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OPERATIONAL REPORT

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
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HEADQUARTERS

25th INFANTRY DIVISION



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

8 AUG 1968

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SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned

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- 2 Incl
1. (S) Report 660293 (1 cy)
Control No. 2614511 (CY 7)
2. (S) Report 670600 (1 cy)
Control No. 2714998 (RB 7)

Robert E. Hammerquist
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6 Lessons Learned, HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION (u), 8
APO, San Francisco 96225

AVDCPHD

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8 AUG 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jul 1966,
(RCS CSFOR-65). (U)

TO: See Distribution

11 30 Aug 66

10 George J. Martin

12 333p.

- 1. Operational Report for Quarterly Period (RCS CSFOR-65)
Location: Vicinity, CU CHI (XT647153), RVN
Reporting Officer: Major General Fred C. Weyand
Prepared by: Major George J. Martin, CO, 18th Military History Detachment
Key Personnel: Appendix 1

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- 2. Significant Organizational Activities.

a. (S) Mission.

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(1) Eliminate organized VC/NVA forces in sector, destroy VC installations and capture supplies. Special emphasis will be directed toward destruction of the 165th "Coup" Regiment which threatens GIA DINH Province.

(2) Clear sector with priority to populated areas, and conduct saturation patrolling of selected areas.

(3) Be prepared to secure BINH HOA, RIK rock quarry, and LONG BINH Logistical Area with a minimum of one battalion on order.

(4) Be prepared to maintain a reinforced infantry battalion on six hour alert as a reserve/reaction force. In the event the battalion is employed, the remainder of the brigade will assume a six hour alert status.

(5) Conduct FIREBALL Operations (Artillery support to selected US/ARVN outposts) in 31 DTA as requested.

(6) Coordinate AO's and operations with 25th Inf Div (ARVN) as appropriate.

(7) Organize, train, and employ quick reaction airmobile forces to exploit targets of opportunity.

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(8) In coordination and conjunction with 25th Inf Div (ARVN), deny to the enemy the rice harvest in LONG AN, HAU NGHIA and TAY NINH Provinces.

b. (C) Operations.

(1) The 25th Infantry Division (-) conducted 22 major and 1290 small unit actions, 22 major and 176 small unit actions resulted in VC contact.

(2) Operation MILLI (27 April - 12 May), an area pacification operation, was highly successful. The 1/27th Inf established a base of operations northeast of BAO TRAI (XT5204) on 27 April. Operating from the battalion base, the 1/27 Inf conducted several company size airborne assaults, local S&D operations, aggressive patrolling and ambushing, and extensive civic action projects. These operations were coordinated and conducted in conjunction with the 49th Regiment (ARVN), province and sector officials. A daily meeting was held at Province Headquarters at which the Province Chief and his staff, the Sector Advisor and his staff, and the CO, 1/27 Inf and his staff attended. A critique of the day's operation and plans for the next day's operation were discussed. This proved to be a highly successful method of conducting such operations. With the existing terrain and enemy situation in the HAU NGHIA Province, it was determined that a U.S. infantry battalion can effectively influence a circular area 12 kilometers in diameter. Since this operation, it has been noted by this headquarters, that the Vietnamese forces in this area are planning and executing operations with more vigor. (App 2 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MILLI).

(3) During Operation LINUE (1-11 May), the 1/5 (M) Inf with Co C, 1/69 Arm provided security for the 588th Engr Bn (-) during a road maintenance and construction effort on Highway 1 and 22 bypass. By escorting engineer work parties during the day and establishing company strong points and numerous ambushes during darkness, the battalion secured the logistical LOC for the 1st Infantry Division throughout Operation BIRMINGHAM. In conjunction with its mission, the 1/5th (M) Inf made a thorough terrain analysis of the area to ascertain the feasibility of mechanized operations in the western portion of HAU NGHIA and the eastern sector of TAY NINH Province. Ambushes and mounted operations in the surrounding area accounted for 20 VC KIA (BC) and 27 VC KIA (poss).

(4) Operation AKRON (8-11 May), an S&D operation, was conducted in the FILHOL Plantation (XT6720) by the 1st Brigade (4/23d Inf, 2/14th Inf, 4/1/5th (M) Inf and C/4/9th Inf). The 7th Regt, 5th Inf Div (ARVN) occupied a blocking position along the eastern edge of the FILHOL Plantation (from grid line 70, on the Saigon River; south to road at XT7017) to prevent VC infiltration into BEN CO (XT7119). During this operation Co C, 4/9th Inf conducted a night attack upon a limited objective. This was the first brigade-size operation conducted by the 1st Brigade Task Force. (App 3 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AKRON).

(5) Operation ASHEVILLE (12-13 May) was a battalion S&D operation (4/9th Inf) in the vicinity of XT6812 to destroy VC positions and installations

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southeast of CU CHI. The results of this operation were 4 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC KIA (poss); ten VC structures, 2 tunnels, numerous rounds of small arms ammunition, and many grenades destroyed.

(6) Operation WAHIANA (16-27 May) was a Division (-) S&D operation in the FILHOL Plantation (XT6720), HO SO WOODS (XT6228) and BOI LOI WOODS (XT5630). Forces penetrated deep into the BOI LOI WOODS, a known VC sanctuary. Army aviation was used initially to airlift two battalions into the vic XT5234. From there, the units swept south. Concurrently, two battalions attacked north from the division base camp through the FILHOL Plantation. The 1/5th (M) Inf was used to block the western and southern portions of the BOI LOI WOODS. VC caches captured or destroyed consisted of 847.4 tons of rice, 615 tons of other edibles (peanuts, dried fish, etc.), 98,698 yards of cloth, ammunition, 4,000 lbs of medical supplies, and sampans. Five base camps, 1 fortified village, 1 training center, and 54 bicycles were destroyed. There were 144 VC KIA (BC), 13 KBA (BC), 175 VC KIA (poss) and 10 VCC. (App 4 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WAHIANA).

(7) Operation FORT SMITH (3 June - 3 July) was a S&D and pacification operation conducted by 2/14th Inf. The efforts of US, ARVN, RF and PF units were closely integrated to create a favorable rapport with the population who had little previous contact with ARVN or American forces. The 2/14th Inf maintained a working relationship with the District Chief of TRUNG BANG. An atmosphere of trust and cooperation resulted in the exchange of intelligence, combined use of personnel, joint ambushes on Hwy #1, reconstruction of a PF outpost, REOCIF, and Helping Hand operations. Primary emphasis was on civic action and psychological operations in order to counteract VC propaganda efforts and bolster government control over the people. Results of this operation were 19 VC KIA (BC), 51 VC KIA (poss), 6 VCC, 32 VCS, 2 rifles and 7,200 lbs of rice captured. (App 5 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FORT SMITH)

(8) Operation MAKIKI (3-9 June). The 2d Bde, in coordination with elements of the 25th Inf Div (ARVN), conducted an S&D operation in the DUC HUE District. A Combat Support Coordination Center was established at Bde/Regt and Div level. On 3 June, 1/5th (M) Inf encountered a VC platoon. The VC attempted to break contact and dispose of their weapons in streams and canals. Several VC went underwater by breathing through reeds. In a fine display of the versatility of the APC, M113, the enemy was actually overrun and routed, with a loss of 11 VC KIA (BC), 19 VCC, and 2 weapons captured. On 7 June the 1/5th (M) Inf discovered an underwater weapons and ammunition cache vic XT520104. The cache contained 105 small arms, 57mm and 75mm RR ammo, AT rockets, TMI and approximately 55,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. Total enemy losses for the operation were 20 VC KIA (BC), 12 VC KIA (poss), 32 VCC, 53 VCS, 26.4 tons of rice, 110 small arms, RR ammo, SA ammo, AT mines, AT rockets and miscellaneous supplies. (App 6 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MAKIKI)

(9) Operation JOLIET (6-10 June) was a battalion (4/9th Inf) S&D operation in the vic of PHOU VINH NINH (XT6813) and AP DONG SAO (XT7010).

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Results of this operation were 3 VC KIA (BC), 9 VC KIA (poss). Numerous grenades, booby traps, and tunnels were destroyed.

(10) Operation UNIONTOWN (9 June - 14 July). The 4/23d Inf was employed as a security force by HQ, IFFORC/V in vic BINH HOA Airfield, RMK rock quarry, and LONG BINH Logistics Area. Light VC contact was encountered.

(11) Operation FARGO (12-14 June) was a two-battalion S&D operation controlled by the 1st Bde in the vic of PHUOC HEIF (XT5617). The operation was initiated to reduce road blocks and tax collection points, ground fire at aircraft, and harassment of RF/PF units. Light contact was made with the VC with results of 1 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC KIA (poss), 1 VCC, 5 VCS. (App 7 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARGO)

(12) Operation FRESNO (13 June - 14 July) was a S&D and pacification operation conducted by 2/27th Inf west of BAO TRAI. The battalion established a base at XT502087 from which they conducted a series of operations in conjunction with ARVN, Province, and District forces. MEDCAS had been conducted on a daily basis in nearby hamlets. Helping Hand materials were distributed. A County Fair was conducted in the hamlet of AP SO DO on 23 June. ARVN Civic Action Teams were used in village search operations. Results were 20 VC KIA (BC), 30 VC KIA (poss), 18 VCC, 41 VCS, 7 small arms, 5,100 lbs rice captured, 22 VC structures destroyed, numerous tunnels, bunkers and SA ammunition destroyed. (App 8 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FRESNO)

(13) Operation SANTE FE (13 June - 4 July). This operation was conducted in HAU NGHIA Province bounded by coordinates XT5808, XT6303, XT5204, and XT5800. Operating from a battalion base, the 1/27th Inf conducted an area pacification program consisting of local S&D operations, aggressive patrolling and ambushing and extensive civic action projects. These operations were coordinated at daily joint meetings with the Province Chief and were supported by the 49th Regt (ARVN). Children pointing out booby traps, mortar rounds and mines are indicative of the salutary effects operations of this nature are having on the local populace. Results were 3 VC KIA (BC), 23 VC KIA (poss), 14 VCC, 78 VCS. (App 9 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SANTE FE)

(14) Operation HELLEWANO (17-21 June). This was a battalion S&D operation undertaken by 4/9th Inf to the west of TRANG BANG to destroy VC defensive networks and reduce VC activity. Light contact with the VC was encountered. Results were 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 VCC, 5 VCS, 12,200 lbs of rice.

(15) Operation NOGALAS (18 June) was a one day S&D operation in the FILHOL Plantation by 1/5th (M) Inf. An elaborate tunnel and bunker system was destroyed. Results were 1 VC KIA (BC), 6 VC KIA (poss).

(16) Operation EHU (21-23 June). The 4/23d Inf conducted a methodical search in the FILHOL Plantation destroying extensive tunnel complexes. Sporadic contact with the VC resulted in 8 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC KIA (poss), and 2 weapons captured.

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(17) Operation COCO PALMS (25 June - 1 July) was conducted by the 1/5th (M) Inf in the vic of the BOI LOI WOODS and HO BO WOODS. On the first day 20-30 VC were observed in a trench system and were fired upon by artillery. When the battalion overran the area, the VC had withdrawn. Numerous bunkers and tunnel complexes were found and destroyed by a special tunnel team from the 65th Engr Bn. A combined ARVN-US operation was initiated when the 3d Bn, 49th Regt (ARVN) conducted an airmobile assault into the AO on 29 June. Results were 6 VC KIA (BC), 4 VC KBA (BC), 6 VC KBA (poss), 4 VC KIA (poss), 2 VCC, 6 VCS, 22 rifles, 1 Czech MG, 72 bunkers, 41 tunnels, 2 sampans and 5 trunchees destroyed. 39,640 lb rice and 100 lb salt captured or destroyed. (App 10 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation COCO PALMS)

(18) Operation KAHANA I & II (3 July - 1 Aug). Operation KAHANA I & II were conducted by the 1st Brigade with elements of the 10th Div ARVN. The purpose was to locate VC forces responsible for an ambush against ARVN forces south of GIA RAY on 30 June, and to prevent an increase of VC incidents in the GIA RAY - VO DAT - VC XU area. The 1st Brigade controlled this operation from the vic of XUON LOC (XT460091). On 5 July 4/9th Inf (+) was committed in vic GIA RAY. On 15 July the 4/23d Inf was employed in the VO DAT - VC XU area (vic XT7232). As a result of the brigade's operations, loggers and charcoal workers were able to return to work, logging trucks were able to move logs cut as long as two years ago, and produce trucks and civilian buses resumed daily trips to SAIGON and other market places. Results were 4 VC KIA (BC), 17 VC KIA (poss), 1 VCC, 5 VCS, 5 KBA (poss).

(19) Operation EWA (8-13 July). This operation was conducted by 1/27th Inf in the area west of the ORIENTAL River to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and bases. Airmobile assaults and Eagle Flights were utilized to saturate the area. A total of 353 refugees were voluntarily evacuated from the VC controlled area of HIEN HOA. Province officials will relocate them in DUC HUE District. Results of the operation were 14 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC KBA (BC), 16 VC KIA (poss), 8 VCC and 8 small arms. (App 11 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EWA)

(20) Operation FOAMHO (10 July). This was a S&D operation in the FILHOL Plantation to reduce activity on the northern edge of the base camp area. The operation was controlled by the 2/14th Inf and included 1 Rifle Co, 1 Mech Co, and 1 Cav Trp. A VC booby trap factory was destroyed as well as numerous rifle grenades. (App 12 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FOAMHO)

(21) Operation NOKULEIA (15-22 July). This operation was conducted in the western portion of HAU NGHIA Province by elements of the 2d Bde. It was determined that the 3d Bn, 49th Regt (ARVN) did not have an immediate reaction capability to take advantage of intelligence information being evaluated by the Joint Operations Center in BAO TRAI. The 25th Inf Div responded by providing helicopters. Results of this contact were 1 VC KIA (BC), 9 VCC, 14 VCS. Eagle Flights were conducted in the area adjacent to the ORIENTAL River. In one such operation, 2 VC main force companies were engaged. The

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VC wore camouflaged uniforms, steel helmets and field equipment. Gunships, armed G1-47 aircraft (GO-GO teams) and tactical air were employed against the VC. Results of this contact from ground and air were 34 VC KIA (BC), 39 VC KIA (poss), Results of the complete operation were 38 VC KIA (BC), 24 VC KBA (BC), 34 VC KBA (poss), 101 VC KIA (poss), 5 VCC, 40 VCS, 23 small arms captured, and a VC arms factory destroyed.

(22) Operation KOKO HEAD (23 July - Continuing). This is an S&D and pacification operation, being conducted west and north of base camp. Results to date are 5 VC KIA (BC), 26 VC KBA (BC), 1 VC KIA (poss), 49 VC KBA (poss), 24 VCC, 99 VCS, 12 small arms and numerous ammunition captured, and 118 buildings, 53 bunkers, 12 tunnels, 16 sampans destroyed.

c. (C) Artillery Support.

(1) Artillery support for month of May: Appropriate exchanges of artillery liaison officers were made between the 25th Inf Div Arty and units of the 25th Inf Div (ARVN) on a permanent basis. This facilitated clearance of fires and provided U.S. arty support for ARVN units. Also, the 25th Inf Div Arty assumed responsibility for artillery fire support of RVMAF units within CU CHI District. This allowed sufficient ARVN 105mm pieces to be released from static defense to form a mobile battery in support of combat operations. The U.S. artillery support for Operation MAILL was phased to support the above mission. Upon completion of Operation MAILL, a rapid reaction 4.2 inch mortar platoon was deployed under operational control of the 25th Inf Div Arty to demonstrate the division's capability to provide rapid reinforcement to any pacified area threatened by the Viet Cong. During Operation WAHIAWA, the artillery support (light, medium and heavy) was used to assist in the destruction of a major logistical base of the VC. Use of indirect 155mm fires in direct support of infantry advancing in heavy undergrowth proved effective in this operation.

(2) Artillery support for month of June: The 25th Div Arty continued development of support for units of ARVN. Defensive fires were increased for the 7th Regt of the 5th Div (ARVN). Of 2200 rounds fired in support of ARVN forces, 400 rounds were fired in 15 missions to support small outposts. Operations of the month consisted primarily of single artillery batteries supporting individual infantry battalions on pacification missions. The direct support battalions worked with an ASR of 20 rounds for this period with no serious degradation of capabilities. In addition to normal U.S. support, one special mission, Operation FIREBALL, was undertaken. A 25th Inf Div Arty Task Force consisting of one 105mm battery (B/2/13th Arty, II FFORCEV unit), one infantry company (B/4/9th Inf) and a command group from 3/13th, were deployed to a remote area of TAY NINH Province. The task force provided artillery support for a province force employed in establishing a BIDG camp site.

(3) Artillery support for month of July: The 25th Div Arty continued to provide artillery support to RVN units within effective artillery range of CU CHI Base Camp. Artillery support was also provided to RVN units

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at BAO TRAI, DUC HUE, DUC HOA and TRANG BANG from forward artillery positions. Beginning 12 July an artillery denial program was undertaken in the FILHOL Plantation to counter increased VC activity in that area. During the period two "FIREBALL" Operations were conducted. The mission of these operations was to lend direct artillery support to a CIDGSF Camp in a remote area north of TAY NINH City. Operation FIREBALL I which began 21 June, was successfully concluded on 15 July. B/2/13th Arty from II FFORCEV was detached from the 25th Div Arty. Operation FIREBALL II commenced on 25 July, when a task force consisting of a command group from 1/8th Arty, B/1/8th Arty (-), and B/2/14th Inf were airlifted to a remote area north of TAY NINH City. FIREBALL II was concluded on 29 July. The success of both FIREBALL operations is demonstrated by the fact that no serious VC activity was encountered during the periods when the artillery task forces were in the area. During July, Operations MOKULEIA and KOKC HEAD required direct artillery support over the major portion of HAU NGHIA Province. To accomplish this, three provisional four-gun batteries were formed from the 1/8th Arty with a six-gun battery remaining at CU CHI Base Camp. C/1/8th Arty (-), was airlifted to TRUNG LAP Ranger Camp on 20 July and 23 July to support one day infantry operations in the area. The unit was air extracted each day. On Operations KAHANA I & II, 7/11th Arty (-) moved by convoy to the XUAN LOC-GIA RAY-VO DAT area to support S&D and pacification operations of the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div. The 25th Div Arty fired 3706 rounds of artillery the evening of 26 July and the morning of 27 July in counter mortar fires for defense of the CU CHI Base Camp. During the quarter, 26,048 rds of artillery were fired. Results by artillery were 117 VC KIA (BC), 325 VC KIA (poss).

d. Other Combat Support. Results of Air Forces strikes were 85 VC KIA and 156 KIA (poss), from 1264 air sorties. There were 21,397 army aviation sorties during the quarter.

e. (FOUO) Chemical.

(1) Perimeter Defoliation.

(a) During the period 26 June - 5 July, the Division Chemical Section provided technical supervision to division troop units for the dispersal of 2,4-D Defoliant on the perimeter of CU CHI Base Camp. At the same time, under the supervision of the Brigade Chemical Officers, the 1st and 2d Bdes defoliated their portions of the perimeter.

(b) The mixture used was two parts diesel and one part 2,4-D.

(c) Method of dispersion was the use of the M106 Portable Riot Control Agent Dispenser (Mity Mite) loaded on a vehicle. In areas that could not be traversed by vehicles, the M106 was back-packed. The most effective vehicle utilized was the M113 Personnel Carrier since it was able to penetrate areas untenable to wheeled vehicles.

(d) The operation was considered effective in those areas covered by defoliant. A total of 22 barrels were dispersed. Subsequent

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evaluation of this operation indicates that an insufficient quantity was dispersed by this method to cover the entire perimeter and recurring applications will be required to defoliate new growth.

(2) CS Seeding of XOM NOI Woods.

(a) On 11 July the mission of the Division Chemical Section was to seed an area along the road through the XOM NOI Woods (XT608174 to XT615165) with Riot Control Agent CS.

(b) The mission was carried out in the following manner.

1 The CS was to be dispersed in package form from four M113 APCs provided by A/3/4 Cav.

2 Two 8 pound bags of CS were tied together with heavy twine forming a 16 lb package of CS. A blasting cap with $\frac{1}{2}$ lb of C-4 and a 45 second time fuse was used to explode the bags. The blasting caps, time fuse, and fuse lighters were carried in a separate APC from the C-4. Upon arrival at the target area the detonators were assembled and placed between the CS bags; a piece of tape was used to secure the charges.

3 The APCs were lined up four abreast at fifty meter intervals. The platoon leader acted as controller for the drop. One package was to be dropped from each of the APCs every 50 meters; the command to drop being given by the platoon leader.

4 At the command, drop, one man in each APC held the package while a second man pulled the fuse lighter pin. The first man then dropped the armed package out the ramp door of the APC.

(c) This method of dispersing CS proved to be very effective. By this method, large areas can be seeded in short periods of time and use of the APC affords personnel a great deal of protection.

f. (C) Intelligence.

(1) VC Activity.

(a) May 1966

1 (C) During the month of May, enemy activities were characterized by acts of harassment and sabotage directed against friendly operations, the CU CHI Base perimeter, and movement on National Routes 1 and 22. Incidents involving anti-aircraft fire and mines increased during the month. This is attributed to the increase of friendly operations. There was also a marked increase in the number of reports concerning large numbers of VC moving in the area between Route 1, the HO BO WOODS and BOI LOI WOODS. A mortar attack on a forward CP occurred 27 May, when the fire support elements of the 1st Bde CP received 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire.

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2 (C) The majority of the VC actions involved forces of platoon or smaller size. However, there were two incidents involving VC forces of company size. On 3 May, an ambush patrol from C/1/27th Inf was attacked, via XT5640446, by a company composed of local guerrillas and elements from the 506th LF Bn. On 7 May, a patrol from B/1/5th (M) engaged elements of the 403d Co, 320th LF Bn via XT505316.

3 (C) The VC lost large quantities of rice, cloth and medical supplies as a result of friendly operations conducted during May. In addition, the VC were forced to abandon base camps and supply areas. VC movement on supply and liaison routes was again hampered by friendly operations, patrols and aerial observation.

4 (C) With the advent of the rainy season and increased combat activities by U.S. and ARVN forces, the VC will be hard pressed to replace the rice and medicine lost as a result of Operation WAHAWA. Due to the number of KIA's suffered by the VC and the large amount of ammunition lost, the combat effectiveness of the VC units in the division TAOR have been reduced considerably. The losses could disrupt VC plans for operations in the early stages of the monsoon season.

5 (U) Results of all operations during May 1966 were:

VC KIA (BC)	211	Small Arms	41
VC KIA (poss)	372	Rice	901.8 tons
VCC	13	Other edibles	619 tons
VCS	57	Cloth	98,698 yds

(b) June 1966

1 (C) During the month of June, VC activities continued to be characterized by acts of harassment and sabotage directed against friendly units, the CU CHI Base perimeter and movement on LOC's within HAU NGHIA Province. The number of anti-aircraft incidents doubled from those reported in May, while mining incidents decreased from the previous month. The large number of AA incidents can be attributed to increased heliborne activity in connection with friendly operations. During the month of June, agent reports, CHIEU HOI reports, and SPAR activity indicated that the VC had returned to the HO BO WOODS area. Operation "COCO LINES" conducted by the 1/5 (M) Inf during the period 25 June - 1 July confirmed these reports. Documents captured indicated that elements of the SAIGON-GIA-DINH Special Region Committee were located in the extensive tunnel system in the area. There was a sharp decline in the number of reports of large numbers of VC moving in HAU NGHIA Province. Numerous reports continued to be received during the month concerning large VC units moving into the BO LOI WOODS area from the vicinity of MICHELIN Plantation.

2 (C) The majority of enemy activity during the month involved forces of platoon size or smaller. The VC continued to withdraw when contacted in force by friendly elements. There were numerous significant

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actions which occurred during the month. On 3 June, Ren/1/5 (M) Inf captured or killed an entire VC guerrilla platoon. The final count was 11 VC KIA (BC) and 19 captured. The captured of 19 VC marked one of the largest single captures of VC in the III Corps Area. The VC suffered another serious setback when C/1/5 (M) discovered a large weapons cache on 7 June. The cache, which included 105 small arms, was one of the largest arms caches discovered by Free World Forces in Vietnam and was the first time Russian ammunition had been captured in any large quantity. Another significant action occurred on 7 June, when elements of the 2/27 Inf discovered a grenade factory which was capable of producing 400 to 500 grenades per week. The month of June also marked the first time the VC utilized the RPG-2 grenade launcher with successful results. The action took place on 18 June, when A/1/5 (M) Inf encountered an unknown size VC force in a heavily fortified position in the FILHOL Plantation. The VC utilized the grenade launchers to damage 3 APC's and inflict casualties on the occupants.

3 (C) Division operations continue to force the VC to abandon base camps and supply areas. His movement is becoming more restricted as a result of the division's pacification operations throughout HAU NGHIA Province. The presence of US forces has motivated the civilian populace into offering information concerning VC activities in the area. This information has not only led to the discovery of weapons and ammunition, but in a few cases several VC have been apprehended as a result of information provided by fellow platoon members. The presence of US forces has also hampered VC movement on supply and liaison routes.

4 (C) The enemy's loss of supplies and war material during the month has been detrimental to his war effort. With many of their supply routes interdicted, the resupply of war materiel will become more difficult. The loss of a possible headquarters in the HO BO WOODS area could have an effect on the command and control of VC Forces in the HO BO WOODS, and the destruction of their extensive tunnel system could force the VC out of an area they have long considered a safe haven. Harassment of US base areas will continue and the enemy will continue to seek targets of opportunity. Although the loss of war materiel and base areas have disrupted their plans for the monsoon season, the VC can be expected to take advantage of increasing periods of inclement weather to conduct their harassing tactics.

5 (U) Major VC Losses during the month.

VC KIA (BC)	- 133	Small arms	- 250
VC KIA (poss)	- 326	Heavy weapons	- 2
VCC	- 73	Rice	- 217,4 tons
VCS	- 233		

(c) July 1966

1 (C) During the month of July, VC initiated activity increased within the 25th Division's TACR and other areas in HAU NGHIA Province. An increase in harassing and probing incidents and actual assaults on RF and

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PF outposts were noted in the entire 31st DTA. The number of anti-aircraft incidents increased by approximately one third from those reported in June, while mining incidents decreased approximately 75%. The large number of AA incidents can be attributed to wide use of Eagle Flights during friendly S&D operations. There was an increase in the number of reports from various sources concerning the movement of large numbers of VC throughout HAU NGHIA Province. These movements of VC forces were reported most frequently in the vic of BAO TRAI (XT526044), DUC HUE (XT440057), and DUC HOA (XS597966). These three towns were consistently reported as targets for VC attacks to take place on 20 July, Geneva Accords Day, and on 26 July. The reinforcement of BAO TRAI by 25th Div elements, plus the numerous airstrikes and artillery missions fired in the immediate vicinity were believed to be instrumental in deterring the attack plans of the 506th LF Bn and the 267th Bn DT2 Regt in the HAU NGHIA Provincial capital area. The attacks were believed to be planned in conjunction with the mortar and recoilless rifle attack on the 25th Div Base Camp on 26 July. The reactions to the mortar attacks on PHUOC HIEP and the TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center plus the encounter with the 1st Bn, 165A Regt on 19 July, were also believed to have prevented a larger scale attack on the division base area. It is also believed that the artillery fire in response to the TRUNG LAP mortar attack deterred a possible attack on the training center.

2 (C) There were numerous incidents of significant enemy contact during the month. The most significant action was the 75mm recoilless rifle and 82mm mortar attacks on the division base camp on 26 and 27 July. There were indications that elements of the 241st Arty Bn, USO Arty Regt had taken part in the attack. This heavy weapons unit normally supports VC main force regiments in the War Zone C area. Another significant action took place on 19 July, when elements of A/1/27th Inf were airlifted into two objectives on the edge of the HO BO WOODS and immediately engaged elements of the 1st Bn, 165A Regt. The VC, who in some cases wore camouflaged uniforms and steel helmets, maintained continuous contact with friendly elements for 4½ hours using mortars, grenades, SA and AW. The length of the encounter indicates once again that the VC will fight tenaciously when surprised or forced to fight in their base areas. The 165A Regiment also figured prominently in the 19 July attack on the PHUOC HIEP outpost located on Route 1, nine kilometers northwest of CU CHI. This action demonstrated the VC capability to strike quickly with a superior force and rapidly withdraw when confronted by division reaction forces. Concurrent with the attack on PHUOC HIEP, the VC also fired 40-50 rds of 82mm mortar into the TRUNG LAP ARVN Ranger Training Center, resulting in friendly losses of 3 KIA and 14 WIA. This clearly demonstrated the capability of VC main force units to successfully conduct simultaneous attacks on separate targets. Large quantities of VC arms and ammunition continued to be located by friendly forces, the most significant being an arms factory located by C/2/27th Inf on 19 July, near the ORIENTAL River at XT513988. The FILHOL Plantation and HO BO WOODS in spite of their proximity to the base camp, constant harassment by artillery, and frequent S&D operations continue to be the scene of occasional intense fighting. Aircraft flying over these areas are routinely subjected to AA fire and ground elements continually encounter mines, booby traps, and VC fortifications. Many of the firing positions utilized during the 26/27 July attack on the base were located along the southern edge of the FILHOL Plantation.

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3 (C) The VC continue to be forced from their base and supply areas. VC activities are also becoming more restricted because of our numerous operations in various areas of the HAU NGHIA Province. Operation CHOCOMATE which is designed to deny to the VC the clandestine use of major LOC's in the area is also having an impact on VC supply and liaison activities. The presence of US forces continues to motivate the local population into offering information concerning VC activities in the area. Numerous arms/ weapons caches have been located during the month as a result of this information. There are indications that the VC no longer feel secure in villages and hamlets which they once controlled. This is in part due to the rapid reaction by division elements in responding to agent reports and information provided by voluntary informants. Another example of diminishing VC influence is reflected in the number of refugees during "Operation EWA". A total of 353 persons requested evacuation from a VC controlled area in DUC HUS District west of the ORIENTAL River and were accommodated by aviation elements supporting the 2d Bde. The mortar and recoilless rifle attack against the division base area will undoubtedly be exploited by the enemy for propaganda purposes in an attempt to reassert their former position of influence among the people. Harassment of outposts, roadblocks, and general VC activity will probably increase during August and the VC may attempt another attack on the base camp or one of the district capitals.

4 (C) VC personnel and equipment losses 1-31 July 1966:

VC KIA (BG)	- 194	Small arms	- 49
VC KIA (poss)	- 434	Rico	- 36.9 tons
VCC	- 53		
VCS	- 181		

(2) (C) Counterintelligence.

(a) The major emphasis in counterintelligence during the reporting period has been the identification of VC infrastructure in the TAOR and the detection and neutralization of the VC espionage and sabotage effort against the 25th Infantry Division. The major counterintelligence project presently underway by the division is called Operation KLEEN. This program involves screening and investigation of approximately 1000 Vietnamese laborers employed daily on construction projects in the base camp. Most of these laborers have been under VC domination for several years and are therefore susceptible to both active and passive collaboration with VC agents. It is also recognized that these laborers form a pool of potential informants who might for necessary, retaliatory or opportunistic motives collect information for us concerning VC activities in their village and hamlets. Since the most logical assessors of this potential among the work force are the US military supervisors and interpreters, these people are briefed and debriefed on a continuing basis by CI agents of the 25th MID. The first phase of Operation KLEEN which was to photograph the ID cards and other identity papers of all indigenous laborers has been completed and it is now estimated that the files are 95 percent complete allowing for new arrivals and those absent when the ID cards were photographed.

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(b) This file will be utilized to check against National Police files, comparison against black and grey lists, and screening by local and provincial MSS officials and sources to detect false ID papers and to identify known or suspected VC. This file will also provide information concerning the number of persons from the various villages in the area and facilitate the systematic establishment of an agent net to cover all worker groups in each village and hamlet in our area. It is hoped that by continuation of this positive CI effort we can minimize the espionage and sabotage threat to the base camp while continuing the practice of employing indigenous help in noncritical areas.

(3) (C) Checkmate.

(a) On 6 July, the division initiated a program of establishing check points at random locations along major highways in HAU NGHIA and TAY NINH Provinces. The purpose of this operation called CHECKMATE is to deny the VC the use of land LOC's to covertly move personnel and equipment through our TAOR. These check points are manned by elements of the 3/4 Cav, CI agents of the 25th MI Det and National Police. The Cav element provides security for the area utilizing 4-5 armored personnel carriers and occasionally a tank depending on the area security situation. Two checkpoints are then established approximately 150 meters apart enabling traffic checks in two directions. Two National Policemen and one CI agent normally conduct the screening process at each location. The 3/4 Cav aero rifle platoon is also prepared to assist the roadblock element if necessary and aerial scouts search out the surrounding area for other targets of opportunity which might warrant the relocation of the ground element.

(b) Twelve CHECKMATES were conducted in July and a total of 2,007 vehicles and 7,665 persons screened. Results of these operations include 4 VCC, 19 VCS, 7 draft dodgers and 14 people of National Police interest detained. Numerous contraband items of CHICOM and CAMBODIA manufacture were also confiscated by the police.

(4) (C) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP). During the period a Div LRRP of 3 officers and 38 EM was organized, manned and equipped. The patrol was attached to the 3/4 Cav for support and placed under the ACoS, G2 for operational control. A cadre was chosen from the initial volunteers and sent to NIA TRAIN for approximately 3 weeks training with the 5th Special Forces Group. Upon return to base camp additional training was conducted by the entire patrol with emphasis on operating in 5 man teams. To date, the patrol has conducted four patrols in HAU NGHIA, TAY NINH and LONG KHANH provinces with the mission of locating VC base camps and detecting VC movement. The patrol has proven itself a valuable addition to our intelligence acquisition capability.

(5) (FOUO) Liaison. The G2 section in order to insure that all intelligence information originating in HAU NGHIA Province is made available to the CG of the 25th Div has greatly increased its liaison with adjacent and subordinate US and ARVN intelligence agencies. In addition to daily visits to

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HQ, 5th Inf Div (ARVN), HQ, 25th Div (ARVN), and the province capital at BAO TRAI, personal liaison is also maintained with the sub-sector HQ's in our TACR, the TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center and the Special Forces Det's. On numerous occasions during the reporting period, perishable information was received during one of these liaison visits enabling a rapid and effective division response. It is anticipated that this closer contact with these agencies will improve the intraprovince intelligence flow to the benefit of all concerned.

g. (FOUO) Logistics.

(1) Supply and Services

(a) During the quarter, the supply and services within the division generally improved. All personnel have received an issue of jungle fatigues and boots. The remainder of the new family of radios materially assisted in communications and reduced the previous high deadline rate of unit radios. The Division also received the new light vehicle retrievers (M78), over 300 anti-intrusion devices and 600 shotguns. With the assistance of Saigon Support Command, the construction of prefabricated refrigerators has established a satisfactory static refrigeration capability. On 1 June, 4,800 cubic feet were completed, 9,000 cubic feet were available 1 July and 14,000 cubic feet were completed by 1 August 1966. The ice cream plant completed 28 June has operated successfully and increased morale throughout the Division.

(b) By 31 July, the Class III yard was 85% completed. Twenty of the 35 berms required for the 10,000 gallon collapsible storage tanks had been completed. These berms proved effective during July when they absorbed mortar and recoilless rifle shrapnel and prevented serious damage to tanks and loss of fuel.

(2) Maintenance

(a) During the quarter, the division deadline rate was well below the average Army standard rate with the exception of engineer (generator and heavy equipment) and aircraft. However, the July flyable rate was above Army Standard.

(b) The Red Ball system has been responsive with the exception of certain engineer heavy equipment and MHE items. In these cases, Red Ball often runs over 30 days. There has been little noted change in the overall supply system. Maintenance is becoming dependent upon the Red Ball system with little increase in the available ASL stocks. In the aircraft field, the lack of receipt of requisitioned PLL and stockage items forces undue reliance on the Red Ball system. This in turn decreases tactical helicopter availability. If the zero balance trend continues as reflected during this quarter, and the initial deployment stockage is depleted, the deadline rate of all equipment will increase and create additional dependency and demands upon the Red Ball system.

(3) Transportation. A total of 431 convoys were run between SAIGON and CU CHI with a total volume of 22,538 vehicles. The last cargo of

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operation MOONLIGHT arrived in the base camp area on 3 June 1966. This completed the movement of equipment and accompanying supplies of the Division units. The 1st Log Comd provided assistance in the movement of POL products and for some operational ammunition. The remaining cargo was transported from LONG BINH and SAIGON with unit transportation.

(4) Operations. In order to meet requirements within a responsive time frame a "Forward Support Command" was established during brigade size operations. In operation MAINT'A and KAHANA all classes of supply were furnished at the brigade train sites. Elements of a forward maintenance company, a medical company and the supply and transport battalion were attached to the brigade. Both air and wheel convoys were successfully utilized for resupply. These forward operation centers proved to be the solution for complete resupply when a unit operates away from base camp areas.

h. (FOUO) Administration.

(1) Personnel. During this period the personnel posture of the division has been excellent. The present for duty strength, both officer and enlisted, currently exceeds the authorized strength. There is a shortage of infantry NCO's (MOS 11B40) in the grades of E5 and E6. The casualty rate of NCO's has created a shortage in greater proportion than the rate of fill. This shortage is recognized as an Army wide problem and is not considered as a critical shortage. The lower grade replacement fill in enlisted combat MOS's has been excellent with the exception of field artillery crewman, MOS 13A10, and pioneers, MOS 12A10. The fill on these two MOS's has been accelerated during the month of July substantially reducing shortages in Division Artillery and the 65th Engineer Battalion. During May and June 1966, the division had a shortage of single engine, single rotor observation helicopter mechanics, MOS 67M, and single engine, single rotor turbine utility helicopter mechanics, MOS 67N. This shortage still exists; however, through an OJT program and an exceptionally good rate of fill during July, the shortage is no longer considered critical. The division has received an adequate number of company grade infantry officer replacements, in fact, at the present time there is a slight overage in infantry captains. As of 31 July 1966, the division was short 9 company grade artillery officers. There is an officer grade imbalance in the division aviation battalion in that the battalion has only 40% of the authorized warrant officer aviators and 200% of the authorized commissioned officer aviators. Some commissioned officers are filling warrant officer slots. However, the aviator infusion program being conducted in Vietnam will assist in reducing this problem.

(2) Key Losses/Gains.

(a) 14 May 66. Col Lynnwood Johnson, CO, 2d Bde, medically evacuated.

(b) 17 May 66. Col Thomas H. Tarpley assumed command of 2d Bde.

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- (c) 20 May 66. LTC Robert W. Walker, CO 1st Bn, 8th Arty medically evacuated.
- Bn, 8th Arty. (d) 1 June 66. LTC James W. Cannon assumed command of 1st
- (e) 1 June 66. LTC Harley F. Mooney appointed ACoS, G2.
- Bn, 27th Inf. (f) 1 June 66. LTC Alvin L. O'Neal assumed command of 1st
- (g) 18 June 66. Col Lynnwood Johnson assigned to MACV.
- 2d Bde, assigned to HQ USARV. (h) 4 July 66. LTC Milton Hamilton, Executive Officer,
- Officer, 2d Bde. (i) 5 July 66. LTC Michael Barones assigned as Executive
- Bn, 23d Inf. (j) 5 July 66. LTC Louis J. North assumed command of 4th
- (k) 12 July 66. LTC John Moffet appointed ACoS, G4.
- 2d Bn, 14th Inf. (l) 12 July 66. LTC William E. Davis assumed command of
- (m) 15 July 66. LTC Charles M. Busbee, Executive Officer Division Artillery, assigned to HQ MACV.
- (n) 15 July 66. LTC Aaron E. Walker assigned as Executive Officer Division Artillery.
- 3d Bn, 13th Arty. (o) 15 July 66. LTC Billy B. Nicholas assumed command of
- medically evacuated. (p) 22 July 66. LTC Alvin L. O'Neal CO 1st Bn, 27th Inf
- (q) 24 July 66. LTC Robert D. Gamble Division Surgeon departed for reassignment in CONUS.
- Surgeon. (r) 24 July 66. Major Kelly G. Gregory Appointed Division
- (s) 30 July 66. LTC John M. Schultz assigned to HQ IIFV.
- Bn (M), 5th Inf. (t) 31 July 66. LTC Victor F. Diaz assumed command of 1st

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(3) The Division PX opened for operations on 25 July 1966. It contains 4000 sq ft of floor space and 4000 sq feet of storage space. Total sales from the Division Site Exchange was \$1,025,328.73 for the quarter ending 31 July 1966.

(4) Strengths.

Division (-) as of 31 July.

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
AUTH	727	163	10,838	11,728
ASGD	769	98	11,641	12,508
FDY	733	98	11,068	11,899

(5) Losses. (1 May - 31 July)

KIA	4	0	128	132
MIA	86	0	1153	1239
MIA	0	0	0	0
DOW	1	0	23	24
Non-Battle Dead	0	0	11	11
Non-Battle Injury	2	0	32	34

(6) Gains. (1 May - 31 July)

74	18	1064	1156
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1. (FOUO) Civic Action.

(1) A Revolutionary Development branch has been established to coordinate the overall GVN program of long term national growth (Revolutionary Development) with Division activities. (App 12, Div Dir 581-2, Revolutionary Development Staff)

(2) Statistical Summary (May - July).

Helping Hand Recipients - 26,839.
MEDCAP patients - 18,927.

Projects:

Health and Sanitation - 313.
Construction - 80.
Transportation - 39.
Commerce and Industry - 39.
Agricultural and Natural Resources - 4.
Education and Training - 47.

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Community Relations - 278.
Communications - 17.
Refugee Assistance - 8.
Public Affairs - 37.

(3) Subordinate units have been assigned CA responsibility for seven separate villages or hamlets. Additionally, the 1st Bde supports the 49th Regt (ARVN) and the 2d Bde sponsors all 25th Inf Div (ARVN) units at DUC HOA and BAO TRAI.

(4) MEDCAP II. The division MEDCAP program is directed towards medical and dental treatment, improvement of sanitary standards, operation of first aid stations, dispensaries, small hospitals, and training of indigenous personnel in first aid, sanitation, and other medically related fields with an aim towards eventual assumption of many of the medical duties by the Vietnamese themselves. MEDCAPS are conducted in the assigned areas of CA responsibility twice a week. During the reporting period 310 MEDCAPS provided medical treatment to 18,927 patients.

(5) Helping Hand. During the reporting period the Helping Hand storage point became fully operational. The 350 tons of Civic Action material donated by the citizens of the state of HAWAII have been stored. On three occasions involving the support of hundreds of refugees, Helping Hand was able to respond rapidly and effectively. To date Helping Hand items consisting of health and sanitation items, toys, clothes, educational materials and basic work items have been distributed to 26,839 needy villagers.

(6) A standard Helping Hand solatium box has been developed to be given to personnel and their dependents who are accidentally killed or injured under any circumstance by U.S. forces. It is also given to dependent survivors of victims of VC terrorist attacks. The box is relatively standard with its contents tailored by sex and age of the recipients and includes such items as rice, food, milk, clothing, toys, shower clogs, etc.

(7) Summary of issues (approximate).

Clothing - 45,143.
Canned Goods - 21,000.
Pencils - 2,500.
Shower Shoes - 412 pr.
Dental Kits - 3,130.
Soap - 29,288.
Toys - 2,700.

(8) The division held its first meeting of the Division Friendship Council in CU CHI during the last week of July. It was attended by division officers, VN District Chief and his staff, American subsector advisors, and the asst-province USAID representative. Items discussed included security, communications, enlargement of hospital and national police station and joint work on road repairs. Additionally, formal friendship councils were established by the 2d Brigade and Div Arty with the villages assigned to them for civic action.

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(9) A Disaster Relief SOP was drafted during the month of July which standardizes procedures for treatment of VN civilians who sustain accidental injury or death as a result of action by US forces. This SOP provides for medical evacuation, claims assistance, and solatium for the individual.

(10) A major effort in English instruction is taking place each week with an English education program sponsored by all subordinate units. Instructional material was obtained from JUSIAO and classes are purposely kept small to increase the quality of learning.

(11) The division has conducted four specific operations designed and tailored for pacification purposes. On these operations, a reinforced infantry battalion was located in an insecure area for a three to four week period. The purpose was to use joint US-Vietnamese civic action and limited combat operations to improve the security of the area while providing Vietnamese officials an opportunity to explain to the people the policies and intentions of the government.

(12) The division conducted three County Fairs during the quarter in villages controlled by the VC. The division band conducted a concert which was enthusiastically received. The VN cultural team also entertained the villagers with songs and stories. These teams continually prove to be very popular. The people were well treated and in addition to the entertainment they were fed and given a MEDCAP. (App 13, Div Reg 525-1, County Fair Operations)

J. (FOUO) Psychological Operations.

(1) A total of 90 hours of airborne loudspeaker support was provided by the 246th PSYOP Co. Forty-two vehicular loudspeaker missions were conducted in coordination with the division PSYWAR effort. Operational Activity has shown a steady increase each month, as the division implemented its PSYWAR plans.

(2) A portable loudspeaker frame, with four speakers on each end of the frame, is being developed for use on helicopters. An adaptor assembly, for power input, is being fabricated by electricians of the 3/4 Cav. The adaptor will consist of a male and female plug to accommodate otherwise incompatible fittings, and enable the broadcast system to utilize standard 28 volt outlets in the UH-1 & OH-23 aircraft.

(3) While PSYWAR plans call for more activity in all fields, emphasis will be to increase loudspeaker missions. It is felt that the advantages of the loudspeaker approach merit this new emphasis. Literacy rate and area coverage are problems often encountered with leaflet drops, but not with loudspeaker missions.

(4) CHIEU HOI rallies continue to provide an excellent source of tactical and psychological information. At the request of the CU CHI CHIEU HOI Center, Division PSYWAR branch has supplied the center with several thousand National Safe Conduct Passes and CHIEU HOI leaflets. Enemy propagandists have come up with the VC equivalent of our CHIEU HOI appeal, heralding the

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benefits for those who rally to the National Liberation Front and assuring them of good treatment. When notification is received that a rallier has been received, the PSYWAR section attempts to interview the rallier as soon as possible. A Polaroid photograph is taken, a tape recording made, and all applicable information noted. The photographs taken will be used as part of the leaflet. The tape recording can be played almost immediately over air-borne loudspeakers. When exploitable evidence is obtained it may be used to produce tapes and leaflets at division level, or it may be forwarded to the 246th PSYOP Co. Since these ralliers are good sources of propaganda, the direct support PSYOP unit is requested to produce these leaflets on a priority basis. Maximum time allowed on these priority requisitions is 48 hours. Local facilities are used when time is more important than quantity or professional preparation. Local Vietnamese officials are used as often as possible to record tapes and sign leaflets.

k. (FOUO) Medical.

(1) Personnel and Supporting Medical Units.

(a) The division at the end of the report period was short eight MC officers, one DC officer, and one MSC officer. The MC shortages were in the two Brigade Surgeon slots and six slots within the 25th Medical Battalion. We now have seven MCs on orders with four arriving in August, two in September and one in November. At present we have a KA (Surgical Team consisting of three MC officers) team from the 68th Medical Group attached to the 25th Medical Battalion.

(b) The 40th Dental Detachment (KJ) consisting of 12 Dental Corps Officers, one MSC Officer, and 20 enlisted men became operational at CU CHI on 23 May 1966.

(c) The 7th Surgical Hospital became semi-operational on 31 July at CU CHI. X-ray, surgical, and a 30 bed holding capability now exists.

(2) Aeromedical Evacuation.

(a) On 11 July 1966, a liaison visit was made by the 25th Aviation Battalion S-2 to the Medical Company (Air Ambulance) (Prov) in SAIGON. The purpose of this visit was to discuss the high incidence of ground fire in the 25th Inf Div TAOR. It was learned that the medical unit does not maintain a ground fire chart and since it is a logistical organization it is not in the normal intelligence distribution channels. Therefore, the primary emphasis during the visit was directed toward familiarizing the unit commander and operations officer with our entire TAOR. The best routes, LZs and areas to avoid were covered in detail. Areas where enemy ground fire must always be expected were posted on the unit operations map for further reference. Arrangements were made that future liaison visits between units would update these areas as information becomes available.

(b) On 28 July, two classes were conducted by the Medical Company (Air Ambulance) (Prov) at CU CHI. The classes included the techniques and capabilities of the air ambulance unit and demonstrations of new equipment.

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(3) Preventive Medicine.

(a) Disease. The spectrum of disease has not varied significantly. The rainy season to date has had no impact on the incidence of malaria with only one case occurring. Six cases of infectious hepatitis have been diagnosed including four from HMB, 3d Bn, 13th Arty. No reservoir for this cluster of cases has been determined but a number of personnel within the battery have been prophylactically inoculated with gamma globulin. The VC rate has continued to increase during the three months from 230/1000 men/yr to 260/1000 men/yr. Heat injury has not been a problem. The average of five cases per month is minimal. Two cases of immersion foot were reported in May and none since. A survey of disease of the feet indicated that no severe problem exists within the infantry units.

(b) Inoculation of animals against rabies is a monthly recurring program averaging approximately 20 animals. However, most animal bites and scratches occur from monkeys and rats which have not been inoculated against rabies and number 5/month.

1. (C) Signal.

(1) (U) May: During the last week of May, the 2d Sig Group assumed responsibility for the lateral communication between the 25th (US) and 25th (ARVN) Divisions, relieving the 125th Sig Bn of the task. The 232d Sig Co of the 2d Sig Gp supplied both equipment and operators.

(2) (U) June: On 7 June 1966, the 25th Infantry Division MARS Station AB8AJ commenced operation in the MARS Network, RVN. Operating on 1388.5 kcs, "phone patch" service is available to MARS Hawaii on a 5 day week basis, Tuesday through Saturday. This service is available to all members of the 25th Infantry Division, with priority to WIA confined in hospital wards.

(3) (U) July: A New Equipment Introductory Team visited the division during the first two weeks of July to provide instruction on the Voice Cipher Device TS-8C KY-8. They qualified a repairman and an instructor from the Division Crypto Section in addition to qualifying approximately 80 operators. During the first part of July, arrangements were completed to rebroadcast AFRS Vietnam at CU CHI. The programming was transmitted from SAIGON over one voice channel on the VHF, and rebroadcast at 1330 kc from a 50 watt transmitter on a temporary antenna beginning 7 July. The station operates 24 hours a day with 5 minutes of 25th Infantry Division News being broadcast at 2105 hours.

(4) (C) During the last half of July, the Division Signal Office worked with the signal officer of the 196th Inf Bde and made liaison visits to Corps and Army signal sections and to the 1st Sig Bde to obtain necessary radio frequencies callsigns, to incorporate the 196th Bde units into the Div SOI. Arrangements were also made to have the 1st Sig Bde provide base camp signal support to the 196th Bde because of the lack of signal resources within the 196th Bde and the 125th Sig Bn.

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a. (C) Training.

(1) 1-31 May 1966: Normal replacement and refresher training was conducted at small unit level by all units. Infantry units emphasized platoon level training and classes on detection and destruction of VC mines and booby traps. 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div also received training from the 2d Bde on ambush techniques and tunnel search and destroy procedures. A/3/4 Cav trained on low-level aerial reconnaissance techniques. Training in night flying techniques continued to be conducted by the 25th Avn Bn and 3/4 Cav in preparation for night airmobile operations. A "Lightning Bug" team of aircraft with searchlights and cal .50 machineguns has been developed by the 25th Avn Bn to interdict waterways at night. Combat support units have been given instruction on basic defense measures to allow them to reinforce the base camp perimeter. This allows more combat troops for major unit operations.

(2) 1-30 June 1966: Due to the training of pathfinder personnel, the airmobile capability of this division was improved. Night airmobile capability was expanded to include night combat assaults. Night firing techniques were emphasized in all phases of training. Special classes were conducted for generator operators. Cross-training of support troops in infantry duties was accomplished so as to relieve more maneuver elements for operations. Construction was initiated on two ranges for individual and crew served weapons. Replacement training was expanded. Training of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol was completed on 30 June.

(3) 1-31 July 1966: Refresher training emphasizing fire adjustment, communications, booby traps and mines, and counterambush techniques continued throughout the month. A special training program was initiated to train selected individuals in mass management, military justice, explosives and demolitions, motor, signal and weapons maintenance, and flame thrower operations. Aviation units continued training on formation flying and night airmobile techniques. During this period the Lightning Ambush Academy began operations. Located in the northwest sector of the 25th Inf Div base camp, the Ambush Academy facilities were completed on 13 July 1966, and formal instruction began on 15 July 1966. The academy's staff and facilities can accommodate three TOE rifle platoons concurrently and provides billet and messing accommodations for both students and cadre. The academy's staff consists of a captain commandant, 2 lieutenant instructors and 12 assistant instructors and administrative personnel. All instructors are combat veterans who are highly skilled in the conduct of ambush and counterambush techniques. The four and one-half day course trains the rifle platoon in ambush techniques, emphasizing all available lessons learned. Normal attachments to the platoon such as forward observers and medical aidmen also participate. Maximum time is devoted to night training and practical exercises to include live ambush patrols into hostile areas. Subjects such as land navigation, fire adjustment and coordination, use of surveillance devices, demolitions, mines and booby traps are stressed. Proficiency in planning, coordinating, rehearsing and executing ambushes and counterambushes are emphasized. A precourse examination sets the stage for subsequent instruction and serves to motivate the student. A comprehensive student evaluation system together with a final examination serves to measure the students' progress and the academy's effectiveness. Three platoons have successfully completed the course as of 31 July 1966. The academy's motto is Skill, Ingenuity, Aggressiveness and Discipline.

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3. (0) Commanders Observations and Recommendations.

a. Observations.

(1) Personnel, None.

(2) (0) Operations.

ITEM: Stay Behind Ambush.

DISCUSSION: The employment of a squad sized or larger element as a "stay behind" force has proven to be most effective after a company or battalion departs an area of operations. The VC will habitually move into an area after a unit departs to follow that unit or scavenge the area.

OBSERVATION: "Stay behind" ambush techniques have proven to be especially valuable after a unit has occupied an area for a period of 24 hours or more. A "stay behind" ambush should be positioned by a unit prior to its departure from an area of operations.

ITEM: Employment of "Pickot Stations" (small blocking forces).

DISCUSSION: The "pickot stations" are small elements (fire team size) that are spaced throughout an operational area or along roads and trails to observe, direct fire, and interdict enemy LOC's. The key to the successful employment of the "pickot station" is knowing the area: situation, and excellent communications.

OBSERVATION: The utilization of "pickot stations" provides excellent results in observing the VC, killing the VC, and controlling villagers. It also enables an infantry battalion to cover a large area with fire, and to prohibit VC efforts to move or escape.

ITEM: 105mm Howitzer Battery.

DISCUSSION: Mobility limitations in SVN dictate use of "light" maneuver forces which are deployed into operational areas by helicopters. A substantial number of successful airmobile operations were conducted during the period employing four-gun 105mm howitzer batteries. In addition to providing adequate fire support, a four-gun battery can be lifted in approximately one-half the time required to move a six-gun battery. Howitzer crews can be rotated within a battery as the situation dictates, and the two remaining howitzers can be effectively employed to defend the base camp or provide fire support for squad or platoon size patrol operations, near the base camp.

OBSERVATION: The four-gun 105mm howitzer battery with limited mission essential equipment can provide fire support to the maneuver battalion in airmobile operations.

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ITEM: Countermortar Defenses.

DISCUSSION: To adequately counter a mortar attack requires a plan that will provide wide coverage. A small volume of fire on many locations is preferable to a large volume of fire on a small number of locations. This can best be achieved by laying artillery by platoons on preplanned targets. 4.2 inch and 81mm mortars can be profitably integrated into the early counter-mortar fires. In the event an attack is mounted, all tubes fire base VT at likely locations. As the situation develops and hostile positions are detected, the volume of fire in those areas are increased. Counterfire planning must also take into consideration possible enemy withdrawal routes.

OBSERVATION: Countermortar plans should provide for instant broad coverage in the initial phase of a hostile mortar attack.

ITEM: Shell WP.

DISCUSSION: Experience has proven that close adjustment with shell HE is dangerous. Manoeuvr elements often mistake their true location on the ground and maps in some areas have been found to be inaccurate. Firing with WP on initial rounds reduces the probability of friendly casualties and allows air and ground observers to quickly spot their rounds. If HE is to be fired in effect it is advisable to complete the adjustment with HE since weight difference between projectiles will normally cause HE to fire as much as 75 meters beyond WP. Adjustment with WP is also necessary when adjusting in dense vegetation. The use of WP during periods of unfavorable humidity and wind conditions should be controlled to prevent limiting visibility.

OBSERVATION: The use of WP in adjustments should be included in SOP's and FOW's should be specifically trained on its use.

ITEM: Ammunition Lots.

DISCUSSION: Several lots of ammunition will normally be on hand in a battalion. In firing, it has been found that variations in range between lots will often exceed 100 meters. This variation becomes critical if a lot change is effected when firing defensive concentrations close to friendly troops.

OBSERVATION: Lots used in adjusting defensive concentrations must also be used to fire for effect.

ITEM: Air-Ground Communications.

DISCUSSION: Experience has shown that FM radios installed in light observation helicopters at times encounter difficulty in communicating with ground stations employing the new series of FM radios. This situation can be offset if the aerial observer carries an AN/PBC-25 radio set. Better communication with the aircraft radio will result if the ground station sets squelch control in the "old squelch off" position.

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OBSERVATION: Aerial observers should always be equipped with the AN/PRC 25 radio set.

ITEM: Field Fortifications.

DISCUSSION: "Digging in" becomes impractical in many areas during the monsoon season. Adequate protection requires that bunkers be constructed above the surface. When loading for a move, consideration must be given to space allocation for shoring and bunker construction materials. Additional vehicles may be necessary in order to transport the proper amount of materials that are needed to adequately fortify a position.

OBSERVATION: Procurement of fortification materials and the means of hauling them must be considered well in advance of operations, especially during the monsoon season.

ITEM: Helilift of 105 Howitzer Battery.

DISCUSSION: Movement of 105mm howitzer batteries overland during the monsoon season is frequently impossible. Roads are impassable and suitable positions, of which there are few in number, are often accessible only by air. 105mm howitzer batteries must therefore develop proficiency in air movement. Each 105 battery should have a complete set of rigging equipment. By fully preparing loads in advance, a lift can be completed with minimum delay thereby permitting much more efficient aircraft utilization. Training of personnel in pathfinder techniques will also promote a more efficient airlift operation.

OBSERVATION: All 105 howitzer batteries should be equipped with helilift rigging gear and specialized pathfinder training should be given to selected personnel.

ITEM: Use of mechanized forces for search and destroy operations.

DISCUSSION: During search and destroy operations, two techniques are used, both of which are satisfactory. The first method has the APC's on line with the infantry mounted. A mounted sweep through the area is conducted followed by a second sweep dismounted. During the second sweep, the infantry and the scouts dismount and search individual huts, tunnels, and other hiding places. Each suspect area is thoroughly cleared and/or destroyed before moving to the next location. In the second method, the tracks are again placed on line, but they move forward at the pace of the infantry in a manner similar to that for operations in built-up areas. The dismounted infantry and scouts ferret out the enemy as the sweep moves forward.

OBSERVATION: Of the two techniques, the former seems more satisfactory. This method costs fewer lives because of the armor protection against mines and booby traps. Additionally, the initial sweep provides a valuable reconnaissance of the area. This permits a concentration of infantry effort during the dismounted search, the time consuming phase of search and destroy operations.

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ITEM: Track-Infantry Team Employment.

DISCUSSION: The VC make maximum use of anti-personnel mines and booby traps. Whenever possible, tracked vehicles should lead dismounted infantry. Tracked vehicles are less susceptible to damage and tend to hold personnel injuries to a minimum by exploding booby traps and mines with a minimum of exposure to personnel. Tracked commanders must be alert to booby traps and command mines suspended from trees, while the following infantry must stay far enough behind to avoid being injured when detonation occurs.

OBSERVATION: That tanks and APC's precede infantry on operations through areas where enemy AP mines and booby traps are expected.

ITEM: Road Obstacles.

DISCUSSION: The VC often establish booby trapped and mined road obstacles. Aerial observers can detect and locate such obstacles so early movement of the clearing force would insure uninterrupted movement of the main body. In clearing the obstacles, the surrounding area should be secured to insure that the roadblock is not covered by enemy fire. The area should then be checked for the presence of command detonated mines. If nothing is found, caution must still be exercised and only the minimum essential personnel should reduce the obstacle.

OBSERVATION: To insure uninterrupted flow of traffic the following procedures should be followed:

- (1) Use aerial observers to detect road obstacles.
- (2) Dispatch a clearing force.
- (3) Secure the area around the obstacle.
- (4) Check for command detonated mines.
- (5) Check for mines in the obstacle.
- (6) Use minimum personnel to reduce the obstacle.
- (7) Make maximum use of earth moving equipment when available.

ITEM: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) techniques for entry into an area of operations.

DISCUSSION: It is essential to preserve secrecy in placing the LRRP into an operational area. Landing by helicopter at last light and entry by foot march have been used. The former has been the least successful technique unless the LZ was at a distance from the operational area and located in an area of little VC activity.

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OBSERVATION: To insure unobstructed entry, foot march is favored for the final approach to the area of operations.

ITEM: The necessity for employment of the air cavalry troop's maintenance and recovery helicopter on all unit missions has proven to be of paramount importance.

DISCUSSION: In order to make timely assessment of damage incurred to aircraft and to assure prompt repair or evacuation, it is highly desirable to have the maintenance aircraft on station, and employed in its primary role when a troop mission is taking place. It is very unrealistic to utilize the maintenance and recovery aircraft as a troop carrier backup and expect it to function effectively in its primary role. Damaged aircraft assessments are accomplished rapidly and the helicopter is either flown out or expeditiously evacuated in order to reduce vulnerability to enemy actions. Having this aircraft readily available during operations also increases the capability to immediately evacuate wounded personnel.

OBSERVATION: The use of the maintenance and recovery helicopter assigned to the maintenance section of the troop should be confined to its primary role.

ITEM: The use of OH aircraft in the aerial reconnaissance role is effective and reduces the valuable flight time of armed helicopters.

DISCUSSION: The use of light scout (OH-23) for reconnaissance and surveillance missions is realistic and effective. The tendency has been to utilize the armed UH-1B helicopter in observation roles because of its greater survivability in the event it is fired upon. Limitations on the OH-23 are ineffective armament subsystems, low survivability, and incompatibility of the old and new series of radios.

OBSERVATION: Increased use should be made of the light scout aircraft (OH-23) of the air cavalry troop for reconnaissance.

ITEM: Road trafficability during the monsoon season.

DISCUSSION: Units have experienced difficulty with trafficability on secondary roads and within operational base areas. This situation was not experienced prior to the monsoon season. This problem is normally encountered with vehicles carrying supplies such as ammunition, repair parts, barrier materials and similar items. Trafficability can be increased to a great extent by spread loading supplies and equipment among organic vehicles.

OBSERVATION: Habitual spread loading of heavy supplies and equipment will increase trafficability during the monsoon season.

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ITEM: Combined Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC).

DISCUSSION: A CSCC, jointly operated by ARVN and US personnel, was recently employed by the 25th Inf Div during the period 3-9 June 1966. The CSCC functioned well, and contributed to mutual understanding between US and ARVN forces. Rapid reaction to various situations was made possible by close and continuous ARVN-US coordination. In the planning phase of joint operations, consideration must be given to the physical layout of the CSCC facilities.

(1) Billeting of ARVN personnel must be a responsibility of the headquarters setting up the CSCC. Because the ARVN is short of equipment, US personnel must make every effort to be good hosts and provide comparable facilities for them.

(2) ARVN personnel should be briefed on the area surrounding the DTCC to include all facilities and specific location of guards. Guards in turn should be briefed on the number of ARVN personnel in the area and when they work and sleep.

(3) US personnel should, whenever possible, escort their ARVN counterparts to meals to preclude any misunderstandings.

OBSERVATION: Consideration given to the above will eliminate misunderstandings and promote a much more efficient and harmonious working relationship between US and ARVN forces.

ITEM: Attached airmobile company.

DISCUSSION: On extended operations, the attachment of the same airmobile company for the duration of the operation would eliminate repeated orientation of the crews on enemy and friendly dispositions. In addition, mutual confidence and training would be greatly enhanced.

OBSERVATION: In allocation of airmobile assets, consideration should be given to attaching the same airmobile company to a unit for the duration of their operation.

ITEM: Joint utilization of tactical assets.

DISCUSSION: The confidence and professionalism of ARVN has been markedly improved by providing them with resources to react to current intelligence, i.e., tactical air, artillery, and army aircraft. Frequently the brigades will release their assets to the ARVN for short periods of time in order for them to conduct limited operations.

OBSERVATION: This technique must be exploited in order to insure continued ARVN participation in pacification efforts.

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ITEM: Early identification and coordination with supporting airmobile units is essential to proper aviation planning and the satisfactory execution of airmobile operations.

DISCUSSION: The identification of supporting non-divisional airmobile companies is frequently delayed until the evening before a scheduled combat operation. Such delays precipitate numerous unnecessary problems in coordination, planning and execution of airmobile operations.

OBSERVATION: Supporting non-divisional airmobile companies should be identified a minimum of 18 hours prior to an operation.

ITEM: Air traffic congestion. The control of all air traffic in the objective area in an airmobile assault is vested in the Air Mission Commander.

DISCUSSION: Repeated instances of unauthorized aircraft intruding into the objective area during an airmobile assault continues to cause collision hazards to aircraft participating in the assault. These aircraft interrupt or delay supporting fires, and result in the unnecessary maneuvering of assault aircraft.

OBSERVATION: The flight of observer aircraft into the objective area of an airmobile operation must be coordinated and cleared with the Air Mission Commander. He will assign routes, altitudes and communications necessary to insure control.

ITEM: Communications support for tactical operations.

DISCUSSION: The signal equipment utilized in support of tactical operations for the 25th Inf Div in RVN has been reduced. The airmobile concept employed by division eliminated the use of signal equipment mounted in 2 1/2 ton trucks and required a smaller signal element for support. The equipment affected by this concept is the Radio Terminal (AN/MTC-69), Manual Telephone Central (AN/MTC-3), and Teletypewriter Central Office (AN/MTC-29). The signal battalion has, used the T&E Manual Central Office (AN/MTC-7) and Teletypewriter Central Office Set (AN/MTC-17) which are mounted in 3/4 ton trucks, to replace the AN/MTC-3 and AN/MTC-29 respectively. To replace the AN/MTC-69 with a piece of equipment that would be airmobile, an AN/MTC 34.5 (so designated by the Signal Battalion) was improvised. This set consists of equipment from an AN/MTC-69 mounted in a 3/4 ton trailer. It provides 4 to 12 channels of VHF communications. The accessory equipment, to include GE-75 generators, is stored in a 3/4 ton truck. In addition, this equipment has a reduced height of 72 inches enabling it to be airlifted by the CH-47.

OBSERVATION: The reduced signal element provides adequate communications for tactical operations. The AN/MTC 34.5 has been on three operations, BVA, KAHNA I & II. Results were outstanding.

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(9) (FOUO) Organization and Training.

ITEM: TO&E Changes.

DISCUSSION: The 125th Signal Battalion is preparing changes to the TO&E requesting additional equipment and personnel. The following items will be requested:

(1) Additional photographic equipment and personnel to augment the present photographic service.

(2) Special lightweight VHF Radio Terminals (AN/MRC-112's) to support the airmobile concept.

(3) Additional machineguns for the signal elements supporting tactical operations.

OBSERVATION: Because of the geographical location and operational commitments, the additional equipment and personnel are necessary.

ITEM: Pathfinder assistance is necessary in the conduct of airmobile operations.

DISCUSSION: The 25th Aviation Battalion has learned through the conduct of airmobile operations over a four-month period, that the assistance of pathfinder personnel is essential to the efficient accomplishment of airmobile assaults and extractions. Operations conducted during the hours of darkness require pathfinder assistance both in the staging area and in the landing zone. Night airmobile assaults cannot be effectively conducted without them.

OBSERVATION: Due to the large number of airmobile operations being conducted by divisional units, recommend that a pathfinder detachment be provided each division size unit in RVN.

ITEM: A division aviation battalion must have the capability to exercise adequate control over both organic and attached operational aircraft.

DISCUSSION: A division aviation battalion must have a flight following capability. This would enable the unit to recall aircraft for rapid reaction operations, provide flight and mission information, and to initiate search and rescue operations. A flight control center, equipped with both FM and UHF radios, and manned by sufficient personnel for continuous 24 hour operations, is required to give the aviation battalion this capability.

OBSERVATION: Current TO&E's do not provide this capability for division aviation battalions operating in RVN. Recommend that personnel and equipment be authorized to implement a flight following center.

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ITEM: An Airfield Command Section is required to control and coordinate airfield activities at division level.

DISCUSSION: The activity generated by organic and attached aircraft operating from a division base airfield is beyond the present control capability of the division aviation battalion. The additional activity of refueling and rearming during the conduct of airmobile operations, together with traffic control for the numerous flights operating from the division base airfield, necessitates a control and coordinating agency for efficient functioning of airfield activities.

OBSERVATION: In the absence of an Airfield Operating Detachment, it is recommended that an Airfield Command Section be authorized the aviation battalion to control airfield activities.

ITEM: Additional helicopter maintenance personnel are required to maintain the desired availability rate of aircraft in RVN.

DISCUSSION: Increased aircraft maintenance requirements, caused by operating in unfavorable climatic conditions and by combat damage, severely increases the normal workload of assigned maintenance personnel.

OBSERVATION: Recommend that sufficient additional helicopter maintenance personnel be authorized the aviation battalion in order to be able to implement a 24 hour maintenance operation.

ITEM: Door gunners are essential for inflight security of aircraft during both combat and administrative flights in RVN.

DISCUSSION: During all flights of UH-1D and UH-1B helicopters, both the helicopter crew chief and a door gunner armed with M60 machineguns provide inflight security for the aircraft. The need for armed door gunners is especially great when operating at low level. Their worth has been proven during 5 years of helicopter operations in RVN.

OBSERVATION: Current TO&E's do not provide for door gunners for each assigned UH-1 aircraft. Recommend that they be authorized the aviation battalion to provide necessary inflight security.

ITEM: The aviation battalion has determined in conducting airmobile operations over a period of 4 months, that it is necessary to provide the Commanding General, each Brigade Commander, and the Aviation Battalion Commander with a UH-1D helicopter equipped with the Airborne Command Console AN/ASC-6.

DISCUSSION: To provide the ground commander with adequate communications facilities with his subordinate units and supporting agencies, the airborne command control aircraft should be equipped with the Airborne Command Console AN/ASC-6. The AN/ASC-6 also provides the Aviation Battalion Commander (Air Mission Commander) the communications capability with which to control airmobile operations.

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OBSERVATION: Recommend that sufficient aircraft equipped with the AN/ASU-5 console be provided the aviation battalion to fulfill operational needs.

ITEM: Detained aviation replacements are an unnecessary burden on a tactical organization.

DISCUSSION: It is presently necessary to transition aviators by both type and model aircraft, and conduct aerial gunnery training for armed helicopter pilots. This places a burden on aircraft availability, and reduces combat effectiveness. It requires 25 hours of valuable UH-1 time to train in this model. Training in gunnery and armed helicopter tactics is required by all aviators assigned to armed helicopters. This requires a minimum of an additional 10 hours of aircraft time prior to combat.

OBSERVATION: That individual aviator replacements be assigned according to their aircraft qualifications, or training be conducted prior to assignment to a tactical unit.

ITEM: Generator Classes.

DISCUSSION: Generators are the life-blood of a signal battalion. Climatic conditions and their continued use require that all generator operators be familiar with the basic fundamentals of generators. A generator class, examination, and critique has been conducted to determine what areas of instruction should be intensified.

OBSERVATION: These classes have increased the operators efficiency, and decreased generator down time.

(4) (C) Intelligence.

ITEM: Close liaison with HWI intelligence collection agencies.

DISCUSSION: Close liaison with Sector and Subsector advisors, Special Forces detachments, and village chiefs has provided this headquarters with timely intelligence that would have been received too late for immediate reaction.

OBSERVATION: Maintaining close liaison with the above mentioned agencies is necessary in order to maintain a timely and current intelligence system.

ITEM: Red Haze missions.

DISCUSSION: Red Haze missions are being flown over areas recently fired on by artillery. Many reported omissions are, in fact, fires started by artillery fire.

OBSERVATION: Coordination between Division G2 Air and Division Artillery operations will considerably reduce, if not eliminate, Red Haze missions over areas being subjected to artillery fire.

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ITEM: SLAR Reports.

DISCUSSION: Information collected by SLAR has been slow in reaching units which have an immediate reaction capability. In many instances SLAR information gathered at night has not reached a firing unit until the following morning.

OBSERVATION: SLAR pickups should be immediately transmitted to an organization within range of the target. This can best be achieved by radioing information on artillery aircraft warning nets.

ITEM: H & I Program.

DISCUSSION: G2 Air conducted an extensive aerial reconnaissance over the area of operations during Operation FIREBALL I. As a consequence much target information was gathered thereby permitting the artillery unit to immediately initiate an effective H & I program. The success of this endeavor can be adjudged by the fact that an enemy mortar attack was not mounted on the artillery battery or supported unit even though both occupied VC dominated territory for three weeks.

OBSERVATION: Development of a sound H & I plan prior to occupation of strange territory will considerably reduce the possibility of mortar attacks.

ITEM: Intelligence furnished by RVN children.

DISCUSSION: On 2 August 1966, several small children informed members of an armored cavalry platoon of the location of several mines which were located in a parking area adjacent to Highway 1, southeast of CU CHI. As a result of this information three anti-tank mines were located and destroyed.

OBSERVATION: Sincere efforts of US personnel to befriend the Vietnamese people often yield tangible results.

ITEM: Quick reaction to perishable intelligence.

DISCUSSION: The use of quick reaction forces that have reacted to perishable intelligence reports from agents and other collection agencies has been very successful. If there is any delay in the reaction to this intelligence, the target usually has disappeared.

OBSERVATION: Quick reaction forces such as Eagle Flights are needed in order to react to timely intelligence.

ITEM: The use of returnees (CHIEU HOI) as an important source of intelligence.

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DISCUSSION: Recent experience has proven that one of the most profitable sources of intelligence is a returnee (CHIEU HOI). Many times the returnees have led US and ARVN troops to secret tunnels where weapons and supplies have been located. The returnee also provides US/ARVN intelligence agencies with names of VC in the different villages. Immediate operations to exploit this intelligence with the returnee accompanying the unit has proven most successful.

