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15 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 29th General Support Group, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal (U)

Deputy Commanding General
US Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHCC-DST
APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief
US Army, Pacific
ATTN: G/OF/OT
APO 96558

(U) The Operational Report of this headquarters for the quarter period ending 30 April 1968 is forwarded in accordance with Department of the Army Regulation 1-19 and US Army Vietnam Regulation 870-2.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROY J. FARMER
MAJ, AGC
Adjutant
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 27TH GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP
APO US FORCES 96491

AVCA SGN SG 0 9 May 1968

OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED
1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968
(RCS-CSFOR-65)
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<tr>
<td>D. LOGISTICS</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. JUDGE ADVOCATE</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THRU:

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Forces Development
    Department of the Army
    Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

A. COMMAND:

(U) The 29th General Support Group was engaged in its operational mission
for 90 days of the reporting period.

B. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

1. (U) The personnel strength of the 29th General Support Group at the
end of the reporting period was as follows:

   a. Authorized (includes augmentation from USASUFCOM, Saigon).

      | OFFICERS | WO | EM | TOTAL |
      |----------|----|----|-------|
      | 279      | 117| 6994| 7390  |

   b. Assigned (includes augmentation from USASUFCOM, Saigon).

      | OFFICERS | WO | EM | TOTAL |
      |----------|----|----|-------|
      | 211      | 99 | 5629| 5939  |

2. (U) The following awards and decorations were processed for members
assigned to HHC, 29th General Support Group during the reporting period.

   a. Legion of Merit: 1

   b. Bronze Star Medal: 3

   c. Army Commendation Medal: 5
3. (U) The RSR spaces to areas indicated below, were utilized by personnel of HHC, 29th General Support Group during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>NO SACES UTILIZED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penang</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. (U) Military police citations were issued to 22 individuals of HHC, 29th General Support Group during the reporting period. Offenses included traffic, off-limits, and curfew violations.

5. (U) Promotions of enlisted personnel assigned to HHC, 29th General Support Group during the reporting period were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To Lay Grade:</th>
<th>E7</th>
<th>E6</th>
<th>E5</th>
<th>E4</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Allocations Received</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of EM Promoted</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. (U) Reenlistment data for HHC, 29th General Support Group during the reporting period:

a. Number of EM who reenlisted: 25

b. Number of EM who redeployed to the CONUS for separation and were eligible for reenlistment: 53
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7. (U) Changes of Key Personnel:

a. COL Thomas J. McDonald, OrdC, replaced COL Milton S. Hochmuth, OrdC, as Group Commander on 6 April 1968.

b. The Executive Officer, LTC Anthony R. Parkovich, QMC, was replaced by LTC Edward M. Riddlehoover, OrdC, on 6 February 1968.

c. The Logistics Officer, LTC William A. Alfonse, OrdC, departed on 28 February 1968. The position of Logistics Officer was held temporarily by Major John Lewis until LTC Robert W. Wagers, QMC, arrived on 19 March 1968 and was appointed the Logistics Officer.

d. LTC Selwyn H. French, CE, was assigned as Chief, Administrative Division on 11 February 1968.

e. CPT George R. Bentley, AGO, replaced Major Gordon A. Ozawa, QMC, on 4 April 1968 as Civil Affairs Officer.

C. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (C) Enemy activity during the reporting period was highlighted by the TET Offensive, a renewed offensive on the 18th of February, and indications of development of another mass offensive during the latter part of April. As of the close of the period this new offensive had not been initiated, but was still expected for the near future. Harassing and probing actions, and stand-off rocket and mortar attacks also characterized the enemy effort.

2. (C) A new development during the period was the use of 122mm rockets against the Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot. On 18 February, 5 March, 13 March, and 1 April the ASD received rocket attacks. On 18 February a pad was hit by a rocket, causing explosions and extensive destruction. On 1 April several rockets landed in the 3rd Ordnance Battalion Cantonment Area resulting in 4 KHA and 2 WHA. The principal threats to the ASD are stand-off...
attacks, penetration by sapper teams, and large ground attacks by VC or NVA forces.

3. (C) Major incidents occurring at locations of interest to this command during the reporting period were:

a. At 000300 February 1968 Tan An, XS5565, received approximately 250 rounds of mortar fire, followed by a ground attack. An estimated 120 rounds impacted in the vicinity of the 483rd Field Service Company laundry site. Results: 483rd casualties - 1 KIA and 3 WIA; damage - 2 Eidal units destroyed and one bath unit damaged. There were a total of 16 friendlies KIA and 123 VC KIA in the attack of Tan An.

b. At 180106 February 1968 the LBASD received 6 rounds of 122mm rocket fire and possible mortar fire. One rocket hit Pad I-8 (dynamite) causing a tremendous explosion and starting many fires. At 0145 an estimated 50 - 100 VC were sighted to the front of Tower 15, YT 097098. The VC blow the first two rolls of wire. Friendly ground fire and gunfire prevented a penetration and drove the VC off. Results: 4 US injured; 8 ammunition pads destroyed (value - $2.7 million). 3 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA (PW); captured 2 AK 47's, 3 RPG-2 launchers, assorted ammunition, grenades and individual equipment and food.

c. At 140048 March 1968, Di An basecamp, vicinity XT 910057, received 27 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. A total of 15 US personnel were wounded at the basecamp. Four (4) rounds impacted in the 3rd Maintenance Company area, wounding three (3) 3rd Maintenance Company personnel and damaging 1 messhall.

d. At 010140 April 1968, the 3rd Ordnance Battalion cantonment area and the ASD received 12 rounds of 122mm rockets. Ten (10) rounds landed in the ASD and 2 impacted in the cantonment area. Three (3) BQ's were destroyed.
e. At approximately 062220 April 1968 a 1/2 ton vehicle from the 185th Maintenance Battalion was traveling North on Highway 15, vicinity YT 090028 when it was hit by a claymore or some type of mine. Results: 2 US KIA.

4. (U) The 524th Military Intelligence Detachment conducted Counterintelligence Inspections of the 185th Maintenance Battalion and 550th Ordnance Detachment during the reporting period. Counterintelligence measures were found to be satisfactory in both of these units.

5. (U) The weather during the reporting period was characterized by the end of the dry season and the transition to the Southwest Monsoon. Weather had little effect on the operations of the Group.

