Operation Cochise and Operation Bolling.

(i) Operations of the 243rd Assault Support Helicopter Company

The 243rd ASHC provided general aviation support for the Korean White Horse Infantry Division, general aviation support to the 5th
Operational Report for Period Ending 30 April 1968

Special Forces Group, General Aviation Support to the II Corps Tactical Zone, and Direct aviation Support to the 3/506th, 401st Airborne Division at Ia Drang. On 26 April one platoon, complete with supporting maintenance elements, was placed in direct support of the 522nd Combat Aviation Battalion in the central highlands.

(j) Operations of the 134th Assault Helicopter Company
The 134th AHC was placed under operational control of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion on 1 April to participate in Operations Rolling and Walker in support of the 173rd Airborne Brigade (SFB). Four UH-1Hs and 2 UH-1Cs are mission ready on a continuous basis to provide support to each of the operations. Since 1 April the 134th AHC has been in direct support of the 273rd Airborne Brigade. Administrative and logistical support remain with the 268th Combat Aviation Battalion.

(k) Operational results as of the 30th of April 1968 (see inclusion 2)

(3) Training activities: Formalized training by all units was conducted approximately 12% of the time during this quarter. Emphasis by the units is discussed below. Only two units participated in significant troop movements during the quarter. The 61st AHC moved its entire complement to LZ English on 28 February and the 243rd ASHC moved one platoon of aircraft plus supporting maintenance to Pleiku in direct support of the 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion.

(a) 61st Assault Helicopter Company
1. The majority of the training activities have been concerned with in-country checkrides and orientation flights for newly arrived personnel. In addition to the pilot training, enlisted crews were given an orientation in aerial gunnery techniques, crew duties, and standard operation procedures.
2. A formal program of instruction for all personnel armed with the M-16 rifle was initiated in April.

(b) 92nd Assault Helicopter Company
1. The majority of the training activities have been flight training to include initial orientation rides, ninety day standardized rides, instructor pilot training, and transition training from the UH-1H to the UH-1C model helicopter.
2. Aviators were instructed in the proper method of operation and orientation of the U.C.-10 emergency transmitter receiver.
3. One hour per month was devoted to safety classes for all aviators. The safety classes included approximately 15 minutes on the subject of survival, escape, and evasion.
4. A series of classes for all officers and warrant officers was conducted on the duties and responsibilities of the Staff Duty Officer. The program of instruction included SOL and authentication procedures, artillery request and illumination procedures, conduct of guard mount, and information on the installation defense plan at the Dong Ba Thin Complex.
5. Classes were conducted by a group of ordnance specialists on 13, 14, and 15 April for the members of the armed platoon. Two hours per day were allocated to instruction in the use of the new warheads for the 2.75 inch rocket and the new proximity fuse. The instruction concluded with a live firing exercise.
6. A one hour class on the preparation of the new Officer Efficiency Report was conducted for all commissioned officers.
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(c) 192nd Assault Helicopter Company

1. Instruction was given in the art of performing night hunter missions. In the interest of safety and due to the experience gained by the night hunter teams in the use of their equipment the minimum speed for the helicopter has been set at 60 knots.

2. Aviator training in March and April was concentrated mainly on completion of ninety day checkrides and instrument proficiency and on-the-job training in the company and detachments.

3. Non-aviator training has stressed weapons proficiency and on-the-job training in the company and detachments.

4. Classes were conducted on 15 April for the members of the armed platoon. The instruction included an orientation on the new 2.75 inch rocket warheads and proximity fuse and concluded with a live fire exercise.

(d) 281st Assault Helicopter Company

1. The majority of the training activities have been flight training to include initial orientation rides, ninety day standardization rides and aircraft commander check rides.

2. Newly assigned personnel have been given extensive instruction on the special techniques required in the infiltration and exfiltration of ground reconnaissance teams.

3. Classes were conducted on 15 April for the members of the armed platoon. The instruction included an orientation on the new 2.75 inch rocket warheads and proximity fuse and concluded with a live fire exercise.

4. Officers and enlisted men received instructions on survival and first aid from B-52, 5th Special Forces Group.

(e) 196th Assault Support Helicopter Company

1. The unit has revitalized its flight standardization training to include a monthly standardization meeting for aviators. Training has been extended to include daily informal and individual training between missions with the crews aboard the aircraft.