OBSERVATION: One of the best sources of information concerning VC activities and supply routes has been the returnee (CHIEU HOI).

ITEM: Interrogation teams at battalion level.

DISCUSSION: The use of interrogation teams by battalions while operating on a separate mission has proven highly successful. The information gathered by the team is immediately available to the S2 and in some cases the captives have shown US forces the location of supplies and weapons.

OBSERVATION: When battalions are on separate operations, interrogation teams at battalion level can provide the commander with timely intelligence.

ITEM: Pictomaps.

DISCUSSION: Only recently have pictomaps of our AO been made available to combat units. Prior to that time, the standard 1:50,000 map and aerial photos were used for operations. Now that pictomaps are available, the requirement for aerial photos has been greatly reduced.

OBSERVATION: The use of pictomaps, scale 1:25,000 have proven extremely valuable to combat units.

ITEM: Intelligence net.

DISCUSSION: The use of a brigade intelligence net when two or more battalions are operating in the field provides the S2's with a means to transmit and receive intelligence details without congestion of the brigade command net. In order to effectively operate an intelligence net, the requirement exists for each battalion to have a PRC-25 authorized for the S2. With this capability there would be an improvement in the intelligence flow.

OBSERVATION: Battalion S2's should be authorized a PRC-25 and RPO since the jeep mounted radio is not available for haliborne operations.

ITEM: Indigenous labor.

DISCUSSION: Many of the same members of the labor force return to units on a rotating basis. Many guards, who are assigned to the duty frequently, become too friendly with the civilians. The possibility of infiltration of the labor force by VC is an ever present threat. Laziness or carelessness by the guards could have disastrous results.

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OBSERVATION: Guards must remain attentive and alert while guarding members of the labor force. They must be cautioned not to become too friendly with the civilians.

ITEM: Aerial reconnaissance.

DISCUSSION: Aerial reconnaissance of proposed LZ's is normally conducted in conjunction with airborne assaults. An aerial reconnaissance conducted jointly by the Airborne Commander and the Troop Commander is highly desirable. However, recent experience has shown that too many separate reconns are being made by various elements. The practice of over-reconning an objective area or LZ is highly detrimental to the airborne assault, in that the enemy seems to be aware of our intentions and is prepared to deliver heavy volumes of ground fire. Continuous orbiting of the proposed LZ by numerous aircraft, is certain to compromise the tactical plan.

OBSERVATION: Reconnaissance must be held to a minimum when planning airborne operations. Devious flight routes and avoidance of the objective area must be employed to prevent direct enemy observation and possible compromise of the tactical plan.

ITEM: Ground fire.

DISCUSSION: The incidence of ground fire directed at aircraft within the TACR has increased in total numbers of rounds delivered and accuracy. More automatic weapons are apparently being employed by the VC, especially in certain areas. Hits are being sustained at higher altitudes which indicate the VC are developing more sophisticated techniques in loading the weapons. Reports of heavy caliber automatic weapons are received in several areas. .50 caliber fire has been received by aircraft on two occasions in the TACR.

OBSERVATION: Aviators are instructed to vary flight path and altitude when reportedly flying over known danger areas. The use of low level (nap-of-the-earth) tactics is implemented when heavy caliber automatic weapons fire is encountered.

ITEM: Ground Fire Charts.

DISCUSSION: The ground fire chart is a valuable tool, by which routes, danger areas can be predetermined. A 60 day presentation on the chart, sometimes traces the path of an enemy force and provides valuable intelligence on enemy patterns of habit. The chart is also used to brief new aviators, or those not familiar with the AO.

OBSERVATION: Recommend that all units having organic aircraft maintain a ground fire chart. Pilots must report all incidents of ground fire to their parent unit as soon as possible so that the chart can be constantly updated.

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ITEM: Interrogation, Prisoners of War. It is the policy of some VC units to have all their soldiers carry CHIEU HOI leaflets for use in the event of capture.

DISCUSSION: Through interrogation of a VCC who belonged to the DL4 Bn, Mobile Force, TAY NINH Province, it was learned that each soldier in that unit carries a CHIEU HOI leaflet. He is instructed that in case of capture, he is to present the document and claim that he was on his way to rally. The captives who furnished this information also used this tactic and only after several days of interrogation did he admit that he had no intentions of rallying prior to his capture.

OBSERVATION: A man who is captured automatically loses any rights he may have had under the CHIEU HOI Program. He is a VCC and should be treated as a prisoner of war until proven otherwise.

The majority of the VCC who are captured, while not actually bearing arms, are almost always implicated by documents found on his person or those found near his place of capture.

DISCUSSION: When a Vietnamese is apprehended in an operational area and he has no incriminating evidence on his person to prove he is a VC, the interrogation amounts to "his word against the interrogator's". Most persons whose names appear on VC documents have difficulty explaining the circumstances. To date, the following types of VC have been captured and confessed to being VC simply because the prompt evacuation of the person's documents or documents found in the immediate vicinity of the place of capture produced evidence which the VC could not deny.

- (1) VC medic for DUC HUE District, HAU NGHIA Province.
- (2) Village finance cadre, DUC HUE District.
- (3) A member of the DUC HOA District Military Provisions Section.
- (4) A member of G-20 Reconnaissance Company, SAIGON-GIA-DINH Special Region.

OBSERVATION: It is imperative that documents captured on the person of a VC or near the place of capture accompany the VC during evacuation.

ITEM: Approximately 1,000 indigenous laborers are employed daily at the division base camp which presents an ideal vehicle to the VC for infiltration of espionage agents and saboteurs inside the division perimeter. This local labor pool is constantly screened by the CI Section, 25th MI Det as part of Operation KLEEN, to detect any espionage or sabotage threat.

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DISCUSSION: The known and suspected VC elements, their families, and their sympathizers comprise a substantial segment of the civilian population in the area contiguous to the division base. The following actions are currently in effect to minimize the risks inherent in such a labor force.

(1) A daily search and shakedown of all laborers prior to entering or leaving the base, with close supervision by noncommissioned US personnel to prevent the introduction or removal of contraband, espionage, or sabotage devices. Women are hired in order to more effectively search women laborers.

(2) A continual screening of ID Cards, with periodic assistance by the National Police to detect bearers of false ID Cards in the division labor force.

(3) A continual collection and photocopying during the workday of laborer's ID Cards provides a growing base of personnel data for comparison with current black and gray list holdings and for counterintelligence investigation.

(4) Informants have been, and are being, developed at various levels within and without the base camp to report on suspects within the labor force.

OBSERVATION: Current search procedures reduce VC espionage potential to a minimum; the ID Card checks hamper attempts to gain access with false documentation; developed informants and other counterintelligence measures have resulted in the detection and apprehension of six self confessed VC espionage agents and the elimination of other known or suspected VC found in the division labor force.

ITEM: Collection and recording of personnel data on known and suspected hostile personalities in positions to affect the mission of the division is one of the necessary functions of the Counterintelligence Section, 25th MI Detachment. The growing compilations become a basic tool of division investigation and intelligence operations.

DISCUSSION: At the onset of division operations in the current TAOR, local agencies furnished data on approximately 150 known or suspected VC. At the close of the current quarter, division intelligence activities had increased the black and gray list holdings to nearly 1600 known or suspected VC personalities plus a listing of over 1500 employees and other individuals of intelligence interest. These had initially been compiled in a conventional card file, but the requirements of the CHECKMATE program to include automobile raids dictated a greater flexibility in access to this centrally located card file. The following actions were taken to meet operational needs:

(1) It was determined that Division AG Machine Records Branch could provide technical and automated assistance to reproduce old data and integrate new and additional data to the present black list and other intelligence personalities holdings.

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(2) An alpha-numeric code was devised by personnel of the Counter-intelligence Section, 25th Inf Det, to translate current files into a format usable by AG Machine Records Branch.

OBSERVATION: The resultant machine records roster provide for a ready reproduction of current intelligence holdings in their entirety by geographic or populated area; by military unit or by types of personalities. This form of automation permits simultaneous and instant use of the local division intelligence personalities assets by several elements of the division and in varied operational areas. It also provides for ready dissemination of information to other headquarters. The system has been accomplished with currently authorized personnel and equipment.

ITEM: Aerial photos of selected ambush sites have provided several advantages to ambush patrols.

DISCUSSION: When ambush patrols are furnished large scale aerial photos of ambush sites, the following advantages occur:

- (1) Thorough orientation of all patrol members regarding terrain features is possible prior to departure.
- (2) Best areas of concealment are revealed.
- (3) Avenues of approach and escape are identified.
- (4) Any enemy defenses within the kill zone such as trenches, AN positions or possible bunkers can usually be identified by imagery interpreters overprinting these positions directly on the photograph.

OBSERVATION: Units should exploit this asset to the fullest extent. Personnel attending the 25th Inf Div Ambush Academy are presently schooled in this technique.

ITEM: Tactical use of aerial photography in County Fair operations.

DISCUSSION: Large scale aerial photographs of selected areas, such as hamlets or villages can be put together as a photo mosaic to portray a specific area, with identifying data posted thereon, which can be successfully used as follows:

- (1) When County Fair operations are planned, squad leaders are equipped with photos of the specific area with the exact houses or buildings marked that his squad is to search or exploit. Complete coverage is assured beforehand.
- (2) When used by interrogators large scale aerial photos of a selected area enables a person being questioned to point out to the interrogator each individual house or position of interest being discussed. This is an excellent aid to communication and understanding.

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OBSERVATION: The above technique is being employed on a continuing basis by elements of the 25th Inf Div with considerable success.

ITEM: Use of special Imagery Interpretation Reports.

DISCUSSION: Special imagery interpretation reports can be utilized to depict the enemy situation in a given area by portraying the information contained in the report directly on 1:25,000 pictomaps thereby providing commanders with a graphic display of the terrain in an objective area.

OBSERVATION: This technique should be applied during small unit actions utilizing the latest imagery interpretation reports that cover the objective area. Special Imagery Interpretation Reports are distributed to battalion level on all aerial photo missions flown.

ITEM: Targeting section at division level.

DISCUSSION: The organization of the division level targeting section has proven extremely valuable in the collation and evaluation of intelligence data. This data is developed into a daily target list which provides FSE with a list of lucrative, active, target areas. Additionally, for each planned operation a supplemental target list is provided to the maneuver elements and supporting units. Data collated includes but is not limited to the following:

- (1) Imagery interpretation reports.
- (2) SPAR reports.
- (3) Red Haze and SLAR reports.
- (4) Incidents of aircraft receiving fire.
- (5) Agents reports.
- (6) All Order of Battle information.
- (7) Roadblocks, ambushes and attacks by the enemy.
- (8) Intelligence estimates and special studies.
- (9) Visual aerial reconnaissance reports.
- (10) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol reports.
- (11) IPW reports.

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OBSERVATION: The full utilization of this section has resulted in a continuous flow of lucrative targets to be exploited by TAC air, artillery, gunships and ground maneuver elements. All units should continue to exploit this valuable resource. In this connection, unit reports of defenses encountered and destroyed prove extremely valuable in keeping targeting data current and valid.

ITEM: VC letter box numbers.

DISCUSSION: Letter box numbers are one of the most positive means used to identify VC units. It has been found that VC units may have several code/cover names, and the unit may switch cover names frequently to confuse friendly intelligence efforts. Letter box numbers on the other hand are usually adhered to for an extended period of time.

CONCLUSION: Units should catalogue VC letter box numbers for easy identification of units.

ITEM: Leaflets utilized for possible informant recruitment.

DISCUSSION: Several reward type leaflets have been published and distributed which instruct any person with information concerning the VC to write this information on the backside of the leaflet and mail it to Box 12 at CU CHI, the District Headquarters. The leaflet has one corner ticked which he is instructed to tear off and retain as a receipt. The leaflet and the corner are both stamped with the same number. He is instructed to report at a later date with his receipt to the District Office to ascertain if his information has been of intelligence value.

OBSERVATION: This provides any Vietnamese with the anonymity he needs and desires while reporting information about VC activities, and offers an opportunity to recruit informants either permanently or temporarily through this screening system.

ITEM: CHIEU HOI Enticement.

DISCUSSION: Paywar leaflets to date concerning CHIEU HOI's consist mainly of written enticements which the average VC cannot read, or cartoons which he does not accept. The interrogation of CHIEU HOI's show a high illiteracy rate, and indicates that several of the major reasons for rallying consist of the following:

- (1) Constant hardships such as living in trenches and constantly on the move.
- (2) Constant fear of artillery fire and air strikes.
- (3) Constant hard work and lack of compensation.
- (4) Loneliness, separation from their families.

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(5) Lack of, or scarcity of food.

(6) False promises by the VC cadres regarding compensations and rewards. Utilizing these reasons, an approach is being made to have photographs of actual scenes of CHIEU HOI's and even ARVN families in a comfortable home with ample food and clothing, happy children, and a close knit happy family depicted in leaflet form. Each photograph would include a caption in simple Vietnamese which they can understand.

OBSERVATION: Leaflets of this type would have a greater psychological impact on the average VC as he will be able to observe the photos and more important, understand them, thereby increasing the possibilities of his rallying.

ITEM: Handling National Policemen during field operations.

DISCUSSION: Field operations conducted by division units will invariably require National Policemen (NP). The proper utilization of these NPs will materially affect the degree of success a unit attains during field operations. The treatment they receive and the method by which they are used while attached to a unit will also be of major importance in maintaining the close relationship needed with the National Police authorities to carry on this joint effort. The following techniques should be followed when working with NPs.

(1) Keep an NP, with interpreter, near the commander at all times to enable the commander to properly transmit his instructions to the NPs.

(2) Keep NPs escorted at all times with US troops. The NPs have a tendency to wander and the unit may lose control of their activities.

(3) Maintain a roster of attached NPs with their respective Police Stations indicated. This will assist in returning them to their proper duty station after the operation.

(4) Muster NPs each morning and night for control and accountability.

(5) When the NPs are interrogating, keep everyone away.

(6) Rice is their staple food. Conditions permitting, feed them rice with a C-Ration.

(7) Give appropriate commendations to those NPs whom you believe have performed beyond their normal duties.

OBSERVATION: Every little effort made to assist these NPs will reflect directly or indirectly on the success of the operation and enhance our relationship with the NP authorities for the continued support which we must have.

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(5) (FOUO) Logistics.

ITEM: Logistical support for operations.

DISCUSSION: Normally, brigades operating more than 20 minutes in flight time from base camp should be supplemented by sufficient personnel from Support Command to operate a Forward Support Operations Center (FSOC). The FSOC should have the capability to receive, store and issue all classes of supplies for brigade operations. Maintenance and medical support should also be adequate for sustained field operations. The FSOC should be resupplied in bulk by base camp FSOC. Forward units are in turn resupplied from FSOC by air/ground as appropriate.

OBSERVATION: The resupply by aircraft from base camp is undesirable due to time consumed and refueling.

ITEM: The requirement for float helicopters.

DISCUSSION: Whenever there is extensive battle damage incurred by any of the unit's helicopters, the division's combat effectiveness is automatically reduced. Provisions should be made to replace these aircraft by float aircraft to maintain a high availability. The accepted availability criteria has been set at 80% within this theater. However, experience has shown that the armed helicopters fall below this level primarily because of battle damage. The present availability rate for armed helicopters runs at less than 60%. If a float were to be established to replace aircraft which require maintenance for a period in excess of one week, the effectiveness of the unit would be considerably increased.

OBSERVATION: That a maintenance float for armed helicopters be established and maintained at the division direct support unit for issue to the using unit whenever an aircraft is required to be grounded for an extensive period. It is felt that an acceptable increase in availability would be realized if the float criteria were established at 20% of the division aircraft authorization.

ITEM: High attrition of selected items due to environment.

DISCUSSION: Weather, terrain and the requirements of operations in this area cause a high usage factor of certain items of supply. Items such as steel tow cables, tow pintles, tow pins, light tow bars and heavy tow bars are used extensively due to the soft areas in which heavy tracked vehicles must operate. These items are constantly breaking or in need of replacement. Suspension parts for track M113, and M88's are also in short supply because of continued heavy usage and mine damage.

OBSERVATION: That the high attrition rate of selected items be considered in order to keep the supply system responsive to user's demands at theater Army level.

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ITEM: Helicopter loading and unloading crews.

DISCUSSION: When receiving and extracting equipment and supplies from forward areas by helicopters, sufficient personnel, organized as a team, should be immediately available to load and off-load aircraft with minimum loss of time. Teams should clear the helicopter pad quickly so as not to interfere with incoming ships.

OBSERVATION: Teams should be organized to load and off-load helicopters with minimum loss of time.

ITEM: Control of helicopters.

DISCUSSION: When more than one unit of a brigade is being resupplied by air, all helicopters should be controlled by the Brigade S4.

OBSERVATION: Coordination is required to appropriately redistribute helicopters in favor of the most demanding unit. A representative from the Brigade S4 stationed on the resupply pad is of great importance for maintaining control.

ITEM: Communication power units.

DISCUSSION: Adequate power units should be made available to units before deployment. This unit is critically short of adequate power units. 72 each, 5KW generators are being used with communications equipment that requires 10KW generators. Most of these generators have surpassed their life expectancy by 50 per cent. As expected, downtime is increasing rapidly. These unreliable generators are a serious threat to division communications.

OBSERVATION: Adequate power units should be made available to units before deployment.

ITEM: Artillery propelling charges.

DISCUSSION: Damp powder seriously affects the accuracy of artillery projectiles. Every effort should be made to keep powder dry. Canisters for 155/8 inch propelling charges must be securely sealed. Semi-fixed ammunition, once exposed to weather, will accumulate moisture rapidly and should be broken open only in small quantities. If repacked in fiber containers the containers must be resealed. A system of ammunition rotation which provides for firing of opened rounds and firing of repacked rounds before breaking open additional ammunition will considerably reduce damp powder problems.

OBSERVATION: Storage of propelling charges and rotation of ammunition must be carefully planned and actively supervised, especially during the Vietnam monsoon season.

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ITEM: Rotation of rations.

DISCUSSION: Rations are susceptible to deterioration due to climatic conditions and storage facilities.

OBSERVATION: Losses can be prevented by off ground storage and continual rotation. A cover should be provided which shields the rations from sun and rain without preventing adequate air circulation.

(6) Other.

a. (FOUO) Civic Action.

ITEM: Immediate response to death, injury or property damage caused by US units during operations.

DISCUSSION: As soon as possible after learning that death, injury or property damage has been caused, an informal investigation is conducted in order to determine what immediate relief can be affected. MILCAP forms are distributed.

OBSERVATION: Monetary and material assistance should be channeled through local officials. The showing of interest in the people's problems by the GVN is a major step in strengthening the people's faith in their government.

ITEM: Effectiveness of Helping Hand, US Aid, and Catholic Relief Society commodities.

DISCUSSION: Commodities from these organizations are used to support plans and objectives in conjunction with military operations and to initiate or support self-help projects.

OBSERVATION: The amount and type of aid should be determined by local officials. The commodities should also be distributed by local officials. Care should be exercised to insure that these commodities are not distributed to the extent of disrupting the local economy. The distribution has been effective when done properly. This has been evident by the changed attitude of the people towards the local officials and the US personnel.

ITEM: Effectiveness of English classes.

DISCUSSION: Classes are being conducted with the local officials, businessmen, school teachers, nurses, and young children desiring to learn the English language.

OBSERVATION: The English classes seem to be achieving the main objective, i.e., teaching English to the Vietnamese, giving the Vietnamese people a better idea of the American way of life and why the American soldier is in Vietnam. It also increases understanding between the Vietnamese people and the US soldier. The most effective classes do not have over 10 people.

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It is better to adequately teach a few people, than to have a large class learn relatively nothing.

ITEM: MEDCAPs must be handled properly to insure maximum results.

DISCUSSION: There are several factors which a MEDCAP must include to be successful. Adequate security, working area with some degree of privacy, and one interpreter per each doctor as a minimum is required. Local health officials should establish a screening program so that the doctors time is effectively used. Crowd control will require extra personnel. A portable shower unit can effectively be used to clean patients and draw any inquisitive children to another area. Any civic action distribution should be held in an area away from the MEDCAP site.

OBSERVATION: All incoming S5s, and surgeons should be briefed on proper steps for a successful MEDCAP.

b. Psychological Operations.

ITEM: Use of aircraft in psychological operations.

DISCUSSION: Both the OH-23 and UH-1 helicopters have been successfully employed in support of psychological operations. Aircraft have been flown for leaflet drops and loudspeaker missions. The OH-23 has proven to be a more desirable vehicle for leaflet drops than the UH-1. The wind flow path around a UH-1 aircraft tends to pull the leaflets back in the open door and scatter them inside the helicopter.

OBSERVATION: The OH-23 is well suited for employment in support of psy ops when available. The following flight techniques are deemed advisable in the conduct of these missions:

- (1) Maintain an altitude of at least 1500 feet above the terrain.
- (2) Make trial leaflet drops to note wind direction and velocity.
- (3) Note speaker amplification and maintain an altitude of 2000 feet on speaker missions.
- (4) Do not hover over the drop area as helicopters are lucrative targets for the VC.

ITEM: Effect of psychological operations.

DISCUSSION: Leaflets and loudspeakers used in various areas have a positive effect on the village people.

OBSERVATION: Local officials will furnish sound ideas for effective propaganda in their areas. They wish to counter the VC influence and are anxious for psy war operations to be conducted. Due to lack of communication media (Radio, TV, Press) pamphlets and loudspeakers are an effective means to tell the people what is happening.

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b. (C) Commanders Recommendations.

(1) Unlike previous operations in the TAOR in which the objective was the location and destruction of VC main and local force units, supplies, fortifications and base areas, three operations, Operation FORT SMITH east of TRANG BANG (XT4519), Operation FRESNO west of BAO TRAI (XT5204), and Operation SANTI FE east of BAO TRAI, were primarily intended as grass roots pacification ventures. These operations positioned an Inf Bn (+) in an insecure area and by a combination of joint civil affairs and limited combat operations improved the security situation and made the Vietnamese government's presence and position understood by the local populace. The pilot pacification operation was HALLI conducted by the 1/27th Inf in the DUC LAM area during 27 April - 12 May. The experiences and lessons learned from this operation were applied to the three other operations. Obviously an operation of this nature geared to winning over the local populace and undermining VC influence in a particular area will not result in spectacular results or large VC losses. The effects are nonetheless impressive and in the long run perhaps even more critical to victory in Vietnam. Results that have been ascertained thus far include:

(a) Introduction of GVN officials into villages and hamlets which because of the existing security situation has not been ventured into for several years.

(b) Marked increase in the commercial traffic along the main LOC's and tertiary trails in the operational area. Particularly noteworthy is the current volume of traffic on the road between CU CHI and the province capital BAO TRAI. Although previously considered under government control this road was seldom traveled by government or military vehicles without escort.

(c) Amelioration of the US and Vietnamese government's image through the conduct of "County Fair", MEDCAP, distribution of Helping Hand goods and other civil affairs projects in the operational area.

(d) The breaching of the VC local political and military organization and long standing infrastructure in the area. This is evidenced by the noticeable increase in voluntary informants, and the willingness of the VCC and VCS apprehended to implicate fellow cell committee members. In one case, a VC platoon leader through his wife indicated his desire to surrender to US forces in the area. Once apprehended the platoon leader turned in his weapon and led a patrol to the hiding places of 9 other members of his platoon who were captured on the spot. On four separate occasions village children also led patrols to VC arms caches containing numerous mortar rounds, grenades and booby traps.

(e) Improvement of the cooperation and rapport between the 25th Infantry Division and Vietnamese Government and Military Authorities in BAO NGHIA Province, which in turn has resulted in a significant increase in military operations against the VC by the 25th AMVN Division.

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(f) A bolstering of the spirit and substance of the RF and PF effectiveness in the operational area as a result of: (1) ~~ammunition~~ forces, (2) fire support, to include gunships and illumination, and (3) physical improvement of outpost fortifications. (For a more detailed analysis see App 14, 25th Div Pacification Operations in HAU NINHIA Province (U).)

(2) The use of attached personnel carriers on S&D operations as well as pacification operations has greatly enhanced the ability of a dismounted infantry battalion to rapidly close with and destroy the enemy. When an infantry battalion has attached personnel carriers, its movement is not as vulnerable to a few well positioned, well camouflaged enemy riflemen. Valuable time is often lost determining the location of a sniper. When track vehicles are a part of the maneuver element of an infantry battalion, this time is greatly reduced because the tracked maneuver element can close rapidly with the enemy to reduce or eliminate the sniper fire.

(3) During Operations FIREBALL I and COCO PALMS, single firing batteries, with security attachments, were deployed in a direct support role for battalion size maneuver elements. In each case, a command and control group was utilized. The group consisted of a field grade officer, a lieutenant, NCO representatives of the Battalion S2 and S3 sections, one clerk and two RTO's. The command group provided tactical fire control, the necessary command structure, insured that all personnel were briefed on the operation in progress and aware of the friendly and enemy situation, and aided in the coordination of supporting/reinforcing fires.

(4) Use of 155mm fires in direct support of infantry advancing in heavy undergrowth of semi-forested areas has proved effective.

(5) Adverse weather and bad road conditions during the monsoon season require units to load vehicles only to prescribed load limits.

(6) When operating during the monsoon season, tracked vehicles are essential to insure emplacement and extraction of artillery pieces and vehicles.

(7) The capability of the aviation battalion to respond rapidly and effectively to a wide variety of combat aviation missions has resulted primarily from the development of combat experienced small unit leaders and flight crews. Perpetuation of this capability will be dependent upon the timely input of replacements for these personnel.

(8) Experience has proven that an infantry division operating in a counter insurgency environment requires a minimum of two organic airmobile companies. Airmobile companies in a direct support role are not

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responsive to the division. Planning is hampered by daily changing of direct support companies, and nonavailability of support frequently requires radical changes in the ground tactical plan. An MTOE adding an additional airmobile company to the division has been submitted.

FOR HIS CONSIDER:

Thomas W. Melles

15 Encls
Appendices
1 thru 15

THOMAS W. MELLES
Colonel GS
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

- ACofS for Force Dev, DA (thru channels) (1)
- ACofS for Force Dev, DA (thru IIFORNEY) (2)(3)
- CG, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOF-JH (direct) (4)
- CG, USARPAC, ATTN: AVC-JH (direct) (5) (6) (7)
- CG, IIFORNEY, ATTN: ACofS G3 (8)
- CG, U.S. Army Inf Sch, Ft Benning, Ga. (9)
- CG, U.S. Army Armor Sch, Ft Knox, Ky. (10)
- CG, U.S. Army Human Res Unit, Ft Benning, Ga. (11)
- USACDC In Off, APO 96558 (12)

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DECLASSIFY AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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PERSONNEL ROSTER

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	
Commanding General	Major General	Fred C. Woyand	
Asst Div Commander	Brigadier General	Edward de Saussure	
CofS	Colonel	Thomas W. Mollen	
ACofS G1	Lt Colonel	Duane W. Compton	
ACofS G2	Lt Colonel Lt Colonel	James W. Cannon Harley F. Noonoy	Thru 31 May 1966 Eff 1 Jun 1966
ACofS G3	Lt Colonel	Truman E. Boudinot	
ACofS G4	Lt Colonel Lt Colonel	William E. Davis John L. Moffat	Thru 24 Jul 1966 Eff 25 Jul 1966
ACofS G5	Lt Colonel	Robert R. Hicks	
Div Surgeon	Lt Colonel Major	Robert D. Gamble Kelly G. Gregory	Thru 24 Jul 1966 Eff 25 Jul 1966
Div Gnl Off	Lt Colonel Major	Robert E. Bundy Herbert G. Evans	Thru 24 Jul 1966 Eff 25 Jul 1966
IO	Major	William C. Shepard	
AG	Lt Colonel	Herbert L Forsythe	
SJA	Lt Colonel	David T. Bryant	
Div Chaplain	Lt Colonel	Alexander L. Parson	
Div IG	Lt Colonel	Felix Salvades	
Div Ava Off	Lt Colonel	Edward P. Davis	
Div Engr Off	Lt Colonel	Carroll D. Strider	
Div Fin Off	Major	Dwight L. Groninger	
Div Trans Off	Lt Colonel	Kenneth R. Haas	
CO, 25th Div Artillery	Colonel	Daniel B. Williams	

Appendix 1 to 25th Inf Div Operational Report on Lessons Learned for
Qtr ending 31 Jul 66

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Personnel Roster (Cont'd)


<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	
OO, 7/11th Arty	Lt Colonel	William D. Brown	
OO, 1/8th Arty	Lt Colonel	Robert G. Walker	Thru 31 May 1966
	Lt Colonel	James W. Cannon	Eff 1 Jun 1966
OO, 3/13th Arty	Lt Colonel	Aaron E. Walker	Thru 14 Jul 1966
	Lt Colonel	Billy B. Nicholas	Eff 15 Jul 1966
OO, 25th Div Spt Comd	Colonel	Herbert S. Lowe	
OO, 725th Maint	Lt Colonel	Robert S. Proudfoot	
OO, 25th S&T	Lt Colonel	William S. Kittroll	
OO, 25th Mod	Lt Colonel	Jack Eskridge	
OO, 1st BCo	Colonel	William B. Sandlin	
OO, 2/14th Inf	Lt Colonel	John M. Schultz	Thru 11 Jul 1966
	Lt Colonel	William E. Davis	Eff 12 Jul 1966
OO, 4/9th Inf	Lt Colonel	Shepherd A Booth Jr.	
OO, 4/23d Inf	Lt Colonel	Michael Barsas	Thru 4 Jul 1966
	Lt Colonel	Louis J. North	Eff 5 Jul 1966
OO, 2d BCo	Colonel	Lynnwood H. Johnson	Thru 13 May 1966
	Colonel	Thomas M. Farplay	Eff 14 May 1966
OO, 1/27th Inf	Lt Colonel	Harley F. Moonoy Jr.	Thru 31 May 1966
	Lt Colonel	Alvin L. O'Neal	Eff 1 Jun 1966
OO, 2/27th Inf	Lt Colonel	Boyd T. Eshore	
OO, 1/5th (M) Inf	Lt Colonel	Thomas U. Groer	
OO, 125th Sig Bn	Lt Colonel	Thomas S. Ferguson	
OO, 25th Avn Bn	Lt Colonel	Edward P. Davis	
OO, 65th Engr Bn	Lt Colonel	Carroll D. Strider	
OO, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav	Lt Colonel	John R. Hendry	

Page 2 to Appendix 1 to 25th Inf Div Operational Report on Lessons Learned
for Qtr ending 31 Jul 66

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AFTER ACTION REPORT
"OPERATION MAIL"



1ST BATTALION 27TH INFANTRY

WOLF HOUNDS

27 APRIL 13 MAY 1966

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION 27TH INFANTRY
(THE WOLFHOUNDS)
APO US Forces 96225

TLIBA-T

3 June 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS/J3/32)

THRU: Commanding Officer
2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
ATTN: LODS-T
APO US Forces 96225

Commanding General
29th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVTIGC - M1
APO US Forces 96225

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO US Forces 96243

1. NAME OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION.

- a. Operation MAILI.
- b. Search and destroy; pacification.

2. DATES OF OPERATION.

27 April to 13 May 1966.

3. LOCATION.

HAU NGHIA Province in area bounded by XT5~~9999~~, XT546122, XT616~~59~~
and XT~~5799~~.

4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS.

1st Bn 27th Inf.

5. REPORTING OFFICER.

CO 1st Bn 27th Inf (Lt Col MOONEY, Commanding)

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6. TASK ORGANIZATION.

Co AI/27 Inf (Capt Mayone & Capt Laski)
Co BI/27 Inf (Capt Garrett)
Co CI/27 Inf (Capt Foss)
1B1/65 Engr (Lt Leatherwood)
1A3/4 Cav (Lt Trifiletti)
2A3/4 Cav (Lt Korosey)
3A3/4 Cav (Lt Weatherwax)
3A1/5 Mech (Lt McQuinn)
Plat AI/69 Armor
2d Spt Plat 16th RRU
3d Spt Plat 16th RRU
2d FASC Plat BI/25th Sig (Lt Rood)
25th Div MID (SA Detteline)

7. SUPPORTING FORCES: Supporting forces included direct support artillery by Btry A, 1st Bn 8th Arty during the period 27 April to 12 May 66, and Btry 1, 3d Bn 13th Arty which reinforced AI/8 Arty during the period 27 Apr to 2 May 66. Army Aviation support from the 25th Avn Bn greatly contributed to the success of Operation MAILI in the form of C & G aircraft and light fire teams to facilitate command, control and support of daily resupply convoys and search and destroy operations. The 25th Avn Bn did an outstanding job in supporting airmobile operations during Operation MAILI. HAU NGHIA Sector supported TF 1/27 by attaching 20 counterterrorist personnel and 6 National Police to TF for employment in night ambushes and search and destroy operations. The Sector also provided MEDCAP, Intelligence and Psywar personnel for the daily TF operations to aid in working with the Vietnamese people in the AO and to promote the pacification program. These ARVN personnel proved to be invaluable in gaining the cooperation of the people of the various hamlets and obtaining intelligence on VC activities. The 25th ARVN Division supported several TF search and destroy operations by providing battalion - size blocking forces to help seal off the objective areas. The 25th ARVN Division also conducted several operations in conjunction with operations being conducted by the 1/27 Inf TF.

8. INTELLIGENCE.

a. Intelligence prior to operation: The VC had been active in the operational area, especially around DUC LAP (XT554054) which had been subjected to several attacks, mining incidents, mortar attacks and sniper fire. VC units reported to be operating in AO included the DONG THAP (DT2) Regt consisting of the 267th Bn (strength 400) and the 269th Bn (strength 500); 506th Local Force Bn (strength 300); and C2 Company (strength 75-100). With the exception of C2 Co, which is a local force unit, the VC units are well equipped with assorted small arms and automatic weapons, 60mm and 81mm mortars, 57mm and 75mm Recoiless rifles. According to reports the DUC HOA LIASON ROUTE and VC SUPPLY ROUTE #1 B run through the operational area. A VC safe area was reported as being located in vic of XT5703, XT5903, XT5901. The last reported location of known VC units in AO: 267 Bn, DT2 Regt at XT48015 on 18 Apr 66; 269 Bn, DT2 Regt at XT401050 on 12 Apr 66; 506 Bn at XT528942 on 9 Apr 66; and C2 Co at XT6098.

2.

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b. Enemy situation during operation: VC resistance was primarily in the form of sniper and harassing fire, and employment of booby traps and mines. Two ~~6.25~~ mortars were fired in vic of ~~the base~~ (XT547049 and XT555055) the mortars were fired from vic XT5484. Villages in areas XT5773 and XT5688 were reported bases for guerrilla VC platoons. On 23 May a sqd (+) ambush from Co GI/27 made contact with one VC Co. From equipment and other material left after the VC were repulsed, the indications are the 1 VC KIA was a sqd leader of the intelligence plat, GI Co, 506 LF Bn. Another VC KIA was a member of the local VC Plat based in village vic XT5773. The VC Co evidently was aided in locating the ambush party by 3 women living in a temple vic XT56647. The three women were never located after this incident. Also, found in the area that contact was made were VC camouflaged straw hats, 1 belt of 30 cal M3 rounds, CHICOM carbine rounds, M1 and US carbine rounds. The village (96387) where the Co C ambush made contact seemed to be a VC meeting area as reflected by ARVN agent reports and 2 contacts made by this unit in that area resulting in VC KIA. Vic XT58222 there is a rice mill where, while on a search and destroy mission, Co 8 found documents which report the VC come to the rice mill frequently to eat. At times, reports indicate, the VC numbered 120. The preceding information was also verified by the Sector National Police chief and his US Advisor via their agent reports.

c. Terrain and Weather:

(1) Terrain: Terrain in AO is flat (dried out rice fields) with intermittent wooded areas (hedgerows), where houses are located. Heaviest vegetated area is in "VC Safe Area" vic XT5773.

(2) Weather: Moderate daily rains and occasional thunderstorms characterized the weather during the period. During the initial days of the operation the weather was hot and humid, but the weather became progressively cooler and more precipitous. The rains did not present a serious obstacle to trafficability on the principal roads; however, in four daily S & D operations tanks were bogged down in wet, marshy areas. Three different times VTR's were required to return the tanks. APC's had no difficulty in traversing cross-country.

d. Fortifications: The AO had numerous spiderholes and bunkers with overhead cover. During the operation, the Bn TF destroyed or filled up 174 spiderholes, 214 bunkers, 16 trenches, and 6 tunnels.

e. Civic Action/PsyOps: Evaluation of population and attitudes through the MEDCAP II program, distribution of Helping Hand materiel, distribution of GVN leaflets (CHIEU HOI, etc) and pamphlets, distribution of 25th Inf Div leaflets, and utilization of ARVN MEDCAP, PsyOps and Civil Affairs Teams this Task Force established a highly successful and vigorous Civic Action/PsyOps program. A leaflet drop (CHIEU HOI and 25th Inf Div 969 leaflets) was conducted 27, 28, 29 and 30 April 1966 at reported VC controlled/contested areas. In addition, a psyops loudspeaker aircraft specified curfew from 1900 to 0600 hours daily on the above dates. MEDCAP II was conducted by Bn Med Plat, Surg of the 1/8 Arty, Div MEDCAP Team and ARVN MEDCAP Teams. The US MEDCAP Teams concentrated their efforts at DUC LAP, DUC HANH A, DUC HANH B and AP CHAN. ARVN Psy Ops, Civil Affairs and Loudspeaker teams accompanied the US MEDCAP teams on many occasions. Approximately 549 villagers were treated. The ARVN MEDCAP Teams accompanied units of the 1/27 Inf on search and destroy

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missions. The ARVN MEDCAP team, in conjunction with ARVN PsyOps and Civil Affairs Teams, gave medical treatment to villagers in areas that they had not ventured into in the past. The PsyOps and Civil Affairs teams also conducted their assigned mission while accompanying units of the 1/27 Inf.

Helping Hand items to include clothing, soap, canned food, toothpaste and toothbrushes were distributed to approximately 600 villagers in DUC HANH "A" & "B" and AP CHANH. Clothing seemed to be in great demand and the villagers were the cloth ng distributed either unaltered or altered to Vietnamese fashion. Through the above Civic Action/PsyOps programs this Bn gained the friendship of the villagers in the AO in a matter of two weeks. Their fears were gone and in DUC HANH "B" where the VC had destroyed 70% of the homes recently, the population of that village increased three-fold during the period that the 1/27 Inf operated in that area. Also, the villagers began to give information pertaining to the VC more readily after the battalion had been in the area for awhile.

9. MISSION. TF 1/27 Inf conducts tactical motor march to AO 270730 Apr 66 and establishes defensive base to block VC log; conducts search and destroy operations to include ambushes and combat patrols in AO to seek out and destroy VC forces and supplies; prepares to assist or support 3/4 Cav element operating from CU CHI to RAO TRAI (XT526044); establish liaison with HAU NGHIA advisor team (XT526044) for coordination of operation and pacification of AO.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: TF 1/27 conducts S & D operations via DUC LAP (XT554052) for approximately three weeks commencing 270730 Apr 66. TF 1/27 conducts motor march from Base Camp to RP (XT582083). On reaching RP, Bn bases established via DUC LAP utilizing maximum barriers and tactical wire from Bn base, TF will establish night ambushes; conducts S & D operations to include combat patrols, village searches, destruction of VC forces and supplies; and conducts a vigorous civic action program.

11. EXECUTION: 1/27 Inf received 2d Bde OPORD 22-6 dtd 151200 Apr 66, planned the execution of the mission and issued 1st Bn 27th Inf FRAG O 0420 (Operation MAILI) to OPORD 3-66, dtd 251200 Apr 66. TF 1/27 Inf conducted a tactical motor march from base camp to the RP (XT582083) commencing 270730 Apr 66. TF consisted of: Recon Plat, Mort Plat, two SR Radar teams, B, 1/27, C1/27 with a plat from C1/5(K), a plat from A1/69 Armor, a plat from B1/65 Engr, 2d, 3d Spt Plat 16 HRU, element 25th MID and 6 National Police attached. Upon reaching the RP, B & C 1/27 w/attachments conducted a sweep to a bn base via XT555060 and established a defensive perimeter with CP locations as follows: Co B - XT556061, Co C - XT661061. Companies of the 1/27 rotated in AO, but CP locations remained generally the same throughout the operation. On the evening of 27 Apr 66, 6 sqd (+) ambushes were established XT575074, XT567065, XT571077, XT559078, XT544075 and XT544069. On 271920 Apr 66, the ambush via XT544071 received S/A fire from via XT545079. 81mm mortars were fired into area and the ambush moved to via XT544075. At 272139 Apr 66, the ambush via XT544069 was triggered at 3-5 VC. Results: 2 VC KIA (BG) with S/A fire. A hand grenade and documents were recovered from the bodies. On 28 Apr 66 TF 1/27 (-) augmented by 12 National Police, 6 intelligence personnel and 2 MEDCAP personnel from HAU NGHIA Sector conducted a S & D operation in an area bounded by coordinates XT551082, XT564080, XT546065, and XT561069. At

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28 Apr 66, BL/27 apprehended 1 VCS vic XT556877. BL/27 also located and destroyed 4 bunkers vic XT555868, XT557875, XT556877, and a booby trap vic XT556875. Cl/27 employing a tank dozer, closed 48 spider holes along road vic XT554867 to XT555878 and destroyed a 150 meter trench along the AO vic XT554875 to XT555875. Plat 1/5 (M) located and destroyed 18 grenade type booby traps in area vic XT552861 - XT549867. Four night sqd (+) ambushes were established on 28 Apr with negative contact as follows: XT568865, XT574878, XT541869 and XT555877. On 29 Apr, B & C 1/27 w/attachments conducted a S & D operation in an area bounded by coordinates XT533865, XT533880, XT545877 and XT545865. At 29 Apr 2A3/4 Cav was attached to TF 1/27 and at 1330 hrs began a sweep through the general area of operations with negative contact. On S&D operation BL/27, employing a tank dozer destroyed 28 bunker type foxholes vic XT543873, 14 booby traps vic XT537873 and 46 covered foxholes vic XT533874. BL/27 also located 17 types VC propaganda leaflets vic XT539872 and destroyed 22 flare canisters vic XT548871. Cl/27 apprehended 1 VCS vic XT533865 and 1 VCS vic XT528874, and had 1 WIA from a booby trap vic XT538876. BL/65 Engr had 1 WIA when blade of dozer hit dud on civic actions project vic XT557872. At 29 Apr 66 A2/27 (+) came under Op/Con of TF 1/27 IAW 2/27 OPORD 33-66 (Opn BULLDOG) dtd 28 Apr 66 and established a Co base vic XT435871. Six night sqd (+) ambushes were established on 29 Apr as follows: XT562868, XT578869, XT544855, XT547878, XT537882 and XT543863. At 29 Apr 66 ambush vic XT562868 was triggered at 18-15 VC with S/A, auto wps, mortar and arty fire. Results: 3 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC KIA (Est). Between 292200 and 292230 Apr 66 A2/27 engaged 16-18 VC vic XT435871 with S/A, grenades and mortars. Results: 7 VC KIA (BC) and 6 VC KIA (Est). On 30 Apr 66, Cl/27 with attachment conducted a S & D operation in an area bounded by coordinates XT557853, XT553862, XT572838 and XT575851. At 30 Apr 66, plat A1/69 Armor was detached to parent unit. Cl/27 destroyed 1 AP mine vic XT611863 and employing a tank dozer, destroyed 3 trenches, 1-500 meter long vic XT566867. 2 A3/4 Cav destroyed 2 tunnels vic XT567864. At 30 Apr 66, 2A3/4 Cav was given an additional mission of sweeping the village of CP HAU HOA with infantrymen mounted. While conducting this sweep, 2 trenches (130 meters and 80 meters respectively), 9 spider holes and 13 bunkers were destroyed by a tank dozer vic XT567864. Also a tank from 2A3/4 Cav had a track blown by an AT mine vic XT575837 requiring a VTR for return to Bn base. In conjunction with Operation MAILL, the following 5 night sqd (+) ambushes were established during the evening of 30 Apr 66: XT567850, XT558836, XT568864, XT555877 and XT548874. Two sqds (+) were moved by APC's to ambush vic XT568865. While moving to the position, 5 VC were spotted vic XT567865 and 8mm mortar fire was called in. One squad was used as a decoy and conducted a sweep through the area on return to the Bn base. Results: Apprehended 1 VCS who was turned over to MI and then to Nat'l Police in BAO TRAI. In conjunction with Operation BULLDOG, A2/27 established the 4 night sqd (+) ambushes with negative contacts: XT448868, XT443872, XT434874 and XT433872. On 1 May 66, Cl/27 improved defensive positions in the Bn base while BL/27, with attachments, conducted a S & D operation in an area bounded by coordinates XT566873, XT575868, XT573868 and XT594873. 2A3/4 Cav conducted a fast sweep from N to S through the area and established a blocking position to the S. BL/27 with attachments then conducted a slow, methodical S & D operation from N to S. BL/27 detained 1 VCs vic XT582864 who was released to Nat'l Police and, employing a tank dozer, destroyed

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7th bunkers vic XT581058. A plat from A2/27 conducted a S & D operation in area bounded by coordinates XT430070, XT443070, XT424060 and XT437054 with negative results. At 011530 May 66, A2/27 was airlifted to base camp and released from Op/Con of TF 1/27 at 011830 May 66. On the evening of 1 May the following 4 night squad (+) ambushes were established with negative contact: XT562040, XT538067, XT553069 and XT571078. At 012150 May 66, B1/27 engaged approx 3 VC vic XT557057 with 81mm mortar and Arty fire. Results: 2 VC KIA (BC), 4 VC KIA (Est). On 2 May 66, C1/27 conducted a sweep in an area bounded by coordinates XT540057, XT547057, XT540052 and XT547054. Upon return, C1/27 remained at the Bn base as a security force and to improve defensive perimeter. TF 1/27 (-) conducted a S & D operation from S to N in an area bounded by coordinates XT555090, XT555078, XT568078 and XT574091 with 2A3/4 Cav (+) blocking to the N. B1/27 engaged 1 VC with S/A vic XT563080 and estimated 1 VC KIA. B1/27, employing a tank dozer, destroyed 35 bunkers (15 ea - XT561084, 20 ea - XT568083), 1 - 50 meter trench vic XT568083 and 10 spider holes vic XT555080. With demolitions, B1/27 destroyed one 100 meter tunnel vic XT564082. At 021045 May 66, FRU reported a VC radio transmitter vic XT551072.

At 021100 May 66, 2A3/4 Cav began a sweep from a line between XT550088 and XT555088 to line between XT550073 and XT555073 in an attempt to locate the transmitter but with negative results. At 020050 May 2A1/5(N) returned to base camp and was detached from TF 1/27. During the evening of 2 May 66, the following 4 sqd (+) ambushes were established: XT536076, XT552075, XT564084 and XT519075. Between 030000 - 030200 May 66 the portion of the Bn base defensive perimeter occupied by Co's B & C 1/27 received a total of 21 incoming rifle grenades. Claymores and 81mm mortars were fired into area where the grenades were believed to have come from. A sweep into this area at first light revealed the following: 2 US rifle grenade duds, 3 CHICOM rifle grenades, 2 US grenade fin assemblies, 1 CHICOM grenade fin assembly, 15 rds 7.95 crimped cart and 1 - 7.62 expended cartridge. This action appeared to be a diversionary action. At 030200 May 66, the C1/27 ambush vic XT564046 received the first of 2 coordinated attacks by 2 main force plato and 1 local force plat (50-75 men) wearing steel helmets. As the ambush fired claymores and S/A, the VC withdrew at approx 0210 hrs and then attacked from 3 sides at 030215 May 66. The attack came from the NE, SE and SW. Arty fire was called in and at 030235 May 66, CO 1/27 dispatched a rifle plat and 2A3/4 Cav to the ambush site. Reinforcements arrived at ambush site at 030245 May 66 and the action terminated at approx 030300 May 66. Results: US losses: 5 KIA, 5 WIA (includes 1 counterterrorist), 31 VC KIA (BC) verified by reports from sector S2 Agent, Regional forces leader and Sector S3/Sector S2. Upon conducting a sweep in the ambush area at first light, plat C1/27 captured 9 VCS hiding in bushes in vic of night's action (2 were later confirmed to be VCC by Nat'l Police) and the following items: 1 - M1 rifle, 1 carbine, 2 carbine ammo pouches, 1 pr Vietnamese jungle boots, 5 BAR magazines, 2 hand grenades (US), 1 smoke grenade, approx 150 rds assorted S/A ammo, 2 ponchos, 3 field caps, 1 straw helmet and 1 M79 expended cart. 2 VC bodies were left in the area of the ambush, 1 of which was identified as a Sqd Leader, Intelligence Plat 1st Co 506 Bn by information located in the lined shirt he was wearing. From this time until TF 1/27 Inf returned to base camp, the area of this ambush was made an outpost defended by a platoon. On the morning of 3 May 66, 2C1/27 and 2A3/4 Cav (-) established a blocking position vic XT527105 to XT552085. A1/27 conducted an A/M assault from base camp to an LZ vic XT513046 and started a S & D operation to the NE and SW towards the blocking position.

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A1/27, employing a tank dozer, destroyed 10 spider holes vic XT516083 and a 75 meter trench vic XT515082. During demolitions, A1/27 also destroyed 2 - 50 meter tunnels vic XT515082. 2A3/4 Cav (-) destroyed 2 trenches vic XT523085. Because of information that 1 VC Reg force plat was located vic XT557037, the S & D operation was halted and A1/27 was trucked to Bn base at 031130 May 66. At 031200 May 66, B1/27 began a S & D operation to the E. At 031418 May 66, an additional platoon from 2/27 conducted an Eagle flight and landed vic XT556018, linked up with 2 APC's from 2A3/4 Cav and established a blocking position to the S. A2/27 destroyed 5 booby traps vic XT555024 and destroyed 2 tunnels each having a VC who would not come out. Results: 2 VC KIA (BO) and 2 tunnels destroyed. B1/27 employing a tank dozer, destroyed 30 bunkers (XT570028), 6 booby traps (XT582082), 1 - 40 meter trench and 4 bunkers (XT583035) and 4 spider holes (XT519028). At 031600 May 66, A2/27 began air lift to base camp from vic XT557019. An Eagle flight plat blocked until extraction was complete, joined B1/27 and returned to the Bn base where they were also extracted to base camp by air. 2A3/4 Cav was replaced in the operational area by 3A3/4 Cav and B1/27 was trucked to base camp and closed at 031815 May 66. During the evening of 3 May 66, the following squad (+) ambushes were established with negative contact: XT555077, XT571078, XT579075 and XT566049. At 032046 May 66, C1/27 received incoming S/A fire and approx 3 rifle grenades from vic XT551065. Fire was returned with M79, 81mm mortar and Arty. At 032055, B1/65 Ingr received approx 12 rds of incoming automatic weapons fire from vic XT549068. Fire was returned with S/A and M79 fire. Results: Firing ceased; B1/65 Ingr received 1 WIA. At 041130 May 66, C1/27 conducted a plat (-) sweep around their permanent outpost vic DUC HANH "B" (XT576076) and a platoon sweep of AP CHANH (6) (XT543055). A1/27 conducted a squad (+) sweep in the woodline in front of their sector of the defensive perimeter at 041130 May 66 and established a day outpost vic XT551066. All actions had negative contact. TF 1/27 (-) concentrated on improvement of defensive positions. During the evening of 4 May 66, the following 4 sqd (+) ambushes were established with negative contact: XT535073, XT553042, XT579075 and XT574050. At 050830 May 66, A1/27, with attachments, departed Bn base on tracks from 3A3/4 Cav and began a S & D operation to the E and S in an area bounded by coordinates XT594040, XT592027, XT601027 and XT604040. At 050900 May 66, C1/27 conducted an A/M assault from a loading zone at Air America strip (XT544052) to an LZ vic XT573025 and began a S & D operation generally from N to S in an area bounded by coordinates XT593014, XT583028, XT583008, XT583028 and XT604040. C1/27 apprehended 1 VCS vic XT581022 and another VCS vic XT585020. C1/27 received 4 WIA's from booby traps vic XT580018. 13 booby traps vic XT584022, 9 booby traps vic XT583016, 2 trenches at XT581025 and XT583025, 12 bunkers vic XT582024, 7 spider holes vic XT583024, 5 spider holes vic XT580016 and 8 spider holes vic XT584016. A1/27 received 2 WIA from booby traps vic XT595033. At 051550 May 66, C1/27 extracted from vic XT589015 to Bn base by helicopter and A1/27 with attachments returned mounted to Bn base. During the evening of 5 May 66 the following 4 sqd (+) ambushes were established with negative contact: XT547085, XT553037, XT579075, and XT569055. At 061232 May 66 Co's C and A 1/27 began A/M assaults from a loading zone vic XT544052 to LZ's vic XT582111 and XT534100 respectively and started S & D operations in an area bounded by coordinates XT530015, XT553097,

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XT558098, XT558116 and XT549122. With the 3/49 ARVN Bn blocking to the W, 3A3/4 Cav (-) blocking to the E, and gunships blocking to the N, Co's A and C 1/27, with attachments, began a S & D operation generally from SW to NE. Prior to landing in LZ's, 3/49 ARVN Bn received B/A fire vic XT535099. Fire was returned by 3/49 ARVN and no fire was received during landing. A1/27, employing a tank dozer, destroyed 2 - 300 meter trenches vic XT539104. C1/27 employing tank dozer destroyed 1 - 500 meter trench, 10 pressure type booby traps and 2 quick release type booby traps vic XT549117. Tracks from 1A3/4 Cav were employed for return of Co's A & C 1/27, with attachments, to the Bn base. During the evening of 7 May 66, the following squad (+) ambushes were established with negative contact: XT553042, XT541069, XT579075, XT576063 and XT563045. During the morning of 7 May 66, B1/27 replaced C1/27 in AO and with attachments conducted a S & D operation in grid squares XT57008, XT54008, XT55007, XT54007, XT55006, and XT54006. B1/27 received ineffective sniper fire from vic XT566082. Fire was returned and infantry with 2 APC's maneuvered to engage the snipers who quickly broke contact. B1/27 destroyed a tunnel vic XT556075. A1/27 conducted a daylight sweep in wooded area vic AP DUC NOAI (2) vic XT553067 with negative contact. The following night sqd (+) ambushes were established on 7 May 66 with negative contact: XT559047, XT579075, XT554071 and XT608158. On 8 May 66, B1/27 (Reinf) conducted an A/M assault on an LZ vic XT566004 and a S & D operation in an area bounded by XT55002, XT56002, XT55000 and XT56000. B1/27 destroyed 5 booby traps vic XT562006, 7 booby traps vic XT554027, 3 booby traps vic XT555038 and, employing a tank dozer, destroyed 3 trenches (600-800 meter total) vic XT561009 - XT565013 and 20 spider holes vic XT550021. Two incoming 60mm mortar rds were received vic XT543050 and XT554056, causing no damage. Shell reports indicated rounds were fired from the village of APGO CAO (1) (XT543043). Gunships were immediately dispatched to search out area. B1/27 also searched village on return from S & D operation. All results were negative. A1/27 conducted a platoon sweep vic AP DUC NOAI (2) (XT553067) with negative results. Upon completion of S & D operation, 1A3/4 Cav replaced 3A3/4 Cav in AO. During the evening of 8 May, TF 1/27 established the following sqd (+) ambushes with negative contact: XT545053, XT579075, XT544043, and XT558040. On 9 May 66 a tank dozer on a road clearing mission hit a mine vic XT569069 and blew a track. A search of this area revealed another AT mine and 2 AP mines which were destroyed in place. A1/27 with attachments conducted a S & D operation in grid squares XT57006, XT58006, XT59006, XT60006, XT61005 and XT62005. 1/46 ARVN Regt blocked to the SE vic XT610030, XT625040 and XT630041 and the 34th ARVN Ranger Bn occupied positions vic XT620020, XT630023 and XT640029 to reinforce and to search these areas for VC equip and materiel. A light fire team delivered interdiction fires to assist in sealing off objective area to the N and E, and elements of 1A3/4 Cav provided a blocking force to the South. A1/27 destroyed a booby trap and burned a suspected booby trapped area with a flame APC resulting in 2 secondary explosions vic XT581070. The flame APC was again used to burn a suspected booby trapped area vic XT549068 resulting in 2 secondary explosions. B1/27 conducted a plat sweep vic Air America Airfield (XT543049) and AP GO CAO (2) (XT543042) with negative results. During the evening of 9 May 66, the following sqd (+) ambushes were established with negative contact: XT545971, XT579075, XT568055 and XT544038. At 1000 hours May 66.

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Al/27 radar picked up movement of 7-8 personnel via XT559#55. Gun mortar and Arty were fired on the location and an estimated 4 VC KIA. On 10 May 66 Bl/27, with attachments, conducted a S & D operation in grid squares XT57#01, XT57#02, XT58#01 and XT58#02. A flame APC hit an AT mine via XT557#37 causing 7 UB WIA. Three VCS were apprehended via XT582#27. Al/27 conducted a plat sweep via XT553#68 and destroyed 2 AT and 2 AP mines via XT563#58. Al/27 received 1 WIA from an AP mine in this same general area. TF 1/27 established 4 sqd (+) ambushes during the evening of 10 May 66 with negative results as follows: XT559#77, XT574#73, XT553#37 and XT566#46. On 11 May 66, Al/27 conducted a sweep via XT563#58 with 2 rifle sqds, a demolitions sqd and a flame APC destroying 6 booby traps and 1 AP mine in the area. Bl/27 conducted a plat daylight sweep in the wooded area adjacent AP CMAN H (6) (XT543#55) with negative contact. During the evening of 11 May 66 TF 1/27 established 4 ambushes with negative contact at XT563#54, XT575#73, XT539#71 and XT542#56. During the night of 11-12 May TF 1/27 conducted a night operation with mission of encircling a village complex and conducting a thorough search of the area at first light. At 12#30# May 66, encirclement of the village complex AP DUC MAGI-XON THA LA (XT55#7) commenced when the platoon ambush force from Cl/27 via XT542#56 began movement to form a block to the West. At 12#34# May, the block to the West was completed and Cl/27 (-) with ARVN attachments, began movement from the Bn base to form blocks to the North and East. At 12#55# May 66, all blocks were in position and the ARVN Psy war teams made an announcement to the villagers that the villages were surrounded and were going to be thoroughly searched. At 12#6# May 66, Cl/27 (-) began search of villages generally from NE to SW. Cl/27 apprehended 2 VCS via XT555#76 and 2 VCS via XT549#75. The S & D operation terminated at 0930# hours. At 1214# May 66, TF 1/27 began movement from Bn base to base camp CU CHI. During this operation the company of 1/27 th that was at base camp CU CHI aggressively defended the 1/27 defensive perimeter by conducting daylight plat sweeps and establishing night sqd (+) ambushes within the 1/27 TAOR. The company also maintained a sqd (+) security force at the BAC HA Church via XT64314# until 1/27 was relieved of this mission at 0612# May 66.

12. RESULTS.

a. VC Losses: 47 KIA (BC), 24 KIA (Poss), 2 VCC, 21 VCS.

Captured and destroyed enemy equipment & material:

- 214 bunkers destroyed
- 174 spiderholes destroyed
- 85 booby traps destroyed
- 16 trenches destroyed
- 6 tunnels destroyed
- 1 house burned
- 8 hand grenades destroyed
- 5 AP Mines destroyed
- 3 AT mines destroyed
- 1 M-79 grenade destroyed
- 4 sampans destroyed
- 1 M1 rifle captured
- 1 carbine captured
- 4 CHICOM rifle grenades captured
- 2 U.S. rifle grenades captured
- 15# rds S/A ammo captured
- 3 types of propaganda leaflets (VC) captured

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b. Friendly Losses: 5 KIA, 22 WIA (1 CT, 1 ARVN).

Friendly equipment damaged:

1 doper tank
1 tank
1 flame APC

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.

a. Supply: All resupply was made by motor convoy. Vehicles departed Bn base after road from DUO LAP to CU CHI was cleared by tank doper or engineer mine-sweeping team in the morning and returned to Bn base with supplies in the afternoon.

b. Maintenance: Normal maintenance of weapons and equipment was performed prior to, during and after operations. During the 16 day operation the battalion's three rifle companies were rotated on a five to seven day basis, so that two rifle companies would be actively participating in Operation MALLI, and one rifle company defended the 1/27 Inf base camp perimeter and had five to seven days to work on maintenance of weapons and equipment.

c. Treatment and evacuation of casualties: The battalion aid station was located forward with the Bn CP group. WIA's not seriously wounded, were evacuated by available helicopter. Seriously injured were evacuated by dust-off helicopters.

d. Transportation. Battalion made effective use of motor transportation to move the battalion to the AO and for all resupply missions. All convoys were protected by armed escorts and gunships.

e. Communications: FM radio communications was excellent throughout the conduct of the operation. AM/RTT communications from Bn base to CU CHI was very slow due to large volume of other traffic on assigned frequencies.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES.

a. Starlight devices were taken by all combat elements and utilized effectively by patrols and elements defending the perimeter.

b. Flame APC's were used to burn suspected booby traps or mined areas.

c. Artillery shell casings filled with thickened fuel were employed throughout the perimeter (5-6 per company) as an expedient flame fougasse.

d. Composite Vietnamese teams, consisting of intelligence, psywar, medical and national police troops, were integrated into the U.S. rifle companies and accompanied the U.S. troops in all operations. This method was extremely effective in that it allowed a more thorough search of the area by elements of the TF.

15. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS.

a. The operation was a valuable experience for the leaders of this battalion in that it afforded them an opportunity to work closely with ARVN personnel and with leaders of armored cavalry elements at the small unit level.

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b. The operation can be considered a success, in that, after a costly attempt by the VC to destroy a US force in an ambush position, there was virtually no contact made with any VC force in the area for the last ten days of the operation and control of the area was withheld from the VC for the duration of the operation. US forces moved at will day or night in the area of the operations.

c. The area of influence of the battalion TF comprised a rough circle of approximately 12 kilometers in diameter, considering the terrain and enemy situation as it existed in HAU NGHIA Province.

d. Daily meetings with the Province Chief and his staff and U.S. advisors proved most beneficial and improved working relationships between the ARVN forces and U.S. Forces,

e. This operation allowed the GVN to extend its influence to most of the hamlets in the area.

f. The freedom of action given the battalion commander allowed him to react to the situation in the area of operations and to apply the proper force at the critical time and place without restriction.


16. RECOMMENDATION.

a. That engineer support be attached to any battalion TF conducting area pacification mission in order to work on roads and other constructions so vitally important to the Vietnamese people.

b. That armored infantry or mechanized infantry elements be attached any battalion TF on separate missions such as Operation MAILL, to allow the bn TF greater flexibility and to have a quick-reaction force.

c. That liaison be established with appropriate governmental officers and U.S. advisors at the earliest opportunity and daily meetings to set up during the entire period of a pacification operation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


PAUL R. FLEBOTTE
Captain, Infantry
Adjutant


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Distribution: Special

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Inclosure 1 (Operations Overlay)



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HEADQUARTERS
1ST BRIGADE
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO US Forces 96225

14 June 1966

AVTLFB-A

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

THRU: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVTLGC-MH
APO US Forces 96225

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO US Forces 96243

Transmitted herewith is after action report pertaining to Operation
Akron.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as


JOHN F. LOPES, JR.
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

DOWNGRADED AT 8 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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APP 3

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST BRIGADE
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO US Forces 96225

AVTLFB-

13 June 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

THRU: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVTLGC-ME
APO US Forces 96225

TO: Commander
U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO US Forces 96243

1. Operation AKRON: Search and Destroy Operation.
2. Dates of operation: 081200 to 111745 May 1966.
3. Location: Area of operation was the FILHOL PLANTATION bounded by coordinates XT7016, XT7020, XT6623, XT6422, and XT6417.
4. Control Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
5. Reporting Officer: Colonel William B. Sandlin Jr.
6. Task Organization and Commanders:
 - a. TF Tomahawk (4/23 Inf (-)) Lt Col Barszcz, Cndg.
Co A, 1/5 Inf (M)
1 Plat Co A 1/69 Armor (operational control for Cu Chi base defense)
2 Squads, Co A, 65th Engr Bn.
 - b. 2/14 Inf (-) Lt Col Shults, Cndg.
1 Plat, Co A, 1/69 Armor (operational control for Cu Chi base defense)
1 Squad, Co A, 65th Engr Bn.
 - c. 1/9 Inf (-) Lt Col Root, Cndg.

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d. Brigade Control
7/11 Arty DS
Co A, 1/69 Armor (-)

7. Supporting Force.

a. Artillery: The 7th Bn 11th Artillery was employed in a direct support mission.

(1) How and when employed.

(a) 7th Bn 11th Artillery supported from base camp locations.

(b) Fires were utilized primarily against suspected targets and sniper fire. Secondly, as suppressing sniper fire and to soften areas in front of advancing forces.

(c) 343 preplanned and on-call fire missions were fired expending 1,844 rounds.

(2) Results:

(a) H & I fires denied the VC complete freedom of movement during hours of darkness.

(b) VC suffered 4 KIA (BC). Number of possible dead was undetermined.

b. US Air Force. Nine (9) air strikes consisting of twenty-eight (28) sorties were flown in support of operation AKRON.

(1) How and when employed.

(a) All air strikes were preplanned and request were submitted through the 25th Infantry Division's Air Force liaison officer.

(b) Air strikes were close air support directed against objective areas in advance of advancing ground forces.

(2) Results.

(a) Four (4) houses and one (1) automatic weapon destroyed. One (1) house damaged. Two (2) trenches damaged.

(b) Objective areas received 35 to 85 per cent area coverage by ordnance.

c. Army Aviation.

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(1) How and when employed.

(a) Four (4) resupply aircraft, one (1) command and control-ship, and one (1) to two (2) light fire teams were utilized on a mission basis each day of the operation.

(b) A total of 289 sorties, consisting of resupply, fire suppression, command and control, evacuation of WIA's, combat surveillance, and combat assault missions, were flown during the operations.

(2) Results.

(a) Armed helicopters were valuable in providing medical evacuation and resupply escorts.

(b) A total of eight (8) helicopters received minor damage from ground fire.

8. Intelligence.

a. Intelligence prior to operation: Intelligence studies, as a result of captured data, agent reports, and POW and returnee interrogation reports, identified VC units as the 2d and 7th Battalion, 165 A Regiment (Main Force), and the C48 Heavy Weapons Company, operating in the area of the FILHOL PLANTATION. In addition, guerrilla and guerrilla support units of undetermined size are known to be operating within the area. These units generally host and prepare installations for the main force and local force units that operate from or pass through the area.

(1) 2d Bn, 165 A Regiment (Main Force): Elements are believed to be C1 (207), C2 (208) and C3 (209) companies. Total strength of Bn is estimated to be 400. Last reported location was in vic of coordinates XT639246 on 28 April 1966. Area of operations: XT6730, XT5130, XT7008, XT5008.

(2) 7th Bn, 165 A Regiment (Main Force): Composition is unknown. Total strength is estimated to be 400. Last reported location (unconfirmed) was in vic of coordinates XT689210 on 29 April 1966. Area of operations: XT5930, XT6730, XT6719, XT5919.

(3) C 48 Heavy Weapons Company: Unit is believed to be equipped with 50 caliber machines, 60mm mortars and possible 81 or 82mm mortars. Strength of unit, unknown. Last reported location was in vic of coordinates XT626225 on 15 April 1966.

b. Intelligence during operation: The only enemy activity encountered was occasional light sniper fire. 1st Brigade TF elements had negative contact with organized VC forces of significant size during

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the operation. TF Tomahawk, on the night of 9-10 May 66, received a possible squad size probing action. No suspected VC units were confirmed nor were any new VC units discovered within the area of operations. Imagery interpretation reports and visual reconnaissance disclosed numerous spider holes, trenches, and tunnels in the area.

c. Description of terrain: The terrain was generally flat to gently rolling and did not represent an obstacle to any of TF Tomahawk's attached tracked vehicles. The vegetation consisted primarily of rubber trees interspersed with heavy jungles and underbrush which made foot and wheeled vehicular movement difficult and restrictive in certain areas. The densely forested areas provided concealment and cover to a limited degree. Observation was greatly restricted in areas of heavy jungle and dense underbrush. Primary avenues of approach throughout the area was limited to the roads and trails.

d. Civic action and/or psychological warfare activities: No civic action or psychological warfare activities were initiated.

e. Summary: Overall evaluation and accuracy of intelligence was rated B2 (usually reliable and probably true) during the operation. The operation security of operation AKRON was considered excellent.

9. Mission: 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, conducts search and destroy operations in sector vic FILHOL PLANTATION (XT6718) 8-11 May 66.

10. Concept of operation: 1st Brigade Task Force executes search and destroy operations with elements, three (?) infantry battalions, supported by 7th Bn 11th Arty and elements of 1st Bn 69th Armor, 1st Bn 5th Inf (M), 65th Engr Bn, and 2 battalions of the 7th ARVN Regiment employed in a blocking position. 2d Bn 14th Inf assist passage of TF Tomahawk by establishing one (1) company base at the edge of FILHOL PLANTATION on 8 May 66; then executes search and destroy operations from Bn (-) base for one day; returns to Cu Chi base and reinforces OP Ann-Margaret (XT664171) to assist return of TF Tomahawk. TF Tomahawk passes through 2d Bn 14th Inf bunker line on 9 May and moves by foot to establish base south of Saigon River on 10-11 May 66 for execution of search and destroy operations in sector; return to Cu Chi base the afternoon of 11 May 66. 4th Bn 9th Inf conduct company size night operations 10-11 May 66 terminating with search and destroy operations on 11 May 66. Elements of Co A, 1st Bn 69th Armor reinforces bunker line defenses at Cu Chi base and provides a two (2) platoon reaction force. Reaction forces are planned for two (2) contingencies: 2 companies, 2/14 Inf with 2 platoons Co A, 1/69 Armor attached for ground deployment and 1 Co 4/9 Inf for airmobile deployment. 7th Bn 11th Arty provides direct support from Cu Chi base. Maximum use of air and artillery to clear avenue of approach to TF Tomahawk's forward base. Priority of Air and Arty to TF Tomahawk.

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11. Execution: 1st Brigade issued OPORD 5-66 at 050900 May 66. The 7th Regiment of the 5th ARVN Division established blocking positions, as indicated on inclosure 1, during period 8 May - 10 May 66.

8 May 1966

At 1200 hours Co B 2/14 moved from XT665171 on foot to Obj 1 to secure a blocking position to assist the departure of TF Tomahawk and 2/14 Inf (-). While enroute Arty fire (105mm) was requested by the unit commander to eliminate possible enemy ambush sites. Three men of the company were wounded by this fire at XT661174 at 1305 hrs. Casualties were evacuated to XT664171 and company proceeded to Obj 1. Negative contact was made during the day and night.

9 May 1966

a. TF TOMAHAWK: TF commenced its move to Obj 3 at 0630 hrs, pre-planned airstrikes were conducted along route of movement and two (2) armed helicopters provided aerial security along route. TOT for start of airstrike was 0730 hrs TAC air located Sanpan vic XT657024 at 0808 hrs. Sunk at 0859 hrs. Lead element, attached mechanized company, reached Obj 3 at 0941 hrs. TF received ineffective sniper fire as it approached Obj area. Contact was less than 30 seconds in length. Approximately 12 punji stake pits, well concealed, and 4 booby traps were discovered in Obj area. All were destroyed approximately 1004 hrs. At 1038 hrs Co B discovered spider holes complex vic XT660193. At 1115 hrs helicopter resupply on Obj 3 commenced. Co B received sniper fire XT666198 at 1120 hours. Contact was again less than 30 seconds in length. There were no indications of VC casualties. Trench system about 150 meters in length with holes in rear for overhead was discovered at XT669202 at 1245 hours. TF closed Obj 3 at 1531 hours. At 1706 hours a major tunnel complex was discovered vic XT684217. 12 booby traps, 14 grenades and 20 rounds of 7.62 ammunition (all Chinese type) were found in area. At 1940 hours one man from Co A 1/5 Inf (M) was killed. Individual was searching tunnel and lifted a booby trapped door. At 2144 hours Co B had contact with VC of undetermined size. Contact was approximately 8 minutes in length. Unit received small arms fire approximately 30 meters from their defensive positions.

b. 2/14 Inf: Bn TAC CP and Co C departed area at 1000 hrs for Obj 2 closing in at 1219 hours. Co B departed Obj 1 at 1100 hours and closed on Obj 2, linking up with Bn (-) by 1303 hours. Elements had negative contact with VC. The Bn was resupplied by helicopter at 1600 hours.

10 May 1966

a. TF TOMAHAWK: 1 KIA from Co B resulted from rifle grenade shrapnel at XT684216 at 0116 hours. Source and location of fire unknown. TF continued to receive sporadic fire throughout the early part of the

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morning which resulted in 4 WIA's during the period. One platoon from the attached mechanized company made contact with the elements of the 7th ARVN Regiment at 0820. The 1st Bde LMO with the 7th ARVN Regiment met the mechanized platoon. Lead elements departed Obj 3 at 0719 hours to continue S&D toward Obj 4. Airstrikes were conducted in vic of XT642215 at 0935 hours. Area had received airstrikes the previous day and secondary explosions had been reported. No visual results were reported. At 0920 hours a tunnel system via XT676202 was investigated prior to airstrike and the only evidence available of VC was blood spots in area. Lead element reached Obj 4 at 1112 hours. At 1402 hours lead element on Obj 4 had one (1) M-113 damaged as a result of a mine at XT642221. Unit received 2 WIA's which were minor and required little first aid. At approximately 1530 hours all elements closed Obj 4 for the night. Aerial resupply was initiated immediately and completed by 1700 hours. Throughout the night negative contact was encountered.

b. 2/14 Inf: At 0700 hours, the battalion conducted S&D operations south to XT664171, OP Ann Margaret, and received negative VC contact. All units reached location by 1530 hours.

c. 4/9 Inf: The first platoon of Co C arrived at XT676157 at 1430 hours to establish squad size ambush patrols at XT690164 under the cover of darkness, and to secure the crossing site at XT671162 for the company's scheduled night S&D operation to Obj 6.