D. PLANS AND OPERATIONS

1. (C) Support of Combat Operations: During the reporting period the 29th General Support Group provided Logistical Support to the following operations: Yellowstone, San Angelo, and Toan Thang.

a. Operation Yellowstone began on 8 December 1967 and terminated 6 February 1968. This operation was covered in the previous report ending 31 January 1968, and no new information was developed during the last 6 days of the operation.

b. Operation San Angelo began on 5 Jan 68 and terminated on 9 February 1968. This operation was covered in the previous report ending 31 January 1968, and no new information was developed during the last 9 days of the operation.

c. Operation Toan Thang began on 8 April and continues at the cut-off for this report. This large scale operation is being supported by supply point distribution from permanent logistical support activities throughout III CTZ. 29th General Support Group augmented 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division Class V point at Phouc Vinh by 2 RT forklift operators and 4 Class
V handlers to provide Class V support for the 11th ACR. The LSA at Phuoc Vinh provided Class I & III support to 11th ACR on a supply point distribution basis.

2. (C) Headquarters, Long Binh Post Operations Order Number 1-68, dated 15 April 1968 assigned the Commanding Officer, 29th General Support Group the responsibility of Sector Commander for the eastern portion of Long Binh Post. This sector is approximately 15 kilometers long and includes the 277th Supply and Service Battalion 203 Storage Area and FDO Yard, the 3rd Ordnance Battalion, Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot (LESD), the 79th Maintenance Battalion (CS), and the 185th Maintenance Battalion (CS). Since the last report the following construction has been accomplished to upgrade Long Binh Post defense. All perimeter construction was performed by the 159th Engineer Group.

a. A double row concertina wire fence, each row consisting of 3 rolls of concertina wire.

b. Fighting bunkers, one bunker approximately every 150 meters, for a total of 59 bunkers in the 29th General Support Group Sector.

c. Three (3) each fifty (50) man quick reaction force bunkers.

d. Access roads to bunkers.

e. Phase IV of Long Binh Post perimeter construction will extend the bunker line to include the 277th Supply and Service Battalion, 203 Storage Area, and Haci North Storage Area. When this phase is completed all of Long Binh Post will be surrounded by a barbed wire fence.

3. (U) Unit Arrivals and Departures

a. During the reporting period two units were attached. The 48th MMU personnel and equipment arrived in-country on 27 March 1968 with duty station at Bear Cat. The 378th Maintenance Support Company arrived in-country
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on 25 April 1968 attached 29th General Support Group, VIMN pending establish-
ment of a General Order, duty station Long Binh.

b. The 67th Light Maintenance Company (US) (DIV) was attached to the
DA Nang Support Command (PROV) by USASUPCOM, Saigon General Order 318, dated
27 March 1968.

c. On 2 February 1968 the 40th Ordnance Company (AMO) was relieved
of attachment this command and further attached to the Ta Nang Support Command
(PROV) less the 2nd Magazine Platoon (Reinforced) which continues to operate
the ammunition supply point at Tay Ninh IJA.

d. On 26 April 1968, the 41st APU moved from its location at Xaun
Loc to Tay Ninh.

E. LOGISTICS

1. (C) The Group continued to perform its assigned mission of providing
logistical support to non-divisional and certain divisional troops in AREA
A and B of the III Corps Tactical Zone. However, the volume of supply support
rendered was down from the previous quarter as shown by the following com-
parison:

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<tr>
<th>Average Daily Issue</th>
<th>Previous Quarter</th>
<th>Present Quarter</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>102.0</td>
<td>93.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
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Class III Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Previous Quarter</td>
<td>195.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present Quarter</td>
<td>187.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Class V Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Previous Quarter</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present Quarter</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. (U) The decrease in average daily issues was due to:

a. The transfer of tactical and support units, personnel and equipment from III to I Corps Tactical Zone. The build-up of the I Corps Tactical Zone and the establishment of the Provisional Support Command at Nha Ngok took place during this reporting period.

b. There was a general decrease in offensive operations during the present quarter as compared to the previous quarter. For the first month of this quarter, US Forces were basically in a defensive posture due to the TET offensive by the enemy. Interdiction of roads prevented the movement of convoys and normal traffic and as a result POL consumption was reduced.

3. (C) During the reporting period, the Supply and Service Companies within the Group received a total 71,693 requisitions for Class II and IV items. Some 30,290 or 42% of these were ASL requisitions. The initial fill from stockage was 12,459, or 41%. Data by month was as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Requisitions Received</td>
<td>21,481</td>
<td>28,672</td>
<td>21,500</td>
<td>71,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of ASL Requisitions Received</td>
<td>10,912</td>
<td>10,656</td>
<td>8,722</td>
<td>30,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Demand Accommodation</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Requisitions Filled from Stock</td>
<td>3,320</td>
<td>4,765</td>
<td>4,374</td>
<td>12,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Demand Satisfaction</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. (C) The direct support maintenance units throughout the Group received a total of 254,612 requisitions for repair parts during the reporting period. Of this total, 185,289 were authorized stockage list (ASL) items. There was an initial fill of 62,289 (34%) of the ASL requisitions. Data by month was as follows:
5. (C) Logistical support to Operation Yellowstone ended on 6 February and to Operation San Anselmo on 9 February. Only one other combat operation was directly supported by the 29th General Support Group during the reporting period. This was Operation Toan Thang in which the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment conducted a search and destroy operation from 15 - 22 April. Logistical support for this operation was provided from the Long Binh and Saigon area by use of dedicated air shipments from Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut Airbase and from the 29th General Support Group Logistical Support Activity at Thouc Vinh.

6. (U) In the area of retrograde, there was a decrease in the tonnage shipped from the previous quarter - 21,566 S/Tons versus 27,711 S/Tons. This decrease of 6,143 S/Tons was due primarily to - (1) the general inability to move materiel to the port during the first part of February as a result of the TET Offensive, and (2) the lack of assets at the Collection, Classification and Salvage point. This condition improved during the last two months of the quarter as indicated by the upward swing in tonnage shipped as shown on the following charts.
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7. (C) There is presently a command wide program to update the armored personnel carrier fleet. During this reporting period 206 vehicles were exchanged. The program will be completed when the vehicles of the 25th Infantry Division, 199th Light Infantry Brigade and float vehicles for the 1st Infantry Division have been exchanged.

