<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD NUMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD391726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIMITATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; MAY 1968. Other requests shall be referred to Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Washington, DC 20310.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980; PER AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command

Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Adjutant General School
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Chemical School
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Chaplain School

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
1. (c) Section 1, Operational Significant Activities

a. Command

(1) During the reporting period there were seven major changes in the staff, II FFORCIV.

(a) On 8 March 1968, Major General John H. Hay, Jr became the Deputy Commanding General, II FFORCIV, replacing Major General Keith L. Ware. General Hay had previously served as Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division.

(b) On 25 April 1968, Brigadier General John S. Lekson reported to serve with the 101st Airborne Division. Colonel Joseph D. Mitchell, the Deputy Chief of Staff, became the Acting Chief of Staff.

(c) On 9 April 1968, Colonel Harry C. Williams became the ACofS, G1, II FFORCIV, after an assignment as Commanding Officer, 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division; he replaced LTC Bernard H. Des Roches.

(d) On 3 March 1968, Colonel Robert C. Jenkins became the ACofS, G1, II FFORCIV, replacing Colonel William M. Isacke.

(e) On 5 March 1968, Colonel John K. Wentor, Jr became the Adjutant General, II FFORCIV; Colonel Wentor previously served as Chief of the Secretariat for the Selection and Promotion Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, D.C. He replaced Colonel Leonard A. Lee.

(f) On 17 February 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Harold P. Inzeller became the Acting Inspector General. Before his present assignment he was Commanding Officer of the 21st Battalion, 9th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division. He replaced Colonel William M. Kirchmier.

(g) On 27 April 1968, Major Clove Cunningham became the Information Officer, II FFORCIV. He replaced Lieutenant Colonel James W. Devitt.

(2) The overall assigned/attached strength of II FFORCIV increased during the quarter. A comparison at the end of the last four reporting periods follows:
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for period ending 30 April 1968, Doc. C.O.A.M. 65 (22) (j-s-k_k

TO-A) (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OPTION</th>
<th>Main Entry Officer</th>
<th>Mail Order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 July 1967</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October 1967</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 January 1968</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April 1968</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) II FFVNUSV Order of Battle, to include location and the control headquarters is shown in Inclosure 1.

(4) A sketch showing the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) with major unit CP locations is shown in Inclosure 2.

b. Personnel, Health, Morale, Safety and Discipline.

(1) The personnel situation within units assigned, attached and under the operational control (CPCOr) of II FFVNUSV remains satisfactory.

(2) The health of the command continues to be excellent.

(3) Morale of the troops continues at a high level.

(4) During the reporting period, the Awards and Decorations Division processed, approved and issued awards as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nov 67 - Jan 68</th>
<th>Feb 68 - Apr 68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier's Medal</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 343 440

(6) Effective 1 April 1968, the 44th APU was directed to conduct electronic inspection of all parcels entering US mails in an effort to reduce the amount of contraband material of metallic content. During the period 1 to 30 April 1968, the following statistics were reported:

(a) Number of parcels inspected 1504

(b) Number of persons declining to permit inspection of their parcels 31
AVPHQ-R-RE-H

SUBJECT: Quarterly Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, REG 0000 - 65 (ML) (N-200-20-4) (1)

(c) Number of parcels containing a suspicious amount of metal
(d) Number of parcels opened and examined by the postal officer
(e) Number of parcels containing prohibited items

(7) Development of the II PFCW base camp continued satisfactorily.

Status of significant projects as of 30 April 1968 follows:
(a) NCO Club - 95% complete.
(b) Officers Club - 70% complete.
(c) Service Club building completed.

o. Intelligence and Counterintelligence:

(1) Intelligence aspects of tactical operations conducted in the II PFCW tactical area of interest are discussed in the Operational Report Lessons Learned submitted by units under operational control of this headquarters.

(2) Intelligence Collection:

(a) The human source collection effort was substantially improved during this quarter. The placement of the 1st Battalion, 505th Military Intelligence Group in a direct support role to II PFCW and the presence of a full time, thoroughly experienced liaison officer in the 02 Section, radically improved the previous arrangements. The efforts of that collection unit are now primarily oriented towards the requirements of the II PFCW G-2. However, it is anticipated that a more effective, yet simplified intelligence collection effort, directed toward obtaining a thorough understanding of all operational control and direct support units of II PFCW. This was undertaken as a comprehensive review of all collection methods was conducted ultimately at the publication of a II PFCW register of intelligence collection requirements.

(b) During the past quarter the basis of the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation for Attack on Viet Cong Infrastructure (ICCA) (200) program was changed to PHONIX to correspond with the previous direction of the Government of Vietnam. The character of the program is the Integrated District Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIICC) is still the basic instrument for conducting the fight against the Viet Cong infrastructure. The Viet Cong Tet Offensive, initiated in III Corps Tactical Zone on 31 January 1968, brought the PHONIX program to a standstill as all the DIICCs were forced, for their survival, to concentrate entirely on collection
and to reaction to order of battle information, with a subsequent decline in collection and reaction to infrastructure information. However, since the early part of March renewed emphasis has been placed on the PHOENIX program and a new director, Mr. Charles Hess, has been appointed for III Corps Tactical Zone. An instruction team for III Corps Tactical Zone was organized and went to certain DIOCC to inspect the training of DIOCC personnel. This team has the capability of giving detailed training on intelligence collection and correlation methods, investigative procedures and maintenance of intelligence files. A significant gain was made in March as the II FFORCSV PHOENIX representative was able to initiate coordination between National Police Field Force units and tactical military intelligence detachments. At present the PHOENIX program is still in the embryo stage and the next quarter will probably be a crucial one in its development. The entire program depends upon the proper training of personnel and coordination between the different agencies, such as the National Police, National Police Field Force, Military Security Service and Republic of Vietnam Army at the district level. If this training and coordination is accomplished, the program should meet with success.

(c) The exploitation of prisoners of war showed continued improvement during the quarter as the time for submission of the Preliminary Interrogation Report was reduced one-third. Additionally, the coordination was also substantially improved.

(d) G2 Air:

1. Maximum aerial surveillance and reconnaissance efforts were in force prior to the beginning of this reporting period and the enemy TET Offensive. There was no decrease of effort in this area throughout the period. After the enemy failed to attain his objectives during the offensive, maximum effort was continued to provide information on the location of Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces, his base areas, rocket launching positions, and resupply and infiltration activities. At the end of this period, SLAR, RED HAZE, and Visual Reconnaissance (VR) were concentrated in and around the Capital Military District, and the Bien Hoa/Long Binh complex as a result of intelligence reports which indicated a high probability of the enemy commencing his second offensive prior to 1 May 1968. Effective results by aerial surveillance and reconnaissance were attained by a coordinated effort to use all available assets of the 73d Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC), the 1st Infantry Division Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition (ASTA) Platoon, Army and Air Force O-1 aircraft, and the assets provided by the 456th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) of the 7th United States Air Force. One hundred percent of the preplanned objectives to be accomplished by II FFORCSV organic aviation, as designated in the Monthly MACV Aerial Reconnaissance Plans, was attained. An average of approximately 80% of the preplanned objectives to be accomplished by United States Air Force tactical reconnaissance assets in support of the III Corps Tactical Zone was attained. During the reporting
period, much of the Air Force reconnaissance assets normally supporting the III Corps Tactical Zone were diverted to the Demilitarized Zone Area in I Corps Tactical Zone.

2. Effective 1 April 1968, all pre-planned target areas for either photographic or RED HAZE coverage were reduced from an allowable maximum of 200 square kilometers to a maximum of 100 square kilometers. This was done to conserve both Army and Air Force assets. There was no ill effect upon the desired coverage in the III Corps Tactical Zone as additional but smaller target areas were pre-planned.

3. The area which received the most SLAR coverage during this period was in the southwestern area of the III Corps Tactical Zone in the vicinity of the area of Cambodia referred to as the "Parrot's Beak". Shortly after the enemy Tet Offensive, SLAR reconnaissance detected a conspicuous increase of moving target indicators within the Parrot's Beak and in the contiguous Republic of Vietnam provinces of Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia, and Long An. This suggested heavy Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army supply and infiltration activities. Commencing during this period were interdiction operations conducted by fly teams on station with SLAR Mohawks of the 73d Surveillance Airplane Company. This is described in more detail below.

4. RED HAZE missions were flown by all elements, the 73d Surveillance Airplane Company and the ASA Platoon, providing limited coverage of pre-planned target areas throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone as well as target areas for operational control units in situ. RED HAZE surveillance by United States Air Force elements was primarily conducted within the peripheral areas of the Corps Tactical Zone.

5. The period was highlighted by another aerial joint effort which entailed the use of aerial photography and H-21B visual reconnaissance. Close to the middle of the period, photographic records of a new north-to-south Viet Cong road, partially built, in the province of Long An. Numerous Army and Air Force aerial photographic missions were conducted to obtain the trace of this road, as well as numerous visual reconnaissance missions by the 73d Surveillance Airplane Company and the ASA Platoon. RED HAZE was used in an attempt to determine the density of Viet Cong vehicular traffic on this road and the presence and locations of enemy service elements. The dense jungle canopy in this area precluded productive SLAR coverage. A combination of aerial and ground reconnaissance determined an accurate trace of this road.

6. During the period covered, the OV-10A (RED HAZE) Mohawk aircraft assets of the 73d Surveillance Airplane Company increased from four to seven, and three OV-1A aircraft, utilized for visual reconnaissance and aerial photography, were transferred. The overall change in mission assets were as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL
a. An addition of one RED HAZE sortie per day for a total of four sorties. Each is capable of covering four target areas, 100 square kilometers in size. The RED HAZE missions are accomplished during the hours of darkness when surveillance is of the utmost importance. During the latter part of the period, the significance of infrared emissions increased due to the arrival of rainfall. The monsoon rains help eliminate much of the natural and man-made fires that make it difficult to discriminate significant infrared emissions.

b. The visual reconnaissance missions remained unchanged with continued reconnaissance of the III Corps Tactical Zone border with Cambodia, the coastline, and direct support visual reconnaissance missions to operational control units of II FFORCLV. The daily visual reconnaissance missions account for a minimum of 15 flying hours.

c. During the last half of the period, SLAR aircraft of the 73rd Surveillance Airplane Company and firefly helicopter teams of the 334th Armed Helicopter Company were utilized as a target acquisition/gun fire team to interdict supply and infiltration routes in the Parrot's Beak area of the III Corps Tactical Zone. The SLAR aircraft was utilized to detect a moving return which was reported in flight to the combination command and control/light aircraft of the firefly team. If the firefly team was in close proximity to the target, it commenced the search. If the firefly team was at an extreme distance, the SLAR aircraft flew a "box" pattern around the target, continuously giving in-flight reports to the firefly team, to determine the direction of movement. The "box" pattern was used to track the target to the SLAR aircraft in an attempt to direct the firefly team onto the target. In six weeks of operations, 182 sampans were either sunk or destroyed as a result of employing this technique. To understand better the operational capabilities of each asset, a liaison visit was made by the firefly team crew members to the 73rd Surveillance Airplane Company. The briefings given by the 73rd Surveillance Airplane Company gave the gun team members a better understanding of the procedures used by the light ship and gun ships of a firefly team to search and destroy the target. Close coordination was maintained between the two aviation companies in regard to time-on-target missions, call signs, frequencies, and any changes in tactics.

d. Use of the KA-60 panoramic camera located in the nose of the CV-1 Mohawk has proven beneficial for many units desiring coverage of landing zones and terrain studies for future operations. Utilizing the panoramic view, tactical commanders as well as aviators can make a detailed study of approaches to an objective or landing zone. The choice of landing zones can be done entirely from the panoramic photos, to include details of obstacles during the approach, and targets of opportunity for artillery and air strike preparations.
AVFBC-RS-K
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R1) (W-DHO-
TU-A) (U)

(3) Targeting System: The method described in the previous report
has been found effective and continues in use. The product of the system
proved to be of extreme value both to the 03 and commander.