11 May 1966

a. TF TOMAHAWK: At 0651 hours aerial resupply was initiated on Obj 4. At approximately 0735 hours the lead element began moving toward Obj 5. At 0959 hours, Co B received sniper fire from vic of XT653185. Fire was returned but results unknown. At 1037 hours, Co C found several tunnel complexes via XT655181 and XT652180. One man was wounded by a booby trap while searching the tunnel. As the search of Obj 5 continued, rifle grenade sniper fire was received on the left flank. Direction of fire unknown. The TF continued to locate and destroy tunnel complexes. At 1545 hours the TF closed into Cu Chi base camp.

b. 2/14 Inf: Co C commenced probing activities in the immediate vic of OP Ann Margaret, XT664171, to locate tunnels and other VC routes of advance and hiding places. At 0945 hours two mines were detonated at XT661171 killing 4 and wounding 11 men from the company. At 1600 hours 2/14 Inf closed into Cu Chi base camp.

c. 4/9 Inf: At 0230 hours Co C reached the creek crossing site XT671162 and conducted an S&D operation on Obj 6. Unit was extracted by helicopter by 1745 hours.

12. Results:

a. Friendly losses.

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DAMAGED EQUIPMENT</u>
4/9 Inf	0	0	0	
2/14 Inf	4	14	0	
4/20	1	9	0	
Co A 1/5 Inf 1		2	0	1 APC M-113

b. Enemy Losses.

<u>KIA (BC)</u>	<u>POSS</u>	<u>KBA</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>
4	4	0	2 oxygen tanks	1 house	9 bunkers 16 houses 13 tunnels 6 walls 1 home-made mine 1750 kilos rice 2 55 gal oil drums 20 rds ammo (7.62) 49 grenades 2 trenches 1 auto wpn position

c. All airstrike areas were not searched by ground forces.

13. Administrative matters.

a. Supply.

(1) All resupply was accomplished by helicopter, HULD, with satisfactory results.

(2) A total of 40 sorties were flown during the 4 days, totalling 10.0 tons of supplies. Additionally, 2,115 gallons of water were airlifted.

Class I - 12,050 lbs
Class III - 560 lbs
Class V - 3,720 lbs
Misc - 3,670 lbs

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(3) Combat Loads: Troops started the operation with field

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pack, 2 canteens of water, 2 "C" ration meals and the on man portion of 1 basic load of ammunition with the exception of one unit that carried 3 on man portions of the basic load. Carrying more than 1 basic load was later determined excessive due to the resupply capabilities by helicopter.

(4) A significant trend that developed during the operation was that only emergency resupply was feasible during the dismounted move and that the peaks of resupply occurred in the late afternoon and early morning. Resupply capabilities can be better programmed during dismounted operations as a result of this experience.

b. Maintenance. No significant problems were encountered.

c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization. Medical evacuation by "Dust-off" was exceptionally well executed. Resupply helicopters were also utilized to return wounded to base camp.

d. Transportation: Troop movement to the area of operations was dismounted. One company returned to the base camp by helicopter.

e. Communications: PRC-10 radios functioned well in open areas and at close range. In secondary jungle, communications with the PRC-10 is spotty and unreliable. Issue of the PRC-25 radios should solve this problem.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques: No special equipment was used during the operation. TF TOMAHAWK employed a technique of searching tunnels using comms wire marked off with tape every ten (10) meters length of the wire in order to measure tunnels. The searchers also used compasses to record the direction of the tunnels. It was determined that rice caches in the ground can often be detected by a circular pattern of soft dirt.

15. Commander's Analysis: Operation AKRON was the first brigade level operation conducted by the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. This operation was undertaken 8 days after the main body of the brigade closed in at Cu Chi, RVN. The operation was successful from the standpoint of an introduction to Filhol Plantation and brigade operations. Instruction by 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division personnel on tunnel destruction proved beneficial throughout the operation. Many valuable experiences were gained at the platoon, company, battalion and brigade level. It was determined that load carrying requirement of the individual soldier can be greatly reduced when helicopter resupply is available.

16. Recommendation:

a. That all units and individuals continue to improve methods of detecting mines, booby traps, and tunnels.

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b. That all units continue to develop better methods of searching and destroying tunnels and other ground fortifications.

c. That an infantry battalion have assigned approximately 18 APCs and as an interim measure a mechanized rifle company or element of a cavalry troop be attached for a search and destroy mission.

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HEADQUARTERS
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO US Forces 96225

CC-2982

AVTLMGD

17 July 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS J3/32)

THRU: Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam
APO, San Francisco 96227

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO, San Francisco 96243

1. Name: Operation WAHIAWA
2. Date: 160700-271700
3. Location: Northwest portion of HAU NGHIA Province in an area bounded by XT4836, XT6236, XT6128, XT4826, XT6624, XT6022, XT6317 and XT7116 known as the BOI LOI WOODS, HOBO WOODS AND FILHOL PLANTATION.
4. Control Headquarters: Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division.
5. Reporting Officer: Major General Fred C. Weyand, US Army.
6. Task Organization:
 - a. 1st Brigade (Colonel Sandlin, Commanding)
 - (1) HHC, 1st Bde
Troop A, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav (-)
Platoon, Co A, 65th Eng (-)
1st F/SC Plat, Co B, 125th Signal Bn
1st Spt Plat, 16th RRU
1st Plat, 25th MP Co (-)
Elm 25 MID
 - (2) 2d Bn 14th Inf (-) (Lt Col Shultz, Commanding)
1st Plat Trp A, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav
Sqdn, Co A, 65th Eng Bn

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years

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(3) 4th Bn, 23d Inf (-) (Lt Col Barrow, Commanding)
2d Plat, Trp A, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav
Sqdn, Co A, 65th Eng Bn

(4) 4th Bn, 9th Inf (Lt Col Booth, Commanding)

b. 2d Brigade

(1) HHC, 2d Bde (Colonel Tarpley, Commanding)
Recon Plat 1/5 (N)
Plat, Trp A, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav
Plat (+), Co B, 65th Eng Bn
2d FASC Plat, 125th Signal Bn
2d Plt, 25th MP Co
4 men Psy Op Team, 49th (ARVN) Regt

(2) 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf (Lt Col Greer, Commanding)
Helicopter

(3) 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-) (Lt Col Mooney, Commanding)
Helicopter

(4) 2d Bn, 27th Inf (-) (Lt Col Bashore, Commanding)

7. Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery Support:

(1) Organization for combat:

(a) 1st Bn, 8th Artillery (-) DS 2d Bde

(b) 7th Bn, 11th Artillery (-) DS 1st Bde

(c) 3d Bn, 13th Artillery

1 3d Bn 13th Artillery (-) GS 25th Inf Div

2 Btry A, 3d Bn 13th Artillery (-) GSR 1/8 Arty

3 Btry C, 3d Bn 13th Artillery (-) GSR 7/11 Arty

4 Plat (6" How) D 3/13 Arty GSR 1/8 Arty

(2) How and when artillery was employed:

(a) The artillery in support of the 1st Brigade moved to TRUNG LAP (XT5821) on 17 May. The artillery in support of the 2d Brigade moved on 15 May to a position vicinity XT483263 and on 22 May displaced to vicinity XT536285. The 4.2" mortar platoons of the 2/14 Inf and 4/23 Inf were placed under the operational control of the CO 7/11 Arty. In the 1st

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Brigade the timeliness of the request and fire was hampered by the lack of the new family of radios. Fire missions had to be relayed from the FO to the FDC by the battalion liaison officers. This problem has since been alleviated by the receipt of new radios.

(b) Artillery fire was used primarily to suppress enemy fires, to soften suspected enemy positions in front of advancing maneuver elements and preparation for airmobile assaults.

(c) Total missions and rounds fired were as follows:

1	7/11 Arty (105)	670 missions	13081 rounds
2	1/8 Arty (105)	1606 missions	10349 rounds
3	3/13 Arty (155&8")	<u>725 missions</u>	<u>3848 rounds</u>
4	Totals	3219 missions	27677 rounds

b. Tactical Air:

(1) Seventy air strikes were flown in support of the Division, 29 for the 1st Bde and 41 for the 2d Bde.

(a) Of the 70 strikes, 40 were by the US Air Force, 16 by the US Navy and 12 by VNAF.

(b) All preplanned strikes were requested by telephone (hot line) through 25th Inf Div G3. Immediate strikes were requested by radio.

(c) Average reaction time for the immediate strikes was 10 minutes.

(2) Results. 10 VC KBA (BC), 29 VC KBA (poss), 79 buildings destroyed, 69 buildings damaged, 12 trenches destroyed, 7,100 lbs of rice destroyed, 3 sampans sunk, 4 bunkers destroyed and 3 secondary explosions.

c. Army Aviation.

(1) 1st Brigade

(a) Five different Airmobile Co's supported the 1st Brigade. The average number of aircraft available each day, except for the four major airmobile operations, were nine UH1D's and two fire teams. These were utilized for resupply, command and control, combat surveillance, medical evacuation and assault missions. A total of 1182 sorties were flown in support of the 1st Brigade.

(b) A total of four battalion and four platoon airmobile lifts were conducted by 4th Bn, 9th Inf and 2d Bn, 14th Inf.

(2) 2d Brigade

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(a) The 118th Airmobile Co flew 645 sorties and airlifted 37.2 tons of supplies. They also supplied UH1B gunships and UH1D Command and Control ships throughout the operation.

(b) The brigade provided each maneuver battalion an OH 230 helicopter daily. Also brigade maintained the artillery advisory radio net and the helipad control net throughout the operation.

(c) On 16 May the 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-) and 2d Bn, 27th Inf were helilifted into the AO by Co A, 25th Aviation Battalion, Co A 501st Avn Bn and the 118th Airmobile Co.

(d) On 22 May the 2d Bn, 27th Inf (-) conducted an airmobile assault within the area of operations (AO).

(e) On 27 May, 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-) and 2d Bn, 27th Inf (-) were airlifted from the AO.

(f) During the conduct of the operation company size elements from the 1st Bn, 27th Inf and 2d Bn, 27th Inf were repositioned and rotated into the AO by the 118th Airmobile Co which was DS to the 2d Brigade.

(3) Ground fire was intense throughout the operation with 10 helicopters being hit during the operation. Two helicopters sustained four hits, however, they were not disabled.

8. Intelligence:

a. Enemy Situation Prior to Operation.

(1) 165 A Regimental Headquarters was believed to be located vicinity of XT6031, XT6431, XT6728, XT5827. This unit was reported to be armed with one .50 Cal MG, one 12.7mm MG, six 20mm MG and thirty-four automatic rifles.

(2) 1st Battalion 165 A Regiment:

(a) Strength: 200.

(b) Area of Operations: XT6030, XT7030, XT7016, XT6016.

(c) Armament: Two .50 Cal MG's, one 12.7mm MG, and various individual weapons.

(3) The BOI LOI WOODS was known to contain supply bases and believed to be the base area for the 320th Local Force Bn. The BOI LOI WOODS area was a known VC stronghold and important commo-liaison base linking the Delta with MR 8 and in particular, War Zones C and D. A VC captive revealed that the TAY NINH Provincial Committee was located in the BOI LOI. On 7 May 65 B1/5 contacted elements of C403 Company, 320th LF Bn as substantiated by

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documents found on the VC KIA. This action was characterized by heavy, accurate and well-disciplined SA and AW fires. Visual reconnaissance indicated extensive trench network in the southern edge of the BOI LOI and numerous well-used trails extending south from the SAIGON River into the BOI LOI. During operation MASTIF in Feb 66, the 1st Div discovered large rice caches and numerous base areas in the BOI LOI. Post engagements with VC in this area revealed that the enemy displayed good control of his units, executed action rapidly and violently, and delivered accurate SA and AW fires. Maximum use of mines, booby traps and harassing fires was effected throughout the operational area.

b. Enemy Situation During the Operation.

(1) Although all information prior to Operation WAHIANA indicated probable contact would be made with one or more of the Main Force units, this in fact, did not occur. On numerous occasions all participating units encountered sporadic to heavy sniper fire in respective areas of operation but at no time was definite contact attained with VC Main Force units. The VC employed to the utmost the principles of camouflage, concealment and defense in depth as evidenced by the extensive use of land mines and booby traps during defensive and delaying activities. When operating in independent groups the VC effectively used sniper fire in conjunction with excellent camouflage discipline and extensive tunnel systems to engage friendly units. On occasion, the VC effectively employed command detonated mines and Claymore type weapons against friendly maneuver elements when close physical contact was imminent. As a result of the vast amounts of material (especially rice) captured and/or destroyed during Operation WAHIANA it was apparent the FILHOL PLANTATION and HOBOWOODS had long been used as a local storage and resupply haven for VC forces either operating within or in transit through the area of operations. It is felt the aggressive response and positive action undertaken by maneuver elements against these supply/storage areas and fortifications will seriously hamper and curtail VC activities in the immediate future and hinder any large scale operations previously planned for execution.

(2) Documents found on 17 May 66 vic XT518337 indicated the TAY NINH Provincial Committee had been located in the area. The locations of four sections subordinate to the TAY NINH Provincial Committee were discovered as follows: TAY NINH Military Intelligence Sub-sections XT500316, TAY NINH Provincial Armament Sub-sections (XT511339), Workers Propagating Section, TAY NINH Provincial Committee (XT527338). Enormous infrastructure activities associated with COSVN Rear Service staff were detected in the BOI LOI. Documents discovered in vic XT500313 indicated the presence of the 320th Bn Hq (D14). On 20 May 66, vic XT520308, a VC carried a message from 320th Bn CO to the 403d Co inquiring into the location and condition of the company. The major enemy contact was made by B/2/27 at 191400 May 66 vic XT533333. An estimated VC platoon was engaged by E/2/27 which resulted in 16 VC KIA (BC), and 12 VC KIA (poss). A total of 40 caches of rice, ammunition, medicine, cloth, fish, tin and wax were located and evacuated or destroyed during the operation. The most significant caches were located as follows:

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Rice - XT564325, 537324, 539321, 565325, 572315, 574311, 529338.

Ammunition - XT529333.

Medicine - XT554307, 529311, 516343, 523340.

Cloth, POL, Dried Fish, Tin, Salt, Sugar, Peanuts - XT564325, 524352, 565323, 580309, 551312, 599324, 586308, 516434, 516313, 523339, 578308.

Additionally, Division units located and destroyed 9 VC base camps, 2 arms repair shops and 1 medical aid station as follows:

Base Camp - XT496322, 525337, 540318, 582305, 528343, 525337, 496323, 500131, 575298.

Arms repair shops - XT500316, 511334.

Medical aid station - XT538320.

The numerous caches, base camps and captured documents substantiate that the BOI LOI was a major COSVN Rear Service supply area.

c. Terrain and Weather.

(1) The terrain of the FILHOL PLANTATION was found to be generally flat to gently rolling. The vegetation consisted primarily of rubber trees interspersed with heavy jungles and underbrush which made foot movement restrictive in certain areas. Observation was greatly restricted in areas of heavy jungle and underbrush; conversely, camouflage and concealment in these same areas was more than adequate. The terrain traversed in the HO BO WOODS is very similar to that of the FILHOL PLANTATION; however, numerous hedgerow type formations, dry and flooded rice paddies and occasional abandoned villages were encountered. In areas of dense growth overland movement was hindered until accessible routes could be found through or around the vegetation obstacle.

(2) Early morning fog delayed resupply to the maneuver units in several instances, however, this is not an uncommon occurrence during this period of the year. Although some rainfall did occur during Operation WAHIANA it did not materially affect or hinder any troop movement or operations.

(3) The terrain was generally flat with open areas north and south of the BOI LOI WOODS. Open areas consisted of rice paddies and cultivated fields. The dense undergrowth, trees and B-52 bomb craters restricted movement of tracked vehicles, on existing trails and low brush areas. Foot movement was slow and tedious. The vegetation provided excellent concealment for the VC in their harassing type tactics and limited friendly observation. Trenches, bunkers and spider holes provided cover to

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the VC from friendly SA and AW fire. Inasmuch as the trench network was generally oriented to the south LZ's were selected to the north of the BOI LOI. Weather conditions delayed the initial air strike and heliborne lift for two hours on 16 May 66. Low ceilings during the morning hours delayed use of command and control helicopters. The afternoon monsoon rains experienced had little effect on operations, however, protracted rains would seriously restrict movement of tracked vehicles in the area of operations.

9. Mission. The 25th Infantry Division conducts search and destroy operations beginning 160700 May 66 to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and bases in BOI LOI WOODS-HO BO WOODS-FILHOL PLANTATION area (Appendix 1 (Annex C to OPORD)).

10. Concept of Operations. Division conducts airmobile and ground operations with two brigades during the period 16-26 May 66 to destroy VC forces, supplies and bases in the area of operations.

a. 1st Brigade.

(1) Conduct search and destroy operations in objective areas 1 and 2 beginning 160700 May 66.

(2) Be prepared to conduct search and destroy operations in objective area 3.

(3) Be prepared to establish Bde fwd base area, vic TRUNG L.P (XT590220) as required to support operations north of objective area 2.

(4) On 30 minutes notice, provide one company as div reaction force. Company released to brigade upon request.

b. 2d Brigade.

(1) Established Bde fwd area, vic XT510260 NLT 151500H May 66. Provide security for SUPCOM Forward Support Operations Center (FSOC).

(2) Conduct search and destroy operations in objective area 4 and 5 beginning 160700 May 66.

(3) Conduct search and destroy operations in objective area 6 on order.

(4) On 30 minute notice, provide one company as Div reaction force. Company released to brigade upon request.

11. Execution. OPORD 10-66, Hq 25th Infantry Division was published on 101200 May 66.

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D-1 (15 May 66)

2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: At 1000, Co A departed base camp escorting the 2d Bde quartering party. Upon closing into the fwd CP area, several personnel were observed fleeing the area. Elements of A/1/5 pursued and apprehended 16 VC suspects. At 1200 Co B and the Bn CP departed base camp escorting the 2d Bde CP and elements comprising the 2d Bde forward support base. Co A arrived at the Bn CP at 1800. Co C remained in the vic of Bde CP to secure wheeled vehicles which had encountered difficulty traversing the terrain along the route to the CP.

D Day (16 May 66)

1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf: Crossed the LD, (Bn bunker line) at 0700 with A/3/4 Cav screening to the front. Bn moved generally north into FILHOL PLANTATION with no enemy contact by the main body. At 1000 the Cav Platoon received SA fire vic XT682197. The platoon immediately returned fire and continued to its assigned area. At 1130 the Cav Platoon encountered 5 VC including one woman vic XT679215 and brought them under fire, killing one and wounding one. Attempts to recover the wounded VC were unsuccessful. Several documents and items of personal equipment were found on the body recovered and in the area where the VC dropped them as they fled. No friendly casualties were sustained. The Bn closed XT670205 at 1500, and secured a perimeter for the night. Preparation and securing of the LZ was completed at 1600. Resupply was effected immediately. During the night three ambushes were employed.

4th Bn, 23d Inf: Crossed LD (Bn bunker line) at 0735. Recon Platoon found tunnel complex vic XT650175. Also located in the same area were three (3) 81mm mortar duds and one (1) booby trap. All were destroyed at 0945 hrs. Recon Plt received sniper fire at XT648184 at 0950. Fire was returned with no casualties on either side. At 1151 Recon Plt again received sniper fire from VC vic XT635210. Arty was used and VC withdrew. No casualties were sustained. Recon Plt located house, XT648208, with warm rice on a table. Building was destroyed. Recon Plt and 3/4 Cav Plt received sniper fire, XT649209 at 1845 hrs. One (1) WIA in Recon Plt. Sniper fire suppressed.

2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: At 0835, A and B Co's commenced their attack into the objective area vic XT5230. C Co, released at 0800 from Bde control, moved to rendezvous with the other attacking elements. A Co reached the SW edge of Obj 4, vic XT494308 and commenced S&D operations to the NW at 0922. B Co continued to attack due east to reach their initial objective vic XT5130. C Co moved to establish blocking positions vic XT500320, 504324 and 512327. B Co continued to attack to the east and arrived vic XT5330 at 1005 with no significant contact and commenced a thorough search of the area.

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C Co now attacking to the SE vic XT512327, and A Co attacking NE vic XT5031, linked up to conduct a thorough search of the area. At 1405, vic XT513326 C Co located a major supply cache consisting of sheet metal, tin, wax, medical supplies, buttons and cloth. All units continued to search the SW portion of Obj 4 throughout the afternoon without contact. A & B Co's established their bases around the Bn CP vic XT4830 and C Co remained in the area XT516313. 1/5th (Mech) units established 12 night ambushes with no significant contact.

1st Bn, 27th Inf: At 0955, 1/27th Inf (-) completed an airmobile assault into LZ WHITE vic XT5433 with negative contact. Upon securing the CP area, XT547324, B and C Co commenced S&D operations into the NE side of Obj 4 (vic XT5432 and 5433). C Co located and destroyed a heavily booby trapped area vic XT545332. B Co continued to sweep vic XT542320 with negative contact. 1/27 Inf (-) elements established four night ambushes. Throughout the night the ambushes and Bn CP received sporadic ineffective sniper fire from the heavily wooded area to their west.

2d Bn, 27th Inf: At 1050 the battalion (-) completed an airmobile assault into LZ RED. On the first lift, elements received SA and AW fire with 3 WIA, and one (1) crew chief killed. Gunships silenced the fire with undetermined results. At 1143 A & C Co's commenced a sweep along the edge of heavy woods to the SE and SW. A Co located a package of documents vic XT 543342 which indicated that C Co 402 LF Bn had been in the area. A & C Co made no significant contact but they did receive some sporadic sniper fire from several locations inside the thick woods. Arty fire was continually placed on the flank of both elements and succeeded in silencing the sniper fire. The Bn 4.2 mortars were airlifted into the Bn CP from the Bds fwd base at 1350. C Co located a small base area vic XT528434 at 1400. The area had been used recently and was not destroyed due to the desirability of placing ambushes in the area. Recon Plt captured 1000 lbs of rice at XT 527347. All elements closed Bn CP at 1800. A total of six (6) night ambushes were established with negative contact.

D+1 (17 May 66)

1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf: Continued S&D operations toward obj TOM, (XT668235) A 2/14, Cav Plat and Recon Plat moved at 0700 hours to occupy blocking positions at XT657227 (A Co), XT664226 (Recon) and XT668232 (3/4 Cav) in conjunction with a preplanned airstrike on obj TOM. At 0930 hours the airstrike was aborted and the Cav Plat was ordered to move through obj TOM and link up with A Co. No enemy contact was encountered during the move through obj TOM. Cav Plat and the mechanized flame thrower of the engineer squad were detached. A Co then searched northeast to obj TOM arriving at 1400 hours. B Co with CP group departed at 0830 hours and searched directly north towards obj TOM discovering a large cache of rice at 1400 hours vic XT670230 (estimated 50 tons). One platoon was left to guard the rice supply area and Co (-) continued on to obj TOM arriving at 1600 hours. At 1700 hours the platoon from B Co was withdrawn from the rice area and rejoined

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the Bn. A Co also found and destroyed approx 150 lbs of rice vic XT663224 at 1330 hours. Bn secured a perimeter around obj TOM by 1700 hours. T-3 4.2" Mort Plat displaced at 1300 hours from Bn base camp to the Bde TAC CP, XT593215. Two ambush patrols were sent out from obj TOM. No enemy contact was made throughout the night. No casualties were sustained during the days operations.

4th Bn, 23d Inf: APC from Cav Plat detonated a mine, XT638203, at 0825 hours. No casualties sustained. B Co received sniper fire, XT645204, at 0915 hrs. Three (3) men wounded and evacuated at 1010 hrs. Carbine and various written material was captured vic XT64221 at 1230 hrs. At approx 1400 hrs lead elements of battalion moved into a mined and booby trapped area at XT643227. Three (3) KIA's and nine (9) WIA's were evacuated by "DUST OFF". Bn withdraw and established forward base at XT640212.

4th Bn, 9th Inf: Bde reaction force Cu Chi.

Bde tactical CP with DS fire support elements (7th Bn, 11th Arty reinf) departed Cu Chi and closed Trung Lap 1600 hrs.

2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: 1/5 (M) elements continued to conduct S&D opns in the SW sector of Obj 4 vic XT4931 and XT5031. C Co continued to search the cache area found on 16 May. B Co found and destroyed base camp vic XT496322 which contained living quarters, mess hall, training area and a small firing range. The area appeared to have been used the day before. A Co surprised four VC in a base camp vic XT500313, wounding two (2) VC. Following the VC blood trails, A Co elements found one (1) VC body and a M1 rifle in a tunnel vic XT499317. At 1625, Co A found a small CP vic XT500316 and surprised four (4) VC who immediately ran when fired upon. Two VC KIA (poss) resulted and several books and a portable typewriter were found in the area. At the same time other elements of A Co found another CP area at XT505320 and captured a TA-312 telephone and a PRC-10 Radio. Three company bases were established and a total of twelve (12) night ambushes were positioned.

1st Bn, 27th Inf: 1/27 Inf (-) commenced thorough S&D opns in their sector of Obj 4. At 1150 B Co captured 6,600 lbs of rice at XT540313. No significant contact was made throughout the day and all elements closed the Bn CP at 1600. A total of four (4) night ambushes were established with negative contact.

2d Bn, 27th Inf: At 0615 A & C Co's conducted local sweeps of the area forward of their perimeters. A Co located and destroyed a large tunnel with an 8 ft room at XT523347. A & C Co commenced their S&D opns while Security and Recon Plats secured the CP area. At 0915 the Security Plat received sniper fire. C Co destroyed five (5) bunkers at XT519336. At 1313 C Co received heavy AW and SA fire from XT513336. While C Co was maneuvering against the fire, 4 WIA were sustained and in the final assault on the position six (6) more WIA were sustained. The VC position was a small village.

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Two (2) VC were killed, a Russian SMG and 300 lbs of cloth were captured. A Co located and destroyed a tunnel complex at XT523340, capturing 60 lbs of medical supplies and documents. A & C Co returned to the Bn perimeter and B Co was airlifted from base camp into the area at 1630. Three (3) night ambushes were established with negative contact.

D+2 (18 May 66)

1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf: Continued S&D operations around it's perimeter. B Co returned to the area of rice supply discovered on the previous day at XT 670230 to assist in its removal. Recon Plat established two OP's on the Saigon River vic XT663242 and XT667243. A cache of rice was found at 1030 hours by B Co vic XT663225. Numerous tunnels and spider holes were found and destroyed. B 3/4 Cav assisted B Co in the removal of rice stores, transporting it by APC to a LZ vic XT669235 for extraction by helicopter. A total of 20 tons of rice were removed and an estimated 10 tons were destroyed by dumping and scattering. All elements returned to Bn area by 1500 hrs. Ambush sites were occupied at XT664241, XT667241, XT671235 and XT659238 with negative contact. Two claymore mines were detonated by VC near the Bn perimeter, but no casualties were sustained.

4th Bn, 23d Inf: At approximately 1022 A Co received sniper fire from XT637210. Fire was returned with no known VC casualties. B Co received fire from friendly helicopters at XT637216 at 1116 hrs with two (2) WIA and one (1) KIA. At 1347 hrs B Co received sniper fire at XT637222. Two (2) WIA's were evacuated by resupply chopper. No known VC casualties. At approximately 1417 hrs the Bn S2 recovered one (1) AT mine, 2000 rds 7.62 ammo clip, 200 rds 7.62 link, four (4) grenades, and ten (10) unidentified tube shape objects. All items were evacuated to Bde S2. Bn TF stopped at XT637227 at 1500 hrs for the night.

4th Bn, 9th Inf: At 0630 a platoon from 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav departed TRUNG LAP to secure LZ B which was accomplished by 0915 hrs. The original LZ time of 0930 hrs was delayed because of weather to 1100 and at this time the first flight elements landed on the LZ. The lift consisted of 7 flight elements with 6-10 UH1D aircraft per element. A total of 446 personnel were lifted into LZ. The lift was completed at 1131 hrs. No enemy fire was encountered in the LZ. At 1220 the Bn crossed the LD in a search and destroy operation toward objective BILL XT634253 with Co C and the Cav Plat leading and followed by the Bn command group and A Co. At 1420 the lead elements of the Bn were on obj BILL (XT643254) having destroyed 5 tunnels and 15 buildings enroute. Many documents and papers, one tractor with ditch digger attachment and 4 bicycles were captured. Resupply by air was effected and the Bn secured a perimeter for the night. A Co had two minor WIA from booby trap fragments during the afternoon. During the night the Bn received 6-10 60mm rounds or rifle grenades in the perimeter with no casualties.

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2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: 1/5 (M) units continued to search and destroy in the SW sector of Obj 4. At 0950 A Co discovered a typewriter at XT500316 and an arms room containing MG spare parts and an armorer school graduation certificate. At 1257 A Co was ordered to search an area west of Obj 4 vic XT486330. At 1632 A Co surprised two VC attempting to emplace a claymore mine resulting in one (1) VC KIA (BC), one (1) carbine and one (1) claymore captured. Night defensive positions were established in the vic of the Bn CP XT4930. Six (6) night ambushes were established with negative contact.

1st Bn, 27th Inf: 1/27 Inf conducted S&D ops in the SE portion of Obj 4. C Co found one (1) claymore, a medical aid station with two cans of US and Chinese medical supplies, assorted clothing and a bag of documents at XT538420. At 1110 B Co located a supply point at XT533314 with canned goods, WD-1/T wire, clothes, 600 rds of small arms ammo, and 6,300 lbs of rice. C and B Co returned to the Bn base at 1600. A total of four night ambushes were established with negative contact.

2d Bn, 27th Inf: At 0815 A, B and C Co's commenced S&D ops into the heavy woods south of the Bn CP. Throughout the day there was no enemy contact which allowed 2/27 Inf to conduct a thorough search of the area locating the following significant items: 150 bags of rice, XT529340; 100 bags of rice XT529341; five (5) tunnels XT523334; three (3) VC bodies in fresh graves XT523340; 15,000 rds 7.92mm, four (4) 81mm mortar rds XT529333; 25 gallons of oil, 15 pints of paint, 3 lbs TNT, XT529333; VC base camp XT525337. The Bn established nine (9) night ambushes.

D+3 (19 May 66)

1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf: Continued S&D operations vic base area. A search of the area where the enemy claymore mines were detonated on the preceding night revealed no significant findings. Numerous tunnels and mines were found and destroyed by each platoon within their sectors. There was little enemy contact during the day; occasional sightings of the VC across the Saigon River vic XT657241 and several rounds of sniper fire were directed toward the searching platoons. By 1530 hrs all elements had returned to Bn base area. Ambush sites were occupied around the perimeter but no contact was made. At 2030 hours one enemy claymore mine was detonated against the Bn perimeter resulting in 5 US casualties: 1 KIA, 4 WIA. The casualties were evacuated the following morning.

4th Bn, 23d Inf: Began movement at 0735 hrs. Just prior to moving C Co sustained a WIA from sniper fire. Individual was evacuated by air and DCA at Cu Chi base. Mines, booby traps and punji pit (XT637228) were reported at 0911 hrs. Bn also had four (4) WIA's at this location. At 1031 hrs Bn received 2 WIA's at XT639228. 3/4 Cav Plat had 2 WIA's, XT634230 at 1440 hrs. Fire was returned with .50 Cal MG, small arms and flame track.

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One (1) VC was killed by BC. Cav Plat had another WIA—at same location at approx 1520 hrs. Bn TF stopped for the night at XT639232 at 1740 hrs. Several booby traps and tunnels w/connecting shelters were reported by Co C at XT639229. Sniper fir was received, XT638228, by the Cav Plat at 1925 hrs.

4th Bn, 9th Inf: At 0730 hrs the perimeter received sniper fire resulting in one friendly KIA and 2 WIA. At 0830 resupply was completed and the units moved out on S&D. One Em was KIA by sniper fire at XT638252 at 1040 hrs. During the S&D operation the units destroyed 6000 lbs of rice, 40 lbs salt, 8 rifle grenades, one tunnel 80 ft long, one tunnel 120 ft long, 8 newly constructed bunkers and numerous dwellings. Units returned to the Bn forward base at 1530.

2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: At 0743 the Bn moved to conduct S&D ops in AO "C" vic XT5634. An APC from Co C hit a large AT mine causing extensive damage to the vehicle and two (2) WIA at XT531306. A Co found a large cache vic XT564235 which contained 34,000 lbs of rice, 150 ea 5 gal cans of kerosene and 500 sheets of tin, all stored on pallets, rolls of black cloth, sewing machines, dried fish. A Co also killed one (1) VC (BC) in the area and captured one 9mm SMG. All units returned to the Bn base at 1605 and a total of nine (9) night ambushes were established.

1st Bn, 27th Inf: At 0735 a plat from A CO, 1/27th was airlifted into the operational area from base camp as a Bn reaction force. The Bn continued to search the heavily wooded area to the west of their CP. C Co located 1,600 lbs of rice at XT535323. Three (3) VC were observed moving in an area where Recon Plat had received sniper fire. Mortar fire was adjusted on the VC resulting in three (3) VC KIA (poss). A small base camp was located in vic XT540318. C Co located 1,600 ea 100 kilo bags of rice stored in bins along with sheet tin, assorted clothing and some food at XT537324. B and D Co closed into the Bn base at 1615. Three (3) night ambushes were established.

2d Bn, 27th Inf: At 0900 2/27 Inf units commenced their S&D ops with A Co moving into the SW, C Co moving to the south and B Co moving to XT520334 to extract a rice cache and complete searching in that area. During these sweeps A and C Co were to penetrate deep into the wooded area for it was believed that earlier contact with the VC and small caches were only the outposts of larger fortifications hidden in the dense woods. A and C Co's made contact almost simultaneously at approximately 0925. A Co received intensive SA and AW fire from vic XT523339 and the area south. On three occasions they were engaged by fire and booby traps and each time the VC broke contact when the fire was returned and arty was placed on their suspected positions. A command detonated mine wounded five (5) US soldiers and a total of nine (9) were wounded by the SA fire. Dense woods and heavy fire caused one "dustoff" aircraft to depart the area and abort its mission at which time carrying parties were dispatched from the Bn CP under the control of the Bn S2. A Co continuing its mission located a well camouflaged

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fortified village which was surrounded with thick underbrush and was heavily bobby trapped. As A Co fired into the village eleven (11) VC were observed being hit by fire. In maneuvering towards the village A Co received six (6) casualties at which time the unit backed off and placed a heavy volume of artillery fire on the area. The Co moved back to the Bn base and an airstrike was placed on the area at 1700. During the entire time A Co was in contact, C Co was also engaged while moving through dense woods. C Co began to receive SA and AW fire vic XT533331 but each time the VC broke contact. At 1710 C Co reached a fortified village (XT533333) and immediately brought in arty fire killing 12 VC. C Co sustained 3 WIA. B Co was diverted from the rice cache and ordered to pass thru C Co, which had secured the village, and to continue the attack to the south. B Co received heavy fire from another fortified position vic XT533331 and sustained four casualties. Heavy artillery fire was shifted and B Co elements continued to maneuver, they received 10 more casualties. The VC having broken contact, the company commenced evacuation of the wounded while continuous artillery fire was placed on the VC position. All elements closed the Bn CP at 1830. 1/8th Arty. continued to saturate the VC positions and the suspected escape routes.

D+4 (20 May 66)

1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf: Continued operations with the entire battalion being airlifted from obj TOM to LZ "C" XT634310 commencing 1030 hrs. LZ "C" was secured by B Co with no enemy contact. Last elements closed in LZ at 1130 hrs and Bn proceeded to search and destroy towards obj TED (XT654283). A Co received enemy sniper fire as it moved towards its assigned area vic XT632307. The Bn occupied a defensive perimeter vic XT632314. There were no significant actions during the night.

4th Bn, 23d Inf: Bn TF remained at XT639232 until approx 1430 hrs due to weather which prevented resupply. After equipment was extracted Bn TF continued S&D mission to XT623238, arriving at 1615 hrs. An ambush was left at CP location for 19 May 1966 and engaged approx (21) VC at 1721 hrs. Results were (7) VC KIA by BC and (5) VC KIA (poss). There were no US losses. Destruction for the day (2) Claymore mines, (25) lbs of salt, wire and batteries, (600) lbs potash, (200) lbs peanuts, and (400) lbs rice.

4th Bn, 9th Inf: The Bn was unable to move as planned due to nonavailability of aircraft for extraction of night kits. Co A moved to the east on a search and destroy mission and Co C remained at Bn base until extraction and resupply was completed. Extraction and resupply was completed at 1400 and the Bn was ordered to move to objective BOB (XT658258). From 1430-1530 A Co suffered 6 WIA including the Co Commander from AP mines. Objective BOB was secured at 1735 hrs.

2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: At 0700 the Bn moved to establish blocking

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positions and ambush points along the northern, western and southern boundary of the 2/27 Inf to preclude VC infiltration from the area. The concept included A Co screening and blocking to the north vic XT503347 and XT535345 then conducting S&D opps to the Saigon River. B Co would screen and block to the west vic XT505347 and XT510330. C Co established squad size ambushes vic XT513329 to XT581312. A Co located 2500 lbs of rice, 27 new bicycles and 20 hand grenades vic XT530350 and B Co located 1500 lbs of rice vic XT513344. At 1257, A Co killed one (1) VC (BC) and captured one (1) rifle at XT527359. At 1700 the units had completed their missions and commenced movement to Bn base area. At 1743, C Co wounded and captured one VC with his rifle at XT520308. Initial interrogation and a letter the VC was carrying indicated that he was on a recon mission from the 320th Bn in the 403d company inquiring as to the situation in the area. The 320th Bn had not heard from the company in five days. A total of three (3) night ambushes were established.

1st Bn, 27th Inf: The Bn continued to S&D in their sector on the western side of Obj 4. Recon Plat. killed one (1) VC (BC) at XT552316. At 1540, C Co located 356,800 lbs of rice and 3,400 lbs of peanuts vic XT542328. At 1543, the Bn CO spotted two (2) VC in the open. Gunships were called and engaged the VC resulting in two VC KIA (BC). The units returned to the Bn base at 1600 and three (3) night ambushes were established.

2d Bn, 27th Inf: At 0900 air strikes were placed on both fortified villages where the units made contact on 19 May. A, B and C Co's conducted local sweeps while the Recon Plat was dispatched to thoroughly search the fortified village, XT533333, and assess the damage from the artillery and air strikes. A Co found two (2) fresh graves and five VC bodies vic XT525339. Recon Plat reported the village at XT533333 was 70% destroyed as was the village at XT535334 which was checked by A Co. There was no significant enemy contact throughout the day. The Recon Plat established an ambush at the hospital complex vic XT525340 at 1916. At 2040 the A Co sector was probed from the northwest by an estimated 2 VC squads. Heavy arty fire, mortars and small arms were placed in the area with illumination, resulting in seven (7) VC KIA (BC) and eight (8) VC KIA (poss). There were no friendly casualties.

D+5 (21 May 66)

1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf: At 1000 the Bn commenced moving toward obj TED along the route XT634307 to XT645296 to XT655287. AT XT634307 A Co received fire and began advancing towards XT628304. The fire fight intensified and A Co sustained 2 KIA, 3 WIA and 1 MIA. Artillery fires and gunships were used to suppress enemy fire. Enemy casualties were not determined, however, the size of the VC force was estimated at one platoon entrenched inside a wood-line approximately 40 to 80 meters forward of A Co. One body was not recovered due to the intense enemy fire and suspension of operations in the area due to darkness. At 1400 hours one dustoff helicopter attempting to

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evacuate A Co's wounded was downed as a result of enemy fire. The ship was rapidly secured and was evacuated at 1625 hours. B Co conducted S&D operations to the left of A Co. The Bn returned to XT635310 with all elements closing in perimeter by 1900 hrs. No further enemy contact was made during the night.

4th Bn, 23d Inf: The Bn TF started moving at 1030 hrs. By 1210 hrs the TF had moved approx 1500 meters north at XT620254. While enroute several tunnels and villages were investigated then destroyed. 300 lbs of rice and 100 lbs of beans were destroyed. Sniper fire was received by B Co XT 613251, at 1320 hrs. Small arms fire was returned. B Co sustained two (2) WIA in the action which were evacuated. Enemy lost one (1) VC KIA by BC. Bn TF secured perimeter at XT606264 at 1530 hrs.

4th Bn, 9th Inf: At 0100 A Co successfully executed an ambush resulting in 2 VC KIA (poss) and 1 US WIA. At 0745 hrs the Bn sustained one WIA from friendly artillery in the Bn base. The Bn continued to search and destroy moving north to obj BUD (XT647279). During the movement the Bn encountered many booby traps and at least 4 mines. Mines were wooden and of CHICOM manufacture. One APC hit a mine which damaged the track. Light sniper fire was also encountered during the move. Several tunnels, a quantity of rice and other items were destroyed during the move. The Bn closed into obj BUD at 1630 hrs and immediately effected resupply. Nine ambush patrols were dispatched at dark to return at 0600.

2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: Throughout the day the entire Bn conducted maintenance of vehicles and equipment in preparation for the next phase of operation WAHIAWA. The Bn established twelve night ambushes, eleven of which were to remain in position until 221500 May 66.

1st Bn, 27th Inf: The Bn conducted maintenance of equipment and finalized plans for the next phase of operation WAHIAWA. At 0900, an air strike was placed in the area where the rice cache was discovered, XT536325, to destroy buildings and small structures comprising the storage base. A Co (-) was airlifted into the AO from base camp at 0820. Three (3) night ambushes were established.

2d Bn, 27th Inf: At 0700, A Co commenced a sweep forward of their area to police the battlefield where they had been probed the night before. Expended brass, canteens, ammo pouches, clothing, one VC body and several drag marks were found. B Co was airlifted from the area back to base camp at 0915. Local sweeps were conducted in the Bn area along with maintenance of equipment in preparation for the next phase Operation WAHIAWA. Air strikes were placed on both fortified villages encountered on 19 May 66. Six (6) night ambushes were established.

D+6 (22 May 66)

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1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf: The Bn moved from its perimeter, XT635310, south towards the road and continued S&D operations to vic XT643300 where the new perimeter was to be established. A Co, in the lead, encountered sporadic sniper fire and maneuvered to the left. B Co was ordered to pass A Co and take the lead. B Co sustained seven casualties which were evacuated by dust off. At approximately 1500 hours an OH-23 helicopter was downed vic the old Bn base camp area, XT635304, and was secured overnight by the Recon Plat. The helicopter was evacuated the following morning. There was no further enemy contact and no casualties during the night. Resupply was not effected at the close of the day due to poor weather conditions.

4th Bn, 23d Inf: Bn TF moved from XT612264 to XT590258 with little resistance closing at 1750 hrs. The following items were destroyed, 17 houses, 19 tunnels, 2700 lbs rice, 75 lbs tobacco, 100 lbs cotton, 200 lbs wheat and 3 bags phosphorus. Resupply was not effected due to weather (rain and low ceiling).

4th Bn, 9th Inf: The Bn started resupply and the exchange of Co's A & B at 0900. C Co and the Recon Plat moved to the northwest to conduct S&D mission. At 1335 B Co had closed into the LZ and moved to the southwest to conduct S&D mission. B Co found a tunnel at XT 657276 containing a ton of rice and sustained two WIA from a VC booby trap in a house nearby. The rice, tunnel and house were destroyed. B Co returned to Bn base at 1655. C Co encountered heavy sniper fire at XT656286 resulting in VC sniper KIA (BC). C Co destroyed 2500 lbs rice and several tunnels and dwellings returning to the Bn base at 1630. The Bn secured for the night and was resupplied. Ten ambush patrols were dispatched at dark to return prior to 0730. At 2030 hrs one ambush patrol from B Co received 4 or 5 hand grenades resulting in one friendly KIA. At 220750 May while returning to the Bn base one patrol from C Co was hit by sniper fire resulting in one friendly KIA and one friendly WIA.

2d Brigade

2d Bde FSOC: At 0730 the artillery fire support base and the Bde GP displaced to XT534285 to support the next phase of the operation. All elements closed at 11.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: At 0704, A Co (-) moved to secure the LZ (XT542296) for 2/27 Inf (-) and at 0715 the Bn GP displaced to XT554276. At 0930 an ambush from C Co at XT488296 wounded and captured one (1) VC armed with two GHIKOM grenades. At 0945 B Co ambush at XT517308 killed one (1) VC at 0945, killed one (1) VC (BC) and three VC (poss). One Russian 7.62mm SMG, three magazines of 7.62mm and two grenades were captured. All units moved to bases vic XT555277 and three (3) night ambushes were established.

1st Bn, 27th Inf: At 0025, C Co killed one (1) VC (BC) and two (2) VC (poss) when mortar fire was placed on VC probing the perimeter. The Bn

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conducted a tactical march into their new base area vic XT562332 with negative contact. Plat from A 3/4 Cav was attached to 1/27 Inf at 1700. All units closed the Bn base by 1710 and four (4) night ambushes were established.

2d Bn, 27th Inf: At 0955 the Bn commenced displacement to their new base area, XT549301. Security elements and supplies were airlifted and the remainder of the Bn conducted a tactical march closing the new area at 1350 with negative contact. The Bn established six (6) night ambushes.

D+7 (29 May 66)

1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf: An airstrike was requested and flown in vic XT629304 at 1000 hrs. Bn did not enter the area after the airstrike. Bn commenced movement after being resupplied. The plan was to move from present location to vicinity of obj TEX (XT628299). Upon reaching vic XT639299 A Co encountered sniper fire from a trench line. A Co suppressed the enemy fires. The Bn base was established vicinity XT639299, at 2000 hrs. No resupply was received due to poor weather conditions, however, the most seriously wounded were evacuated at midnight after an improvement in the weather conditions. There was no enemy contact during the night.

4th Bn, 23d Inf: Resupply was initiated at 0830 hrs. A Co captured 12,000 lbs of rice at XT590264. Rice was destroyed. At 1115 hrs B Co received sniper fire at XT598262. Sustaining 1 WIA. Fire was returned; results unknown. TF moved to XT582252 for the night.

4th Bn, 9th Inf: Orders for local S&D were changed and at 1405 hrs the Bn departed for objective B (XT616287) conducting S&D enroute. As estimated 10-15 snipers were encountered enroute resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 VC KIA (poss). The Bn closed into obj B at 1610, was resupplied by air and secured a perimeter for the night. 6 ambush patrols were dispatched at 1910 to return at 0720 the next morning. Two ambushes were successfully executed during the night resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC).

2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: The commander's concept for the next phase consisted of a full Bn attack into an objective area bounded by XT5831, XT6033, XT6230. The plan called for rapid movement to seize objectives to the north and NE and then commence slow, detailed search and destroy operation in zone. Artillery and air preparation were placed in the obj area prior to the attack. There was only one (1) significant enemy contact throughout the attack which commenced at 0730. At 1104, A Co engaged three VC in a group, killing one (1) VC (BC) and two (2) VC (poss). The entire objective area was heavily mined both with AT and large command detonated mines. A total of six (6) APC's hit mines resulting in 11 WIA and extensive damage to three of the vehicles. Several small caches were found in the area including rice, kerosene, documents, lodgers and 3,000 empty rice bags.

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The Bn CP displaced to vic B Co at XT582305. A and C Co established a consolidated base vic XT608318. The Bn employed eleven (11) night ambushes.

1st Bn, 27th Inf: 1/27 Inf (-) conducted S&D ops in the northern sector of Obj 5 with Co's B and C and 3/4 Cab Plat attacking SE along the Saigon River and A Co moving south into the dense woods vic XT560320 commencing at 0730. Throughout the day there was no enemy contact. Several tunnels and small bunkers were destroyed in the area. A cache consisting of 60,000 lbs of rice and 4,000 lbs of peanuts was discovered vic XT572315. All units moved back to the Bn base, closing at 1710. Three (3) night ambushes were established.

2d Bn, 27th Inf: At 0730 the Bn commenced S&D ops in the southern sector of Obj 5 (XT5630). At 0830 a Guinness claymore was detonated against C Co, wounding seven (7) men. The element from C Co also received heavy SA and MG fire from an undetermined size force. Artillery and mortar fires were placed on the position at XT559303, and when elements from C Co attacked the VC broke contact. 2/27 Inf (-) elements made no further enemy contact throughout the day. C Co located a large cache vic XT551212 consisting of cloth, batteries, bundles of plastic, kerosene, rolls of wire and levels. A and C Co's closed the Bn base by 1628 and six (6) night ambushes were established.

D+8 (24 May 66)

1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf: Bn commenced movement at 1200 hrs. B Co moved through A Co and immediately began receiving sniper fire from vic XT636298. B Co maneuvered and suppressed the fire, sustaining six casualties, two KIA and four WIA. The enemy was enclosed in three bunkers that controlled the area. Estimated strength of the enemy was seven personnel. Grenades and direct fire anti-tank weapons were used to silence and destroy the bunkers. The unit continued to obj B (XT627286), closing at 1700 hours. Two ambush patrols were employed during the night with no enemy contact.

4th Bn, 23d Inf: Bn TF began movement north on S&D mission. At approx 1045 hrs B Co received friendly artillery rounds in their location at XT 584225. Two (2) WIA were sustained, one (1) of which DOW. At 1500 hrs Bn TF halted at XT585272 for the night. During the days operation numerous houses and 2800 lbs of rice were destroyed.

4th Bn, 9th Inf: Bn conducted local S&D operations with C Co moving to the NW, B Co moving SW and the Recon Plat moving SE. During the day 1700 lbs rice, 5 dwellings, numerous mines and booby traps, 7 tunnels, VC flags, VC uniforms and numerous other items were destroyed. B Co sustained 8 WIA from 2 booby trapped hand grenades at XT624281. The 2/14th Infantry moved into area of operations arriving at 1710 hours, and occupied the north-eastern side of the perimeter for the night. The Bn dispatched 4 ambush patrols for the night.

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3d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: At 0700 all units of the Bn commenced to conduct thorough S&D ops in their respective sectors. 1/5 (M) elements continued to find several caches in the area which appeared to have been used recently as a VC unit base and rest camp. At 1345 A Co received a new mission to attack NW along the Saigon River to link up with elements of 1/27 Inf (-). Elements of C Co sunk several sampans and located small caches of food supplies while searching along the Saigon River vic XT599324. All units moved to a Bn base vic XT583205 at 1730. Nine (9) night ambushes were established.

1st Bn, 27th Inf: At 0730, the Bn continued to conduct S&D ops in their sector of Obj 5 with negative enemy contact. At 1323, B Co located a bunker containing fifty 5 gal cans of medical supplies at XT554307. The units completed their sweeps and returned to the Bn base at 1620. Three (3) night ambushes were established. At 2020, while moving into position one ambush called in artillery fire on five (5) VC resulting in 5 VC KIA (pos).

2d Bn, 27th Inf: At 0730, after screening the area to the front of their positions A and C Co commenced S&D ops in their sectors of Obj 5. A Co received sniper fire resulting in two minor WIA's. Artillery fire was placed on the suspected VC position but they had broken contact. A and C Co completed their missions and by 1800 had closed the Bn base. Six (6) night ambushes were established.

D+9 (25 May 66)

1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf: Bn moved out at 1230 hours from objective B southeast for 600 meters, south for 400 meters then south-west to obj F (XT619263). B Co was lead element for movement and encountered no VC enroute. Rear elements, however, did encounter sniper fire from vic XT625285 prior to departing the old Bn base. All elements closed base area vic (XT619263) at 1730 hours and secured in area with 4/9 Inf. Four ambush patrols were employed during the night with no enemy contact.

4th Bn, 23d Inf: Bn TF moved to XT563199 with no enemy activity or action reported. One (1) casualty from snake bite was evacuated. Bn TF continued operation with only activity being two (2) VCS apprehended that were evacuated to Bde.

4th Bn, 9th Inf: Bn moved out at 0900 in S&D toward objective F (XT619263). Enroute C Co encountered light sniper fire resulting in two friendly WIA. The Bn destroyed 20 dwellings, 6 of which were booby trapped, 5200 lbs rice, 4 tunnels, 6 bunkers and numerous other items. The Bn arrived at obj F at 1630 hours, was resupplied and secured a perimeter for the night. Four ambush patrols were dispatched at 1845 and returned at 0630 the following morning. The patrols had no contact.

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2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: The battalion dispatched elements to occupy platoon size ambushes along the southern edge of Obj 4 and 5. One platoon from C Co completed operations in the 1/5 (M) AO by screening east from XT586308 to XT590308. At 1005 B Co ambush vic XT578296 killed two (2) VC (BC) and captured four CHICOM grenades and miscellaneous documents. At 1305 the Bn CP displaced to XT555275. At 1420 C Co ambush (XT311105) killed one VC (BC) and captured one (1) CHICOM rifle, two (2) hand grenades and web equipment. The platoon size ambushes remained in position at night and three (3) more ambushes were established in the vicinity of the battalion CP.

1st Bn, 27th Inf: At 0825 the battalion commenced a tactical march to the new base vic 2d Bde CP XT530280. At 1215 a VC Claymore was detonated along the route, wounding six (6) personnel vic XT542210. A thorough search of the area was made with negative contact. The battalion closed the new area at 1400 and prepared defensive positions. Six (6) night ambushes were established. At 2220 the ambush vic XT527257 killed one (1) VC (BC).

2d Bn, 27th Inf: The battalion commenced displacement to new base vic XT493246 at 0630. A security force was airlifted to the new CP location at 0950. All elements closed the new location at 1246, and defensive positions were immediately prepared. A total of six (6) night ambushes were established.

D+10 (26 May 66)

1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf: Bn commenced movement 0830 hrs from obj F to Bde forward base vic XT593216. There was no enemy contact enroute. Unit passed thru elements of 4th Inf vic XT617224 enroute to Bde base. Listening posts were employed outside the Bn perimeter during the night, and there was no enemy contact.

4th Bn, 23d Inf: Bn moved south of TRUNG LAP to secure road from TRUNG LAP to Highway 1.

4th Bn, 9th Inf: Bn moved south to obj M (XT618225) at 1030. The Bn left a seven man element from the Recon Platoon behind to establish an ambush at the old position. A VC force of 8 or 9 men made a reconnaissance by fire of the position at 1230 hrs, then moved in and started to police the area for ammo cans, trash, etc. The recon element sprung the ambush at a distance of 30 meters and got 3 VC body count and 3 VC KIA possible. As the patrol moved out of position to search the bodies they were fired on by a superior force and withdrew under cover of small arms and artillery fire. They joined the remainder of the Bn on obj M at 1435. The Bn occupied perimeter positions for the night and was resupplied. At approximately 1710 the Bn perimeter received 4 rounds of 8 inch artillery. This

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artillery was fired from the Cu Chi base camp. The Bn sustained 2 KIA and 18 WIA from the friendly artillery fire and one of the wounded later died. VC snipers were engaged resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 KIA (poss). Seven ambush patrols were dispatched at 1830. An ambush patrol from B Co detonated a claymore mine against a VC force with unknown results at 2105.

2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: At 0730 the A Co ambush located vic XT553313 killed 2 VC (BC) and captured a CHICOM assault rifle, seven ammo magazines and two CHICOM grenades. At 0810 all ambushes were ordered to return to the Bn base, closing at 0910. The Recon Plat called in artillery fire on four (4) VC in the open resulting in four (4) VC KIA (poss). At 1800 B Co was ordered to secure the 2/27th Inf (-) CP. B Co arrived at 1920 and was placed under OPCON Co 2/27th Inf.

1st Bn, 27th Inf: At 0755 C Co commenced S&D ops in AO "B" vic XT5127. C Co returned to the Bn base at 1140 with negative enemy contact. A Co commenced S&D ops vic XT5227 and XT5327 at 1030, returning at 1420 with negative contact. Six (6) night ambushes were established.

2d Bn, 27th Inf: At 0900, A Co, Recon Plat and the MEDCAP team initiated searching ops vic XT5124. Several rounds of ineffective sniper fire were received by advancing elements but exact VC positions could not be determined. The Recon Plat captured one (1) VCC at 1045 vic XT588329. The VC gave information about the location of members of his squad and that he knew where 50 VC were hiding in a tunnel. Based on this information, A Co, C Co and Recon Plat were diverted from their mission to exploit the intelligence information. At 1500, the tunnel (XT503210) was located and encircled. While investigating the tunnel, one man from A Co was wounded three times in the legs. Certain that there were VC in the tunnel, the unit set up a defensive perimeter around the tunnel for the night. The battalion CP was augmented by B Co, 1/5th (Mech) Inf. Continuing to search the area, two 45 cal pistols, 1 carbine and several assorted documents were found in one of the adjacent tunnels.

D+11 (27 May 66)

1st Brigade

2d Bn, 14th Inf: Bn was extracted from the area by CH47 and UHED helicopters, extraction was begun at 0800. All elements closed Div base camp at 1050 hrs. There was no contact enroute or during the day.

4th Bn, 9th Inf: At 0743 all patrols returned to Bn base without making contact. At 0800 the Bn moved out for the ARVN Ranger Camp at TRUNG LAP closing there at 0910 without incident. The first elements departed by helicopter for Cu Chi base camp at 0920 and the last elements closed in the Cu Chi base area at 1100 hrs.

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4th Bn, 23d Inf: Bn TF provided convoy security for Bde returning to Cu Chi from TRUNG LAP. Co A received one (1) WIA at XT58200. Evacuated by "Dust Off". Bn started movement to Cu Chi with first elements arriving at 1250 hrs. Entire Bn closed base camp area at 1310 hrs.

2d Brigade

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf: At 0730 B Co returned to 1/5 (M) control and the bn commenced its mission of clearing and securing the road from XT 508259 to XT488205 for the overland extraction of the Bde CP. At 1107 the Bn CP commenced its move along the route to vic XT492212. At 1515, all elements had passed through the bn security forces at which time 1/5 (M) commenced their overland move closing base camp at 1855.

1st Bn, 27th Inf: At 0625 the Bn cleared the road from 2d Bde CP to XT504257. The 3/4 Cav Plt and elements from the 65th Engr remained to secure the road while 1/27th Inf elements moved back to their base. At 1000 the Bn commenced an airmobile extraction from the AO to base camp. Airlifted elements closed Cu Chi at 1120. The 4.2 mortar plt which was attached to the 1/8th Arty returned with the PSOC elements at 1600.

2d Bn, 27th Inf: During the night elements at the location of the tunnel received intermittent SA and rifle grenade fire into their positions. C Co killed one (1) VC (BC) attempting to escape the encirclement. Elements conducting a sweep at 0630 found the VC body, a pistol and a rifle. Personnel went back into the numerous tunnel entrances to continue the search. Several noises were heard inside and the decision was made to extract the personnel and commence completed destruction of the entire tunnel complex. A special tunnel team was flown into the area from Saigon and by 1112 the complete destruction had been accomplished. The Bn returned to its CP area and at 1254 commenced an airmobile extraction from the AO, all elements closing base camp by 1342.

12. Results:

VC KIA (BC)	144	Dried Beef	100 lbs
VC KBA	13	Beans	4.18 tons
VC KBA (poss)	30	Sugar	1.8 tons
VC KIA (poss)	205	Parafin	4000 lbs
VCC	10	Tar	500 gals
VCS	9	Medical Supplies	4000 lbs
Small arms	32	Cloth	98,698 yds
Heavy weapon	1	Tin	550 sheets
Ammo	23,524	Steel	30 sheets
Mines/demolition	174	Steel	10 bars
Base camps	9	Heavy wire	30 rolls
Supply Points	3	Motorcycle	1
Fortifications	41	Bicycle	54
Tunnels	140	Sewing Machines	8
Building	234	Duplicating Machine	1

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Rice	847.4 tons	Typewriter	1
Peanuts	615 lbs	Batteries (4.5 volt)	190
Dried fish	3800 lbs	Dental Set	1
Phosphate	550 lbs	Entrenching tools	77
Wheat	200 lbs	Canteens	41
Salt	375 lbs	Outboard Motor	1-6 HP
Tobacco	75 lbs	Tractor	1
Sorghum	1000 lbs	Sampans	41
Fuel	2,630 gals	PRC-10	1
Oil	115 Gals	TA 312-PT	1
Cotton	100 lbs	Documents	5,181

13. Administrative Matters.

a. Supply. All maneuver elements were resupplied by helicopter. 1st Bn. 8th Arty and Hq 2d Bde were resupplied by one vehicular convoy. In addition, on 19 May, 400 rounds of artillery ammunition was supplied to the 1st Bn, 8th Arty using the Air Force LAPES system of delivery. A Forward Support Operations Center was established by Support Command with 2d Bde CP in order to provide Class I thru IV support to the brigade.

b. Maintenance.

The 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry had 11 M113 Personnel Carriers hit by mines during the operation. Of the 11, five were repaired in the field; five were evacuated to base camp for repairs and one was blown in place.

c. Treatment of Casualties and Evacuation.

(1) The Bn Aid Stations accompanied the maneuver battalions into the AO.

(2) The 25th Medical Bn provided each Bde with a clearing platoon and maintained "dustoff" aircraft on standby throughout the operation.

d. Communication.

(1) Types utilized.

- (a) FM radio.
- (b) AM radio.
- (c) Point to point (hotline) telephone.
- (d) Switchboard to switchboard (common user) telephone.
- (e) Teletype (on-line) crypto.
- (f) Courier.

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(2) Communications difficulties were experienced by the 1st Bde primarily due to the lack of authorized radios. This problem has since been alleviated.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques: None.

15. Commander's Analysis.

a. The use of stay behind ambushes again proved effective. As a unit departed an area where they had been for any length of time, well concealed ambush forces were able to surprise VC moving into the area.

b. When VC units in well camouflaged fortified positions are encountered in dense woods such as the BOI LOI, maximum artillery and air must be brought to bear on the VC positions prior to an infantry assault.

c. Searching a known VC area is not sufficient. Slow, detailed and often repetitive searching is necessary to locate caches and VC installations.


d. Gunships must enter the command net of the unit they support and must know the unit scheme of maneuver. If necessary, the gunship commander should land and be briefed by the commanding officer or the S3.

e. Battalion CP's must be capable of rapid displacement by air. Units must program early lift of excess equipment such as night kits, demolitions, etc., by normal resupply ships.


f. The firing of the center tube, artillery or mortars, on the axis of advance is effective both as a means of maintaining direction in dense vegetation and for expediting support fires when enemy contact is made.

g. The establishment of a Forward Support Operations Center (FSOC) along with a Fire Support Base and Brigade CP is not advisable when cross country movement or repetitive travel on roads subject to heavy mining is necessary. Maximum use of aerial resupply, and hence minimum essential equipment in the Brigade Forward CP remains as the most practical approach to operations of Brigade size in the present Division TAOR.

FOR THE COMMANDER :


PHILIP S. BONDI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG


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
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
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BOUDINOT
05

The image shows a highly textured, grainy surface, possibly a scan of a document or a photograph of a physical object. A prominent, dark, irregular line runs across the frame, starting from the top left and curving towards the bottom right. In the lower-middle section, there is a small, white rectangular box containing the number '5'. The overall appearance is very noisy and high-contrast, with a lot of black and white speckling.

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
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AVTLEDB-T(15 Jun 66)

1st Ind(C)

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS/J3/32)

HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO 96225, 20 June 1966

TO: See Distribution

1. During Operation HAKIKI a Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC) was established at Division Headquarters. This was a combined US/RVNAF center established to effect the coordinated use of all combat support (both ARVN and US) during the planning and execution of this operation. The center functioned on a co-director basis with the CSCC providing information and recommendations to both commanders. A 25th Infantry Division representative, ARVN representative and US advisor were available in the following functional areas:

- a. Co-director representatives.
- b. Artillery Element.
- c. G3 Air.
- d. G2 Air.
- e. Tactical Air Control Party.
- f. Army Aviation Element (ARVN Air Liaison Officer represented both the Tactical Air Control Party and Army Aviation Element).

2. The 25th Division representative, his ARVN counterpart and the ARVN's American Advisor were situated at the same desk so that there was constant coordination between them. Information was received by the CSCC from the ARVN regiment and the US brigade, jointly posted and disseminated to the other headquarters. A single journal was maintained, entering information from both ARVN and US sources. An example of CSCC operations was:

- a. At 041100 June 1966, the 25th ARVN Division requested a light fire team of two gunships from the 25th US Division to look for a reported VC platoon via XS604804.
- b. The fire team was dispatched to the target area by Army Aviation.
- c. At the same time, sensing that there was a potential TAC air target, the US co-director requested the ALO with the 25th ARVN Division to also recon the area.
- d. The FAC located an estimated VC platoon and directed a VNAF strike of 3 A1H's into the target area. This was repeated with a second VNAF strike and then again with a USAF F100 strike.

DNOWGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY AFTER 12 YEARS

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AVILEDB-T(15 Jun 66)

1st Ind (C)

20 Jun 66


SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS/J3/32)

e. The fire team was redirected to support Operation BARK by covering the extraction of a 25th US Infantry Company which was supported by 25th ARVN artillery.

f. Upon completion of the airstrikes, 25th ARVN troops searched the target area and reported 44 VC KIA (BC), 1 VCC, 1 M79, 1 carbine, 1 shotgun and 1 pistol.

4. Operations of this type are productive to both US and ARVN troops. After the initial hesitation is overcome, a potent team is created with which to control the fire support of both US and ARVN forces.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



THOMAS W. MELLEN
Colonel GS
Chief of Staff


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MACV, ATTN: MACI (thru IIFORCEV)
MACV, ATTN: Chief, USAF Advisory Group
(thru IIFORCEV)
CG, USARV, ATTN: AVC (D & H)
CG, IIFORCEV, ATTN: G3 (D & T)
CG, USA Infantry School, Ft Benning, Ga.
CG, USA Armor School, Ft Knox, Ky.

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WAKIKI



2D BDL, 25TH INF DIV
COMBAT AFTER ACTION

REPORT

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO US FORCES 96225

AVLEDB-T

15 June 1966

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (RCS/J3/32)

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: G3
APO US Forces 96225

1. (Operation MAKIKI) OPC D 25-66.
2. 031000 Jun - 091000 J. 66.
3. 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, in conjunction with the 49th Regt, 25th AVN Div, conducted search and stray operations in the central portion of HAU NGHIA Province in the area bounded by KP3818, XI 1504, XM4718, XI5204. This was a joint US-AVN operation with forces participating as indicated below.
4. Control Headquarters: 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div.
5. Reporting Officer: Colonel Thomas M. Tarply.
6. Task Organization and commanders were as follows:

<u>TF 1/5 (M) (Lt Col Gross, G-1)</u>	<u>Bde Ctr</u>
1/5 (M) Inf Sqd B/65 Engr Helicopter	Co C 1/27 (Base security) Co C 2/27 (Base Pwd Base Security) 1/8 Arty Bn Engr Plat (-) B/65 Engr 2d FASC Plat (-) B/25 Sig MP Plat (5th SF Co) Elem 25th F D 2d & 3d Plat, 16th HV AVN PSYOP Team Co A 25th Inf Bn 118 Ambul Co (Lt)
<u>TF 4/23 Inf (Lt Col Bostrom, G-1)</u>	
4/23 Inf (-) Sqd B/65 Engr Helicopter	
<u>TF 1/27 Inf (Lt Col O'Neal, G-1)</u>	
1/27 Inf (-) Sqd B/65 Engr Helicopter	
<u>TF 2/27 Inf (Lt Col Bostrom, G-1)</u>	
2/27 Inf (-) Sqd B/65 Engr Helicopter	

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
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7. Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery Support:

(1) Organization for Combat:

(a) 1/8th Arty - DS 2d Bde.

(b) 5/13 Arty:

1 5/13 Arty (-) G3 25th Inf Div.

2 B 5/13 Arty: GSR 1/8 Arty.

3 Plat (H^o How) D 5/13: GSR 1/8 Arty.

(2) How and when artillery employed:

(a) Artillery supported from two locations during the operation. 3 - 9 June 1966 the artillery base was located via TRANG BANG, (XT494196) on 6 June 1966. Battery C returned to CU CHI to support the 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf opns on 7 June 1966.

(b) Fires were utilized primarily to suppress sniper fire, flush VC from inundated hiding areas and suspected VC positions.

(c) On-call artillery fires were available throughout the operation.

(d) A total of 555 missions and 4,049 rounds were fired in support of the operation.

(3) Results, Effectiveness and Timeliness:

(a) Due to the fact that no large VC force was encountered during the operation it is difficult to measure the results of the artillery fire. A total of 5 VC KIA (POSS) were a direct result of artillery fire.

(b) All fires requested were accurate and timely throughout the entire operation.

(c) Well planned H&I fires denied the VC freedom of movement during the hours of darkness.

b. US Air Force:

(1) Eight air strikes were flown in support of the operation, all of which were preplanned.

(a) Of the eight (8) strikes, four (4) were by the US Air Force, one (1) by the US Navy and three (3) by VNAF.

(b) All strikes were requested by telephone (Hot Line) through 25th Inf Div G3.

(2) Results of Air Strikes: a total of nine (9) structures were destroyed and one (1) damaged.

c. Army Aviation:

(1) Army Aviation flew a total of 210 sorties and moved 160 tons of supplies during the operation.

(2) 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div Aviation Section provided OB23 support during the operation.

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(3) On 051000 Jun, 4th Bn, 23d Inf (-), 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-), and 2d Bn, 27th Inf (-) were airlifted in six flights by 37 UH1D's escorted by 17 UH1B (gunships) into respective AO's. Aircraft support was provided by the following units: 68th Airmobile Co, 116th Airmobile Co, 118th Airmobile Co, 173d Airmobile Co, Co A (Airmobile) 25th Avn Bn, and 197th General Support Co.

(4) On 070900 Jun, 4th Bn 23d Inf was extracted from AO by 30 UH1D's and returned to base camp.

(5) On 080900 Jun, 1st Bn 23d Inf was extracted from AO by 30 UH1D's and returned to base camp.

(6) On 090900 Jun, 2d Bn 27th Inf was extracted from AO by 30 UH1D's and returned to base camp.

(7) All lifts were conducted as planned with no significant problems.

8. Intelligence.

a. Analysis of terrain and vegetation in which operation was conducted:

The terrain in the area of operations was generally low and flat with the highest elevation being 5 meters. The vegetation consisted of bamboo hedgerows, rice fields and tall trees with underbrush, all of which afforded good concealment to the enemy for harassing operations and evasive tactics. The inundated rice fields and narrow trafficable roads precluded the use of wheeled vehicles. Terrain and vegetation did not affect the use of APC's.

b. Intelligence prior to operation:

The area of operations is completely controlled and dominated by VC units. In this area have included contact with friendly forces except for harassing type actions. The GI20 LP Company was reported in the area. Additionally, the 267th and 269th MF Battalions, Daug Thap II Regiment have been known to operate in this area. The area has been used as a VC logistical and transfer point.

c. Enemy situation during operations:

The most significant enemy contact was made by the Recon Plat, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf when an estimated VC platoon was engaged via XT466155 on 3 Jun 66.

Results: 12 VC KIA (BC) and 19 VCO. Subsequent to this action, TF element encountered squad-sized VC units. The VC made extensive use of mines and booby traps throughout the area. On 7 June 66, Co A, 2d Bn, 27th Inf discovered a weapons and grenade factory via XT415164. Also on 7 June 66, Co C 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf discovered a large weapons and ammunition cache via XT520104. Upon inspection by a MACV Technical Intel Team, the cache of Russian ammunition was estimated to be one of the largest discovered to date. The detail breakdown of weapons and ammunition are included in paragraph 12.

9. Mission: The 2d Bde Task Force was to conduct search and destroy operations for period 5-9 Jun in TRANG BANG district via XT3813, XT4505, XT4218 and XT5204, in conjunction with the 9th Regt, 25th ARVN Div to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies, and base camps.

10. Concept of operations: The 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div conducted airmobile and ground move to AO commencing 21000 Jun 66 to conduct search and destroy operations. The operation was conducted in four phases.

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Phase I: (2 Jun) The Bde Fwd Support base moved to vic TRANG BANG (XT4819) to conduct coordination with the 49th Regt (ARVN).

Phase II: (3 Jun) TF 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf conducted a mechanized attack and TF 4th Bn, 23d Inf, TF 1st Bn, 27th Inf, TF 2d Bn, 27th Inf conducted an airmobile assault into objective 1. Upon arrival in the AO all elements moved rapidly to establish blocking positions to completely encircle the area prior to commencing search and destroy operations in their respective zones. On 2/27, 2d Bde reaction force, established two blocking positions, XT452194 and XT486185. The entire airmobile assault and ground attack was preceded by and in conjunction with the 49th ARVN Regt airmobile assault into objective 2.

Phase III: (4-9 Jun) All elements conducted search and destroy operations in zone.

Phase IV: (7-9 Jun) TF 4th Bn, 23d Inf was extracted from AO 7 Jun. TF 1st Bn, 27th Inf continued search and destroy operations in zone until 8 Jun at which time they were extracted. TF 1st Bn (M) 5th Inf and 49th ARVN Regt conducted a joint US Mechanized and ARVN attack 7-8 June 66 with the 1st Bn (M) 5th Inf extracting from the AO on 8 June 66. TF 2d Bn 27th Inf continued to search and destroy in AO and were extracted on 9 June 66. The Bde fwd headquarters elements closed base camp on 9 June 66.

11. Execution: Div OPORD 12-66 was received on 28 May.

D-Day (3 Jun 66)

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf

At 0700 the Bn commenced movement and by 0925 lead elements had penetrated the area of operations and were located vic XT470127. At 1030 Co A reported that the attached Recon Plat had killed two (2) VC and run over two more as they drove through the water filled rice paddies. A detailed and systematic search of the area resulted in 12 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC KIA (POSS) and 19 VC. Many of the VC were submerged in holes, underwater and breathing through hollow reeds. By 1100 all blocking positions in the AO were occupied. At 1112, Co B shot and killed 1 VC (BC) and captured another in the same general area vic XT453165. During the afternoon hours, company size sweeps were conducted throughout the AO with negative contact. A total of eleven (11) night ambushes were established. Co C's ambush vic XT431181 killed one (1) VC at 1851 and two (2) more VC at 1950. At 2005 Co B's ambush made contact prior to arriving at its position; however, the VC broke contact, 1 VC killed (Poss) and captured 1 Thompson SMG. At 2400 the same ambush killed 1 VC (BC) vic XT464160.

4th Bn 23d Inf

At 1104 the Bn conducted an airmobile assault into LZ 2 vic XT423130. The assault was completed at 1250 with negative contact. By 1355 two blocking positions were occupied, Co A and the Cnd Group vic XT436135 and Co C vic XT420125. At 1458, Co A received two (2) WIA and HHC received one (1) WIA from beehy traps vic XT432134. Co A captured one (1) VC vic XT426128. A total of five night ambushes were established with the ambush vic XT430124 capturing two (2) VC, one of which was wounded and later died.