2. Bi-weekly servicing and familiarization of individual weapons has been instituted. Included in the training program is an orientation and familiarization for newly arrived personnel.

3. Two enlisted personnel are presently attending engine and airframe mechanics school at Vung Tau.

(f) 243rd Assault Support Helicopter Company

1. The majority of training activities were concerned with the operational training of replacement maintenance personnel and flight training on newly assigned aviators.

2. The unit has conducted weekly training of all assigned personnel in M-16, M-19, and M-60 weapons plus aviation safety, escape and evasion and emergency first aid.

(g) Chemical: None

(h) Paywar: None

(i) Other: None

(j) Logistics

1. The major logistics efforts during this reporting period have been directed toward:

(a) Eliminating excess equipment on hand in the subordinate units.

(b) Reduction of conex inventory.

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Operational Report for Period Ending 30 April 1968

(c) Improvement of motor maintenance and supply operation.
(d) Dong Ba Thin perimeter improvement.
(e) Establishing POL facilities.
(f) Ensuring property accountability.
(g) Support of outlying units.

(2) POL Support: The bulk of the battalion's miniport equipment is emplaced with the 61st Assault Helicopter Company at LZ English. The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion is providing the pump, filter separator, hoses, and nozzles. Fuel storage bladders are provided by the FSA. The equipment on hand is inadequate to provide desired refueling capacity at more than one location. Support from Qui Nhon Support Command has been negligible other than for JP4 storage.

(3) Assistance visits: Assistance visits continued in the motor maintenance area. Checklist and reference material in the areas of unit supply, property accountability, ammunition, POL, unit messes and other areas of SH interest are being updated and revised. Assistance visits in these areas will be resumed in the near future.

(h) A shortage continues to exist in body armor (chest protectors), emergency radios (UH-10), proper size ballistic helmets, and caliber 30 pistols. Although on requisition these items have not been received in sufficient quantities.

(5) Units within the battalion have encountered a high usage rate of short shafts, input quills, tail rotor blades, main rotor blades, tachometer generators, and pilots attitude indicators. The requirement to inspect tail rotor hubs every 100 hours is causing excess down time at Periodic Inspections. The direct exchange system is unsatisfactory as the Direct Support Company does not continuously maintain tail rotor hubs on hand.

(6) Complying with the required availability of aircraft is becoming more difficult daily. Parts fill continues to be a problem due to the delay of receipt of EDPs of 10-15 days. Extensive controlled cannibalization has satisfactorily resolved the problem to date.

(7) All aircraft in the assigned units have again exceeded the allotted flying hour program while continuing to maintain a satisfactory percentage of availability. The following chart is the quarterly summary of maintenance data on the flying hour program, February through April:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>61st A/C</th>
<th>92nd A/C</th>
<th>192nd A/C</th>
<th>281st A/C</th>
<th>196th A/C</th>
<th>243rd A/C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TYPE A/C</td>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>UH-47</td>
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<tr>
<td>AV NO A/C ASGN</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>16.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>&amp; FLYABLE</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; NORS</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; NORM</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>39.8</td>
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<td>6722</td>
<td>5521</td>
<td>2993</td>
<td>3697</td>
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<td>1580</td>
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<td>1600</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>816</td>
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<tr>
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<td>165.7</td>
<td>105.4</td>
<td>128.5</td>
<td>128.1</td>
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<td>81.4</td>
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<td>63.6</td>
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<td>PER MO</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Operational Report for Period Ending 30 April 1968

(8) Aircraft Status as of 30 April 1968 (see inclosure 3)

e. (U) Civil Affairs

(1) The Civil Affairs program has continued to function in an outstanding manner. Local churches and orphanages in the Dong Ba Thin area have been adequately cared for. During the past quarter a total of 9750 board feet of lumber, 2500 pounds of food, and 760 pounds of health items were contributed to the various missions, orphanages, schools and prisons throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone by units of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion. A total of 16,800 piasters was contributed to the Tet relief fund.

(2) The 92nd Assault Helicopter Company recently received a forced issue of Class 1 Supplies. All items were in excess of unit's needs and a portion of each were donated to the local orphanage along with 2500 gallons of potable water.

(3) The 192nd Assault Helicopter Company acting as a part of the 3/506 Task Force has joined efforts on behalf of the Vietnamese people of Phan Thiet and environs by placing at the disposal of the S-5 all building materials not usable by the unit.