8. (C) Field maintenance deadline rates have shown a 9 percent drop during the reporting period. The deadline rate for combat vehicles and artillery is exceptionally low (4 per cent and 2 per cent respectively.) This achievement is especially significant when it is considered that demand satisfaction during the same period was only 34 per cent. This low deadline rate in spite of poor supply performance can be attributed primarily to (1) intensive management of Red Ball and O2 priority requisitions, (2) the extensive use of the 218th CCCS Company cannibalization point as a source of repair parts, (3) increased local fabrication of repair parts, and (4) the recent exchange programs for M43 tanks, M123 armored personnel carriers, and M109 self propelled 155mm howitzers.

9. (C) There was a marked decrease in production during February 1968 at the PA&E maintenance facility which was not operational 1 - 14 February 1968 following the Tet Offensive. On 15 February 1968 the facility became operational with 61% of the work force present. On 26 February 1968 normal operations were resumed with 87% of the work force present.

10. (C) During the past quarter the units of the 29th General Support Group were directly responsible for providing the following services:

a. Laundry: 3,560,719 pounds
b. Bath: 262,381 showers
c. Bakery: 2,483,252 pounds
d. Graves Registration: Handled and processed a total of 730 remains.
(1) US Forces: 623
(2) E. & E. World Forces: 77
(3) Civilians and CIDG: 30

11. (C) The total of 730 remains processed represents a 200% increase in the numbers of remains handled, over the past quarterly report. This rise in remains can be attributed to the TET Offensive conducted in this area.

12. (U) The Services Section was responsible for the coordination of airlift support for operation Toan Thang. This operation was in support of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and involved a total airlift requirement of over a million pounds of supplies and equipment. Twelve dedicated aircraft were utilized on a daily basis. This system of utilizing dedicated airlift in support of major operations again proved to be the only effective means of supply for an air-loo operation.

F. TOTAL STAFF SECTIONS

1. (U) Staff Judge Advocate.

a. On 22 April 1968 the legal clerk for the past year, SP4 William C. Wohlers, rotated. He was replaced by SP4 David M. Drucker.

b. Non-Judicial Punishment for the Command:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion/Squadron</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29th General Support Group</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Ordnance Battalion</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79th Maintenance Battalion</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185th Maintenance Battalion</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>266th Supply and Service Battalion</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tay Ninh LSA (PROV)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>610th Maintenance Battalion</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>126</strong></td>
<td><strong>143</strong></td>
<td><strong>160</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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c. Personnel within the command tried by courts-martial:

(1) General Courts Martial: One member of the command was tried by General Court Martial during the reporting period. It was convened by the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command.

(2) Special Courts-Martial:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 29th General Support Group</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Ordnance Battalion</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79th Maintenance Battalion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185th Maintenance Battalion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>266th Supply and Service Battalion</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tay Minh LSA (I-ROV)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>610th Maintenance Battalion</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GRAND TOTAL: 30

(3) Summary Courts Martial:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 29th General Support Group</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Ordnance Battalion</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79th Maintenance Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185th Maintenance Battalion</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>266th Supply and Service Battalion</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tay Minh LSA (I-ROV)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>610th Maintenance Battalion</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Legal assistance rendered totaled 176 actions, including 121 interview, 41 instruments drafted and other miscellaneous services.

e. During the reporting period this office supervised claims administration and investigation within the Group. Five Article 32 Investigations were conducted by the command.

2. (U) Civil Affairs

a. Civilian Labor:

(1) Permanent Hire: During the period 1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968 this section administered an average of 1409 Local National (Direct...
Hire) Employees. These personnel were employed in fifty six different job descriptions. An augmentation to the TDA WCAYA99 for Local National Employees was developed and submitted for approval on 2 May 1968. If this is approved the number of Local National Employ as will be increased from 1389 to 1650.

(2) The USARV Program 5 Civilianization (Local National Substitution Plan) was terminated. It was not deemed practicable at this time.

(3) A1K (Daily Hire) Laborers: This section administered an average of 493 A1K (Daily Hire) Laborers per month during the period 1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968 with an average payroll of 1,179,200 $VN per month.

b. Civic Action: (1) This office collected from HHC, 29th General Support Group and all subordinate battalions of the Group a total of 1,627,30 MFC and 35,240 $VN during the TET Aggression Relief Program Fund drive. This money is in the process of being distributed to Local National Employees who suffered property loss or damage during the TET Offensive.

(2) The village Pau Hang was relocated and is in the process of being rebuilt with assistance from the 19th Light Maintenance Company of the 185th Maintenance Battalion.

(3) The Civic Action Programs coordinated by this section during the period 1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968 furnished the monetary equivalent of approximately 136,200 $VN in aid and assistance.

3. (c) S-4

a. Significant activities in 29th General Support Group base development include:

(1) The construction of a new work point for the 218th CC&S Company.
(2) The move of the 185th Maintenance Battalion into their new facilities in the M&S Area.

(3) The construction of a retail POL point on Route 15 for operation by the 266th Supply and Service Battalion.

b. The 507th Engineer Detachment, the R&U Engineer Detachment from USAUSUCOM, Saigon, nearly completed the wash rack for the wash rack for the 218th C&G&S Company. The point is located south of Bradley Street in the M&S Area of Long Binh Post. The point consists of a hard stand of 7000 square yards with a 2400 square feet wash rack in the center of the hard stand. Presently two steam cleaners are being used at the wash rack but these will be replaced by a steam boiler fabricated from a 100hp boiler. The point became operational the week of 28 April 1968.

c. The 185th Maintenance Battalion began its move into their new maintenance area just south of the 79th Maintenance Battalion area. The seven 70' X 140' buildings and surrounding hard stand were constructed by RBK Corporation with assistance on the hard stand from the 159th Engineer Group. As of 30 April 1968, HMSC less the tech supply section, 140th Heavy Maintenance Company and the 61st Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company had moved into their new facilities. Except for the 19th Light Maintenance Company facilities for the remaining companies of the 185th Maintenance Battalion are still in the planning stage.

d. The 507th Engineer Battalion in conjunction with the 266th Supply and Service Battalion began construction of a retail POL point on Route 15 between Bradley Street and Marshall Street. The facility includes three 500 BBL POL Tanks and will be used to alleviate the load on the present retail POL point near gate number three.
CONFIDENTIAL

4. (C) Communications

a. During the reporting period the communications section continued
to operate the internal communications systems, providing command and control
facilities to subordinate elements. (See Enclosure 3)

Traffic processed at Group Headquarters:

(1) Land-Line Teletype 730 messages
(2) Radio Teletype 917

b. With the establishment of a new ground defense system at Long
Binh Post, a communications network was initiated to include both voice
and telephone communications (See Enclosure 4).
1. (U) Item: Personnel

OBSERVATION: a. In the officer area the 29th Group authorization has increased by four to 279 since the last report, but of some concern is the fact that the assigned officer strength has decreased by 22 to 211 assigned or a percentage of 75. In particular the current shortage of 5 officers in the grade of 0-4 leaves a void in experienced officer to fill critical staff positions at the Headquarters and as Battalion Executive Officers.

b. The total authorization for En increased from 7,219 to 6,994 while the assigned strength decreased from 6,398 to 5,629 leaving the Group at 81% of enlisted strength.