1st Bn, 27th Inf

At 1125 the Bn conducted an airmobile assault into the AO. The assault was completed at 1350 at which time the Bn CP was established at XT408177. Co B commenced S&D ops via XT402179, XT463168, XT408170 and XT406178. At 1335 Co B received 6 WIA from beehy traps vic XT408170 and at 1423 two personnel from the 8th Arty were wounded by beehy traps vic

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XF408183. At 1445 Co B located 1,500 lbs of rice via XF407172 and the AT Plat located 4,000 lbs of rice via XF407170 all of which was evacuated. At approximately 1430 the AT Plat and Engr squad located and destroyed 19 booby traps and one bunker via XF407178. At 1435, two sampans via XF406183 were destroyed. A Co conducted S&D ops via XF41285, XF41283, XF41180 and XF41183 with negative contact. At 1730 Co B received 4 WIA's from booby traps via XF406177 and destroyed one (1) AT mine via XF407176. Five (5) night ambushes were established.

2d Bn, 27th Inf

At 1130 the Bn conducted an airmobile assault into their AO, completing it at 1430 with negative contact. Co's A and B, immediately upon completing their airmobile assault, commenced local sweeps, established blocking positions and conducted reconnaissance for night defensive positions with neither company meeting any resistance during their operation. Co B received one WIA from a booby trap via XF410138 at 1758. The Recon Plat established a blocking position via XF406157 at 1610. Six night ambushes were established.

D+1 (4 Jun 66)

1st Bn (A), 5th Inf

At 0730, Co A (-) was placed under OPCON of 4/23 and Co C (-) was placed under OPCON 1/27 to assist in the clearing of the above units AO's. Co B conducted a thorough search of its AO and captured one (1) VC via XF467157 at 1145. Co A returned to Bn control at 1226 and commenced a thorough search of its AO, capturing one (1) VC via XF482135 at 1315. At 1350 one (1) APC from Co B hit an AT mine via XF445160 receiving light damage. A thorough search of the surrounding area produced two (2) AT mines and 35 booby traps. Co base areas were established along with 12 night ambushes. At 2015 Co B ambushed observed five (5) VC at long range via XF448168. Mortar fire was placed on the target resulting in 2 VC KIA (PCSS).

4th Bn, 23d Inf

The Bn continued to conduct S&D operations in their AO with Co A, 1/5 (K) under OPCON to assist in rapidly searching the area. At 0900 Co A captured and evacuated 4,800 lbs of rice from XF433139. At 0900 Co A received six (6) WIA from booby traps via XF433127 and destroyed one (1) tunnel via XF424124. At 1630 Co C received one (1) WIA from a booby trap via XF424124 and a 1700 Co C captured one VC hiding in a house via XF425125 along with one (1) CHICOM grenade. During the day, the Bn captured a total of 19 VCS. A total of four (4) night ambushes were established.

1st Bn, 27th Inf

At 0035 Co B received two (2) incoming rifle grenades and SA fire from via XF406175. The Co returned fire with SA and M-79. A search of the area in the morning disclosed one (1) VC KIA, one (1) German 7.62 Heuser rifle, and mine documents. At 0815 Co B destroyed five (5) sampans via XF406181 and nine (9) grenade booby traps via XF397133. Co 1/5 (K) under OPCON 1/27 hit an AT mine and an AP mine via XF407174 while enroute to the Bn CP, resulting in two (2) WIA and minor damage to the APC. Co 1/5 conducted S&D ops with Recon Plat at 0935 via XF407176, XF411178, XF410174 and XF408172. Recon Plat located and destroyed one (1) tunnel three (3) bunkers and 28 booby traps via XF410176. At 0945 Co A destroyed 17 booby traps via XF408179. At 1059, the Bn captured 2,200 lbs of rice via XF409173 and 2,000 lbs of rice via XF409171. A total of seven (7) night ambushes were established.

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24th Bn. 27th Inf

The Bn continued to conduct slow and thorough S&D ops in their AO. Co B upon questioning civilians in the area, was told of two groups of VC - one of 200 and one of 30 - that had passed through the area recently. Co A received two (2) WIA's from booby traps at approximately 1010 via XT417159. At 1130, elements of Co B destroyed four (4) booby traps, UBU bomblets via XT433148 and XT431148. At 1220 Co A located several booby trap warning signs via XT426132 and at XT425155. At 1314 Co B destroyed two (?) booby traps via XT426147. At 1315 a platoon from Co B received SA fire from via XT412133. The VC broke contact when the platoon placed fire on the suspected VC position and commenced to maneuver. Upon sweeping back towards the base area Co B destroyed two (2) tunnels, four (4) bunkers and a camouflaged tank via XT409148. A total of five (5) night ambushes were established.

D-1 (5 Jun 66)

1st Bn. (Mech), 5th Inf

At 0648 an APC from Co A was damaged by an AT mine via XT471132. At 0730 Co A departed to conduct S&D ops in reported VC controlled areas via XT454120, XT471118, XT489119, XT493107 and XT483097. Co B departed for 2/27 AO to be placed under OPCON of CO 2/27. At 1020 Recon Plat received one (1) WIA from a booby trap via XT453127. Co A completed the search of all objective areas south of the AO at 1203. Returning to 1/5 AO, an APC from Co A hit an AT mine causing extensive damage to the vehicle and wounding 11 men, 10 of which were immediately returned to duty. Co C, continuing to search in its area received two (2) WIA from booby traps at 1445 via XT434155. Co B was released by the 2/27 at 1553. A total of 13 night ambushes were established.

4th Bn. 23d Inf

The Bn continued S&D ops in its AO with Co A destroying two (2) bunkers and two (2) tunnels via XT432125 at 1000. At 1630 Co A captured one (1) VOG via XT417124. At 1700 Co C received one (1) WIA from a booby trap via XT417124 and the Recon Plat received two (2) WIA from booby traps via XT419123. Four (4) night ambushes were established.

1st Bn. 27th Inf

Operations commenced at 0700 with Co A conducting S&D ops via XT402168, XT409176, XT405164 and XT 13169, and Co B conducting S&D ops via XT409176, XT416177, XT413165 and XT418163. At 0815 Co A located and destroyed three sampans hidden in thick brush via XT415168. At 0957, Recon Plat located a grenade factory via XT413178. Among items in the factory was gun oil, hacksaw blades, auto valves, a 3 foot heavy duty vise, large wooden work table, a mould and a forge. The surrounding area was heavily booby trapped, as a total of 31 were located and destroyed by the Recon Plat. At 1025 Co B located and destroyed three (3) sampans via XT403168. At 1145 HHC found a house at XT412174 containing four tunnels and a large underground room. A bunker 15 feet away contained 85 expended cartridges (Cal .30, 7.62mm, 9.62mm, Cal 31). The entire complex was destroyed at 1500. Throughout the day, elements of HHC bagged 4,500 lbs of loose rice found via XT411174. A total of seven (7) night ambushes were established.

21st Bn. 27th Inf

With B 1/5 (M) under OPCON CO 2/27, the battalion commenced S&D ops in their AO to thoroughly search a heavily wooded area via XT425155. Gunships sweeping the area received AW fire from via XT422161 and XT425159, both gunships and artillery placed fire in these areas with unknown results. While B 1/5 (M) and B 2/27 conducted a detailed search of the area, B 1/5 (M) detonated a total of 18 booby traps. Six (6) WIA were sustained in Co B 2/27 from booby traps. Co A remained in a blocking position to conduct

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a sweep via XT23161 on order. B 1/5 (M) was released to return to 1/5 (M) at 1553. B 2/27, completing its sweep, returned to the company base at 1700. Co A, moving to its objective at 1600 had three (3) men wounded by booby traps via XT422156. The company continued its sweep and closed into the base perimeter at 1735. A total of six (6) night ambushes were established.

D+3 (6 Jun 66)

1st Bn (M), 5th Inf

The Bn conducted maintenance and local searches in zone on 6 Jun. Sixteen booby traps were destroyed via XT446180 and XT455155. A five gallon container of medical supplies was captured via XT473156. The Bn CO received a Frag order extending the AO of the 1/5 for a joint US mechanized and ARVN airborne assault commencing on 7 June. During several joint meetings conducted with the CO, 49th ARVN Regt plans involving two ARVN battalions attacking on an axis adjacent to and in coordination with the 1/5 (M) were finalized. Recon Plat was ordered to establish five stay behind ambushes via XT431180, XT434179, XT440174, XT464156 and XT471147. A total of 17 night ambushes were established.

4th Bn, 23d Inf

The Bn continued to S&D in the AO. At 0945 Co A destroyed one (1) reinforced bunker with firing ports at XT415125 and two (2) camouflaged sampans, one via XT414127 and one at XT415126. At 1225 Co A destroyed four (4) camouflaged sampans at XT416127. At 1700 Co A captured 8,400 lbs of rice at XT429124. The rice was distributed to the local civilians upon the advice of National Police. All elements closed into a battalion perimeter. A total of six night ambushes were established.

1st Bn, 27th Inf

At 0730, Co B commenced S&D ops in vic of XT410165, XT410170 and XT402177. Co A with an attached ARVN PSY WAR Team conducted a sweep of the area via XT402168, XT409176, XT405164 and XT413165. At 0814 Co A located and destroyed three (3) sampans and one (1) tunnel 30 meters long via XT403171. Co A received one WIA from a booby trap. Also five (5) grenade booby traps were located and destroyed in the same area. At 0920 the Recon Plat destroyed five (5) grenade booby traps and three (3) CHU's via XT402170. At 1130 A Co discovered 900 lbs of rice, four booby trapped 60mm mortar rounds and 12 grenade booby traps in an abandoned house. At 1145, the AT Plat burned a house in the booby trapped area via XT402170 and three small explosions resulted. Eleven more booby traps and five (5) more CHU's were destroyed in the same area. At 1230, Co B destroyed four sampans via XT403171 and four (4) sampans via XT403173. At 1600, the AT Platoon located a building believed to be utilized for making booby traps since it contained black powder, fuse tape, fuses, thread, bits of scrap metal and torches. Some documents were found in the area and eight booby traps were destroyed. A total of six (6) night ambushes were established.

2d Bn, 27th Inf

The Bn continued to conduct S&D ops in its AO. At 0820 Co A found and destroyed a camouflaged sampan via XT415154. At 1045, Co B located and destroyed a small tunnel via XT413190. At 1157, Co A located and commenced evacuation of 4,800 lbs of unhusked rice via XT412162. Co B received three (3) WIA from booby traps via XT423148 where four bunkers were discovered. The bunkers, which were destroyed, contained approximately 20 lbs of medical supplies which were evacuated. Co A closed into the Bn CP at 1500 and Co B closed at 1600. A total of six (6) night ambushes were established.

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1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf

At 0630, the battalion commenced its move to the new AO (Incl 2) with Co A leading, followed by Co B at 0650 and Co C at 0700. Co A's lead vehicle hit a mine via XT498092 resulting in minor damage to the vehicle and four (4) WIA, two (2) of which were returned to duty. 1/5 (M) elements commenced a detailed search of the area. Co C received rifle grenade fire in its sector with two (2) WIA via XT542118. At 1400 the Recon Plat which was occupying stay behind ambush points in the old AO, assembled via XT466155 and extracted 3400 lbs of rice located by one of the ambushes. At 1536 Co C discovered a cache via XT518110 consisting of 116 weapons and several tons of ammunition and explosives. In view of the size of the cache, Co A and Co C established their bases around the cache. Co C effected link-up and coordination with elements of the 49th ARVN Regt on their right flank. Co B, with Recon Plat attached, established a company base via XT560081. A total of ten night ambushes were established. Three 60mm mortar rounds landed outside the Co B perimeter and several harassing small arms rounds were received during the night with no friendly casualties.

4th Bn, 23d Inf

At 1030 the battalion commenced their airmobile extraction from a landing zone via XT425130. One platoon remained as a stay behind force via of the landing zone. The Bn (-) received sniper fire from via XT427136 as the last helicopter departed the area. At 1700, the stay behind force which had negative contact, during the day was extracted from the AO. The battalion was released from operational control of the 2d Bde at 1720.

1st Bn, 27th Inf

At 0800 the battalion continued S&D operations with Co A sweeping via XT410180, XT420180, XT410173 and XT420175 and Co B via XT416166, XT428168, XT422177, XT419173 and XT416173. At 0930 Co B destroyed three (3) booby traps via XT417168 and seven booby traps via XT419175. At approximately 1100, the AT Plat destroyed 10 booby traps, two (2) 2.75 in rockets and a five gallon booby trapped container of black powder via XT412171. At 1420 the AT Plat destroyed four (4) more booby traps via XT413171. During the day, artillery fire was called in on a heavily booby trapped area via XT419175 and during the mission 28 small explosions were observed in the area. A total of five (5) night ambushes were established. Co B's ambush sustained three (3) WIA when it encountered a heavily booby trapped area via XT404169.

2d Bn, 27th Inf

The battalion continued its S&D ops in the AO commencing at 0830. Co B in via XT415147 located and destroyed a tunnel containing sleeping quarters for three personnel at 1031. Co A located a booby trapped hut at 1345 via XT415164. The booby traps were destroyed and the items extracted from the hut included 800 lbs of parts and tools obviously utilized to make grenades and booby traps. Co B completed operations and closed into the Bn base at 1645, with Co A closing at 1745. A total of eight (8) night ambushes were established.

D+5 (8 Jun 66)

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf

At 0730 the battalion continued to search in the AO. Co C continued to search in the vic of the arms and ammunition cache. Co A assumed the mission of searching the remainder of Co C's sector and Co B continued to search in the assigned sector. At 1145 Co C wounded and captured one (1) VCC via XT501117. By 1410 all units had completed the search of their sectors and commenced movement to effect linkup with the 49th ARVN Regt. At 1545 the battalion was ordered to return to base camp and at 1642 all elements closed into the 1/5 (M) base camp area.

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1st Bn. 27th Inf

At 0715 Co A moved from the battalion base to secure the LZ via XT407175 for the airmobile extraction of the battalion. The LZ was secured at 0800 and the extraction commenced at 0900. By 1000 hours the Bn TF less a stay behind force of one platoon closed into base camp. The stay behind platoon observed three (3) VC via XT407169 at approximately 1100 and called in artillery fire with unknown results. At 1235 the platoon was extracted from the area.

2d Bn. 27th Inf

Co A initiated S&D operations at 0807 and Co B initiated operations to complete searching the entire area at 1100. At 1403 Co B called in mortar fire on two (2) VC resulting in two (2) KIA (POSS). At 1520 Co A destroyed two (2) AT mines via XT419165. Co B completed its operations and closed into the Bn perimeter at 1600. At 1650 Co A discovered a cache of rocket propellant powder, rocket motors, paint and miscellaneous other supplies via XT419165. The company completed its sweep and returned to the Bn perimeter at 1830. Between 2130 and 2330 there was some minor activity such as SA fire flashlights and sounds beyond the perimeter. Indirect fire was placed on the area with undetermined results. A total of nine (9) night ambushes were established.

D+6 (9 Jun 66)

2d Bn. 27th Inf

At 0815 the battalion commenced its airmobile extraction from an LZ via XT418166. The battalion closed into base camp at 0900.

Bde CP and 1/8 ARTY

The Bde CP, 1/8 Arty and U 2/27 escorted by a plat from the 3/4 Cav moved by convoy from TRANG BANG to base camp closing at 1020 hrs. Barrier material including 10,000 sandbags, 80 rolls of barbed wire, 460 long pickets, 600 short pickets and 160 rolls of concertina wire were given to sub-sector for use in improving defense of ARVN and PF elements.

12. Results: (VC Losses)

VC KIA BC - 21	57mm RR Rd - 5
VC KIA (POSS) - 8	5 gallons of black powder - 1
VCC - 28	Rice - 26 tons
VCS - 49	Building destroyed - 23
Weapons - 121	Tunnels - 35 (Destroyed)
SA Ammo - 55,804 rounds	Bankers - 23 (Destroyed)
AP mines - 29	Well - 1 (Destroyed)
AT mines - 21	Trench - 1 (Destroyed)
Granades - 64	Uniforms - 1
Rocky traps - 230	1 gal can gun oil - 1
BT - 2150 lbs	Trip wire - 30 feet
CMU Bombs - 2	Supplies for making granades 1080 lbs
2.75 rocket duds - 2	Sampans - 44
RPG 2 - 18	Supply point - 1
Duck - 1	
Medical supplies - 11 lbs	
Plasma - 4 bottles	
Medicine - 16 bottles	
Flashlight - 1	

Friendly Losses

KIA - 1
DOW - 1
MIA - 90

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The following is a recapitulation of combat damage to vehicles:

1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf:

Six (6) APCs damaged: Three (3) evacuated, three (3) repaired in the field.

4th Bn, 23d Inf: None

1st Bn, 27th Inf: None

2d Bn, 27th Inf: None

15. Administrative Matters:

a. Supplies:

(1) All resupply was effected by air from base camp. Support Command maintained normal operations in the base camp area. Units drew necessary supplies in base camp for dispatch to the forward area.

(2) One 5,000 gal water tanker was positioned at the Bde forward CP and one 5,000 gal tanker was positioned at the resupply helipad in base camp.

(3) A water point was established by I Co, 65th Engr at the Bde forward CP. A total of 3,600 gal of water was processed per day during the operation.

(4) The 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf consumed 5,529 gal of M/GAS. A total of 2,300 gal AVIATION GAS was consumed in support of the operation.

(5) A total of 359 resupply missions were flown, airlifting 160 tons. The following is a breakdown by class of supply:

Class I - 34.4 tons	POL - 19.2 tons
Class IV - 12.1 tons	Misc - 62.0 tons
32.3 tons	

b. Combat loads: Upon departing base camp, personnel carried two canteens of water, and two ration meals. Ammunition loads were as follows:

M14 - 200 rds; M16 - 300 rds; M14E2 - 300 rds; M60 - 1500 rds; M79 - 36 rds; 2 LAWs per platoon; 4 claymores per platoon; 2 hand grenades per man; 2 CS/CA grenades per fire team.

c. Maintenance.

(1) The 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf had six (6) APC's inoperative due to AT mines of which three had to be towed back to base camp on the last day of the operation.

(2) Maintenance of all equipment was stressed throughout the operation and thorough maintenance inspections were conducted by all unit commanders upon return to base camp.

d. Treatment of casualties and evacuation.

(1) Bn aid stations accompanied the Bn forward command posts.

(2) The Bde surgeon remained at the Bde forward CP.

115 patients were treated at the hospital for further treatment.

(4) Resupply helicopters were used to evacuate wounded back to the clearing platoon as the tactical situation and availability of "dump-off" aircraft dictated.

e. Communications:

(1) Types utilized:

(a) FM radio

(b) AM radio

1 Point to point (Hot Line) telephone.

2 Switchboard to switchboard (common user) telephone.

3 Teletype (on-line crypto).

(c) Courier (liaison officers).

(d) Wire.

(2) Courier remains the fastest and easiest method of transmitting classified reports with tight deadlines over short distances. During the operation, the INTSUM and SITREP were transmitted by teletype without difficulty.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques:

Starlight devices were carried by all units and used extensively during night operations.

15. US-ARVN Joint Operations.

a. General: Joint Operations between US and ARVN troops on Operation MAKIKI, were characterized by close coordination, cooperation, and an extreme willingness to share experience and knowledge exhibited by both units. The following phases of the operation are considered noteworthy.

b. Coordination Meetings between Commanders: Daily coordination was effected between the commanders and staff of the 2d Bde and the 49th (ARVN) Regt. The meetings dealt not just with specific details of current operations but also general information and suggestions for tactical operations were exchanged. The prevailing attitude of friendly cooperation contributed to the overall success of the operation.

c. Liaison Officers: A joint tactical operation center was set up in the 2d Bde CP area. The 49th (ARVN) Regt was represented by a liaison team headed by an ARVN Captain and his US Advisor counterpart. The advisability of co-locating the liaison team with their counterparts in the TOC was demonstrated by the rapid reaction to requests for artillery and air strikes. Troop locations could be easily and quickly exchanged, reducing the delay from time of request to fire on target to a minimum. Having eye-to-eye contact with the ARVN element virtually eliminated the possibility of misunderstanding tactical changes due to a rapidly developing situation and again providing rapid reaction by ARVN elements to exploit these situations.

(11)
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the idea. In all cases the "team" concept was most successful and was a great assistance in carrying out the mission.

16. Commander's analysis:

a. The term most descriptive of combat operations on operation MAKIKI is "teamwork". Teamwork as exhibited throughout the operation by both US and ARVN commanders, staffs, and troops. And also teamwork between the Mechanized Infantry elements and ground troops lifted into an area of operation.

b. The joint US-ARVN operations have been discussed elsewhere in this report and I can only add that I look forward with pleasure to the next opportunity to work with the 49th ARVN Regt. Staff co-ordination, especially in the S2, S3, and S5 areas, was most beneficial. Civil Affairs and Pay War operations, conducted in conjunction with pay war teams from the 49th Regt (ARVN) were very effective.

c. The use of Army Aviation to rapidly move a large number of troops into an operational area is not a new idea. On operation MAKIKI, however, this was very effectively combined with a drive by the 1/5 (M) into its AO. This maneuver netted the largest single-day body count of the entire operation. There has been much conjecture and speculation as to the ability of mechanized units to operate in the local terrain during the southwest monsoon period. No appreciable loss of maneuverability was suffered during this operation as the tracks found ample solid footing on which to travel.

d. Bangalore torpedos were effectively used as a method of clearing booby trapped areas, employing the same principles as has been used to clear minefields.

e. Special planning is required to employ stay-behind forces in conjunction with aerial extractions. In order to have successful stay-behind patrols or ambushes after positions must be selected sufficiently far from the LZ or base camp so as to prevent compromise by local villagers who move into areas vacated by US troops.

f. The following civil affairs and Pay War activities were conducted:

(1) Approximately 496 civilians were treated by unit doctors under MEDCAP.

(2) 525 bars of soap, 50 toys, 75 toothbrushes and 75 tubes of toothpaste were given to friendly villagers. A demonstration was conducted to teach the proper method of using these health items.

(3) 26 tons of captured rice were evacuated from the operational area and turned over to G5 Helping Hand for storage.

(4) Several loudspeaker and 5 leaflet missions were flown by S5 personnel. A total of 100,000 leaflets were dropped including 60,000 requested by the S5, 45th ARVN Regt.




g. All units performed in an outstanding manner during operation MAKIKI. It was most rewarding not only from the mission accomplished standpoint but also in the friendships and harmonious relationships which were developed with members and advisors of the 25th ARVN Division.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
as

A. R. KENNETH, JR.
A. R. KENNETH, JR.
Major, Infantry
Adjutant


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Incl # 1

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A: **PLFB-C** (23 Jul 66) 1st Ind (U)
SUBJECT: **Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS MACV J3/32)** (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO 96225 29 July 1966

THRU: **Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: ACoFS G3 (D&T)**
APO 96266

TO: **Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, ATTN: J343,**
APO 96243

Forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Phillip U. Bondi

PHILIP U. BONDI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION:

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST BRIGADE
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

AVTIFB-0

23 July 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

THRU: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVTICC-MH
APO US Forces 96225

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO US Forces 96243

1. Operation FARGO: 1st Brigade Search and Destroy Operation to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps.
2. Dates of Operation: 120420 - 141515 June 1966.
3. Location: Area of operations was in the vicinity of PHUOC-NHIEP, AP BAU DIEU Villages bounded by coordinates XT555195 North; XT570175 East; XT550153 South; XT540172 West.
4. Control Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
5. Reporting Officer: Colonel William B. Sandlin, Jr.
6. Task Organization and Commanders:
 - a. 2d Bn, 14th Inf (-) Lt Col Shultz, Cndg.
3d Plat, Troop B, 3/4 Cav
Engr Sqd, 65th Engr Bn
VN National Police
 - b. 4th Bn, 9th Inf, Lt Col Booth, Cndg.
2d Plat, Troop B, 3/4 Cav
Engr Sqd, A Co, 65th Engr Bn
MP Sqd, 25th MP Co

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7. Support Forces:

a. Artillery: 7th Bn, 11th Arty was employed in Direct Support of the 1st Brigade.

(1) How and when employed.

(a) 7th Bn, 11th Arty (-) supported from base camp
Cu Chi.

(b) B Btry supported from 2d Bn, 14th Inf base camp
area XT556168.

(c) Fire was used primarily as H&I fire. 56 H&I missions were fired totalling 224 rounds. 18 support missions were fired totalling 108 rounds.

(2) Results: H&I fires denied VC freedom of movement during hours of darkness.

b. Tactical Air: No suitable air targets were determined during this operation.

c. Army Aviation: Forty (40) UH-1D and sixteen (16) UH-1B to lift an Infantry battalion and one Infantry company simultaneously into three landing zones. During the operational period, 368 sorties were flown which consisted of airmobile assault, command and control, aerial reconnaissance, aerial resupply and medical evacuation.

8. Intelligence:

a. Intelligence studies conducted prior to operation FARGO indicated VC activity within the operational area has been generally concentrated along Hwy 1 and Hwy 7. Since 1 May, both routes have been the scene of numerous mine incidents. Anti-aircraft incidents in the area have increased in the past month. The C50 Company was reported in the vic XT506171. Reports indicate the C50's mission is to stage attacks along Hwy 1, to collect taxes and capture GVN employees. The C50 Company is reportedly armed with 1-60mm mortar, 1-1mg, 4-ARs, 2-M79s and assorted small arms. The C26 Company, strength 100, was reported in the vic XT569168 on 18 May. This is the 2d report of this company in the same area. The company reportedly possesses 1-60mm mortar, 1-.30 cal MG, 5-ARs, 4 grenade launchers and assorted small arms. Due to the large number of mine incidents, it is concluded that VC sapper units are also present and operating with local force guerrilla units. The actual mission and organization of these sapper elements is unknown, however these squads have the mission of mining and interdicting Hwy 1 and 7. The operational area is known to contain numerous guerrilla units that operate out of the many villages and hamlets. Three guerrilla squads operate consistently vic PHUOC HIEP (XT569170).

b. Recent significant activities revealed that on 1 Jun 3 National Police vehicles traveling from Cu Chi to Trang Bang were ambushed

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by a VC squad with AV's at XT534169. One vehicle was destroyed, 6 ARVN's KIA, 1 WIA, and 20,000 piastres (payroll) stolen. On 3 June, elements from Trung Lap Ranger Training Center were ambushed at XT593210 by 20 to 40 VC.

c. During the operation VC contact was limited to occasional sniper fire. The VC employed booby traps within the AO and a road block along Hwy 1. Number of VC guerrillas operating in AO could not be confirmed.

d. The terrain in the area of operations consisted of thick hedge rows, some heavy brush and wooded areas which offered excellent concealment and cover from direct fire weapons. There are also many clearings and rice fields which offered the VC excellent fields of fire. There were no major obstacles which could affect the movement of track vehicles and dismounted troops. The weather had no effect on the conduct of the operation. The only natural obstacle within the area of operations is the Rach Ba Dap Creek that flows southward across Hwy 1 (XP543177), however, it would be an obstacle only during heavy rains which would make it untrafficable by track vehicles.

e. Summary: Over all evaluation and accuracy of intelligence was rated B/2 (usually reliable and probably true). The overall security of operation FARCO was considered excellent.

9. Mission:

a. 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division conducts search and destroy operations during the period 12 - 14 June 1966 to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps via PHUOC HIEP (XT555170) and to interdict VC movements in area of operation.

b. Conduct airmobile and ground assault 12 June 1966 into obj area to encircle VC forces.

c. Conduct ROAD RUNNER operations in sector.

d. Provide wire, pickets and technical advice on installation of RF and PF outposts in Brigade sector.

10. Concept of Operation: 1st Brigade conducts airmobile and ground operations in assigned area with two battalions (-) during the period 12 - 14 June 1966. 2d Bn, 14th Inf established blocking position in the AO as the 4th Bn, 9th Inf conducts S&D operations in area. A Co, 2d Bn, 14th Inf is designated as brigade reaction force. On 12 Jun 66, 2d Bn, 14th Inf moves one (1) rifle company from operational base camp (Operation Fort Smith) over ground to establish blocking positions from coordinates XT553155 to XT 553178 to be completed by 0700 hrs. in order to block VC attempting to move from PHUOC HIEP. One (1) rifle company will be airlifted from Ou Chi base location to LZ 1 by 0630 hrs and will later link up with ground force to help establish blocking positions. On order, upon completion of blocking mission, 2/14 Inf will continue to conduct S&D operations in Fort Smith AO.

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4th Bn, 9th Inf airlifted from Cu Chi base camp lands at LZs 2, 3, and 4 and establishes blocking positions from coordinates XT557178 to XT568170 by 0700 hrs; initiates detailed search starting at 0730 hrs East to West from LD to boundary, linking up with 2/14 Inf blocking forces NLT 1500 hrs. Upon link up continue detailed S&D mission with priority to location and destruction of VC caches and facilities in PHUOC HIEP. On the second day of the operation, 13 June, 4/9 Inf will continue S&D operation and civic action activities. Wire, pickets, and technical advice on installation to RF and PF outposts will be part of the civic action program. Plan for heli-lift extraction of 4/9 Inf from AO 141500 June 1966.

11. Execution: 1st Bde OPRD S-66 (Operation Fargo) was issued 101400 June 66. Operation commenced 120430 June 66.

a. 2/14 Inf: Co C and the Recon Plt moved from the battalion base camp location via XT522198 (Operation Fort Smith area of operation) at 0430 hrs to establish blocking positions along PL RED. The Cav Plt attached to the battalion moved from the battalion base camp at 0615 hrs to secure LZ 1 (XT52156) and occupy coordination point at XT551173. B Co was helilifted from the Cu Chi base camp and landed on LZ 1 at 0630 hrs. At 0630 hrs, C Co and the Recon Plt arrived at coordinates XT548167 on PL RED and immediately established blocking positions from this point to the coordination point at XT55178. B Co linked up with the 3/4 Cav Plt after landing and established blocking positions from XT55155 to XT548167 along PL RED. All blocking positions were maintained without incident until 4/9 Inf completed it's S&D mission in the area of PL RED. At 1400 hrs all elements of 2/14 Inf withdrew from blocking positions and continued Operation Fort Smith.

b. 4/9 Inf: At 0630 hrs the battalion departed from base camp Cu Chi by helicopter for the operational area of Operation Fargo. The first element lifted, A Co, landed at LZ 2 and established contact with 2/14 Inf. One (1) VCS was detained at XT564180 who stated that VC elements, size unknown, were moving south from LZ 2. Co C & B landed at LZ 3 and 4 respectively, crossed LD at 0725 hrs and commenced S&D operations. B Co detained 16 civilians and later released them after interrogation. Elements of both companies discovered and destroyed 1 ton of rice in vic XT557166. As the S&D operation continued B Co apprehended three VCS and 1 draft dodger. Upon interrogation, one of them was determined to be a VCC. At 1620 hrs the battalion closed on Obj 2 and established a base camp. Resupply was effected immediately. A Co located and destroyed 1 anti-tank mine via XT553177 at 1645 hrs. Ambush patrols were sent out during the night at locations XT545277, XT548172, and XT554177. Patrols had negative VC contact and returned to base camp at 0600 hrs.

13 June 1966

4/9 Inf: At 0900 hrs, C Co, while conducting a S&D operation encountered sniper fire at coord XT655178. Fire was eliminated as a result of friendly small arms fire. 100 rounds of ammunition marked 188 with large star figure were located and destroyed in vic of sniper fire. The rounds

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were 127 cal and were assumed to be used for anti-aircraft purposes. At 1000 hrs 25 persons were apprehended at XT555192. All persons were questioned by the National Police element attached to the battalion. The interrogation resulted in one of the 25 being held for further questioning by NP authorities. B Co at 0900 hrs located and destroyed 1 booby trapped grenade, 1 tunnel, and 9 houses at coord XT548183 during it's S&D operation. At 1050 hrs, generally at the same coordinates, the company was hit by heavy sniper fire and sustained 2 WIAs. Fire was immediately returned by the company to establish a superiority of fire resulting in one (1) VC killed (BC), 1 VC captured. At 1420 hrs the battalion conducted a MEDCAP mission in the village of An Dae at coord XT536180 and treated 29 individuals. The engineer element attached to the battalion completed a triple strand concertina fence around the PF compound located at XT540276. The last VC engagement took place at 1700 hrs as C Co encountered 2 VC at coord XT553177, which resulted in 1 VC killed (poss). By 1800 hrs all battalion elements had returned to the operational base camp area. Ambush patrols were located at coord XT548185, 549192, 55182 and 559178. All patrols returned by 0600 hrs the following morning. Patrols had negative VC contact.

14 June 1966

4/9 Inf: A Co with the Cav PIT departed the operational base camp at 0730 hrs to investigate a road block on Hwy 1 at XT603140 as reported by a captured VC. The company, enroute, encountered several booby traps and apprehended two VCS in vic XT612163. By 1030 hrs, the road was cleared. The road block consisted of 16 dirt mounds, ranging from 6" to 18" high that covered the entire width of the road. A Co then moved from the highway to a rice cache location pointed out by the same VC the previous day. At this location, coord XT621159, the company uncovered and destroyed 500 lbs of loose rice located in a 5' X 4' hole. Extraction of the battalion commenced at 0800 hrs with B Co helilifted from base area to Cu Chi closing at 0842 hrs. C Co began heliborne extraction at 1300 hrs and completed closing at Cu Chi by 1325 hrs. Prior to extraction, C Co conducted two (2) plt sized S&D operations that commenced at 0615 hrs. At 1005 hrs the company destroyed 1 booby trapped 105mm round in vic XT65184. A Co, after completion of it's mission of clearing road blocks along Hwy 1, moved by road convoy and closed Cu Chi base camp 1515 hrs terminating Operation Fargo.

12. Results:

a. Personnel losses:

(1) Friendly.

4th Bn, 9th Inf: 3 WIA

(2) Enemy.

<u>VC (BC)</u>	<u>VC (poss)</u>	<u>VCC</u>	<u>VCS</u>
1	1	1	35

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b. Enemy Losses.

- (1) Captured 2 tons rice.
- (2) Destroyed.
 - (a) AT Mines: 1
 - (b) Booby trapped grenades: 1
 - (c) Tunnel complex: 1
 - (d) Houses: 9
 - (e) 188 Ammunition: 100 rds
 - (f) 105 How booby-trapped: 1
 - (g) Road block 6" X 8": 16
 - (h) Loose rice: 500 lbs

13. Administrative Matters.

a. Supply.

- (1) Resupply was accomplished by UH1Ds and road convoy.
- (2) 77 UH1D sorties were flown totaling approximately 48 tons.
- (3) Due to the fact that the 4th Bn, 9th Inf established a battalion trains area and fed a modified A ration the amount of Class I and water needed accounted for 60% of resupply effort.

b. Maintenance. No significant problems were encountered.

c. Treatment of Casualties. Evacuation by dust-off helicopter was successful.

d. Transportation. A reduced headquarters and trains element moved by convoy and rifle companies were helilifted with no significant problems.

e. Communications. New radios were issued prior to the operation and effective communications were maintained.


14. Commander's Analysis. The overall results of this operation in conjunction with Operation Fort Smith has certainly won friends for the United States in this area. During this operation on 13 June the 4th Bn, 9th Inf conducted a MEDCAP II in the vic AP MAY DUC at which 29 patients were treated. Due to limited time period for this operation there were no discernable results of the one civic action activity. But taken with CA operations in the Operation Fort Smith which was conducted in approx.

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ately the same area it can safely be assumed that it contributed to the overall success of the mission. The 4/9 Inf distributed about 20,000 assorted leaflets, to include Safe Conduct Passes; Chieu Hoi (Open Arms); and 969 Reward leaflets throughout the Bn TACR. These leaflets were delivered mostly by hand and the effects of this distribution cannot be determined due to the shortness of the operation. It is felt that this distribution assisted the overall operation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:




JIMMIE B. SPIVEY
Captain, Infantry
Adjutant

1 Incl
Overlay to OPORD 8-66

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Inclosure #1

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AVCOMHD (15 Jul 66) 1st Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Opn FRESNO)

HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO 96225 12 August 1966

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: ACofS G3,
APO 96227

TO: Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, ATTN: J343,
APO 96243

(C) With reference to the remarks under the dateline 6 July, para 11, the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry was returned to the Cu Chi Base Camp because of commitments of 2 battalions of the 1st Brigade on a II Field Force mission in the XUAN LOC - VO DAT area.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



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MAP 8

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HEADQUARTERS
2D BATTALION 27TH INFANTRY
(THE WOLFHOOUNDS)
APO 96225

AVTLSDC-T

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

THRU: Commanding Officer
2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
APO 96225

Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
APO 96225

TO: Commander
U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO U. S. Forces 96243

References:

- a. OPRD 25-66 (Operation FRESNO), Headquarters, 2d Brigade, 10 June 1966.
- b. OPRD 57-66 (Operation FRESNO), Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, 11 June 1966.

1. NAME OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION.

- a. Operation FRESNO.
- b. Pacification.

2. DATES OF OPERATION: 130600 June through 150600 July 1966.

3. LOCATION: Ham Nghia Province in designated area as shown by Annex A (Op Overlay).

4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS:

The control headquarters, 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, issued Operation Order 26-66 on 101200 June 1966. The order gave the 2d Bn, 27th Inf the mission of conducting S & D Operations in the vicinity of AP DONG HOA (2) (Annex A, Op Overlay). The 2d Bn, 27th Inf Operation Order 57-66 issued on 11 June 1966 further broke the mission down into more concise duties. In essence the battalion planned to conduct combat operations such as Search and Destroy missions, night patrols and ambushes, and combined ARVN-US operations with the 1/10 (M) and 4/49 ARVN battalions located at B&O TRAI. Also, and of equal importance, the battalion wished to conduct extensive Civil Affairs and Psychological Warfare programs. This would include road improvement operations, the supplying of materials and advice on the construction of Popular Forces installations, and Medical Civic

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Action Programs (MEDCAP) in the surrounding villages. All of these operations, conventional and unconventional, were to be coordinated through the Province and District levels of Hau Nghia Province in order to best support, whenever possible, the National Revolutionary Development Plan.

5. REPORTING OFFICER: Lt Col Boyd T. Bachore

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

Co A, 2/27 Inf	Bn Control
Co B, 2/27 Inf	Bacon Platoon
Co C, 2/27 Inf	Booby Platoon
	Mortar Platoon
	Grid Survl Sec
	IFSC Elm
	1/B/65 Engr
	Elm 25th MID
	2d Spt Plat 16th RRU
	Additional Interpreters
	Helicopter (C & C Ship)
	Plm 124th Sig Bn
	Co 1/5 (Mech) on order
	Trp 3/4 Cav on order
	20 National Police

7. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery

(1) Composition

(a) 13 June - 1/8 Arty (-) DS 2d Bde; attach one 155mm How Btry 3/13 Arty and one platoon 8" How 2/32 (-).

(b) ARVN 105mm How and 155mm How located at BAO TRAI.

(2) Comments

(a.) Artillery "will adjust" missions were used extensively in support of daily operations. The primary targets were sniper locations. All missions fired successfully suppressed the sniper firing.

(b) A technique of dropping artillery rounds behind a suspected VC location was successfully utilized to deliberately push one VC into an area where a friendly stay behind ambush was employed and waiting for him. The ambush team killed the VC and captured his weapon.

(c) A technique of walking fires in front of the lead infantry elements was utilized with great success in the areas of thick undergrowth close to the Oriental River. This technique not only provided accurate data immediately available for sudden fire missions, but it also discouraged close in snipers and served as a means of determining accurate map locations.

(3) Preplanned artillery preparations were fired on many helicopter landing zones in conjunction with airborne assaults.

(4) Use of artillery at night.

(a) H & I fires were utilized extensively at night throughout the entire AO to fire on suspected VC locations, supply routes, and supply caches.

(b) Artillery concentrations were plotted in support of all night ambushes.

(c) Artillery was used in conjunction with the lightning bug. When this ship drew SA fire the coordinates of this VC location were

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

immediately fired upon.

(5) All "will-adjust" missions fired were accurate, timely and very satisfactory.

b. 25th Aviation Bn:

The unit provided the bn with the mobility needed to move into a specific area with great speed and surprise. The aircraft were used for Night Airmobile assaults, early morning airlifts to designated LZ's, extractions from extremely small PZ's, resupply command and control, prisoner evacuation, and medical evacuation. This unit maintained flexibility to deal with various changes and continued the mission, without delay. The gunships providing escort for the airlifts did an excellent job in suppressing sniper fire around the PZ's and LZ's. Also the gunships provided excellent support in flying cover for our convoys.

c. 1/5 (M), 3/4 Cav (M):

These mechanized units provided the bn with an immediate reaction force and conducted many missions serving as a screening force, a blocking force, convoy security, and flank security. The biggest asset provided to the bn when operating as either platoon or company size force was the ability to react quickly and move fast to affect any situation. Whenever the 3/4 Cav platoon was used as a reaction force there were two tanks which provided a reassuring punch. The mechanized elements were limited on occasions due to the heavy rains. Many areas were inaccessible to the tracked vehicles.

8. INTELLIGENCE:

Operation FRESNO resulted in significant breakthroughs in the development and exploitation of tactical intelligence by the battalion. Prior to Operation FRESNO, political and military conditions in southwest central HAU NGHIA Province had degenerated to the point that very little political control was exercised by GVN authorities in areas outside the province capital, district headquarters towns, and ARVN garrison towns. Despite a fairly well-developed ARVN intelligence net centered in the provincial capital at BAO TRAI, and a developing net at the headquarters of USSF Det B-35 at DUC HUE, sufficient combat power and combat logistic support had been lacking for the exploitation of those intelligence sources available.

The VC political organization on the other hand had been able to utilize its combat power to effectively isolate the people of the south and southwest portions of the province from GVN authority. This had been done by systematic destruction of all secondary roads, except those useful to the VC and of no value to the GVN. The VC then concentrated their strength along areas adjacent to the Oriental River, utilizing it and its highly developed adjacent network of canals, supplemented by light escort trains. The poor trafficability of the predominantly low-lying paddylands of the area, combined with the systematic destruction of the province secondary road network tended to confine the ARVN 25th Division at DUC HOA and the 49th ARVN Regiment at BAO TRAI to areas within a half day's march of their garrisons or those areas which lay directly astride the primary road network. The next step in the VC plan had been the attempt to conclude the isolation of the province capital and the ARVN garrison towns by systematically overrunning the RF/PF outposts which protected the primary road network. Before the 25th Inf Division arrived in CU CHI it was necessary to supply the totally isolated RF/PF outpost by battalion size convoys during midday which were subject to sniping, harassing mortar fires and command

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detonated mines, as well as full-scale ambushes, all along their route.

The combat power available to the VC in the area generally was thought to consist of a main force regiment: The DONG TRAP II Regiment, which had two main force battalions - the 267th & 269th, each about 300-400 men. These battalions are heavily armed with modern weapons up to 82mm mortars. In addition, the 506th LONG AN Provincial Battalion and two district companies, the C2 and C120 companies, were thought to operate in the area. Besides these main force units, the system of local guerilla forces combined with the political infrastructure was capable of maintaining control over the population, harassing and ambushing small ARVN contingents and acting as guides, support troops and augmentations in concert with main force units for large-scale operations. Under this system each hamlet had to provide up to a squad (and each village one or two platoons) to the local effort. Thus in a relatively small area comprising three villages, the VC could mass in several hours at least one company. Besides the local guerillas, the VC had drafted these hamlet and village males who showed less inclination to fight into village militia forces whose mission was primarily to support larger VC operations with unarmed manpower for the construction of roadblocks, tunnels, secret holes, trenches, and the transportation of dead, wounded, and supplies. Other individuals and villages occupied political and financial positions in the hamlets and villages, which were instrumental in maintaining daily political control of the population. The VC control of the countryside had existed long enough to effectively develop illegal governmental infrastructure for south and southwest central HAU NGHIA Province which had none for a supplant GVN Political and economic authority in the area. In fact, perhaps GVN authority never ended in many parts of this area. VC forces in the region had thus built an effective political infrastructure which was protected by their capability of massing 6 battalions of armed troops, plus up to two battalions of laborers, at any point in the province.

During the weeks prior to Operation FRESNO, the 49th ARVN Regiment had attempted to reverse this degenerative process by carrying out multi-battalion operations along the east bank of the Oriental River between DUC HUE and BAO TRAI. These operations were followed by a VC attack on the district capital of DUC HUE during the night of 26-27 May 1966. The VC easily succeeded in storming the town; killed a significant number of the RF/PF troops charged with guarding the fortified town; sank the boat platoon which had been charged with maintaining GVN authority on the Oriental River; killed or kidnapped many of the anti-VC citizens of the town; and carried off a sizable amount of weapons including mortars, machine-guns, and BAR's. The only significant industry of the province, a large, fairly modern sugar mill was located in DUC HUE. Constant VC taxation of boats bringing the cane to the mill and trucks taking molasses and sugar along the primary road network to Saigon had rendered sugar mill operations barely profitable. There were reports that the mill was being moved piecemeal to the more secure BIEN HOA area. By storming the district capital and site of HAU NGHIA's only significant industry the VC were able to effectively demonstrate their mastery over HAU NGHIA's political and economic life.

As the battalion entered Operation FRESNO, there was little hard intelligence information on the area. Fresh from Operation MAKIKI in the LOC GIANG - AN NINH area, where it was felt VC operations were intimately linked to the FRESNO area, the battalion set out initially to build a bank of information and familiarity with the area. During the first day battalion intelligence personnel interviewed nearly 20 local civilians, detainees and VCS. Initial interrogations were directed towards several EEI: what had been recent VC activities in the area?, what were the routes and LOC's used by the VC in the area?, what were the most active VC hamlets and villages

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in the area, in what areas of the region did the VC units bivouac when moving through? Rapidly, information was gained identifying the major VC LOC which was used for the transportation of arms and ammunition from Cambodia to the HO BO - BOI LOI region. The LOC ran from the Oriental River, via XT 468039, up the RACH NHUM to landings at XT 485048, then along a winding road lined with foxholes to AP GO SAO (2) (XT 500072). The initial stopping point was located near a pagoda in AP TRAI BI (XT 493077). From there, the material was transported across the major highway at AP GIONG VOI (XT 515084), then to AP BAO CONG (1) (XT 520091) and finally to one of two offloading points - either through TAN MY (XT 520100), to AP BEN LONG (XT 525112) or through AP RUNG DAU (2) (XT 540102), to AP GAY QUEO (XT 548117), from where it was carried by sampan across the great swamp. The first night of the operation, ambushes were therefore laid along this route. One ambush laid by A Co just south of TAN MY (XT 504076) netted 6 VC KIA (BC) and 4 weapons. Agent reports later revealed that 8 VC had been killed and several others wounded. This group turned out to be a VC squad from AP BEN LONG. In the days following this initial success, intensive in small unit operations, substantial patrols, and S & D sweeps were carried out to the north and south of the battalion perimeter along the previously indicated VC supply route. Extensive trench systems and bunker type shelters were found along this route to the north of the highway in the AP GIONG VOI - AP RUNG DAU (3) area and a long line of foxholes parallel to this route south of the highway and north of the Oriental River. Interrogation of civilians encountered by the battalion elements during their sweeps indicated that large enemy units had been located along the VC supply route north of the battalion perimeter, but had moved out on receiving news of the arrival of American troops in the area.

After the establishment of the battalion perimeter, the mission of the local guerillas in the area appeared to have changed. Prior to the arrival of the battalion in the area, the mission of the local guerillas had to maintain VC domination of the hamlets, reinforce VC tax collections from the people, snipe at friendly troops who ventured into the area and lay booby traps in their path. After the arrival of the battalion, the mission of the local guerillas changed, especially for those groups in the AP GIONG VOI - AP RUNG DAU (3) area north of the perimeter and in the AP GO SAO (1 & 2) - TAN PHU THUONG area east and southeast of the perimeter. The new mission appeared to include harassing fire and sniping incidents against both the battalion perimeter and the reconnaissance platoon reinforcement of the construction site of a new PF outpost north of AP SO DO (XT 510078). Roadblocks and mines were also placed along the road between AP SO DO & BAO TRAI. Most incidents were a regular occurrence every two or three nights. More serious incidents of harassing fire by the VC tended to originate from the south and southeast of the battalion perimeter. It is surmised that such incidents had two main purposes. The first was to recon by fire the night defenses in an attempt to locate and identify US strongpoints and crew-served weapons positions within the battalion perimeter. Another purpose may have been to distract US attention from the areas where large guerilla force units were moving during those evenings. Incidents of construction of many roadblocks along the major roads, especially the highway from DUC HUE XT 430072 to the PF outpost at (XT 496096) tended to coincide with movement of large VC elements across the roads. The construction of roadblocks may have been to insure the safe passage of the VC elements across these major highway-danger areas and to deny friendly elements a high speed approach to the flanks of moving VC units.

Succeeding in operations north and south of the perimeter on 15 and 16 July established the fact that traveling VC psychological warfare teams had been working intensively in the area during the week prior to the arrival of the battalion. Propaganda shows were presented during the hours 2000 to 2400 by the team and were aimed at proselyting local youths for the VC and at obtaining financial contributions in addition to normal taxes. At least two areas where such performances were held were identified: AP BEN LONG (XT 526113) and AP GO SAO (XT 493072).

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Succeeding operations by the battalion revealed the existence of a guerilla platoon at XOM BAO TRAU (XT 475217). The platoon was said to stay in the village during the day and withdraw to the AP AN HOI village area during the night (XT 4314). This platoon probably had the responsibility of maintaining surveillance over the AP RUNG DAU (1) road intersection and PF outpost (XT 496096). The operation also revealed a continuing use by a large number of VC units of the trail system passing from the AP AN HOI area (XT 4314) through XOM BAO TRAU then southeast to AP CU LAO TIE (1) XT 497108 then to the BEN LONG - AP CAY QUEO area.

Operations by battalion element along the Oriental River via AP GIONG SAO (XT 480058) discovered warning signs which first identified the so-called "GO CAT" areas as being VC strongholds where the VC would lay mines and booby traps to prevent the penetration of friendly elements. A large cache of documents including VC reconnaissance maps of the entire area subsequently found by C Co in the RACH NHUM area XT 464045 located the GO CAT areas at XT 483047 south of the RACH NHUM & XT 482016 north of the RACH HOA THOM River. Both "GO CAT" areas appeared to be used extensively by the VC when they were approached by friendly elements. In both areas snipers and booby traps were encountered and when penetration of the areas was finally gained, the areas were found to contain numerous bunkers. Interrogation of detainees and VCS from these areas revealed that large VC units of 100 to 300 men frequently bivouacked there. They tended to approach from the north using the trail network south from AP AN HOI area (XT 4314) to HIEP HOA (XT 466093) then slightly west of AP AN THUAN (XT 475078) moving south to AP GIONG SAO (XT 477062) and then to the RACH NHUM (XT 470050). The TAN PHU THUONG (XT 480023) area along the Oriental River was generally entered from the southeast via XOM GOING NLANG (XT 5400) and HOA KHANH (XT 520023). Units utilizing these areas frequently are probably the C2 and C120 Companies and the 267th VC main force battalion. These areas in the vicinity of the Oriental River along the RACH HOA THOM (XT 470012) and the RACH NHUM (XT 473045) are doubtless utilized continually for refuges and hideouts for main force elements operating in the area. But because of intensive operations in this area, the main force VC elements in the area were said to have received orders on 22 June to commence withdrawal to an area 8-12 kilometers to the south on the west bank of the Oriental River.

On 20 June A Co conducted a night airmobile assault. Once on the ground, the A Co elements received sniper fire from a lone sniper. Following the sniper fire, 60mm mortars were fired by the VC and mysteriously fell on the location of the source of their own sniper fire. It is felt that the night airmobile assault so confused the VC that they were unable to coordinate their covering fires for a force of 50-70 VC which had been in the immediate area and withdrew to the northwest on the arrival of A Co.

On 24 June B Co elements, utilizing a star behind ambush, killed a VC armed with an M-1 carbine at XT 486066. Papers he was carrying identified him as a member of the DUC HOA district VC committee in charge of proselyting. During the period of operation PHESNO, significant efforts had been made by the battalion staff to develop effective liaison with the ARVN HAU NGHIA Province staff and their advisors. Particular efforts in this direction had been made in the field of intelligence. On 29 June a breakthrough was made in intelligence when the ARVN Province S-2, Dai-uy Trieu, announced that he had a VC who wished to rally to the government and turn in the other members of his squad at the same time. Although efforts to exploit this intelligence were unsuccessful on June 29th, on June 30th the information was successfully exploited. The VC squad leader surrendered to battalion elements in his hamlet at AP RUNG DAU (2) (XT 520097). He then pointed out 4 VC from his hamlet working in the fields and led the battalion to 5 more hiding in a secret hole in a hedgerow. Two weapons and five grenades were captured with the VC. In addition, one VC fleeing from the Objective area was shot and killed and two

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others with him were captured on direction from an orbiting gunship. The success of this operation was due largely to close US coordination with ARVN intelligence personnel who went into the field with battalion elements. On 11 June a similar operation was carried out with province intelligence personnel acting on the basis of Chieu Hoi information. An airmobile assault of one company surrounded the hamlet of BAO CANH HA XT 5601. Then battalion and sector intelligence personnel were airlifted into the hamlet and thoroughly searched it, uncovering 5 secret holes. One VC was killed in the first secret hole by a grenade which also caved in the hole. Three VC, including the VC hamlet finance chief and two VC district finance cadre were captured in another secret hole. These two operations were examples of the successes possible when American combat power was used to exploit timely information provided by the well-developed ARVN agent net in the battalion AO. Up to that time, organized US intelligence sources had been rarely able to provide information of the requisite tactical freshness because of the lack of a developed agent net in the AO.

Significant strides seemed to be made also in the status of the populace, because of previous VC propaganda which had evoked imaginary fears. These were rapidly dispelled by the conduct of the troops themselves, and at the end of the operation, local residents had begun to voluntarily inform battalion elements of the location of mines, booby traps and VC movements.

In addition, the small unit operations which saturated the AO seemed to have adversely affected the morale of the local VC guerrillas. The squad leader who gave himself up and turned in his squad stated that everywhere he went US troops were operating and he concluded that the most prudent course of action was to turn himself in before he was captured or killed.

Weather during the operation was initially favorable with rain only in the late afternoon. During the latter half of the operation, however, rain began falling at noon and continued intermittently into the night which rendered the entire region nontrafficable to wheeled vehicles and gradually withdrew other large areas from the effective range of APC's.

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9. MISSION:

a. 2/27 Inf (-) conducts tactical motor march 130800 Jun 66 to AO; establish camp via AP DONG HOA (2) XT 488097; conducts S & D operations in AO; conducts combat patrols and ambushes; conducts combined operations with local ARVN Forces; provides wire pickets and technical advice on installations to RF and PF units; conducts road improvement operations in sector from XT 525048 to XT 496097 and from XT 496097 to XT 438053; conducts ROAD RUNNER operations; conducts an extensive CA and Psy/War program in AO; and leaves one company in base camp to be rotated on order CO, 2/27 Inf; base camp company establish 2 AP's nightly.

b. Mission (Civil Affairs/PSYOP): To support 2d Bn operations; to control movement of non-combatants; to assist in Revolutionary Development; minimize non-combatant casualties; to induce non-combatants to aid intelligence efforts; and to induce the enemy to rally or surrender.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Tactical:

1. 2/27 Inf (-) conducts a tactical motor march 130800 Jun 66 to AO with Co A leading, followed by HHC elements and attachments, Co B rear, all escorted by elements of 1/5 (Mech); establish a base vicinity XT 502087. Co C remains at CU CHI base camp to assume the perimeter responsibility from Co A & B at 121200 Jun 66 (Annex D Tactical Motor March; Annex B, Fire Support Plan.)

2. Co A & B, 2/27 Inf: Conduct S & D operations, patrols and ambushes, combined US-ARVN operations, and pacification operations in Bn AO on order.

3. Co C, 2/27 Inf: Conduct tactical motor march to Bn Forward Base, vicinity XT 502087 on order.

4. Recon Platoon: Bn Res.

5. Sety Platoon: Bn Res.

6. Mortar Platoon: GS.

7. Gnd Survl Sec: 2 AN/PPS 4 Radar sets will accompany Bn to fwd base vicinity XT 502087, sec (-) will remain at CU CHI base camp and man Bn perimeter radars.

8. 1/B/65th Engr: GS.

9. Elm 25th MID: GS.

10. 2d Spt Platoon 16th RRU: GS

11. Elm 125th Sig Bn: GS.

12. Coordinating Instructions:

(a) Bde rules of engagement apply.

(b) Bn TAC SOP applies.

(c) HHC elm and attachments plan for 3 week op., Rifle companies plan for 2 week op.

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(d) No vehicular movement after 1800 hrs daily.

b. Civil Affairs/PSYOP:

- (1) Attempt to keep non-combatants in place.
 - (2) Conduct civic action programs to the extent security and military operations permit.
 - (3) PSYOP will be employed primarily against civilian targets, both hostile and friendly.
 - (4) HHC: Attached 8 National Police effective 11 June 1966; 12 National Police effective 13 June 1966.
 - (5) National Police assigned to units on mission basis.
 - (6) Coordinating Instructions:
 - (a) Maximum effort will be made to minimize non-combatant battle casualties during tactical operations.
 - (b) Civilian dwellings will not be burned nor will private property including livestock, be destroyed except as an unavoidable consequence of combat action.
 - (c) Wheeled vehicles will not be driven over planted rice fields except as a tactical necessity.
 - (d) Refugee Control Points.
 - (1) XT 495097.
 - (2) XT 513075.
 - (e) Requests for propaganda leaflets, arial loudspeaker missions, or Helping Hand materials will be submitted to bn S-5.
 - (f) Curfews in effect in AO.
 - (1) District and Province Capitols (2200-0500).
 - (2) Villages and Hamlets (2100-0600).
 - (3) River traffic (2000-0600).
 - (g) Families are authorized 200 Kg of polished rice or 300 Kg of paddy rice in residence.
 - (h) Captured foodstocks will be evacuated to the Division collection point through bn S-5.
 - (1) Annex C, Pacification Overlay.
 - (1) Appendix 1, Propaganda Target Disposition Overlay.
- c. Indirect Fire Support:
- (1) Air support - All air strikes will be on call.
 - (2) Artillery support.

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(a) General - establish fire support base and support operation with on-call fires.

(b) Organisation for combat.

(1) 1/8 Arty (-) DS 2d Bde; attach one 155mm How Btry 3/13 Arty and one platoon 8" How 2/32 Arty (-).

(2) ARVN 105mm How and 155mm How located at BAO TRAI.

(c) Artillery will:

(1) Be prepared to mark air strikes with White Phosphorous as required.

(2) Maintain 6400 mil fire capability.

(3) Plan close in defensive concentrations for security.

(4) Be prepared to fire high angle fires during Dustoff.

(5) Maintain aerial observation during daylight hours and be prepared to conduct aerial observation during the hours of darkness.

(6) Appendix (Artillery Fire Plan).

d. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Fire planning and Control.

(a) Restrictions on Artillery Fires during helicopter operations - TBA.

(b) All artillery and mortar fires must be approved by Artillery LNO and coordinated with Bde FSOC. Fires outside bn AO must be approved by Bde FSOC.

(c) All air strikes under control of Bde FAC.

(d) Emergency cancellation of fires in clear text.

(e) When possible defensive concentrations will be fired in prior to 2000 hrs daily.

(f) Unit CP and ambush sites to 1/8 Arty FDC NIF 1800 hrs daily. Report changes as they occur.

(g) Boundaries are Fire Coordination lines.

(h) All fire requests will go to 1/8 Arty Bn FDC.

(i) Arty and 4.2 mortar fire plans to 1/8 Arty FDC.

(j) All calls for ARVN Arty support will be coordinated through Bde FSOC.

(2) Safety:

(a) Mortar and arty units post guard during actual firing to insure no friendly aircraft are in close vicinity of direction of fire. Also no firing of VT fuses when friendly aircraft are endangered.

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(b) Emergency signal to lift air strike, artillery fires, or termination of illumination - Red Star Cluster.

(c) Units mark from on request with panels or colored smoke.

(d) First round of all adjustment or close in fires will be WP.

11. EXECUTION.

13 June 1966

The plan for the battalion for this day was to move to vicinity XT 502087 and establish a base camp. The move was made in two phases; an airborne assault by the Quartering party which consisted of 8 officers and 61 enlisted men and a motor march by the bn (-) with attachments.

Quartering Party:

This element was made up of both the Reconnaissance and Security Platoons with representatives from each of the major units, staff sections, and attachments. The mission was to clear and secure the new base camp, then designate locations for all the incoming elements. The airlift commenced at 0649 hrs at the CU CHI Army Airfield and was completed at 0715 hrs. During the day intelligence information concerning VC movements and dispositions was gained through the questioning of local residents. The MI Detachment questioned all civilians who moved along the road while the HQ elements questioned people living within the planned perimeter. The Reconnaissance and Security Platoons made sweeps approximately 300 meters outside the planned perimeter and found two signs indicating mines and booby traps at XT 505085. After a thorough search of the area however no mines were actually found. Signs telling the local populace to fight against all Americans were located at XT 506082 and brought back to the bn S2. A newly dug trench system was also located at XT 517083. At 0930 hrs the lead elements of the convoy began to arrive and were guided into position by their respective quartering party representatives.

Bn (-) with Attachments:

The motor march commenced at 0800 hrs. One platoon of 1/5 (M), along with two gunships, provided the escort while ARVN artillery at BAO TRAI was prepared to fire indirect fire support. Also, one company of ARVN soldiers set up outposts along the route of march (App 2 to Annex D). The return convoy, made up of those vehicles not needed for the operation, left at 1140 hrs and arrived at CU CHI at 1307 hrs. No contact was made during the convoy phase either coming out or going back to CU CHI.

Battalion Headquarters Elements and Attachments:

The battalion perimeter with the CP located at XT 508083 extended for approximately 300 meter radius around the CP. This included 150 meters of the road in order that daily traffic along this route could be better controlled. At 1330 hrs, a command and staff meeting, to include representatives from all attached units, was held to finalize the general concepts for Operation FRESNO. A thorough discussion of plans for Search and Destroy operations, Civil Affairs, MEDCAP and Engineer projects, was followed by a detailed S2/S3 briefing concerning the present Operational Area (AO). At 1445 hrs 10 Counter-terrorists (CT's) from the ARVN camp at BAO TRAI were attached to the Bn. A and B Companies each received five CT's. The mission of the CT's was to aid the companies in handling

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indigenous personnel by means of interpretation and interrogation methods and to provide the unit with a greater knowledge of the terrain, surrounding villages and local populace. The Recon and Security Platoons utilized the remainder of the day to prepare defensive positions for the inner perimeter with emphasis on securing the Bn Tactical Operation Center (TOC). The engineers cleared roadways within the bn perimeter, dug waste disposal pits for the mess halls, and aided in the preparation of defensive positions. The MI detachment interrogated a total of 11 detainees during the day.

A and B Co 2/27 Inf:

Since these two major units accounted for all of the bn defensive perimeter, (Annex A) (A Co to the northeast, B Co to the southwest), both units spent the majority of the day preparing defensive positions, conducting local sweeps to their front, and planning for the night's ambushes.

Indirect Fire Support:

The 105mm Artillery Battery located at BAO TRAI, as well as the 4.2 Mortar Platoon and both 81mm mortar sections within our perimeter, registered their defensive concentrations early in the day. A Fire Coordination Line (FCL) was established to prevent any firing into ARVN operations vicinity AP SO DO and TAN PHU TRUNG.

Civil Affairs:

The battalion surgeon and his medical team examined and treated 31 civilians in the village of AP CU CAO TRE. This constituted the start of the MEDCAP which was to be continued on a daily basis. The S-5 team distributed toys to all the children of this village. The local populace within our perimeter were also visited and alerted on exactly what was expected of them while the Bn conducted operations in this area.

Night Activities:

Three ambushes were employed to the southwest of the B Company perimeter vicinity XT 490085, XT 495080, and XT 504075. No contact was made. At 2000 hrs B Company received sporadic sniper fire from the south of the perimeter vicinity XT 504075. M79's were fired at this location, results unknown. Three ambushes were planned to the northeast of the A Co perimeter at XT 510085 (ambush #1), XT 505097 (ambush #2) and XT 507087 (ambush #3). At approximately 2100 hrs when ambush #2 was going into position 12 to 15 VC appeared 30 meters to their front. The 8 man patrol immediately opened fire and continued the fire while they withdrew to allow the area to be saturated with artillery. At approximately 2:30 hrs, fifty 105mm HE rounds were fired mainly into XT 504096, while the patrol returned to the company CP to receive further instructions. Three very minor casualties were suffered (facial cuts) apparently from hand grenades. After a thorough evaluation of the situation the decision was made to send out a new patrol to include the squad leader of the old patrol and one other man from the old patrol. They were to go back to the scene of action (XT 504096) to thoroughly search this area and reestablish the ambush, in another area close by. At 2230 hrs the new patrol arrived in position and found 6 VC (KIA) by body count and 3 rifles along with grenades, ammunition, field gear, and documents. The weapons and other captured materials were brought to the new ambush site vicinity XT 504088. At 2255 hrs this ambush reported a force of 15 VC moving from the north towards their position. Artillery was immediately fired into the area vicinity XT 504096 using the last mission as a reference point. The results were 10 VC (KIA) possible. Ambush #1 and ambush #3 left for their locations earlier in the night at 2100 hrs. Ambush #3 had no contact during the night but ambush #1 shifted its location at 2300 hrs to

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XT 50750850 because A Co's radar picked up 2 to 3 VC moving at this location. Two more VC were spotted through a Starlight device north of the A Co perimeter at XT 505086. M79s were fired into the area with unknown results.

14 June 1966:

Plans for the day were to employ A & B Companies in S & D operations vicinity AP RUING DAC (3) and AP GIONG VOI (Appendix 1 to Annex A).

A and B Co, 2/07 Inf (Oral Order #1):

Prior to leaving on the day's operation through, AP GIONG VOI, 2d Plat A Co made another early morning sweep of the initial ambush site vicinity XT 504096 to pick up the dead VC bodies. Only four of the original bodies were left, a new body was found approximately 150 meters from the scene of action (total 5 recovered.). At this time another VC rifle was found. At 1000 hrs A & B Companies left on their sweeps. Throughout the day both units ran into booby-trapped areas and occasional sniper fire. The Bangalore torpedo-Claymore mine method was used extensively to breach paths through the booby trapped hedgerows. Many signs were also encountered warning all people to stay away. One friendly NVA from A Co was suffered as a result of a booby trap at XT 505094.

Recon Platoon:

Along with mine clearing personnel from the engineers, this element cleared the road from BAO TRAI to AP RUING DAC (1). They also provided security for the SS, the battalion surgeon, and the Engineer Platoon Leader who all went to AP SO DC to coordinate for HUCAP, Civil Affairs activities, and the construction of an ARVN Popular Forces outpost.

Battalion HQ's:

The 25th Div Commanding General, the Assistant Div Commander (support) and the B Co Commander were briefed on the previous night's ambush activities. A late agent report indicated that the A Co ambush actually accounted for eight (8) VC (KIA) by body count. The patrol leader was recommended for the BSM with V. The S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, and the S5 went to BAO TRAI to discuss operations through 18 June. The ARVN "GO" team from BAO TRAI consisting of 11 National Policemen, 3 medics, 4 intelligence specialists, and 7 Psychological Warfare specialists, was attached to A Co for the next day's operation. The mission of this team is to supply the Bn and the ARVN Forces with the latest intelligence estimates and census accounts. Also the team supplies medical assistance to Vietnamese civilians, gives the working unit more interceptors, and aids in the control of civilian movement within a designated area. Our concept was to use the Go team as a unit. It was attached to our company, rather than piece mealing its resources between units in the battalion. This would assure unity of command, especially during the initial trail period. Should this concept prove effective, then it was planned to graduate the Go Team to more decentralized operations.

Night Activities:

At 2031 hrs, 13 June, 3 VC with automatic weapons fired into the B Co perimeter from XT 501080, XT 502082, and XT 503083. M79's were fired in return and the enemy firing ceased. During the night A Co employed three ambushes at XT 507086, XT 504088, and XT 507078. B Co employed three ambushes at XT 494088, XT 496077, and XT 494083. No contact was made by any of the ambushes.

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15 June 1966:

The plan for today was to conduct a sweep to the northwest with A & B, 2/27 and 1/5 (M) emphasizing search and destroy missions through AP HEN LONG, AP BAO CONG (1), and AP GOING VOI (Appendix 2, Annex A). Also MEDCAP was planned for AP SO DO, and roadclearing and securing missions were to be conducted by the Recon. Platoon and the engineers.

A & B, 2/27 and A, 1/5 (M) conducted extensive search and destroy operations (Oral Order #2, Operation QUAKER) which included AP GOING VOI, AP RUNG DAU (3), AP BAO CONG (1), TAN MY, and AP HEN LONG. During the sweep many complex tunnels and trench networks were located. Also these elements encountered some booby trapped areas. Occasional sniper fire was received from the woodlines. Throughout the day many civilians were encountered and questioned.

A Co, 2/27 Inf:

This unit located and where possible destroyed tunnels and trench systems at XT 513084, XT 513089, XT 514086, XT 512086, and XT 513085. The Bangalore-Claymore technique was used at XT 514083, and XT 514084. Sniper fire was received from XT 518098, but subsequent search failed to locate VC. The ARVN GO team proved valuable in handling the civilians in the area. However as time progressed they became tired and less effective. Although the intelligence potential of the team seemed to be fairly effective, the value of the political and paywar members of the team were less easy to judge.

B Co, 2/27 Inf:

Sniper fire was received by this unit at XT 512092 and XT 521096. The snipers were engaged but could not be located positively. One man was wounded by a booby trap at XT 518091 and was evacuated by the Command and Control helicopter (C and C ship) to CU CHI. An old sick man (civilian) was evacuated by the C and C ship to BAO TRAI for medical attention and was returned to his home at XT 519090. Villages revealed that 200 VC were at XT 519093 the night before.

A Co, 1/5 (M):

This mechanized element had a splendid potential for moving fast and covering terrain. It received sniper fire from two locations (XT 516097 and XT 520098), however, subsequent engagement and search of these areas could not produce any VC.

Battalion HQ's:

Two visitors were briefed. Lt Col Wood, the British Military Attache, came from Saigon to witness a few days operations. Brigadier General PHAN TRONG CHINH the 25th Div (ARVN) commander also received a short briefing. The Bn CO with staff went to BAO TRAI for the daily planning meeting with ARVN leaders and US advisors.

Civil Affairs:

The MEDCAP team examined and treated 91 civilians from the village of AP SO DO (XT 514072). This was established as one of the permanent sites for future MEDCAP, which were to rotate between AP RUNG DAU (1) and AP SO DO every other day. The Bn 85 distributed 65 sets of men's clothes and 90 sets of women's clothes. Leaflets were distributed by the men of A and B, 2/27 warning the population of what will happen if the VC use their village to attack US troops. Work was continued on the ARVN outpost at AP SO DO.

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Recon Plat and Engineers:

These elements worked clearing the road from BAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1) while providing security and assistance for the MEDCAP and Civil Affairs teams.

Night Activities:

Three ambushes were employed by A Co at XT 509083, XT 509093, and XT 505077. B Co employed three ambushes at XT 495089, XT 506075, and XT 495078. None of these ambushes received contact. Beginning on this night, a new method was utilized. Formerly curfew was at 2100 hrs. Many "civilians" were still moving after dark, most of those people seemed to be VC who were taking advantage of this administrative no fire period of darkness. Thus the AP's moved out at 1945 hrs and stopped short of their assigned sites. Then at 2100 hrs they moved to their respective ambush position. This discouraged people from moving after 1930 hrs nightly.

16 June 1966:

Today's plans were to conduct a combined ARVN-US search and destroy operation commencing 160800 June. (Appendix 3, Annex A). Since this would be our first combined US-ARVN operation, the plan was purposely unambitious and uncomplicated. The main purpose was to accomplish the first operation, instilling a maximum of mutual confidence and cooperation.

Operation QUAKER began at 0900 hrs with A, 2/27, B, 2/27, A, 1/5 (M) working in conjunction with the ARVN forces 1st Trp, 10th Cav (mechanized), First Co, 4/49 to conduct search and destroy operations to the northeast of the bn perimeter as per Oral Order #3. Throughout the day all units ran into booby traps, sniper fire, and tunnels.

A Co, 2/27 Inf:

This unit searched and destroyed tunnels at XT 521090 and XT 537098. Booby trap signs, but again no actual booby traps, were discovered at XT 512086. A heavily wooded area at XT 542100 contained numerous signs warning all people to stay away. The area was also heavily booby trapped, thus the Bangalore-Claymore technique was utilized here. After breaching a path, however, nothing was found inside the area. The SO team provided medical aid to two civilians in a house at XT 529087. Three US soldiers and one ARVN counterterrorist were wounded by booby traps at XT 515088. The ARVN soldier was evacuated to BAO TRAI while the US soldiers were evacuated to CU CHI. A flame APC belonging to the engineers was positioned on the right flank of the company perimeter near the road.

B Co, 2/27 Inf:

This unit had only one action during the day. Sniper fire was received from XT 545119. The sniper was engaged. A thorough search of this area disclosed nothing.

A Co, 1/5 (M):

The mission of this unit was to screen and secure the left flank of the advancing rifle companies (A & B, 2/27) (Oral Order #3). This was successfully accomplished. No contact was made at all during the day.

ARVN Forces, 1/10 (M), 4/49:

These two elements again worked together on their SOP road clearing operations from BAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1). They also worked on and

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secured the ARVN outpost at AP SO DO. In addition, the Recon Platoon outposted and patrolled the road from base camp to BAO TRAI in order to secure resupply convoys.

Civil Affairs:

The MEDCAP team examined and treated 120 villagers, from AP BUNG DAU (1). The Pn 85 team with the National Police set up a traffic control system to check on all Vietnamese vehicles, and personnel passing through the perimeter. The primary control point (XT 501081) is manned by two National Policemen. Two traffic control points are manned in the same way along the highway at XT 508081 and XT 501086. People began coming from the outlying area to get medical assistance from the bn aid station.

17 June 1966:

Plans for today were to conduct an airmobile assault in conjunction with the 4/49 ARVN (Appendix 4, Annex A). The MEDCAP team will continue treating civilians in AP SO DO while the engineers continue construction of the ARVN Popular Forces Outpost.

This day was marked with two major items of interest. Operation KEYSTONE (Oral Order #4) a combined ARVN-US airmobile assault commenced at 0753 hrs. At 1120 hrs the Vietnamese Chief of State and his party arrived for briefings on the past actions of, and future plans for, Operation FRESNO.