(4) The 196th Assault Support Helicopter Company provided funds through donations for local Vietnamese women to attend a teachers school at Qui Nhon.

(5) The 516th Medical Detachment has opened a clinic to all Vietnamese. Treatment includes pediatrics, adult medicine, and acute trauma.

f. (U) Personnel

(1) Current requirements make it necessary to utilize rated aviators to fill positions that could be filled by non-rated personnel. These positions are necessary ones that are essential to the successful operation of a headquarters at battalion level or higher. At company level, in addition to already authorized unit supply technician, an administrative officer could be classified in the same category. The use of non rated personnel in these various positions would allow a rated officer to return to his primary duty and alleviate the lack of aviators qualified to perform flight. Most of these positions are non TOE, however, in view of the fact that they are essential to the operation, the use of non rated personnel would be an economical solution to the problem.

(2) Infusion continues to be a problem. Approximately 860 personnel, 49% of the battalion, are scheduled for Deros during the months of October and November 1968. This includes 51% of the enlisted and 41% of the officer strengths. The breakdown of units having the majority of losses is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
<th>NOVEMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>61st AHC</td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92nd AHC</td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192nd AHC</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243rd ASHC</td>
<td></td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) The units assigned to the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion are still experiencing a critical shortage of aviators and in some cases
AVGD-AA
Operational Report for Period Ending 30 April 68

there are not enough commissioned officers to fill the command positions.

(a) Unit Strengths as of 30 April 1968:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subordinate Unit</th>
<th>Officer Auth</th>
<th>Officer O/H</th>
<th>WO Auth</th>
<th>WO O/H</th>
<th>EM Auth</th>
<th>EM O/H</th>
<th>TOTAL Auth</th>
<th>TOTAL O/H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>61st AHC</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td>152</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>204</td>
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<tr>
<td>616th TC DET</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>922nd SIG DET</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>192nd AHC</td>
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g. (U). Artillery: None
h. (U). Other

(1) Information Officer
(a) The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion Public Information Program continues to be active in providing coverage of the Dong Ba Thin Complex and the forward areas.
(b) A summary of the battalion news releases is as follows:
Feature Articles------------------18
Pictorial Releases------------------15
Operational Report for Period Ending 30 April 1966

Hometown News Releases-------------------------------150
Formal Press Interviews-----------------------------0
(c) The Battalion continues to utilize the MI0 capabilities of
higher headquarters to cover important events.
(2) Signal
(a) The major projects which took place during this period were:
1. Installation of switchboard facility, AN/MTC-1, at Lane
Army Airfield
2. Establishment of radio-teletypewriter not using AN/VSC-2 with 61st
AHC at LZ English and the 192nd AHC at Phan Thiet
(b) Discussion of accomplishments
1. The switchboard AN/MTC-1 replaced 4 SB-22 and 1 SB-86. The
five switchboards at Lane Army Airfield created a cumbersome, un-
necessarily complicated switching facility. These small, separate
boards were replaced with a larger, integrated unit, permitting all
communication land lines to be centralized in one location and resulted
in faster switching capabilities and improved telephone service.
Duplicitous functions of switchboard personnel were eliminated, however,
ironically there is a shortage of qualified individuals to operate the
new switching facilities efficiently. The encumbrance upon assigned
units to furnish men to operate this switchboard suggests the need for
a signal service unit to operate and maintain the new landline commu-
nication system.
2. During March this unit received 2 each AN/VSC-2 radio-
teletypewriters which expanded this battalion's on-line crypto capability
on a reliable basis between battalion headquarters, the 192nd AHC, 61st
AHC, and the forward location at LZ English. Prior to this innovation
teletype traffic was passed either via indirect or time consuming means.
The performance of the AN/VSC-2 had been highly satisfactory until 1
April at which time the set at Phan Thiet became inoperative and has re-
mained in that status ever since that time due to the lack of available
repair parts. This inoperability has caused the necessity for add-
itional secure means of teletype contact with the 192nd and therefore
a request has been submitted to utilize existing land lines for this
purpose. Assuming approval of this request and repair of the
malfunctioning unit of the AN/VSC-2, this headquarters will have both
primary and alternate teletype communications with the 192nd AHC.
2. Section II Lessons Learned: Commander’s Observation, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

Personnel

Non-rated Supply Officer and Maintenance Technician

(a) OBSERVATION: TCS 1-258F does not authorize the CH-47 units a Unit Supply Technician or an Aircraft Repair Technician. Augmentation of present AS to include slots for personnel mentioned above would greatly enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of these units.