(4) Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle:

(a) Description: The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) remains
the supreme military and political headquarters for Viet Cong/North Viet-
namese Army units in the Republic of South Vietnam. The reorganization
referred to in the previous report became more clearly defined during the
quarter. The Viet Cong boundaries and designations of areas within III
Corps Tactical Zone are shown on enclosure 6. A captured document, dated
21 February 1968 and published by Military Region IV, indicated that the
reorganization might not be as radical as supposed, at first. The docu-
ment made reference to Thu Bon Hot and Long An Provinces, which indicated
that those several Viet Cong designations may still be in effect. The
sub-regions probably should more properly be viewed as superim-
posed over the existent structure, rather than having completely replaced
it. The sub-regions appear to be intended primarily to facilitate mili-
tary operations and area control and could be compared to "areas of opera-
tion" for main force and local force units within them. The designation
of the sub-region equates to regiments and the 9th North Vietnamese Army
Regiment was found to be organic to Sub-Region 4 during the period. There
was evidence indicating attempts to form a regiment-sized unit in Sub-
Region IV and the same efforts were probably also being made in the other
areas. The sub-regions do not follow the traditional Viet Cong approach
to political boundaries, nor do they appear to facilitate post-war polit-
ical objectives. The sub-regions do appear to facilitate military activ-
ities, thus they may have been established for that purpose while the
political control may remain as it was before.

(b) Significant Order of Battle Developments.

1. The status of enemy forces underwent considerable change during the
quarter; the overall personnel strength suffered a significant de-
crease, the combat effectiveness of units declined but the total number
of identified units increased. The table below portrays the combat effect-
iveness of regiments and separate battalions at the beginning and at the
end of the quarter. Units possibly present, but not yet firmly recorded,
are shown in parentheses. The table includes units in III Corps Tactical
Zone, located in areas in which the 9th US Infantry Division conducts op-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FCs</th>
<th>CS</th>
<th>NCS</th>
<th>RCS</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>FCs</th>
<th>CS</th>
<th>NCS</th>
<th>RCS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inf Regt</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf Bn</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25(3)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty Cdo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17(2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
2. The Dong Nai Regiment is known to be composed of three maneuver battalions, designated K1, K2 and K3, and was situated in the Catcher's Mitt at the end of the quarter. K1 Battalion was formerly the 380th Viet Cong Local Force Battalion; K2 was formerly the 7th Battalion/568th Regiment/330th North Vietnamese Army Division, and the K3 Battalion was formerly the Phu Loi 1 Viet Cong Local Force Battalion. The present K3 Battalion of the Dong Nai Regiment assumed that role in December 1967, replacing the former K3 Battalion which had previously been designated the 8th Battalion/568th Regiment/330th North Vietnamese Army Division. Upon leaving the Dong Nai Regiment in December 1967, the battalion was designated as the K3 North Vietnamese Army Battalion, subordinate to Sub-Region 3. One other battalion which had been thought to be a component of the Dong Nai Regiment in the Phu Loi II Battalion. Documents captured on 25 March indicated that this battalion was formed as the 2nd Phu Loi Battalion of an unspecified regiment of 330th North Vietnamese Army Division. It infiltrated into South Vietnam in early 1967 and subsequently was assigned to the Binh Duong Province area to conduct operations in coordination with Phu Loi 1 Battalion and the Dong Nai Regiment. Prisoners of war captured on 20 March substantiated the inference of the document that the Phu Loi II Battalion had never been subordinate to the Dong Nai Regiment. They further indicated that the battalion had been formed as the 9th Battalion of the 568th Regiment and became designated as the Phu Loi II Battalion in South Vietnam. Though the battalion had been scheduled to operate in Binh Duong Province, it is apparent that those orders were changed prior to the TET Offensive. Like former K3 Battalion/Dong Nai Regiment - now the K3 North Vietnamese Army Battalion of Sub-Region 3 - the Phu Loi II Battalion also moved to Sub-Region 3 and was subordinate to that area headquarters.

3. Evidence indicates that the 101st North Vietnamese Army Regiment is no longer subordinate to the 7th North Vietnamese Army Division and is now subordinate to Sub-Region 1.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam

for Period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFR - 65 (R) (U)

a. Elements of the 1st US Infantry Division reported on 3 February the capture of a soldier named Tuxen (sic) vicinity XT73C340. During interrogation the prisoner of war stated that he was a member of a transportation unit of the 7th North Vietnamese Army Division Headquarters, and that the division itself consisted only of the 141st and 165th North Vietnamese Army Infantry Regiments. The prisoner of war further stated that the 101st North Vietnamese Army Regiment is no longer a part of CT 77, time of resubordination unknown, but operates independently in the Tri Tien/Dau Tieng area.

b. Documents captured by elements of the 25th US Infantry Division, vicinity of XT744160, included an order awarding Liberation Medals to eight individuals of K3, Gia Dinh 1 (possibly 3rd Company, 1st Battalion, 101st Regiment) and K3, Gia Dinh 3 of Doan Phu Loi III (3rd Company, 3rd Battalion, 101st Regiment) for outstanding combat achievements during counteroffensive operations. The order was signed by Tran Trung Ha, Assistant Field Grade Political Officer of Sub-Region 1.

c. Documents and prisoners of war captured in recent weeks have referred to the 101st North Vietnamese Army Regiment as the Phu Loi III Regiment and the subordinate battalions as the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Gia Dinh Battalions. (As Comment: The foregoing reports, coupled with the established physical presence of the 101st regiment in Sub-region 1, lend credence to the view that the regiment has been resubordinated to Sub-region 1. Particularly noteworthy is the document referred to in subparagraph b, above; such an order would be most unusual if the receiving unit were not subordinate to the issuing agency. The detachment of the 101st Regiment from the 7th North Vietnamese Army Division also has a precedent; from July 1966 to January 1967, the regiment operated with the 9th Viet Cong Division. Whether the currently accepted resubordination of the 101st Regiment to Sub-region 1 is permanent, or was effected for the 77th Offensive and possible later offensive actions, can not be determined. The designations Phu Loi III and 1st, 2nd and 3rd Gia Dinh Battalions have been accepted as an also-known-as designation for the regiment and its battalions.

d. On 16 March 1968, an element of the 25th US Infantry Division captured five prisoners of war in the vicinity of XT795084. During initial interrogation, the prisoners of war revealed that they were from the 203rd Regiment/20th North Vietnamese army artillery Regiment, and that their base camp was located approximately 200 meters from the place of capture. The 203rd Regiment is reportedly subordinate to the 8th Viet Nam artillery Command and is organized into two battalions—the 2d and 3d—each of which contains three companies. The 1st Battalion suffered so many casualties during its invasion movement that its remaining personnel were placed in the 2d and 3d Battalions. The primary weapon of the unit is the 122mm rocket. Each battalion possesses 18 rocket launchers with two to three rockets per launcher. The overall strength of the unit was reported as being between four and five hundred men. According to prisoners of war, the unit began

CONFIDENTIAL

Invasion from North Vietnam in early 1967, arriving in Tay Ninh Province in June. The troops remained at an unknown location along the Cambodian border in Tay Ninh for about a month, then moved throughout Tay Ninh and Ninh Long for five months. In December, the unit moved south through Thu Dau Mot into the Saigon area where it took part, on an undisclosed date, in a "bombardment" of Tan Son Nhat Airbase. Subsequently, the unit moved to the location mentioned above. According to the prisoners of war, the mission of the regiment was to maintain its combat posture with the objective of striking Tan Son Nhat in the future. All of the prisoners of war stated that the morale of the unit was low due to constant Allied air strikes and artillery, and several rocket launchers had been lost or destroyed. (G2 Comment: The 208th North Vietnamese Army Artillery Regiment was previously recorded as a North Vietnamese Army Rocket Regiment located in III Corps Tactical Zone first came from documents captured by the 25th US Infantry Division at XT842QV on 27 February 1968. These documents confirmed the presence of the 3rd Battalion, 208th Regiment as reported by the prisoners of war, and indicated that the mission of the unit "in the second phase of the general attack is to destroy all US aircraft and 7,000 Americans at Tan Son Nhat." However, except for the prisoners of war, there is little documented evidence currently available to suggest that more than two battalions of the 208th are currently present in III Corps Tactical Zone and it has not been adequately determined if the 208th is operating separately, or is providing replacements to elements of the 54th Artillery Regiment that is currently located in III Corps Tactical Zone.)

5. Two new rocket battalions are probably present in III Corps Tactical Zone; these are the K33 and K34 North Vietnamese Army Artillery Battalions. Both Battalions had been part of the 40th North Vietnamese Army Artillery Regiment, B1 Front, located in Kontum Province, II Corps Tactical Zone. The two Battalions are believed to have arrived in northern III Corps Tactical Zone late in 1967 or in early 1968. Both units were originally trained in the use of 122mm rockets. A captured notebook and a prisoner of war, however, also made reference to 107mm rocket firing tables, to 75mm recoilless rifle firing data and to transporting ammunition for the latter weapons. The prisoners of war, captured 8 April 1968, also indicated that his unit—the K34 Battalion—and the K33 Battalion were part of a unit designated the 5th Separate Regiment. The existence of the mentioned element is considered doubtful.

6. On 18 February, an estimated five enemy companies attacked the perimeter of an American force in the vicinity of Song Be. Seven prisoners were captured, who stated that they were members of the 211th and 212th Battalions respectively. These Battalions had been part of the 52nd North Vietnamese Army Regiment, 520th North Vietnamese Army Division. The prisoners stated they had arrived in Phuoc Long Province with the 212th and 213th Infiltration Groups in July 1967. The 211th Battalion was formed of one company each from the 212th and 213th Groups and one company.
from the reconnaissance element of T10 Group, possibly identical with the 273d Viet Cong Regional Company/Military Region 10. The 212th Battalion was composed of the remaining forces of the two infiltration groups.