VIP Briefings:

The full contingency of guests arrived on location in six helicopters at 1120 hrs and was met by a 10 man combat-ready rifle squad from C, 2/27. This squad acted as an honor guard initially, then moved out to provide all around security for the briefing area. The party to be briefed consisted of Lt Gen Nguyen Van Thieu, the President of the Republic of Vietnam and (Chairman of the National Revolutionary Council), Lt Gen Cao Van Vien, Chief JCS, RVNAF; Maj Gen Fred C. Myland, 25th Infantry Division G1; Maj Gen Le Nguyen Khang, 03 III Corps; Brig Gen Jones, Div COC, MACV; Col Mueller, Sr Advisor III CTZ. Also the Division ID, Lt Col Salvador escorted the USAFV ID on a visit to the area. A host of others included aides, staff members, and reporters. The briefing consisted of plans and concepts for Operation FRESNO with a detailed progress report of our Civil Affairs actions and tactical successes. After being made an honorary "Wolfhound" by the BA CO, Lt Gen Thieu passed out engraved lacquerware gifts to selected officers and NCOs in the battalion.

A Co, 2/27 Inf:

This unit employed three ambushes at XT 508088, XT 501089, and XT 508082 during the night of 16-17 June. No contact was made. Operation KEYSTONE (Oral Order #4) began at 0753 hrs. This unit was the first to lift off from the pickup zone and land at LZ 1 on Obj A. The LZ was cold. As the company moved through their objective areas, they encountered many signs warning of booby traps, however no booby traps were actually found in these areas. The area around AP AN HIEP especially at XT 461128 was interlaced with many trenches. Some trenches were newly dug, and some were well camouflaged and fitted with punji stakes. At 0829 hrs a man was spotted about 300 meters from the unit running towards a swampy area at XT 511103. After giving chase and thoroughly searching the area he could not be located. At 0920 hrs, well constructed fighting trenches

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were located at XT 468123. The trenches were oriented to the west. At 0926 hrs a VCS was captured and evacuated to BAO TRAI in the C & C ship. The company continued the mission until they closed into base camp at 1310 hrs.

B Co, 2/27 Inf:

During the night of 16-17 June three ambushes were employed at XT 502095, XT 498082, and XT 497087. No contact was made. At 0613 hrs on the 17th this unit commenced their portion of the airlift by filling five helicopters of the second lift and all ten helicopters of the third and last lift. The unit was flown to LZ 1 to secure the west half of Obj A. During the day no contact was made and the company returned to base camp at 1400 hrs.

4/49 (ARVN):

At 0620 hrs 17 June this unit conducted their portion of the air-mobile assault from the airstrip at BAO TRAI to LZ 2 where they secured Obj 1. During their sweep an ARVN Regional Forces soldier was found in a house at XT 473135. He was bound in chains and was being imprisoned by the VC. This ARVN soldier had been captured by the VC one week before when the Hiep Hoa sugar mill was overrun. The soldier was picked up by our C & C ship and evacuated to the sector S-2 at BAO TRAI. An ARVN soldier was wounded from a booby trap at XT 473220 and was evacuated by our C & C ship to BAO TRAI. The unit completed its sweep and returned to BAO TRAI at 1400 hrs.

B Co, 1/5 (M):

This unit had a dual mission. First they were to search and destroy all around the bn perimeter until they extended 1000 meters out from the perimeter. Then they were to hold in place and aggressively outpost a new perimeter 1000 meters out. This mission was accomplished in order that the bn CP could be secure from mortar fire in case the VC had previous information that the Vietnamese Chief of State would be visiting the battalion.

Engineers:

At 0615 hrs the two-man demolition teams were attached to A and B Companies (a daily requirement). From 0615 hrs to 0620 hrs the road was cleared from BAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1). Clearance was obtained from the ARVN authorities to cut timber for overhead cover within the bn perimeter and for emplacements at the Popular Forces Outpost at AP SO DO.

Reconnaissance Platoon:

This unit established a platoon defensive position near AP SO DO at XT 510077 on 16 June 66. Motorized patrols and outposts were established along the road from base camp to BAO TRAI. Security was provided for the MEDCAP team in AP SO DO. This element was to remain in its defensive position until further notice.

Night Activities:

1st Platoon, C, 2/27 and the Scty Plt established six ambushes during the night of 17-18 June. No contact was made. The 2d Plt, B, 1/5 (M) was attached to the bn at 1830 hrs to act as reaction force when needed.

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18 June 1966:

The plan for the day was to conduct a combined search and destroy operation with the ARVN 51st Ranger Battalion located at DUC HUE. A & B Companies plus A, 1/5 (M) were to provide the US Forces punch (Appendix 5, Annex A).

1st Plat, C, 2/27 established three ambushes outside the A Co perimeter during the night of 17-18 June. Their locations were XT 511085, XT 508092, and XT 511079. No contact was made. The Security Platoon established three ambushes outside the B Co perimeter at XT 494090, XT 486077, and XT 503074. No contact was made. Because of intelligence information received during the night that the VC 506th battalion was located at XT 466020, Operation EMPIRE (Oral Order #5) was cancelled. Instead Operation BUCKEYE (Oral Order #6) was initiated 180700 June. The mission was to locate this suspected VC force and destroy it or hold it in place until a larger force could arrive.

A Co, 2/27 Inf:

At 0700 hrs the company left base camp and moved along route WELL. One man was wounded by a booby trap at XT 488077, at 0815 hrs. The wounded man was evacuated by a C & C ship to CHI. The area around XT 488077 was very heavily booby trapped with CBU "butterfly bombs". At 1129 hrs, two new chargers for a Carbine were found at XT 483027. At 1152 hrs carbine fire was received from XT 482027. The unit deployed one element which returned the fire and engaged the sniper at approximately 100 meters. The sniper firing ceased, but the sniper could not be located. At 1323 hrs, one man stepped on a large mine, which blew his leg off below the knee. He was evacuated to CU CHI at 1330 hrs by the C & C ship. Between 1515 hrs and 1532 hrs 10 camouflaged VC shelters were destroyed; 4 at XT 473018, 4 at XT 472018, and 2 at XT 471019. Because these had been recently occupied, (within a few hours), the intelligence report which initiated the operation was thereby confirmed. At 1800 hrs this unit was moved to base camp by an airlift utilizing 5 helicopters in each lift. After completion of the extraction the company moved into its positions in the base camp perimeter. At 1930 hrs, sniper fire was received from XT 511089. While the 2d Plat, B, 1/5 (M) was being readied for its role as reaction force, the A Co 81mm mortars fired 15 HE rounds at this VC location. When the mortars ceased firing, the APC's attacked out of the perimeter towards the woodland utilizing their 50 cal machineguns to put the VC location in a crossfire. The sniper firing ceased. This also provided a good rehearsal for the Mech Platoon's role as the reaction force.

B Co, 2/27 Inf:

At 0700 hrs this unit led the S & D operation to the Oriental River with A Co following. At 0844 hrs the unit was located at XT 498048. At this location they questioned some civilians living in the area and found out that on an azimuth of 230 degrees at approximately 1000 meters there was a suspected VC location. This information was immediately fed to higher channels for further disposition. More evidence that the VC were in this area was gained at 0925 hrs when a bunker was located and destroyed at XT 482042. At 0951 hrs 6 to 8 old bunkers were found, which were mostly filled with water. At 1045 hrs a message was found which read "We the VC warn all people to stay in their hamlets until 15 June. If the enemy attacks we will struggle with all weapons available. If they are mopped up we will attack GO CAT." This again was turned in along

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with many other documents through intelligence channels. At 1147 hrs 6 sheets of Pierced Steel Planking were picked up by the C & C ship at XT 477023 and brought back to base camp to be used as overhead cover. At 1307 hrs, two VC boats were destroyed at XT 478027. For most of the day this unit was frequently in water ranging from 1 foot deep to waist high. At 1800 hrs an airmobile extraction took the unit back to base camp; thus Operation BUCKEYE ended.

Airmobile Extraction:

Early in the day plans for an airmobile extraction of A & B Companies from the Oriental River area were tentatively made for 1800 hrs that evening. The big question was whether these two units would set up a defensive positions in the river area or whether they would be extracted back to base camp. Again, this depended on what was developed during the day. The decision was made at approximately 1500 hrs to extract. Because of the heavy undergrowth in the river area, it was difficult to find an adequate PZ. Two suitable PZs were finally located at XT 477026. However, each was only big enough for five helicopters to land at one time. A Co, 25th Aviation Bn supplied 10 helicopters with two gunships as escort. The airlift commenced at 1800 hrs amid some sniper fire which steadily increased as less and less people remained on the PZ. The enemy fire was primarily aimed at the helicopters. The gunship managed to suppress the sniper fire with its rockets and machineguns by the time the last elements were airborne. An agent report from BAO TRAI revealed that during the extraction the gunships together with the C & C ship accounted for 4 VC KIA (by body count) and 5 VC KIA (possible). All elements of A & B, 2/27 had returned safely to base camp by 1820 hrs.

Artillery:

When the friendly units entered the area around grid square 4804, they were moving in a southwesterly direction into an area of dense undergrowth. Since vision was limited at times to 30 meters, artillery fires were utilized in the following manner: to confirm friendly locations, to neutralize suspected VC locations along the axis of advance, and to have current firing data continuously available in order that immediate fires could be brought upon the enemy. Only leading elements used these methods at the average rate of one round every two minutes. From 1337 hrs to 1437 hrs the artillery fired 7 rounds (3 HE & 4 WP) from XT 472021 to XT 47430138. From 1454 hrs to 1541 hrs the artillery fired 82 rounds (81 HE & 1 WP) from XT 42450138 to XT 46840106.

Recon Platoon:

From 0615 hrs to 0850 hrs, elements from this unit provided security for the daily road clearing operation from BAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1). A roadblock was found during the sweep at XT 519061. The blockade was made of bamboo and trees and had signs on it warning of mines. The engineers mine detectors, however, gave no indication of mines, thus the roadblock was cleared away. During the day more work was done on the platoon's own permanent positions near the site of the Popular Force Outpost. In the afternoon, elements went with the MEDCAP team to AP RUNG DAU (1). Elements of the platoon also escorted the water supply vehicles and trailers from BAO TRAI to base camp.

Civil Affairs:

The MEDCAP team visited the village of AP RUNG DAU (1) treating 91 civilians. English classes were given by the Bn Communications Platoon to 12 Vietnamese civilians living within the base camp perimeter. Arrangements were made for a Vietnamese Barber from BAO TRAI to be in the battalion area on 19 June 66 to give haircuts to the members of 2/27. A price of 30

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plans had been agreed upon for each haircut. Coordination was made with the authorities at BAO TRAI to begin employing between 30 to 50 local villagers to fill sandbags for the battalion.

19 June 1966:

The plan for the day was to have two platoon sweeps in the bn AO. A & B Companies were to airlift to the same general area as 18 June and conduct S & D operations in this area as per oral order #7 (Appendix 7, Annex A).

During the night of 18-19 June six ambushes were employed around the battalion perimeter. Also extensive artillery and mortar H & I missions were fired during the night at suspected VC locations. As per Oral Order #7 Operation LONESTAR commenced with the Security Platoon's sweep at 1200 hrs, followed by the 2d Platoon, B Co, 1/5 (M) which moved out at 1300 hrs. A & B, 2/27 airlifted to Obj Zap at 1200 hrs. The concept for this days operation was to return to the same area as Operation BUCKEYE. This time however, the area was to be saturated with artillery and mortar fire; then units were to move in quickly with an air assault to search and destroy back to base camp.

Indirect Fire Support:

a. H & I fires 182000 June.

1. 4.2 Mortars

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NATURE OF TARGET</u>
XT 530117	Suspected VC supply route
XT 518115	Suspected VC co location
XT 469063	Suspected VC supply cache
XT 464055	Suspected VC supply cache

2. Artillery (105mm)

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NATURE OF TARGET</u>
XT 477022	Suspected VC supply routes
XT 468018	Suspected VC supply routes
XT 472014	Suspected VC supply routes
XT 471008	Suspected VC supply routes

3. Artillery (155mm)

<u>LOCATIONS</u>	<u>NATURE OF TARGET</u>
XT 46250223	Suspected VC anti-aircraft position
XT 46200210	Suspected VC anti-aircraft position
XT 46200185	Suspected VC AW position
XT 46260160	Suspected VC AW position
XT 46360135	Suspected VC anti-aircraft position

* A total of 36 rounds were fired (HE and WP mixed)

b. Preparation on IZ in grid square 4804 ** (Time lapse 1150-1155 hrs)

1. 4.2 mortars - 24 HE and 24 WP
2. 105 Howitzer - 5 WP and 53 HE
3. 155 Howitzer - 6 WP and 30 HE
4. 8" Howitzer - 10 HE

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** A total of 152 rds were fired in the preparation.

c. Walking fires - At 1350 hrs 3 WP and 5 HE were fired in grid square 4804.

A Co, 2/27 Inf:

During the night of 18-19 June, ambushes, manned by 1st Platoon, C, 2/27, were employed at the following locations: XT 504099, XT 511087, and XT 518079. No contact was made. During the morning hours the company conducted maintenance on their weapons and equipment. A foot inspection was also held. At 1200 hrs the unit airlifted to Obj Zap, thus commencing Operation LONESTAR. The airlift was complete at 1203 hrs and the LZ was cold. As this unit moved back to the northeast, booby traps were encountered. At 1248 hrs, a booby trap was destroyed at XT 478048. At 1256 hrs, two booby trapped grenades were destroyed at XT 406049. At 1307 hrs, one booby trapped grenade and one booby trapped butterfly bomb were destroyed at XT 487049. At 1315 hrs, two civilians were located and questioned at XT 485050. They reported that when the "Bombs started dropping" (artillery and mortar prop fires), the VC fled to the north northwest. At 1544 hrs, 3 grenade type booby traps were destroyed at XT 487047. The unit closed back into the bn base camp at 1600 hrs.

B Co, 2/27 Inf:

Again the Security Platoon manned the ambushes during the night of 18-19 June, outside the B Co perimeter. The ambushes were located at XT 503075, XT 495075, and XT 494083. There was no contact during the night. Personal hygiene and care and cleaning of weapons and equipment in preparation for Operation LONESTAR took up most of the morning hours. At 1200 hrs this unit was airlifted to Obj Zap. At 1315 hrs, two booby trapped butterfly bombs were destroyed at XT 485050. At 1450 hrs, a wounded VC soldier was found at XT 485048. Upon being questioned, he said he received fragments apparently from the rockets of the gunships that had fired around the LZ prior to the troops landing. Because he was seriously wounded (lung puncture), he was evacuated by the C & C ship to the hospital at CU CHI where he would be both better cared for and further interrogated.

2d Plat, B, 1/5 (M):

This element commenced their sweep at 1200 hrs (Oral Order #7). At 1400 hrs, signs were located at XT 506054 which warned the civilian populace to stay away from that area as it was heavily mined and booby trapped. A subsequent search, however, could not reveal any mines or booby traps. Civilians in the area seemed very friendly. At 1410 hrs a haystack with a hidden compartment was located at XT 509046. A search produced 2 male personnel about age 40 years. One man had only one eye. Other items found with them were medicine in bottles, booby traps, and various sorts of web gear. Also found were notebooks and other documents along with steel pots, and empty 60mm mortar canisters. At 1450 hrs three other male VC suspects were found at XT 504046. At 1500 hrs, all five of these VCS were evacuated to the bn POW compound for further interrogation. The platoon closed into base camp at 1600 hrs.

Security Platoon:

This element began its sweep at 1000 hrs (Oral Order #7). At

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1020 hrs, booby trap signs were located XT 497076; but no actual booby traps could be located. At 1030 hrs at XT 495074, a pistol belt with ponche, and a Chicom grenade were found in a logtack. These items were returned to the bn S2. The grenade was destroyed. At 1040 hrs at XT 489074 four foxhole bunkers were located and destroyed.

Engineers:

The SOP early morning road clearing operation conducted from BAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1) was completed at 0910 hrs. At 0930 hrs, the flame APC was attached to the 2d Plat, B, 1/5 (M) for their sweep. At 1100 hrs the SOP demo teams were attached to A and B Companies. More construction materials for the ARVN outpost (barbed wire and pickets) arrived on the convoy at 1100 hrs. 30% of the materials needed to complete the outpost are presently at this location and 60% of the clearing operations for fields of fire and a solid base have been completed. The grader has been continually improving the road to BAO TRAI.

Civil Affairs:

The barber gave haircuts all day within the battalion perimeter. Arrangements were completed to have civilian laborers at the base camp to fill sandbags. The Communications Platoon continued its daily English classes to the Vietnamese civilians living within the perimeter. MEDCAP was performed in the village of AP SO DQ (100 civilians were treated).

Night Activities:

The 2d Platoon, B Co, 1/5 (M) conducted a sweep east of the bn perimeter at 1830 hrs. It was designed to accomplish a two-fold purpose. It was not only to discover any enemy activity to the east of the perimeter, but also to drop off a stay behind squad to establish an ambush site. The platoon (-) returned to the perimeter at 1900 hrs. The stay behind ambush squad returned at 2100 hrs with negative contact. At 2215 hrs the A Co radar picked up movement vicinity XT 5063000, M79's were fired, but results were negative. 3d Platoon, A Co, 2/27 departed the bn perimeter at 2020 hrs to establish an ambush site at XT 496096. The platoon was in position at 2300 hrs. B Co established two squad sized ambush points at XT 503076 and XT 496076. These ambush sites were in position at 2300 hrs. The Security Platoon established a platoon size ambush at XT 416065. It was in position at 2305 hrs.

20 June 1966:

Plans for the day. A Co, B Co, and the Security Platoon were to conduct care and maintenance during the day in preparation for the night's ambush operations. The Recon Platoon was to continue its road clearance and security missions. 2d Plat, B, 1/5 (M) was to conduct a sweep as per Oral Order #8 (Appendix 8 to Annex A).

A Co, 2/27 Inf:

At 0610 hrs the 3d Platoon returned from its ambush site (no contact). At 201000 the company commander and his platoon leaders made an aerial reconnaissance of the night ambush sites for 20-21 June and the night airborne assault for 21-22 June. For most of the day the company engaged in care and maintenance of equipment and personnel, and preparation for the night ambush. Four Vietnamese barbers were cutting hair in the company all day. The concept behind this night's company-sized area ambush was not only to set up an ambush site to kill VC, but also to rehearse for the following night's airborne assault. The area chosen for the A Co ambush was similar to the terrain and road network found in the area.

designated for the airmobile assault. Thus, all elements of the company would be well rehearsed on the actions and techniques to be taken the following night. The company departed the bn perimeter at 2247 hrs and moved to its assembly area per Oral Order #8 (Appendix 8 to Annex A). The move served as a training vehicle in that it allowed leaders at all levels to exercise maximum leadership capabilities in areas of control, practice night orientation techniques, and coordinate close ambush sites under a unified command. The ambush site was completely established at 210130 hrs.

B Co, 2/27 Inf:

By 0645 hrs both ambush patrols had returned to the company perimeter. No contact was made. During the day the company conducted care and maintenance of personnel and equipment. The CO and 3d Platoon Leader made an aerial recon for the platoon-size night ambush. Vietnamese barbers were in the area all day cutting hair. At 1700 hrs the Security Platoon was attached to the company to man the 3d Platoon sector while they were on patrol. The 3d Platoon established its ambush at HT 501101. It was in position at 2315 hrs.

Recon Platoon, 2/27 Inf:

This element continued to man its defensive position in the village of AP SO DO during the night of 19-20 June. Together with the engineers they conducted the daily road clearing operation from BIC KRAI to AP NUNG DAU (1). They also secured the HUCAP team at AP SO DO and the engineers building the A/N PT outpost. The platoon was given the mission to be prepared on order, to deploy to the bn perimeter, if the bn's reaction force, 2/B/1/5 (M), was committed to assist the A Co ambush.

Security Platoon, 2/27 Inf:

The platoon returned from its ambush site at 0745 hrs. No contact was made. The remainder of the day was spent in care and maintenance of personnel and equipment.

2d Plat, B Co, 1/5 (M):

At 0800 hrs the 2d platoon departed the bn perimeter with the remainder of B 1/5 (M) to mark the area of the A Co night airmobile assault and area ambush under the guise of a S & D op. (Appendix 8, Annex A). The purpose was to mark key terrain features and landing zones by the armored vehicle tracks, to facilitate identification from the air and on the ground. The mission was completed at 1300 hrs. At 1400 hrs the 2d platoon left for CU CHI, being replaced by the 1st platoon. The 1st Platoon B, 1/5 (M) Co with A and HHC, 2/27 elements assumed the A Co defensive perimeter effective 1700 hrs. The 1st Platoon B 1/5 (M) was also the bn reaction force.

Artillery H & I (19-20 June) (155mm):

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE OF ELEMENT</u>
XT 45940178	Suspected VC supply route
XT 45200182	Suspected VC supply route
XT 46470458	Suspected VC location
XT 47310360	Suspected VC location
XT 47570315	Suspected VC location
XT 41100998	Suspected VC location
XT 40470937	Suspected VC location

S-4, 2/27 Inf:

The daily "ROAD RUNNER" convoy reached the bn forward base area at 1215 hrs. It brought the bn's rations, ammunition, ice, and refreshments. The return trip to CU CHI began at 1430 hrs. The convoy was temporarily suspended for a few days at this point because all available escort units were committed to other missions. Coordination was made to start resupplying the bn by air (UH1D) until ground convoys could again be initiated.

Engineers:

The engineers continued the construction of roads within the bn perimeter and the improvement of the road between BAO TRAI and AP RUNG DAU (1). The engineer team worked on the ANH K' outpost, and completed the platform around the outpost tower.

Civil Affairs, 2/27 Inf:

The MEDCAP team treated 102 civilians at AP SO DO. Coordination was made to obtain a cultural team and entertainment for the bn "County Fair" operation scheduled for 23 June.

Night's Activities:

At 2015 hrs sniper fire was received from approximately 200 meters to the left and right flanks of the B Co perimeter generally from the southwest. It was estimated that the VC were using six automatic weapons and six to eight small arms. M-79's and mortar began firing on the VC locations. The mortar fire resulted in three VC KIA (30) and ten VC KIA (possible). At 2015 hrs the 1st Platoon B, 1/5 (K) suffered one minor KIA from sniper fire. He was treated by the battalion surgeon.

21 June 1966:

The plan for the day was for A Co to prepare for the night air-mobile assault, and for B Co to conduct a sweep as per Oral Order #9 (Appendix 9, Annex A). The Recon Platoon was to continue its road clearing and security mission for the engineers and MEDCAP team.

A Co, 2/27 Inf:

The company made no contact at their ambush site during the night and returned to the bn perimeter at 0730 hrs. The company spent the remainder of the day conducting care and maintenance in preparation for the night airmobile assault. Operation Peach (Appendix 9 to Annex A) was the first night airmobile assault to be conducted by the 2/27th. At 1919 hrs the first lift consisting of five helicopters (Pathfinders and Security), left the PZ. The pathfinders became disoriented flying at tree top level and marked the wrong LZ. Thus, this lift initially landed at the wrong LZ and had to be relifted to the correct LZ at XT 474093. The airlift portion of the operation was completed at 1940 hrs. There was one minor injury when an RTO's radio straps got tangled with the seat straps in the helicopter. The RTO suffered a badly bruised forearm. He was evacuated to CU CHI with his radio, creating a gap in communications at ambush #7. The company commander cancelled this ambush. By 2021 hrs, the company had reached the first ambush site (XT 472096). The company dropped off the first ambush patrol and continued on in this manner until all ambush sites were established. The ambushes were established at the following times:

<u>AMBUS.</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
#1	2030 hrs	XT 472096
#2	2104 hrs	XT 454103
#3	2136 hrs	XT 455105
#4	2155 hrs	XT 456109
#5	2210 hrs	XT 455114
#6	2215 hrs	XT 45 116
#7	CANCELLED	
#8	2159 hrs	XT 458111
#9	2230 hrs	XT 452111

During the move to the various ambush sites, the company received ineffective sniper fire from XT 455104. The firing started at 2047 hrs and ceased at 2147 hrs. A total of 10-12 rounds were fired by the sniper. No fire was returned by the company. In fact it appeared that the VC were completely confused by the operation. Apparently a VC mortar dropped about three rounds on the VC sniper firing at the company. The sniper was silenced.

B Co, 2/27 Inf:

The platoon ambush returned to the base camp area at 0643 hrs. There was no contact. At 0900 hrs, as per Op Order #10 (Operation ALGIA) (Appendix 10, Annex A), the company conducted a motor march to XT 513028. At this point they began a northerly sweep to the bn perimeter. The ARVN GO team was attached to the company for the day. The team questioned all civilians they encountered during the sweep. At 1330 hrs, one civilian revealed information that a VC in a blue uniform had departed XT 487061 at approximately 1300 hrs. The company returned to the bn perimeter at 1600 hrs. At 1840 hrs, this unit made a sweep of the woodline around the P for the A Co airlift. No contact was made. The company returned to the bn perimeter at 2020 hrs. Three squad sized ambushes were established at XT 494090, XT 496077, XT 503074. They were in position at 2115 hrs.

Recon Platoon:

This element continued to occupy its defensive position in the village of AP SO DO. The platoon conducted its daily road clearing mission from BAO TRAI to AP HUNG DAU (1). At 0800 hrs a road block, consisting of two VC ambush and containing two booby trapped CEU's was destroyed by one flame APC at XT 525054. The booby trapped CEU's were pointed out by Vietnamese children who had been attending English classes conducted by the Battalion Comm Platoon. The unit outposted the road during the day from BAO TRAI to AP HUNG DAU (1) and secured the engineers and the MEDCAP team at AP SO DO during the day. Effective 1800 hrs, the platoon returned to AP SO DO and again was prepared to return to the bn perimeter to take the place of 1st Plat, B, 1/5 (M) if they were committed as the reaction force.

1st Plat, B, 1/5 (M).

This element continued to act as the Bn Reaction Force. At 1700 hrs, along with the Security Platoon, this unit manned the A Co perimeter. Also it secured the PZ for A Co from 1745 hrs to 2029 hrs.

Engineers:

The engineer platoon continued road construction within the bn base camp area and improved the road from BAO TRAI to AP HUNG DAU (1). Also work was continued on the ARVN XP outpost.

Heavy Mortar Platoon:

During the night of 20-21 June this platoon fired four M & I missions (total of sixteen M rounds).

COORDINATES

XT 47150423
XT 47590484
XT 47760372
XT 48260361

TARGET

Suspected VC position
Suspected VC position
Suspected VC supply route
Suspected VC supply route

S-4:

The bn resupply for the day was completed utilizing sixteen UHL-D loads of rations; ammunition, etc. Fourteen vehicles were given a Technical Inspection, - no major deficiencies were found.

Civil Affairs:

A total of 84 persons were treated by the bn MEDCAP team in the village of AP 30 DQ. Continued coordination was made to obtain all the supplies and entertainment needed for the bn "County Fair" operation scheduled for 23 June. A leaflet drop was made in MO requesting that VC come into the Open Arms Program (Job Order 301).

22 June 1966:

The plan for this day was to have A Co conduct care and maintenance after returning from the ambush. B Co was to sweep the village of AP NUNG DAN (1) with 1st Plat, B, 1/5 (M) as per Oral Order #10 (Operation ALQMA) (Appendix 10, Annex A).

A Co, 2/27 Inf:

The company began its return to base camp from the ambush site on foot at 0630 hrs. Questioning of civilians along the route at XT 473103 indicated that 50 - 70 VC passed through the area on the 21st. The VC had warned the civilian population to stay in their houses, because the area would be booby-trapped. The VC disseminated this information to the people by use of a loudspeaker system. The company made a thorough search of the area, but could not find evidence of booby trapping. By 0805 hrs, the company had returned to the bn perimeter. They conducted care and maintenance for the remainder of the day.

B Co, 2/27 Inf/1st Plat, B, 1/5 (M):

The ambush patrols for B, 2/27 returned to the company perimeter at 0615 hrs. No contact was made. B, 2/27 departed the bn perimeter at 1115 hrs and moved to the village of AP NUNG DAN (1), thus commencing Operation ALQMA. At 1130 hrs the 1st Plat, B, 1/5 (M) left the bn perimeter to link up with B Co. The two units surrounded the village as planned. Men elements of B Co along with the GO team searched through the village. The GO team emphasized its Psy/War capabilities. At 1342 hrs, four radio antennas were discovered on two houses. They were destroyed. Both units returned to the bn perimeter at 1615 hrs.

C, 1/5 (M):

At 1800 hrs C Co, 1/5 (M) was attached to the bn and 1st Plat B, 1/5 (M) was released to return to CU CHI. C, 1/5 (M) was to have the mission of securing the entire bn perimeter during Operation BILGRASS

(Appendix 11 to Annex A).

Recon Platoon:

The platoon with the engineers completed the road sweep from AP SO DO to BAO LAI then to Hiep Hoa and Duc Hiep at 1042 hrs. The platoon provided security during the day for the engineer advisory team at the AP SO DO outpost and the bn MEDCAP at AP NUNG DAU (1).

Security Platoon:

This element occupied three squad sized outposts during the day until 1700 hrs on the road from AP NUNG DAU (1) to DUC Hiep, (XT 517063, XT 483093, and XT 471069). The unit then returned to base camp.

Engineers:

The engineers continued to improve the road network within the base area and work on the existing road from BAO LAI to Hiep Hoa. Work on the RE outpost was continued.

Civil Affairs:

Final coordination was made for the unit rations, food, supplies, etc, for Operation BIRMGESS, the Battalion's JMWAVE operation. MEDCAP was conducted in AP NUNG DAU (1) during the afternoon. 92 civilians were treated at the village and 13 more were treated at the Battalion Aid Station. The bn communications platoon made strides with its daily English classes. Not only were the Vietnamese children learning English but they were learning to play baseball. They also were given new clothes from the 25th Div "Helping Hand" supplies.

Night Activities:

At 2020 hrs the Recon Platoon received 7 SA rounds from XT 503072. The 4.2 mortars fired 18 rounds at the VC location, the sniper ceased (At this time the entire platoon was at its night's defensive position XT 510077). The Security Platoon secured the northern portion of the B Co perimeter during the night. One ambush was dispatched to XT 496095. At 1700 hrs C, L/5 (A) assumed responsibility for the B Co perimeter. Two B Co ambushes were in position, by 2130 hrs at XT 496076 and XT 503076.

23 June 1966:

The general concept behind Operation BIRMGESS was that A & B 2/27 would be utilized to completely surround the village of AP SO DO early in the morning. The GO team would be utilized to maintain close check of all persons going out, coming in, or staying in the village in the initial morning hours. The fair essentially consisted of a cultural team, a MEDCAP team and the distribution of "Helping Hand" items. This was the first time this bn had attempted this type operation, and it was realized that many risks were involved should the VC attempt to sabotage the activities. The fair could possibly be misinterpreted, should anyone get hurt through VC actions, and civil affairs successes accomplished this far would be nullified.

Operation BIRMGESS commenced at 0300 hrs when A & B, 2/27 moved from the bn perimeter on their way to AP SO DO. The encirclement of the village was complete at 0438 hrs. From this time on no one was allowed to leave the village. The ARVN GO team arrived in the village at 0640 hrs and moved all villagers to the village schoolhouse. The team then began checking the ID cards of all the people. This was done to discover any

false ID cards and also to insure that all the inhabitants of the village did have ID cards. An ID card team was available at the village to issue cards to all authorized personnel who did not have one. The SO team conducted a thorough search of the village starting at 0615 hrs. The Psy/Sec members of the team mingled with the people of the village attempting to get as much information as possible from them. At 0715 hrs the 2d Brigade Band arrived and gave their concert until 0915 hrs. Immediately after the concert, the Vietnamese cultural team entertained the villagers with songs and stories of Vietnamese history and culture until 1100 hrs. The Province Chief, Major HNA, gave a speech urging the villagers to be loyal to the Government of Vietnam and to give the authorities all information concerning VC activities. Upon completion of the speech, lunch was served to the 350 persons who were at the village. The free meal was provided by the bn's combined efforts with GVN authorities. During the afternoon the bn surgeon treated 94 villagers for various illnesses. At 1330 hrs "Tropic Lightning" MILPERS MED supplies were distributed. This included 20 sets of men's clothing, 50 sets of women's clothing, and 20 tons. The operation ended at 1400 hrs and A & B Co, 2/27 withdrew from their security positions around AP SO DO and returned to the bn perimeter.

Recon Platoon:

Together with the engineers this element completed the daily road sweep from BAO TRAI to Hiep Hoi. At 0825 hrs, the platoon returned to its defensive position to secure the engineer advisory team at the PF outpost. This element also worked with 4 National Policemen to control vehicular traffic from AP SO DO to BAO TRAI.

Security Platoon:

The one ambush patrol returned to the bn perimeter at 0630 hrs. The platoon established two outposts along the road from AP NUI DAU (1) to Hiep Hoi. The outposts returned to the bn perimeter at 1200 hrs.

Civil Affairs:

Aside from the tremendous success of the "County Fair", plans were made to hire more civilian laborers to fill sandbags for the bunkers on the perimeter. The Recon Platoon conducted its daily English classes for fifteen Vietnamese children. Also physical therapy was given to one child after the bn surgeon gave instruction on the proper methods. The apparent accomplishments of the County Fair included better relations with the Vietnamese local population, an indication of GVN support, and valuable intelligence information.

Night Activities:

C Co, 1/5 (M) after securing the bn perimeter all day while Operation BULLGRASS was being conducted, left the bn AO to return to CU CHI. They left behind one platoon to be utilized as the bn reaction force. At 1930 hrs the bn received information from the Recon Platoon that the residents of AP SO DO were leaving the village. Initially it was suspected that the VC might be planning a reprisal because of the tremendous success of the County Fair. Thus the 1st Plat, C, 1/5 (M) mounted their APC's and moved down the road through AP SO DO, not only as a feint to throw the VC off guard, but also as a show of force. The Recon Platoon returned to base camp at 2030 hrs using a different route. There was no further action during the night. Squad ambushes were located at RT 50800865, RT 50320880, RT 50800805, RT 491096, RT 485094, RT 517064, and RT 510078.

24 June 1966:

The plan for the day was for A, 2/27 to airlift to a new AO for a two day S & D operation. B, 2/27 was to S & D to the southwest of the bn perimeter and C, 2/27 was to airlift from CU CHI to DUC HUE and assist in the defense of the Special Forces camp there. 2d Plat, C, 1/5 (M) was to conduct a sweep to the north to act as security force (south flank for A/2/27). All units were to move in accordance with Operation GARDEN (Appendix 12, Annex A).

The operation commenced at 0629 hrs when C Co helilifted from the CU CHI Army Airfield to DUC HUE (XT 430072). The lift was completed at 0700 hrs. C Co spent the day preparing positions around the sugar mill in order to accomplish the mission of defending the area. Because of enemy information received, Operation GARDEN was altered slightly. At 1035 hrs, A Co received sniper fire from XT 529110. The fire was returned, but the VC fled. Civilians located at XT 528112 reported that approximately one VC platoon with green uniforms and helmets had fled to the southwest when the US troops landed in the helicopters that morning. The company commander of A Co from an OH-23 spotted a man with a weapon, in uniform and steel pot, running at XT 533110. As a result B Co was airlifted at 1300 hrs to XT 535104, and 1st Plat, A Co, 3/4 way moved through AP BEN LONG to link up with B Co. Together they S & D throughout the area around XT 535104.

A Co, 2/27 Inf:

At 0720 hrs this unit helilifted to LZ 101. The LZ was cold. The airlift was completed at 0739 hrs. At 0924 hrs the unit appropriated 4 sampans to aid in checking all the canal systems. The company searched the entire day but could not make contact with the VC reported earlier. At 1600 hrs the unit moved back to XT 540120 to set up their night defensive positions. Three ambushes were set up around their perimeter at XT 545120, XT 541113, and XT 536113.

B Co, 2/27 Inf:

At 0800 hrs the unit commenced its sweep along Axis SIX. At 0845 hrs one VCS was pulled out of a hole at XT 495080. At 0907 hrs, snipers could be heard firing at two C-130 airplanes flying low at XT 462048. At 1030 hrs a VCS with one eye was picked up at XT 472055. At 1110 hrs sniper fire was received at XT 476058. Artillery and 4.2 mortar missions were fired on the sniper's location until the firing ceased. At 1246 hrs B Co arrived back inside the bn perimeter and turned in the two VCS to the bn POW compound for further interrogation. At 1300 hrs they helilifted to XT 535104 to aid A Co in finding the suspected uniformed VC platoon. At 1521 hrs, one soldier was wounded by a booby trap at XT 526108. He was evacuated at 1525 hrs by C & C ship to the CU CHI Hospital. At 1613 hrs, a booby trapped grenade was destroyed at XT 526114. The company returned at 1700 hrs to the bn perimeter. Two ambushes were established by 2010 hrs, at XT 496089 and XT 499079. At 2140 hrs the southern flank of the B Co perimeter received five rifle grenades. The grenades fell approximately 50 meters short of the actual front line perimeter. Two snipers also fired from this general vicinity. M-79's were fired with unknown results.

Engineers:

The road from BAO TRAI to DUC HUE (XT 435071) was cleared by 1048 hrs. Two roadblocks were found. The one at XT 484094 was made up of branches. The other at XT 465087 was made up of several dirt mounds. During the day more work was done on the base camp interior road system. The US Army advisors at BAO TRAI were assisted by advice on a better draining system for their area.

Security Platoon:

This element had the mission of securing the road from the bn perimeter to DUC HUE. At 1110 hrs one minor WIA was suffered by a booby trap at the bridge at XT 473090. The injured man was evacuated back to the Battalion Aid Station. At 1155 hrs elements from the platoon found and destroyed 5 booby trapped grenades at XT 472090. The entire platoon established an ambush at XT 483093 at 2120 hrs. 4.2 mortar defensive concentrations were fired around the ambush site.

2d Plat, C, 1/5 (M):

The platoon left on its sweep at 0700 hrs. They moved to Obj FOX with no contact. At 1100 hrs they moved to a blocking position at XT 505105 in conjunction with A Co's movement. At 1225 hrs the unit was released when 3d Plat, A Trp, 3/4 Cav arrived at the bn location.

3d Plat, A Trp, 3/4 Cav:

This unit arrived with the resupply convoy at 1225 hrs at the bn perimeter. At 1300 hrs, the unit moved north towards AP HEN LONG to coordinate their sweep with B Co.

Recon Platoon:

During the day the platoon continued its security missions with the engineers at the PT outpost and on the morning sweep. Security was also provided the MEDCAP team. During the night the platoon continued to occupy its defensive position at XT 510077. At 2110 hrs small arms fire was received from XT 507073 from four or five chipora. Also, four rifle grenades hit around the platoon positions. The suspected VC location was fired on by the 4.2 mortars. The sniper firing ceased.

Civilian Affairs:

The bn surgeon examined and treated 103 villagers from AP RUNG DAU (1). This brought the total treatments to 1030. Another "County Fair" was being planned for the 4th of July in HIEP HON. The bn employed 50 civilian laborers from AP SO DO to fill sandbags for the bn perimeter.

PSYWAR operations continued in the area, (numerous leaflet drops and occasional broadcasts). Leaflet Job Order #153 was dropped along the river today. Also Chieu Hoi leaflets were passed out in Ban My (AP RUNG DAU (1)).

25 June 1966:

As shown by Oral Order #13 (Appendix 13, Annex A) the plan for the bn on this day was for A Co to continue S & D operations in AO SWAMPY but to be prepared for an airlift back to base camp late in the day. 3d Plat, A, 3/4 Cav again provided security (south flank for A Co.). B, 2/27 was to conduct S & D operations along Axis B&D and C, 2/27 was to conduct a sweep along Axis AMOS. The Recon Platoon, middies, Security Platoon, and engineers were to conduct their daily SOP missions within the bn AO.

A Co, 2/27 Inf:

At 0800 hrs, the company began a sweep to the west in AO SWAMPY. At 1340 hrs a dud butterfly bomb was destroyed at XT 515109. With no further action during the day, the company moved back to their CP area at XT 540120. At 1925 hrs approximately 7 small arms rounds were received into the A Co perimeter from XT 544117. Immediately M-79 rounds were fired into the area and the sniper firing ceased. Three ambushes were

established around the perimeter at XT 543115, XT 543120, and XT 535115. The ambushes were all in position at 2010 hrs.

B Co, 2/27 Inf:

At 0900 hrs the company began their sweep along Axis BAD. At 1055 hrs, 4 civilians were questioned at XT 475065. They provided information that a number of VC passed through the location moving south, they were on foot and it took 15 minutes for them to pass. At 1232 hrs some expended carbine cartridges were found at XT 477061. One male civilian was also picked up at this location and detained for further questioning. At 1301 hrs, sniper fire was received from XT 487068. Artillery (105mm) and 4.2 mortars went into action and fired approximately 35 rounds on the sniper's location. The sniper firing ceased. At 1435 hrs, sniper firing was again received at XT 491078. This time the company commander ordered a stay behind ambush to go into effect. While the company moved on ahead, the artillery fired one round at a continuous rate behind the snipers position. With the artillery falling behind him and the unit supposedly moving out of the area, the confused VC walked in the direction of the company and walked right into the stay behind ambush. The VC was killed, papers proved him to be a fairly important VC recruiting cadre member. At this same location two VCS were picked up and used to carry the dead VC back to base camp. The captured materials consisted of 1 carbine, 1 pistol belt, a flashlight, a hammock, and some documents. At 16025 hrs, a platoon-sized killer team was in position at XT 502073. The mission of the killer team was not to serve as an ambush but to act as a reaction force to eliminate snipers.

C Co, 2/27 Inf:

C Co had no contact during their sweep along Axis AMOS. Three VCS were picked up at 1535 hrs at XT 442081. The company moved back at 1600 hrs to continue its defense of the sugar mill area.

Recon Platoon:

The daily road clearing mission with the engineers was completed from DUC HUE to BAO TRAI at 0900 hrs. Security was given to the MEDCAP team at AP SO DO and the water trailer convey going to BAO TRAI. A reconnaissance was made of the area from where the sniper firing was received the night before, but nothing could be found.

Security Platoon:

During the day this unit outposted the road from DUC HUE to XT 495097. By 2100 hrs two ambushes were positioned outside the bn perimeter at XT 494087 and XT 498087.

Engineers:

The base camp interior road construction was completed. The improvement of the main road from the base camp to BAO TRAI was also completed.

Civil Affairs:

The bn surgeon examined and treated 90 villagers in AP SO DO. A total of 1120 villagers had been treated up to this time during Operation FRESNO. The bn hired 51 civilian laborers to fill sandbags. Plans were made for the Vietnamese barbers (4) to come daily to cut hair in the bn base camp. 5000 leaflets were dropped through out the bn AO and more leaflets

drops were scheduled for the 26th, 27th, and 30th of June. The 969 leaflet, offering money for information leading to the capture of weapons or soldiers, was dropped in the AO.

26 June 1966:

The plan for the day was in accordance with Appendix 14, Annex A. A, 2/27 was to continue to S & D in AO SWAMPY and be prepared to move by air to the bn forward CP. B, 2/27 was to sweep along Axis HOPELESS and be prepared for an airmove to bn forward CP to take the place of B Co.

A Co, 2/27 Inf:

At 0900 hrs the unit commenced operations in AO SWAMPY by moving to the west of their CP location. At 0935 hrs a tunnel and a booby trapped grenade were found and destroyed at XT 543119. At 1018 hrs, sniper fire was received from XT 545118, a distance of 250 meters. The company employed fire and maneuver until they reached the sniper's area. The sniper could not be found but expended M1 and carbine cartridges were lying around the area. Also trenches with overhead cover were found extending from XT 547112 to XT 547117. At 1113 hrs two booby traps were found and destroyed at XT 548116. In the same area a hut was found occupied by a woman with a child. Additional carbine and M1 expended casings were found. Civilians questioned at this location reported that 10 VC in green uniforms with steel pots were in the area earlier. When a helicopter had flown over the area earlier the VC hid in a schoolhouse and told the civilians to stay inside their homes or they would be shot. At 1144 hrs two WIA's were suffered from booby traps at XT 556117. The wounded were evacuated by Dustoff at 1153 hrs. The company completed its sweep at 1530 hrs and prepared for the air extraction. The extraction began at 1600 hrs to bn base camp and was completed at 1621 hrs. At 2317 hrs 2 VC were sighted through the starlight device approximately 200 meters in front of the company perimeter. The VC were moving parallel to the company front. M-79's were fired at this location. The VC dispersed.

B Co, 2/27 Inf:

The unit began its sweep to the south at 0800 hrs. At 0910 hrs four villagers were questioned at XT 490074. They stated that six armed VC had passed through the area heading west to east at 0800 hrs on 25 June. The company returned to the bn perimeter at 1115 hrs and prepared for the air move back to CU CHI. At 1545 hrs B Co completed their airlift.

C Co, 2/27 Inf:

At 0800 hrs the company commenced its sweep to the south of the sugar mill. The company captured one VCS at XT 42920635. The VCS was turned over to the Special Forces at DUC HUE. The sweep was completed at 1045 hrs. The company commenced the airlift to the bn forward area at 1538 hrs and completed it at 1545 hrs. They assumed the B Co portion of the perimeter.

3d Plat, A Co, 3/4 Cav:

The platoon with the GO team attached moved through the AP GIONG VOI area beginning at 0800 hrs. Many civilians were encountered and questioned but no enemy contact was made. The platoon returned at 1350 hrs. At 1430 hrs, four APC's from the platoon left for A Co's area to secure the FE and to carry out some of the barrier material which could not be taken by helicopters. They returned at 1700 hrs.

Engineers:

The engineers with the Recon Platoon cleared the road from BAO TRAI to DUC HUR. Because of the heavy rains during the night road construction and improvement operations were set back a few days, but the unit continued to advise the ARVN PF on construction of AP SO DO outpost. Security was provided by the Recon Platoon.

Security Platoon:

During the day this element scoured the bn CP area, and conducted care and maintenance. A platoon ambush was established at XT 475088 at 2255 hrs.

Civil Affairs:

The bn surgeon initiated a sick call for the local civilians living within the perimeter. Twenty civilians were treated. Five women and six children walked into the A Co CP area requesting medical aid. After treatment they gave out information about VC activities. Secured by the Recon Platoon the MEDCAP team went to AP RUNG DAU (1) and treated 22 civilians. The Battalion Communications Platoon continued its English classes to the 15 Vietnamese children who attended daily. The platoon fed the children every noon meal. Leaflets were passed out to the indigenous population within the local area telling them not to let the VC use their houses and farms to fight the US from. If so their houses would be fired upon.

27 June 1966:

The plan for this day was to have a combined ARVN-US operation as per Oral Order #15. Two Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) companies with Special Forces Advisors were to establish a blocking position while A and C Co's, 2/27 made a sweep to trap any VC in the area. 3d Plat, A Trp, 3/4 Cav was to establish a blocking position on the northeast flank to catch any VC fleeing in this direction.

Operation SUNFLOWER commenced at 0500 hrs when the engineer platoon outposted the A Co perimeter, HHC outposted the C Co perimeter and A, 2/27 and C, 2/27 moved to the PZ. At 0505 hrs the mortar/artillery preparations were fired on LZ 2-A and LZ 1-C. 12 white phosphorous rounds (155mm) were fired on the west bank of the Oriental River to provide a smoke screen for the airmobile assault. This proved extremely effective. At 0611 hrs C Co was lifted from PZ YE to LZ 1-C. A Co lifted off PZ YE at 0617 hrs and landed at LZ 2-A at 0622 hrs. At 0634 hrs the two companies were linked up and prepared to move forward in their S & D operations. At 0640 hrs the CIDG companies were in their blocking position approximately 500 meters short of the planned block. (Appendix 15, Annex A). This was due to extensive booby traps in their area of advance. The 3/4 Cav Platoon established its blocking position at XT 480070. This element was unable to go any further south due to the water in the rice paddies. At 0700 hrs the Cav Platoon swept around a marked mine field at XT 483078. At 0707 hrs A & C, 2/27 began detailed search of the RACH NHUM area. At 0820 hrs a camouflaged house capable of holding 10 - 15 people was searched and destroyed by A Co at XT 471049. At 1015 hrs C Co found three 5 gallon cans and two ammo cans containing VC documents. One homemade pistol was also found at this location (XT 467045). At 1106 hrs, A Co destroyed two houses at XT 468052. At 1143 hrs some well built bunkers with firing positions were destroyed at XT 468051. At 1159 hrs the CIDG units were fired on from XT 464045. Artillery was fired on this location and the sniper firing ceased. At 1209 hrs, C Co found a carpenter set, 100 lbs of rice, 12 M-79

rounds and 12 butterfly bombs at XT 464045. Everything was destroyed. At 1216 hrs 20 VC were spotted by the CIDG units. An artillery mission was called in on the VC location. The VC could not be located again. At 1228 hrs, 3d Plat, A Trp, 3/4 Cav questioned local civilians in their blocking position (XT 467045) and ascertained that 20 VC had been operating in the area via XT 456047. At 1240 hrs A Co destroyed a well constructed bunker at XT 456049. At 1500 hrs, A & C, 2/27 reached the CIDG blocking position. At this time A & C, 2/27 reversed their direction and moved back towards their respective PF's for the air extraction to base camp. Due to the nonavailability of aircraft A & C, 2/27 had to walk back to the bn base camp. The companies completed this movement at 1920 hrs without contact. Four squad-size ambushes were established around the bn perimeter by 2155 hrs. Throughout the day grenades were periodically dropped into the water along the canal banks to flush out any VC hiding there. There were no direct results determined.

Indirect Fire Support:

Rounds fired during the preparation (0550-0555 hrs)

32d Arty (8 in)	11 HE rounds
13 th Arty (155mm)	12 WP, 12 HE
8th Arty (105mm)	30 HE
2/27 4.2 mortar	12 HE

Recon Platoon:

This unit completed its road clearing mission from DUC HUE to BAO TRAI at 0930 hrs. The engineers at the PF outpost and the MEDCAP team at AP SO DO were given security by this element.

Civil Affairs:

The bn surgeon treated 93 villagers in AP SO DO. Plans for the 3d County Fair to be held at HIEP HOA on 4 July commenced. The Bn Commo Platoon continued its English classes.

Chieu Hoi leaflets was distributed from coordinates XT 4701 to XT 4704 to XT 4606 and from XT 4511 to XT 4235. Also the 969 was dropped from XT 4609 to XT 4613. These leaflets seem to be paying off as the bn has had several Chieu Hoi's come in during this operation.

28 June 1966:

In accordance with Oral Order #16, Operation GEMMER was planned so that the bn could conduct a combined S & D operation with the ARVN 51st Ranger Bn. The 51st Bn was to hold in a blocking position to the west of HIEP HOA. 3/A/3/4 Cav moved out at 1200 hrs and reached their position at 1240 hrs. At 1155 hrs C & A, 2/27 moved to the objective area along with the GO team. C & A companies began their sweep at 1350 hrs. At 1455 hrs 3/A/3/4 Cav picked up 4 VCS. A Co located 400 lbs of rice at XT 469062. It was left in place. At 1511 hrs a badly burned VC was located at XT 476099. He was evacuated to the bn base camp along with his wife and sister. After he was given medical aid, all of them were interrogated. At 1555 hrs, booby trap signs, but no actual booby traps, were located at XT 461101. The operation ended at 1615 hrs at which time the 51st Ranger Bn was released. All 2/27 elements closed back into base camp at 1715 hrs. By 2115 hrs four ambush points and one platoon size ambush were located around the bn perimeter. The Security Platoon ambush was located at XT 489075.

Recon Platoon:

This unit completed its SOP road clearing mission from DUC HUE to

BAO TRAI at 1120 hrs then proceeded to secure the engineer advisory team at AP SO DO and the MEDCAP team at AP RUNG DAU (1).

Civil Affairs:

81 villagers were treated at AP RUNG DAU (1). The bn S-5 made a reconnaissance of the HIEP FOA area in order to submit plans for the County Fair scheduled there on 4 July 1966.

3000 of the 969 leaflet were distributed from XT 5003 to XT 4807. This leaflet has been distributed over the entire AO at least once.

29 June 1966:

The plan for this day was to conduct care and maintenance with specific emphasis on improvement of the bunkers and wire barrier along the bn perimeter. Night operations were planned for as per Oral Order # 17.

The Recon Platoon, along with an engineer team, conducted its daily road clearance mission beginning at 290800 hrs. At 0834 hrs, the Recon Platoon located a road block (XT 5175062). The road block was checked for mines. None were discovered and the roadblock was cleared. By 1158 hrs the Recon Platoon and the engineer team had completed clearing the road from DUC HUE to BAO TRAI.

During the morning the companies conducted care and maintenance of equipment, improved defensive positions, and prepared for night operations. Emphasis was placed on the improvement of individual fighting positions. The engineers continued construction of the triple concertina wire barrier around the battalion perimeter. At 1215 hrs the battalion received a report from the Sector TOC that a woman reported that her husband, a VC platoon leader, wanted to turn himself in. At 1218 hrs the battalion requested two helicopters for use in exploiting the woman's information. At 1233 hrs C Co was given a warning order to prepare three platoons for a mission. A Co was told to be prepared to assist C Co. At 1240 hrs a request was made for two gunships to support the operation. At 1245 hrs the Bn CO and S3 went to the Sector TOC to be briefed on the woman's information and to coordinate the exploitation of this information. At 1310 hrs A & C Company and 3/A/3/4 Cav were briefed on the execution of the operation. The plan was to airlift a platoon from A & C Co to blocking positions on the east and west of AP CU LAO TRE (1), A on the east, C on the west. The remainder of each company was to follow on foot to reinforce the platoon blocking position. 3/A/3/4 Cav was to move north along the road and establish a block to the north of AP CU LAO TRE (1) XT 501105 to XT 504104. At 1320 hrs the 1st lift of the C Co platoon left the LZ reaching the LZ at 1323 hrs, the 2d lift of the C Co platoon was completed at 1329 hrs. The A Co platoon airlifted out at 1335 hrs reaching the LZ at 1339 hrs. At 1340 hrs A/3/3/4 Cav departed the bn perimeter to move to its blocking position. At 1346 hrs the remainder of A & C Co's departed to reinforce the airlifted platoons. The wife of the VC platoon leader was brought from BAO TRAI to the Bn CP and was transferred to an APC. The APC moved out at 1408 hrs toward the location of her house. The AP CU LAO TRE (1) village was surrounded at 1423 hrs and all escape routes were sealed. At 1410 hrs A/3/3/4 Cav reported the possibility of an ambush located at XT 493133. Investigation by helicopter disclosed a number of persons in the reeds along the road. Gunships were requested but when they flew over the area no persons were sighted. The area was to be subjected to H & I fires during the night. The units were instructed to start moving south to the new location that the woman recognized as her home. At 1530 hrs C Co picked up two VCS vicinity XT 502104, the two VCS were brought to the Battalion IFW compound when the companies returned to

the battalion perimeter. At 1540 hrs, the two gunships supporting the operation sighted four men on bicycles at NT 511078, the ships fired two warning bursts, but the four men failed to stop. The third burst of fire hit the lead man, the other three continued on. An element of the bn Recon Platoon picked up the wounded VC and brought him back to the Battalion Aid Station where he died. The remainder of the platoon pursued the three fleeing VC and captured two of them when they attempted to join a funeral procession at NT 521063. As the companies moved south, A Co captured 1 VCS at NT 513091 at 1633 hrs. He was taken to the IFW compound when the company returned to the battalion perimeter. The companies surrounded the village of TAN HX from the 10 grid line south with A Co on the south, C Co on the north, the two companies swept through the village. C Co captured another VCS at 1727 hrs at NT 521102. The companies prepared to air extract to the bn perimeter at 1800 hrs, with the A Co PZ located NT 552120 and the C Co PZ at NT 519099. The extraction began at 1800 hrs and was complete at 1833 hrs.

Civil Affairs:

The MEDCAP team treated a total of 206 persons at HIMP HOA. Security was provided by the Security Platoon. A total of 15 villagers from outlying areas were treated at the bn aid station. The bn AO was covered with leaflets (aerial leaflet drop) asking the residents to turn in information pertaining to the capture of VC weapons. Money was offered as a reward for this information.

30 June 1956:

During the day training and preparation was to be the key for the night offensive operations. (Appendix 18, Annex A).

While A & C Co, 2/27 were conducting care and maintenance the 3d Plat, A Tro, 3/4 Cav continued the search in TAN HX for the VC platoon leader who wished to give himself up. At 0900 hrs the VC platoon leader had given himself up and gave his weapon to the Cav platoon leader. He indicated that there were four VC in tunnels in the area. At this time one platoon from A Co was airlifted to the objective area to assist in the search of the VC. The VC platoon leader pointed out four VC who were captured and airlifted back to the bn base camp at 1027 hrs. At 1100 hrs a tunnel system was searched and found to contain some documents. At 1212 hrs one bolt action rifle and five VC were taken from a tunnel at NT 523098. At 1240 hrs they were airlifted back to the bn IFW compound. At 1310 hrs, one AT mine and one AP mine were destroyed at NT 517103. Five grenades and assorted items of web gear were captured at NT 523098. The elements then returned to the bn perimeter.

A composite group made up of the engineers, the GO team, and the Security Platoon had the mission of filling in trenches to the east of the bn perimeter. The engineers provided the bulldozer, the GO team obtained and controlled civilian laborers for the project and the Security Platoon provided the security for the whole group. The bn utilized two platoon sized ambush patrols at NT 489076 and NT 515083.

Civil Affairs:

The bn aid station treated 24 civilians. 1250 lbs of rice were received from USMID for distribution during the 4 July County Fair. 2000 Chieu Hoi leaflets were distributed from NT 4308 to NT 4310. These leaflet drops are married up with the operation as much as can be. So far during the operation propaganda has proved to be a successful weapon.

1 July 1966:

The plan for this day is as shown in Annex 20, Annex A.

C Co, 2/27 Inf:

At 0924 hrs one platoon left the bn perimeter to conduct S & D operations in the village of AP DONG HOK (2) and the CAU RICK ANHIN canal to the west of the village. At XT 486098 a large hole was discovered camouflaged under a haystack but it contained nothing. At 1545 hrs after a thorough search of this canal and village areas the platoon returned to base camp.

3/A/3/4 Cav:

This element together with the Security Platoon and an engineer bulldozer departed the bn area at 0904 hrs and moved to the village of AP CAU HUBO. Their mission was to fill in the trench systems in the area. As the Cav Platoon moved along route Castle, elements of the Security Platoon were dropped off to insure continual security of this route. By 1330 hrs 700 meters of trenches had been filled and it was decided at this time to bring this element back to base camp.

Indirect Fire Support (M & I Fires) (Suspected VC locations):

Artillery (105mm) 2 rounds per target.

Coordinates

XT 45990458
XT 47020351
XT 47730252
XT 46530465
XT 47110272
XT 46950408
XT 47350256

A Co, 2/27 Inf:

At 0850 hrs one platoon of A Co departed the bn perimeter to continue searching the southern flank of TAM MY. At 0930 hrs the platoon reached the objective area just as a VC emerged from the woods with his hands up at XT 517097. This VC gave the names of 11 other VC, seven of which had already been captured on 30 June. At 1008 hrs the platoon located approximately 5000 lbs of rice concealed beneath a false floor. The rice was bagged and evacuated to Dde HQ's for use in the Civil Affairs program. At 1415 hrs a three level tunnel system was located and destroyed at XT 521100. At 1546 hrs, a school used for training VC was located and destroyed at XT 521101. The platoon returned to the bn perimeter at 1725 hrs.

Civil Affairs:

94 civilians were treated by the MEDCAP team at AP SO DO.

2 July 1966:

The plan for this day was to conduct operations as shown in Appendix 21, Annex A. Essentially a great deal of emphasis was to be placed on improvement of the bunker/barrier line around the bn perimeter, and care and maintenance of weapons, vehicles, and equipment. Elements conducting S & D operations, were to continue emphasis on filling in all trenches and foxholes encountered in the BN AO.

At 0700 hrs, C Co departed the base camp and at 0740 hrs an injured boy was found at XT 472075 and evacuated to the bn aid station for treatment. At 1040 hrs this unit filled in foxholes along a possible VC withdrawal route. 30 foxholes were filled in at XT 476076. The rest of the day was spent searching for mines with the mine detector teams from the engineers.

At 0900 hrs the Security Platoon departed base camp with the GO team to go to the village of AP TAN HOI (2). The platoon surrounded the village while the GO team conducted Psy/War activities. The Recon Platoon was shown a dud 60mm mortar round at XT 518061 by some children from AP SO DO. The round was destroyed in place. The road clearing mission and security for the engineer advisors and MEDCAP team were accomplished as planned.

The 3d Platoon, A Trp, 3/4 Cav with a rifle platoon from A Co, 2/27 attached (and a bulldozer) departed base camp to fill in more trench systems. The rifle platoon outposted the return route for the Cav platoon. At 1117 hrs one AT mine was destroyed at XT 512100. One minor WIA was suffered from a booby trap (XT 512100). Trafficability of tracked vehicles in this area was very limited. At 1200 hrs artillery (20 HE delay rounds) was fired at a suspected VC ammo cache (XT 56150497).

Civil Affairs:

71 persons were treated by the MEDCAP team in the village of AP RUNG DAU (1). Five bags of rice and 10 sets of women's clothing were distributed to families living within the battalion perimeter.

Flight Activities:

Five ambush points were employed around the bn perimeter. The bn utilized three Lightning Bug missions (2100 hrs, 2200 hrs, and 0100 hrs). Around 2200 hrs small arms fire was received from XT 489174, XT 460190, XT 480193, and XT 550227. The gunships engaged these targets, results unknown.

3 July 1966:

For this day, as on 2 July, work was continued on the concertina and bunkers along the bn perimeter. Emphasis was placed on training on day and night ambush and counter-ambush techniques, tunnel running, and the Bangalore-Claymore technique for clearing paths through booby trapped areas.

Because of the heavy rain fall during this period, the capabilities of the Cav Platoon and the bulldozer teams were limited to only the higher areas. Also much of the heavy equipment and many of the vehicles were sent back to CU CHI in anticipation of more flooded areas at the bn forward base camp. One platoon from A Co filled in 300 meters of trenches in the TAN HI area. One platoon from C Co filled in 50 foxholes at XT 482063. Local villagers in this area were questioned and it was determined that 30 VC had passed through the village of AP GIANG VOI moving south during the night of 2-3 July. The Security Platoon spent the day at AP NOI with the GO team conducting a search, a census, and gathering information.

The Recon Platoon conducted its SOP missions of road clearing and security for the engineers and the MEDCAP teams. At 1315 hrs, while the platoon was escorting the MEDCAP team to HIEP HEM a command detonated mine exploded between two of the Recon vehicles (XT 484094). The Recon Platoon began a thorough search of the area and located the wires used to detonate the mine. While following the wires one man was injured by

a booby trap attached to the wire (XT 483095). The wire led to a house XT 483095 in which there were two women. They were brought to the IFW compound for questioning. At 1315 hrs the Recon Platoon was joined by one platoon from A Co to help in the search. A total of 7 more detainees were brought back to the Bn IFW compound for questioning. At 1450 hrs one man was injured by a booby trapped grenade. As he picked up the one grenade there was another one underneath.

Civil Affairs:

MEDCAP was held in AP 30 DO, with 116 villagers being treated. This brings the total number of villagers on Operation FRESHO to 1736. Leaflet (Job Order #46) drops were made from XT 4909 to XT 5411. This leaflet explains to the people about the better GVN life as compared to the VC.

4 July 1966:

Operation INDEPENDENCE (Appendix 22, Annex A) was to be the second "County Fair" operation in the Bn AO and was to be a combined ARVN-US effort. This time it was to be conducted at HIEP HOA much in the same manner as the last county fair on 23 Jun (Appendix 11, Annex A).

Earlier in the day at 0210 hrs the Lightning Bug technique was being utilized in the Bn AO. The ship with the lights drew fire at XT 448101. Artillery (12 HE) was fired on the target.

At 0634 hrs the 4/49 (ARVN) commenced its airmobile assault to surround and seal off the village of HIEP HOA. The village was sealed off at 0736 hrs. At 0630 hrs the 2d Plat, B, 1/5 (M), with the engineer teams, commenced to clear the road to HIEP HOA. At 0715 hrs a grenade was found and destroyed at XT 485096 (on the road).

One platoon from A Co and one platoon from C Co outposted the road from the Bn perimeter to HIEP HOA. At 0815 hrs the GO team along with the Security Platoon and the Bn S-5 went to HIEP HOA. The GO team spent the day taking a census of the village, checking ID cards, and questioning the local populace on VC activities in the area. They also distributed 150 GVN agricultural instruction pamphlets. The Security Platoon was on hand to control the people and prevent any VC terrorist activities from taking place. At 1000 hrs the GVN cultural team made their presentation. Two bands played continuously in different places in the village. A speech was given by Major NHA, the HAU NGHIA Province Chief. The MEDCAP team treated 219 villagers. The 25th Div "Helping Hand" items consisting of four boxes (3 x 4 x 4) of clothes, two boxes of toys, 500 cans of food, and 1200 lbs of rice, were distributed to the villagers. While the County Fair was going on in HIEP HOA, one platoon from A Co filled in 400 meters of trenches and filled in a tunnel one hundred meters long in the TAN MY area. One platoon from C Co destroyed one bunker and filled in 20 foxholes at XT 488050.

H & I Fires:

<u>Coord</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Rounds</u>	<u>Target</u>
XT 448101	105mm	12 HE	Suspected VC position
XT 420087	105mm	18 HE	Suspected VC position
XT 513120	4.2 in	12 HE	Suspected VC position
XT 448108	105mm	9 HE quick	Suspected VC position
		9 HE delay	
XT 487049	4.2 in	6 HE quick	Suspected VC position
		6 HE delay	
XT 447098	155mm	2 HE	Suspected VC position
XT 436081	105mm	4 HE	Suspected VC position

5 July 1966:

During the night of 4-5 July a total of five ambushes were employed around the bn AO. Each company utilized two ambushes and the Security Platoon employed one ambush to the front of the artillery bn. The A Co ambushes departed between 2030 hrs and 2045 hrs; C Co ambushes departed between 2045 hrs and 2100 hrs; the Security Platoon departed at 2050 hrs; all were in position by 2115 hrs. There was negative enemy contact during the night and they returned to the bn perimeter at 050630 July.

At 2010 hrs the C Co perimeter received approximately 20 SA sniper rounds from the southwest of their position. Illumination and HE mortar fire was fired on the suspected VC location. At 2012 hrs the Recon Platoon, in its defensive position via XT 510077, sighted approximately 12 VC moving west XT 509061. The platoon also received 50 to 60 sniper rounds. The platoon returned the fire with M-79's and mortar fire. A Co also received two rifle grenades short of their perimeter, the rounds were fired from XT 505080. This area was immediately taken under fire by the company 81 mm mortars, results unknown.

On 5 July the 2/27 Inf extracted from its forward base camp by motor convoy. The moving of vehicles from their protected positions was overcome by utilizing VIB's and APO's to extract the vehicles from the mud. The convoy was assembled by 1620 hrs and started moving at 1625 hrs. The convoy made the move from the forward base camp to the CU CHI base camp without incident and closed at 1712 hrs. All elements started care and maintenance activities and a platoon of B Co prepared for an eagle flight on 6 Jul 66.

6 July 1966:

Although the entire bn had moved back into base camp at CU CHI, Operation FRESNO was to continue. The reasons for moving back to CU CHI were: vehicular difficulties due to mud, need to man two perimeters (CU CHI and forward base), shortage of forces which could be committed at night due to manning two perimeters; and health and welfare of the troops (most of forward area was under water).

On this day, the 3d Platoon of B Co conducted an immobile assault at 0800 hrs into IE 1 (XT 505085) (Appendix B4, Annex A). At 0830 hrs the GO team was airlifted from BAO TRAI to link up with the B Co platoon. The entire element swept through the old forward base camp area. Questioning of the local populace revealed that a large VC force (possibly company size) had passed through the area moving in a southeasterly direction. At 1200 hrs the 3d platoon with the GO team airlifted from IE 1 to the village of AP QAY QUO (XT 541115). The platoon swept east then south through the village area. From all indications the VC trench systems that had previously been filled in by the bn had not been touched by the VC. One booby trap was located and destroyed at XT 538110.

Civil Affairs:

At 0800 hrs the bn MEDCAP team airlifted to the Special Forces camp at BUC HUE. From there the team was escorted by the Special Forces to HUP HUA. 409 persons were treated (the largest daily total). The MEDCAP team left at 1600 hrs for airlift back to CU CHI. A loudspeaker message was given in the BAO TRAI area informing the population of unlawful deeds committed by the VC. Also it explained the goals and purposes of the GVN and why the US is here.

7 July 1966:

In compliance with Oral Order #25, one platoon from C Co departed CU CHI Airfield at 0620 hrs for LZ MED. At 0651 hrs the platoon was on Obj 1. At 0733 hrs two VCS were captured at XT 462109. At 0830 hrs the platoon picked up three VCS at XT 463109. At 0930 hrs a helicopter transported them all to BAO TRAI for further questioning. At 1144 hrs the unit moved to Obj #3 and conducted a thorough search. At 1315 hrs they airlifted back to CU CHI.

8 July 1966:

Civil Affairs:

The MEDCAP team along with the Security Platoon conducted operations in AP SO DO and AP RUNG DAU (1). (Appendix 26, Annex A). The MEDCAP team arrived at AP SO DO at 0900 hrs and worked until 1200 hrs, treating 164 people. At 1200 hrs they moved to AP RUNG DAU (1) where they treated 150 villagers. At 1500 hrs they were airlifted back to the Division helipad.

9 July 1966:

In accordance with Oral Order #27 the Recon and Security Platoons airlifted to HIEP HOA at 1230 hrs. While the Division MEDCAP team (to include one dentist) treated civilians in HIEP HOA, the Security Platoon together with the GO team from BAO TRAI conducted S & P missions through Objective HORNE (Appendix 27, Annex A). All units had returned to CU CHI by 1630 hrs.

10 July 1966:

For today the combined forces of C Co, the Security Platoon, the Recon Platoon and the GO team were to conduct S & D operations as shown by Appendix 28, Annex A. The units were airlifted into LZ's 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 from the CU CHI Army Airfield in three lifts at 0603 hrs, and 0649 hrs. The three lifts were on their respective LZ's by 0658 hrs. Sniper fire was received at LZ 3. The gunships suppressed this fire. All elements were on Obj FOX at 0714 hrs. The GO team conducted its operations throughout the area. At 0845 hrs the GO team picked up one VCS at XT 485055. At 0850 hrs C Co received sniper fire from XT 485055. This resulted in one WIA. Dustoff evacuated the man to CU CHI. At 0900 hrs an agent report was received that a VC platoon was located at XT 483037. Two gunships were sent to this location to check it out. The gunships drew fire at 1051 hrs from XT 472029 and XT 478037. Both areas were taken under fire. At 1030 hrs C Co picked up one VCS and 6 VCS at XT 478057. They were returned to BAO TRAI for further interrogation. At 1600 hrs C Co suffered one KIA at XT 479048 from sniper fire. By 1647 hrs all elements had airlifted back to CU CHI.

Civil Affairs:

234 villagers were treated at ICM DUC HANH A (XT 575075) and B (XT 567065) by the MEDCAP team. The battalion surgeon controlled a convoy to DUC HANH and after setting up his security, he began treating patients. MEDCAP has proved and is proving to be a valuable aid to the US forces in their pacification mission.

11 July 1966:

The combined ARVN-US operation for today was to take place as shown in Appendix 29, Annex A. At 0605 hrs A Co began their airlift.

to the objective area. After two lifts at 0644 hrs, the airlift was complete. At 0713 hrs the objective area was encircled. At 0830 hrs, A Co linked up with the (ARVN) 51st Ranger Bn. The Ranger Bn completed the sweep through the objective area at 1052 hrs. After this the 51st Ranger Bn returned to the sugar mill while A Co conducted S & D operations XT 485115. Extraction of A Co commenced at 1404 hrs and was complete by 1503 hrs.

12 July 1966:

This day's operation was to be in accordance with Appendix 30, Annex A. At 0540 hrs, B Co with attachments (Recon Platoon, Security Platoon, 4 National Police, 8 interpreters, 2 engineer demo teams) departed for the Division Helipad. The units were airlifted into LZ's 1 - 7 in three lifts commencing at 0624 hrs. All lifts were on their respective LZ's by 0655 hrs. This operation was conducted, based on the report at 1501 hrs 11 July, from a Rallier from BAO CHANH NA who had turned himself into the ARVN units at BAO TRAI. The information was that the rallier was willing to lead them to a tunnel and VC houses in the village. B Co began to exploit the information by S & D on Obj PASSEY. At 0750 hrs, the wife of a VC soldier was detained at her home for questioning. The Rallier led B Co to a tunnel located at XT 561008. The tunnel was destroyed. The wife of the VC soldier divulged that there were six VC operating within the village. Three additional tunnels were located at XT 573004 and were destroyed. At 0914 hrs, B Co received 5 to 6 rounds of carbine fire at XT 573003. ARVN troops, with Capt THIEN the Sector S2 from BAO TRAI, located the VC leader's home and a tunnel located at XT 561006. Three VCC's were taken from the tunnel by elements of B Co. They were interrogated and found to be a VC district cadre member, a local VC guerrilla, and a VC district Finance Corps member. Three 5 gallon cans of documents were also taken from the tunnel. B Co began extraction at 1449 hrs and completed at 1544 hrs.

13 July 1966:

The Recon Platoon provided security for the MEDCAP team at AP SO DO and AP RUNG DAU (1). A total of 234 people were treated by the team surgeon.

14 July 1966:

The plan for this day was to implement Oral Order #32 as shown in Appendix 32, Annex A.

B Co, 2/27 Inf:

At 0720 hrs, this element landed on LZ 2. As they moved off to the northeast two minor WIA's were suffered from booby traps at XT 415112. Villagers questioned in the immediate area said that the VC had been there earlier in the morning and had told all villagers to stay in their homes as the entire area was going to be booby trapped. All the booby traps that were found during the day were new and freshly dug. At LZ 2, at the same time, an OH-23 took one small arms hit from XT 409112. A total of five more booby traps were located and destroyed on the LZ by 0908 hrs. At 1025 hrs, the unit located what appeared to be a 100 lb bomb, with no fuse, underwater at XT 414135. The bomb was lifted out of the water and destroyed. At 1133 hrs, 9 booby traps were destroyed along the road running from XT 409114 to XT 408140. 3 more booby traps were destroyed at XT 414135. At 1226 hrs B Co had 2 armed VC trying to sneak up on their position at XT 414134. The two personnel were taken under fire with an M-60 machinegun. The VC were actually located approximately 50-100 meters away. A search was immediately begun of the wood line

around XT 414134. 3 more booby traps were found and destroyed at this location as the unit tried to enter the woodline heading southeast. As this search was going on (1256 hrs) 12 sniper rounds were fired on the unit from XT 420130. Artillery was called in on this location, but a thorough search could not produce any VC. At 1350 hrs, one man received fragments from a booby trap at XT 414113. At 1358 hrs, some documents were found at XT 413113. The documents included the name and picture of a VC squad leader who had stepped on his own booby trap and who according to the villagers was at the CHOLON Hospital. The bn 82 took all the information necessary for possible capture of this man. At 1455 hrs the unit was extracted from LZ 1 by airlift back to the Division Helipad. Two of the three minor WIA's were evacuated back to CU CHI by C & C ship. The other WIA remained with the unit.