EVALUATION: a. On the surface 81% doesn't appear to be critical with the demonstrated ability of the Group to adequately perform all missions. But it should be noted that the 218th CC&S Company of the 79th Maintenance Battalion, must be maintained at approximately 250% of authorized enlisted strength to accomplish their increased mission in the field of retrograde. These additional personnel are drawn from other units both within the 79th Maintenance Battalion as well as from other Battalions.

b. The manning level for the 218th CC&S when coupled with specific MOS shortages throughout the 29th Group does present a critical problem. Among the more serious MOS shortages are:

Electrical Repairman
Field Radio Repairman
Weapons Support Repairman
Fire Control Computer Repairman
Electrical Instrument Repairman
Artillery Repairman
Baker
Engineer Equipment Repairman
POL Storage Specialist
Ammunition Handler

c. Although the missions are adequately accomplished it is felt that there are far too many instances of "too little arriving a little too late", all because of the shortage of personnel.

RECOMMENDATION: a. There must be constant analysis of the personnel situation at all levels (both military and civilian) in order to shift personnel to the areas of the greatest need, such as the 218th in the particular case cited above. Skills as well must be considered as the requirements may call for cross training of personnel.

b. As far as the officer situation is concerned and the probability of having great voids in experience because of the stretch between O-3 and O-5 strong consideration should be given to ignoring technical service lines in order to fill key staff positions, to include Battalion Executive Officers, with available officers who have the overall experience in terms of years of service.

2. (U) Item: Administration

OBSERVATION: The internal affairs of the Group, as divorced from the operational areas of supply and maintenance, are complex to say the least. There is the adjutant to include military personnel; S-4 for internal supply, organizational maintenance, base development and food service; Chaplain activities; Civil Affairs (to include indigenous civilian labor) which has an effect on military personnel; and Staff Judge Advocate activities.
EVALUATION: These sections represent far too great a sphere of control for the Group Executive Officer when it is considered there is the SP&O, HQ & HQ Company as well as the "bread and butter" of the organization, i.e., logistics and maintenance to be controlled and coordinated by the Executive Officer.

RECOMMENDATIONS: The assignment of a branch or division chief (this headquarters has installed a Chief, Administrative Division) to supervise and coordinate the internal activities will result in more effective control and permit the Executive Officer the opportunity to adequately perform those functions normally associated with the Executive Officer who is in effect a Deputy to the Commander and rates the subordinate battalion commanders.

(NOTE: This has proved most effective within this command during the period of this report, with an officer assigned to the duties of Chief Admin, there has been a marked degree of improvement which has resulted in more effective planning and policies. This is particularly true in the areas of Civil Affairs and the analysis of the personnel situation).

3. (U) Item: Morale and Discipline

OBSERVATIONS: a. The morale of the command is good. However, it should be noted that since the TET offensive many areas have been off-limits and severe curfews established. As an example, the city of Bien Hoa was the most popular city for off duty recreation for the troops at Long Binh, where this headquarters and four assigned Battalions are situated. The placing of this city and adjacent villages off-limits has had a deleterious effect on the morale of the troops. A direct result of this is the increase in the number of delinquency reports, i.e., the rate for February was 12.9 per thousand; for March it increased to 29.8 per thousand and an April rate of 24.4 per thousand.
This resulted from the long period after T2T when it appeared that actual attacks and contacts with enemy in this immediate vicinity were so infrequent as to seem remote. With this interpretation by the troops more chances were taken at stopping in off-limits areas, violating curfew restrictions, etc, the natural consequence being the increased rate.

b. This trend is also reflected in the steady increase in non-judicial punishment and Special Court Martials (see Section I para F). The decrease in Summary Court Martials is due solely to 1st Log Regulations which prohibit Summary Courts except in cases where Article 15 action is refused.

EVALUATION: a. On the plus side the reenlistment program, as reflected below, is outstanding in all areas except US indictees which is difficult at best.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Term RA's</th>
<th>Career RA's</th>
<th>AUS Inductees</th>
<th>NG USAR Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb <code>Elig</code> <code>0/0 Enl</code></td>
<td><code>Elig</code> <code>12/12 Enl</code></td>
<td><code>Elig</code> <code>31/3 Enl</code></td>
<td><code>Elig</code> <code>2/2 Enl</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar <code>Elig</code> <code>5/5 Enl</code></td>
<td><code>Elig</code> <code>5/5 Enl</code></td>
<td><code>Elig</code> <code>15/1 Enl</code></td>
<td><code>Elig</code> <code>0/0 Enl</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr <code>Elig</code> <code>0/0 Enl</code></td>
<td><code>Elig</code> <code>17/17 Enl</code></td>
<td><code>Elig</code> <code>4/0 Enl</code></td>
<td><code>Elig</code> <code>1/1 Enl</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Extensive Chaplains coverage throughout the Group is another item worthy of note, as an indication of this coverage the Group Chaplain accomplished the following during the period covered by this report:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff Visits</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conferences, retreats and councils attended</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worship services conducted</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy Communion celebrated</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character Guidance classes taught</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hospital visits 7
Stockace visits 6
Counselling Sessions 153
Interviews 786

RECOMMENDATIONS: Added emphasis should be placed in the areas of
HE Clubs, A&R Programs, Day Rooms and the R&R Program in order to provide
more wholesome outlets for off duty recreation. Although the morale is
good, an overall analysis of the morale and discipline within the command
indicates that more should be done for the soldier and consequently programs
should not be of the stop-gap variety but continuing in nature.