2. It is possible a new battalion is located in Viet Cong Ben Tre Province/Military Region 2. On 7 April 1968, elements of the 9th US Infantry Division captured a letter of appreciation vicinity XS580331. The letter was dated 10 December 1967, and addressed Phan Van Ky, a rifleman in the Reconnaissance Unit, D520. It was signed by Bu Trie for the Headquarters, D520. At the same location a notebook was captured which revealed that the unit was armed with machinegun, rocket and 84-mm weapons. Also captured was a circular dated 15 November 1967, and prepared for the signature of Tu Ket of D520. This outlined regulations to be implemented by personnel of the unit. Another batch of documents captured by elements of the 9th US Infantry Division under unknown circumstances contained a promotion order of Tu Van Tien from rifleman to assistant squad leader in D3, D520 (3d Company, 520th Viet Cong Infantry Battalion). Dated 18 December 1967, the order is signed by Le Ngoc Dinh for the Headquarters of D520. (G2 Comment: This is the first documented evidence that the Viet Cong have formed a new battalion in Ben Tre Province of Military Region 2. Previous indications include Combined Military Interrogation Center Report #US 793-68 in which it was stated that the 520th Battalion was formed in late 1967 subordinate to Kien Hoa Province. The unit had a strength of 400, and was organized into three infantry companies and a combat support company. The designation 520th Battalion is consistent with the cover series for Military Region 2, and lends credence to the existence of the unit.)

8. On 18 April 1968, a unit of the 259th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) engaged an enemy force vicinity Ti:0252.-M145,-M145 captured several documents. The documents made reference to the 76th Viet Cong Regiment, Infiltration Group 251, and the 4th Vietnamese Army Sapper Battalion. The sapper battalion had entered Group 251 during its invasion leaving North Vietnam in October 1967 and arriving in Kien Hoa Province on 5 April 1968. The battalion organized into a headquarters element and probably five company-sized units, designated M0-L1. The strength of the battalion was given as 285. In March prior to its arrival in Republic of Vietnam, the battalion was reorganized (no explanation given) and an unspecified number of personnel were transferred. Subsequently, the battalion was indicated as having a headquarters element and three companies, designated M0-L2. (G2 Comment: Despite the reference to the "4th Sapper Battalion", which would normally label the unit as having a specialized mission, there is doubt as to the role the unit will be assigned. As of the end of the reporting period, no further information was available to clarify the situation. There also was no information to indicate the disposition of the unit detached from the battalion prior to its arrival in the Republic of Vietnam.)
9. Deactivation of Central Office South Vietnam and Region Forward Supply Councils: An undated letter, captured on 9 April, vicinity XU-283215, was signed by Ho Van Chau for the Party Committee of C64 (possibly Central Office South Vietnam Forward Supply Council). The letter was addressed to a cadre of the Tay Ninh Province Forward Supply Council, and informed him of organizational changes necessary because of the new mission outlined in a resolution adopted by Central Office South Vietnam for 1968: Forward supply councils at Central Office South Vietnam and region level were deactivated and those at province level should be consolidated and strengthened. If more feasible, the councils could be formed into local finance - economy sections or rear service sections to provide more effective support for armed elements. (G2 Comment: The document confirms other indications that the Viet Cong are decentralizing their supply system in order to provide supplies for military forces at the lowest possible level.)

(c) Recapitulation:

1. The Viet Cong regions, provinces and special zones in III Corps Tactical Zone only, controlled 41 local force companies, 15 platoons and eight units.

2. The battalion and regimental sized units located within III Corps Tactical Zone were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SUBORDINATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69th Arty Command</td>
<td>CCSVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84A NVA Arty Regt</td>
<td>69th Arty Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88th NVA Regt</td>
<td>Unknown (possibly 7th NVA Div)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st NVA Regt</td>
<td>Sub-Region 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141st NVA Regt</td>
<td>7th NVA Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165th NVA Regt</td>
<td>7th NVA Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271st VC Regt</td>
<td>9th VC Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272d VC Regt</td>
<td>9th VC Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273d VC Regt</td>
<td>9th VC Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274th VC Regt</td>
<td>5th VC Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275th VC Regt</td>
<td>5th VC Div</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RG3 CSFOI - 65 (R/L) (4-DHO-TO-A) (D)

Dong Nai Regt
1st Guard Ba
1st MF Ba
8th MF (Arty) Ba
Group 10
C 10 Sapper Ba
46th Recom Ba
K3 NVA MF Ba
Phu Loi II Br
267th MF Ba
269th MF Ba
2d LF Guard Ba
14th LF Ba
16th LF Ba
D440 LF Ba
D445 LF Ba
2d Independent LF Ba
504th LF Ba
21 LF Ba
34 LF Ba
4th LF Ba
5th LF Ba
6th LF Ba
7th LF Ba

Sub-Region 5
GOSYN
Sub-Region 1
Sub-Region 1
Sub-Region 4
Sub-Region 6
GOSYN
Sub-Region 3
Sub-Region 3
Sub-Region 2
Sub-Region 2
Sub-Region 2
Bn Bien
Bn Bien
Sub-Region 3
Sub-Region 3
Sub-Region 1
Sub-Region 2
Sub-Region 3
Sub-Region 1
AVFBO-RE


NOTE: The designation of "Main Force" and "Local Force" battalions as well as the subordination of such units has been in a state of flux and are presented as being tentative at this time.

3. The following units, one regiment, two main force separate battalions, and five local force battalions were located in northern IV Corps Tactical Zone, an area in which the 9th US Infantry Division conducted operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC UNIT</th>
<th>SUBORDINATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deng Thap I Regt</td>
<td>Military Region 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>295th MF Bn</td>
<td>Military Region 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>518th MF Bn</td>
<td>Military Region 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>502d LF Bn</td>
<td>Kien Phuong Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>504th LF Bn</td>
<td>Kien Tuong Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>512th LF Bn</td>
<td>An Giang Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>514th LF Bn</td>
<td>My Tho Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>516th LF Bn</td>
<td>Ben Tre Province</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Units possibly present in III Corps Tactical Zone include one artillery regiment, three infantry battalions, two artillery battalions and one sapper battalion as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SUBORDINATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>208th NVA Arty Regt (-)</td>
<td>Possibly 69th Arty Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K33 Arty Bn</td>
<td>Possibly 69th Arty Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K34 Arty Bn</td>
<td>Possibly 69th Arty Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211th</td>
<td>Military Region 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212th</td>
<td>Military Region 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>520th</td>
<td>Ben Tre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th NVA Sapper Bn</td>
<td>Unknown (possibly 5th VC Div)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1963, RG 35479 - 65 (Vol) (2-0693-
50) (0)

(d) Summary of Recent Activities:

1. As noted in the previous report, the enemy's Tet Offensive was initiated in III Corps Tactical Zone on 31 January 1963. The offensive was designed to seize and hold key governmental and military installations in Saigon, the provincial capitals and district headquarters. Additionally, the key military installations of II FFGRCE, III Corps, Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhat Airbases were prime targets. The base camp of the 1st and 25th US Infantry Divisions received particularly heavy attacks by fire during the offensive. It became known that the enemy had intended to establish a revolutionary government or at least achieve a position of strength from which to call for peace negotiations if the offensive had succeeded. That the offensive had failed was clear within one week after it was initiated, though documents and PU indicated that Phase II of the offensive was scheduled. Phase II occurred on 18 February, though the scope and intensity of the attacks fell far short of the earlier phase. The Phase II planned attacks were unquestionably interdicted by Allied operations to such an extent that they actually posed no serious threat.

2. In the Saigon-Cholon-Tan Son Nhat area, the attacks were conducted by the C-10 Sapper Battalion; 2d Independent and 2d, 5th and 6th Local Force Battalions; 267th and 269th Main Force Battalions; D-16 Battalion, and possibly the 3d Battalion of the 271ot Infantry Regiment supported by the 1st Main Force Battalion and the 3d and 4th Local Force Battalions.

3. The Bien Hoa/Long Binh complex was attacked by the 5th Viet Cong Division and the 0-1 Local Force Battalion, between 31 January and 2 February. Both the 274th and the 275th Regiments of the 9th Division suffered heavy casualties during those attacks and immediately thereafter retired to western 5-1 area or into the Central Viet Cong, however, the 2d Battalion of the 274th Regiment is believed to have been located in the vicinity of Tan Duc in the Capital Military District and elements of the 275th Regiment have been in southern Bai Long Province. The division as a whole was engaged in extensive resupply, replenishment of personnel and retraining throughout most of the period since Tet.

4. The 9th Viet Cong Division conducted operations in the western Capital Military District and Sub-Regions 1 and 5 during February and March. As of the middle of March there were indications that elements of the 7th North Vietnamese Army Division were replacing them. Thereafter, all regiments of the 9th Viet Cong Division began a gradual withdrawal northward and at the end of the period were probably located in northeastern Sub-Region 1 and southern Bai Long Province. It is to be noted, however, that on 21 April, the reconnaissance company of the 273d Regiment was identified in the Hoc Mon area northwest of Saigon. At the end of the period, documents taken from a body in the western Capital Military District identified the reconnaissance company of the 273d Regiment. Though there were conflicting reports concerning the location
of the 9th Viet Cong Division during April, it is probable that the major elements of the division were in the vicinity of the Michelin Plantation at the end of the month. The presence of reconnaissance units in the Capital Military District in the month of April, however, indicated that the division was planning further operations in the Capital Military District in the near future.

5. The 7th North Vietnamese Army Division, minus the 101st Regiment which was resubordinated to Sub-Region 1, generally failed to participate in the TET Offensive or post-TET actions on any large and continuing scale. Two regiments—the 111st and the 165th—of the division, appeared to have been assigned the tasks of blocking US forces, interdicting lines of communication and providing security for Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army lines of communication. The two regiments were identified in contacts during the first part of the month. During late March and throughout most of April, however, the 7th North Vietnamese Army Division, like most of the enemy units, had moved away from the Capital Military District into close-in base areas where they largely avoided major contacts.

6. The 101st North Vietnamese Regiment was identified during the TET Offensive in the Go Vap District of northern Saigon and the Capital Military District. The 101st Regiment was the only unit of that size which failed to withdraw from the Capital Military District. Reports received early in April indicated that the strength of the unit had declined to approximately 300 men, thereby making it the most decimated of the enemy’s regiments.

7. The 88th North Vietnamese Army Regiment was engaged to a very limited extent during the period. It reportedly had the mission of acting as a general reserve and its lack of major contacts during the period substantiates that report. Based on several prisoners of war reports during the TET Offensive, it had been speculated that the regiment might have had the mission of furnishing replacements to the 5th Viet Cong Division; however, no firm evidence of such a function was ever received. At the end of the period, the 88th North Vietnamese Army Regiment was unlocated, but was probably in the Long Nguyen Secret Zone.

8. The Dong Nai Regiment began the quarter as the strongest of the enemy’s 10 infantry regiments. Elements of the regiment engaged in several attacks throughout the period. On 1 and 6 February, respectively, elements of the regiment were engaged in the vicinity of Pan Coong, and on 4 February, the attack on Tan Uyen was suspected of having been conducted by the regiment’s 2d Battalion. Contacts with elements of the regiment continued throughout February and most of March. After 19 March, there were no identified contacts with the Dong Nai Regiment until 15 April at which time an Army of the Republic of Vietnam unit was attacked near 17954222. A prisoner of war captured during the action stated that he was a member of the 2d Battalion, Dong Nai Regiment. At the end of the period, the regiment remained in the Catcher’s Mitt area, doubtless preparing
for future missions.

