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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (6 Aug 68) FOR OT RD 682183 22 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

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  US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
  25th Infantry Division Artillery
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

LOCATION: Vicinity Cu Chi (XT 647 143), RVN

1. Significant Organizational Activities: During the course of the quarter the 25th Infantry Division Artillery continued its mission of support of the Division's dry season campaign. The specific mission of Division Artillery was to provide supporting fires to US maneuver elements in the Division Tactical Area of Operational Responsibility and to provide General Support for Government of Vietnam Forces in the military pacification. During the period 1 February to 30 April 1968, the Division Artillery provided support for five major operations. These were operations YELLOWSTONE, SARATOGA, QUIET THANG, WILDERNESS, and TAN THAN. Operations YELLOWSTONE and SARATOGA began during the preceding quarter and their opening gambits are discussed in the 25th Infantry Division ORLL for that quarter.

This was a two brigade operation involving the 1st and 3d Brigades. The 7th Bn, 11 Artillery was direct support to the first brigade with its fires reinforced by the 3d Bn, 13 Arty (-). The 2d Bn, 77th Arty was in direct support to the 3d Brigade with its fires reinforced by the remaining battery of the 3d Bn 13th Arty. The enemy's TET offensive began 30-31 January 1968, requiring the redeployment of the 1st and 3d Brigade elements. By 24 February operational YELLOWSTONE had terminated and all 1st and 3d Brigade elements were committed to Operation SARATOGA in the Southern TAOI.

Operation SARATOGA (6 Dec 67 - 10 Mar 68): This operation was previously discussed in the ORLL dated 1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68 and was directed at the military pacification of the Southern TAOI. Division elements taking part were the three battalions of the 2d Brigade supported by the 1st Bn, 8th Arty in conjunction with the 5th and 25th ARVN Divisions. However, initiation of the TET Offensive by VC and NVA Forces required a major redeployment of units from other areas of the TACI in to the South. On 6 Feb half of the divided assets of 3d Brigade were committed to operation SARATOGA and the TAN SIV Nhut - HOC NON area. The remaining half followed...
Upon termination of Operation YELLOWSTONE on 16 Feb 68, at this time, artillery support in this area was provided by the 1st Bn, 8th Arty, reinforced by one battery of the 6th Bn, 77th Arty and one battery of the 3d Bn, 13th Arty. By 20 Feb, all elements of the 2d Bn, 77th Arty and an additional battery of the 3d Bn, 13th Arty were deployed in the Saigon Area. During this period of the TET Offensive, Division Artillery formulated and initiated a defense against rocket and mortar attack (DARMA) for the TAN SON NHUT area. This consisted of all available target acquisition means, radar, flash intersections from towers, crater analysis, flash intersections from maneuver units, constant aircraft surveillance, plus extensive artillery suppression fires in the rocket belt area, as a counter against the frequent 122mm rocket attack against TAY SON NHUT Air Base.

Upon termination of YELLOWSTONE followed by the termination of SARATOGA on 10 March the situation in the Saigon, TON SON NHUT area and along highway 1 had been stabilized, although considerable VC and NVA activity was still encountered in this area.

Operation QUIET THANG (11 March - 7 April 68) Operation WILDERNESS (11 March - 7 April 68)

These operations were conducted concurrently. The Division mission during QUIET THANG was to destroy NVA/VC forces in zone and to maintain the capability to reinforce TAN SON NHUT Air Base. The 1st Bn 8th Arty, controlling four batteries was assigned the mission of DS to the maneuver elements in the CMB area, with emphasis on the DARMA Plan. Operation WILDERNESS concerned operations in the Northern portion of the IAOI, and security of major base camps and route security. A major realignment of the artillery was conducted during this period. 1st Bn 8th Arty remained in the CMB area, as DS 2nd Bde, 7/11 Arty moves to their base camp location at TAY NHI with the mission of DS 1st Bde. 2nd Bn 77 Arty moved to vicinity base camp location at DAO THIC with the mission and to provide artillery fires for base camp defense. 3rd Bn 13 Arty - moved from the Saigon area to CU CHI, with 2 batteries remaining in the Saigon area reinforcing the fires of 1st Bn 8th Arty.