B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
NONE

C. PLANS AND OPERATIONS
1. (U) Item: Support of Combat Operations (Operation Yellowstone and
San Angelo - see after action reports attached as Inclosure 1 & 2)

OBSERVATION: These operations were covered in the previous quarter.
They are included now because the operations terminated on 6 Feb 68 and 9
Feb 68. No new observations were developed.

EVALUATION: NONE
RECOMMENDATIONS: NONE

2. (U) Item: Return of FA Personnel and Equipment

OBSERVATION: The subject of dedicated aircraft in support of
tactical operations has been discussed in previous ORLL's, and Operation
Toan Thang proved this system to be effective. In the planning stage,
air craft are set aside on a daily basis to initially pre-stock forward
support areas with personnel, equipment, and supplies. Daily airlift is
scheduled, based on anticipated demands and is usually very satisfactory.
EVALUATION: A problem results upon termination of an operation when the dedicated airlift ceases. It is then the responsibility of the operating elements, i.e., FSA Commander to request airlift for return transportation of personnel, equipment, and supplies back to their parent unit. This request must go in on an O1 priority, and sometimes a unit will wait two to three weeks before its personnel and equipment are finally returned. This results in a tremendous loss of man power and equipment hours.

RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that when planning for a major tactical operation involving the deployment of an FSA, consideration be given to dedicated retrograde airlift upon termination of the operation, and that the re-deployment of logistical support personnel and equipment be included in the plan which provides transportation for the tactical unit supported.

D. LOGISTICS:

1. (U) Item: Tanks, M-48A2C received in exchange program required installation of vision rings.

   OBSERVATION: The M-48A2C tank was programmed to replace the M-48A3 tanks assigned to the 11th ACR. The replacement vehicles were received minus vision rings. The rings were shipped separately and were installed by maintenance personnel of this group.

   RECOMMENDATION: That equipment for replacement of exchange program be shipped with all equipment and devices installed.

2. (U) Item: Return to user program of M-48A3 tanks.

   OBSERVATION: The program was established as a result of the exchange of M-48A3 tanks with M-48A2C tanks. Technical Inspection revealed that approximately 400 man hours per tank would be required to return these vehicles to a ready for issue condition. The program is further complicated since no
ASL exists at General Support level. The 79th Maintenance Battalion recently received the authority to repair ballistic drives, infrared systems and articulate periscopes. However, the required fixtures to facilitate repairs are not on hand, but are on requisition. The lack of the required fixtures results in the 79th Maintenance Battalion having to retrograde unserviceable fire control components to CONUS and the requisitioning of replacements.

EVALUATION: Experience has shown that repair parts receipts are slow and as such delays in the repair of the 23 M-48A3 tanks can be expected. The present General Support Program published by 1st Logistical Command does not include the repair of M-48A3 tanks. The introduction of this repair program will adversely affect published General Support programs.

RECOMMENDATION: Programs of this nature must be programmed far in advance so as to allow for proper maintenance planning. It is further recommended that the 23 M-48A3 tanks presently on hand in the 79th Maintenance Battalion be evacuated to a Maintenance facility adequately equipped and staffed for General Support repairs of M-48A3 tanks.

3. (U) Item: Five Ton Multifuel Engines

OBSERVATION: Recently the Army Audit Agency conducted an inspection of retrograde procedures as practiced with five ton multifuel engines. The findings of this inspection included: some of the retrograded engines were uneconomically repairable and should not have been retrograded; some engines had parts removed without a like part being replaced; and many of the engines were not properly secured in the shipping containers which allowed them to be damaged during transit.

EVALUATION: The 218th CCGS Company has a limited capability to inspect each of these engines prior to retrograding them. The most efficient
means for insuring that the circumstances mentioned above are not perpetuated is to require the originators of the shipment to meet certain standards.

RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that standards be set and stated in a certificate to accompany the engine container. The certificate should state that the engine is beyond direct support repair capability; that no parts are missing from the engine; and that the engine has been firmly secured in its container so as to preclude damage during shipment. A sample certificate is shown below:

CERTIFICATE

I certify that engine, serial number __________________:

1. Is beyond DS repair capability
2. Has no missing parts.
3. Is firmly secure in its container so as to preclude damage during shipment.
4. Has been drained of all fuels, lubricants, and coolants.

__________________________
(Printed name)

__________________________
(Signature)

__________________________
(Grade)

__________________________
(Position)

OBSERVATION: A duplication of effort between Services. A survey conducted by the 7th Air Force showed that a duplication of effort was being expended between the Army and Air Force on various Air Bases throughout Vietnam. It was suggested by the Air Force that some of these activities be consolidated to provide better utilization. A laundry site on the Bien Hoa Air Base was picked as one of the Army facilities to close. This was accomplished on 30 April 1968.

EVALUATION: The results of eliminating this laundry site are greater utilization of government resources, and reduction of personnel and equipment required to do the job.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that all service functions performed by Army units on Air Force installations be reviewed to determine if they are being duplicated by the Air Force.


OBSERVATION: The TET Offensive dramatically highlighted to danger of relying on significant numbers of local nationals to perform vital services in a Vietnam type military operation. A case in point was the processing of personal laundry, a service which has always been largely performed by Vietnam nationals. The TET Offensive effectively reduced this service to near zero and normally adequate Quartermaster laundry facilities were not able to absorb the additional workload. The situation could have been even worse if an authorized IN civilianization program had been fully implemented in the QM laundries. Fortunately, only a few spaces were converted prior to 31 January 1968.
EVALUATION: The breakdown in laundry service resulted in a series of health and morale problems. Although many soldiers did their own laundry, many more wore the same clothing several days in a row due to either their degree of involvement in the tactical situation or a lack of ambition and initiative.

RECOMMENDATION: In the interest of insuring continued operation of vital services and recognizing that the civilianization of non-combat functions is an important part of nation building, recommend that contingency plans be developed to insure continuation of vital services in the absence of local national facilities, and/or personnel. These contingency plans would primarily identify these non-essential services or less essential services that would be closed or reduced in scope to permit adequate military staffing of the essential services. Individuals should be assigned to a specific contingency slot by name and cross-trained in that job to at least a familiarization level.

E. JUDGE ADVOCATE

1. (U) Item: Publication Shortages

OBSERVATION: Many forms and publications necessary for the administration of military justice are in short supply. Orders have been placed repeatedly since October for essential forms and publications and to date only one order has been filled.