9. In summary, the quarter began with the enemy forces engaged in a full scale offensive. Within one week the major force of the offensive had been expanded and the contacts became more sporadic and less intense. On 18 February, Phase II of the TET Offensive was initiated, but with considerably less force than earlier. The remainder of the quarter was characterized by periodic harassing attacks, primarily by fire, regrouping, resupply and replenishing personnel losses. At the end of the quarter, though intelligence indicated the development of another major offensive, the enemy had failed to alter his recent relatively inactive role. It is considered probable that allied operations had again disrupted the enemy's time schedule. However, continued sightings of enemy elements converging on the Capital Military District and the continued forward movement and caching of supplies, weapons and munitions indicate that the enemy plans to engage in another major offensive to seize Saigon.

(5) Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Battle Loses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14,129</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>1,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>1,820</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rice (tons)</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>132.1</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>445.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The above statistics represent those enemy losses inflicted by United States/Free World Militaryadvisers. North Vietnamese personnel and do not include losses inflicted by Republic of Vietnam Army.

(6) Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army Battle Losses:

(a) The most significant change in enemy tactics to occur during this quarter was the willingness to fight in allied controlled areas as opposed to the locales at which recent major engagements had been largely in enemy controlled or disputed areas. This趋势 was dictated by the objective of establishing a revolutionary presence or a stronghold in the more populated area of the corps tactical zone. Though major engagements declined in the second half of the quarter, major enemy forces remained largely in close-in base areas.

(b) A second area of major tactical change was noted in the employment of the 122mm rocket. Employment increased greatly during the period
not only in the number of attacks, but also in the number of targets. The attack on Vung Tau on 23 April marked the first time that installation was attacked with rockets and also the farthest south that that weapon had been used. Among the changes in rocket employment were the following:

1. Greater variation in time of firing. While major attacks still usually took place in the early morning hours, attacks of smaller scale were noted virtually throughout the day.

2. In at least one instance, rockets were fired using a launch tube of any type. The rocket rested upon an "A" frame and was fired in that manner.

3. Whereas previously, it appeared that rockets were employed only by major elements of the 81st North Vietnamese Army Artillery Regiment, it was apparent that small elements—possibly even sections—were placed in direct support of infantry units or operated separately in conducting attacks by fire.

4. The symmetrical layout of the familiar L-shaped trenches gave way to asymmetrical rectangular trench systems.

5. Instead of closely guarded, isolated launch positions, the enemy frequently sought positions immediately adjacent to friendly units from where a few rounds were quickly launched and an escape made before detection.

6. Rather than the previously-used positions completely in the open and adjacent to wooded areas, sites were found actually within wooded areas.

7. Indications were found in a few instances that the carrying tube rather than the regular launch tube may have been used in firing some rockets.

8. A document captured on 25 March, identified as a directive of the 69th Artillery Command, contained the following points:

   a. Artillery attacks are best made during the day particularly when the target is an airfield.

   b. A continuous barrage followed by withdrawal is best.

   c. Harassing fire with one or two rockets at irregular intervals during daylight is to be increased.

   d. Weapons should be employed at various locations so as to confuse counter-battery fire.

   (7) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Relative Probability of
CONFIDENTIAL

AVPFO-35

Adoption at the end of the Quarter:

(a) Capabilities:

1. Attack:

a. The enemy is capable of conducting another offensive, aimed principally at Saigon-Tan Son Nhat and Bien Hoa - Long Binh, with elements of the 7th North Vietnamese Army Division and the 5th and 9th Viet Cong Divisions, the Long Nai Regiment and separate Main Force and Local Force Battalions.

b. The 84th North Vietnamese Army Artillery Regiment, the possible 203rd North Vietnamese Army Artillery Regiment, and the possible K33 and K34 Artillery Battalions can attack lucrative targets throughout III Corps Tactical Zone independently or in support of ground attacks.

c. The separate main force and local force battalions are capable of conducting limited attacks against allied units, lines of communications, outposts and installations within their respective areas.

2. Defend:

a. The enemy is capable of defending base areas in War Zone "C", Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces with elements of the 7th North Vietnamese Army and 9th Viet Cong Divisions.

b. The enemy is capable of defending base areas in War Zone "D" and Bay Binh Province with elements of the 9th Viet Cong Division and the Long Nai Regiment.

3. Reinforce:

a. The enemy is capable of immediately reinforcing an attack on Saigon or vicinity with four battalions from the northern provinces of IV Corps Tactical Zone.

b. The enemy is capable of reinforcing with invasion groups of unknown size which are now indicated to be moving into the III Corps Tactical Zone.

4. Withdraw: The enemy is capable of breaking contact and withdrawing to relatively more secure areas at a time of his choosing.

5. Other:

a. The enemy is capable of replacing his heavy personnel losses suffered during the TET Offensive, by upgrading guerrillas and by receiving
replacements from North Vietnam.

2. The enemy is capable of conducting resupply at the required rate.

(b) Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses:

1. The enemy's severe losses suffered during the quarter have caused a serious gap in personnel familiar with the terrain.

2. By sometimes hasty firing on aircraft, the enemy has become increasingly vulnerable to air cavalry, artillery and tactical air strikes.

3. The enemy's extended lines of communications are subject to interdiction.

4. The enemy's military operations are vulnerable because of poor timing caused by political pressure.

5. The enemy is susceptible to his own propaganda as in exporting a popular uprising during the Tet Offensive.

6. The enemy is weak in medical facilities and supplies.

7. Upgrading of guerrillas are made vulnerable to the enemy's influence and control in the countryside.

8. Deteriorated leadership, due to hasty withdrawal and tactical errors to be made, and may be an effect.

9. The enemy is vulnerable to superior artillery and firepower, especially in the provinces surrounding the Capital Military District.

(c) Relative Probability of Adoption at the End of the Quarter:

1. A second offensive, similar to the Tet Offensive, but probably more concentrated on Saigon-Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa areas, with and utilizing more main force units in the Saigon attack is probable early in the ensuing quarter.

2. If allied operations continue to interrupt the enemy's plan for a second offensive at an early date, it is probable that the enemy will withdraw major elements of his forces to more secure areas in order to receive replacements and to retrain. Continued harassing attacks, particularly by fire, are probable if such a withdrawal is effective.

d. Operations, Plans and Training.

(1) Introduction.
(a) During the reporting period, II FFORCEN conducted operations in all of the 11 provinces in III Corps Tactical Zone, and in several provinces of IV Corps Tactical Zone. Large unit operations were conducted as follows: 29 by US forces, four by Free World Military Assistance Forces and seven combined operations in which at least one maneuver battalion under the operational control of this headquarters participated with units of other nations. All large unit operations resulted in contact with the enemy.

(b) The highlight of the period came on 31 January with the US/FWMAF and ARVN forces response to the VC/NVA TET Offensive. The objective of this offensive was to seize and hold key governmental and military installations in Saigon, the provincial capitals and district headquarters. Primary military targets in the III Corps Tactical Zone were II FFORCEN and III Corps headquarters installations and the Bien Hoa and Tan Son Mint airbases. This offensive had come as no surprise; friendly forces, aware of the enemy's intentions, had been redeployed prior to the attacks, and met the offensive with rapid reaction of maneuver forces, tactical air, army aviation and artillery, which combined to produce an overwhelming counter-offensive. Operations in and around Saigon were conducted by Task Force WARE. Within the first week it became clear that the enemy was defeated in its effort to gain an important military victory. On 16 February, Phase II of the offensive was to have begun as a second attempt at attaining the goals of the TET Offensive, but enemy's operations had been interdicted to the point that no major attacks were initiated. Follow-up operations continued until 9 March, and on 11 March the II FFORCEN initiated Combined Operation QUIET THANG in coordination with intelligence and Mobile ARVN Armed Forces and National Police to conduct and destroy enemy units in the Capital Military District and in An District and in Long An, Hau Nghia and Binh Dinh Provinces, and to conduct prompt follow-up operations by psychological and civil reconstruction activities. On 7 April, Operation QUIET THANG terminated, having destroyed or dispersed most enemy forces from provinces surrounding the Saigon area. The following day Campaign TOAN THANG began as a combined offensive throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone, to complete the destruction of enemy elements still near Saigon, to reach out and destroy main force units in remote regions and to penetrate enemy base areas and deny the enemy use of them. During the first two months of the reporting period, the enemy demonstrated aggressiveness and a willingness to become engaged in decisive local battles, but during April the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces increasingly avoided contact. As April wore on, intelligence reports began to indicate that enemy forces were regrouping and re-equipping for a possible attack of the same magnitude as the TET Offensive. On 24 April, II FFORCEN and III Corps conducted redeployment of forces in and around Capital Military District to prevent the enemy from massing in and around Saigon, and to destroy enemy units before they could reach the city. FWMAF and National Police forces conducted operations in Saigon and Capital Military District. II FFORCEN units assumed
AVPBC-RE

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force, Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968, NCS CSFGA - 65 (Al) (CONFIDENTIAL) (0)

responsibility for areas on the outer perimeter of Capital Military District and conducted operations designed to engage and defeat the enemy along major invasion routes. Defenders of critical military installations outside the Saigon area were reinforced. The enemy offensive, however, failed to materialize by the end of the reporting period.

(c) Meanwhile, a number of other operations continued and others were initiated. These paralleled or complemented the main effort of destroying enemy units which had engaged in the Tet Offensive. Operation YELLOWSTONE continued in progress until 24 February with the objective of neutralizing War Zone D and interdicting invasion and escape routes in that area. Operation SARATOGA, initiated on 8 December 1967, continued until 10 March as a reconnaissance in force in support of pacification. Operation SAN ANGELO was conducted in northern Phuoc Long Province from 16 January to 9 February, with a major objective of destroying enemy main force units there. Operations LON DON 68, ENTERPRISE, RILEX, and NARASUAN provided distant security for pacification operations while ARVN forces provided close-in security. Operation WILDERNESS was initiated on 11 March to destroy enemy forces operating in Tay Ninh Province. It continued until 7 April, when Campaign TOAN THANG commenced. II FFORCEV also conducted a number of operations in the IV Corps Tactical Zone: HOPIAC (1 June 1967 - 7 February 1968), and MOPIAC X (9 February - 30 April), to secure construction of the Dong Tam Base Camp; CORONADO X (18 January - 13 February), an airmobile and riverine operation in Minh Thang and Kien Hoa Provinces; THUONG CONG DINH (7 March - ), a combined US/ARVN operation to locate and destroy enemy main force and other units in Minh Thang Province, and PEOPLES ROAD (17 March - ), to secure engineering paving operations along Highway QL 4 east of Cam Lay. CORONADO XI and XII (11 February - 7 March), were conducted under the operational control of Senior Advisor, IV Corps in coordination with elements of two ARVN divisions to locate and destroy enemy forces southwest of Can Tho. During the period as well, a number of operations of relatively short duration were conducted: Operations PINNARO (6 March - 7 April), CLARKSVILLE and LOS BANOS (both 26 March - 7 April), COOKTOWN ORCHID (1 - 7 April), and ATLAS I, CARLISLE and WATERFORD I (all 4 - 7 April). These operations will not be discussed in detail.