(b) EVALUATION: The mission, maintenance complexities, and supply problems of a CH-47 Company are of such a nature that the personnel requirements for aviators becomes a paramount concern at the present time. Even though the TCS does not authorize positions for the MOS 671B and 761A the requirements of these positions must still be met. The units have had to utilize aviators that could otherwise be performing their primary mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That TCS 1-258F be augmented to include position slots for MOS 671B and 761A.

Operations

(1) Efficient employment of the CH-47

(a) OBSERVATION: It is increasingly apparent that most ground units do not know how to properly and efficiently employ the CH-47.

(b) EVALUATION: Many of the missions assigned to medium helicopters are much more suitable to utility helicopters in size and weight. This mission assignment is directly related to the unfamiliarity of the ground commander with the capabilities and limitations of each type aircraft and the type loads of each. There is little standardization among the employing units as to what the aircraft are capable of and when it is advantageous to utilize one type over the other.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Chapter 6 of the 1st Aviation Brigade Manual be expanded to give detailed information on utilization and ground operations with reference to the medium helicopter. Recommend publication of an extract of the manual and distribution be made to all echelons of command utilizing helicopter type support.

(2) Gunship tactics in densely populated areas

(a) OBSERVATION: During the period 1-14 February while supporting D.I.T., most of the hits received by the gunships were from the sides and from locations other than that under attack.

(b) EVALUATION: When attacking targets within the periphery of a city or large village the armed helicopter should utilize the highest approach angle possible. This is necessary to further decrease the enemy's
anti-aircraft effectiveness. Normally the enemy located in a city is spread out and not confined to one area or specific location. Gunships attacking in a lower than necessary flight path are unwittingly increasing the chances of taking hits.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That serious consideration be given to incorporating the use of high attack angles in gunship aerial fire support in densely populated areas.

(3) Gunship cover for people sniffer missions

(a) OBSERVATION: On many occasions, due to the nature of the terrain and the mission itself, the slick has, of necessity, made rapid and sharp turns and has evaded or "lost" the gunship cover.

(b) EVALUATION: When providing gunship cover for low level people sniffer missions a successfully tried method for providing adequate cover is to position the lead gunship 750-1000 meters behind and to the side of the slick. The second gunship should be about 1000 meters behind the lead and 300-500 feet higher in altitude. In this manner the second gunship can provide cover to both the slick and lead gunship and also be in a position to observe evading maneuvers or rapid turns that the slick may make, inform the lead gunship of the slick's direction, and provide continuous cover to the slick at this crucial time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the tactic discussed here be reviewed as a possible method of gunship cover and possible inclusion in aerial fire support instruction.

(4) Repair and replacement parts

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to the excessive overflying of the flying hour program and the difficulty in obtaining replacement items all units are low or repair parts.

(b) EVALUATION: Receipt of TF's continue to take 10-15 days. Parts fill of replacement items for AS-2 slab often become NDPs before received. Units are encountering a high usage rate of short shafts, input quills, tail rotor blades, main rotor blades, tachometer generators, and pilots attitude indicators. The requirement to inspect tail rotor hubs every 100 hours is causing excessive dow time at periodic inspections. Direct support companies do not maintain tail rotor hubs on a continuous basis and makes the Direct Exchange System unsatisfactory in this regard.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a survey of the current supply system be conducted with a view toward upgrading the efficiency of said system, making the system more responsive to the needs of the supported units, and assigning higher priorities to the more heavily committed units.

(5) ISEA II Corps Aviation Support
(c) OBSERVATION: Numerous after mission reports have indicated a trend toward increased duty blade time in supporting the senior advisors in the various provinces.

(b) EVALUATION: It is evident that the supported personnel are not utilizing their aviation assets effectively or efficiently. The primary reason for this development is the lack of a definite schedule for the support once it has been authorized. By preplanning these missions, more effective utilization can be obtained and better support can be rendered.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the advisors be enjoined to program their activities for each day's tasks and brief the supporting crew on arrival.

c. Training: None

d. Intelligence: None

e. Logistics

(1) Unserviceable, limited quantity equipment

(a) OBSERVATION: In recent weeks ground units have been using unserviceable equipment and a limited quantity of serviceable equipment to external loads for the Chinook.