EVALUATION: Shortages of forms have reduced the timely administration of military justice. For example, total exhaustion of the supply of DA Form 2627-1 virtually stopped the imposition of punishment under Article 15, UCMJ; and the unavailability of DA Pamphlet 27-10 has impeded the ability of trial and defense counsel to do an optimum job in their assigned duties.
RECOMMENDATION: Command emphasis on the processing of publication requests, at effective levels, would contribute significantly to the timely and intelligent administration of Military Justice.

4 Incl as

THOMAS J. MCDONALD
CCL, OrdC
Commanding
AVCA SGN CO (9 May 68) 1st 1nd (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
(RCS CSPO-65) 29th General Support Group

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96375
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, APO 96570
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968, of the 29th General Support Group, is forwarded in accordance with AR 1-19.

2. Reference: Section II, Para D2: The selection of items on the General Support Production Program has been based on estimates rather than supply planning data. Many items on the General Support Production Program were later found to be excess to theater requirements. In addition, any crash programs and a heavy DS back-up support mission has further detracted from the GS program. This command is presently conducting a full review of the GS Production Program based on technical supply activity experience.

3. Reference: Section II, Para D3: Instructions received from 1st Logistical Command required all multfuel engines to be retrograded regardless of condition. It would be advantageous to send uneconomically repairable engines to PDQ as many needed parts could be recovered for repair at DS or in the GS Production Program. The responsibility of securing the engine properly in its container is with the ISU making the turn-in. With the number of engines received daily by the 218th CCS Co it would be an excessive workload to check each and every engine; however, adequate inspections must be made to insure compliance.

4. Reference: Section II, Para D5: It is the command policy to convert additional military manpower spaces to IN. This civilianization program will continue to be implemented and will probably continue at an ever increasing rate. In the event of the development of another situation like TEM, the 29th Gp does have organic capability to provide sufficient military manpower to operate QM laundries to satisfy bulk laundry requirements. As for the laundering of personal clothing, it is the individual's responsibility to maintain minimum health and sanitation standards.
SUBJ: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (RCS CSFR-65) 29th General Support Group

5. Lessons learned, observations, and recommendations are concurred in by this command, with the exceptions noted above. A copy of this endorsement has been provided to the originating headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER

FREDERICK R. HUCK
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

TEL: LB 2604
TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 29th General Support Group for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 is forwarded.

2. (C) Pertinent Comments follow:

   a. Reference Section II, paragraph A1. Concur. Personnel assignments are based on mission requirements; therefore, the percentage of assigned to authorized will be higher in some units than in others. Officer personnel are assigned by branch and grade. Grade is given primary consideration. Officer assignment procedures recommended in basic report are in effect. No further action is required by higher headquarters.

   b. Reference Section II, paragraph A2. Concur. It is the group commander's perogative to organize his headquarters to best accomplish the mission consistent with prescribed manpower authorization.

   c. Reference Section II, paragraph A3(b). The statement that "the decrease in Summary Courts-Martial (SIC) is due solely to 1st Log Regulations which prohibit Summary Courts except in cases where Article 15 action is refused" is patently incorrect. Paragraph 5(b), LC Reg 27-1, dated 12 December 1966, merely requires a convening authority to consult with the Staff Judge Advocate prior to referring a case to a Summary Court-Martial when an accused has not been offered non-judicial punishment pursuant to Article 15. There is no outright prohibition against trial by Summary Courts-Martial under such circumstances.

   d. Reference Section II, paragraph C2. Concur with recommendation that re-deployment of logistical support personnel and equipment be included in the plan for withdrawal of tactical forces from the area of operation when operating under Air-LOC. Current procedure of requesting Priority 01 air has resulted in unnecessary delays in extracting logistical forces and equipment. Future planning conferences with Field Forces on Air-LOC operations will include plan for withdrawing logistical forces simultaneously with withdrawal of tactical units.
e. Reference Section II, paragraph D1. Vision rings would normally be installed on tanks prior to shipment. M48A2C tanks were issued to the 11th ACR on a one-time basis to alleviate the tank shortage following the TET Attack, and were issued to a single unit to facilitate supply support. Due to the time limitations of delivery dates established by D1, it was not feasible to install the vision rings prior to shipment.

f. Reference Section II, paragraph D2. Concur with the recommendation that maintenance programs be initiated as far in advance as possible to allow for proper maintenance planning. See paragraph 2h below for comment on the remainder of the recommendation.

g. Reference Section II, paragraph D3. Concur. The procedure for certifying the condition of non-serviceable engines is best determined by the maintenance personnel making the engine exchange. This procedure does not, however, relieve the CC&S unit of the responsibility for performing inspections on a sampling basis to insure that multi-fuel engines are properly packaged for shipment. Recommend this procedure be implemented country-wide by higher headquarters.

h. Reference Section II, paragraph D5 and paragraph 4 of 1st Indorsement. Concur that the processing of personal laundry is a vital service in a Vietnam type military operation. The lack of convenient facilities may have a deleterious effect on morale, however maintaining morale and insuring proper sanitation and personal hygiene standards are command responsibilities. Concur that lessons learned during any activity should be reviewed and when necessary appropriate contingency plans developed by each unit.

i. The recommendation to evacuate 23 tanks in paragraph D2 and paragraph E1 in its entirety are considered inappropriate for inclusion in the ORR and should be the subject of separate action.

3. (U) Concur with basic report as modified by indorsements. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER

TELEPHONE: LBN 2684

ROBERT W. MUNSON
LT
ASSISTANT AG

CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS, US Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96553

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 29th General Support Group as indorsed.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning five ton multifuel engines, page 24, paragraph D3; 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2g: Concur. Determination of condition of multifuel engines must be made at the DSU level. This headquarters will publish instructions that engine cans will be spot checked to insure that engines have been properly secured in shipping containers to preclude damage in transit. USARPAC has directed that all multifuel engines, regardless of condition will be evacuated.

b. Reference item concerning savings of personnel and equipment. Laundry Operations, page 26, paragraph S4: Nonconcur. A Joint Army-Air Force Logistical Survey Team conducted a detailed survey throughout RVN during the period September through November 1967 to determine where logistical functions were being duplicated. In cases where functions could be consolidated or performed by either Army or Air Force, recommendations were made by the team to do so. Recommend those findings and recommendations made by the team be implemented, rather than initiating another survey of this type.