(d) Australian and Thai forces continued operations in II FFORCEV area of operations, under the operational control of II FFORCEV. The 1st Australian Task Force participated in three operations during this reporting period: Operation COEUR (24 January - 1 March), a reconnaissance in force operation in area of operation COLUMBUS, between Highway QL 1 and the Dong Nai River northeast of Long Binh; Operation PINNARO, in the Mal Chau Vien Mountains southeast of Laos, and COOKTOWN ORCHID (1 - 7 April), a land-clearing operation in Phuoc Tuy Province. Since 8 April the 1st Australian Task Force has participated in Campaign TOAN THANG in the same general area as COOKTOWN ORCHID. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment conducted Operation NARASUAN in the Aroch Trach
Subject: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS GSFOR - 65 (XL) (W-DHO-TO-A) (U)

District, from 20 October 1967 until 7 April 1968, then began participation in Operation TOAN THANG.

(a) With the TET Offensive, the enemy attempted to disrupt and interdict lines of communication. Highways 3L 1 east and west of Saigon and Highways QL 4, QL 14 and QL 15 south of Saigon were the major targets. The enemy, however, failed to block these routes and they remained open with added security measures. By 30 April, the status of most highways had returned to that of the pre-TET period. Because of continuing pressure upon the enemy, some routes were considered even more secure than before 31 January. Water lines of communication were not seriously affected for use by Vietnamese. Use of waterways leading to Saigon for military purposes by friendly forces was seriously curtailed during and immediately after TET, but by the end of April they were considered to have reached a level of security comparable to that of the pre-TET period.

(f) During March and April II FFORCEV prepared and undertook the execution of combined RVNAF/US/PWMAF Operation QUYET THANG (11 March - 7 April) and Campaign TOAN THANG, which began 8 April. Both were fully coordinated and required operations orders to be published in both Vietnamese and English. These operations were unique in III Corps Tactical Zone and reflect the close association that has developed between III ARVN Corps and II FFORCEV.

(g) II FFORCEV during this reporting period for the first time utilized a new technique in rendering combat support to ARVN elements in the III Corps Tactical Zone, that of placing US Armored Cavalry squadrons and mechanized Infantry battalions in direct support of ARVN Infantry divisions. This technique, employed with the ARVN 18th and 34th Divisions, proved extremely successful in enhancing ARVN firepower, aggressiveness and speed of reaction.

(h) Shortly after the TET Offensive was initiated, G3 was given the mission of preparing a comprehensive briefing and after action report on allied operations during the TET Offensive. The briefing was presented some 20 times for civilian and military dignitaries in many different locations. From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to separate battalion commanders, the response has been one of interest and enlightenment. This briefing will be incorporated into the after action report of the TET counteroffensive.

(i) Operations by Company F, 50th Infantry (Long Range Patrol) continued to center around the conduct of long range reconnaissance and trail-watch, ambush missions in support of elements under the operational control of II FFORCEV. From 1 February 1968 until 22 April 1968, Company F operated under the control of the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light). From 1 February 1968 until 7 February 1968, the company conducted missions in the Catcher's Mitt region, east of Highway 16 and north of Bien Hoa.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Field Force Vietnam for Period ending 30 April 1969, RGS OPLAN - 65 (1d) (-R- Tu-A) (U)

From 7 February until 28 March, the company participated in Operations ELGIN III/BOX SPRINGS in the same general area. From 28 March until 10 April, Company F participated in Operation REDROOSTER in Tay Ninh province, and from 10 April until 30 April, in Campaign FIND ISAAC in area of operations COLUMBUS II, northeast of Long Binh. On 24 April Company F went under the operational control of 24th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and operated out of Cu Chi in the region south of the area. After 29 April, the unit was placed under the operational control of the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, once more in the Operation's main area. Long range patrol operations resulted in the following enemy losses: 61 killed, four captured and 14 detainees apprehended. Friendly losses from enemy action were six wounded. There were no casualties from hostile action during either March or April. This fact is credited to increased experience and professionalism on the part of personnel on patrols. A number of specialized procedures have been adopted by Company F to facilitate its operations, among them:

1. A new technique has been developed to adjust artillery fire when patrol teams locate the enemy. Normally, the aerial relay C-1 aircraft is used to adjust artillery fire required by a patrol team on the ground, and the enemy tends to believe that the aircraft made the sighting and is directing the artillery fire. Under these conditions, the enemy seeks cover from the aircraft, he usually exposes himself to the patrol, and the team, using the aircraft as a relay, is able to bring effective fire upon the enemy from sightings made on the ground.

2. Deceptive touchdowns have continued to be successful in enhancing secure insertions, and it has been found as well that deceptive extractions can be equally effective. When a team has made a minor contact or has been sighted, an attempt is made to deceive the enemy by moving the team away from the area. Cundsips are expended around the team's position. The team throws smoke, and the lift ships touch down in the landing zone and remain there for a minute before taking off empty. To the enemy it appears that the team has been extracted, but in actuality it has remained and continues the mission.

3. On extremely dark nights, when pilots have difficulty discerning ground features, the homing device on the CH-1H model helicopter has been employed to locate teams in emergency situations. The technique is as follows: The team depresses its radio handset and breaks the squelch at 10-second intervals while the command and control ship homes in on the signal. Using this method, the command and control element is aware when its helicopter is directly over the patrol's position. When the helicopter is directly overhead, the patrol then employs a ground signal light and the helicopters can move in for the extraction.

4. A modified harness from a T-10 parachute attached to a 120-foot nylon rope has been used successfully to extract wounded by
CONFIDENTIAL

SUNDC-VH-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFL-9 - 65 (Kh) (-200-70-0) (U)

The harness requires a few more seconds to look up than the standard hipline, but can completely secure an unconscious man by the use of snap links.

The M-72 light anti-tank weapon has proved an effective means of aiding a light team in breaking contact. Fire from this weapon, which is extremely effective against personnel, has been shown to create momentary disorganization among the enemy, thus giving time for the team to break contact.

The following changes occurred in force structure during the reporting period:

1. Gains:
   a. Squadron C, 1st Armored Regiment, Royal Australian Armored Corps arrived in country on 15 February and was assigned to the 1st Australian Task Force.
   b. The 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry arrived in country on 7 April and was assigned to the 9th Infantry Division.
   c. The 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry arrived in country and was assigned to the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) on 7 April.
   d. Three infantry company packets arrived in country between 8 and 12 February and were assigned to the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light).
   e. The 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry was assigned to the 12th Aviation Group on 21 February.
   f. The 5th Battalion, 42nd Artillery arrived in country and was assigned to the 54th Artillery Group on 15 April.

2. Losses:
   a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division was deployed to I Corps Tactical Zone under the operational control of III Marine Amphibious Force.
   b. The 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry (-) was deployed to I Corps Tactical Zone and became operational control to the 1st Air Cavalry Division on 26 February.
   c. Company C, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor was attached to the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry (-) effective 17 February and deployed to I Corps.
Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for period ending 30 April 1968

Tactical Zone with that unit.

- The 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery, 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division deployed to I Corps Tactical Zone and became operational control to the 1st Armored Cavalry Division on 18 February.

- Battery G (.50 Cal KB), 55th Artillery deployed to the II Corps Tactical Zone for duty with the Americal Division on 13 April.

- The 1st Battalion, 33rd Artillery deployed to I Corps Tactical Zone on 14 March.

- The 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery was deployed to I Corps Tactical Zone on 15 March.

- The 17th Assault Helicopter Company was attached to the 16th Aviation Group effective 16 March.

- The 166th Assault Helicopter Company was attached to the 16th Aviation Group effective 16 March.

- The 200th Assault Support Helicopter Company was attached to the 16th Aviation Group effective 16 March.

- The 308th Combat Aviation Battalion was attached to the 16th Aviation Group on 16 March.

- Exchange of Units. The 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment replaced the 7th Royal Australian Regiment on 9 April, and was assigned to the 1st Australian Task Force. The 7th Australian Regiment returned to Australia.

- Change in Designation. The designation of the 4th Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery was changed to the 12th Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery on 13 April. No change in organization took place.

- Training. During the period two Infantry battalions, one each from the 16th and 25th Infantry Divisions, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, completed the Battalion Refresher Training Program, with the exception of the Concluding Evaluation Exercise. This training was conducted by the 9th Infantry Division.

Operations Initiated prior to this Reporting Period:

(a) Operation CORONEL was initiated on 15 February 1967 by the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division in Long An Province in coordination.
with Army of the Republic of Vietnam, National Force/Popular Force and Provincial reconnaissance Unit. Its objective was to support pacification activities by improving security conditions in the region of Highway 4 through the destruction of enemy forces in the area, reconnaissance in force, cordon and search, saturation patrolling and eagle flight operations were employed. Enemy ground attacks by company size and larger forces, mortar attacks and other incidents along highway 4 had occurred more frequently than in previous reporting periods. In response to enemy attacks on 21 January in the daigon area, 5/60 Infantry (Mechanized) was released to operational control to Task Force HAK in Capital Military District. On 2 February, 5/60 Infantry with 2/60 Infantry under its operational control conducted reconnaissance in force operations one kilometer southwest of Ben Tre. Heavy contact was made with an estimated enemy battalion at 1555 hours; 2/39 Infantry moved to reinforce the contact and at 1839 hours made contact with an enemy force one kilometer north of 3/39 Infantry positions. The 2/39 Infantry continued to maneuver south and at 2100 hours linked up with the 3/39 Infantry. A sweep the following day disclosed 152 enemy killed, two detainees and one small arm captured. Nineteen were killed, 64 wounded and five missing. The 5/60 Infantry was released from operational control of Task Force HAK on 5 February. Commencing at 0300 hours on 10 February, Tan An was attacked by an unknown size enemy force. Friendly forces at the time of the attack consisted of Headquarters Company, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division; 5/60 Infantry (Mechanized), one Popular Force Company and National Police. The attack was initiated by approximately 250 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar and RIF fire, followed by a ground attack from the south. This was supported by three attacks from the north. Friendly forces directed a heavy volume of fire from small arms, automatic weapons and grenades into the attacking force. Light P1e teams, 3D-47 (Spooky), 3D and Republic of Vietnam Army artillery supported the friendly forces. The enemy force was killed and 132 dead (90 credited to Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces), nine small arms and five crew served mortars. 12 losses were four killed and 53 wounded. National Police losses were four killed and 11 wounded. Twenty-five civilians were killed and 200 were wounded. On 17 February, 2/60 Infantry was reduced in scope when the 5/60 Infantry was released to Division control. On 17 February, light fire teams and directions engaged an enemy convoy of some 95 sampans 20 kilometers northwest of Tan An. The following day, a sweep was conducted by 2/60 Infantry. Four machine guns on carriers, 533 50-2 rounds, 552 82mm mortar rounds, 98 60mm mortar rounds, 200,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 75 rounds of 105-17, 29 75mm recoilless rifle rounds and 297 pounds of demolitions were captured. Seventy-five sampans were destroyed and one enemy body was found. On 18 February, the 4/39 Infantry was released from operational control of Commander 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for
operations in the ENTAVBI area of operation. Two minor contacts by 2/60 Infantry and 2/3 Infantry near Tan An resulted in 25 enemy killed on 22 February. Thirty-two enemy bodies killed in previous contact were located on the same d.p. On 21 February, 5/60 Infantry (less one company) was released from operational control 34 Brigade, and became operational control to the 1st Brigade for Operation HOPAC I. 2/60 Infantry (less one company) terminated participation in Operation ENTAVBI on 8 February. Operation ENTAVBI terminated on 10 March 1966. Significant cumulative enemy losses include 2,107 killed, 1,099 detainees, 46 returnees, 340 small arms and 50 crew served weapons captured. US losses included 253 killed and 1,540 wounded.