C Co, 2/27 Inf:

At 0615 hrs this element departed the Division Helipad and by 0651 hrs all elements were on LZ 3 (two lifts). At 1019 hrs a tunnel was found at XT 417159. It was searched then destroyed. Throughout the entire 4115 grid square approximately 50 foxholes were found. Each was destroyed. At 1210 hrs, the unit found one 55 gallon drum of diesel fuel right on the riverline at XT 408160. It was destroyed in place. At 1430 hrs, 12 sampans were destroyed along the canal (RACH BU THAY) from XT 410154 to XT 420154. This element was airlifted back to CU CHI beginning at 1552 hrs and ending at 1627 hrs.

Recon Platoon:

The platoon was airlifted at 0615 hrs to Obj D. At 0845 hrs a U-shaped tunnel 25 feet long, was located at XT 411173. It was destroyed. At 1010 hrs, 5 booby traps were destroyed at XT 408175. The booby traps appeared to be placed around a tunnel and house in the area. Both house and tunnel were destroyed. At 1124 hrs one WIA was suffered from a booby trap. A Dustoff evacuated the man to CU CHI. At 1305 hrs 6 booby traps were destroyed at XT 408175. At 1420 hrs, while the platoon was located at XT 412178, two VC with weapons were spotted at XT 415175. The platoon opened fire and chased them for about 300 meters before they were lost in the woodline. The platoon was airlifted back to the Division Helipad from LZ 4 at 1643 hrs.

Civil Affairs:

The bn MEDCAP team airlifted at 0915 hrs to DUC ME and with security provided by the Special Forces they moved to HIEP HOA Market Place (XT 440056). 209 villagers were treated during the day. The MEDCAP returned to base camp at 1430 hrs. There was a leaflet drop throughout AO FRESNO. Leaflets reemphasized that a reward will be given on any information about VC activities. 540 (5" x 8") lined tablets were received and will be taken to AP SO DO for use in the school there. MEDCAP and distribution of school supplies was accomplished at TAN PHU TRUNG.

12. RESULTS:

a. Friendly

- (1) 27 personnel were casualties (see Annex G).
- (2) 3 vehicles were damaged (see 13 (b) Maintenance).

b. Enemy

(1) 15 VC KIA (Body Count); 10 VC KIA (Possible); 40
VCS; 15 VC: 21 detainees.

c. Material and equipment

(1) Captured:

1 rifle M-1
2 Mausers, model 98 (German)
3 Mosin type bolt action (russian)
1 carbine, US
7 pistol belts
14 ammo pouches
5100 lbs of rice
60 lbs documents
4 canteens
7 flashlights
3 combat packs
2 web gear

(2) Destroyed:

17 hand grenades
20 rifle grenades
14 GBU bomblets
12 M-79 rounds
76 booby traps
18 structures
14 sampans
16 AT mines
4 AP mines
2823 tunnels, trenches, foxholes
1 (55 gal) drum with diesel fuel
miscellaneous clothing

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Supply

Convoys, 21 to forward area (2 received light sniper fire)
21 to CU CHL.

19 Water convoys to BAO MAI and return (3-4 water
trailers per convoy).

Cumulative miles traveled: 2,378 miles, (no accidents)

Direct support resupply by chopper; 3 days, 21 lifts, 25,200 lbs.

Class I:

"B" rations for entire battalion (forward) were delivered
daily by convoy. Companies supplemented these rations with
coke and beer ration.

"C" rations: A 3 day supply of C-rations was on hand
throughout the operation 450 cases (approx).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Ice: Potable 23,000 lbs
Non-potable 69,000 lbs

Sundry Packets: 50 pkts sent forward.

Class II:

Boats, woc 1000 pr
Fatigues, companies resupplied as necessary
Miscellaneous Resupply:
Melting Hand Supplies - 7 "C" boxes
Water Operation - paddles, floats, weather balloons,
underwater
Showers, Latrines
Other

Class III:

POL Ammunition sent forward.
1. Gas 4,975 gal
2. Diesel 1,260 gal
3. Oil 10 gallons 30 wt

Class IV:

Barrier Materials delivered:
Sandbags 150,000
Barbed wire 100 rolls
Concertina 500 rolls
Fence posts 1200
Conexes 2
Scrap lumber PSP 40 sheets

Class V:

1. CTG, 5.56mm ball	73,075
2. CTG, 7.62mm ball	14,310
3. CTG, 7.62mm ball & tracer	27,600
4. CTG, cal 45 ball	658
5. CTG, cal 50 ball/tr	5800
6. CTG, cal 50 spotter/tr	490
7. CTG, 40mm HE	2809
8. CTG, 81mm HE w/PD	206
9. CTG, 81mm Illum	40
10. CTG, 81mm WP	100
11. CTG, 90mm HEAT (RR)	48
12. Gren, hand smk green	50
13. Gren, hand smk red	32
14. Gren, hand smk yellow	48
15. Gren, hand smk violet	40
16. Gren, hand frag	500
17. Bangalore torpedo	20
18. Cratering charge 40 lb	14
19. Gren, hand smk WP	64

* More than double the bn basic load of ammunition was kept on hand at all times.

b. Maintenance

(1) Although many vehicles were utilized to move the bn to the forward base camp, most of these were sent back to CU CMI the first day of the operation. The Recon Platoon and the resupply vehicles in the

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transportation section were the only vehicles that were used constantly.

A 4 man maintenance team was kept on location throughout the operation. Because of the extremely wet and muddy road condition, winches were used extensively to pull out stuck vehicles.

(2) The following is a list of repairs made:

1/4 ton - 2 generators replaced
5 tires replaced
1 radiator repaired

3/4 ton - 1 carburetors repaired
1 radiator repaired
2 water pumps replaced
1 generator replaced
1 fuel pump repaired
3 voltage regulators repaired
24 spark plugs replaced
1 brake adjustment made

2 1/2 ton - 1 air power cylinder repaired
1 water cylinder replaced
2 brake adjustments made
6 winch shear pins replaced

(3) 7 services were performed.

(4) One 1/4 ton was damaged by a mine.

c. Treatment of casualties - The bn forward aid station consisted of the bn surgeon and 6 medics. During the operation 199 patients were examined and treated at the aid station. All of these were for minor wounds, miscellaneous sickness and non-battle injuries. All were returned to duty. 25 patients were evacuated by helicopter to CU CHI. Two Dustoffs were called for and evacuated a total of 2 patients to CU CHI.

d. Medical evacuation - Because of the seriousness of some of the wounds, many casualties were evacuated directly to CU CHI without stopping at the bn aid station. However, a minor MIA was taken directly to the aid station in order that he could be returned to duty as soon as possible. It is essential that a bn aid station be with the bn at all times, especially at night. One night it took 47 minutes for a Dustoff to come to the bn area for a seriously wounded man. Greater reliability was placed on the G & C staff throughout the problem to evacuate all types of casualties.

e. Transportation - The primary means of transportation was by helicopter (air assaults) except for going out to the AO, when co resupply convoys, and when returning to CU CHI. It was necessary for all convoys to have a mechanized rifle platoon and 2 gunships providing escort. Resupply for a short period (3 days) was done by helicopter.

f. Communications - There were no major problems encountered in this problem. The communications setup consisted of wire for primary communication within the bn base camp. However, whenever the bn must operate two base camps, there is a distinct need for 10 additional TA-312's in order not to disrupt garrison operations. The bn maintained radio and RFF contact (125th Signal) with hq. VLF hotlines went from the bn to the located at CU CHI, the 1/8 Artillery located at B&C TRAI, and the 1/27 VFC IT 575035.

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14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. The Bangalore torpedoes-Claymore mine technique used to enter heavily booby trapped and mined areas first devised and utilized during Operation HULL again proved valuable. This method was used extensively to clear paths through booby trapped hedges. This method allowed friendly forces to enter the area without suffering any casualties. It was usually found that whenever the VC had something he didn't want US forces to uncover, headquarters, tunnel system's, supply caches, etc he would completely clear the area with booby traps.

b. Ambushes during the operation were executed nightly at the squad, platoon, and company level. Initially the ambush left the bn perimeter about 2100 hrs because of the established curfew at that time. However it was discovered that the VC used this buffer zone of darkness (which usually 1930 hrs) to roam around outside the perimeter. The technique devised to counteract this was to send the ambush parties out of the bn perimeter before it got dark. Patrols would stop short of their assigned positions and wait until darkness fell. Then they would move to their actual positions. This technique gave the VC less freedom to move during the "buffer time". Also the Province Chief at that time changed the established curfew outside of populated areas to 1930 hrs nightly.

c. During the entire operation, the bn MEDCAP team provided medical treatment to the Vietnamese civilians. The techniques used here was to set up a schedule of where MEDCAP would be held and at what time. As it turned out the MEDCAP team normally rotated between AP NUNG DAU (1), and AP SO DO, and later in the operation added Hiep Hoa. The point is that the villagers could count on receiving medical aid every other day in one of the village areas. In this way people who didn't live in any of the villages mentioned could still come from the outlying area to be examined. An average of 135 people were treated daily throughout the entire operation.

d. Use of mechanized and foot mobile reaction forces for all contingencies; the use of feints, shows of force, and diversionary IZ's; and the use of helicopters to drop in squad and platoon blocking forces to surround an area without any prior warning all added to the success of Operation HULL.

e. Almost daily the bn elements would find VC signs marking areas that were mined or booby trapped. Many times actual mines or booby traps could not be found. Troops had to be cautious and not get complacent and careless. There is a tendency to let down when no mines or booby traps are found.

f. The Engineer Flame APC proved valuable in checking out road-blocks. Every day early in the morning, a road clearing mission was conducted. If a road block was encountered, the flame APC would burn away the tree branches and/or bamboo, thus exposing any booby traps. The booby traps would either be detonated in place or destroyed by the intense heat of the flame.

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15. COMBAT ANALYSIS:

Operation FUSINO was this battalion's first experience with the extended period, area and people oriented mission which emphasized pacification, as differentiated from previous operations, which were usually search and destroy missions of short durations in continually changing areas. These latter operations virtually were conducted in people and intelligence vacuums. The concept proved most promising and has been the source of many reports indicating its potential for future operations. The key to counter-insurgency operations at battalion or any level is valid tactical intelligence on which the units can react as appropriate. Lacking this intelligence and discounting pure blind luck, countless man hours and resources are wasted alternately "using a steamroller to crush an egg in the dark" or committing insufficient resources to do the job. The only reliable formal intelligence capability in the FUSINO area is the one conducted by the Sector S2 at BAO (BAI); the alternative is for the unit to develop its own intelligence, as it always has in the past, by becoming more familiar with an area and its people, the longer it operates there. In effect, the unit becomes area-oriented through countless trials and errors in a specific sector. The pacification concept combines these two, and for the first time this battalion was able to react to valid tactical intelligence, tailor its forces as appropriate, and accomplish its mission with relative ease. The sources were as varied as any complicated job, combining the intelligence gained from Chieu Hoi's, agents, prisoners, etc. This battalion was able to net tangible results -- captured Viet Cong with their weapons and equipment (in theory at least much more important than dead VC body count), weapons, cadres, documents, etc. This was done with considerably less casualties and expenditures of resources than our previous operations have produced. We are enthusiastic about the technique. It holds greater potential than our previous methods of operations.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS:


a. It is essential that at least one engineer platoon be attached to any Battalion Task Force conducting area pacification missions. Road improvement and building of PF outpost and advice on the A.VN forces and Vietnamese people about engineering projects proved vitally important not only for civil affairs but to construction on the forward base camp. The minimum needed is one bulldozer, a grader, a front loader, and two dump trucks.

b. An armored or mechanized infantry element should be attached to any Battalion Task Force on their search and destroy missions to allow greater flexibility, a quick reaction force, and shock action.

c. Close coordination must be maintained with appropriate GVN and A.VN authorities and US Advisors in order that tactical as well as civil affairs operations can be run smoothly and successfully. Daily meetings should be conducted to insure close coordination.

d. The MDDCAP as well as other civil affairs activities such as county fairs, leaflet drops, loudspeaker runs, engineer aid, and the distribution of 25th Div "Helping Hand" items should be greatly emphasized during a pacification operation.

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

Appendices

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
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Appendix 1 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to
(Op FVRSNO) Opal Order #9 14 June 1966 Operation JOURNAL



1. A. No Change
B. No Change
2. 2/27 conducts S & D ops in AO.
3. A Co cross LD 1000 hrs, conduct detailed S & D throughout Obj A.
B Co cross LD 1000 hrs, conduct detailed S & D throughout Obj B.

MEOM



Recon Plat provide security for engineer team on road clearing mission
provide security for MEDCAP, S5, and engineers to AP SO DO.
Security Plat outpost in perimeter.
ERC be prepared to assist Soty Plat in outpost of in perimeter.
Engr/Medics/S5 coordinate civil affairs activities, SO DO.


4. No Change.
5. No Change.

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Appendix 3 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FIGSNO)
Oral Order #3, 16 June 1966, Operation QUAKER

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09
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1. No Change.
2. 2/27 conducts combined S & D op w/ARVN units.
3. 2/27 conducts sweep along axis Blue ARVN forces S & D Obj 1 & on order S & D Obj 2, 3 & 4.
 A/2/27-with attached demo tm & ten ARVN counter-terrorists, crosses at 160900, moves along axis Blue, return route Red.
 D/2/27-w/attached demo tm & Co tm crosses ID 160915, follows A Co & provides scfy for Co tm, return route White.
 A/4/27 (II)-screens left flank of axis Blue.
 1/10 & 4/49-conduct S & D sweep to Obj 1 & on order seize Obj 2, 3 & 4. Return & bring clear road from DAO TRAI to AN RUNG DAU (1).
 Scfy-secure base camp.
 H/4/27 on order assist Scfy Plat in an scfy.
 Medics-conduct MEDCAP AN RUNG DAU (2).
 SOP
 SOP


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Appendix 4 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (OF FUSHO)
Oral Order #4, 17 June 1966, Operation MYSTIC

1. No Change.
2. 2/27 & 4/19-conduct airmobile S & D assaults into IZ 1 & 2, conducts op assigned AO.
3. 2/27-conducts airmobile assault into IZ 1 starting 170755; conducts 3 & D in Obj 1, 2 & 3.
 A/2/27-conducts airmobile assault into IZ 1, 170755; secures east half of Obj A, on order S & D Obj D & C.
 B/2/27-with Go Team conducts airmobile assault IZ 1 170812, secures west half of Obj A, on order S & D Obj D & C.
 Recon clear road to DAO TRI then to AIRFIELD DAU (1), secure engr & MEDCAP AP SO DO.
 Soty security for base area.
 HIC-attach one demo tm A & B off 170600, const PF outpost AP SO DO, conduct road improvement ops.
 Go Team-attached D Co off 170600.
 Medcap-conduct MEDCAP AP SO DO.
 4/19-conduct airmobile assault 170820, from airstrip to IZ 2, seize Obj 1, on order S & D Obj 2 & 3.




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Appendix 5 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report
Oral Order #5, 18 June 1966, Operation EMPINE

(Op FUSHO)

Time Schedule

- 0700 - D 1/5 cross LD
- 0700 - A & B 2/27 cross LD
- 0730 - 51st Rn Dn est blk pan
- 0730 - D 1/5 encircle Obj Go
- 0800 - A & B 2/27 S & D Obj Go




1. No Change.
2. 2/27-conducts coordinated S & D with D/1/5 (M) & 51st Rn Dn.
3. 2/27-conducts S & D sweep along Axis Sally, conduct S & D op in Obj Go. D/1/5 (M) sweeps along Axis Able, encircles Obj Go tying in with 51st Rn Dn blocking force.
 - A/2/27-sweep left along Axis Sally, S & D left of Obj Go, secure attached Co Team, cross LD 100700.
 - D/2/27-sweep right along Axis Sally, S & D right of Obj Go, cross LD 100700.
 - Recon-conduct sweep of road to DAO TRAI then to AP RUNG DAU (1), outpost road from DAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1), secure MEDCAP & Engr construction teams AP SO DO.
 - Sety-secure base camp area.
 - HHC-be prepared to reinforce Security Platoon.
 - Medics-conduct MEDCAP in AP SO DO.
- D/1/5 (M)-sweep along Axis Able, encircle Obj Go, tying in with the 51st Rn Dn. Cross LD 100700.
- 51st Rn Dn-sweep along Axis Roger, est blocking pan southwest portion Obj Go, tying in with D/1/5 (M).
4. SOP
5. SOP

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Appendix 6 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
 Oral Order #6, 13 June 1966, Operation LUCKY (Replaces Op BATTLE)





1. No Change.
 2. 2/27 conduct sweep along route WELLS, on order deploy and S & D Obj Story & Black.
 3. 2/27 sweeps along route WELLS, A Co leading, D Co trailing, on order A Co S & D Obj Black, D Co S & D Obj Story.
- A/2/27-cross ID 180700, sweep route WELLS, on order S & D Obj Black, be prepared to est co def posn or extract on order.
- B/2/27-cross ID 180710, trail A 2/27 along route WELLS, on order S & D Obj Story, be prepared to est co def posn or extract on order.
- Recon-conduct road sweep to DAO TRAI to AP HUNG DAU (1), secure area tm AP SO DO & MEDCAP tm AP 05 HUNG DAU (1).
- Sety-secure bn base area.
- HHC-on order reinforce Sety Plat.
- Medcap-conduct MEDCAP AP HUNG DAU(1).
- Eng continue const of AP SO DO Popul Forces Outpost, conduct road improvement op.
4. S1
 5. SOP


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Appendix 7 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
Oral Order #7, 19 June 1966, Operation L ESTER.



1. No Change.
2. 2/27 conducts 2 sweeps & an airmobile assault.
3. Scty sweeps route Elko, D/1/5 (M) sweeps route Sommers, A & D 2/27 conduct airmobile assault to Obj Zap. A/2/27 conducts airmobile assault to Obj Zap, land LZ's 1 & 2, on order S & D Obj Zap. D/2/27 conducts airmobile assault to Obj Zap, land LZ's 3 & 4, on order S & D Obj Zap. D/1/5 (II) sweeps route Sommers, LD 191200 Recon-secure MEDCAP & Engr Teams. Scty sweeps route Elko, LD 191000. Medics conduct MEDCAP AP SO DO.
4. SOP
5. SOP



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Appendix 3 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FICSNO)
 Oral Order #0, 20 June 1966, Operation DANIEL

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
1. No Change.
2. 2/27 conducts a sweep and recon of route Gilbert in preparation for 2/27 night airmobile assault. Establishes one co size ambush to rehearse night airmobile assault, and est two squad (+) night ambushes.
 - A 2/27-conducts a recon w/2DL/5 (M) to check IZDark and determine location of ambush site for airmobile assault night of 21 Jun, cross ID 200300 establishes night ambush on terrain comparable to area of its airmobile assault, conducts care and maintenance of equipment during day 20 Jun and prepares for night operations.
 - B 2/27-care and maintenance of equipment, and establish 2 lang range patrols via XT 500105 and XT 522001.
 - Recon-continue daily road clearance operations, secure MEDCAP & Engr tm, maintain its defensive position via XT 510077.
 - Scty-security of the En GP area.
 - HHC-reinforce 2DL/5 (M) in the defense of the A Co perimeter off 201800.
 - 2DL/5 (M)-conduct sweep of route Gilbert, mark IZDark for A 2/27 night airmobile assault 21 Jun, cross ID 200300. Assume A Co perimeter, reinforced by HHC elements, off 201800.
 - Medics-conduct MEDCAP in village of AP SO DO.
 - Engr-continue construction of AP SO DO Popular Forces Outpost in AP SO DO, continue road improvement on main road and within the base camp area.

4. SOP
 5. SOP

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Appendix 9 to Annex A to Combat Operations After
Action Report (p FRESNO) Oral Order #9, 21 June 1966,
Operation FRACH




1. No Change.
2. 2/27 continues S & D, and area pacification operations during Op FRESNO, A Co conducts night airmobile assault, B Co conducts sweep.
3. B Co 210900 conducts sweep, A Co conducts night airmobile assault to LZ Dark, attachments continue present missions.
A 2/27-conducts night airmobile assault to LZ Dark, landing LZ 212000 hrs and establishes to size area ambush, returns 220000 along Axis Home.
B 2/27-conducts sweep, w/atch Co Team along route Bound, departing 210900, using atch Co tm to interrogate civilians along route Bound.
Recon-conduct daily road sweep to DAO TRAI then to AP RUNG DAU (1), secure Engr & MEDCAP teams AP SO DO, continue to man the platoon defensive position via XT 510077.
Soty-defense of the CP area, assist in def of A Co area eff 211700.
HHC-reinforce Soty Platoon in def of A Co perimeter eff 211700.
Engr-continue road construction base area, continue road improvement.
DAO TRAI to AP RUNG DAU (1), continue construction of Popular Forces Outpost AP SO DO.
Medics-conduct MEDCAP AP SO DO.
1st Plat B 1/5 (M) bn reaction force, defense of A Co perimeter eff 211700.
4. SOP
5. SOP

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Appendix 10 to Annex A to Combat Operations
After Action Report (Op FIESNO) Oml
Order #10, 22 June 1966, Operation ALOHA



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1. No Change.
2. 2/27 (-) conducts S & D & area pacification ops during Op FIESNO.
3. 2/27 (-) conducts sweep of AP RUNG DAU (1), conducts care & maintenance
A 2/27-rtn bn perimeter 220630, conduct care & maintenance.
B 2/27-with attached B 1/5, Co Team & MEDCAP tm surround AP RUNG DAU (1)
221200, conduct MEDCAP & Co tm activities.
Recon-soty for engr in road clearance HMO HRAI to HIEP HOA (vic XT 462007).
Soty-outpost road as Recon & engr clear road.
Engr-clear road, continue construction of outpost AP TO DO.
Co Team-attached to B 2/27, eff 221000.
MEDCAP-attached B 2/27, eff 221000.
B 1/5 (N)-attached B 2/27, eff 221000.
4. SEP
5. SOP

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Appendix 11 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FIASSNO)
Oral Order #11, 23 June 1966, Operation BLUEGRASS



Time Schedule


- 230300 - A & B depart base area.
- 0400 A & B encircle AP SO DO.
- 0630 - Go Team arrive AP SO DO.
- 0730 - Dde Band arrive base area, move to AP SO DO.
- 0800 - Cultural team depart DUC HUE.
- 0830 - Cultural team arrive AP SO DO.
- 0900 - Cultural team activities.
- 1200 - Chow.
- 1300 - MEDCAP Team & band activities.
- 1500 - Helping hand activities.
- 1600 - Release civilians, units return base area.

1. No Change.
2. 2/27 conducts a "County Fair" type operation in the village of AP SO DO.
3. A & B 2/27 surrounds the village of AP SO DO, moves the villagers to an open area and provides entertainment and food, A&WV Go Team conducts census questioning of villagers, searches village and conducts psywar operations.
 - A 2/27-departs base area 230300, surrounds village NLT 0400, secures village area during "County Fair" operations.
 - B 2/27-depart base area 230300, surrounds village NLT 0400, secure village area during "County Fair" operation.
- Recon-occupy defensive pen AP SO DO, conduct road clearance with attached engr tm from DAO TRAI to HUE NCA.
- Security-security of base area.
- C 1/5 (N)-attached to 2/27 off 221800 for perimeter sety during Operation BLUEGRASS.
- Engr-continue road construction in base area, road improvement and advising and material supply for Popular Forces outpost AP SO DO.
- Go Team-conduct census, psywar ops during Operation BLUEGRASS.
- Dde Band - attached to 2/27 for entertainment of Vietnamese during Operation BLUEGRASS.
- Medics-conduct MEDCAP during Operation BLUEGRASS.
4. SOP
5. SOP

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Appendix 12 to Annex A to Combat Operations
After Action Report (Op FLESN) 5
Oral Order #12, 24 June 1966,
Operation QAJUKN





1. No Change.
2. 2/27 conducts S & D and area pacification in bn AO.
3. 2/27 conducts S & D, area pacification & sety of DUC HIE sugar mill.
 - A 2/27-land LZ Wet 240735, conduct search of streams & canals in co AO, extract 251700, atch one LK & one URM, prepare for 3 day op.
 - B 2/27-cross ID 240650, S & D along Aris Six, establish two night ambushes from AP RUNG DAU (1) to AP HEN KHU.
 - C 2/27-conduct automobile assault to DUC HIE mill, vehicles convoy to DUC HIE, prepare for 3 day operation.
- Recon-conduct road clearance BAO TRAI to HIEP HOA, sety of engr & MEDCAP teams, occupy def pan via XT 510077.
- Security-CP area sety.
- Medical-MEDCAP AP RUNG DAU (1) 241400.
- 1 Plt, C, 1/5 (N) and Obj For 240000, screen A Co southern flank, atch one Natl Police, one interpreter & one demo tm.
4. SOP
5. SOP


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Appendix 13 to Annex A to OGAAR (OP FRESNO) Oral Order #13,
25 June 1966, OPERATION BAY



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
C O N F I D E N T I A L

Appendix 13 to Annex A to OCMR (OP 13) (C) (incl Order 13,
25 June 1966, OPERATIVE MAT

1. No change.
2. No change.
3.
 - a. 2/27 conducts S & D opn, area pacification in def of DUC HUE Sugar Hill.
 - b. A, 2/27- Search AC S/LIEN, air move from PZ HUSAI 1700 to LZ DAN.
 - c. B, 2/27- S & D on Axis RAD, est 2 night ambushes along road to DUC HUE.
 - d. C, 2/27- Def Sugar Hill, search RUCN THINH on Axis HUS.
 - e. Plat, 3/4 Coy- Setr force A Co south flank, Ia Reaction Force.
 - f. Recon Plat- Recon force via 510077, clear road from RI TRAI to DUC HUE, Setr for Ia r' RECON teams.
 - g. Coy Plat- Outpost road during day until 1700 hrs, defense of portion A Co sector, Ia perimeter.
 - h. Red Plat- Conduct ... RECON PL ...
 - i. HHC- Assist in def of Ia perimeter.
 - j. AC team- Jaro maintenance Critique of opn by Bn staff.
4. SOP.
5. SOP.

C O N F I D E N T I A L




Appendix 14 to Annex A to COAAR (OP FRESNO), Oral Order #14, 26 June 1966,
Operation GOLDEN BASS



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
Appendix 14 to Annex A to COMBAT (OP FIDESO), Oral Order #14, 26 June 1966
Operation GOLDEN GATES.

1. No Change.
2. No Change.
3. a. 2/27 conducts S & D area pacification Bn HQ.
b. A, 2/27 S & D AO SAMPA, be prepared to air move to Bn Fwd CP, PZ DAK (1600 hrs) to LZ MAP Y.
c. B, 2/27 S & D Axis NEPLAT, be prepared to air move to CU CHI or convoy, if convoy along route Blue (time TBA)
d. C, 2/27 Sweep Axis NO O, be prepared to air move or convoy to Bn Fwd CP if convoy along route Red. Assume Co perimeter.
e. Recon Plat - Occupy plat def pos via RT 510077, sweep rd B.C. TRAM to DUC HILL, secure MEDCAP & Ingr team.
f. Stry Plat out east rd DUC HILL to AP HUNG DAN (1).
g. Med Plat MEDCAP AP HUNG DAN (1) 1400.
h. 3,4,3/4 Cav sweep Axis HONG.
i. HHC assist def bn perimeter.
j. GO team attach B, 2/27.
4. SOP.
5. SOP.

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Appendix 15 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FUEBNO)
 Oral Order #15, 27 June 1966, Operation SUNFLOWER



1. No Change.
2. No Change.
3. A 2/27--conduct airmobile move from PZ Ye 0605, land LZ 1A 0610, S & D in zone, air extract 1740 from PZ 1A to LZ Three. Atch 1 mine detector, 1 dema tm.
- C 2/27--conduct airmobile move from PZ Ye 0555, land LZ 1C 0600, S & D in zone, air extract PZ 1C 1730. 1730 land LZ Three, atch 1 mine detector & 1 dema tm.
- 3A3/4--sweep Axis Big, ID time 0600, est blk'pen northeast flank, rtn base camp after air extraction, atch one interpreter, one National Police.
- Recon-secure engr & MEDCAP tm. Run road LA: TRAI to DU CHU, occupy plat def pan.

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Special Forces--Move along Axis BLUE, EST BLK pos 0630 hrs via IT 450050 to IT 459055.

Soty-0900 soty engr wood cutters, est night ambush.
 Engr--clear road DUC RUE 0700 then to DAO TRAI, 0900 cut timber for Special Forces, improve roads, advise FF on outpost construction.

Medics--MEDCAP, AP SO DO, 0900.


Go Team--return base camp from DAO TRAI.

4. SOP
5. SOP

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Appendix 16 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FIDESHO)
 Oral Order #16, 28 June 1966, Operation GEMMER



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
1. No Change.
2. No Change.
3. 2/27 conducts combined operation w/51st Rn Bn, conducts area pacification in bn AO.
 - A 2/27 moves along Axis Boom, trailing C 2/27, searches right half Obj, ID time 0700.
 - C 2/27 moves along Axis Boom, leading *A* 2/27, search left half Obj, ID time 0700.
 - D, A 3/4 Cav moves along Axis Boom, secures northeast flank Obj, tying in with 51st Rn Bn, ID time 0700.
- 51st Rn Bn - move along Axis Dang est blk pan, mark flanks with yellow smoke to coordinate joining with 3 A 3/4 Cav, ID time 0600. Recon-clear road to HEO TRAI then to DUC HUB, sety MEDCAP & engr. Security-secy base camp. Go Team-truck to HNSP HQ, conduct census/Paywar ops rtn base camp by truck, follow Recon 0800. MEDCAP AP HUNG DAU (2), 1400. Engr-road clearance with Recon Plnt, road construction & improvement.
4. SOP
5. SOP

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Appendix 17 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report
(Op FIGSNO) Oral Order #17, 29 June 1966, Operation OPPORTUNITY

1. No Change.
2. No Change.
3. 2/27 continued S & D and area pacification in Dn AO.
 A 2/27-2 plat sweep along Axis Black, ID time 1915, drop off plat
 size ambush loc to be determined.
 C 2/27-2 plat sweep along Axis Night ID time 1945, drop off plat
 size ambush, loc to be determined.
 3A 3/4-scty engr road clearance, scty Co Team AP MOI (1), moves
 to AP MOI (1) by Route 1, scty Obj A, def A Co perimeter
 during plat sweeps, in reaction force.
 Recv-occupy def pan, scty MEDCAP to HIEP HOA.
 Security-OP scty, scty MEDCAP to HIEP HOA.
 Medics-MEDCAP HIEP HOA 1000 hrs.
 Co Team AP MOI for census & paywar ops
 move by truck 1907 following
 3 A 3/4 Cav.
 Engr-road clearance DUC HIE to
 DAO TRAI, road const & improvement.

4. SOP
5. SOP



1. No Change.
2. No Change.
3. 2/27 conducts area pacification & night ambushes in bn AO.
A 2/27-est two squad (+) size ambushes, ID time 1945 hrs.
C 2/27-est two squad (+) size ambushes, ID time 1930 hrs.
3A 3/4 conducts road sweep along Route Bold, ID 2000, secure false IZ 2030 hrs, rtn 2200 hrs.
51st RH In-est two squad (+) size ambushes NLT 2000 hrs.
Avn In-aift to false IZ for false air extraction 2030 hrs.
Recon-occupy plat def pen, sety engr & MEDCAP.
Sety-bn OP sety.
MEDCAP-HIEP HQA 1400 hrs.
Engr-road clearance, construction & improvement.
4. SOP
5. SOP




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Appendix 19 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FIDENO)
Oral Order #19, 1 July 1966, Operation GAMMA GAMMA



1. No Change.
2. No Change.
3. 2/27 continues to operate in AO conducting pacification and S & D operations.
 - A 2/27-moves along Axis 3 with LD time of 0000. Move into Obj D and conduct S & D op. Send advisor along with 3A 3/4 to show tunnels. Use CS in trenches and tunnels.
 - B 2/27-moves along Route 2 to Obj 3. LD time 0000, conduct S & D op in Obj area, and 1 sqd moves to Obj A. Area is suspected to have caches of arms & logistical items. Have extra medics conduct MEDCAP ops if necessary. Immediate reactionary forces.

Recon-escort engrs, secure MEDCAP at 1000 hrs.

Security-post road along Route 2 with 3 A 3/4.

3 A 3/4-move along Route 2 to Obj C to secure area for use of bulldozer.

Engr-advise Popular Force, bn reserve clear routes.

in this priority: (1) Rt 2, (2) DAO TRAI (3) DUC HUE.

Go Team-return from DAO TRAI.

MEDCAP-conduct operation at 1000 hrs.

4. SOP
5. SOP

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
Appendix 20 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FIESHO)
Oral Order #20, 1 July 1966, Operation BIG RIVER (Replaces Op GRAND CANYON)

1. No Change;
2. No Change;
3. 2/27 continues to conduct S & D and S & P operations in Op FIESHO.

A 2/27-secure Route Castle, in reaction force for rally information and C Co. Provide guide to 3 A 3/4, secure rt for withdrawal of bulldozer from Obj A. Man 3 AP's, two in 50 sector and one in 8th Arty area. Fill in trench system along Rt to Obj C.

C 2/27-conduct S & D and S & P operation in AO Area at 0700 and then in AO Bryant three day operation. Man two AP's.

3 A, 3/4-secure engr on Route Castle to Obj A. Reaction force for Recon @ night.



Engr-clear Route Castle, DAO TRIA, DUC HIA in this priority. fill in trenches, work on concertina, roads and advise PF. Recon-secure engr on road clearing DAO TRIA, DUC HIE, secure MEDCAP at AP BUNG BANU at 1400, continue work at PF outpost.


Security-secure Go tm on Obj Bravo 0900, HHC-be prepared to man perimeter. Go Team-search and pacify Obj D 0900.

4. SCP
5. SCP

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
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Appendix 21 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
Oral Order #21, 2 July 1966, Operation: GILW 143



1. No Change.
2. No Change.
3. 2/27 continues to operate conducting S & D and pacification in Op FRESNO.
 - A 2/27-bn reactionary force for C Co and Hallier information, provide one guide to 3 A 3/4 to point out trench systems.
 - C 2/27-move at 0530 to P2 and from there to Obj VC and LZ 1, 2, 3, surround Obj VC and give thorough search, move back to base on Axis Bee.
 - 3 A, 3/4-secure engr on Route Castle to Obj Echo, reactionary force for Recon tonight.
 - Engr-clear Route Castle, DAO TRAI, DUC HUE, in this order. Bulldozer will accompany along Route Castle to fill in trenches at Obj Echo, concentrate on triple concertina and internal roads, bn reserve.
 - Recon-secure engr on road clearance operations to DAO TRAI, DUC HUE, secure MEDCAP at HUNG DAU at 1400, continue to work with Popular Forces.
 - Security-secure Go team on Obj F.
 - HIC-be prepared to man perimeter.
 - Go Team-search and pacify Obj Fortrot.
4. SCP
5. SCP

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


1. No Change.
2. No Change.
3. 2/27 continues to operate with S & D and S & P missions in Op FRESNO.
A 2/27-moves Axis 1 to Obj A at 0730 hrs; secure engr bulldozer in Obj A, secure route and return, 2 AP's.
C 2/27-conduct S & D and S & P in AO Amos at 0700 and AO Bryant, 2 day operation, man 2 AP's at night.
3, A, 3/4-rotationary force for Rallier information and col's, care and maint., reserve force for Recon Plat.
Engr-clear rt to Obj A for bulldozer, clear rd to BAO TRAI & DUC HUE, bulldozer fill in trenches in Obj A. Concentrate on concertina and internal roads, advise Popular Force Outpost, bn reserve.
Recon-secure engr on road clearing operation to BAO TRAI & DUC HUE, secure MEDCAP at 1300 hrs. Continue to work with PF Outpost.
Security-secure Go Team in Obj B at 0900.
HHC-be prepared to man perimeter..
MEDCAP-at HIEP HQA.
Go Team-S & P Obj B at 0900.
4. SOP
5. SOP

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Appendix 23 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report
(Op FMSNO) Oral Order 23, 23 July 1966, Operation INDEPENDENCE

Oral Order is on next page.



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
Appendix 23 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)
Oral Order #23, 4 July 1966, Operation INDEPENDENCE

1. No Change.
 2. No Change.
 3. 2/27 continues to conduct S & D and S & P missions in AO in Op FRESNO.
 - A 2/27-conduct S & D operations in AO Day, LD time 0700, 1 day op, demo team attached, 2 AP's.
 - C 2/27-conducts S & D and S & P at 0700 in AO Bryant, 1 day op, 1 laborers and demo team attached, 2 AP's.
 - 4/49-200 spaces, picked up at FZ Liberty at 0615. Move to IZ Bell surround Obj Freedom from east, north, and west. Coordinates XT 462087 and XT 473089. Secure woodlines to prevent sniper fire. Advisor on left flank to use yellow smoke to tie in with 1/5.
 - C, 1/5 (M)-move along Route 4 at 0630 hrs, secure south of HZIP HOA, control traffic on road, sweep Obj Freedom on order. Secure County Fair area, man 1 AP, reaction force for Recon Plat at night.
 - Recon- 0600 secure engr on road clearing to DUC HUE & BAO TRAI, escort vehicles & traffic thru county fair area, defend Popular Forces Outpost at night.
 - Security-move along Route 4 at 0700 to Obj Freedom, secure county fair area. Controlled by S5, at night attached to C, 1/5 (M) for perimeter.
 - Engr-at 0600 clear road to DUC HUE & BAO TRAI, continue internal road, concertina. Advise PF, bn reserve, provide dump trucks to assist in transporting 4/49 back to their compound.
 - Go Team-operate with S5 in county fair area. Move along route 4 at 0700 to Obj Freedom, return to BAO TRAI at night.
 - MEDCAP-operate at county fair and continue to conduct local MEDCAP activities.
 - HHC-man perimeter on call.
 - County Fair Schedule
 - a. Three UH1-D helicopters will deliver performers.
 - b. Gunships for protection.
 - c. Time schedule
- 0600 throughout day MEDCAP will be conducted.
0730-0830 band.
0830-1000 Cultural show.
1000-1015 Message by District & Province Chief.
1015-1030 Taped message.
1030-1230 Country music and movie.
1230 Helping hand.
4. SOP
 5. SOP

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Appendix 24 to Annex A to OCAAR (OP Fresno)
Oral Order #24, 5 July 1966, Operation HOME BASE.

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AXIS WHITE



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1. SOP.

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2. SOP.

3. 2/27 will conduct air assault on West side of CHINA RIVER in vicinity of coordinates XT 459002 with A & C Companies. The remainder of the Bn and attachments will move in convoy to CU CHI.

a. A Co-90 spaces will be provided, move from PZ 0600 hrs to LZ D, search LZ B area, S & D Axis RED to PZ C with emphasis on thorough search of PZ C. Extracted from PZ C at 1500 hrs for move to CU CHI.

b. B Co- Be prepared, on call, to reinforce A & C on order. Conduct air assault from Div Helipad to execute this mission.

c. C Co-90 spaces will be provided to conduct air assault. Move from PZ 0600 hrs to LZ B, search LZ B area, S & D Axis RED to PZ C with emphasis on thorough search of PZ C. Extracted from PZ C at 1500 hrs for move to CU CHI.

d. 2,3,1/5 (H)-Convoy escort on route home to CU CHI.

e. Engr-Clear road RAC TMI, move by convoy along route home to CU CHI.

f. Recon Plat- Secure Engr on rd clearance to RAC TMI, move along route home to CU CHI.

g. Security Plat- Move by convoy along route home to CU CHI.

h. ITC- Move by convoy along route home to CU CHI.

i. 4/49- Sweep Axis MINA to PL 1, S & D Axis MINA from PL 1 to PZ. Extracted from PZ D. Time to be announced.

j. CIDG- S & D Axis MINA.

k. Coordinating instructions:

- (1) In S & D mission C Co on L, A Co on Right.
- (2) S-4 Convoy Commander.
- (3) SP time for Bn convoy 1200 hrs.
- (4) Report crossing of CP's and RP's and closing time.
- (5) A,C and 4/49 report crossing of PL.
- (6) Gunships on convoy route.
- (7) Tactical air on Call.

4. SOP.



5. Command- Be CC, ITC, ITC, and S-3 in C & C ship during operation.

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Inlosure to Appendix 24 to Annex A to OGAAR (OP FRESNO),
Oral Order #24, 5 July 1966, Operation HOME BASE.

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CP4
CP3

ROUTE HOME

CP2

CP5

- 302.
- 302.
1. 2/27 will move along route home at 1200 hrs in motor convoy to CU CHI.
- a. A Company will move along route home at 1200 hrs in 2n convoy. A Company will be third element in order of movement. Assume respective sector, 2n Per 060700. Care and maintenance upon reaching CU CHI.
- b. B Company is reactionary for convoy movement. 11n perimeter until 060700. Continue to work on designated projects in CU CHI base camp.
- c. C Company will move along route home at 1200 hrs in 2n convoy. Conduct care and maintenance upon return to CU CHI. Fifth in order of movement. Resume respective sector of 2n perimeter 060700.
- d. Engr- Clear road to BAC 1111 at 0700 hrs. 2d element in order of movement.
- e. Recon Platoon- Escort Engr in road clearing operation to BAC 1111 at 0700 hrs. Stop trucks and escort at 30 DC at 1100 hrs.
- f. MEC- Move along route home to CU CHI at 1200 hrs. Fourth element in order of movement.
- g. Security Platoon- Move with MEC element (4th) along route home to CU CHI at 1200 hrs.
- h. Artillery- Move along route home to DUC IAP at 1200 hrs. Sixth element in order of movement.
- i. 1/5 Mech- Secure Artillery battery and rear of column. Escort convoy to CU CHI at 1200 hrs along route home.
- j. Coordinating Instructions:
- (1) Gunships to escort convoy.
 - (2) Artillery preplanned concentration.
 - (3) Report crossing CP's and release point.
 - (4) Thorough police of area conducted prior to departure.
 - (5) Medical evacuation- Dustoff on call.
 - (6) Medic and medical vehicles dispersed throughout convoy.
 - (7) Convoy SOP & r vehicles.
- k. SOP.
- l. Command- In CO, S-3, and AIC in C & C ship controlling convoy.


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
Appendix B to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to
Op FALCONO Opal Order #25 6 July 1966 Operation CLARK

MEDCAP
0830

MEDCAP
0730



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
Appendix 25 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to
Op FRESNO Oral Order # 6 July 1966 Operation CLARK

1. No Change.
2. No Change.
3. 2/27 will continue to conduct S & D, and S & P operations in AO FRESNO.
The missions will be conducted by air assaults into respective areas of operations.
 - A Co conduct care and maintenance and continue to progress on bunker and bunker line. Take over bunker line at 0700 hrs in respective area of the perimeter, and 1 OP in front of the perimeter (day).
 - B Co 1 platoon will conduct aerial assault in AO TAN leading div pad at 0900 hrs landing from southwest, 12 1. Platoon will consist of 42 mm. Attached close team and 4 National Police. Upon completion of this AO move on to AO JOHN. Prepare to be extracted at 1600 hrs LZ to be designated.
 - C Co conduct care and maintenance and take over respective area of the perimeter at 0700 hrs.
Recon conduct care and maintenance.
Security conduct care and maintenance.
BFO conduct care and maintenance.
MENDAP operate in sugar mill area at 0730 hrs, operate in TAN HQA area 0830 hrs. Security will be provided by Go Team.
4. SOP.
5. SOP.

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Appendix 25 to Army
 Combat Operations Allocation
 Report to CPT
 Oral Order #257 July 1968
 Op TOWTEL 11



1. No Change.
2. No Change.
3. 2/27 will continue to conduct S & D and S & I in the area. The mission will be accomplished by the assaults in respective areas.
 - A & B Co continue care and maintenance and program on barrier and barrier line.
 - C Co reformed platoon will conduct ambush assault into IV BTR 070600 surround hedgerow complex K 466102, and capture VC cadre. Conduct S & D in Obj 1 with Co Tm. One squad will check graves at Obj 2 with mine detectors and probing. Move to C 13 on order. Be prepared to react on any intelligence. Composition of platoon: 42 men, 1 interpreter, 4 National Police, Artillery FO & RTO. C Co minus will be reactionary force for this element. Extraction 1500 hrs, LZ to be designated by CO Company C.
- Recon, Security, HHC continue to conduct care and maintenance in bn area.
- Coordinating instructions:
 - A. Attached to bn - 6 slicks and 1 light fire team.
 - B. C & G ship to be used by CO Company C.
 - C. Resupply truck at Div pad.
 - D. Commo relay through S/O TRAI.
4. SOP.
5. SOP.



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Appendix 27 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to
Op FUMONO Oral Order # 8 July 1966 Operation USLP

AP SO DO
MEDCAP/Secy
PZ 1 1205-1600

AP SO DO
MEDCAP/Secy
0910 (1200)
SO DO


06

1. No Change.
2. 2/27 continue to conduct S & D and S & P operations in AO FUMONO. Be prepared to reinforce 1/27 on order.
3. 2/27 will conduct S & D, S & P in AO by use of organic elements.
A Co division reaction force 1700 hrs prepare for operation 9 July 66.
B Co prepare for operation 9 July. Continue to progress on bunker and barrier line.
C Co man 1/27 perimeter at 1700 hrs, division reaction force 1700 hrs.
Recon recon route to KOI MOI along Axis Jack 0730 hrs. Return Axis Jill upon completion.
Security secure MEDCAP team at AP SO DO and AP RUNG DAU (1), move by air from div pad to IZ 1 at 0900, move from PZ 1 to IZ 2 at 1200 hrs, extracted from IZ 2 at 1600 hrs.
Mortars & Radar general Support.
HHC respons ble for 2/27 perimeter 1700 hrs.
MEDCAP move to SO DO & RUNG DAU by air 0900 to IZ 1 from div pad. 1200 hrs move from PZ 1 to IZ 2. At 1600 hrs extracted from IZ 2 to base camp.
Coordinating instructions:
 - A. Support requirements.
 - (1) 1 C & C ship 0800-1700 hrs.
 - (2) 1 Light fire team 0800-1700 hrs.
 - (3) 14 strikes for MEDCAP & Security 0800-1700 hrs.
 - (4) Airstrikes 1000 (XT615174-XT619172)
1230 (XT621157-XT621169)
 - B. 0800 bn awards ceremony.
 - C. Aviation meeting, div pad, S-3 (0830).
 - D. 1300 coordination meeting BAO TRAI, S-3.
 - E. 1500 briefing for Bn CO at BAO TRAI.
4. No Change.
5. No Change.

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Appendix 28 to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to
Cp FIVE NO Oral Order 9 July 1968 Operation SIFT



1. No Change.
2. No Change.
3. No Change.

Recon conduct air assault at 1230 hrs in to LZ 1. Secure division MEDCAP team in HIEP HQ extraction from PZ 1 at 1630 hrs.

Security conduct air assault from division at 1240 hrs, search and pacify Obj HORSE. Provide security for MEDCAP.

Go Team air move to LZ 1 at 1240 hrs, conduct S & P in Obj HORSE. Extraction from PZ 1 at 1630 hrs.



MEDCAP division MEDCAP team leave division pad 1300 hrs to conduct MEDCAP in HIEP HQ. Security finished by Recon & Security Platoons. Air move to LZ 2, extraction PZ 1 1600 hrs, for return to base camp.

4. SOP.
5. SOP. :

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Appendix to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to
Op. GREEN Oral Order #29 10 July 1945 Operation GREEN




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Appendix ~~27~~ to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to
Op FRESNO Cont Cont ~~27~~ IC July 2, 66 Operation GOAL GREEN

1. No Change.
2. 2/27 will conduct S & P operations in area of operation FRESNO.
Be prepared to conduct LPT on order.
3. 2/27 will conduct S & P operations in Op FRESNO by use of organic
and attached elements.
 - A Co Division reaction team at 0500 hrs. Continue to progress on
barrier and barrier work. On respective portions of bn perimeter, 1 AP
at night.
 - B Co return to base camp 0700 hrs conducting sweep of return route. Man
perimeter and return. Continue work on barrier and barrier line.
3 Edge saw teams and 2 were attached for building alternate positions.
 - C Co Division reaction team until 0500 hrs, conduct air assault at
0515 hrs to Obj A, B, C. Block entire reach, south and east from
Obj FOX. Extracted from PZ 1 BOB at 1500 hrs for return to base camp.
Man perimeter and provide 1 AP at night. 200 attachments plus 1
National Police and interpreter.
 - Recon conduct air assault into IZ 1 at 0900 hrs, set up Axis JOINER.
Move to Obj B by 1300 hrs and provide security for MEDCAP. Extraction
from PZ 1 at 1700 hrs.
Security continue work in base camp on CJ THI defense plan blocking
positions. On reaction force.
 - 4/49 make an air assault from PZ JIM at 0615 hrs to IZ DELTA. S & D
Obj FOX and provide security for MEDCAP team. Extraction from PZ BOB
at 1530 hrs.
 - Go Team attached to 4/49 for air assault to IZ D at 0625 hrs. Conduct
S & P in Obj FOX. Extraction at 1530 hrs from PZ BOB.
Mortars GS.
Radar GS.
HHC be prepared to man bn perimeter on order.
MEDCAP air move from division pad to IZ 2 at 1300 hrs. Conduct
MEDCAP in DUC HANH B at 1300 hrs, and DUC HANH A at 1500 hrs. Extraction
from PZ 1 at 1700 hrs for return to base camp.
- Coordinating instructions.
 - A. Support requirements:
 - (1) C & G ship 0545-1800 hrs.
 - (2) 1 Heavy fire team 0545-1800 hrs.
 - (3) Airlift force: C Co 100 spaces, 4/49 250 spaces MEDCAP 7 spaces,
Go Team 16 spaces, Recon 21 spaces.
 - (4) 6 slides 0300-1700 hrs on call.
 - (5) 3 org saw teams 0730-1700 hrs for alternate positions in
base camp.
 - (6) 4 National Police, 4 interpreters, SOP medics and FO.
 - (7) Go team attached 4/49 0600-1500 hrs.
 - (8) 2 dozens saw work on barrier trace 0730-1700 hrs.
4. No Change.
5. No Change.

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


1. No Change.
 2. No Change.
 3. 2/27 continues S & D, S & P operations in AO FRESNO. Be prepared to reinforce 1/27 on order.
 - A. To be reaction force, continue work on bunker/barrier line, man 1/27 perimeter, 2 AP's.
 - B. Co conduct air assault 0615 to LZ 1-7, S & D Obj PASKEY, extract 1500 hrs. Man 2/27 perimeter, 2 AP's. Attached: Recon, Soty, 4 National Police, 3 interpreters, 2 man demo team, effective 111700.
 - C. Co division reaction force, continue work on bunker/barrier line. Recon attached B Co effective 111700. Security attached B Co effective 111700. Mortar GS. Radar GS. HHC be prepared to man perimeter. Media base same operations. 1/19 call sign SUN RIVET HQ, freq 45.6. Be Control docoms, spy teams, defoliation teams.
- Support requirements:
- A. Rgr road improvement, barrier tocs, alternate position preparation.
 - B. 4 National Police effective 111700.
 - C. LCH 120800-121800.
 - D. C & G, heavy fire team, for security of lifts.
 - E. Shicks B Co 12h, attached 59, total 123.
 - F. 2 demo teams direct contact (Lt Leatherwood)
4. SOP.
 5. SOP.

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Appendix B to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to
Op FRESNO Oral Order 13 July 1965 Operation UTAH



1. No Change.
 2. No Change.
 3. 13 July 2/27 will continue to operation in AO FRESNO. Be prepared to reinforce 1/27 if still in operation.
 - A Co continue work on bunker/barrier line, man perimeter, 1 AP.
 - B Co division reaction force 130700, work on bunker/barrier line, man perimeter, 2 AP.
 - C Co division reaction force until 130700, conduct air assault into IZ 2, 3, 4, 130700. Plock Obj CARL, extract IZ 3 at 1500 hrs, man perimeter. Attached 3 National Police, 3 interpreters effective 121700.
 - Recon conducts air assault 130730, IZ 1, S & D Obj BOYD, secure Co team, extract team at 1500 hrs, attached 2 National Police, 1 interpreter 121700.
 - Security air assault into IZ 1, 130730, S & D Obj BOYD, secure Co team, extract from IZ 1 131500, attached 2 National Police, 1 interpreter effective 121700.
 - Mortar GS.
 - Radar GS.
 - HHC to prepared to man perimeter.
 - Medic MEDCAP sugar mill secured by SB, at 0830 by chopper, extracted 0850.
 - Go team 1 each IZ 1, 5, 6, 130830.
 - 51st air assault 130800 into IZ 5 0800, S & D Axis B (west half of Obj Carl) secure GS team, extracted from IZ 2 131500.
 - 3/49 air assault 130800 in IZ 6, S & D Axis A (east half of Obj Carl) secure Co team, extracted from IZ 3 at 1530.
 - Engr improve road from CU CHI to BAO TRAI, secured by 4/49 130800-131700.
 - 4/49 secure engr plant on road from CU CHI to BAO TRAI, 130800-131700.
- Support requirements:
- A. 1 C & C 130700-131800.
 - B. 1 Heavy fire team 130700-131800.
 - C. Airlift Recpt 25, Scty 25, C Co 125 spaces.
 - D. Engr Platoon.
 - E. 3 engr adv teams 130730-131700 for alternate positions.
 - F. 2 dozers 130730-131700 for bunker/barrier trace.
 - G. 5 National Police, 3 interpreters.
 - H. Arty remain at sugar mill.


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Appendix B to Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to Op FRESNO
 Oral Order # 14 July 1966 Operation MAINT

DL-24
 RECON
 0615



227 will continue to conduct S & D & ... operations in AO FRESNO. A Co will move to THUNG IAP ranger camp. A Co will be in air 141200 to defend ... for 3 days. Attached 1 National ... 1 interpreter, Security ... 140700.
 2 Co will be in air 141500, man ... 141500. Man ... Attached 2 ... 2 interpreters, 2 demo teams.
 3 Co will be in air 141500, S & D Co ... Extract 141500, man C Co perimeter ... Attached 1 National Police, 1 interpreter, demo team.
 Recon air assault LZ 4 0615, S & D Co ... Extract 141500, man C Co perimeter ... Attached 1 National Police, 1 interpreter, demo team.
 Security Attached A Co effective 140700
 Mortar GS.

Recon GS.
 1st man A Co perimeter.
 Medco MEDCAP HIEP HCA Market Place ... by SF. Air move 140915, ... 141600. Attached 1 interpreter
 Eng improve road CU CHI-BIO TRAIL.
 1st secure eng.
 2nd secure MEDCAP team.
 3rd Control deser, saw teams, defoliati-
 team.
 Support requirements:
 1. Eng road improvement CU CHI-
 BAO TRAIL, barrier trace, alter-
 nate positions fields of fire.
 2. 1 National Police.
 3. 2 interpreters.
 4. 1 demo team.
 5. Aviation: MOH 0600/1800


C & G for lifts
 Heavy fire team 0600-
 Slick for resupply
 0700-1800 48
 Lifts:
 A 1200
 B 126 0600/1500
 C 126 0600/1500
 Recon 28 0600/1600
 MEDCAP 7 0915/1600

MEDCAP TM
 SF Helo - P-2
 0930/1600

5. SF.
 MEDCAP
 1000

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SECRET



Appendix
I - Target List

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
Appendix 1 to Annex B to Combat Operations After Action Report (Op WESNO)

<u>COMO NO</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>NATURE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
FR 704	5138 0734	Dend in Road	On Call
FR 705	1050 0972	Road Jet	On Call
FR 706	4002 1050	Ford	On Call

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Annex C (Pacification Overlay) (Civil Affairs/PCROP) to Combat Operations
After Action Report (Op FRESHO)




LEGEND

- GI - Government Influence
- P - Pacified
- D - Disputed
- VC - Viet Cong Control

Appendix

1 - Propaganda Target Disposition






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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Appendix 1 to Annex G (Civil Affairs/PSYOP) to Combat Operations After
Action Report (Op FIRENO)

X 40
10



X 50
02

C O N F I D E N T I A L

O O

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Annex D (Tactical Motor March) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(O, FRESNO)

Reference: Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000

1. Formation: Appendix 1, Formation of Vehicles.
2. Route: Appendix 2, Route Overlay.
3. Preparation & Loading of vehicles: SOP.
4. Briefings: SOP.
5. Immediate Actions: SOP.
6. Coordinating instructions:
 - a. Rate of march: 25 MPH.
 - b. Interval: 100 meters between vehicles.
 - c. When convoy stops, dismount and take up security.
 - d. Disabled vehicle pull off road and signal rest by.
 - e. Trail element follow up with B Co.
 - f. COs A Co, HHC, and B Co report crossing SP, CP's, and PP.
 - g. Air panels on lead and last vehicle of each company, pink - lead, orange - last.


Appendices:

- 1 - Formation of Vehicles.
- 2 - Route Overlay.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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Appendix 1 (Formation of Vehicles) to Annex D (Tactical Motor March) to
 Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FUELSHO)




1. Form up at 130700 Jun-66, conduct last minute checks and briefings.
2. Order of March: A Co, HHC, & Atch, B Co.
3. Move out in order of march with A Co commencing the move at 130745 Jun 66.
4. SP at intersection of Schofield & Tare Roads at 130800 Jun 66, convey picked up at SP by 1/5 (M) escort.

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
Appendix 2 (Route Overlay) to Annex D (Tactical Motor March) to
Combat Operations per Action Report (Op FRESNO)



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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Appendix 2 (Route Overlay) to Annex D (Tactical Motor March) to
Combat Operations After Action Report (Op FRESNO)



C O N F I D E N T I A L

Annex F to Combat Operation After Action Report to O: FLEMO.

Name	Serial No.	Type Found
1. Gilroy, Roberto	RA 19763020	SV complete body
2. Leasing, Alex L.	RA 16830484	FV (R) arm
3. Williams, Clarence	RA 11036147	FV (L) arm
4. Smith, Jerry	RA 10843542	GSV in buttocks
5. Nelson, Louis	RA 11027106	AMP (R) foot SV (R) leg
6. Taylor, Martin R.	RA 110271130	GSV (R) side head
7. Cheng, William V.	US 51570296	FV (L) leg
8. Branchman, Raymond	US 5632848	SV buttocks
9. Williams, William H.	US 5245702	FV (R) arm (L) leg
10. Webster, Dallas	US 52458715	FV (R) arm
11. Locke, Daniel A.	US 51130398	Bruise macele forearm
12. Erivo, David	OS326455 2d Lt	twisted ankle
13. Cole, James	RA 23915395	FV (L) leg
14. Bugausky, Charles	RA 16322120	FV (L) thigh
15. Erage, Lloyd H.	US 51552533	KIA rifle gren complete body
16. Ganzy, Allan A.	US 51551690	KIA GSV abdomen
17. Lea, Stearning	RA 25874485	Internal bleeding (non bat)
18. Scott, Gilbert	RA 55693695	FV (R) leg
19. Walker, Willie	RA 14920504	FV (L) ant chest
20. Baker, John W.	RA 14855194	GSV (L) shoulder
21. Brown, Eugene	US 51370043	FV (L) side
22. Conway, Steven	US 51561591	FV (L) forearm
23. Artway, Samuel	OS322485 1st Lt	RFV (L) arm & leg
24. Stephenson, Harry	US 53402817	FV (R) thigh (R) forearm
25. Gilmore, Freddie	US 53385093	RFV (R) shoulder & R arm & both legs
26. Handlon, Jerry	US 55842371	FV face, chest (L) leg KIA
27. Fitzpatrick, Michael	US 51538437	FV head & chest KIA

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TELETYPE (20 July 66) 1st Ind (O)
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Opn SANTE FE) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO 96225 3 August 1966

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: ACoFS G3 (D&T)
APO 96227

TO: Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, ATTN: J3A3
APO 962A3

1. Operation SANTE FE is one of four operations conducted to date with primary emphasis on pacification. This operation successfully extended GVN and US influence throughout the assigned area of operations.

2. Operations of this type should be followed closely by a determined effort by ARVN and Province forces to keep the area pacified. Without such effort, the advantages obtained are quickly dissipated and the initiative again given to the VC.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Philip U. Bondi
PHILIP U. BONDI
OFF, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

ACoFS for Force Dev, DA
CG, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOF-ME
MACV, ATTN: J3A3 (thru IIFORCEV)
MACV, ATTN: J3 (thru IIFORCEV)
MACV, ATTN: MACF (thru IIFORCEV)
MACV, ATTN: Chief, USAF Advisory Group (thru IIFORCEV)
CG, USAFV, ATTN: AVO (D & H)
CG, IIFORCEV, ATTN: ACoFS G3 (D & T)
CG, USA Infantry School, Ft Benning, Ga.
CG, USA Armer School, Ft Knox, Ky.
USACDC Ls Off APO 96558
USA Inf H Res Unit, Ft Benning, Ga.

DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION SANTE FE



1ST BN . . . 27TH INF

WOLFHOUSES

13 JUN - 4 JUL 1966

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1ST BATTALION 27TH INFANTRY
(SHE WOLFHOUSES)
APO U.S. FORCES 96225

TLIRA-T

20 July 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After action Report. (ROS: MACV J9-32)

THRU: Commanding Officer
2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
ATTN: LBOS-T
APO US FORCES 96225

Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVTGA-3H
APO US FORCES 96225

TO: Commander
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J943
APO US FORCES 962A3

1. Operation: Sante Fe
2. Dates of Operation: 13 June - 4 July 1966.
3. Location: Hau Nghia Province, Duc Hoa District.
4. Control Headquarters: 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
5. Reporting Officer: 1st Lt Alvin L. O'Neal.
6. Task Organization:
A1/27 Inf (Capt Mayone)
B1/27 Inf (Capt Garrett)

DOWNGRADED AT 9 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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Bn Control:

Recon Plat
AT Plat
Hv Mort Plat
Plat, Co B 1/65 Eng
3d Spt Plat, 16th RRU
Elem, 25th MID
Elem, 125th Sig
CT
National Police
Interpreters
381/5 Mech Plat
1A3/4 Cav Plat

7. Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery Support: Btry A, 1st Bn, 8th Arty, DS to 1st Bn, 27th Inf.

b. How and when Artillery employed: 1/8 Arty on 13 June established fire support base via Bao Trai (XT527045). On 26 June, Btry A, 1st Bn, 8th Arty was attached and established a fire support base within the perimeter (XT570044). On 2 July, Btry A, 1st Bn, 13th Arty established fire support base via Duc Lap (XT553053). Throughout the operation, 1/8 Arty supported with pre-planned and on-call fires.

c. Results of Artillery: Artillery support during the operation was greatly restricted due to close proximity of friendly and Allied units and the many houses scattered throughout the AO.

d. Army Aviation:

(1) How and when aviation was used:

- (a) Command and control aircraft for ground ops.
- (b) Airlift of troops and equipment within the AO.
- (c) Resupply of rations, water, and equipment.
- (d) Evacuation of serious casualties.

(2) Results of Army Aviation: Army air support was a decisive factor in the accomplishment of mission in the AO. The helicopter support provided TF1/27 Inf with a high degree of flexibility and mobility which could not be achieved by other means due to the restrictive effects of the weather. 1/27 Inf utilized organic personnel throughout the operation to set up and control helicopter landing zones. This method proved extremely effective and 1/27 Inf was able to develop and establish a workable airmobile SCP.

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8. Intelligence:

a. Enemy situation prior to operation: Operational area has been the scene of numerous VC initiated incidents, and has long been regarded as a VC safe area where the VC could seek refuge. 3 VC platoons were estimated to be operating out of Ap Hau Hoa (3) (XT57-9035), Giong Lon (XT615018), and Nhanh Hoa (XT575019). The VC force which attacked C1/27 Inf ambush vic XT564046 on 3 May 1966, was composed of local guerrillas and an intelligence platoon from the 506th Local Force Bn. The C2 Co (Duc Hoa Co), strength 80, was normally located within the operational area. Co sized forces of the 506th Bn were also known to have operated in the southern portion of the AO. Recent VC activity includes:

- (1) 26 May - 2 VC companies reported at XS500952 (Eval F-3).
- (2) 27 May - Unk number of VC directed harrasing fire on ARVN 3/50 at Duc Hoa.
- (3) 29 May - 5 roadblocks discovered at XT563063.
- (4) 1 Jun - 300 VC and 30 laborers at XT620063 (Eval F-4).
- (5) 1 Jun - 3/4 ton truck hit mine vic XT545049.
- (6) 2 Jun - 3 dirt mounds discovered at XT628003.
- (7) 2 Jun - 200 VC rptd XS525965 (Eval F-3).
- (8) 5 Jun - 80 VC rptd vic XT531059 (Eval F-3).

b. Enemy situation during the operation: Throughout the operation, the VC employed numerous grenade booby traps and mines. They also utilized snipers to harass and confuse US Forces. A major contact was made on 282300 June by Ambush Purple (Co A, 1/27 Inf) at XT551034. In this engagement, a recon element of C3 Company, 506th Local Force Bn with a nine (9) man militia sqd attached, attacked the ambush patrol. The entire VC force consisted of 40-50 men. Identification of unit involved and unit strength was obtained from a VC MIA captured on 29 June 1966, documents captured from VC MIA on 3 July 1966, and National Police and Sector agent reports. In a heliborne operation in Bao Canh Na, the VC evidently had prior knowledge of our intention to operate in the area. The VC advised the villagers via their Psywar loudspeaker system to remain in their houses as they intended to booby trap the area. A number of villagers, VCC, VCS, and detainees, gave information that the VC used the following route to transport food, weapons, ammo, and VC MIA: Giong Loc (XT584015), to Bao Canh Na (XT562011), to Ap Thoi Noi (2) (XT544017), to Ap Bao Cua (XT5201), to canals vic AT5100 where sampans were waiting. The most active areas appeared to be: (1) Ap Giong Lon (XT6101), (2) Xom Giong Sen (XT5802), (3) Giong Loc (XT5801), and (4) Xom Giong Sen (XT5903).

c. Terrain and Weather: The terrain was flat with rice fields. The houses and hamlets were situated on high ground where dense vegetation was prevalent. The weather during the first 3 weeks made the terrain ideal for APC and Infantry operations. However, after this initial period, the terrain was rendered untrafficable and APC's experienced difficulty in supporting infantry elements.

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aggressive and intensive Medcap II program utilizing the 1/27 Inf Bn Surg and the 2 medics of the ARVN "Go Team", was conducted throughout the operational area. This program paid great dividends in the following ways:

(1) The villagers were treated for their illnesses and diseases.

(2) The attitude of the people changed from that of passiveness which was almost hostile, to that of friendliness. This friendliness increased in each successive visit by the Bn Surgeon Villagers in the area where Medcap II was conducted, willingly began giving information pertaining to the VC. In Ap Hau Hoa (3) (XT5703), long a VC sanctuary, the villagers indicated booby trapped area, pointed out the house of the VC chief, and volunteered information on VC movement through the hamlet. In Duc Lap (XT5505), and Ap Chanh (XT560050), the children pointed out booby traps, 60mm rounds, and grenade duds to the 1/27 Inf Recon Plat.

(3) Distribution of "Helping Hand" clothing, soap, toothbrushes, toothpaste, USAID clothing, candy, ice, burgum, tablets, pencils, and handbags, greatly aided in changing the attitude of the villagers throughout the AO.

9. Mission: 1/27 (-) conducts tactical motor march to AO 130900 June 1966; conducts S&D opns, combat patrols, and ambushes in AO to locate and destroy VC forces and supplies; conducts combined opns with local ARVN forces; establish liaison with Hau Nghia Advisory Team (XT5204); provide wire, pickets, and technical advice on installations to RF and PF units in AO; conducts road improvement operations in AO from XT585088 to XT526043 and from XT526043 to XT525048; and conducts Road Runner opns in AO.

10. Concept of Operations

a. 1/27 Inf (-) (Wolfhounds) conducts S&D operations vic Ap Hau Hoa (XT575703) for approximately three (3) weeks beginning 130900 June 1966. Operations will be conducted in four (4) phases:

(1) Phase I: 1/27 Inf (-) (Wolfhounds) security plus quartering party escorted by 1/5 Mech element, conducts motor march from base camp to fwd def base, (XT570044). Element will sweep bn base site and secure for arrival of main body.

(2) Phase II: 1/27 Inf (-) (Wolfhounds) main body plus attachments conducts motor march from base camp to Ap Hau Hoa (3). Co A will occupy southern half of the base defense perimeter. Co C will occupy northern half. Bn truckmaster will muster empty trucks for return to Cu Chi. AT plat will begin security checks of civilians residing west of perimeter.

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(3) Phase III: 1/27 Inf conducts S&D operations in AO to include day and night patrols, ambushes, village searches, destruction of VC forces and supplies, and a vigorous CA program.

(4) Phase IV: 1/27 Inf returns to Cu Chi.

11. Execution: The 1st Bn 27th Inf (Wolfhounds) was tasked by CO, 2d Brigade, 25th Inf Div, to conduct search and destroy operations in Duc Hoa District, Hau Nghia Province, for approximately three (3) weeks commencing 13 June 1966. (2d Brigade OPORD 27-66, dtd 10 June 1966). CO, 1st Bn, 27th Inf planned a concept of operation and issued Bn OPORD 6-66 (Operation Sante Fe) at 120730 June 1966. The plan envisioned Bn TF (2 Companies plus attachments) moving by motor convoy to establish a fwd base North of Ap Hau Hoa (3) (XT570044). Upon establishment of bn base, TF1/27 Inf was to conduct search and destroy ops throughout AO Sante Fe for a period of approximately three weeks. Where practical, combined ops with ARVN forces would be conducted. Road Runner, CA, road, and installation construction projects would be incorporated into the general plan.

a. 1st Bn 27th Inf (Wolfhounds) conducted motor march to vic Ap Hau Hoa beginning 130808 hrs to initiate its participation in operation Sante Fe. The security elements and quartering party departed base camp (Cu Chi) at 130808 hrs and arrived at bn fwd defense base at 130935 hrs. At 0847 hrs, the main body crossed the SP and at 1050 hrs the battalion task force closed battalion operational area. Bn CP was established at XT570044. B1/27 Inf remained in base camp Cu Chi and assumed responsibility for defense of 1/27 Inf base camp perimeter.

b. 131800 - 141800 June 1966: 1/27 Inf established eight (8) night ambushes in AO Sante Fe. At 132235 hrs, Ambush Sardine (XT560042), received ineffective fire from an automatic weapon and carbine. The firing appeared to originate from vic XT559047. The ambush did not return fire, but 6 rounds of 81mm mortar fire were called in with undetermined results. Ambush Sardine moved approximately 50 meters and no further contact was made during the night. All other ambushes had negative contact. At 140630 hrs, the Recon plot with attached Engineer mine detector team, moved out to secure Route Blue from base camp to road intersection at XT555053 - clearing the area 500 meters on either side of the road. The unit returned to bn fwd defense base at 141135 hrs. Negative contact was made and no tunnels or VC supplies were found. At 141415 hrs, attached RRU unit reported homing in on a suspected VC transmitter located at XT567039. 3A1/27 Inf was dispatched to the suspected site. After a thorough search, the element reported that it was unable to locate the transmitter and returned at 141545 hrs.

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ambushes in AO Sante Fe. All ambushes reported negative contact. At 142155 hrs Bn fwd defense base received small arms fire (carbines), automatic weapons fire, rifle grenades, and 60mm mortar fire from vic XT568040. 1/27 Inf forces replied with small arms, and 40 rds from 81mm mortar platoon. Results were unknown. There were no friendly casualties. At 150700, the Recon Plt with attached mine detector team, moved out to secure route blue from Bn fwd base camp to road intersection at XT555053. The road was secured by 150830, and the attached engineer element moved out to help construct the ARVN outpost at Duc Lap airstrip. At 150701, one ARVN Mech Co, the 1/10, and a rifle company from the ARVN 4/49 Bn moved out of Ap Bao Trai to a blocking pos S of Hau Hoa (3), (XT575030). At 150900, TF 1/27 Inf commenced sweep south towards the objective area (Ap Hau Hoa). Numerous mines and booby traps were discovered and destroyed, but no contact was made with VC elements. A thorough search of the area and an extensive interrogation of the population by the ARVN "Go Team" yielded negative results. The ARVN blocking force to the south effectively sealed off the area, and no one was allowed to pass through the force without proper credentials. TF1/27 Inf returned to Bn fwd defense base at 151440, and the ARVN blocking force was released for their return to Bao Trai at 151445. The engineer element completed the earth work portion of their construction project at Duc Lap airstrip, XT543049, and returned to the Bn fwd base camp at 151515. 1/27 Inf elements continued to search for a VC transmitter reported earlier to be in close proximity to base camp. The transmitter was not located.

d. 151800 - 161800 Jun 66: TF1/27 Inf established six night ambushes in AO Sante Fe. All ambushes reported negative contact except Ambush Hawk (XT541033). At 152155, Ambush Hawk saw 5-6 VC moving in line formation from SW to ambush site. Mortar concentrations were fired. Results unknown. At 160300, Ambush Hawk received small arms fire, automatic weapons fire, possible MG fire and 5-7 rifle grenades from the South, Southwest, and Southeast. Mortars were fired with undetermined results. There were no friendly casualties. At 160700, the Recon Plt moved out to secure route blue from base camp to road intersection at XT555053. The road was secured at 160800 and the attached engineer element moved out to assist in the construction of the ARVN outpost at Duc Lap airstrip. At 160830, TF1/27 Inf began a sweep south towards Ap Hau Hoa XT579025, the Bn Obj for the day. Numerous grenade booby traps and AT mines were discovered and destroyed, and approximately 60 "L" shaped trenches were filled. At 161024, 1/27 Inf received small arms fire from an estimated 2 VC from Loc XT583027. At 161037, Co A received additional carbine fire from estimated 4 snipers at location vic XT579026, and XT574036. A1/27 Inf maneuvered elements, but snipers could not be located. Intelligence information from villagers indicated that approximately 5 VC armed with rifles and pistols belts with ammo had been in the area, but had not fired and moved southward when US forces approached.