c. Reference item concerning publications shortage, page 27, paragraph E1: Concur. Command interest in adequate and timely publications support has been, and will continue to be emphasized. For a period of approximately 60 days during March and April 1968, DA Form 2627-1 was in critically short supply throughout Vietnam. As a result commanders having offset press reproduction and facsimile camera equipment have now been delegated authority to reproduce DA, DD, and SF blank forms to meet emergency needs. DA Pamphlet 27-10 is
AVHGC-DST (9 May 68) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968,
RCS CSFOR (U) (RL)

available through publications supply channel and should be requisitioned
by the unit concerned from the USA AG Publications Center, Baltimore,
Maryland.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 Incl
nc

Copies furnished:
HQ, 1st Log Cnd
HQ, 29th Gen Spg Gp

C. S. NAKATSUKA
Capt, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 29th Gen Spt Gp, for Period Ending 30 Apr 68, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 11 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2c: The problem of publication shortages will be a matter of command attention to preclude future short supply.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

4 Incl
nc

C. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Asst. AG
SUBJECT: After Action Report, Task Force Merritt, Forward Support Activity, Katum, RVN

THRU: Commanding Officer
Tay Ninh LSA (FROV)
APO US Forces 96216

Commanding Officer
29th General Support Group
APO US Forces 96491

TO: Commanding General
USASUT COM, Saigon
ATTN: AVCA SGN GO
APO US Forces 96491

1. (U) References:


   c. O'ORD, 25th Infantry Division, codename "Operation Yellowstone".

2. (C) Nature of the Operation: Search and destroy missions conducted by elements of the 25th Infantry Division in northern part of Area A, III Corps Tactical Zone, vicinity of Katum, RVN.

3. Units Supported:

   HD, 1st Brigade
   HD, 2nd Brigade
   2 Bn 14 Inf
   4 Bn 9 Inf
   3 Bn 22 Inf
   2 Bn 12 Inf
   2 Bn 22 Mech
   1 Bn 5 Mech

   7 Bn 77 Arty
   3 Bn 13 Arty
   65 Engr Bn
   568 Engr Bn
   B Co 25th Med En
   1 En 49th Inf (ARVN)
   FSA, Katum
SUBJECT: After Action Report, Task Force Merritt, Forward Support Activity, Katum

4. (U) Length of FSA Support: 14-17 December 1967 was spent in setting up operational areas. FSA provided support from 17 December 1967 through 6 February 1968. 7-10 February 1968 was used for back hauling of supplies, equipment and personnel.

5. (C) Problem Areas

a. Arrival of Equipment: Convoys were initially limited to only 5 ton vehicles and under without trailers. This required the majority of FSA equipment to be scheduled for air lift. Delay in acceptance of airfield by Air Force Inspection Team resulted in four days being lost in setting up equipment for operations of various areas. During period when equipment was not available personnel built protective bunkers and the bulldozer was used to build berms for C1 III and C1 V storage, road network for supply areas and cleared jungle from perimeter of base camp.

b. Stockage Objectives: Stockage objectives received thru initial coordination with 25th Inf Div Supply and Transportation Battalion were used as basis for planning and selecting equipment to operate FSA. One day prior to operation, stockage objectives received thru 29th GS Group determined by 1st Log Cmd were different in Class III area. Later changes to stockage objectives were made by G-4 25th Inf Div to FSA, Katum for C1 III & V. These were not excepted since changes to stockage objectives was retained at 1st Log Cmd. These changes submitted were relayed through 29th General Support Group as recommended changes. At one time C1 III stockage objectives maintained by various headquarters is shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FSA Katum</th>
<th>25th Inf Div</th>
<th>1st Log Cmd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avgas</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avgas</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mogas</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avgas</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Resupply by Airlift: After initial period of air lifting equipment and some supplies to Katum, air lift of supplies decreased were experienced due to diversion of aircraft to other critical areas and refusal of aircraft to land because of ground fire and mortar attacks. While this initially hindered the FSA, once land LOC were used for resupply no further problems existed.

6. (U) Lessons Learned

a. That FSA'S should be controlled at the lowest possible level of command, by the logistical base nearest the location of the FSA.
b. That land LOC is the only way to properly resupply an FSA. Air LOC is too undependable.

c. That necessary transportation must be attached to the controlling headquarters of the FSA so that the commander not only controls the supplies but also the means of getting them to the FSA.

7. (U) Statistical Data: See Incl 1

8. (C) Task Force Organization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command &amp; Control</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II &amp; IV</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry &amp; Bath</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES Maintenance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graves Registration</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Squad (Prov)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

§6: Incl 2 for Organization Chart

9. (U) Layout of FSA Areas: See Incl 3

"A TRUE COPI"  SYLVESTER A. MERRITT JR.
R.H. ROTH  MAJ, QMC
CH, SF&O  FSA, Commander
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>(Rations)</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Issued</th>
<th>On Hand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>Total A Rations</td>
<td>145,060</td>
<td>144,088</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average per day</td>
<td>7,790</td>
<td>2,771</td>
<td>9,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total C Rations</td>
<td>75,856</td>
<td>65,356</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average per day</td>
<td>1,536</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>15,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Rations</td>
<td>224,916</td>
<td>209,444</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average per day</td>
<td>2,183</td>
<td>2,014</td>
<td>24,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Sundry Packs (Each)</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average per day</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Class II & IV (Tons) | Total Construction | 516.75 | 516.75 | - |
|                     | Average per day | 9.94 | 9.94 | 52.37 |
|                     | Total Fortification | 1264.00 | 1264.00 | - |
|                     | Average per day | 24.31 | 24.31 | 72.81 |
|                     | Total II & IV | 1780.75 | 1780.75 | - |
|                     | Average per day | 17.12 | 17.12 | 62.59 |

| Class III (Gallons) | Total JP-4 | 390,800 | 340,500 | - |
|                     | Average per day | 7,515 | 6,548 | 44,930 |
|                     | Total Avgas | 21,300 | 18,000 | - |
|                     | Average per day | 410 | 346 | 4,890 |
|                     | Total Avgas | 167,700 | 167,700 | - |
|                     | Average per day | 3,225 | 3,225 | 12,290 |
|                     | Total L.P.G | 232,800 | 232,800 | - |
|                     | Average per day | 4,477 | 4,477 | 17,190 |
|                     | Total FCL | 792,600 | 759,000 | - |
|                     | Average per day | 15,242 | 14,596 | 20,075 |

| Class V (Tons) | TOTAL | Average | 6395.711 | 4081.336 | - |
|                | Laundry (pounds) | 121.264 | 78.949 | 1281.319 |