Operation T0401 THANG (complete victory) 7th April 1968 - continuing.

During the early stages of this operation Division Artillery units continued to provide support from the areas and with the missions as stated in the closing period of operation QUIET THANG. During mid April, however, intelligence indicated that NVA/VC main force units would attempt a major attack on Saigon and the CMB on or about 1 May. Again a major realignment of Division Artillery units was executed to provide
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AVDCA-OP
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned For the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968.

Support for the maneuver elements that were deploying to meet this threat. On 30 April 1968, there were seven artillery batteries located within range of the CMD area. There were only two Division Artillery batteries that were not located within a 20 kilometer radius of the CMD area.

During this reporting period, in order to support the fast-moving tactical situation Division Artillery battery size units have made 221 displacements. Most of the moves were by convoy; however several were by air lift. One battery move was by Air Force fixed-wing to a distance of over 50 kilometers, with further air lift by CH47 of an additional 15 kilometers, in support of a Special Forces CIDG extraction in northern part of War Zone C. Fire Support Bases have frequently been subject to mortar attack, may on a nightly basis. There were no significant ground attacks against artillery Fire Support Bases. During this reporting period the 25th Infantry Division Artillery fired 230,370 105mm rounds, 36,174 155mm rounds, and 11,920 8" rounds for a total expenditure of 288,470 rounds.
2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. PERSONNEL:

(1) ECONOMIC USE OF PERSONNEL

(a) OBSERVATION: Continuous split operations compounded with a high rotation rate causes a higher demand for FDC personnel than that indicated by the TO&E.

(b) EVALUATION: During base camp and separate battery operations only the battery command post and FDC receive frequent calls from outside sources.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Establish the switchboard at the command post and cross train the battery clerks, battery commanders driver, and battery radio as radio-telephone and switchboard operators.

b. OPERATIONS:

(1) IMPROVISED RADIO-WIRE INTEGRATION

(a) OBSERVATION: When firing batteries displace from base camp to forward locations for combat, all TO/E radios must accompany the units. Therefore no direct contact is possible with the rear elements or staff sections until land lines are installed.

(b) EVALUATION: Permanent installation of one radio RT-524/VRC with its components and control radio set GRA-39 with the switchboard SB-22PB in the rear area would provide immediate and continuous communication through a network of switchboard circuits. See II.CLOSURE 1.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That one radio RT 524/VRC with control radio set GRA-39 be authorized by TOE and installed with the battalion rear switchboard.

(2) OPERATIONAL REPORTS (S2/S3)

(a) OBSERVATION: During the tactical operation, the S2/S3 are operating in a field position their administrative functions interfere with their tactical operation.

(b) EVALUATION: During operations the S2/S3 administrative load increases two fold. In order to preclude this conflict, adequate work space should be provided in a separate area.
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SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The battalions should utilize the M109 van for the S2/S3 office positioning the S2 safes and S3 record file to afford a place for the operations officer to prepare reports as required.

(3) FDC COMMUNICATION WITH EACH HOWITZER SECTION.

(a) OBSERVATION: A means is needed whereby all howitzer section personnel can hear fire commands from FDC and provide additional checks to preclude errors.

(b) EVALUATION: There are 9 AN-GRA 39A remote sets authorized per firing battery that are vehicular mounted. Since operations in Vietnam usually preclude their use in this manner, they provide an excellent amplification means for fire commands when hooked in series with the gun line telephones in the gun positions and FDC.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Use AN-GRA 39A at each howitzer section to amplify fire commands.

(4) OCCUPATION OF POSITION.