(b) Operation KITTYHAWK was initiated on 19 May 1967 by the 1st and 3d Squadrons, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, as a security mission for Blackhorse Base Camp in Long Khanh Province. At the beginning of January 1966, 3/5 Cavalry (less one troop) was responsible for the Blackhorse security mission. In response to attacks in the Bien Hoa/Long Binh area, 2/3/5 Cavalry was deployed to Long Binh on 11 January. Three contacts with enemy forces in the vicinity of Bien Hoa and Long Binh resulted in three US killed and 24 wounded; forty enemy were killed. On 2 February, 6/3/5 Cavalry contacted an unknown size enemy force in the western part of Xuan Loc. One US was killed and three were wounded; enemy losses were 36 killed. On 15 February, 3/5 Cavalry (less Troop D) commenced preparation for movement to I Corps Tactical Zone and 1/11 Cavalry assumed responsibility for Operation KITTYHAWK. Contact with enemy forces was light and sporadic after 2 February and on 21 March, Operation KITTYHAWK was terminated. Significant cumulative results include 69 friendly forces killed and 245 wounded; enemy losses were 193 killed and 123 detained.

(c) Operation DWAC was initiated by 5/60 Infantry, 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry division on 1 June 1967 to secure dredge and dragline operations during construction of the Dong Tam Base Camp. Friendly units were frequently rotated on this mission and at the beginning of January 1966, the 4/47 Infantry had assumed responsibility for Dong Tam security. Contact with enemy forces was light and sporadic until February when the enemy initiated heavy mortar attacks against the Dong Tam Camp. On 7 February the camp received over 100 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle 82mm mortar fire again, along to the 34th Medical Hospital and several other installations. Two US were killed and 22 US wounded. In response to this attack, the 5/60 Infantry (Mechanized) and 2/39 Infantry commenced offensive operations to locate and destroy enemy forces in the Dong Tam area of operation. At 1200 hours, on 7 February, 3/5/60 Infantry contacted an estimated two companies four kilometers northwest of My Tho. Company C reinforced the contact. Airstrikes, artillery and light fire teams supported the two companies. Five US were killed and 19 were wounded; enemy losses were 23 killed.
SUBJECT: Operational report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
for period ending 30 April 1968, ROE 800 A - 65 (A) (L-105)

On the same day, Company B and C, 2/59 Infantry contacted an enemy force of unknown size one kilometer west of the 3/59 Infantry (recon-

(a) Operation CMD, a reconnaissance in force operation in Binh Duong and Long Kinh, 9th Infantry Division. This operation commenced on 10 January 1968 and terminated 7 April 1968. Basic objectives were to support pacification by reconnaissance in force operations, to provide a ready reserve force for Army/National/Popular Force outpost, to assist the Government of Vietnam in completing developmental projects, and to clear existing roads and trails. It produced benefits in Binh Duong and Long Kinh provinces simi-

(b) Operation FJLY, a reconnaissance in force operation in Bien Hoa and Long Khanh provinces, was conducted by the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. This operation commenced on 22 July 1967 and terminated 7 April 1968. Basic objectives were to support pacification by reconnaissance in force operations and to produce a ready reserve force for Army/National/Popular Force outposts, to assist the Government of Vietnam in completing developmental projects, and to clear existing roads and trails. It produced benefits in Bien Hoa and Long Khanh provinces similar to those resulting from Operation CMD in Long An province. Significant cumulative enemy losses include 277 enemy killed and 366 wounded; enemy losses were 273 killed and 149 detained. Two were killed and 16 wounded. Operation CMD288 terminated on 7 February. Significant cumulative enemy losses include 239 enemy killed, 543 de-

(c) Operation JUCLAQ, initiated on 20 October the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment initiated Operation JUCLAQ in the Chon Thach district, Bien Hoa province. This force conducted extensive reconnais-

(d) Operation NH01, initiated on 6 November 1967 with the primary objective of neutralizing the area and interdicting known invasion and escape routes used from the north. The task objective included major elements of the 1st Armored Division, 1/49 ARVN Battalion, 3/49 ARVN Battalion and 3/81 Cavalry (less 1 troop). This operation also provided security for the rotation of Civilian Irregu-

20 MAY 1968

CONFIDENTIAL
AVN-3u-1104
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces, Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1966, HQG CSFOR - 65 (Ll) (J-W-64-
(U)) (1)

(Mechanized) received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an enemy force of unknown size one kilometer south of Tay Kinh. Friendly forces employed organic weapons fire and were supported by light fire teams, AC-47 (Spooky), artillery and airstrikes. This contact resulted in two US killed and 30 wounded; enemy losses were 70 killed. On 17 February, Operation YJLJOSTI was reduced in scope to a two-battalion operation. During this reporting period, enemy forces initiated harassing mortar and rocket fire against friendly installations. Although attacks were frequent in the Tay Lanh and Dau Tierr area, they resulted in limited damage and few casualties. Operation YJLJOSTI terminated on 24 February. Significant enemy losses were 1,254 killed, 1,438 determined and 146 small arms, 58 crew served weapons and 583 tons of rice captured. Friendly losses were 135 US killed and 1,094 US wounded.

(g) Operation SARATOGA was initiated by the 1/27 Infantry, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division on 8 December 1967 as a reconnaissance in force operation in Binh Thuan province in support of pacification. Initially this operation maintained a sizable military force in the southern portion of the division's zone while the majority of the division's resources were committed to Operation YJLJOSTI; however, as enemy activity increased in the Saigon - Meao Hon area, Operation YJLJOSTI was reduced in scope and available forces were committed to Operation SARATOGA. On 31 January Cu Chi Base Camp received an estimated 24 rounds of mortar and rocket fire causing 15 US wounded. At 0346 hours a 1/27 Infantry patrol engaged an unknown number of enemy approximately four kilometers southeast of Duc Xo with small arms and automatic weapons. This contact resulted in four US killed and three US wounded; while 15 of the enemy were killed. At 0635 hours, 2/27 Infantry contacted an enemy force of unknown size in the same area resulting in 12 US wounded and 22 enemy killed. In response to attacks on Tan Son Nhut, 3/4 Cavalry (less Troop A) came under operational control to Task Force HARE and conducted a cross-country road move to reinforce contacts in the Tan Son Nhut area. The squadron, with Troop C in the lead, contacted an estimated three enemy battalions at the southwest corner of Tan Son Nhut (289/0960). Friendly forces engaged the enemy with organic weapons to include direct fire ammunition. Troop B reinforced the contact and the squadron fought its way through the enemy forces, completely disrupting the enemy's attack. Artillery and light fire teams supported the squadron during the period of contact, thereby contributing to the success of the attack. This eight-hour battle resulted in 15 US killed and 23 US wounded; enemy losses were 162 killed and 24 captured. All contacts on 31 January on Operation SARATOGA resulted in 206 enemy killed and 24 captured as compared to 24 US killed and 77 US wounded. On 27 February 1/27 and 2/27 Infantry Battalions came under operation control to Task Force HARE. On the same day, Cu Chi Base Camp received a mortar, rocket and RPG attack that resulted in only light casualties.
but hit the ammunition storage area causing heavy damage and loss of ammunition and buildings in the base camp. On 5 February, 3/4 Cavalry, (less one Troop), 1/27 Infantry and 2/27 Infantry were released from operational control of Task Force Delta. Three contacts in the Hoc Lom area resulted in 86 enemy killed on 5 February. On 6 February, A and B 2/12 Infantry engaged an unknown size enemy force nine kilometers southeast of Cu Chi; results were one US killed, 11 wounded and 20 enemy killed. At 0930 hours on the same day, 6/5/4 Cavalry and 4/1/27 Infantry contacted an estimated enemy battalion. 6/5/4 Cavalry reinforced the contact. Friendly forces were supported by light fire teams, airstrikes and artillery. This contact resulted in nine US killed and 16 US wounded; 48 enemy were killed. Contacts on 7 and 8 February, as a result of offensive reconnaissances in force operations by US forces, resulted in 145 enemy killed as compared to 10 US killed and 101 wounded. On 9 February, 6/5/2/27 Infantry contacted an estimated enemy battalion three kilometers southeast of Hoc Lom; friendly forces were supported by artillery, light fire teams, AC-47 (Spooky) and airstrikes. Three US were killed and 14 US wounded; 48 enemy were killed. Contacts on 9 February resulted in 365 enemy killed. Operation SHADOW contacts on 9 February resulted in 365 enemy killed. On 10 February, Task Force SAHIL contacted enemy forces three kilometers northeast of Hoc Lom; a total of 103 enemy were killed. A total of 103 enemy were killed and 29 wounded. Reconnaissances in force operations were made by elements of the 25th Infantry Division on 12 February and 12 US killed and 65 US wounded; enemy losses were 90 killed. The most significant contact on 12 February occurred four kilometers northeast of Hoc Lom when 1/27 Infantry contacted an unknown enemy force. Forty-seven of the enemy were killed in this contact. On 14 February task force 4/27 Infantry (Mechanized) conducted a reconnaissance in force operation along Highway 44 to an objective seven kilometers southwest of Hoc Lom (A771509). At 0830 hours, one kilometer west of the objective, the task force contacted an enemy force of unknown size; light fire teams and artillery supported the friendly forces. Eleven US were killed and 48 wounded; enemy losses were 91 killed. Forty-three enemy dead were located six kilometers northeast of Cu Chi and 60 were killed by light fire teams six kilometers north of Hoc Lom. All contacts on 14 February resulted in 183 killed and 69 wounded; 219 enemy were killed. Sporadic contact with enemy forces was made by US elements.
on 15 February and a number of enemy dead were found from previous contacts, accounting for 160 enemy killed. On 17 February, the 25th Infantry Division increased Operation SAILUTA in scope when two additional combat battalions were added from Operation SAILUTA. On 21 February Task Force 3/4 Cavalry, with 2/5 Infantry (less 3/4) under its operational control, conducted reconnaissance in Combat Operations near nine kilometers west and southwest of Van Don. But at 0956 hours, Troop C received small arms, automatic weapons and automatic weapon fire from an enemy force of unknown size ten kilometers southwest of Van Don (AT532922). Troops A and B reinforced the contact and light fire teams, artillery, AC-47 (spooky) and airstrikes supported the friendly forces. Three 30 were killed and 22 wounded; 135 enemy were killed. All Operation SAILUTA contacts on 21 February resulted in six 30 killed and 47 wounded, 272 enemy killed. On 22 February, Operation SAILUTA was terminated and all of the 25th Infantry Division combat forces joined Operation SAILUTA. On 2 March 2/4/5 Infantry, while moving south along Route 240 five kilometers north of Xom lon (AT533054), received heavy fire from an estimated enemy company in camouflage, dug-in positions. Friendly forces returned fire with organic weapons and were supported by light fire teams, artillery and airstrikes. Companies 4 and 5 reinforced the contact and swung southeast from Route 240 to the Don River. Forty-eight 60 rounds were killed and 29 wounded. Twenty-six enemy killed were located in following反正. On 3 March 2/27 Infantry and 2/3 Air cavalry contacted an enemy force of unknown size seven kilometers southeast of Xom lon. Friendly forces were supported by airstrikes, artillery and light fire teams. Fifty-three enemy were killed; friendly losses were seven killed and 49 wounded. On 4 March 2/06 Infantry (less D Company) moved to the Xom lon-Paron area. A and B Companies conducted a sweep of Don Lon village (AT533113) from
the east. At 1400 hours Company B received small arms and machine weapons fire from the south. Company B established a blocking position south of the village and the reconnaissance platoon took up a similar position in the west supported by two airstrikes. Company A attacked to the south through the village. Six US were killed and 17 wounded. 106 enemy were killed, 18 detainees were apprehended, four small arms and three crew served weapons were captured. On the 8th the 2/187 Infantry moved from the Chu Lai River to Dan Binh (Y100210) and on the 10th, 25 enemy killed during previous contact were located seven kilometers north of Dien Bien. On the 10th, B/3/187 Infantry moved to Dan Con and established operational control to 4/39 Infantry for operations in Capital Military District and was subsequently released on 13 February. Operation WASHINGTON terminated on 17 February. Significant cumulative results were 37 US killed and 210 US wounded, 456 enemy killed, 85 detainees apprehended and 57 small arms and 20 crew served weapons captured.