TOTAL Processed - 116,360
Average per day - 2,238

Bath (showers)
TOTAL Showers - 21,570
Average per day - 4.15

DO: GRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
Graves Registration (remains processed)

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVCA SGN VI SB

22 March 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report FSA, Song Be

TO: Commanding Officer
   Headquarters, 33d General Support
   Group and Vung Tau Sub-Area Command
   AFO US Forces 96291

1. References:

2. Nature of Operation: Operation "San Angelo" was a brigade size operation conducted by the 1st brigade, 101st Airborne Division with supporting elements of the division. The operation in general was a clearing and blocking action with its base elements located at Song Be with areas of operation extending northward to the vicinity of the Cambodian border. The FSA Commander with selected personnel made reconnaissance of the Song Be airstrip on 13 and 29 December 1967 to select areas and determine what was necessary to prepare the areas for occupancy. The FSA moved by air (C 130s) from Vung Tau and Binh Hoa on 5 January 1968 utilizing 30 sorties. Personnel and equipment closed at Song Be on the evening of 5 January 1968. Immediate priorities for work accomplishment included erection of tentage in the cantonment area, digging and construction of protective and fighting bunkers, and area clearance for reception of supply storage. These jobs were sufficiently completed on the 5th of January to permit receipt of supplies at the rate of 30 aircraft daily commencing on 6 January 1968. The FSA maintained a five day level of supplies in Class I, III, IIIA and fast moving Class II & IV items. Additionally, the FSA provided personnel augmentation to the brigade operated ASP (21 EE), laundry, bath, graves registration and fire fighting detachment.
3. Problem Areas

a. The deployment date for the FSA did not allow II Field Force Engineers (Co D 168th Engr Bn) sufficient time to prepare logistical areas for use, i.e., primarily terracing and construction of three steel IOL tanks, clearing and building up the Class I area and the cutting of a road network to facilitate receipt, storage and issue of supplies.

b. Initial receipt of supplies and equipment coming into Song Be were in many cases not clearly identified as to consignee. As a number of units with equipment and supplies were moving into Song Be during this period it resulted in some confusion. This was corrected shortly after arrival and did not re-occur.

c. The arrival of supplies to stock the FSA was scheduled by higher headquarters and did start coming in within 24 hours after arrival of the FSA. This, coupled with comment (a) above caused considerable backlog at the airstrip, and subsequent reshuffling of supplies to facilitate clearing and building of storage areas. It is recommended, time permitting, that an FSA be given sufficient time after arrival on site to organize its facilities prior to receipt of supplies.

d. "Operation San Angelo" terminated on 9 February 1968. The FSA submitted its aircraft requirements and TCMD's for extraction of personnel, equipment, and supplies to Binh Hoa and Vung Tau. An estimated 37 sorties (C 130) were required to extract the FSA. With C1 priority for aircraft, the first plane load of equipment and personnel departed Song Be on 16 February and the last on 8 March; for a total of 28 days to extract the FSA after the operation was terminated. This resulted in the loss of critical supplies and essential equipment to both the 29th and 53d GS Groups for an excessive period of time. It is recommended, where possible, that selected personnel and items of equipment considered critical be upgraded for priority shipment.

4. Lessons Learned;

a. That an FSA (Air Loc) must plan on being self-sustaining in all areas for a minimum of five (5) days. This is particularly important in planning requirements for C1 IV barrier materials for protective and fighting bunkers.

b. Advance coordination between supporting and supported elements must be specific and in detail as pertains to areas of responsibility. If possible, these agreements should be in writing to preclude later misunderstanding. Some of these coordinating areas are as follows:

(1) Stock levels on all items to be held by the FSA.

(2) System of maintenance.
SUBJECT: After Action Report FSA, Song Be

(3) Services to be provided and their locations.
(5) Method of control (stock movement, etc).
(6) Defense arrangements.
(7) Liaison arrangements.
(8) Division of responsibilities.
(9) Restrictions (movement, foliage destruction, etc).
(10) Daily routine.
(11) Local procedures.
(12) Priorities of engineer effort.

c. When large amounts of supplies in variety are being moved by air, it is imperative that the FSA Commander establish priorities of shipment and that these priorities be adhered to at the base airfield. This will ensure that items most needed are on hand in sufficient quantities for operations and will preclude the build-up of relative excesses.

d. In conjunction with reconnaissance of the supported unit, the FSA Commander should in addition to other considerations, keep the following points in mind when selecting the FSA location:

(1) Current or likely enemy threat.
(2) Topography.
(3) Location of units to be supported.
(4) Routes available.
(5) Communication facilities.
(6) Weather.
(7) Defense arrangements available.
(8) Air strip capabilities.
(9) Movement of supplies.
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22 March 1968

S1BJ=:

After Action Report FSA, Song Be

(10) Services required.
(11) Engineer effort available.
(12) Safety Distances applicable.
(13) Local labor (if used).


Incl

as

LOY V. SCHRACK
LTC, Infantry
Commanding

"A TRUE COY"

E. KOTH
Hq TC
Chief, SPCO

CONFIDENTIAL
### 1. Receipts and Issues: Issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class I (Rations)</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>107.837</th>
<th>2.630</th>
<th>97.076</th>
<th>2.367</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1.600</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1.600</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>68.214</td>
<td>1.663</td>
<td>57.410</td>
<td>1.400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class III (Gallons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOGAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIESEL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Class V (Short Tons)** Recquisitioned and controlled by tactical unit. ASI Augmented by FSA personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class IV</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>512.73s/t</td>
<td>13.4s/t</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOGAS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIESEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unit of issue as appropriate

2. Size of FSA Force: 4 Officer, 9 WO, 121 EM, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II &amp; IV</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Services Rendered:
   Baths: 40,000
   Laundry: 123,000 lbs
   Grave Registration: 21 processed

4. Maintenance Performance: Supported FSA only.

5. Forces Supported:
   1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Div
   2/17 Cav, 101st Airborne Div
   501st Sig Bn, 101st Airborne Div
   326th Eng Bn, 101st Airborne Div
   Co D, 168th Engr, II Field Force
   Btry 6/27 Field Arty
   Btry 2/23 Field Arty
   MACV, Song Be
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 29th General Support Group

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 April 1968 (U)

CO, 29th General Support Group