(a) OBSERVATION: The battery commander is seldom able to recon a new battery position before the battery occupies the position.

(b) EVALUATION: Reconnaissance and selection of artillery position areas are usually accomplished on a higher level than the battery, due to limited availability of aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All personnel must be well trained in occupation of battery area. Plans for position areas must be standardized as much as possible.

(5) REPLOT RANGE WITH FADAC.

(a) OBSERVATION: When the M-18's polar replot function is employed, the range displayed is the firing table range corresponding to the last elevation fired. This will be in error by a distance corresponding to the registration correction if a registration has been entered into the computer.

(b) EVALUATION: Two methods of removing this error are available to the operator.

1. Enter the battery center as an observer. Whenever a polar replot is desired recall the observer (D-4) and then use survey (D-5) type 3. The range and azimuth from the battery center to the last grid fired will be displayed.

2. After each registration compute and enter a muzzle velocity which zeros the registration range correction for that charge in accordance with the procedures discussed in paragraph 14, "USAAFS Fire Control and Coordination Letter 5 FADAC." When this has been done, the polar replot range will be the true range to the target.
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The second method is the most desirable. However, when a series of registrations have been fired, a situation requiring a polar re-plot may occur before all current muzzle velocities are computed and entered.

(a) RECOMMENDATION: It is therefore recommended to set up the computer with the grid of the battery center entered as an observer to insure the capability of obtaining correct data.

(6) REFINEMENT OF MAP SPOTTED BATTERY LOCATION

(a) OBSERVATION: In many areas of Vietnam, particularly those areas where land clearing operations have been conducted, it is often impossible to obtain, either timely surveyed coordinates or an accurate map spot. Direction can be established the first day by a sun spot.

(b) EVALUATION: The location problem can be solved, provided the following is obtained,

(1) Accurate directional control

(2) Several valid registrations conducted on points identified on the map, and on the ground.

(3) Concurrent NATO and computer met messages.

(c) PROCEDURES:

a. Precision registrations are conducted using standard techniques.

b. After each registration, the orienting angle is measured and the adjusted deflection and azimuth are computed.

c. The FADAC net deflection correction is determined and applied to each registration point as determined above.

(1) Enter the assumed battery coordinates as observed.

(2) Using the survey function (D-5) type 3, determine the azimuth from this battery center to each registration point.

d. Assume that zero corrections (H-7) have been applied.

e. With the concurrent met in the computer, determine the deflection to the registration point.

f. The difference between the deflection corresponding to the azimuth determined in (2) and the computed deflection is attributed to net. This correction is then applied to the measured azimuth to deter-
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mine the azimuth to the registration point. Example:

Azimuth corresponding to measured orienting angle 2500
Net deflection correction L-6
Azimuth to registration point 2506

g. Using the registration points as observers, the backward azimuths of those obtained in 4-f above, and survey type 2 determine the battery location by intersecting from each pair of observers, and determining the mean of all grids obtained.

h. Enter this mean as the battery grid and repeat steps c to g until results of successive approximations of azimuths to registration points agree to within one mil. The final grid is assumed to be the base piece location.

(7) DETERMINATION OF FADAC GFT SETTINGS FOR MANUAL COMPUTATIONS THROUGH 6400 MILS.

(A) OBSERVATION: Frequently a situation may require that many, or all missions be fired out of the transfer limits of the registration points. The following procedures, and the attached forms have proven of value.

(B) EVALUATION;

(i) When the FADAC is non-operational for a short period (ie changing generators) and the mission is received of such urgency that it precludes, either waiting on the FADAC, or computations of the data to the target using conventional Net and VE techniques. By using these GFT settings, all data fired manually is FADAC data.