(4) Operation WASHINGTON was initiated on 18 December 1967 by elements of the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) as a security operation in Dien Bien Province. Primary mission was to conduct local reconnaissance in force operations designed to prevent rocket and mortar attacks against the Long Bien/Dien Bien complex. Initial task organization included 2/3 Infantry and B/17 Cavalry. On 5 January 4/12 Infantry assumed responsibility for Operation WASHINGTON and 2/3 Infantry continued participation in Operation WASHINGTON. On 24 January 2/3 Infantry reinitiated participation in Operation WASHINGTON. Company F, 51st Infantry (Light) commenced operations in the Long Bien area of operation. On the same day, the UNKOM area of operation was extended south to include an area ten to fifteen kilometers south of Dien Bien. On 31 January, enemy forces initiated attacks on US installations in Dien Bien, Long Bien and on an enemy weapons compound. On 2 February 121 rounds had been received and enemy forces initiated heavy ground attacks throughout the Long Bien/Dien Bien area. In response to these attacks, 4/12 Infantry (less one company) established blocking positions along the Long Mai River. Company B was released to operational control of Task Force PANTHER. B/17 Cavalry provided security for fire support bases and the prisoner of war compound (Y90425). The 2/3 Infantry established blocking positions one kilometer east of Long Mai.
village. Task Force WITHIN (C/4/12 Infantry, 3/2/3 Infantry, one Platoon D/17 Cavalry, A/2/47 Infantry, C/2/47 Infantry and Reconnaissance Platoon 2/47 Infantry) conducted reconnaissance in force operations north of Hoai village. Contact with enemy forces continued throughout the day and as of 2400 hours, Task Force WITHIN losses were one KI, 19 US wounded, three helicopters damaged, three armored personnel carriers damaged and one armored personnel carrier destroyed. Enemy losses were 315 killed, 19 prisoners and 32 small arms and two crew served weapons captured. At 0200 hours, 3/2/3 Infantry contacted an unknown size enemy force one kilometer west of Hoai village. Light fire teams supported the friendly forces. Two US were wounded and eight enemy were killed in this contact. Light fire teams in support of the 199th Infantry (Separate) (Light) killed 78 of the enemy during the day's operation. All contacts on 31 January resulted in one US killed and 24 wounded; enemy losses were 515 killed, 31 prisoners and 32 small arms and three crew served weapons captured. On 2 February, the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) became operational control to the 101st Airborne Division. Task organization included 2/3 Infantry, 4/12 Infantry, 2/11 Cavalry, 2/506 Infantry, 1/17 Cavalry (less one platoon), A/3/17 Air Cavalry and Company F, 51st Infantry (Light). During the day's operations, 91 enemy dead from previous contacts were found. On 3 February 2/11 Cavalry conducted road clearing operations along the highways in the vicinity of Bien Hoa. At 1505 hours Group A contacted an estimated enemy company eight kilometers north of Bien Hoa. Task Force 2/506 reinforced the contact; artillery, airstrikes and light fire teams supported the friendly forces. A sweep of the area was conducted by the 2/11 Cavalry and 2/506 Infantry. Thirty-five enemy were killed while four US were killed and 27 US were wounded. The 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) was released from 101st Airborne Division control on 7 February. Responsibility for the UNTAC area of operation was split with the 101st Airborne Division conducting operations in north UNTAC while the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) conducted operations in south UNTAC. Subsequently, 3/11 Cavalry became operational control to the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) for operations in south UNTAC. The 101st Airborne Division terminated participation in Operation UNTAC on 5 March, and the 2/506 Infantry and 2/11 Cavalry became operational control to the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light). Contact with enemy forces was light and sporadic after 5 February and on 8 March, Operation UNTAC was terminated. Significant cumulative results were US 13 killed and 181 wounded, 922 enemy killed and 151 detainees, 102 small arms and 66 crew served weapons captured.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCO GFR - 65 (R1) (CONFIDENTIAL) (U)

(I) Operations HAVENFORD and HAVENFORD I. Operation HAVENFORD was initiated by 3/7 Infantry, 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (light) on 14 January as a reconnaissance in force operation in Gia Dinh and Long An Provinces. Contact with enemy forces during January was light and sporadic. On 31 January, 3/7 Infantry became operational control to Task Force WARE and on 2 February, Operation HAVENFORD terminated. Operation HAVENFORD I was initiated on 5 February, in the same area of operation as HAVENFORD. The 3/7 Infantry continued reconnaissance in force operations under operational control of Task Force WARE until 9 February when 2/3 Infantry assumed the HAVENFORD I mission and 3/7 Infantry moved into Saigon. Both units remained operational control to Task Force WARE. Significant contacts are discussed under Operation Task Force WARE. Cumulative results during the period 14 January - 18 February were 21 friendly forces killed and 97 wounded. Enemy losses were 124 killed, 85 detainees, and 97 small arms and 13 crew served weapons captured. Results of contacts for units participating in Operation HAVENFORD and HAVENFORD I under operational control of Task Force WARE are included above. Separately, during the period of operational control to Task Force WARE (52) enemy were killed, 30 detained, and 95 small arms and 11 crew served weapons captured. Contacts with enemy forces on 1 and 3 February by 3/7 Infantry are not credited to Operation HAVENFORD. They include five friendly forces killed and 14 wounded; enemy losses were 165 killed, 20 detainees and one small arm captured.

(II) Operation SAN ANGELO commenced on 16 January in northern Phuoc Long Province. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division initiated this reconnaissance in force operation with a two-battalion airborne assault to the north and northwest of Song Be. A third battalion conducted airborne assaults on 17 January to the northeast of Song Be. Sporadic contacts commenced on 17 January in widely separated locations. Several base camps and a hospital complex were discovered; however, there were no significant contacts until 1 February. At 1445 hours on that date 2/3/502 Infantry contacted an enemy battalion eight kilometers southwest of Song Be. One US was killed and four were wounded in this contact; enemy losses were 16 killed. The 2/327 Infantry suspended participation in Operation SAN ANGELO on 2 February and moved to Tan Son Nhut. Subsequently the unit became operational control to Task Force WARE for five days. On 9 February 1/327 Infantry commenced movement to the Bai and became operational control of III Marine Amphibious Force on arrival. Operation SAN ANGELO terminated on 9 February. Significant cumulative results were 13 US killed and 68 wounded; enemy losses were 63 killed and 37 small arms captured. Although Operation SAN ANGELO terminated, several significant contacts in the Song Be area were made with enemy forces by elements of the 101st Airborne Division. Commencing at 0055 hours on 18 February, an estimated enemy battalion attacked the village of Song Be. By 0145 hours the enemy force had occupied Song Be and 200 of the enemy were reported to have assembles in the village marketplace. At first light, the 31st ARVN Ranger Battalion moved to Song Be and commenced an attack on the enemy forces in the village. In the
initial attack one US was killed, three US were wounded, four Republic of Vietnam Army soldiers were killed and 25 wounded. Twenty of the enemy were killed and nine captured. At 1030 hours 2/2/17 Cavalry and 3/1/506 Infantry were committed to assist Republic of Vietnam Army forces in driving the enemy battalion from Song Be. Contact lasted until 2025 hours. Seven US were killed and 25 wounded. Total enemy losses were 75 killed and nine captured (25 enemy credited to US forces, 50 enemy and nine prisoners credited to Republic of Vietnam Army forces). The Combined United States and Republic of Vietnam Army operation continued. On 19 February 2/2/17 Cavalry and 3/1/506 Infantry moved to blocking positions west and southwest of Song Be. The 31st ARVN Ranger Battalion conducted a sweep into the blocking positions which was completed by 1900 hours. Seventeen enemy were killed by the Ranger Battalion. At 1:40 hours, 2/2/17 Cavalry located a large enemy force in spider holes five kilometers west of Song Be. The enemy force was engaged with airstrikes, artillery and light fire teams. A follow-up sweep of the area disclosed 72 enemy killed. 2/2/17 and 3/1/506 Infantry continued pursuit of enemy forces north toward the Song Be River and at 1815 hours contacted an estimated enemy company. Friendly forces were supported by airstrikes, artillery and light fire teams. Twenty-seven of the enemy were killed, and 15 small arms and three crew served weapons were captured. On 21 February, 2/2/17 Cavalry contacted an estimated North Vietnamese Platoon three kilometers north of Song Be. Small arms and automatic weapons fire was exchanged. The friendly force was supported by airstrikes, artillery and light fire teams. A follow-up sweep of the area was conducted which resulted in finding 20 North Vietnamese soldiers killed; one United States soldier was killed and two wounded during this action. From 18 until 29 February all contacts with enemy forces in the Song Be area resulted in eight United States soldiers killed, 27 wounded, four Republic of Vietnam Army soldiers killed and 25 wounded. Enemy losses were 228 killed and 24 detainees (67 enemy killed and 24 detainees were credited to Republic of Vietnam Army forces).