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After securing Ap Hau Hoa, extensive medcap and Helping Hand activities were conducted and smallpox inoculations were administered to indigenous personnel throughout the area. A1 platoon supported by National Police continued to screen and check all civilian personnel passing 1/27 Inf checkpoint at XT567044. A total of 80 Vietnamese civilians were checked, all had proper identification cards.

e. 161800 - 171800 June 60: TF1/27 Inf established six night ambushes in Route Fe. All ambushes reported negative contact. At 162158 hrs, TF1/27 Inf elements on bn fwd defense base perimeter noted 1 VC in vic XT572040. Three M-79 rounds were fired. A thorough search of the area at 170700 failed to reveal any signs of VC. At 170700 hrs, the Recon platoon moved out to secure Route Blue from base camp to road intersection at XT555053. The road was secured at 170800 hrs, and the attached engineer platoon moved out to assist in the construction of the ARVN outpost at the Duc Lap airstrip and to continue road improvement operations between Duc Lap and the bn fwd defense base. At Duc Lap intersection (XT555053), the engineer platoon destroyed 3 grenades and 1 AT mine. The grenades and the AT mine appeared to have been laid the night before. Of interest, is the fact that the location of the grenades and mines were pointed out to the U. forces by children who were playing in the area. It appears that the intensive medcap activities which had been conducted throughout Route Fe by 1/27 Inf forces had made a marked impression on the indigenous population, and had served to strengthen US and ARVN influence throughout the area. At 170830 hours, Co A and Co C moved out on a sweep to the SE and SW respectively. Numerous booby traps and rifle grenades were located and destroyed by both companies. At 171114 hrs, C1/27 Inf encountered sniper fire from two snipers vic XT581022. C1/27 Inf returned with small arms and artillery. C1/27 Inf reported finding fresh blood on the trail at XT581020, indicating, at least 1 VC KIA (poss). No further contact was reported by either company and both units closed on fwd defense base by 1445 hrs. Extensive medcap activities were conducted in Ap Hau Hoa. A total of 112 personnel were treated. All appeared to be appreciative and extremely happy to see the bn surgeon. The mutual trust which has developed between U forces, ARVN elements, and the indigenous population was readily apparent. The villagers openly offered information to U forces on VC movements and activities. At 171330 hrs, a Vietnamese Intelligence Agent accompanying the medcap team, reported that a dwelling in Ap Hau Hoa at XT577034, belonged to a VC hamlet Chief, and had been visited by both the hamlet Chief and the village Chief between 162400 and 170015 hrs. An ambush was established near the site that night in anticipation of a return visit, but the VC failed to return. The Recon platoon conducted Ro runner ops between Duc Lap and Duc Hanh B, XT575075. A1 platoon supported by National Police continued to screen and check all civilian personnel passing 1/27 Inf checkpoint at XT567044. A total of 106 Vietnamese civilians were checked. All had proper identification cards.

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f. 171800 - 181800 June 1966: TF1/27 Inf established five (5) night ambushes in AO Sante Fe. At 180045 hrs, ambush Austin (AT557054), reported that it had been hit by automatic carbine fire and that there was 1 US W/L. Two APC's from attached 5th Mech platoon were dispatched to evacuate patrol. The wounded individual died enroute to bn fwd defense base. At 180715 hrs, Recon platoon moved out to secure Route Blue from bn fwd defense base to road intersection vic AT555053. The road was secured at 180808 hrs. At 180800 hrs, companies A and C were airlifted from defense base to Bao Canh Na loc vic AT551007. Airlift consisted of thirty-three UH-1H lifts, and was conducted in a highly orderly and expeditious fashion. At LZ Red, south of Bao Canh Na, TF1/27 Inf (-) exited the choppers and quickly deployed into the woodline on the southern edge of the objective. At 180820 hrs, TF1/27 Inf (-) commenced its sweep from S to N with attached 1/5 Mech platoon positioned north of the hamlet as a blocking force. The initial civilian reaction appeared to be one of surprise. However, upon questioning the villagers, it was learned that the VC with loudspeakers had been through the obj area on the night of 17 June, and had warned the villagers that US troops would be entering the area on 18 June. Villagers were also informed that they were to remain indoors because the area would be booby trapped. Information received also reported there were 20-30 VC in Bao Canh Na on 16 June 1966. Only one booby trap was found in Bao Canh Na. It was destroyed in place. Four VC were captured vic AT556015 and a total of 8 VCS were detained. At 181149 hrs, A/27 Inf encountered automatic sniper fire from an estimated 3 VC. AT557018. A1/27 Inf engaged the snipers and made a thorough search of the area, but was not able to locate VC. At 181300 hrs, 1 APC from 5th Mech platoon hit an AT mine at AT556202. No damage was done to vehicle or personnel. C1/27 Inf and A1/27 Inf closed bn fwd def base at 181226 hrs and 181350 hrs respectively. No drummer ops were conducted between base camp and Duc Minh B by the Recon. Platoon. At platoon supported by National Police continued to screen and check all civilian personnel passing 1/27 Inf checkpoint at AT56044. A total of 80 personnel were checked. All personnel checked out satisfactorily.

g. 181800 - 191800 June 1966: TF1/27 Inf established 4 night ambushes in AO Sante Fe. All ambushes reported negative contact. At 190715 hrs, Recon Platoon moved out to secure Route Blue from bn fwd def base to road intersection at AT555053. The road was secured at 190800 hrs, and the Madcap element secured by 1st platoon, A1/27 Inf, proceeded to Duc High A and B to carry out Madcap activities. A total of 176 patients were treated. Element returned to fwd base camp at 191200 hrs. At 190800 hrs, C1/27 Inf moved from fwd base camp to Obj Kitty, vic AT603025 to conduct operations against a suspected VC force. At 190850 hrs, C1/27 Inf stated that villagers reported 4 VC running across field vic AT597036. Helicopter recon failed to locate VC. At 190948 hrs, C1/27 Inf received sniper fire from vic AT604030. Artillery fire was placed on suspected VC locations. Results undetermined. From 191002 hrs to 191030 hrs sniper fire was received from Obj Kitty. A thorough search of the area, however, produced negative results. C1/27 Inf did locate a building complex on Obj Kitty which might have at one time housed a VC hospital with a 30-40 patient capacity. Indications were that it had not been used recently.

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01/27 Inf returned to Bn fwd defense base at 05. B1/27 Inf conducted sweep between Duc Hanh A and Bn fwd defense base commencing 191134. No VC contact was made, but 5 VCS were detained vic XT580058. B1/27 Inf found approximately 20 bamboo stakes with attached propaganda leaflets along the road vic XT578049. The stakes appeared freshly planted. AT platoon supported by Nat'l police continued to screen and check all civilian personnel passing 1/27 Inf checkpoint at XT567044. A total of 110 personnel were checked. All personnel checked out satisfactorily. Road runner operations were conducted between base and Duc Hanh B by Recon Platoon.

h. 191800 - 201800 Jun 66: TF1/27 Inf established 7 night ambushes in AO Sante Fe. All ambushes reported negative contact. At 200430, TF1/27 Inf (-) moved out on S&D mission to Obj Cat vic XT609001. At 200600 attached mech plat departed Bn fwd defense base to act as a blocking force at Obj Cat. At 0655, B1/27 Inf received sniper fire from XT603022. Friendly casualties: 1 KIA, 1 WIA. TF1/27 Inf returned fire with unknown results. At 200715, the decision was made to expand the Bn obj to include the hamlet complex to the SE of Obj Cat. At 200755 several booby trap signs and a VC trench network were uncovered vic XT699022. At 0802 hrs, 8 VCS were detained at XT609022 - two of which later proved to be VCG. One VCG stated that he had hidden a weapon under his bed. A thorough search of his hut produced negative results. At 100930, TF1/27 Inf wheeled north and swept the operational area again. Successive sweeps N to S and E to W produced negative results. At 200945, TF1/27 Inf encountered additional VC trenches and booby trap signs. At 1115, after the objective had been thoroughly searched, TF1/27 Inf with attached mech Plat moved NW to Obj Cat, where B1/27 Inf suffered 1 slightly WIA by a booby trap. TF1/27 commenced return march to Bn fwd defense base at 1315. Enroute to base camp, B1/27 Inf located a fully armed CHICOM claymore. It was set up and ready to fire. The claymore was brought back to Bn fwd defense base. TF1/27 Inf closed at 1520. At 200810 hours vic XT570045, a CHICOM claymore was found and detonated approx 50 meters in front of the perimeter, slightly wounding 1 US soldier. A thorough search of the area was conducted and a CHICOM battery and 300 meters of detonating wire were found. Medcap was conducted at Ap Thanh (3) vic XT559048. Approximately 79 patients were treated. AT plat supported by Nat'l Police continued to check all civilian personnel passing 1/27 Inf checkpoint at XT567044.

1. 201800 - 211800 Jun 66: TF1/27 Inf established 4 night ambushes in AO Sante Fe. All ambushes reported negative contact. At 210715, Recon Platoon moved out to secure Route Blue from base camp to road intersection at XT555053. Road was secured at 210745. At 210815, Bn Recon Plat reported that small children at Duc Lap intersection were reporting the location of old US hand grenades and 60mm mortar duds.

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Between the hours of 1815 and 0950, a total of 22 hand grenades, one grenade booby trap, 16 60mm duds, and two 155mm duds were found and destroyed. At 210800 hrs, B1/27 Inf moved by motor convoy to detruck point located XT526042. Upon reaching destination, B1/27 Inf dismounted and began a two pronged sweep East utilizing one platoon to the North and one platoon to the South. At 210937 hrs, via XT551-030, B1/27 Inf encountered booby trapped signs. One booby trap was destroyed. Two US WIA occurred as a result of tripping grenade booby traps. Two VCS were detained and brought back to base. One proved to be VOG, and when questioned gave much intelligence information to MID. This information included names, orgns, and opns of VC in area. Attached Medcap Team treated 6 villagers enroute to base camp. The people encountered during the sweep appeared very friendly to US personnel. B1/27 Inf closed base camp at 211145 hrs. At 210945 hrs, 16 RRU reported picking up signals from a VC transmitter at XT557080. 3B1/5 Mech was dispatched to investigate but was unable to locate the transmitter. Recon platoon conducted an Roadrunner opn from Duc Manh B to base camp. AT platoon supported by National Police continued to screen and check all civilian personnel passing 1/27 Inf checkpoint at XT567044. A total of 50 persons checked out satisfactorily.

J. 211800 - 221800 June 1966: TF1/27 Inf established 4 night ambushes in AO Sante Fe. At 212010 hrs, Ambush Tiger, XT589-043, noted 7 VC walking along the trail towards their ambush site. When the VC were approx 30 meters from the ambush site, US Forces opened up with M-16 and hand grenades, resulting in 2 VC dead (poss). The VC did not return the fire although the ambush patrol did receive fire from huts located via XT588042 and XT595038. The VC ran towards the East and the US patrol called in 81mm mortar fire. The ambush patrol relocated to XT589044. A thorough search conducted in the area during the morning produced negative results. At 212013 hrs, Ambush Sheep via XT559051, received a short burst from an automatic weapon via XT560053. Fire was not returned. At 212023 hrs, the ARVN outpost at XT577074, received SA fire North of outpost. At 211943 hrs, the bn perimeter received 4 incoming rds from via XT57-2040. Fire was returned with M-79. Results unknown. At 220845 hrs, 3B1/5 Mech platoon departed base camp to set up blocking pens SE of Ap Tram Loc via XT636044. At 220905 hrs, a two (2) company airlift commenced, and by 220945 all elements had arrived at LZ. Movement thru the obj was slow, and the entire area was thoroughly searched. At approx 221030 hrs sniper fire was received via XT622033. Fire was returned. Results unknown. At 221450 hrs, C1/27 Inf touched off two booby traps (XT622033) and sustained one WIA. Dustoff evacuated WIA at 1520 hrs. At XT602033, 221410 hrs, C1/27 Inf again received SA fire. 3B1/5 Mech deployed but could not locate VC. A total of two VCS were picked up in the AO. TF1/27 Inf was extracted at 221530 hrs, via XT619033. 3B1/5 Mech, which was being used as a blocking force, located a cache of approx 1500 lbs of rice, via XT622033. The rice was brought back to base. AT platoon supported by National Police continued to screen and check all personnel passing 1/27 Inf checkpoint at XT567044. A total of 50 persons were checked. All checked out satisfactorily.

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230730 - 230943 June 1966: TF1/27 Inf established 5 night ambushes in AO Sante Fe. All ambushes reported negative contact except Ambush Yankee. At 230730 hrs, Ambush Yankee (Recon platoon), reported seeing 30 civilians gathering at XT609031. As the Recon platoon maneuvered towards vic XT609031, in order to better observe what was taking place, it received 4 rds of sniper fire from vic XT609032. Additional fire was received from XT618020, resulting in one US WIA. En CO ordered 5th Mech platoon to proceed to Recon location to aid engaged element. 5th Mech and Recon platoon cleared area from where sniper fire originated with the help of two gunships which arrived at 230943. A thorough search of the area was made with negative results. However, 2 VC women were detained and returned to base camp for interrogation. Mech and Recon platoons reached base camp at 231148. At 230536, B1/27 Inf moved to village vic XT554033. The village was sealed off, and a thorough search of the area was conducted. The entire opn was so well executed that the villagers were caught completely by surprise. Not a single villager managed to escape the cordon which was placed around the village. The search netted a total of 10 VCS detainees and 5 VCS. VCS and VCC detainees were transported to base camp fwd for interrogation. B1/27 Inf returned to base camp at 231045 hrs. C1/27 Inf was airlifted to Bao Canh Na, XT562008 at 230822 hrs. No VC contact was made, and the company proceeded with its pacification and Med-cap opns. A total of 47 patients were treated. 2 VC were detained at XT562017 and XT562010. C1/27 Inf returned to base camp at 1500 hrs. AT platoon supported by Nat'l Police continued to check and screen all civilians passing 1/27 Inf checkpoint at XT567044. A total of 60 personnel checked out satisfactorily.

1. 231800 - 241800 June 1966: TF1/27 Inf established 4 night ambushes in AO Sante Fe. All ambushes reported negative contact. At 231950 hrs, fwd defense base received 6 probing rounds from BAR and rifle grenades from vic XT574043. Fire was returned with M-79 and 81mm mortars. Results unknown. At 240540 hrs Ambush Eagle, (Co B - XT558017) reported that it had 1 WIA from a booby trap which it had encountered on return to fwd defense base. WIA was evacuated to Cu Chi. At 240800, B1/27 Inf was airlifted from base camp fwd to LZ Bravo, XT612034. The entire air movement was well coordinated and executed. No VC contact was made during B1/27 Inf opn. Very few indigenous people were seen during the sweep. B1/27 Inf returned to fwd defense base at 1410 hrs. C1/27 Inf commenced move south to Obj X, XT581024, at 0830 and reached the Obj area at 0915. Several freshly planted grenade booby traps were encountered at XT580025. Two US WIA by booby traps were reported at 241015. WIA's were evacuated to Cu Chi. A total of 5 booby traps were destroyed within Obj X, and two VCS were detainees were taken from XT581024 at 241030. C1/27 Inf returned to base camp at 241515 hrs. The attached 5th Mech platoon was released from TF1/27 Inf control effective 241200 hrs. 1A3/4 Cav platoon replaced the 5th Mech platoon.

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At 240900 hrs, recon platoon reported that children in the vic of XT55-6053 were again pointing out hand grenades and mortar duds. The children pointed out a total of 1 CBU bomb, 7 hand grenades, and 2 60mm duds. All were destroyed in place. Medcap Team was dispatched to Ap Chanh (3) vic XT560047 at 240900 hrs, to treat the indigenous personnel. A total of 108 patients were treated. All appeared extremely appreciative of the help rendered them by the US personnel. AT platoon supported by Nat'l Police, continued to screen and check all civilians passing 1/27 Inf checkpoint at XT567044. A total of 55 personnel checked out satisfactorily.

m. 241800 - 251800 June 1966: TF1/27 Inf established 4 night ambushes in AO Sante Fe. All ambushes reported negative contact. At 241942 hours, B1/27 Inf received 3 probing B&R rds from vic XT573042. B1/27 Inf returned with M-79, SA, and 81mm mortars. Results unknown. At 0853 hours, the Medcap Team commenced ops at Obj B, Xom My Tau, XT568059, after it had been secured by B1/27 Inf. A total of 58 patients were treated. When Medcap had been completed, B1/27 Inf continued with its sweep to the NE thru Xom Iay Vien (2), vic XT580063, and returned to bn forward defense base. No VC contact was made nor were any mines or booby traps encountered. The people appeared friendly throughout the sweep. C1/27 Inf commenced pacification of Ap Hau Hoa (3) at 250815 hrs. The people in the village stated that at 241930 hrs, a platoon of VC had entered the village to check on the possibility of constructing a roadblock on the main road, and that 3 VC decided to fire 3 rounds at the 1/27 Inf perimeter. When 1/27 Inf returned fire, the VC changed the plans and moved out of the village. This would coincide with the firing which 1/27 Inf experienced at 241942 hrs. While pacification operations were being conducted, a number of ARVN and US advisory personnel visited Ap Hau Hoa, and observed the Medcap Team administer aid to some of the 144 patients treated in the hamlet that day. At 251100 hrs, 1 APC from 1A3/4 Cav, which had been given the mission of screening the road from bn forward defense base, south to XT580022, fell into a tank trap vic XT572040. Dimensions were 16' X 14' X 6'. The vehicle was pulled out of the trap undamaged. 1 MIA resulted (broken jaw and ribs), and was evacuated to Cu Chi. 3 booby traps were found at XT578035 at 1425 hrs, resulting in 1 US KIA. 8 "L" shaped trenches were also destroyed at same location. At 1330 hrs, vic XT578035, C1/27 Inf destroyed 2 small bunkers and 1 VC house. By 1520 hrs, C1/27 Inf had completed the pacification of Ap Hau Hoa and returned to base camp. Throughout the opn, Recon platoon continued to secure the road from base camp to Duc Lap. At 1030 hrs, Recon platoon found a small child on the road approx 200 meters north of the perimeter, vic XT557048. The child was dead and was turned over to his parents who evacuated him to Bao Trai.

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4 night ambushes in AO Sante Fe. At 251500 hrs, one of the APC's that was carrying Ambush Wolf to its ambush site hit an AT mine, vic XT553038. APC was badly damaged and 8 WIA were sustained. A VET was called in to help extract the damaged APC. An evacuation chopper was also called in to remove the wounded. The APC could not be extracted. One reinforced rifle squad from BL/27 Inf was dispatched at 1950 hrs to help provide security for the 3/4 Cav platoon. Vehicle was extracted the next morning and the security element returned to BL/27 Inf. At 260530 hrs, BL/27 Inf moved out to secure the village of Ap Bao Son (2) vic XT556025. BL/27 Inf made a thorough search of the area and detained a total of 25 VCS for questioning (17 detainees, 8 VCS). Once secured, pacification and Medevac ops were undertaken by the ARVN "Go Team" and US medical pers. The people were most responsive to the pacification ops and welcomed the Medevac pers. A total of 94 patients were treated. At 260920 hrs BL/27 Inf moved N to Ap Bao Son (1) vic XT554032. Pacification ops were again conducted with the same general response. A total of 114 personnel were treated by Medevac pers. Co sustained one WIA (slightly) from booby trap vic XT557036. BL/27 Inf closed base camp at 261300 hrs. At 260700 hrs, CI/27 Inf was airlifted to LZ at XT626055. Aircraft reported automatic weapons fire from vic LZ. However, CI/27 Inf reported negative contact upon landing. Numerous sampans, SA ammunition and mines were destroyed in CI/27 Inf sweep to the NW. 3 grenade booby traps were destroyed. Motor convoy departed base camp at 1500 hrs and picked up CI/27 Inf at the untracking area, XT576077. CI/27 Inf closed base camp at 261555 hrs. Eng platoon continued with road improvement ops from bn fwd def base to Duc Lap commencing 261300 hrs. AT platoon supported by National Police continued to check and screen all civilians passing 1/27 Inf checkpoint at XT567044. A total of 37 personnel were checked. All checked out satisfactorily.

o. 261800 - 271800 June 1966: TF1/27 Inf established 4 night ambushes in AO Sante Fe. At 270700 hrs, 1 platoon of CI/27 Inf moved to Km My Tau, vic XT568049, and Go Cao, vic XT543042, with the mission of searching the area. Platoon at My Tau reported negative contact and returned to base camp at 0940 hrs. The platoon searching Go Cao detained 1 VCS vic XT544041. Another VCS was detained at XT544046. No VC contact was made and the element returned to base camp at 271230 hrs. At 270630 hrs, BL/27 Inf moved with the ARVN "Go Team" to search and secure the village of Giong Lee vic XT583015. At 0910 hrs, while enroute to obj area, BL/27 Inf received sniper fire vic XT57500 from an estimated 3-5 VC. VC were engaged but results unknown. At 1210 hrs, BL/27 Inf apprehended 4 VCS at XT570020 and at 1030 an additional 6 VCS plus the wife and 3 children of a confirmed VC were apprehended. At 1100 hrs, blood and expended carbine rounds were found vic XT570020. Villagers stated that 2 VC had been seen dragging away a badly wounded comrade (1 VC KIA, poss). SA fire was again received at 1105 hrs from vic XT575012. BL/27 Inf engaged and pursued snipers but were unable to track down VC. When BL/27 Inf finally arrived at Giong Lee, it made a thorough search of the area with negative results.

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p. 291800 - 291800 June 1966: TF1/27 Inf established 5 night ambushes in AO Sante Fe. At 282310, ambush Purple located at XT551034, made contact with a large VC force estimated to have consisted of seventy (70) VC. When the engagement began, firing could be heard at the battalion defense base. Radio contact was lost between patrol and parent company immediately. A1/27 Inf fired 81mm mortars around ambush locations with unknown results. At 282315 hrs, the battalion reaction force, 1A1/27 Inf was ordered to go and assist the patrol. 1A1/27 Inf departed wire at battalion defense base at 282345 hrs, and reached the ambush location at 290113 hrs. 1A1/27 Inf made negative contact with both VC element and the US ambush. 1A1/27 Inf continued to search for the ambush until 290345 hours, at which time it returned to the battalion defense base due to intense darkness. A1/27 Inf departed the battalion defense base at first light to continue the search for ambush Purple. At 290705 hrs, A1/27 Inf encountered a soldier who claimed to be a survivor of the ambush group being sought, but could not provide any information as to what happened. At 290822 hours, the Bn S-3 sighted the lost ambush from the air via XT551034. He notified CO A1/27 Inf, who was on the ground approximately 200 meters away. All 12 patrol members were dead. They had made contact with a superior sized VC force and had been overwhelmed in position. A1/27 Inf called for Lustoff to remove the dead. A1/27 Inf commenced a search of all houses and growth in the area for signs of VC. Much blood was found in the vic of the ambush site indicating that US troops killed many VC. A1/27 Inf continued to search area within 1500 meters of the ambush site, apprehending three VCs at 291015 hrs via XT542026. A1/27 Inf returned to bn fwd defense base at 291115 hrs. At 0800 hrs, B1/27 Inf received the mission of assisting in search of VC who had hit ambush Purple. B1/27 Inf moved to vic XT564009, Bao Canh Na, conducted a search of the villagers, swept E to vic XT583015, and headed N to base camp. At 291050 hrs, B1/27 Inf apprehended 3 VC via XT561045 at 1245 hrs, and commenced a search 1000 meters either side of Route 9 up to Bao Trei (XT526044). C1/27 Inf apprehended 8 VCs at 1410 hrs and closed Bn forward defense base at 1500 hrs. 4/49 ARVN swept area W of AO Sante Fe. 34th RVN Ranger swept area of AO Sante Fe bounded by coord 5500, 5597, 5897, 5800. None of the units participating in the search for the VC who attacked ambush Purple were able to locate anything of significant value.

q. 291800 - 301000 June 1966: TF1/27 Inf established 4 night ambushes in AO Sante Fe. At 300340 hrs, ambush Tiger (XT558040) spotted 15-30 approximately 500 meters NW of ambush site. At 0430 hrs, the same ambush noted what they believed to be a squad sized unit moving toward a nearby woodline. 81mm mortar fire was called in, and the area was kept under surveillance.

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AT 0615 hrs, ambush Tiger found 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC KIA, and 2 VCS women. Blood was found in the immediate vicinity of the site indicating that more VC were KIA. Ambush Tiger returned to base camp at 0800 hrs. Ambush Tiger results: 8 VC KIA (poss), 1 VC KIA (BC), and 3 VCS apprehended (1 VCC and 2 VCs). A1/27 Inf departed base perimeter at 0730 hrs for S&D ops in Bao Canh Na (XT562009). At 0745 hrs, A1/27 Inf destroyed 1 freshly planted booby trapped grenade vic XT569035. A1/27 Inf reported that woman stated that VC in area had warned people to stay out of rice paddies because they were mined and booby trapped. A thorough search of Bao Canh Na produced negative results. B1/27 Inf departed fwd def base at 0752 hrs by motor convoy to pen Yankee (XT5759079), and commenced S&D ops in NE sector of AO. B1/27 Inf apprehended a total of 10 VCS during the opn. B1/27 Inf closed bn fwd def base at 1410 hrs. C1/27 Inf departed base camp at 0615 hrs and swept along grid line 04 to coord 5404. At grid line 5404, the company turned N and swept to road where they were picked up by motor convoy and returned to bn fwd def base at 1155 hrs. Along assigned route, C1/27 Inf destroyed 1 booby trapped hand grenade vic XT558042. A thorough search of assigned sector produced negative results. C1/27 Inf departed bn fwd def base at 1530 hrs for base camp Cu Chi, and closed base camp Cu Chi at 1630 hrs. 1A3/4 Cav, with attached line sweeper team from Eng unit, cleared road between base camp and rice mill vic XT582023. 1A3/4 Cav provided flank security for return sweep of A1/27 Inf. Eng plat conducted road improvement operations from base perimeter (XT570044) to Duc Lap (XT555053). AT plat supported by National Police continued to check and screen all civilians passing A1/27 Inf checkpoint at XT567044. A total of 30 personnel were checked. All checked out satisfactorily. At 0930 hrs the medcap tm escorted by Recon plat moved to Duc Hanh A to conduct medcap operations. A total of 90 patients were treated. The medcap team closed the bn fwd def base at 1250 hrs. At 1435 hrs, Recon reported that it had destroyed 1 60mm cax and 3 hand grenades at XT556052. Children in area had again pointed out the dux and grenades to the Recon Plat.

r. 301800 Jun - 011800 Jul 1966: TF1/27 Inf established 4 night ambushes in AO Sante Fe. At 010035 hrs, ambush Mercedes, XT563053, observed 4 VC by starlight setting up a mortar 600 meters away vic XT569050. Indirect fire was called and the VC dispersed. Results unknown. At 010112 hrs, ambush Mercedes observed 12-20 VC vic XT569050. 4.2 mortar fire was called. At 010225, ambush Mercedes again observed, through the starlight, 7-9 VC crawling in a rice paddy approximately 500 meters East of their location. Artillery fire was called and the VC ran toward a nearby tree line. At 010300 hrs, ambush Mercedes saw 6-8 VC in the woodline vic XT569058. 61mm mortar fire was called, VC dispersed, results unknown. At 010458 hrs, 1 plat, 3/4 Cav and A1/27 Inf departed for ambush Mercedes location to make a thorough check of the area.

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A total of 14 VCs were found in vic XT562030, the VCS were returned to base camp. At 010856 hrs, 1A3/4 Cav and A1/27 Inf reported that they could find nothing further and returned to base camp. Recon platoon secured Route Blue and found one hand grenade vic XT556053, at 1130 hrs. Two 60mm duds and one hand grenade were found at XT555053 at 1430 hrs. All were destroyed in place. At 1140 hrs, a small boy was brought to Bn Aid Station for treatment of a badly infected hand. A small boy who was found in the vicinity of XT564045, reported to the Recon Platoon that a VC was in a house located at XT559047. A thorough search of the hut resulted in one VCS. AT platoon continued to check Vietnamese passing 1/27 Inf checkpoint. A total of 50 personnel were checked. All checked out satisfactorily.

s. 011800 - 021800 July 1966: TF1/27 Inf established 2 night ambushes in AO Sante Fe. All ambushes reported negative contact. On 2 July 66, the Bn TF effort was devoted entirely to the conduct of a County Fair in Ap Hau Hoa, vic XT576036. At 0526 hrs, Co A moved out and sealed off the southern boundary of the village to insure that no one escaped, while 1A3/4 Cav secured the route from bn fwd def base to the southern edge of Ap Hau Hoa. At 0645 hrs, Co B swept through the village, policed up the inhabitants, and moved them to a centralized screening area. GVN National Police, with the assistance of the AT platoon, screened the civilians to determine their true status, and a complete census of the population was conducted. After Ap Hau Hoa had been secured, and the screening process begun, the County Fair activities commenced. TF1/27 Inf scheduled medcap and Helping Hand, movies, volleyball games, Vietnamese and American entertainment, and visits by ARVN and GVN officials. The County Fair activities were well received by the village inhabitants, although they seemed to be rather bewildered at the vast array of entertainment. At 1415 hrs, the County Fair was completed, and TF1/27 Inf closed bn fwd def base at 1605 hrs. 1A3/4 Cav platoon was released from TF1/27 Inf control at 1515 hrs and returned to Cu Chi. 3B1/5 Mech was attached to TF1/27 Inf effective 1515 hrs.

t. 021800 - 031800 July 1966: TF1/27 Inf established 3 night ambushes in AO Sante Fe. All ambushes had negative contact. The Operation for 3 July 66, envisioned a sweep by B1/27 Inf from NE portion of AO to bn fwd def base. A1/27 Inf was to be utilized as a blocking force a few hundred meters NE of bn fwd def base, while 3B1/5 Mech would be tied in on the left flank of A1/27 Inf and would be utilized to block traffic moving west of Route Blue. 4/49 ARVN from Bao Trai, established an additional blocking pen along the Duc Lap - Cu Chi highway. By 0835 hrs, A1/27 Inf, 3B1/5 Mech, and 4/49 ARVN elements were in their assigned blocking positions, and B1/27 Inf was ready to commence its sweep from pen Yankee (XT585087) to bn fwd def base. B1/27 Inf had negative contact throughout the sweep.

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A1/27 Inf, approximately 300 meters from the blocking position. A1/27 Inf challenged the individuals with voice commands and warning shots, but personnel continued to run and were subsequently cut down by US SA fire. Only 1 body could be found, but it contained documents which indicated that individuals was VC. A search of the immediate vicinity produced blood around area where the other VC had been observed. A thorough search was undertaken but the other VC could not be located. All elements closed on fwd defense base by 1405 hrs. AT plat assisted by National Police continued to check Vietnamese passing 1/27 Inf checkpoint. A total of 35 personnel were checked. All personnel checked out satisfactorily. At 1445 hrs, a suspected enemy transmitter was traced to vic XT569045. A thorough search of the area was made with negative results.

u. 031800-041800 July 1966: TF1/27 Inf established 2 night ambushes in AO Santa Fe. At 032245 hrs, Ambush Red, XT559047, reported observing 10 VC vic XT559038. Ambush Red engaged VC with 81mm Mortar fire and estimated that three VC were KIA (poss). VC dispersed in a NE direction. A thorough search of the area was made by Ambush Red, the following morning, producing negative results. A "Lighting Bug" mission was flown over TF1/27 Inf AO during the night. AT fire was received from vic XT614015 and SA fire was received from vic XT611015. The "Lighting Bug" retaliated with suppressive fires, results unknown. Additional fire was received from vic XT559012. TF1/27 Inf departed fwd def base by motor convoy to base camp Cu Chi in two march serials. Serial #1 departed fwd base at 0944 hrs and closed Cu Chi at 1025 hrs. The second serial departed at 1247 hrs and closed base camp at 1340 hrs. No enemy activity was encountered by either serial along the return route to Cu Chi. The entire operation was conducted in an orderly fashion. A C&C UH-1D controlled the movement and a UH-1D fire team was on immediate stand-by alert. The closing at base camp Cu Chi marked the termination of Opn Santa Fe.

12. Results:

a. VC losses: 4 VC KIA (BC), 16 VC KIA (poss), 21 VCC, 65 VCS, 82 VCS detainees.

b. Captured and destroyed enemy equipment and material:

- (1) Two (2) Chicdn claymores.
- (2) Thirty-six (36) booby traps.
- (3) Sixty-three (63) hand grenades.
- (4) Three (3) AP mines
- (5) Eleven (11) AT mines.
- (6) Two (2) 7.62 Chicdn carbines.
- (7) One (1) VC tunnel.
- (8) Forty (40) 60mm duds.
- (9) Ten (10) 105mm duds.
- (10) Two (2) 155mm duds.
- (11) Sixty-eight (68) "L" shaped trenches.
- (13) One (1) CBU bomb.
- (14) Four (4) VC huts.

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- (16) One hundred fifty (150) rounds of .30 caliber ammunition.
- (17) One hundred fifty (150) rounds of .50 caliber ammunition.
- (18) Two (2) pistol belts

- c. Friendly losses: 14 KIA, 30 WIA.
- d. Friendly equipment destroyed or damaged:
 - (1) Five (5) M-16 rifles
 - (2) Three (3) Cal 45 pistols
 - (3) One (1) M-14 rifle
 - (4) Two (2) M-14E2 rifles
 - (5) Two (2) M-79 grenade launchers.
 - (6) One (1) M-60 machine gun
 - (7) One (1) starlight scope
 - (8) Two (2) PFC 25 radio sets.

13. Administrative matters:

a. Supply: Resupply was accomplished by motor convoy. A scheduled convoy was dispatched from Cu Chi once each day and adequately met the requirements of TF1/27 Inf. Supplies required on an emergency basis were flown in by Helicopter.

b. Maintenance: Normal maintenance of weapons and equipment was performed prior to, during, and after the operation.

c. Treatment of casualties and evacuation: The Bn Aid Station accompanied the Bn CP group. Casualties were treated by the aidmen attached to the rifle companies, then moved to the aid station by litter or helicopter for further treatment. C&C and resupply helicopters were utilized to transport wounded requiring evacuation. Emergency cases were evacuated utilizing both Dustoff aircraft and assigned OH-1Ds.

d. Communications: TF1/27 Inf utilized numerous means of communications during Opn Santa Fe. FM and AM-RTT/CW/Voice were established by 1/27 Inf communications platoon. Elem 125th signal provided TF1/27 Inf with VHF Sole User, Common User, and Land Line teletype capability. No communications difficulties were encountered during the operation.

14. Commanders Analysis:

a. TF1/27 Inf accomplished its mission. TF1/27 Inf entered a long established VC stronghold, and through a balanced combination of tactical opns and civic action programs, was able to dominate the terrain and population. The effects of TF1/27 Inf extensive Medcap and civic action program will most likely make a more lasting impression upon the indigenous population than the display of US tactical power,

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The use of the ARVN "Go Team" materially aided 1/27 Inf in accomplishing its mission. Members of the team were familiar with the customs and many knew the local village inhabitants. They were thus better qualified to determine which segment of the local populace was sympathetic to the Viet Cong. This assistance helped unit commanders to apprehend many VCS who later proved to be VCS.

c. Airmobile operations greatly enhanced the combat capability of TF1/27 Inf. As the operation progressed, it became increasingly apparent that the rising water level was causing personnel to experience fatigue. APC's also became increasingly dependent upon the road, and their cross-country mobility was cut to a minimum. The use of the helicopters enabled TF1/27 Inf to operate unfatigued in a designated operational area, and eliminated the need for extensive APC support during movements to and from bn fwd defense base. Greater results could be attained if a D3 airmobile Co were available to the battalion commander:


15. Recommendations:

a. GVN and ARVN personnel be immediately prepared to actively assume responsibilities for areas cleared by US Forces. Although TF1/27 Inf controlled AO Sante Fe from 13 June to 4 July '66, future GVN influence will be minimal if appropriate measures are not taken to actively continue the pacification effort.

b. That every effort be made to provide TF1/27 Inf with the same aviation company throughout the duration of any operation.

c. That a helicopter fire team be on standby status to insure a quick reaction capability. Use of the fire team is invaluable in sealing off an objective, and preventing the escape of VC.

d. That a C&C helicopter be assigned to 1/27 Inf for the entire day. On numerous occasions it became necessary to release the helicopters due to higher priority commitments. This often occurred during the critical stage in the operation, and resulted in the ground elements being left without essential air surveillance and protection.


ALVIN L. O'NEAL
Lt Col, Infantry
Commanding

Annexes:

A-Operations Overlay

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Annex A (Operations Overlay) to Combat After Action Report for OPORD 6-66 (Operation Sente Fe) dated 11 June 1966;

Ref: Map, RVN, 1:50,000 Sheet 62431

DUG LAMP



+05

61

O'Neil
Lt Col

1-27 AO

RT BLUE

Acknowledge:

Distribution: "A"

OFFICIAL:

+03

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S-3

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ATTN: C (13 Jul 66) 1st Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (BOA J3/32) Operation
0000 PALMS (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO 96225 29 July 1966

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: ACoS G3 (D&T),
APO 96266

TO: Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, ATTN: J343,
APO 96243

1. Reference subparagraph 7a(2) (a). Lack of accuracy for initial artillery mission of phase 1 was due to inaccurate initial lay of supporting artillery battery. Immediate corrective command action was taken which resulted in subsequent timely and accurate artillery support.

2. Attention is invited to the description of VC fortifications in the HO BO WOODS (para 8).

3. The use of mechanized flamethrowers to assist in the assault and destruction of these fortifications are hampered because the wheeled vehicle flamethrower service unit cannot follow the APC's over the type terrain found in the area. A tracked service unit could alleviate this problem.

4. The acetylene gas method of tunnel destruction is limited in its destructive capabilities. This unit finally resorted to multiple shaped charges connected in parallel, and therefore detonated simultaneously. Though this method is satisfactory, the volume of explosives needed for destroying an extensive tunnel system creates limitations. A satisfactory tunnel destruction device or equipment for forcing the VC from tunnels is needed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Philip U Bondi
PHILIP U. BONDI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION:

ACoS for Force Dev, DA
CG, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-MH
MACV, ATTN: J343 (thru IIFORCEV)
MACV, ATTN: J2 (thru IIFORCEV)
MACV, ATTN: MACV (thru IIFORCEV)
MACV, ATTN: Chief, USAF Advisory Gp (thru IIFORCEV)
CG, USARV, ATTN: AVC (D & H)
CG, IIFORCEV, ATTN: ACoS G3 (D & T) DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
CG, USA Infantry School, Ft Benning, Ga. DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
CG, USA Armor School, Ft Knox, Ky. DOD DIR 5200.10
USA Inf H Res Unit, Ft Benning, Ga.

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION (MECH), 5TH INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96225

AVTLAG-C

13 July 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report (RCS/J3-32)

THRU: Commanding Officer
2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVTLAG-C
APO U.S. Forces 96225

THRU: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVTLAG-CP
APO U.S. Forces 96225

TO: Commander
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viet Nam
ATTN: J343
APO U.S. Forces 9624C

1. NAME OF OPERATION: "COCO PALMS."
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 250630JUN66-011935JUL66.

3. GENERAL: The 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry conducted this separate battalion operation in the area of the Bod Loi and Ho Bo Woods, Hau Nghia and Binh Duong Provinces (Incl 1, TACR Overlay).

4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

5. REPORTING OFFICER: Lt Col Thomas U. Greer, Commanding Officer, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf (Lt Col T. U. Greer, Commanding)
Recon Plat (Lt J. E. McQuinn)
Stry Plat
Hvy Mort Plat (Lt L. Phillips)
Mech Flame Csc, 65th Engr Bn

Co A (Lt G. F. Smith, Commanding)
Engr Sqd (-), 65th Engr Bn

Co B (Capt R. B. Vickery, Commanding)
Demo Tn, 65th Engr Bn

Co C (Capt W. A. Blair, Commanding)
Demo Tn, 65th Engr Bn

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AFTR 2-C

3 July 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-action Report (BCR/J3-32)

7. SUPPORTING FORCES.

a. Artillery:

(1) Composition:

(a) First five days of operations

B/3/19th Arty (155 How SP): DS 1/5th Mech
1 plat D/3/13th Arty: Atch B/3/13th Arty.

(b) Sixth to eighth days of operations:

C/7/11th Arty (105 How towed): DS 1/5th Mech
B/3/13th Arty: Atch C/7/11th Arty
1 plat D/3/13th Arty: Atch C/7/11th Arty.

(2) Comments:

(a) Phase I - The artillery support was not considered adequate due to a lack of accuracy during a critical mission.

(b) Phase II - The artillery fired a 10 minute preparation on Objectives C and A. A 155mm howitzer battery and one platoon 8" located at Ou Chi provided the preparation on Objective C while a 155mm howitzer battery and one platoon 8" located at Trung Lap fired the preparation on Objective A. 4.2" mortars were used to prepare blocking position Z and Objective B. The preparation was accurate and timely. On the second and third days of Phase II a roving preparation, controlled by the Arty LO from the air, was used on objective areas (GS XT 6528 and vicinity XT 657268). The artillery fire was extremely accurate and timely. All "will-adjust" missions during this phase were accurate and timely.

b. Air Support.

(1) Composition: 7th AF provided close air support.

(2) Comments: The Bde AF LO traveled in the C&C ship and called for all "immediate" air strikes. The required response time varied, but in all cases it was considered satisfactory. Eleven preplanned close air support missions were utilized in Phases I and II. A preplanned B52 air strike requested by the 25th Inf Div to precede the attack on 26 June was not flown. Due to the lack of information from the USAF concerning the approval or disapproval of the strike, H-hour, etc., the attack was unnecessarily delayed for 55 minutes.

8. INTELLIGENCE.

a. Intelligence prior to the operations: Two main force battalions of the 165A Regt had been reported in the operations area. The Trang Bang Local Force Company was also reported in the area of operations via XT 4932. USAF PAC reported light to moderate small arms fire was constantly received during the week of 17-23 June from along the streams (XT 610270-XT 625306, XT 495318-XT 520345) and the wooded areas on the northeast edge of the Ho Bo Woods (XT 643260-XT 635307). Results of operations by this battalion into the Boi Loi-Ho Bo Woods on 29 Mar - 5 Apr (CIRCLE PINES), 16-21 Apr (KAHALA) and 15-27 May (WAHIAWA) revealed that the area contained several supply bases and the base area of the 0320th Mobile Bn, Tay Ninh Province. Documents and PW's captured in the area indicated the Tay Ninh Provincial Committee was located in the Boi Loi Woods with subordinate

sections as follows: Tay Ninh Military Intelligence sub-sections (XT 500316), Tay Ninh Provincial Armament sub-section (XT 511339), and Workers Proselyting Section, Tay Ninh Provincial Committee (XT 527338). The numerous caches, base camps and documents substantiated that the Soi Loi was a major COSVN rear service supply area. The Ho Bo has long been the base area for the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Region Committee.

b. Enemy situation during the operation: Initial contact was made by Company B on 25 June when they wounded and captured a VCC who claimed to be the XO and political officer (but was probably a platoon leader or higher rank) of the 1st Co, 320th Bn, via XT 506314. Co C determined, through interrogation of civilians in the area, that a VC force of 10 to 15 personnel moved every day south along the trail at coordinates XT 482299, moving just after dark. This same force usually passed in the opposite direction each day about 1000 hours. After assaulting a bunker on 26 June, Co C wounded and captured a VCC via XT 640304. Documents in his possession indicated that he was a member of the security element of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Region Committee, which seems to be located in the extensive tunnel system in the area. Numerous documents found in the area indicated that the Political Staff, Military Affairs Committee, Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Region and agencies subordinate to COSVN were located in the area. Of particular interest were the large number of receipts for ammunition and weapons found in a tunnel which indicated the presence of an ammo and weapons supply point in the area. Documents captured in via XT 634305 indicated the B103 Medical Section, Rear Service Staff, Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Region Committee was in the area. The documents included medical books, requests for medicine, medical expense records and related documents. Numerous letters of introduction to VC, dated 13 June 1966, from various medical sections stating that they would attend a medical class numbered B46 were also captured. One of the documents, a request to join the Communist Party, was addressed to the Security Section, Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Region. Additional documents also indicated the presence of the Propaganda and Training Section (many propaganda signs were in the area, some written in English and some in Vietnamese) and the 2d Co, 243rd Anti-aircraft Bn, U80 Arty Regt in the Ho Bo Woods. No enemy force of significant size was encountered during the operation. Enemy strength was estimated at 15-20 VC operating in two- and three-man cells. Of significance was the fact that in several cases the VC fought from within the tunnels—a change to his tactics thus far encountered by this battalion. The edges of the Ho Bo are laced with trenches (Incl 2). Extensive defensive fortifications consisting of bunkers, trenches with overhead cover, tunnels and underground rooms were encountered during the operation. Some examples of the more significant ones are as follows:

(1) Area I (Incl 3): Fortifications in this area consisted of 29 large bunkers (20'x20'), which had been constructed within the 60 days prior to this operation. (This unit had been through the area on April 21, during Operation KAHALA. At that time the bunkers were not there.) Unlike other bunkers found in the area, these were partially above ground with all-around 6"x12" firing ports approximately three feet above ground level (Incl 4). The bunkers were built in pairs connected by a tunnel. One trap door in the tunnel was the main entrance into each bunker pair and an escape tunnel led out of each bunker (Incl 5). All of the bunkers were concealed from aerial observation by rubber trees and dense woods. Excavations for five more bunkers had been completed but construction had not started. The bunkers within the complex were mutually supporting and on one of the

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main avenues of approach into the Ho Bo (Incl 6). Each bunker was capable of sleeping 40 VC. Once the bunkers were completed, the complex would have been able to house an estimated 1,360 VC.

(2) Area II (Incl 3): Fortifications in this area consisted of a series of 5'x6' mutually supporting bunkers interconnected by a trench and tunnel system (Incl 7). An unusual and well protected bunker was located in this area vic XT 621291 (Incl 3). In addition to its use as a fighting position, the bunker also served as the control center for several clusters of command detonated mines and bombs. The trench with overhead cover provided supplementary positions and a covered escape route. Strong points were located at both ends of this area at coordinates XT 629302 and XT 614276. The area across the creek from this area to the west contained many old houses, most of which were at least partially destroyed. However, these all contained protective shelters and small tunnels which showed signs of recent use by the VC.

(3) Area III (Incl 3): Fortifications in the area consisted of a complex system of bunkers and underground rooms connected by tunnels and trenches. The complexes were well concealed in heavily wooded areas overlooking open clearings (Incl 9, 10 and 11). In all cases except one, the tunnels began in a bunker. Large underground rooms within the complex were capable of accommodating six to eight persons. Most of the bunkers were constructed with large rubber tree logs (6"-10" dia) for the supports and overhead beams. Two to three feet of dirt covered each bunker, many of which were concrete reinforced, thus providing excellent protection from artillery fires. Some of the bunkers were eight feet deep with firing steps (Incl 12) connected to sleeping quarters and cooking rooms (Incl 13). New construction was observed in GS XT 6528.

c. Terrain and Weather. The terrain is generally flat with open areas south of the Bod Loi and south, central and north of the Ho Bo. Open areas to the south and north consisted of damp and wet rice paddies, some of which were cultivated. The central area of the Ho Bo consists of rubber trees and dense woods as depicted on the map. However, secondary growth throughout the area varies from light to thick with the center being the lightest area. The dense woods and areas of thick undergrowth restricted movement of track vehicles. Foot movement through these areas was also slow and tedious. B52 bomb craters presented a definite obstacle to track vehicles due to the depth and density of the craters. Thick vegetation provided excellent concealment for the VC and limited friendly observation. The stream west of the Ho Bo was impassable to track vehicles north of XT 612280. Can Ca Bay Stream was negotiable from XT 580278 to XT 588255. Rice paddies adjacent to this portion of the stream were damp to wet but trafficable to tracks. Weather conditions during the operation presented little or no problems. Low ceilings prevented some helicopter operations but had no effect on ground operations. Average weather conditions during the operation were mostly cloudy skies with .59 inches of precipitation per day; temperatures ranged from a high of 91 degrees to a low of 71 degrees; winds were from the SW at 5-8 knots.

e. There were no Civil Affairs/Psy Ops activities conducted during the period.

9. MISSION: 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf moves 250630JUN66 to conduct independent search and destroy operations in the area of operations to locate and destroy VC units and base camps.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report (RCS/J3-32)

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: 1/5th Mech moved in two echelons from base camp commencing 250630JUN66 and conducted deceptive operations along the southern edge of the Boi Loi Woods complex to cover search and destroy operations in the Ho Bo Woods on 26 June. Bn (-) moved at 0630 hours with Co A, Co B and Recon Platoon to saturate areas 1, 2, and 3, respectively, with ambushes. Co C departed base camp at 0800 hours along Axis GREEN in an attempt to flush the VC into the ambushes. Co C then established ambushes on Obj 4. To develop the cover plan, extensive aerial recons, artillery and mortar registrations, H&I fires, and limited air strikes were placed on Obj X on 25 June (Incl 14, Operation Overlay). On 260725JUN66 the Bn attacked to seize Obj A, B, and C. Co A and C moved along Axes RED and BLUE, through Obj D to seize Obj A and C, respectively. Co B moved along Axis WHITE to establish blocking position Z and, on order, seized Obj B. All companies then conducted detailed searches in their objective areas. During this phase of the operation a mech flame track was attached to Co A and Co B. Recon Platoon screened the battalion's west flank initially and was placed under Co B's OPCON during the detailed search (Incl 15, Opn Overlay).

11. EXECUTION: The operation was conceived on 15 June 1966 and issued as OPORD 24-66 (Operation COCO PAMS) 171200JUN66.

D-Day (25 June 1966)

The battalion moved as planned without incident until armed helicopters reported seeing 25-30 VC in a trench vic XT 539311. Five were estimated to have been killed after effective air and mortar fires were placed on the target. After completion of daylight deception activities, the battalion closed into a night perimeter.

Company A

The company departed base camp at 0640 hours and closed into Obj 1 at 0950 hours. No contact was made until 1545 hours when a VC was killed (BC) by an ambush vic XT 544310. A thorough search of the objective area produced clothing, ammunition and a large AT mine. The company closed into the battalion perimeter vic XT 530288 at 1830 hours and established two night ambushes; no contact was made.

Company B

The company departed base camp at 0630 hours and closed into Obj 2 at 0800 hours without contact. Light contact was made throughout the day resulting in two VC killed (BC) and one captured. At 1900 hours the company closed into the battalion perimeter vic XT 530288 and established two ambushes; no contact was made.

Company C

The company departed base camp at 0830 hours and secured Obj 5 by 1028 hours. No contact was made and the company closed into the battalion perimeter at 1830 hours. Two ambushes were employed that night but none made contact.

Recon Platoon

The platoon departed base camp at 0650 hours and established blocking position 3 at 0910 hours. At 0940 hours two VC suspects were apprehended when they attempted to depart the area. The suspects were evacuated along with three other suspects apprehended by the command group vic XT 534285.

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13 July 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report (RCS/J3-32)

D+1 (26 June 1966)

The attack was scheduled for 0630 hours but was delayed by higher headquarters until 0725 hours. This delay was caused by a proposed air strike which was not conducted (see para 7b(2)). All companies secured and searched their objective areas and closed into a battalion perimeter for the night defense. Nine ambushes were employed during darkness but no contact was made.

Company A

The company reached its objective area at 1030 hours making light contact enroute. Intense automatic weapons fire was received from a bunker vic XT 62252956 and the ensuing fire fight resulted in two VC killed and the discovery of an extensive bunker-tunnel complex (Incl 7). The assault on the bunker produced 12 rifles, munitions and a mount for an SG-43 HMG. Several bodytraps, command detonated mines and explosives, to include four 25 lb frag bombs, were destroyed. The bunkers and tunnels were destroyed by demolitions and shape charges. Four VC were estimated to have been killed in the bunker-tunnel complex.

Company B

By 1000 hours the company had established its blocking position destroying two bunkers and capturing one VC enroute. Detailed search of the area produced several boxes of clothing, munitions, miscellaneous documents and equipment and a tunnel complex vic XT 616294. The company met light resistance and destroyed 12 bunkers, 5,000 lbs of bodytrapped rice, and several grenades and CBU bodytraps.

Company C

The company's attack encountered bodytraps, AT mines and moderate small arms and rifle grenade fire from trenches and bunkers. By 1432 hours a large command bunker with an extensive tunnel complex was encountered vic XT 640301. By 1800 hours the company had searched out the objective area destroying two AT mines, twelve bodytraps, several bunker-tunnel complexes and captured one VCC with rifle, two Russian AT mines, claymore weapons and bodytraps. Three VC were estimated to have been killed in the bunker-tunnel complexes.

Recon Platoon

The platoon screened the battalion's west flank but made no enemy contact. While performing its screening mission, the platoon located and destroyed 2,000 lbs of bodytrapped rice, bodytrapped CBU bomblets, two bunkers and captured 1500 lbs of peanuts, one rifle and several documents.

D+2 (27 June 1966)

Co B, 2/27th Inf (Capt J. R. Paschall, commanding) was attached effective 270800ZJUN66 and the Battalion Task Force employed Co A vic XT 623297 (ALPHA), Co B vic XT 655285 (QUEBEC), Co C vic XT 645302 (NOVEMBER), Co B, 2/27th Inf vic XT 635305 (CHARLIE), and the Recon Platoon vic XT 655273 (TANGO) on search and destroy operations. An LZ was secured vic XT 636296 for the Co B, 2/27th Inf helicopter landing, and all companies conducted S&D operations in their respective areas following artillery, mortar and air preparations. Throughout the day units met light to moderate resistance and closed into the battalion perimeter vic XT 630288 by dusk. Ten ambushes were employed during darkness without contact.

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Company A

The company departed the base at 0730 hours and encountered AT mines, rifle grenades and small arms fire from two bunkers on the edge of their objective area. The company overran the bunkers and estimated killing two VC. Two rifles and a 7.92mm ZB26 LMG were captured. A detailed search of the bunkers led into an extensive tunnel network which produced many documents, clothing, munitions and equipment. The bunker, tunnel and all munitions were destroyed.

Company B

The company conducted a detailed search of the area against light small arms fire, boobytraps, and AT mines. By the end of the day they had destroyed by demolitions 16 bunkers, two of which were concrete reinforced, a concrete reinforced room capable of seating 30 persons, 26 tunnels, 200-300 feet each, 12 GBU boobytraps and four AT mines.

Company C

The company arrived on the assigned objective area and met stiff resistance from several bunkers. The VC employed rifle grenades, automatic weapons, command detonated AT mines and claymore-type weapons from four different bunkers. Two VC kills were estimated in the ensuing bunker assaults which revealed a concrete reinforced bunker-tunnel complex. The company searched and destroyed these complexes and captured several grenades, claymore weapons, GBU bomblets, boobytraps, clothing, fresh food and large mines wired for command detonation (155mm, 175mm, 8" and 250 lb bombs), 225 rounds of 7.92 ammo, a Gheco carbine, three sets of field equipment and miscellaneous documents which filled two sand bags.

Co B, 2/27th Inf

The company landed on the LZ at 0830 hours and moved into their area following an artillery preparation. They discovered and destroyed 11 tunnels, 79 yds of white cloth, fresh food and a bicycle. They also captured seven medical jackets, a mask and cap and approximately four pounds of miscellaneous documents.

Recon Platoon

The platoon secured the wood line south of Obj CHARLIE and assisted the passage of Co B, 2/27th Inf. By 1106 hours the platoon occupied blocking position TANGO to prevent enemy departure from the AO. The platoon made no contact but found and destroyed a 30 lb claymore type weapon.

D+3 (28 June 1966)

The TF continued S&D operations in the AO and employed Co A vic XT 616285 (GOLF), Co B vic XT 655285 (QUEBEC), Co C vic XT 655-278 (UNIFORM), Co B, 2/27th Inf vic XT 652285 (OSCAR), and Recon Platoon along Axis SALLY (XT 638296 - XT 642305 - XT 633308 - XT 625304). During the search the VC put up stiff resistance from within the tunnels and in some cases prevented complete searching prior to destruction of the tunnels. Attempts to flush the VC out by use of tear gas were ineffective. The VC continued to fire from within the tunnels. Charges were placed as close as possible to the VC and detonated, collapsing the tunnels. Each company employed stay-behind ambushes before returning to the battalion perimeter. Only the Co B

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ambush at XT 651281 made contact, killing one VC (BC).

Company A

In searching their obj area the company encountered several elaborate bunker-tunnel complexes and by the end of the day had destroyed eight of these positions, three machinegun positions, a mortar position, clothing, several boobytraps and dry batteries. Sleeping quarters in two of the large bunkers could comfortably accommodate four persons each. Rifle grenades were used by the VC in the area.

Company B

A thorough search of the area was continued throughout the day which resulted in the destruction of seven bunkers, an extensive tunnel complex, two AT mines and grenade boobytraps. The VC used rifle grenades, small arms and, from within the tunnel complex, an automatic weapon. Smoke was used to locate all entrances and the tunnel was destroyed.

Company C

Several tunnels were found in the company objective area. A ravine, 10-15 feet deep, 300 feet long and 12 feet wide was located vic XT 654280. Into the sides of the ravine were tunnels to provide shelter and storage areas. One of the tunnels located in the area consisted of several levels and eight passageways. An underground classroom with a seating capacity of twenty persons was also located and destroyed. By the end of the day the company destroyed two bunker-tunnel complexes, three tunnel complexes, several boobytraps and munitions. New ammo pouches, web equipment, one carbine, a medical kit and miscellaneous clothing and documents were captured.

Co B, 2/27th Inf

The company objective area contained no trace of use by VC. Two boobytraps were located and rifle grenade fire was received from the south of their objective area.

Recon Platoon

The platoon conducted its sweep along Axis SALLY and by 0905 hours encountered a complex bunker-tunnel system vic XT 642303. Small arms fire was received from within the tunnels. The platoon spent the rest of the day searching and destroying the tunnels and bunkers and by the end of the day had destroyed five bunker-tunnel complexes, two well concealed tunnels, seven hand grenade boobytraps, and five CBU boobytraps. Ten thousand lbs of rice and four bags of cement were captured. Efforts to flush the VC out of the tunnels failed and the tunnels were destroyed.

D+4 (29 June 1966)

The battalion task force continued S&D operations with light to moderate contact. The TF employed Co A on Obj HOTEL vic XT 655-288; Co B returned to Obj QUEBEC; Co C on Obj ECHO vic XT 660260; Co B, 2/27th Inf on Obj FOXTROT vic XT 655274; Recon Platoon continued its sweep of Axis SALLY. All companies returned to the battalion perimeter at dusk and employed seven ambushes during the night, but no contact was made.

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Company A

The company conducted their search under constant harassing small arms and rifle grenade fire. The area was heavily boobytrapped and the bunker-tunnel complexes encountered were well constructed and reinforced. By the end of the day six tunnels, two bunker-tunnel complexes, munitions and several command detonated mines were destroyed. Six hundred lbs of boobytrapped rice was also found and destroyed.

Company B

With the exception of one command detonated mine, the company made no contact during the day. After thoroughly searching the area, 22 bunkers (several of which were reinforced with steel or concrete), 17 tunnels (two of which were three-level), suspended 81mm boobytraps, 31 grenades and 60mm boobytraps, and many other munitions were destroyed. One rifle and several rounds of ammunition (20mm, 7.62mm and 40mm) were captured.

Company C

The company met no resistance during their search but encountered several boobytraps. A large three-level tunnel complex was found via XT 638266 which led to several bunkers. One of these bunkers was reinforced with steel beams and a steel top. This entire complex along with three sampans and a boat were destroyed.

Co B, 2/27th Inf

The company met no resistance in their search which produced an extensive bunker-tunnel complex. The tunnel led to 12 different exits/entrances and a thorough search of the area produced clothing, documents, ammunition, medical supplies, 3,000 lbs of rice, a VC gas mask, a Chinese or Russian gas mask, 55 gals of kerosene and eight boobytraps.

Recon Platoon

The platoon completed its sweep of Axis SALLY and in the process received two rifle grenade rounds and hit one AT mine. A large bunker-tunnel complex, reinforced with steel beams, was discovered. Inside the bunker were several benches, stools, a blackboard, rifle grenades, and 500 lbs of rice. With the exception of the rice, the entire complex was destroyed. By the end of the day, a total of 3,400 lbs of rice and 100 lbs of salt were captured.

D+5 (30 June 1966)

The battalion TF continued S&D operations to complete the detailed search of the area. The TF was employed with Co A returning to Obj HOTEL, Co B with the Recon Plat attached returning to Obj QUEBEC, Co C to vic XT 595265 (KILO) and Co B, 2/27th Inf to Area LIMA, vic XT 625295 in order to saturate the area with daylight ambushes. Several AT and AP mines and boobytraps were encountered during the day while destroying extensive bunker-tunnel complexes and large reinforced bunkers in the AO. Co B, 2/27th Inf was released from battalion control at 1604 hours. All companies returned to the battalion base and employed seven ambushes but no contact was made.

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Company A

The company completed their search of the ravine via XT 653-280 and also found several fortified buildings in the area. Nine bunkers, four tunnels, six buildings and several boobytraps were destroyed. Five hundred lbs of rice was captured by the end of the day. The company then conducted a reconnaissance in force via XT 650268; results were negative.

Company B

The company completed the search of their objective area encountering heavily boobytrapped areas and AT mines. Two tunnels and twelve bunker complexes were destroyed along with numerous boobytraps. Several 81mm, 105mm and 155mm rounds, all of which were wired for command detonation, were found and destroyed. Two carbines were also captured.

Company C

The company's search in the new objective area was hampered by several AT and AP mines and boobytraps. Twenty-one bunkers, varying in size from 15'x15' to small concrete reinforced bunkers were destroyed. The company also captured 900 lbs of rice, clothing and miscellaneous documents.

Co B, 2/27th Inf

The company saturated their area with ambushes but no contact was made. Extraction by helicopter commenced at 1430 hours and by 1604 hours the last element was airborne and released from battalion control.

D+6 (1 July 1966)

The battalion terminated the operation and commenced its return to base camp at 0700 hours. Co A was required to secure a portion of an LZ for the 3d Bn, 49th Inf Regt (ARVN) helicopter extraction via XT 638273. They were also required to establish a blocking position via XT 625268 and destroy some large bunkers via XT 597264. Co B secured the remainder of the LZ, Co C was given the mission to secure the road from Trung Lap (XT 5819) to Hwy 1 (XT 5616) and protect the engineer clearing party along the road. The Recon Platoon escorted the GP group, Hvy Mort Plat and all disabled vehicles to via Trung Lap and then escorted the artillery group from Trung Lap to the base camp. Due to reports of ground activity via XT 590270, Co C was diverted to investigate and at 1300 hours Co A (-), 2/14th Inf was airlifted into the AO to assist in securing the road from Trung Lap to Hwy 1. By 1935 hours all elements closed into the base camp, terminating Operation COCO PALMS.

Company A

The company established its blocking position and secured its portion of the LZ by 0803 hours. Eleven large, well constructed bunkers (Incl 4) were destroyed via XT 596263. No contact was made during the day, except for the detonation of one AT mine via XT 580229 which moderately damaged an APC.

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Company B

The company secured their portion of the LZ by 0800 opposed by light and sporadic small arms fire. Upon completion of the helicopter extraction, the unit conducted a sweep through a suspected VC occupied area via XT 604264; no contact was made and the company returned to base camp.

Company C

While enroute to secure the road from Trung Lap to Hwy 1, armed gunships reported receiving heavy ground fire from vic XT 590270. The company was diverted in an attempt to close with and destroy the enemy. No VC were found in the area and signs of VC occupancy were not evident. The company then resumed its original mission and returned to base camp at 1935 hours.

12. RESULTS.

a. Friendly:

(1) 634 personnel started the operation and 586 completed. The latter figure includes 39 WIA who remained with their units (Incl 16, Casualty List).

(2) Fourteen APC's, M113, were damaged by mines. Six were repaired in the field and continued the operation.

b. Enemy:

(1) 25 VC killed (6 EC), 3 VCC and 6 VCS.

(2) Material, equipment and facilities:

(a) Captured:

- 2 M1 rifles
- 13 Chicom carbines
- 2 U.S. carbines
- 1 U.S. M16 rifle
- 1 German Mauser
- 1 7.92mm DMG, 2826 (BRND)
- 1 Springfield rifle (1903)
- 1 M72 LAW
- 4 rifles, type unknown
- 1 machinegun mount on wheeled carrier for 7.62mm H&M SG-43 (Goryunov)
- 1 carbine, type unknown
- 10 combat packs
- 1 cartridge belt
- 2 pistol belts
- 6 medical jackets
- 1 medical cap
- 1 medical mask
- 1 medical kit
- 31 ammo pouches
- 4 bags (100 lb) cement
- 20,000 lbs rice
- 1 gas mask, Russian or Chinese type
- Numerous documents
- Miscellaneous clothing
- Medical manuals

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(b) Destroyed:

21 rifle grenades
 3 hand grenades (U.S.)
 6 hand grenades (VC)
 35 hand grenades (Chicom)
 20 boobytraps (hand grenade, 81mm and 60mm type)
 21 boobytraps (CBU bomb type)
 3 boobytraps (2.75" rocket)
 7 81mm boobytraps (suspended in trees)
 1 boobytrapped antiaircraft rocket
 1 U.S. carbine (boobytrapped in a punji pit)
 34 CBU bomblets
 35 AT mines
 1 AP mine
 3 61mm rds (rigged for cmd det)
 4 105mm rds (rigged for cmd det)
 7 155mm rds (rigged for cmd det)
 2 8" rds (rigged for cmd det)
 3 250 lb bombs (rigged for cmd det)
 3 175mm rds (rigged for cmd det)
 11 claymore weapons
 155 bunkers
 78 tunnels
 4 25 lb frag bombs (U.S.)
 1 VC frag bomb
 1040 rds 7.62mm linked ammo
 40 rds Chicom 7.62mm ammo
 300 rds 5.56mm ammo (U.S.)
 50 rds 7.62mm (short)
 725 rds 7.92mm ammo
 80 rds cal .30 ammo
 1 B.R magazine
 30 rds cal .32 ammo
 1 VC gas mask
 1 boat
 1 wagon
 7,600 lbs rice (boobytrapped)
 11 M79 rds
 60 buildings
 6 sampans
 70 gals kerosene
 1 sugar cane processing machine
 Miscellaneous clothing.

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.

a. Supplies: All resupply was accomplished by UH1D helicopters flying from base camp to the forward CP area. During the operation, 131 sorties delivered the following supplies:

- (1) Class I: 44,500 pounds.
- (2) Class II: 11,000 pounds.
- (3) Class III: 38,000 pounds (4,675 gallons).
- (4) Class IV: 3,600 pounds.
- (5) Class V: 24,300 pounds.
- (6) Miscellaneous: 34,280 pounds (includes 6,832 gallons of water).

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(7) Personnel: 14,000 pounds.

The battalion expended the following ammunition and demolitions during the operation:

Ctg 7.62mm ball	1,680 rds
Ctg 7.62mm 4+1	30,400 rds
Ctg 5.56mm ball	25,560 rds
Ctg 5.56mm tracer	1,140 rds
Ctg cal .50 4+1	22,200 rds
Ctg 40mm, HE	1,296 rds
Ctg 81mm, HE	208 rds
Ctg 81mm, WP	6 rds
Ctg 4.2", HE	635 rds
Ctg 4.2", WP	37 rds
Grenade, frag	875 ea
Rocket, M66	7 ea
Mine, AP, M18A1	24 ea
Grenade, smoke, yellow	32 ea
Grenade, smoke, violet	96 ea
Grenade, smoke, HC	48 ea
Grenade, hand, CS	106 ea
Flare, trip	32 ea
Block, demo, C4, 2 1/2 lb	590 lbs
Block, demo, TNT, 1lb	1,650 lbs
Cratering charge, 40 lb	43 ea
Cord, detonating	4,000 feet
Fuze, blasting, time	1,250 feet
Ignitor, fuse	170 ea
Blasting cap, non-electric	510 ea

b. Maintenance: The Bn started the operation short six (6) carriers, personnel, F.T., M113. The Recon Platoon was short three (3), the Medical Plat one (1), and Co A and Co C one (1) each. During the operation thirteen (13) carriers were damaged by AT mines and one (1) carrier was damaged by a large AP mine. Six (6) of these vehicles were repaired in the field and continued the operation. The other eight were evacuated to base camp at the termination of the operation. Of the eight (8) that were evacuated to base camp, seven (7) had to be towed; one returned under its own power. Six (6) of the above eight (8) carriers have, since their return, been declared not economically repairable. Twenty (20) carriers became inoperable for mechanical failures during the operation; however, twelve (12) of these were repaired in the field and continued the operation. The remaining eight (8) were evacuated to base camp at the termination of the operation. Seven (7) of the eight (8) returned under their own power; however, they were short-tracked. The major mechanical failure experienced was the separation of the idler arm from the hull of the carrier. There were seven (7) of these failures and all seven (7) carriers had to be evacuated. Two of the carriers with this failure had been rebuilt eight (8) months ago and since that time they have traveled more than 2500 miles. The other five (5) tracks with this failure were over five (5) years old and have traveled over 5000 miles. Because this Bn was short five (5) Light Recovery Vehicles, it became a major problem to evacuate the eight vehicles that required towing. In order for this Bn to accomplish the task of extracting the eight downed vehicles, ten (10) additional combat vehicles were diverted to tow the downed tracks. Two (2) tracks were so badly damaged they required four other vehicles to tow them. If the five (5) Light Recovery Vehicles had been on hand, they could have accomplished the same task as the ten (10) carriers, with less wear and tear.

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c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization: The Bn Fwd Aid Station was staffed by one doctor and four medics. During the operation 156 patients were seen and treated, of which 73 were due to sickness or disease, 52 from wounds received in hostile action, and 31 non-battle injuries (sprains, cuts, bruises, etc.). Thirty-four of the 156 patients were evacuated by resupply helicopters. During the operation, 18 Dust Off helicopters were requested which evacuated a total of 43 casualties. These 43 patients were not processed through the Bn Aid Station, but evacuated to the 25th Med Bn.

d. Transportation: The Bn consumed a total of 8,837 gallons of HCOAS during the operation.

e. Communications:

(1) The primary means of communication during Opn COCO PALMS was FM radio. Wire nets were used at all times in the CP complex and to the companies whenever possible. During the periods of darkness the Bn command net maintained radio listening silence and used wire as the primary means of communications. The Bn maintained FM radio and RATT contact with Bde. There was no wire communication between the Bn and Bde. UHF air-ground communications were also available and used by the AF LO for air support missions.

(2) This Bn is equipped with the VRC-12 family of radios which is an excellent piece of equipment. It is believed that the intense heat (115 degrees) inside the carrier M113 has an adverse effect on the radio transmitters (RF524 and RF246). During the operation a total of eleven RT's either failed to transmit or receive or the fan (cooling system) ran continuously. This situation was partially corrected by periodically turning the sets off and permitting them to cool. This procedure was especially true at night when less radio traffic was required and nets could be monitored with the auxiliary receiver (RA42) without sacrificing communications efficiency.

f. Medical Evaluations: Access to the Bn Aid Station during the operation was good. Overall medical care of minor complaints and casualties was good. However, it was not advisable to evacuate all injuries through the aid station because of the terrain, time factors involved and the seriousness of the wounds. Of the 83 injuries that were treated at the aid station, 54 were returned to duty. This fact alone demonstrates the value and necessity of a forward aid station.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES.

a. Mechanized flame throwers. The flame throwers proved to be very effective during this operation due to the numerous bunkers encountered. The one major drawback was the wheel-mounted service unit which could not accompany the battalion over cross-country routes. Therefore, the flame throwers were of little value once their pressure was expended. Extensive use could be made possible by mounting the service unit in a full track carrier to provide the necessary cross-country mobility.

b. Tunnel destruction techniques. A technique has yet to be found which will adequately destroy a complex tunnel system. A special technique employing acetylene gas and detonator proved ineffective for many reasons, one of which was the depth of the tunnels encountered. This technique is stated to be very effective in depths of less than six feet; however, most of the tunnels in the area were

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well below six feet. Another technique applied which was quite successful was the use of several cratering charges placed at key levels and tunnel "T's," connected in parallel with detonating cord (Incl 10). When detonated, the parallel connection results in simultaneous detonation of all charges and the resulting blast completely caves in the tunnel. This method, however, would require a large amount of explosives for the extensive tunnel systems which were prevalent in the AO.

15. COMMANDER ANALYSIS.

a. The several contacts made the first day of the operation along the southern edge of the Boi Loi Woods indicated continued extensive use of this area by the VC. Their continuous and rather careless movement to and from the southern edge of these woods makes the area ideally suited for saturation ambushing.

b. It was not until one hour after the attack on 26 June was due to begin that the battalion found out that the B52 strike would not be made. Then our planning was hampered by not knowing whether the strike would be made or the time the strike was to be made.

c. After the first day's operation in the Ho Bo Woods, it became apparent that the extent of the bunker/tunnel systems was such as to require either an extended stay to accomplish the mission or additional troops. Hence, when an additional rifle company was offered, it was readily accepted.

d. The evidence of new construction in the Ho Bo Woods plus the extensive fortifications encountered indicate the VC plan to continue extensive use of this area. In spite of the 78 tunnels which were destroyed, it is felt that only a very small percentage of the total tunnels in the area were located and destroyed. This opinion is based on the ease with which the VC eluded our continuous search and on the fact that very few tunnels with concealed entrances were located.

e. The construction of most of the bunkers found and destroyed was such that they could withstand a direct artillery hit. Thus, as long as they remained inside their bunkers, the VC were immune to artillery fire and immune to all but direct hits by bombs.

f. It is believed that the extensive bunker system found in grid squares XT 5925 and XT 5926 provided a haven, safe from artillery fire and air strikes, for a large force moving through the area. Since this system was only recently constructed, it might be assumed it was constructed to support the nonsoon offensive in this area.

g. Neither the ARVN nor the U.S. advisors with the ARVN understood the use of the No Fire Line. The ARVN battalion actually moved troops across the NFL before making any formal request for a change.

h. There has been some discussion of late among medical corps personnel that battalion surgeons should not be in the field. The Battalion Aid Station and surgeon moved to the field with the CP Group. The surgeon treated 83 patients for injuries (both battle and non-battle) and returned 54 to duty. He also treated 73 men for sickness or disease and returned 68 to duty. The value of the presence of the battalion surgeon in the field is obvious.