(ii) When performing a manual check of FADAC data and the deviation exceeds prescribed tolerances, it can be quickly determined whether the difference is due to net effects or FADAC operator error. Immediately after registration, the attached form is completed for each charge. Information noted (INCLOSURE 2) "A" is obtained from FADAC, and "0" from the manual chart. Azimuth limits are entered 400 mils left and right of the registration point, and then every 800 mils. The FADAC azimuth to the registration point, or check point (CP) A is determined and entered. The battery center is entered as an observer. A GFT setting is established every 800 mils, using the azimuth to the CP, the FADAC range to the registration point and the polar plot mission(2r) function. After firing data is computed, the deflection is compared to the chart deflection.
and a deflection correction taken in each octant. The GFT setting is established using the chart range to the registration point and the computers time and quadrant. The form is covered by acetate and items marked 0 are updated with each subsequent Met. As time permits, all data should be checked by a manual met, applied with wind cards.

(3) Until recently, this system was of little value, as manual data computed to the registration point did not differ from FADAC by more than the allowed 6 mils deflection, 0.6 seconds in time, and 6 mils in quadrant throughout 64000 mils. However, during the month of April, we began experiencing significant wind effects in charqs 6 and 7, and this system has shown itself to be of great potential in reconciling the differences between FADAC data and that derived through manual techniques.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That the above procedures be adopted for determining GFT settings for manual computations through 64000 mils.

v. TRAINING

(1) CROSS TRAINING OF BATTERY PERSONNEL

(a) OBSERVATION. A firing battery under attack often sustains casualties in the gun sections.

(b) EVALUATION: NONE

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All firing battery personnel should be crossed trained in ammunition handling and the higher number cannonier jobs.

(2) LACK OF CARGO VEHICLES

(a) OBSERVATION: The large quantity of ammunition and bunker building material that must be carried by a direct support artillery battalion is causing gross overloading of available vehicles.

(b) EVALUATION: NONE

(c) RECOMMENDATION: An additional 5 ton truck per battery to haul bunker material would give each unit more flexibility and decrease the damage to organic vehicles due to overloading.

d. INTELLIGENCE:

(1) TARGET ACQUISITION REQUIREMENT:

(a) OBSERVATION: A serious need exists for additional target
acquisition means within the division.

(b) EVALUATION: Locating the enemy remains the greatest problem confronting our forces in Vietnam. The present target acquisition capability of this division cannot adequately cover the division's huge TAOI. The requirement of protecting large base camps in addition to tactical positions has further compounded the problem. The TAOI is large enough to accommodate a corps, if not a field army, and it is estimated that division artillery alone needs three additional AH/IFS-25 radars to meet its surveillance requirements. Continual enemy infiltration prior to recent offensives and the enemy's attack on outlying positions are further indications of the need for additional target acquisition means. The enemy has also been able to consistently sustain rocket and mortar attacks on our positions. Additional flash ranging and counter battery capabilities are needed to meet the enemy threat.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that a target acquisition battery minus the sound ranging platoon be attached to Division Artillery. The assignment of a PATAB to Field Force Artillery would be an alternative solution to the problem.

e. LOGISTICS:

(1) ISSUE OF SHELL HE BY LOT NUMBER

(a) OBSERVATION: Batteries at times have received mixed lots of HE ammunition making it difficult to maintain a completely registered lot.

(b) EVALUATION: Each battery should have more than one lot so that suspension of a particular lot will not cause the battery to be called out of action. However each battery should have at least one registration lot. The firing battery could expend between 100-200 rounds to register six charges. Thus, the registration lot should consist of a minimum of several hundred rounds.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The S4 at battalion level should maintain a card file system which encompasses daily expenditures and issue by lot to insure maximum effective control over distribution of large lots.

(2) LUBRICATION OF HOWITZER M101A1:

(a) OBSERVATION: When the authorized lubrication oil, GAA amendment #1, is used to lubricate the elevation arcs on the howitzer M101A1 the dust combines with the lubricant to form an extremely abrasive paste.
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10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

(b) EVALUATION: None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Use a lighter lubricant which combines less freely with dust.