(b) EVALUATION: A number of dropped loads during this reporting period has indicated the need for an immediate investigation of sling rigging equipment in the hands of supported units. Faulty equipment has been responsible for several dropped loads. In addition, many ground units have only a limited quantity of serviceable equipment on hand. Many times aircraft have had to wait for ground personnel to break down rigging on a load in order that the straps, clevis, and donut could be used for the next load. Valuable time is wasted during these delays.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That survey be conducted to determine the shortages in serviceable equipment and that all efforts be made to restock this equipment in the supported units' inventory.

(2) Establishment of field refueling sites

(a) OBSERVATION: The equipment needed to provide rapid refueling in forward areas is lacking.

(b) EVALUATION: The present 100 gpm pumps do not give the rapid refueling capability needed in the forward areas. In order to reduce the turn around time, a critical item in airborne operations, adequate miniport equipment must be on hand in each unit and further designated in the TOE.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That one each 350 gpm, 8 port miniport per company and two per battalion be included as standard equipment and incorporated into future TOE's.

f. Organization: None

g. Other: None
Operational Report for Period Ending 30 April 1968

3 Incl
1. Organizational Chart
2. Operational Statistics
3. Aircraft Status

DISTRIBUTION (U)
3 CYS TO: 17TH CAG
3 CYS TO: DCG, USARV
2 CYS TO: CIRCUSARPAC
2 CYS TO: CG, 1ST AVN BDE

Marion F. England
LTG, ARMY
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGD-60 (12 May 68) 1st Ind


Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group, APO 95240 25 May 1968

TO: Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam, APO 96350

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. (C) The following comments and recommendations on Section I and II are submitted for review and/or approval.

   a. Reference item concerning shortage of Radio Set AN/URC-10, Section I, para 1, d, (4), page 7: Concur.

   b. Reference item concerning Manual Telephone Central Office, AN/MTC-1, Section I, para 1, h, (2), (a), 1 and (b), 1: Concur. Comment concerning need for signal service elements is not considered appropriate for entry into this document and will be processed separately. This headquarters assisted in obtaining the MTC-1 for installation at Lone Army Airfield based upon assurance that operators were available within on hand resources and that maintenance assistance would be available from the 453rd Signal BN (CA). If the MTC-1 cannot now be managed within the resources of the 10th CAB, they will be encouraged to submit a request for an MTOS augmentation with appropriate justification.

   c. Reference item concerning Radio Teletypewriter Set, AN/VSC-2, Section I, para 1, h, (2), (a) and (b), 2, page 10: Concur.

   d. Reference item concerning Non-rated Supply Officer and Maintenance Technician, Section II para 2, a: Concur. Recommend the unit submit an MTOS if the present organization cannot efficiently accomplish its mission.

   e. Reference item concerning Efficient Employment of the CH-47, Section II, para 2, b, (1) and USA II Corps Avn Support, Section II, para b, (5): Concur with the problem. The 17th CAG is presently implementing an orientation program to be presented to the ground unit commanders throughout II CTZ. This program will consist of conferences, lectures, demonstrations and practical exercises on the capabilities and limitations of the various army aircraft; responsibilities of the ground and air mission commanders in an air mobile exercise; proper procedures of
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGD-SC (12 May 68)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

rigging loads for aircraft transport and airmobile mission planning and execution. The program will be supplemented with hand-out material to expand on the oral presentation. It is hoped that such an orientation will provide a basic understanding of the army aviation assets thus allowing for a more efficient aircraft utilization with a corresponding reduction of hours flown to accomplish the same mission.

f. Reference item concerning Gunship tactics in densely populated areas, Section II, b, (2): Non-concur. During a gun run, the higher the altitude of the aircraft, the longer period the aircraft is observed and exposed to enemy fire. This is extremely dangerous in areas where antiaircraft weapons are employed. Information received this headquarters indicates that the tactics now being employed by the AH-1G Cobra are similar to those described in the initial observation; however, the AH-1G is faster and due to improved weapon sights can engage a target at a much greater range.

g. Reference item concerning Gunship cover for People sniffer aircraft, Section II, para 2, b, (3): Non-concur. The lead gunship should be to the right or left not more than 250 to 300 meters and approximately 100 to 200 feet higher than the sniffer aircraft. The second gunship should be 200 to 300 feet higher and positioned behind and to the right or left so that he can always observe both aircraft and react to enemy fire.