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16. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Future operations employing saturation ambushes along the southern edge of the Boi Loi Woods should be conducted.

b. Periodic operations should be conducted into the Ho Bo Woods area to prevent rebuilding of the extensive bunker complex and eventually to convince the VC of the futility of using this as a major base of operations.

c. Extensive use should be made of M&I fires in grid squares XT 5925 and XT 5926 to deny the VC the opportunity to rebuild the bunkers destroyed in that area.

d. Information on B52 strikes must be made available at the earliest possible time.

e. Careful coordination on the use of supporting fires, to include a thorough explanation of the No Fire Line, should be made with ARVN forces operating in the vicinity of U.S. forces.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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

JAMES G. ADDRESS
Capt, Inf
Adjutant


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








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


Inclouure 2 (Trench System) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf, sub J Combat Operations After-Action
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
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Inclosure 3 (Area Overlay) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf, subj Combat Operations After-Action
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
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
Enclosure 4 (Bunkers, Area I) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf, sub J
Combat Operations After-Action Report (RCS/J5-32), dtd 13 July 1966

BUNKER - SIDE VIEW

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
Inlosure 5 (Bunker System, XT 595262, Area I) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech)
 5th Inf, sub J Combat Operations After-Action Report (RCS/J3-32), dtd
 13 July 1966



Ref: Map, VIETNAM, 1:12,500, Special Series,
Sheet 7 of 22

Inlosure 6 (Bunker Overlay, Area I) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf,
subj Combat Operations After-Action Report (RCS/J3-32), dtd 13 July
1966


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Inclosure 7 (Typical Bunker System, XF 621296, Area II) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf, sub J Combat After-Action Report (HCS/J3-32), dtd 13 July 1966

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


TRIANGLE BUNKER

Inclosure 8 (Triangle Bunker, AT 621291, Area II) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf, sub J Combat Operations
After-Action Report (RCS/J3-32), dtd 13 July 1966

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
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Enclosure 9 (Typical Tunnel, Bunker and Trench System, XT 631303, Area III) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf, subj Combat Operations After-Action Report (RCS/33-32), dtd 13 July 1966

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
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Inclusion 10 (Typical System, AT 634302, Area III) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf, sub J Combat Operations
After-Action Report (RCS/J3-32), dtd 13 July 1966

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
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Enclosure 11 (Typical System, AT 63930', Area III) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf, sub J Combat Operations After-Action Report (RCS/J3-32), dtd 13 July 1966

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


SIDE VIEW OF BUNKER

Inclosure 12 (Sideview of Bunker, XT 643298, Area III) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf, subj Combat Operations
After-action Report (RCS/J3-32), dtd 13 July 1966

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
TOP VIEW OF BUNKER

Inclosure 13 (Top View of Bunker, XI 64,2298) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf, sub j Combat Operations
After-Action Report (RCS/J3-32), dtd 13 July 1966


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Ref: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000,
Series L701, Sheet
6244II




Inclosure 14 (Opn Overlay, 25 Jun 66) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech)
5th Inf, subj Combat Operations After-Action Report (RCS/J3-
32), dtd 13 July 1966

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65
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Ref: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheets
6244II, 6344III



Inlosure 15 (Opn Overlay, 26 Jun 66) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf, sub j Combat
Operations After-Action Report (dCS/33-32), dtd 13 July 1966

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53

C O N F I D E N T I A L
CASUALTIES SUSTAINED—OPERATION COCO PAIMS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE WOUNDS</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
WEST, James L.	PFC E3	Co A	FW (r) upper arm	1B10	25th Med
CASTLEMAN, Ricky D.	PFC E3	Co A	GSW head—DOW	1B10	DOW
THOMAS, Michael R.	PFC E3	Co A	GSW (r) side	1B10	25th Med
SAITH, George P.	1st Lt	Co A	FW (l) hand	1542	Rtn to Duty
WARBLUM, Boyd D.	Sgt E5	Co A	FW (l) ear lobe	1B40	Rtn to Duty
BARLETT, Dennis	SP4 E4	Co A	FW (b) hands and neck	1B20	25th Med
GORRES, Monty L.	SP4 E4	Co A	Frac (l) foot	1B20	25th Med
FERRARI, James F.	SP4 E4	Co A	FW (r) hand	1B20	Rtn to Duty
DLION, Claude Jr.	PFC E3	Co A	FW (l) hand	1B10	Rtn to Duty
PUMDSACK, Terry L.	PFC E3	Co A	FW (r) face	1B10	Rtn to Duty
LOVE, John D.	SP4 E4	Co A	Tooth ext and nose lac	1B20	25th Med
WHITAKER, Charles C.	PFC E3	Co A	Back inj	1B10	25th Med
MORAN, Thomas L.	PFC E3	Co A	FW (r) hand, (l) side	1B10	25th Med
BEAN, Hudson Jr.	SP4 E4	Co A	FW (r) arm	1B20	25th Med
BELLE, Richard D.	PFC E3	Co A	FW (l) knee	1B10	25th Med
HARLIE, Ernest T.	Ssg E6	Co A	FW rear (l) shoulder	1B40	93rd Evac
FOSTER, Roland D.	SP5 E5	Co A	FW (r) side	11C20	25th Med
SIMONELLI, Vincent	PFC E3	Co A	Head laceration	1B10	Rtn to Duty
FREEMAN, Kenneth L.	SP4 E4	Co A	Back inj	1B20	Rtn to Duty
TEETERS, Billie W.	PSG E7	Co A	GSW (r) arm	1B40	93rd Evac
WHITE, Clinton K.	PFC E3	Co A	FW head	1B10	Rtn to Duty
GUSS, Samuel D.	PFC E3	Co A	Poss rupt ears	1B10	Rtn to Duty
NELSON, Griffin O.	Sgt E5	Co A	FW (r) arm	1B40	Rtn to Duty
KNOLES, Michael A.	SP4 E4	Co A	Burn on (r) arm	1B20	Rtn to Duty
GENTRY, William J.	SP4 E4	Co A	Inj (l) eye	1B20	Rtn to Duty
GREEN, Barry J.	PFC E3	Co A	Poss concussion	1B10	25th Med
SMITH, Sandy O.	PFC E3	Co A	Back inj and bruised chest	1B10	25th Med
HAYES, John F.	SP4 E4	Co A	Head and back wounds—poss conc	1B20	93rd Evac
TOMNER, Ira O.	PFC E3	Co A	GSW in head	1B10	93rd Evac
POWLER, Jerry D.	PFC E3	Co A	FW (l) leg	1B10	25th Med
BUMPH, Ivor E.	PFC E3	Co A	KIA	1B10	KIA

Inlosure 16 (Casualty List) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf, sub J Combat Operations After-action Report (RCS/J3-32), dtd 13 July 1966

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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DISPOSITION

NAME	RANK	UNIT	TYPE WOUNDS	MOS	DISPOSITION
FLANNING, Otis R.	SP4 E4	Co A	Cut, lip and (r) leg	11B20	Rtn to Duty
QUIGLEY, James W.	PFC E3	Co A	ick inj	11B10	Rtn to Duty
MOODY, Bill D.	PFC E3	A	cuts and bruises	11B10	Rtn to Duty
HALL, David M.	SFC E7	A	of (r) hand	11B40	25th Med
PATE, Marvin L.	SP4 E4	Co B	FW both legs and head	11B20	25th Med
HENNING, Clifton L.	2nd Lt	Co B	Bruises (r) shoulder	1542	Rtn to Duty
HUGH, Donald	PFC E3	Co B	FW buttocks, (r) side, penis	11B10	25th Med
MC CULLION, Joseph R.	SP4 E4	Co B	FW (l) heel and back	11B20	25th Med
JOHNSON, Dennis A.	SP4 E4	Co B	WP burns on back, hands	11B20	Rtn to Duty
CARDENES, Arnoldo	PFC E3	Co B	FW over body--DOM	11B10	DOM
HENPHILL, Tommy D.	PFC E3	Co B	FW (r) arm	11B40	Rtn to Duty
ROLF, Gerald R.	PFC E3	Co B	GSM head--KIA	11B10	KIA
STEVER, Frank E.	Sgt E5	Co B	FW (r) arm	11B40	25th Med
TREMBLY, Ralph	Ssg E6	Co B	FW lower lip	11B40	Rtn to Duty
COUSIN, Kenneth E.	SP4 E4	Co B	FW in back	11B20	Rtn to Duty
IRVING, Earl E. Jr	SP4 E4	Co B	Poss frac hand (r)	11B20	Rtn to Duty
BROWN, Samuel	PFC E3	Co B	Poss frac (l) shoulder	11B10	25th Med
JACKSON, David	Ssg E6	Co B	FW (r) leg	11B40	93rd Evac
DANSON, Preston	Sgt E5	Co B	SW (l) arm	11B40	93rd Evac
LEWIS, Christopher	PFC E3	Co B	FW (r) leg	11B10	Rtn to Duty
SHARRETT, David	PFC E3	Co B	FW chest	11B10	93rd Evac
MC GOUGH, John W.	SP4 E4	Co B	FW (r) cheek	11B20	Rtn to Duty
EVELAND, Donald L.	Ssg E6	Co B	FW (l) leg and side	11B40	25th Med
COUSIN, Kenneth E.	SP4 E4	Co B	FW back and legs	11B20	25th Med
HENSLEY, Larry F.	PFC E3	Co B	FW forehead	11B10	25th Med
FOHD, Cleo	SP4 E4	Co C	FW torso, front, back, groin	11B20	25th Med
VINGUENT, James D.	SP4 E4	Co C	Mult FW lower abdomen	11B20	25th Med
MC KINNEY, James	Sgt E5	Co C	FW buttocks, legs, back	11B40	25th Med
IVERI, James W. Jr.	Sgt E5	Co C	FW both legs--sucking chest	11B40	25th Med
SMITH, Matthew R.	PFC E3	Co C	FW chest (r) leg	11B10	25th Med
NORRIS, Kibby S.	PFC E3	Co C	FW (r) temple	11B10	Rtn to Duty
SIZEMORE, James W.	PFC E3	Co C	FW (r) eye	11B10	25th Med
KIRKMAN, Terry L.	PFC E3	Co C	FW neck	11B10	Rtn to Duty

Page 2 to Inclosure 16 (Casualty List) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf, subj Combat Operations After-Action Report (MOS/JB-32),
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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE WOUNDS</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
SCANTLIN, James M.	PFC E3	Co C	Punct of (r) leg	1B10	Rtn to Duty
MIDON, George L.	SP4 E4	Co C	Knee effusion	1B20	25th Med
KAUTSCH, Tim P.	SP4 E4	Co C	Lac of (l) index finger	1B20	25th Med
ELLIS, Harold J.	1st Lt	Co C	GSW (r) leg	1542	93rd Evac
JOHNSON, John D.	SP4 E4	Co C	FW (l) arm	1B20	Rtn to Duty
MUTI, Andrew A.	PFC E3	Co C	VW (r) elbow	1B10	93rd Evac
CLASSEL, Rodney W.	PFC E3	Co C	FW (l) arm	1B10	93rd Evac
ORTEGA, Reynaldo Jr.	PFC E3	Co C	FW neck	1B10	Rtn to Duty
PEREZ-VELEZ, Rafael	PFC E3	Co B	Inj ear	1B10	Rtn to Duty
LUNA, Harold D.	SP4 E4	Co B	FW (r) thigh	1B20	Rtn to Duty
LUND, Larry W.	PFC E3	Co C	FW (l) arm	1B10	Rtn to Duty
NORTHROP, James L.	SP4 E4	Co C	FW head (r) hand and body	1B20	Rtn to Duty
DALE, Hachiro	PSg E7	Co C	GSW (r) side	1B40	KIA
WASHINGTON, James T.	PFC E3	Co C	Bruised (l) shoulder	1B40	KIA
HICKS, Kenneth E.	PFC E3	Co C	Poss perf ear	1B10	Rtn to Duty
SCHOOLER, FT, James H.	PFC E3	Co C	FW (r) leg	1B10	Rtn to Duty
EPPS, William M.	PFC E3	Co C	Cut above (l) eye	1B10	Rtn to Duty
BLEDSON, Lowell D.	SP4 E4	Co C	FW (r) arm, lip and gum lac	1B20	25th Med
BROOKS, Otis J.	Sgt E5	Co C	Traum ampt (l) foot	1B40	93rd Evac
KYLES, Ben E.	Sgt E5	Co C	FW (r) cheek	1B40	Rtn to Duty
HENSEL, Jack W.	PFC E3	Co C	Punct (l) leg	1B10	Rtn to Duty
BLEWINS, Bill H.	Cpl E4	HHC	Lac (l) eye	11C40	Rtn to Duty
JONES, John E.	PFC E3	HHC	Scratch on forehead	91A10	Rtn to Duty

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DISTRIBUTION LIST

25th Infantry Division	25 cys
2d Brigade	5 cys
1st Brigade	4 cys
1/27th Infantry	1 cy
2/27th Infantry	1 cy
3/4 Cavalry	1 cy
Each Company	1 cy
File	1 cy
Unit History	1 cy

Inclosure 17 (Distribution List) to Ltr, HQ, 1st Bn (Mech) 5th Inf,
sub j Combat Operations After-Action Report (RCS/J3-32), dtd 13
July 1966

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AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION EWA

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1ST BN 27TH INF
WOLFHOUSES
8 JUL - 13 JUL 1966

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APP 11

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION 27TH INFANTRY
(THE WOLFHOUNDS)
APO US FORCES 96225

AVTISEB-T

2 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: 12CV J3-32)

THRU: Commanding Officer
2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
ATTN: LBDB-T
APO US FORCES 96225

Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVTICA-MH
APO US FORCES 96225

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO US FORCES 96243

References:

- a. OPORD 28-66 (Revised) (Operation EWA), Headquarters, 2d Brigade, 5 July 1966.
- b. OPORD 8-66 (Operation EWA), Headquarters, 1st Battalion 27th Infantry, 7 July 1966.

1. NAME OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION:

- a. Operation EWA.
- b. Search and Destroy.

2. DATES OF OPERATION: 8-13 July 1966.

3. LOCATION: Hau Nghia Province, west of the Oriental River and East of the Cambodian Border. (See Annex A, Operations Overlay).

1
DOWNGRADED 3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS, DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10

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4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: The control headquarters, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, directed that TF1/27 Inf conduct an airmobile assault on Obj 1 (XT9207), commencing 060630 hrs July 1966 to establish a battalion base. A second airmobile assault was directed on Obj 2 (XT2808) with one (1) company prepared, on order, to conduct a search and destroy mission on Obj 3 (XT2706). Elements to be airlanded on Obj 2, and possibly Obj 3, were to be extracted NIT 061500 July. Further, TF1/27 Inf was directed to conduct eagle flights in the assigned AO from 9-12 July.

5. REPORTING OFFICER: Lt Col Alvin L. O'Neal.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. A1/27 Inf (Capt Myone)

Demo Team, B/65 Engr
1 National Police
1 Interpreter

b. B1/27 Inf (Capt Garrett)

Demo Team, B/65 Engr
1 National Police
1 Interpreter

c. C1/27 Inf (Capt Leski)

Demo Team, B/65 Engr
1 National Police
1 Interpreter

d. Battalion Control

Recon Platoon
AT Platoon
Hv Mortar Platoon
EL 125 Sig
Elem, 25 MID
Btry A (-) 1/8 Arty

7. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery Support: 1/8 Arty with attachments, 1/8 (-) 2/13 Arty, D (-) 2/13 Arty, DS to 1/27 Inf.

b. How and when artillery employed: On 7 July the 1/8 Arty (-), consisting of a central element, HQ 1/8, C1/8, C2/8 (Three (3) 155mm howitzers), and D3/13 (two (2) 8" howitzers),

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were prepositioned vicinity Ap Dong Hoa (K244087). On 7 July, Btry A (-) 1/8 Arty, was attached to TF1/27 Inf and established a fire support base within the TF1/27 Inf Bn defense perimeter on 8 July. The arty battery accompanied the Bn into the AO by airlift, remained within the battalion defense perimeter throughout the operation, and was airlifted back to its Cu Chi perimeter base upon termination of the operation. Throughout the operation, 1/8 Arty supported with preplanned and on-call fires.

c. Results of Artillery:

(1) Artillery defensive concentrations were plotted to encompass the battalion defense perimeter.

(2) After completing precision registration, the registration piece was adjusted by an aerial observer onto three (3) different targets. The data for replot established by the adjustments aided in identifying landmarks by coordinates on an aerial photo that were not portrayed on the battle map.

(3) Co-location of the 4.2" mortar section and 105mm How battery FDC's, provided a mutual control in the processing of firing data. This close working synergy resulted in economy of fire support and massing of fires as the situation dictated.

(4) Artillery preparations on landing zones and objectives gave the helicopter assault force the advantage of moving into areas that were partially neutralized by the fires.

(5) H&I fires were employed throughout the AO and were delivered by all caliber, from both fire support bases, into areas formally inaccessible to artillery due to range.

(6) The use of WP marking rounds assisted patrols in land navigation to and from ambush sites during the hours of darkness.

(7) Concentrations plotted in support of ambushes were employed with success. On 10 July 1966, artillery and 4.2" mortar fires served as an effective blocking force when a US ambush engaged a ten-man VC patrol. The VC were engaged with small arms. The 81mm mortars were called close-in and howitzer and mortar fires sealed off escape routes for the Viet Cong. This action proved extremely rewarding and netted a total of 6 VC KIA (BC), 2 KIA (poss) and one captured VC (WIA).

(8) Enemy automatic weapons firing hampered free movement of the C&C helicopter during a two (2) company sweep along the densely foliated area near the Oriental River. The firing was silenced after artillery was employed against it.

d. Army Aviation:

(1) How and When Army Aircraft used:

(a) Command and Control aircraft for ground operations.

(b) Airlift of troops and equipment to and

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from the AO.

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(c) All resupply

(2) Results of Army aviation: Army air support was a decisive factor in accomplishing the mission in operation BNA. The helicopter support provided TF1/27 Inf with a high degree of flexibility and mobility. The 116th Aviation Company (Airmobile) was in direct support of TF1/27 Inf throughout the operation, and presented the battalion with a quick reaction capability. The availability of choppers also enabled TF1/27 Inf to execute a maximum number of missions throughout the operation over a very large assigned AO. As a result, the VC were continually harassed throughout the day by forces ranging from rifle fire teams to company sized elements.

§1. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy situation prior to operation: The assigned area of operation has long been the operational area of the 267th and 269th Main Force Battalions of the Dong Thap 2 (DT2) Regiment, the 506th Local Force Battalion, the C2 Local Force Company, and the C120 Local Force Company. Numerous platoon and squad sized guerrilla forces were also known to be located in the area. The 267th and 269th battalions had established a pattern of operating in close proximity to the Oriental River unless forced to withdraw to the Cambodian Border area due to the pressure of US or ARVN operations. The 506th battalion has generally operated in and around the "Horseshoe Area" of the Oriental River (XS5693). The C2 company had a past history of operating along the West side of the Oriental River and it has been generally believed that this company has provided security for movement of VC supplies into a location vic XS5493. The C120 company generally operated in the vic of the Hiep Hoa Sugar Mill located vic XT540072. Numerous platoon and squad sized guerrilla forces operated out of the many villages and hamlets in the area. Numerous VC supply and infiltration routes were reported to traverse the entire AO. Secret VC bases were reported within and in close proximity to the area. On 25 June 1966, two SPAR reports originated vic XS568923. The area in vic XS490970 revealed intense SPAR activity during the early part of June. A VC headquarters was believed to have been situated in this area. During the month of April, a VCC declared to his captors that four ammunition caches belonging to the ICMG AN Provincial Force were located west of the Oriental River vic XT548013, XS460889, and XS550960. These caches were supposed to be located in graveyards and measured 1-5 meters deep and 4.5m on each side. Supposedly, wooden covers were placed over the graves with a layer of sand and cement on top. The cache was camouflaged to appear as a grave. A VC captive reported in early July that THO HO (XT2808) was the site of a VC camp where four US and several ARVN POW's were being held. Other recent reports of VC activity in the area were sixty (60) VC reported to have moved on 8 June from vic XS545382 to XS538923, evaluation F-3; VC platoon

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reported to be located via XT480015 on 18 June, evaluation F-2; AR fire received on 18 June from via XT505025 and XT484018; VC ammunition point with forty (40) cases located via XS548923 on 19 June, evaluation F-3; unidentified VC battalion reported on 20 June to be located via XS538910, evaluation F-3; 506th battalion supply section reported moving five sampans of rice and ammo on 21 June to location via XS537910. On 22 June, a 5th SFG agent reported a VC interzone committee had established a supply base near the Oriental River with an economics and finance office location via XS484962 and a food storage area located via XS1949

b. Enemy Situation During the Operation: The VC evaded US forces during the period the operation was conducted. Usual guerrilla tactics (employment of booby traps, mines, harassing/sniper fire) were not used extensively. Information from a memo detaineo indicated that the US and ARVN POW's reported to be at THO ID via XT2808, were taken to Ba Thu via XT265035 on 30 June 1966. The THO ID (XT2808) and Coc Ring (XT2806) areas were confirmed as being VC bases or rest areas along a reported supply and liaison route as evidenced by: (1) documents and medical supplies indicating a medical facility, and (2) the large number of fortified bunkers, foxholes, trenches, tunnels, hasty lean-to's, outdoor fire pits, and camouflaged huts. The many bunkers found had no firing ports, could house 5-10 men each, and had an overhead mud cover approximately 1 1/2 feet thick. The bunkers and tunnels were located on small wooded and elevated areas of land throughout the rice and reed fields. Numerous bunkers were also found at DUC HUE via XT3208. The 269th Bn, DT2 Regt, also reported located at THO MD-Coc Ring area, was reported to have moved to HOA KHANH near canal 3 via XS498975, on the same day US operations commenced. On 10 July an ambush patrol from Co B1/27 Inf made contact with 10 VC. Interrogation of VC WIA from this engagement revealed that the 10 VC were from the C120 company located at DUC HUE. The VC left their company at MY THUAN hamlet (XT375098), for the 1/27 Inf Base Camp. Their mission was to find the 1/27 Inf CP, locate possible VC mortar positions, and determine US defenses in the area. After completing their mission the 10 VC were directed to join the company at MY THUAN DONG (XT450048). The C120 Company was reported to be composed of 120 men divided into three platoons and armed with 1-60mm mortar, 1-81mm mortar, 2-B40's, 1-57mm RR, 3-30 Cal MG and assorted rifles. Also, on 10 July, section officials reported that the 506th Local Force Bn and the 269th Bn DT2 Regt were located in via XT4503. An operation conducted on 11 July in the area where the 2 battalions and the C120 company were reported to be located produced no significant contact. On 11 July, documents found at DUC HUE (XT327079), indicated a VC induction and recruiting facility in that vicinity for the entire DUC HUE District. On

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12 July, a VC cadre captured by B1/27 Inf, disclosed that the BINH HOA TAY village (XT4300) guerrilla unit, consisting of 70 men, was located via XT4300, and that a VC medical training center was reported to be located at XS3296. An operation on 12 July along the RACH TRAM river from XT394198 to the Cambodian Border via XT320133, a reported VC infiltration and supply route, uncovered a large number of sampans indicating a well-utilized waterway. However, no trenches, bunkers, or foxholes, were discovered along the river. After the operation, an interrogation of VC captured revealed that a VC Labor Force Platoon composed of 3 squads and one guerrilla squad operated in GIONG PHO (XS4099), and that a 30 man VC militia platoon was located at GIONG GUNG hamlet, via XT3614.

c. Terrain and Weather: The terrain is typical of the Delta Region of South Vietnam. There are numerous canals, rivers, streams, and flat rice fields. Many of the rice fields are presently overgrown with weeds, and where the water level is higher, fields of reeds predominate. The water level in the rice fields varies from a few inches to waist deep. Elevated areas of land are dispersed throughout the rice and reed fields. The water level in the eastern portion of the AO is lower, and large areas are devoted to farm crops. However, due to the constant afternoon and evening rains, even the elevated areas of land are wet and muddy.

d. Civic Action/Paramar Evacuation of the Population: Civic action conducted during this operation consisted primarily of the evacuation of refugees. Throughout the operational area, units of 1/27 Inf found civilians who desired to be evacuated to areas under GVN control. A total of 264 such personnel were evacuated to Duc Hu (XT4207), where control and responsibility for the refugees passed to GVN authorities. A small number, approximately 20, requested evacuation, but only if their water buffalo were also evacuated. Due to tactical requirements and a lack of suitable transportation for these water buffalo, it was not possible to meet this requirement and the people remained in the area. The attitude displayed by this small group of civilians was considerably different from the vast majority of refugees, who were quite willing to leave all their possessions in order to reach the security of GVN control. Leaflet drops were executed throughout the AO.

9. MISSION: TF1/27 conducts airmobile assault into OMI WAIKIKI (XT3208), commencing 080630 July 1966 to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies, and base areas in AO. Operation will include eagle flights, reconnaissance, patrolling, and heliborne reaction forces to locate and destroy elements of the 267th, 269th, and 506th VC battalions.

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10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

- a. PHASE I: B1/27 Inf conducts an airmobile assault into OBJ 1 (LZ WAIKIKI) at 080630 Jul to seize the old French fort area via XT326079, and to establish a security perimeter for the artillery battery firing position. At 080645 Jul, Btry A, 1/8 Arty, will be airlifted by Chinook helicopter to OBJ 1 (WAIKIKI), and will quickly prepare to support TF1/27 Inf units in the conduct of combat operations. OBJ WAIKIKI will become the battalion base.
- b. PHASE II: C1/27 Inf conducts airmobile assault into OBJ 2 (TRIPLER) via XT285085 at 080715 July. Company force will conduct S&D operations in OBJ 2 (TRIPLER) to locate and destroy VC forces, installations, and supplies. Company forces will be extracted by helicopter lift NLT 081500 July and moved to Bn base (WAIKIKI).
- c. PHASE III: A1/27 Inf will be airlifted from Cu Chi base at 080715 to WAIKIKI - TRIPLER Objective area. Company will be prepared to be airlifted on OBJ TRIPLER to assist C1/27 Inf in its mission, or be airlifted to OBJ 3 (SUNSET) to conduct S&D operations against VC forces. If A1/27 Inf is airlifted to an objective area other than WAIKIKI, the company will be extracted and airlifted to WAIKIKI NLT 081500 July.
- d. PHASE IV: HHC 1/27 Inf will be airlifted from Cu Chi base to OBJ WAIKIKI. LZ time 080800 July. HHC 1/27 Inf will await the establishment of battalion defense base.
- e. PHASE V: TF1/27 Inf conducts daily eagle flights, reconnaissance patrols, S&D operations, and fast reaction force operations in assigned AO to locate and destroy VC forces.
- f. PHASE VI: Operation UFA terminates and 1/27 Inf is returned by helicopter lift.

11. EXECUTION:

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TF1/27 Inf began OPERATION UFA. All elements of TF1/27 Inf were airlifted from Cu Chi to the operational area during the early morning. B1/27 Inf and HHC 1/27 Inf were airlifted into OBJ WAIKIKI (Obj 1) to clear the area and establish a base camp. A1/27 Inf was airlifted into OBJ TRIPLER (Obj 2) to conduct S and D operations. They were later extracted by helicopter and airlifted to battalion base at WAIKIKI. A Btry, 1/8 Arty, was airlifted into OBJ WAIKIKI to provide fire support during the operation.

At 0610 hours, B1/27 Inf, Bn Command Group, elements of HHC 1/27 Inf, and A1/8 Arty advance party, were airlifted from Base Camp

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Cu Chi to OBJ WAIKIKI loc via XT324081. The base camp was established without enemy contact. A1/8 Arty airlanded at Base Camp Waikiki at 0650 hrs and established an artillery fire support base.

At 0700 hrs, C1/27 Inf was airlifted from Cu Chi to OBJ TRIPIER loc via XT287076. No enemy contact was encountered and C1/27 Inf began search and destroy operations in northern half of OBJ TRIPIER. During the sweep C1/27 Inf found a camp site for 12-15 VC which had been used 6 or 7 days before. A small cache of medical supplies containing aspirin and penicillin were found. One VCS was captured and evacuated to BAO TRI. Eleven refugees were evacuated to DUC HUE. At 1502 hrs, C1/27 Inf was extracted by helicopter to battalion base at WAIKIKI.

A1/27 Inf was airlifted to OBJ TRIPIER at 0739 hrs, and began search and destroy operations in the southern half of the objective. A1/27 Inf found two small camp sites containing two loose 50 cal rds and two black pejsms tops. A family in the area related their belief that 65 VC were operating in the area. One camouflaged sampan was found and destroyed. Twenty-one (21) refugees were located and evacuated to DUC HUE. A1/27 Inf called in a helicopter gunship team to investigate a report of several men in the area. The gunships located several lean-to structures and fired several bursts of MG fire into them with negative results. At 1520 hrs, A1/27 Inf was extracted by helicopters to battalion base at WAIKIKI. The Recon platoon swept the battalion base area perimeter and located several holes which were marked to be destroyed the following day.

At 1526 hrs, one platoon B1/27 Inf departed the battalion base by helicopter lift to investigate a suspected cache located via XT262060. Recon platoon located the cache and destroyed the following: four (4) tons of rice, 1800 lbs of fertilizer and one cart. The helicopter gunships had made the original report of a suspected cache to the battalion command group. The location of the cache was believed to be a VC stopover point. Huts were of a temporary construction and were well camouflaged.

TF1/27 Inf established six night ambushes within 500 meters of the outside perimeter of the battalion base. All ambushes reported negative enemy contact.

During the day's operations, helicopters were used extensively for aerial recon missions throughout the AO. Constant surveillance was placed over all suspected VC locations in order to keep the VC on the run. Additionally, the helicopter pilots were able to locate targets which were considered to be lucrative in future operations.

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9 JULY 1966

Two company and two platoon sized operations were conducted on 9 July. A1/27 Inf was ordered to return to OBJ SUNSET, Obj 3, to continue searching for VC holdings while B1/27 Inf was to conduct a series of eagle flights utilizing two platoons. C1/27 Inf conducted a platoon eagle flight into the area south of the battalion base during the early afternoon. The Recon platoon continued to sweep selected areas close to the battalion base for the purpose of destroying VC tunnels, bunkers, and known VC houses.

At 0825 hrs, A1/27 Inf was airlifted to OBJ SUNSET via XT285056 by the 116th Avn Co (Airmobile). Co A made a thorough search of the area. No VC contact was made but A1/27 Inf found numerous articles indicating the presence of the VC. Medical supplies, VC documents, plastic gas masks, expended 30 and 50 cal rounds, and a clay model of a UH-1D helicopter were among the items found.

While on OBJ SUNSET, A1/27 Inf destroyed twenty VC structures, one and a half tons of loose, unhusked rice, ten gallons of gasoline, and one large sampans loaded with a large supply of cooking sauce. The sampans had been hidden and well camouflaged. It was found near a location believed to be a food preparation area for the VC. One woman and two children refugees were found on the objective. Those people were airlifted to the refugee center at DUC HUE. Ten bags of rice were evacuated with the family. A1/27 Inf was extracted from OBJ SUNSET and airlifted back to battalion base at 1440 hrs.

B1/27 Inf conducted two platoon sized eagle flights into objectives YANKEE loc via XT3210 and X-RAY loc via XT3311. B1/27 Inf landed on OBJ YANKEE at 0921 hrs. No VC contact was made. Forty refugees were found and evacuated to DUC HUE. The platoon found and destroyed eighteen tons of rice on site and evacuated two tons of rice to battalion base.

At 1258 hrs, both platoons were extracted from the two objectives and airlifted to the northeast to OBJ ZULU loc via XT2910. Here B1/27 Inf (-) swept across an area thought to be a VC route of march. No contact was made, but the company found and destroyed 61 VC structures, one cert, four sampans, and two 105mm duds. Twenty refugees were found and requested movement to government controlled territory. This was accomplished by aircraft. B1/27 Inf was airlifted back to battalion base at 1535 hrs.

C1/27 Inf manned the base perimeter until 1530 hrs. At that time a platoon eagle flight was conducted into an area south of the battalion base loc via XT3305. No contact was made on two landings in that vicinity.

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Recon platoon conducted a sweep in an area north to north-east of the battalion base. They found and destroyed one sampan, twenty bunkers, eight VC structures, one tunnel and one AP mine. This operation was concluded at 1300 hrs.

The first VC contact of the operation was made at 2100 hrs by one of three ambushes which had been positioned outside the battalion base perimeter. At that time, ambush flier personnel observed nine VC moving in a group to their front. The patrol leader waited until the VC were well within his designated killing zone at which time he proceeded to cut down the VC with devastating fire. The leader had fired the first rounds into the VC group, one of which detonated a rifle grenade carried on the VC's belt. In turn, two other grenades exploded. While SA, AW, and M-79 rounds were being fired, mortar fire was called in on the group. The VC were unable to return a single round of fire. At first light, the patrol located two Chicom carbines, one US carbine, two US M-1 rifles, one US Thompson sub MG, two rifle grenade launchers, two cartridge belts and 300 rds of SA ammo. The VC lost six KIA (BC) and two KIA (Pose). One VC (WIA) was captured by Recon the following morning. The Commanding General of the 25th Inf Div personally decorated the patrol leader the following morning.

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Operations conducted on 10 July were executed as a result of intelligence gained from VC sources by higher headquarters. Two VC battalions were reported to be located on the west side of the ORIENTAL RIVER via XT445035. This information was received on the afternoon of 9 July. The Battalion Commander immediately began planning for the new mission.

At 0830 hrs, the 116th Avn Co (Airmobile) lifted two platoons of B1/27 Inf and two platoons of C1/27 Inf into four platoon landing zones loc via XT454034. The two companies landed without enemy contact. The helicopter fire teams received only sporadic small arms fire. Platoons from B1/27 Inf and C1/27 Inf were on immediate "standby" at the battalion base as well as the helicopters to lift them. In addition, platoons from A1/27 Inf were on thirty minute standby. During the morning, B1/27 Inf and C1/27 Inf swept from the LZ's along the Oriental River, searching for VC forces. No VC contact was made. Gunships continued to conduct recon by fire over all canals in the area without contact. The two companies destroyed thirty VC identified huts, four bunkers and two AP mines in the objective area. Both companies were extracted by air and returned to battalion base at WAIKIKI. Artillery preparatory fires and a preplanned air strike hit the objective area prior to the airmobile assault.

A1/27 Inf remained at battalion base and served as the battalion security and reaction force.

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Recon platoon resumed the mission of maintaining surveillance over the VC bodies at site of ambush Tiger. These were the VC killed the night of 9 July. Recon platoon was also to conduct another search of the area for evidence of VC losses during the engagement of the previous night. Recon platoon found one VC WIA from the ambush engagement. Under interrogation, the VC revealed that at approximately 091800 Jul, he had led a ten man squad from **MR THAN** hamlet (XT375088) to the 1/27 Inf base to make a recon. At approximately 2000 hrs, his squad was ambushed by US troops. He stated he was the assistant platoon leader of the 1st Platoon, C1, Duc Hue Company. Subsequently, much valuable intelligence information was obtained from this VC. The VC stated that his company was located near XT450048, and that he was to have returned to that location after the recon of 1/27 Inf base. This information was flashed to the battalion commander and B1/27 Inf checked out the area prior to extraction. No sign of the VC company was found. Recon platoon continued to search ambush area and found and destroyed two sampans and five bunkers.

TFl/27 Inf conducted six night ambushes vicinity battalion base. Two of the ambush patrols made enemy contact. Ambush Dodge (XT324080) received some probing fire from an estimated 5-10 VC. The patrol leader reported he believed the VC did not know of his location. The leader called in 81mm mortar fire with unknown results. Area was searched at first light on 11 July with negative results. Ambush Coronet loc vic XT322080, detected noise to their front and observed an estimated 15 VC far to their front. Since the enemy was not in their ambush killing zone, 81mm and 4.2" mortar fire were called in. A search of the area at first light revealed negative results. Ambush Coronet destroyed two sampans when returning to base from ambush site. Gunship teams of the 116th Avn Company continued to conduct recon and surveillance missions over the AO during the afternoon and evening.

New eagle flight targets were located and earmarked for operations on succeeding days. At 2100 hours, a "starlight" mission was flown over the east-west river connecting the Cambodian Border and the Oriental River. This river also marked the north boundary of the AO. The mission involved battalion personnel and three helicopters from the direct support airborne company. One ship was used as a control ship and carried two persons utilizing the M-16 rifle with starlight scope. Two gunships followed behind. During the one hour flight, the troopers using the starlight located and marked two VC sampans. One sampan was sunk and one possibly sunk by the gunships.

11 JULY 1966

A1/27 Inf conducted three platoon sized combat results by

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helicopter into three objectives along the Rach Tram River. The river connects the Cambodian Border (XT321133) and the Oriental River (XT394139). LZ's were located at XT346138, XT324133, and XT372147. The concept of this operation was to land the three rifle platoons at locations along the river and have each platoon sweep to the East covering both sides of the river. Since there were numerous sampans and "learn-to" type huts along the bank, and the fact that virtually no people were seen in the area, substantiated the belief that this river was a major location for the VC. Sampans were seen moving on the river at night, and the area had been hit virtually every night with H&I fires.

The air landings began at 0805 hrs and were completed at 0818 hrs. Troops made no enemy contact. A thorough search of the river line was conducted. Rubber boats were used to check inlets and under overhanging growth along the banks. Gunships were used to provide constant surveillance over friendly troops and to locate suspicious ground positions. At 0847 hrs, approximately thirty civilian personnel were noted moving north from the river. They appeared to be heading for the village of Ap Chanh loc via XT3418. At 0907 hrs, a standby platoon from C1/27 Inf was airlifted to XT332147 where a snatch was executed. Twelve of the fast moving civilians were grabbed, loaded aboard the aircraft and returned with the platoon to the battalion base WIKIKI for interrogation. A1/27 Inf located and destroyed ninety-five (95) VC identified houses, ninety-two (92) sampans, nine CBU's and two Chicom grenade booby traps. One sampan had a load of raw meat stored in it which was destroyed. Several VC documents were found. A1/27 Inf was extracted by aircraft and returned to WIKIKI at 1314 hrs.

3B1/27 Inf conducted a search and destroy operation several hundred meters to the South of WIKIKI between 0830 and 1200 hrs. At loc XT319083, eight shelter humpers, four VC identified houses and one concrete bunker were destroyed.

Recon platoon conducted a sweep East-Southeast of WIKIKI between 0730 and 1100 hrs. At XT327079, the platoon located and destroyed four VC identified houses. Also found at that location were one US pistol belt, two ammo pouches (one contained VC documents and the other contained two hand grenades), one school bag of VC documents, one bag of medical supplies, one flashlight, and a bundle of bloody clothing. At XT323088 the platoon destroyed eleven bunkers. At XT321086, two tons of rice were found in an abandoned hut. The rice was extracted.

1C1/27 Inf conducted a sweep due West of battalion base. The platoon located and destroyed two bunkers, eight tunnels, three houses and three sampans. This sweep began at 0800 and was completed at 1130 hrs.

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At 1600 hrs, a "snipe hunt" was conducted via XT26100. A squad from the Recon platoon was mounted on two helicopters. A CAC aircraft was used as control and spotter. The concept of the "snipe hunt" was to conduct air surveillance over a rice paddy, locate suspicious people, and drop a squad down and snatch two to four individuals for interrogation. At approximately 1610 hrs, four persons were seen running across a paddy. The squad was landed and a total of four persons were snatched. Gunships escorting the three helicopters flushed several VC in the paddies. Most were armed. Three VC, all armed, were killed (BC). One body and a rifle were recovered. The snatch was made at XT262073. Prisoners were evacuated to rear area Cu Chi.

A starlight mission was conducted in conjunction with the 116th Avn Co but was aborted due to inclement weather. 1/27 Inf established three night ambushes. No enemy contact was made.

12 JULY 1966

One company and three platoon sized operations were conducted on 12 July. A1/27 and C1/27 Inf manned the battalion base, and provided platoon reaction forces for the company sized eagle flights conducted by B1/27 Inf in the SE section of the TAOR. A1/27 Inf and C1/27 Inf also conducted platoon sized sweeps from battalion base 2000 meters to the S and N respectively. The recon platoon swept the southern portion of the battalion base in search of VC tunnels, bunkers, and VC houses. A1/27 Inf (-) together with C1/27 Inf (-) manned the battalion base, and 1 platoon from A1/27 Inf was positioned at the battalion chopper pad on 15 minute alert in the event B1/27 Inf eagle flight needed rapid reinforcement.

At 0805 hrs, A1/27 Inf departed battalion base and swept 2000 meters along a trail to the S. A thorough search of the area was made and two empty sampans were destroyed. The sampans had been well hidden and camouflaged, and it was obvious that they were being utilized to transport VC supplies. No enemy contact was made during the sweep and the platoon returned to the battalion base at 1115 hrs. At 1600 hrs, a squad from A1/27 Inf conducted another "snipe hunt," utilizing the same technique which had proved so successful in the past. At XT338142, "snipe hunt" noted a suspicious group of men crossing a rice paddy. The UH-1D's swooped down on the surprised men and picked up a total of 5 individuals. Upon interrogation, one turned out to be a VC, 3 were VCS detainees, and 1 was released.

B1/27 Inf conducted the major operation of the day. The Pn S-3 and B company commander selected, in the SE portion of the TAOR, 3 objectives in close proximity to one another which appeared to be lucrative eagle flight objectives. Shortly before lift-off, the entire area was hit by airstrikes and artillery. At 0805 hrs, one platoon from B1/27 Inf was airlifted into Obj 1, XS18962. No

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enemy contact was made, but the platoon destroyed 3 bunkers and 14 VC houses. A total of 47 refugees requested to be evacuated. UH-1D helicopters from the 116th Avn Co (Airmobile) airlifted these people to Duc Hue - the GVN refugee collecting point. At 0845 hrs, a second platoon, 2B1/27, was airlifted into Obj 2, XS415985, and immediately encountered VC sniper fire. A squad from the B1/27 Inf standby platoon was called to reinforce the element on Obj 2, and gunships peppered the entire area with devastating fire. Enemy losses totaled 2 KIA (BC), 1 VCC, 14 VCS, 40 VC houses, 1 VC cart, 20 bunkers, and 2 bags of documents. At 1124 hrs, the platoon at Obj 1, was airlifted into Obj 3, XS399994, where 12 sampans, 3 bunkers, and 14 VC houses were destroyed. 23 refugees were evacuated to Duc Hue. While the search was being conducted, the platoon received sniper fire from a position approximately 200 meters west of Obj 3. The platoon deployed to the area, killed 3 VC (BC), captured 1 Mauser rifle, and 1 wallet with documents. At the conclusion of the operation, all B1/27 Inf elements were airlifted back to the battalion base, and closed at 1435 hrs.

At 0832 hrs, 1 platoon C1/27 Inf departed battalion base and conducted a 2000 meter sweep to the north, while the balance of the company, together with A1/27 Inf (-), provided battalion base security and a platoon reaction force for the B1/27 Inf operation. At XT312104, the platoon found a plastic bag filled with VC documents; and at XT316101, 9 VC bunkers and two sampans were destroyed. The platoon returned to battalion base at 1245 hrs.

At 120800 hrs, Recon platoon departed the battalion base to make a thorough search of the southern portion of the perimeter. Recon platoon was unable to locate any additional VC bunkers, sampans, or tunnels, and returned at 1110 hrs.

A "Lightning Bug" operation was conducted in the AO between 111231 hrs and 120015 hrs. One sampan was engaged and sunk at XT429072. A secondary explosion was observed in the vicinity of the sampan.

The operation conducted on 12 July is noteworthy in that the operation was controlled by the Company Commander himself. The Company Commander was provided a C&C ship, and sufficient aircraft assets to move his platoon or reinforce as the tactical situation dictated. This allowed the Company Commander to gain a great deal of experience in command and control and also provided the battalion command group with added depth in controlling assets.

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TF1/27 Inf terminated Operation EWA on 13 July. The airlift

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back to Cu Chi was to begin at 0730 hrs but a low cloud ceiling prevented the helicopters from landing at WAIKIKI until 0830 hrs. The first flight of helicopters to land at WAIKIKI reported receiving ground fire west of Cu Chi which slightly damaged one chopper. The airlift began at 0830 hrs. The order of extraction was supplies, HHC 1/27 Inf, B1/27 Inf, A1/27 Inf, and C1/27 Inf. The UH-ID helicopters extracted the personnel while the CH-47 helicopters extracted A Btry, 1/8 Arty, the Bn Heavy Mortar Platoon, ammunition, and supplies. No difficulties were encountered during the extraction, and the last element of TFL/27 Inf closed Cu Chi perimeter at 1355 hrs.

12. RESULTS:

a. VC Losses: 14 VC KIA (BC), 3 KIA (poss), 8 VCC, 17 VCS. Captured and destroyed enemy equipment and material included the following.

Chicon carbines	2	105mm duds	2
US carbine	1	gals gasoline	10
M-1 rifles	2	flashlight	1
1917 Winchester 303 rifle	1	wallet/papers	1
Thompson Sub MG	1	bundles of documents	4
rifle grenade launchers	2	bags of medical supplies	3
rifle grenades	6	houses	338
grenade booby traps	2	sampans	134
CBU	3	bunkers	63
cartridge belts	2	outboard motors	3
pistol belt	1	Tons of rice	27 ¹
gas masks	2	lbs of fertilizer	1800
		foxholes	8
		carts	3

b. Friendly Losses: 2 KIA (returned to duty)

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Supply

(1) General - All resupply on Operation HUA was by air utilizing both CH-47 and UH-ID aircraft.

(a) Class I

1. Breakfast and dinner - "C" rations
2. Supper - "A" rations

(b) Class III

Battalion established a Class III refueling point for aircraft at forward defense base. Bladders were airlifted in by CH-47 on the third and fourth day of the operation. Empty bladders were extracted by UH-ID. The airmobile company supplied pumps, hoses, and personnel to operate the refueling point. A total of 5000 gallons of JP-4 was expended.

(c) Class IV

1. Battalion was resupplied with the

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following items:

- a. Concertina - 1500 meters
- b. 8' stakes
- c. Sandbags - 43,000

2. All Class IV items were extracted on the last day of the operations by helicopter.

(d) Class V Expenditures

1.	Ctg 5.56 Ball	12,900
2.	Ctg 7.62 Ball	2,240
3.	Ctg 7.62 Ball 5/clip	1,900
4.	Ctg 40mm HE	240
5.	Ctg 81mm Mtr HE M23A1 2/PDF	421
6.	Ctg 81mm Mtr Smoke WP W/PDF	68
7.	Ctg 4.2 Mtr HE W/PDF	516
8.	Ctg 4.2 Mtr Smoke WP W/PDF	84
9.	Grenade, Hand Frag	225
10.	Grenade, Hand smoke, green	84
11.	Grenade, Hand smoke, red M18	32
12.	Mine - Anti-Per Claymore M18A1	93
13.	Signal Illum, Red Star Procht	4
14.	Signal Illum, White Star Cluster	16
15.	Eng Demo Block TNT (1 lb block)	450
16.	Caps, Blasting, Non Elec	135
17.	Fuse Blasting Time (ft)	250
18.	Igniter Mine Fuze M2 w/proof	74
19.	Flare Surface Trip M29A1	109
20.	Ctg 105mm HE	2201
21.	Ctg 105mm Smoke WP	160

(e) Water

1. Battalion was resupplied at the rate of 2 gallons per man per day.
2. Total resupply of water - 5000 gallons

b. Maintenance - Normal maintenance of weapons and equipment was conducted prior to, during, and after the operation.

c. Medical - There were no serious casualties during the operation. All Medevac was by air. Non-serious casualties were evacuated by resupply ships during normal operations. There were no friendly battle casualties.

d. Transportation - Movement of personnel and supplies was done by air. The DS 116th Avn Company (Airmobile) adequately met the transportation requirements of TF1/27 Inf.

e. Communications: During Operation Bua, TF1/27 Inf utilized the normal FM communications available to the battalion as supplemented by AM and VHF means. FM communications were effective within the AO. However, it was necessary to establish a retransmission station at the Duc Hue Sugar Mill loc vic XT435072. This

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retransmission station provided the battalion with the capability for communicating between the forward defense base and Cu Chi base camp, a distance of 30,000 meters. AM communications were provided by the use of USAF radio, the AN/PRC 47. This capability was utilized on several occasions at night when atmospheric conditions contributed to very poor FM communications over great distances. A VHF capability was provided by the division 125th Signal Battalion. The AN/PRC 69 was modified in number of channels and sized to fit on the bed of a 3/4 Ton truck and trailer. This VHF equipment provided the battalion with sole-user, common-user, and landline teletype means. By modifying the VHF equipment to the 3/4 Ton truck, the entire package was air transported to the objective area by the CH-47 helicopter. In addition to radio communications, the normal landlines were established within the battalion forward defense base.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. The battalion utilized the small ren-racked three man rubber boat extensively during Operation Ewa. These boats weighed approximately fifteen pounds and were usually issued two per infantry squad for a given tactical operation. The boats provided an excellent means for the infantrymen to gain access to deep canals where they could successfully conduct searches for hidden sampans and caches of VC supplies. Small air tanks were carried in order that the boats could be inflated wherever needed.

b. The battalion, in close coordination with the supporting airmobile company, developed a method of "snatching" suspected personnel off the ground through the use of an infantry squad mounted aboard a UH-1D helicopter. It was soon learned that shortly after the battalion began to close into the forward defense base each afternoon that indigenous personnel began to roam the rice paddies in small groups. These people gave the appearance of working in the paddies. Since the area of activity was one of questionable loyalty, it was determined that these people, if caught, might be of some intelligence value. A hunt was organized consisting of a command and control helicopter carrying the ground commander and the air team commander and two UH-1D's, each carrying an infantry fire team and a helicopter fire team. The concept of this operation was to have the C&C aircraft orbit the snatch area to locate suspects. Once the suspects are located, the fire team lands on either side of the suspects. The suspects are then brought aboard and returned to base. The fire team provides surveillance and suppressing fire if necessary. This concept was executed on two occasions at around 1700 hrs in the afternoon. On the first attempt, four suspects were apprehended and three VC, all armed, were killed. On another day, five suspects were apprehended. Of these five, one confessed to being a VC, three were held as suspects

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and one individual was cleared and released. The 1/27 Inf has coined the term "snipe hunt" to this concept. The snipe hunt is extremely effective in the type of "open country" terrain found in the AO. It is also imperative that the unit get to know the area well and that locations for "snipe hunts" be carefully selected.

c. For the first time, the battalion utilized a Starlight scope from a helicopter. The AO contained many streams and canals which were suspected locations for the VC. The great number of sampans found in the area left no doubt that supplies were being moved throughout the area. The battalion and the direct support airmobile company executed two starlight missions at night. The first was successful in that two large sampans were sighted, one destroyed, and one possibly destroyed. The second mission on a succeeding night was not successful due to inclement weather conditions. One UH-1D was utilized as a starlight ship, 1/27 Inf personnel used the starlight scope mounted on the M-16 rifle to locate the enemy, then opened fire to mark the target. Trailing the starlight aircraft was a helicopter fire team that engaged the target after the marking was accomplished. This concept is good and works well, especially in areas where there are numerous canals and rivers.

15. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

The provision of a direct support airmobile company to the Infantry battalion for the entire period of an operation afforded the commander an unprecedented opportunity in developing his operations. Having aircraft at his disposal enabled him to launch a maximum number of airmobile operations varying in size from fire team to company over a very large operational area. Flexibility was also materially increased since the battalion was able to rapidly hit targets of opportunity throughout the AO, and reinforce rapidly as the situation dictated. Aerial resupply of the entire battalion task force was successfully integrated into the overall plan for effective usage of the airmobile company. During the six days of actual operations, plus the planning time prior to the first day, the battalion commander, the staff, and personnel of the airmobile company were able to develop the finest professional working relationship.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That whenever possible, consistent with available aviation assets, an airmobile company be placed in direct support of the infantry battalion when that battalion is operating in an isolated area and far removed from its home base. The same airmobile company should remain in DS during the period.

b. That an infantry battalion and preferably the 1/27


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Inf. conduct future operations in the area of operations from time to time.

c. That a VHF radio mobile package, which is capable of being airlifted by available helicopter assets, be made available to the battalion when operating from a fire support base in an isolated area for several days.

d. That GVN civic action teams be trained in the handling of refugees and made available during operations in isolated areas where GVN influence is virtually unknown. These trained Vietnamese people would actually handle the evacuation of refugees utilizing US transport. The entire effort would thus be less of a US show.


ALVIN L O'NEIL
Lt Col, Infantry
Commanding

Annexes:


A- Operations Overlay

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Annex A (Operations Overlay) to Combat After Action Report to COMUSMACV 8-66 (Operation 2700)
dated 7 Jul 66

Ref: Map, RVN, 1:250,000 Sheet NC 48-7



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OIR 551-2

HEADQUARTERS
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

CIRCULAR
NUMBER 551-2

2 August 1966

Expires 1 August 1967

FOREIGN NATIONALS

Revolutionary Development Staff Section

1. Purpose. To establish a Revolutionary Development Staff section in the 25th Infantry Division, and prescribe its organization, functions, and responsibilities.

2. General.

a. Revolutionary Development encompasses those military, political, economic, social, and psychological activities which are designed to:

- (1) Liberate the people from VC control.
- (2) Restore local government.
- (3) Maintain public security.
- (4) Win the support of the people to the national government.

b. Each province has a Revolutionary Development office which supports national development programs. Planning and coordination therefore must be made at the province level to direct military and civic action into areas which will be of greatest benefit to the GVN. To effect properly this planning and subsequent action it is necessary to collect, record, and analyze data pertaining to the multitude of activities that are part of or support the Revolutionary Development Program.

c. A Revolutionary Development section will be established as an element of the division staff, functioning under the supervision of the ACoS, G5.

3. Organization. The Revolutionary Development staff section will be organized as follows:

a. Branch Chief - This officer will supervise activities pertaining to:

- (1) Liaison with other Revolutionary Development agencies of the GVN and those US agencies supporting or assisting the GVN effort.

APP 12

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

Philip U Bondi

PHILIP U. BONDI
OPT, AGC
Asst AG

THOMAS W. MELLER
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

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G5 (15 cys)

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HEADQUARTERS
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
APO 96225

AVDOIN

7 August 1966

SUBJECT: 25th Division Pacification Operations in HAU NGHIA Province (U)

TO: See Distribution

1. (U) Purpose. The purpose of this study is to provide the reader with background information concerning the joint pacification efforts of the South Vietnamese Government and the 25th Infantry Division (US) in HAU NGHIA Province. An abbreviated sketch of the physical characteristics of the province as well as a brief historical summary of the area are also discussed in order to provide a full appreciation of the inherent problems in any pacification endeavor in this area. The data and information contained herein represent a distillation of studies and after action reports recently prepared by USAID, Advisory Team 43, BAO TRAI, the 2d Bde, 25th Division and the 25th Division, G2 Section.

2. (C) General:

Physical description. HAU NGHIA province is located west northwest of Saigon and extends from Gia Dinh province on the east to the Cambodian Border on the west. Its other neighbors are BINH DUONG to the northeast, TAY NINH to the northwest and KIEN TUONG and LONG AN province to the south. Most portions on the province boundary are ill defined and artificial and even those stretches demarcated by streams or canals constitute no meaningful obstacle to passage. The 27 kilometer frontier with Cambodia is particularly hard to distinguish for almost of its entire length. Most of the province is extremely flat and low lying and typically upper Mekong Delta in appearance. In the extreme west and in southwest the land table is fairly close to sea level and dominated by an expanse of swampy terrain generally referred to as the Plain of Reeds. The central portion of the province is slightly higher and better drained and moving to the north the terrain rises imperceptibly to a maximum elevation of approximately 30 meters. Vegetation covers virtually the entire land surface of the province with most of the natural cover replaced by rice. Indigenous forest remain only in the extreme northern and northeastern portions such as the BOI LOI Woods

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

APP 14

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area and in the WILHOL Rubber Plantation and the HO BO Woods complex situated in PHU HOA District of BINH DUONG Province. Vegetation throughout HAU NGHIA generally does not appear to be as dense or lush as in neighboring BINH DUONG.

b. History. HAU NGHIA was one of the final creations of the Diem Regime and established as a province on 15 October 1963 by Presidential Order. The province was made up of 4 districts contributed by the neighboring provinces as follows: DUC HOA and DUC HUE Districts formerly of LONG AN Province TRANG BANG of TAY NINH Province and CU CHI of BINH DUONG Province. The province was created primarily to coordinate military activities on both sides of the old boundary between LONG AN and TAY NINH. This boundary ran lengthwise through the KINH TAY Swamp and VC units operating on either side of this swamp could conduct military operations in one province and then flee across the border with almost sure knowledge that there would be neither pursuit nor meaningful coordinated response from the neighboring province. HAU NGHIA, although not recognized by the VC as a province continues to be of great importance to them. Communication, supply and liaison routes between the Delta and VC redoubts in War Zones C and D and the Iron Triangle pass through HAU NGHIA Province. HAU NGHIA is also a prime source of paddy rice and much needed manpower for VC forces. BAO TRAI, the province capital was selected because of its theoretical capacity to maintain liaison with and render tactical assistance to each of the district towns and secondarily to avoid selecting one of the existing district capitals thereby offending the other three.

3. (C) Background:

a. Prior to arrival of the 25th Infantry Division effective government control in HAU NGHIA province extended only to the maximum range of supporting weapons located in the Vietnamese military installations immediately surrounding the 4 district capitals and the province capital. This security umbrella encompassed about 25 per cent of the population with 60 per cent under VC control and another 15 per cent living in contested areas.

b. Even during the days of the French Administration the area that is now HAU NGHIA Province was considered politically unstable because of its long history of rebel activity. CU CHI district, then a part of BINH DUONG Province was notoriously anti-administration even before 1961 when it developed into an overt trouble spot. By 1962, most of DUC HUE District, much of upper DUC HOA and portions of CU CHI and TRANG BANG were under VC control. In many other areas not actually under de facto VC control there never was an effective political presence to begin with and the government's position was precarious at best.

c. In 1962 and early 1963, the government made a concentrated

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effort to clear and pacify much of the area astride Route 1 in connection with Operation SUNRISE the original Strategic Hamlet Program. A considerable amount of time and expense was devoted to relocating thousands of people to areas which could theoretically be more logically defended and supported. In spite of the impressive statistics compiled during this operations, there was in fact little genuine pacification in terms of rooting out the VC infrastructure and replacing it with a viable local governmental mechanism. During late 1963, the situation in HAU NGHIA province became critical and by early 1964 military reversals were commonplace and proceeding at an alarming rate. In June 1964, DUC HOA was attacked and partially overrun and the DUC HUE District capital of MY QUI located west of the Oriental River was evacuated since virtually all of district was then under VC control. The capital was transferred to the HIEP HOA Sugar Mill with 3 villages of DUC HOA District located east of the river being ceded to DUC HUE and the district boundaries realigned accordingly. The situation continued to deteriorate until October 1964 when the 25th ARVN Div was transferred to HAU NGHIA province from II Corps. With the arrival of the 25th the overall military decline was temporarily arrested and the immediate DUC HOA Area resecured. In the Spring of 1965, the VC renewed their heavy pressure throughout the province gaining steadily until the arrival of the 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division in the CU CHI area in January 1966. At the time, the Brigade arrived government control in CU CHI district, outside the district capital, TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center and a few other isolated outposts, was tenuous even in daylight hours and all areas were subject to constant harassment. Two Popular Forces posts, THAI MY and VINH CU were little more than prisons in basically VC controlled hamlets. Guerrillas and sappers operating along Route 1 in the GAY TRON - PHUOC HIEP - SUOI SAU area were particularly active and prone to ambush not only military traffic but civilian vehicles of opportunity as well.

d. During the first three months in-country the 2d Brigade concentrated on securing the CU CHI base area and conducting search and destroy operations designed to destroy main and local Viet Cong forces and relieve the pressure on the base camp. Subsequent to the arrival of the Division Headquarters and as a result of the increasing coordination with ARVN and Province officials, it was decided to increase the Division's contribution to the Revolutionary Development Program (RDP). This program properly supported by social, political, economic and military action was felt to be the logical blue print for the restoration of order and stability to HAU NGHIA Province. The concept behind the RDP calls for the gradual extension of the full spectrum of the government's influence outward from secure or pacified area.

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e. In response to a request by the HAU NGHIA Province Chief the Commanding General, 25th Division directed that planning begin for the first pacification operation. The operation was called MAILI and the unit selected was the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry (Wolfhounds). Although this operation was the pilot project of this nature it will be discussed in relative detail since it encompasses all the techniques and lessons learned applied to later operations.

3. (0) Operation MAILI.

a. Background. One of the critical areas of HAU NGHIA Province scheduled for securing in 1966 was the area astride Provincial Route 8 between BAO TRAI (XT5204) and CU CHI (XT6212) encompassing new life hamlets AP CHO (XT5505) DUC CHANH (XT5505), DUC HANH "A" (XT5606) and DUC HANH "B" (XT5707). AP CHO and DUC CHANH are usually referred to collectively as DUC LAP. Provincial Route 8 is the only usable road leading into the province capital from Saigon via Route 1 through CU CHI. It was essential that the hamlets along this road be secured in order to insure the maintenance and security of this key route. Route 8, also cuts across a major Viet Cong supply and communication corridor leading from LONG AN Province to VC base areas in TAY NINH and BINH DUONG Provinces. Since October 1965, ARVN forces had been repeatedly attacked and driven away from their positions along the route by the Viet Cong. The result had been that the previously thriving hamlets had been almost completely evacuated by the residents. The road had been mined or interdicted with roadblocks almost daily during the seven months prior to MAILI making travel difficult and hazardous. The hamlets in the area up to 6 kilometers to the northwest and southeast of the road had been unmolested sanctuaries for Viet Cong local guerrillas for months. Except during an occasional ineffective sweep by ARVN forces stationed at BAO TRAI, the people of these hamlets had experienced no contact with the GVN. Although not considered to be active Viet Cong sympathizers, they had nevertheless been forced to make accommodations with the VC in order to survive.

b. Preparations. Prior to the operation, the CO, 1st Bn, 27th Inf and the Sector Advisor discussed in detail the objectives of the operation, the area of operation, and the tactics to be employed. The area of operation was divided into sections generally following hamlet boundaries. Each day the battalion would clear one of the sections of Viet Cong guerrillas and provide security for the employment of a composite Vietnamese "GO TEAM" consisting of National Police (NP), psychological warfare troops, intelligence troops, and medical personnel. The NP would search each dwelling and check the credentials of the residents. The psywar team, equipped with bull horns and leaflets, would discuss various GVN aid programs with the people. The intelligence team would attempt to identify the Viet Cong infrastructure and also recruit agents among the villagers. The medical group would provide rudimentary medical treatment to the sick and infirm. An officer and an NCO from

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the American sector advisory team would accompany the Vietnamese team to provide liaison between the Vietnamese and the US company and platoon commanders. Additional NP would be assigned to the companies for the duration of the operation to serve as guides and to assist in the identification of VC suspects. Vietnamese Counter Terror troops would be assigned to the battalion to assist in night ambushes which would be used extensively throughout the area.

c. Operations:

(1) Operations got under way on 27 April and initially, the US troops appeared to be uneasy when working in close contact with the Vietnamese and this in turn reflected in the performance of the Vietnamese. However, as the daily operations continued, both the US and Vietnamese troops began to work more effectively together. By the end of two weeks, the combined forces had evolved a highly efficient "modus operandi", and a true sense of camaraderie had developed. One reason for the improvement was due to the critique and planning conference conducted each evening at 1700 hours in a provisional Joint Operations Center at BAO TRAI. At this conference, which was attended by the CO and staff of the 1st Bn, 27th Inf, the Province Chief and his staff, and the Sector Advisor and his staff, the current day's operation was reviewed and critiqued, and plans made for the next day's operation.

(2) The Vietnamese and their American advisors participated in every phase of operation MAILI and accompanied the 25th Division companies and platoons into every hamlet in the area of operations. They proceeded by helicopter, tank, personnel carriers, trucks, or on foot. On one occasion, in response to hard intelligence of a Viet Cong location, US and Vietnamese troops were transported from one objective area to another by a collection of USAID, National Police, and Vietnamese Regional Force trucks driven by US advisors. On five occasions, battalions from the ARVN 25th Infantry Division conducted operations designed to support and compliment the efforts of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry. On three occasions, these ARVN battalions were under sector command while on two other cases, they were under ARVN 25th Division command.

(3) During MAILI, sufficient security was provided to DUC HANH "B" to allow province to construct a new outpost near that hamlet. Fields of fire were cleared for the new outpost by the engineer platoon attached to the 1st Bn, 27th Infantry. Barrier materials for the new outpost were salvaged from two abandoned outposts in a nearby area which were leveled by the engineer platoon at the request of the Province Chief.

(4) Results: The success of Operation MAILI is more appropriately measured by the results listed below:

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- (a) Control of the area of operation was wrested from the Viet Cong for the duration of the operation. Commercial and private traffic was heavier and moved much more freely on Provincial Route 8 and other feeder trails in the area.
- (b) The Viet Cong were discredited in the eyes of the people living in the area of influence of the 1st Bn, 27th Infantry task force.
- (c) The US soldiers demonstrated that, contrary to Viet Cong propaganda, they are not unfeeling, blood-thirsty brutes.
- (d) GVN influence was extended to each of the hamlets in the area of the operation. Many of these had not been ventured into for several years by province officials.
- (e) Medical treatment was administered to 833 adults and children in the area during the 19 MEDCAPS performed in the various hamlets.
- (f) The new life hamlets along the route between BAO TRAI and OU CHI began showing definite signs of life. In DUC HANH "B" alone, the population approximately tripled by the end of the operation, indicating restored confidence and a desire to live under GVN control.
- (g) The efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. troops provided an excellent example for the members of the Sector Staff. After twice being embarrassed by the late arrival of his forces at their appointed locations, the Province Chief cracked down and required a higher standard of performance by his subordinates.
- (h) The concept of the composite Vietnamese "GO TEAM", consisting of intelligence, psywar, medical, and national police troops, was perfected and its effectiveness demonstrated. (This twenty man team is to be kept intact and will, it is hoped, accompany ARVN battalions on future search and clear operations.)
- (i) The value of close coordination between the US battalion staff and the Sector Staff (with its US advisors) was readily apparent. The late afternoon daily conferences in the provisional Operations Center at BAO TRAI made possible an extremely close cooperation between the various participants. Problems were worked out and mistakes were discussed in an atmosphere of genuine understanding. Toward the end of the period, the Province Chief stated that he would order his two attached ARVN battalions to conduct operations in coordination with the Americans in any way recommended by the US Battalion Commander. Thus the operation provided an effective vehicle for the development of integrated, combined operations at the small unit level.

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4. (C) Other Pacification Operations. The experiences and lessons learned from Operation MAILL were applied to the strategy and techniques of three other pacification operations FT SMITH, SANTA FE and FRESNO. (See Enclosure 1 for Areas of Operation). Tactics were refined and coordination with Sector and Subsector officials was improved through daily contact. Because of the multi-battalion aspect of FRESNO and SANTA FE a Brig Liaison team was maintained at Sector Headquarters to facilitate the two way information flow between the battalions in the field and province officials. In addition to the results previously enumerated for MAILL, during SANTA FE and FRESNO several incidents transpired which were indicative of the growing success of our pacification effort.

a. During the last week in June, on five separate occasions, village children led members of the 1st and 2d Bns, 27th Infantry to small ammunition caches in the vicinity of their hamlets. These children demonstrated a wide range of area knowledge and in one instance led troops to a cache 2 kilometers away from their homes. The more important items recovered included 31 60mm mortar rounds, 39 grenades, 2 155mm arty rounds and over 2100 rounds of miscellaneous small arms ammunition.

b. On 30 June, a VC platoon leader took advantage of the Division's presence in his area to arrange with local officials, through his wife, for US Forces to capture him at his house. Once apprehended, the platoon leader turned over his weapon and led a platoon to the hiding places of nine other members of his platoon who were captured on the spot. The key item in this action was the response of province officials upon hearing of the defector's wish. Within 30 minutes, US Forces had been notified and reacted to exploit the information.

c. Enemy Personnel and Equipment Losses for all four pacification operations are shown in Inclosure 2.

5. (C) Associated Pacification Activities. In addition to the activities enumerated previously the following operations have also been carried out in support of, and in conjunction with the main pacification effort.

a. MEDCAP: A MEDCAP team consisting normally of a doctor and four aidmen provided medical treatment to inhabitants of hamlets as part of the "GO TEAM" or during "COUNTY FAIR" operations. When a hamlet was secured by US Forces, the MEDCAP team would enter and provide treatment for periods of three or four hours. The team was always warmly accepted and the enormous flow of inhabitants both from that hamlet and nearby hamlets was encouraging. The total number of inhabitants treated during SANTA FE and FRESNO alone was 6,686.

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b. County Fair. County Fair operations incorporating civic action and psychological warfare measures, were conducted in all areas during the pacification operations. The primary objective was to identify and neutralize the existing VC infrastructure in the hamlets and villages. County Fair operations in all hamlets were quite similar; therefore, the following description of the activities of the SO DO County Fair will illustrate a typical operation. The operation began at 230400 Jun 66 when two companies of the 2d Bn, 27th Infantry surrounded the hamlet. Two checkpoints were established, one at each end of the hamlet, and all personnel attempting to leave the area were checked by the National Police stationed at the checkpoints. At approximately 0700 hours, the infantry with assistance of three Vietnamese search teams began a house to house search of the hamlet. These teams consisted of one National Policeman, one ARVN intelligence NCO and one US Advisor from Sector. A thorough search was made not only for intelligence information but also from a population control aspect. The school was chosen as a collection and processing center and all available inhabitants were moved to that area where a complete census was conducted. As soon as the census was completed and the inhabitants had been screened to determine their true status the GO TEAM set up the Paywar and MEDCAP teams at the school. The MEDCAP team treated a total of 94 villagers for various illnesses and was warmly received by the villagers. A mobile identification card team was also provided from Sector to assist in processing inhabitants without identification cards. A cultural team consisting of three men and two women not only provided entertainment but also gave a very subtle psychological message to the people through that medium of entertainment. The 2d Brigade Band then gave a band concert and the Province Civil Affairs Officer drove a Lambretta equipped with a loudspeaker through the hamlet playing recorder music thus adding to the overall relaxed atmosphere of the operations. Major NHA, the Province Chief, arrived from BAO TRAI, mingled with the inhabitants and gave an inspiring pro-government speech. A noon meal was prepared by US Forces and served to 350 villagers. After the noon meal, 25th Division Helping Hand items donated by the people of Hawaii were issued. The remainder of the afternoon was used by the civic action team to distribute USAID, CARE, and CRS commodities and supplies to the people. Literature concerning province agricultural programs and public health services was also distributed. In short, all resources were used in an attempt to influence the people in the hamlet to start thinking in terms of GVN control rather than VC domination. Information received during this operation led to an operation in a nearby area resulting in numerous VC tunnels and fortifications destroyed.

c. Checkmate. On 6 July 1966, the Division initiated a program of establishing traffic check points at random locations along major highways in HAU NGHIA and TUY BINH Provinces. The purpose of

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this operation, called CHECKMATE, is to deny the VC the use of land LOC's to covertly move personnel and supplies through our TAOR. Checkpoints are manned by elements of the 3/4 Cav, National Police and CI agents of the 25th MI Det. An average of four APC's are employed to furnish security in the area of operation. Two checkpoints are then established, approximately 150 meters apart, enabling traffic checks in two directions. Three National Policemen and one CI agent are located at each checkpoint. The Cav's Aero rifle platoon is also prepared to assist the roadblock element if necessary and aerial scouts search out the surrounding area for any other targets of opportunity.

d. Roadrunner. Concurrent with the conduct of the pacification operations, the division also employed tailored task forces traversing main and secondary roads in HAU NGHIA Province to demonstrate our intention to use and keep open these LOC's. During June, the division conducted 86 of these "roadrunners" travelling a total of 1500 kilometers and clearing 35 road obstacles.

6. (C) Evaluation. The HAU NGHIA Province Advisory Team in the Special Report on Revolutionary Development, dated 1 July 1966, stated the following concerning our pacification efforts "As a result of continued operations by the US 25th Division in VC controlled areas and the prodigious effort being made by the US in pacification work, a positive change in the attitude of the people in VC controlled areas is being made. In the operational areas of "FRESNO" and "SANTA FE" the people are freely providing the forces with information concerning the locations of mines, booby traps, small caches of ammunition, and the names and homes of local Viet Cong. The US is countering the VC propaganda by their extensive MEDCAP program, by improving roads made impassable by the VC, and by being able to live and operate with relative impunity in VC controlled areas. The continued pacification operations provided the US forces with an understanding of the problems in rural construction and also the use of measured force when dealing with the guerrilla who is among the people, i.e., refusal to shoot artillery salvoes on a sniper, thus preventing the destruction of local houses and the killing of innocent people. The daily meetings and continual contact between the US and VN forces provides for a closer working relationship which is essential in combined operations. These meetings also provide an opportunity to point out the advantages of US methods of operation, which are characterized by their flexibility and rapid reaction time."

7. (C) Conclusion. Through pacification efforts such as those discussed above lies perhaps the most logical approach to the MACV "Hearts and Minds Program". Although results are never dramatic and occasional

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
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reversals are to be expected these operations are critical to ultimate victory of ARVN and FVMAF in South Vietnam. VC Main Forces and their base areas must obviously be constantly sought and destroyed concurrent with these pacification efforts in order to prevent these forces from exerting their influence in the pacified areas. With proper distribution of military forces and assets, pacification and search and destroy operations can be undertaken simultaneously to win the war on both fronts.

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
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PACIFICATION OPERATIONS

	KIA (BC)	KIA (POSS)	VCC	VCS	WPNS	CAPTURED GRAN (TENS)
OPERATION MAILI 27 APRIL - 12 MAY	47	51	3	26	2	2.7
OPERATION FORT SMITH 9 JUNE - 6 JULY	19	51	6	32	2	3.6
OPERATION FRESNO 13 JUNE - 14 JULY	20	30	18	41	6	2.55
OPERATION SANTA FE 13 JUNE - 4 JULY	3	17	14	74	0	.75

TOTAL 89 149 41 173 10 9.60

SECRET



CU CHI

DUE HOA

Hiep Hoa

DAO TRAM

DUMPH