(3) DUNNAGE AND COVER FOR CLASS V SUPPLIES

(a) Units in the field often find that they have inadequate material to cover Class V or place it on dunnage.

(b) EVALUATION: When a battery is supplied entirely by air, the normal dunnage and cover in the form of ammunition boxes and plastic sheets are removed in order to reduce weight.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the battalion ammunition sections include 4 - 6 pieces of 4" x 4" lumber and the plastic in which artillery ammunition is shipped.

f. ORGANIZATION:

(1) Service Battery Requirement.

(a) OBSERVATION: Divisional artillery battalions organized under the Road TO&E are not able to sustain themselves logistically during prolonged combat operations away from base camp.

(b) EVALUATION: The TOE's provide neither sufficient personnel nor equipment to properly handle the ammunition resupply problem and keep up with the logistical requirements of arty batteries. This problem becomes even more apparent when the batteries occupy widely separated field locations. This Division is fortunate in having a non divisional 105mm howitzer battalion attached to it which has an organic service battery. It has been found that this battalion is capable of supporting itself under almost all combat conditions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A service battery similar in design to that of a non divisional battalions should be added to each divisional battalion.

g. SANITATION:

(1) FIELD URINALS

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been observed that sinking a tube into the ground hoping that urine will be absorbed by the soil is not satisfactory after the first few days.

(c) EVALUATION: An expedient means is needed to increase
the area over which the urine may be absorbed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A solution to the problem is to dig a 3' x 3' x 3' hole, fill it 1/3 to 2/3's full of empty beer and soda cans, put a metal tube along the cans, cover them with screen, and fill the remainder with dirt.

3. COVER AND CONCEALMENT

In Vietnam artillerymen have found that concealment of battery position yield few of its traditional advantages and pose many tactical problems to both the primary mission of providing fire support and the secondary mission of self defense. With no enemy air to contend with, the need for overhead concealment and camouflage is nonexistent, woods and hedgerows not only limit a battery's 6400 mils firing capability in the support role, it quite possibly can provide the enemy an unobserved avenue of approach.

There is, however, one extremely important consideration for concealment of fire support bases (FSPB) in Vietnam. That is to locate undetected alternate gun positions along key avenues of approach into the FSPB. These positions can be occupied during the hours of darkness or during attacks upon the FSPB. Beehive and direct fire HE missions have proven to be extremely effective in support of the FSPB defense plan.

The artilleryman must rely heavily on cover to minimize the effect of enemy fire. This cover is almost never natural, but comes about through planning and a lot of back breaking work. Second only to the laying of the guns in importance, cover, and this means overhead cover as well as cover from direct fire, should be accomplished as soon as possible after occupation. From there on the traditional rule to constantly improve the position should be adhered to. The conventional designs for gun positions and bunkers as taught in the artillery school at Fort Sill, are used in almost all cases. These must be adapted to the terrain and weather with the limitation on how deep they are dug dictated by the ground water level.

3 Incl

as

s/ Gordon Summer, Jr.

GORDON SUMMER, JR.
COL, Arty Commanding

DA, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO San Francisco 96225 24 June 1968

CG, IFFORCEV
ATTN: G-3 (D & T)
APO San Francisco 96266

Basic correspondence forwarded for necessary action/information.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. D. Zeiler
2LT./AG0
Asst. Adjutant
AVFBC-RE-H (18 May 68) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

DA, HQ II FFORCMV, APO San Francisco 96266

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVFBC(DST), APO 96375

Commander, US Army Pacific, ATTN: POP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery and concurs with it with exception of comments contained in para 3 and 4 below.

3. Reference para 2b (1) (c). Nonconcur with recommendation to authorize each artillery battalion rear a TOE R.I.I capacity. Each division signal battalion has five RMI stations authorized which should provide ample division area coverage. The forward artillery elements are authorized to net with these stations, therefore the extra equipment requested cannot be justified.