h. Reference item concerning Repair and replacement parts, Section II, para b, (4): Concur. The aircraft parts supply system has been under intensive evaluation for several weeks. The system is undergoing change now. Changes include, increased use of transceiver and centralized control of Qui Nhon Depot stocks at ANCC in Saigon. These changes have been in effect only a few days, within thirty days, an evaluation should be made to determine if further changes are necessary.

i. Reference item concerning Unserviceable, Limited quantity equipment, Section II, part: Concur. The IFFV program initiated to conserve Army aviation assets called for the increased use of sling loads as the preferred mod of helicopter cargo delivery.
AVCD-3L (12 May 68)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

j. Reference item concerning establishment of field refueling sites, Section II, para e, (2): Concur. Recommend NTCE action be initiated by the unit.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
JERAI M. GOOCH
LT, AGC
Adjutant
AVFA-GC-OT (12 May 68) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for
Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 8 JUN 1968

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96307

Concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ROBERT C. GABBARD
11th AGC
A1G, ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copy furnished:
17th Cbt Avn Gp
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBA-C (12 May 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for
Period Ending 30 April 1968, ROS CGFCR-65 (KL) (U)

Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384 JUN 25 1968

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: CGTOP-07, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This Headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

2. (C) The following additional comment is considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 1f(2), page 8. Group commanders have the primary responsibility for infusion from within their own resources. 1st Aviation Brigade will monitor the entire infusion program within the Brigade, coordinate infusion between units from different groups, and identify to USARV problem areas which cannot be resolved from resources within the Brigade.

b. Paragraph 2a, page 11 and paragraph 2d, 1st Indorsement. The Phase II Standardization TOS/TOTE L-258G authorizes two Aircraft Repair Technicians, ROS 67150. A requirement for a T60A Supply Technician was not considered.

c. Paragraph 2b(1), page 11 and paragraph 2e, 1st Indorsement. A USARV Manual for the Utilization and Employment of the CH-47 and CH-54 is being prepared. Distribution is planned for all units in RVN which are supported by CH-47 and CH-54 aircraft.

d. Paragraph 2h(5), page 12. Aviation commanders have a responsibility to their supported units to advise and assist in proper utilization of aviation assets. 1st Aviation Brigade will insure that subordinate commanders are so informed.

e. Paragraph 2e(1), page 13 and paragraph 2i, 1st Indorsement. USARV has a requirement at this time for units to determine the quantities of the various kinds of slings required in the coming year. In addition, 12 X 12 foot nylon/net slings are now being distributed to all 1st Aviation Brigade units. These net slings were procured under the ESURE program.
AVBA-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Combat Aviation Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

f. Paragraph 2e(2), page 13 and paragraph 2j, 1st Indorsement. Current MTOE's do not include this equipment, however, this recommendation will be given strong consideration in future MTOE actions by 1st Aviation Brigade.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JOHN D. MIXSELL, JR.
CPT. AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. Concur with report as submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ 1st Avn Bde
HQ 10th Cbt Avn Bn
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 10th Cbt Avn Bn for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Ass'Lt AG
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*Reported type below*

- 61st AHC Aircraft Loss: 2 UH-1H, Aircraft Damage 12 UH-1C, 5 UH-1H
- 92nd AHC Aircraft Loss: 1 UH-1C, Aircraft Damage 10 UH-1C, 7 UH-1H
- 192nd AHC Aircraft Loss: 2 UH-1H, Aircraft Damage 18 UH-1C, 1 UH-1D, 3 UH-1H
- 281st AHC Aircraft Loss: 2 UH-1C, 6 UH-1H, Aircraft Damage 16 UH-1C, 10 UH-1H
- 196th ASHC Aircraft Damage: 6 UH-1H
- 213rd ASHC Aircraft Damage: 4 CH-47
- 134th AHC Aircraft Damage: 2 UH-1H

| Hours Flown | 5895 | 7415 | 6900 | 1479 | 2901 | 3829 | 1672 | 647 |

| Total       | 33768|
## AWD-4A Operational Report for Period ending 30 April 1968

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**CONFIDENTIAL**
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion**

- **Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 April 1968**

**CO, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion**

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