4. Reference para 2b (3) (c). The primary purpose of the AN/GRA-39 is to permit remote operation of the AN/VRC-12 series radios. At the present time, there is a critical shortage at Headquarters, II FFORCMV for four AN/GRA-39 units to use as remote devices from AN/VRC-12 series radios. If the firing batteries in 25th Infantry Division Artillery have a limited need for their radio remote capability, recommend that the equipment be redistributed to Headquarters, II FFORCMV, where a critical shortage exists. The use of the AN/GRA-39 as a public address system is a secondary capability which should not be TOE essential. If a requirement exists for a loudspeaker, the firing batteries should take action to modify their TOE.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GERALD D. LARKINS
LTC, AGC
DEPT: ADJUTANT GENERAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96275

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division Artillery.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning lack of cargo vehicles, page 8, paragraph 2c(2). Firing batteries of DS artillery battalions are not authorized 5 ton trucks; they are, however, authorized thirteen 2½ ton trucks. Direct support artillery battalions are included in the standardization of units program; the stated problem has not been reported by any other like unit. The requirement to move bunker materials is not of a continuous nature and therefore does not lend itself to a change to authorization documents. Vehicle authorizations for the battalion are considered adequate to support overall requirements.

   b. Reference item concerning lack of cargo vehicles, page 8, paragraph 2c(2): Nonconcur. Battalion size movements are rare in Vietnam. Normally one or two batteries move at a time, frequently by air. In those instances when batteries do make land moves, an additional vehicle can be provided from battalion assets. There is not a daily continuing requirement for an extra cargo vehicle in direct support artillery batteries.

   c. Reference item concerning target acquisition requirement, page 8, paragraph 2d(1). Nonconcur. The AN/MPQ-4 counter mortar radars authorized in each division are newer and better than the AN/MPQ-10 radars authorized in a TA Battery. The flash ranging capability of a TA Battery can be provided from existing personnel assets, using BC scopes obtained thru TDA augmentation for base camp defense.

   d. Reference item concerning a requirement for a service battery for each divisional artillery battalion, page 10, paragraph 2f(1): Nonconcur. The justification offered for the service battery with each artillery battalion is to increase the ability of the battalions to supply ammunition. A check of current TOEs and MTOEs for 105mm divisional and nondivisional battalions indicates that the ammunition resupply capability of each battalion is approximately the same. Therefore, the addition of the service battery cannot be justified.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

e. Reference item concerning cover and concealment, page 11, paragraph 3: Concur. The undetected alternate gun positions along key avenues of approach into the FSPB must be well coordinated with the maneuver commander and provision for security established prior to occupation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy Fum:
HQ 25th Inf Div Arty
HQ II FFORCEV
GPOP-DT (18 May 68) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 25th Inf Div, Arty for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 19 JUL 1968
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
K. F. OSBORN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG
Control Radio Set GRA-39

Switchboard SS-32/PT

Radio RT-524/VRC

INCLOSURE 1
Inclosure 3 to ORLL Report for Quarterly Period ending 30 April 1968.

TASK ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT

1. Organic Units:
   a. 1st Bn (105) 8th Arty
   b. 2d Bn (105) 77th Arty
   c. 3d Bn (155/8") 13th Arty
   d. 6th Bn (105) 77th Arty
   e. 7th Bn (105) 11th Arty

2. Units positioned in 25th Infantry Division TAOR with the mission of GS, 25th Infantry Division Artillery:
   a. 2d Bn (175/8") 32 Arty
   b. 1st Bn (155) 27th Arty (-A & C Btry)
   c. Btry B, 2d Bn (Automatic Weapons) 5th Arty


4. Units under operational control of 25th Infantry Division Artillery: 2d Bn (105) 40th Arty (-A Btry) from 1 April 1968 to 9 April 1968 with mission of GS, 199th LIB.
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division Artillery**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations. 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968

CO, 25th Infantry Division Artillery

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* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

*** Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.