(1) Operation QUADRO X was initiated on 18 January by the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division and supported by Navy Task Force 117. The 2d Brigade with 3/60 Infantry and 3/47 Infantry conducted airmobile and riverine reconnaissance in force operations in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces and on 31 January, became operational control to the Senior Advisor IV Corps for operations in Go Cong, Vinh Long and Phong Dinh Provinces. Initially, QUADRO X was designed to seek out and destroy enemy installations and to locate, fix and destroy the enemy 263 Main Force Battalion, 5/4 Local Force Battalion and 1st Cong Cal Be District Forces. Contact with enemy forces in Cal Be District was light and sporadic and on 25 January the brigade shifted to Giong Trom and Kho Cay Districts, Kien Hoa Province. The 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division became operational control to the Senior Advisor IV Corps and was subsequently directed to conduct attacks against enemy forces in Dinh Tuong Province. At 1615 hours on 1 February the 2d Brigade commenced an attack in the vicinity of My Tho, the capital city of Dinh Tuong Province, conducting beach
assaults southwest of the city and attacking from the My Tho River north along the water reservoir. The 3/47 Infantry attacked north and became heavily engaged by a large enemy force within the city. The 3/60 Infantry attacked north and moved to a position northwest of the city where it became heavily engaged by an estimated enemy battalion. Artillery, light fire teams and airstrikes supported friendly forces and heavy fighting continued throughout the night. Enemy losses were 26 killed and 10 detainees; friendly losses were three killed and 31 wounded. The following day elements of the Mobile Riverine Force continued the attack against hostile strongholds within the city. House-to-house fighting developed and the 2d Brigade elements maintained contact with the remnants of an estimated three enemy battalions. By 1200 hours most of the enemy had been driven out of the city. To sever enemy routes of escape and to provide the best positions for the destruction of the remaining enemy forces, an encirclement of the city was conducted jointly by United States and Vietnamese forces. Results during the second day of fighting were 11 United States soldiers wounded and 31 enemy killed. The 7th ARVN Division reported 408 enemy killed, 26 detainees apprehended, and 156 weapons captured, while sustaining 45 killed and 161 wounded. On 4 February the Mobile Riverine Force moved to the vicinity of Vinh Long City and the 2d Brigade commenced offensive operations against enemy forces in that area. The 3/60 Infantry conducted an airmobile assault south of Vinh Long and attacked north in zone. The 3/47 Infantry conducted beach landing south of the city and established blocking positions to seal off enemy routes of escape. During the day contact was sporadic with small enemy units resulting in 15 enemy killed and five weapons captured. The attack continued the next day and during the period 5 to 7 February, elements of the 2d Brigade conducted sweeps north and northwest toward the city to clear the airfield and adjacent areas of enemy forces. Heavy contact was established with a large Viet Cong force during this phase of the operation and resulted in 133 enemy killed, 67 detainees, and 24 weapons and four crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were three killed, 55 wounded and one missing in action. On 11 February the Mobile Riverine Force displaced to Dong Tam and in the afternoon conducted riverine and airmobile reconnaissance in force operations in Cai Lay and Long Dinh Districts, Dinh Tuong Province, to destroy enemy concentrations and their installations. The operations were designed to eliminate enemy concentrations threatening the city of My Tho, and to maintain National Highway 4 open for commercial and civilian traffic. The 5/60 Infantry Battalion (Mechanized) (less one company) with 1/2/39 Infantry became operational control to the 2d Brigade for this phase of the operation. The 3/60 Infantry and 3/47 Infantry conducted airmobile assaults nine kilometers northeast of Cai Lay, then attacked southwest toward Cai Lay. At 3:20 hours C/3/60 Infantry found a weapons cache located in sunken sampans along the Chau Long Canal. It contained 67 small arms, one crew served weapon, 40 105mm-2 rounds and 100 60mm mortar rounds. At 1300 hours 1/2/39 Infantry engaged an unknown size enemy force five kilometers northeast of Cai Lay. Coasdes B and C, 5/60 Infantry (Mechanized) reinforced the contact. Sporadic fire was encountered.

the remainder of the day. Friendly forces were supported by light fire teams, artillery and airstrike. Two US were killed and 14 wounded; enemy losses were 79 killed. Operation COMANDO X terminated on 13 February 1968. Significant cumulative results were 12 friendly forces killed (two Navy), 190 wounded (nine Navy) and one Navy missing in action. Enemy losses were 334 killed, 280 detainees, and 115 small arms and team crew served weapons captured.

The 1st Australian Task Force initiated Operation CUBBURG on 24 January. This reconnaissance in force operation was conducted in an area of operation CUBBURG to the northeast of Long Binh, north of Highway QL 1 and south of the Dong Nai River. The 1st Australian Task Force adapted readily to the new area of operation and was highly successful in a number of small unit contacts. In most of the contacts with enemy forces, the Task Force not only inflicted casualties on the enemy, but captured their weapons as well. On 4 February, in several contacts, the 1st Australian Task Force killed 18 enemy without sustaining casualties. On 7 February Company V, 2d RAR contacted an estimated enemy company eight kilometers northeast of Trang Bom (YT35184) resulting in eight New Zealanders wounded. Enemy losses were 13 killed and six small arms and five crew served weapons captured. Operation CUBBURG was reduced in scope on 13 February and the 2d RAR (less two companies) terminated participation. On 14 February, Fire Support Patrol Base ASHMORE (17Z1015C) received a mortar and light attack from an estimated enemy company. Friendly forces employed a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire against the attacking enemy force and light fire teams supported. As a result of this attack, seven Australians were killed and 22 were wounded; one US was killed and 12 were wounded in the same contact. A sweep of the area the following day disclosed four enemy killed. Operation CUBBURG terminated on 1 March 1968. Significant cumulative results include 18 killed and 91 wounded from the 1st Australian Task Force, one US killed and 12 US wounded. Enemy losses were 100 killed, and 108 small arms and 25 crew served weapons captured.

Task Force WARE. In response to enemy attacks in and around Saigon, Task Force WARE was established on 31 January in Capital Military District with the mission of assuming command and control of such US tactical units as would be made available to it, and in coordination with Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, to destroy enemy forces in and around Tan Son Nhut and the Thu Tho Racetrack during the period 31 January - 3 February. The second phase was designed to destroy enemy forces in districts surrounding Saigon during the period 4 - 18 February. Initial task organization included Task Force THEBAUD (2/27 Infantry, 3/18 Cavalry, 1/9/3 Infantery and 4/3/4 Cavalry), Task Force GISLER (3/7 Infantry (less one company) with one platoon armored personnel carriers attached), Task Force STEELE (5/60 Infantry (Mechanized) and one company
3/7 Infantry), Task Force NEVER (one company 2/16 Infantry with one platoon armored personnel carriers attached) and 3/7 Infantry. Commencing at 0225 hours on 31 January 1968, enemy forces identified as elements of the 9th Viet Cong Division initiated attacks against friendly forces and key installations in the Saigon area. At 0321 hours, enemy forces initiated an assault on Tan Son Nhat Airfield. The main attack was conducted by at least three battalions and was launched from the west at Gate number 051 with battalion sized supporting attacks against Gate number 10 (east) and Gate number 058 (north). Fire was received at almost all points around the Tan Son Nhat perimeter. Forces from the 377th Security Police Squadron, Task Force 35 (two Platoons USARV Reaction Force), and mixed Republic of Vietnam Army security units moved to block a penetration at Gate 051. By 0430 hours, the penetration was contained approximately 200 meters inside the Tan Son Nhat perimeter. At 0500 hours, two companies of the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion launched a counterattack at the shoulder of the penetration from southeast to northwest but were stopped by fierce resistance after only short advance. Concurrently, the Tan Son Nhat Commander and his advisor requested reinforcement of at least a US brigade. In response, the 3/4 Cavalry, 25th Infantry Division was dispatched from Cu Chi to Tan Son Nhat, the 3/4 Cavalry Squadron Commanding Officer moved his unit on a cross country route which he personally marked with flares dropped from his command and control aircraft. Upon arrival at the southwest corner of Tan Son Nhat, the squadron conducted an estimated enemy battalion. (This battle is discussed under Operation SARKTCG). From the onset of the enemy attack, light fire teams, Republic of Vietnam Army and United States artillery and flares ships were used in the defense of Tan Son Nhat with highly effective results. The 53rd Regional Force Battalion commenced operations against the rear of the enemy force further disrupting his attack. At 0610 hours, a platoon from the 101st Airborne Division successfully landed by assault helicopter on the roof of the BCI building to assist the Military Police and US Marines in eliminating the enemy force which had breached the perimeter wall. The following nightfall a 4-man counterattack by the 4th ARVN Marine battalion resulted in the recapture of the Co Loa Camp and the howitzers. The enemy had taken trained tank crews in the expectation of capturing other weaponized HCUs. The Military District advisors and facilities became part of the Task Force WARE staff and tactical operation center. At 1100 hours, the 1/18 Infantry began arriving at Tan Son Nhat with the entire battalion closing by 1300 hours. At 1219 hours, a 25-man mixed force of United States Air Force and Republic of Vietnam personnel led by a US NCO commenced a frontal assault on the nose of the penetration. This attack restored the
perimeter and allowed Gate number 051 to be closed. By 1300 hours, the balance of the 3/4 Cavalry arrived at Gate number 051. While enroute, these elements had received heavy fire from the Vinatexco Plant located just northwest of Gate number 051. With the help of light fire teams and airstrikes, the fire was silenced. Task Force GIELER (3/7 Infantry Battalion (less one company) and two companies 5/60 Infantry (Mechanized)) sent a company reinforced with a platoon of armored personnel carriers from Binh Chanh to reinforce the Military Police contact at the Phu Tho Racetrack in Saigon. The company moved by truck to a point five blocks from the racetrack then fought its way to the racetrack and linked up with the Military Police. It then secured the racetrack for the 3/7 Infantry (less one company) which arrived by helicopter at 1600 hours. The remainder of the day was spent in clearing a three to four-block radius around the racetrack. A two-company force from Task Force THEBAUD (3/4 Cavalry, 1/18 Infantry, 2/27 Infantry, 4/1/4 Cavalry) manned the perimeter around MACV Headquarters. This force was later reduced to one company. Task Force STEELE (5/60 Infantry (Mechanized) (less one company) and one company 3/7 Infantry) moved to secure Binh Chanh and to conduct operations in that area. Task Force MEYER (one company 2/16 Infantry and one armored personnel carrier platoon) moved to secure the Binh Loi Bridge at 1345 hours. One platoon moved to assist in securing the New Embassy Hotel in Saigon. The 1/27 Infantry moved by helicopter to Hoc Mon and in conjunction with district forces relieved the enemy pressure in the city. At 1700 hours, US forces at Tan Son Nhut were released from operational control Tan Son Nhut Senior Advisor and attached to Task Force THEBAUD (3/4 Cavalry, 1/18 Infantry, 2/27 Infantry and 4/1/4 Cavalry). The 1/18 Infantry with the 3/4 Cavalry (less one troop) attacked the enemy force which renewed the assault at Gate number 051, but was unable to completely clear the area due to darkness and returned to bolster the Tan Son Nhut perimeter. The 2/27 Infantry and 4/1/4 Cavalry moved to downtown Saigon to secure four bachelor women's quarters and a bachelor enlisted quarters whose unarmed personnel were threatened. On 1 February, Task Force THEBAUD attacked to the west of the 1st RVN Marine Battle Group to relieve enemy pressure. The 2/27 Infantry swept west of Tan Son Nhut and searched the Vinatexco Textile Plant which had been fired on by the 3/4 Cavalry, Vietnamese Air Force and light fire teams on 31 January. One hundred sixty two enemy killed, 101 weapons (crew served and individual), and numerous other items of equipment and documents were located. Task Force THEBAUD (3/7 Infantry less one company and two companies of 5/60 Infantry (Mechanized)) conducted a sweep employing four companies in the vicinity of the racetrack. One mechanized infantry company contacted a large enemy force about three blocks from the racetrack, that was firing small arms and crew served weapons from positions in large buildings that dominated the area. Friendly forces engaged the enemy with organic weapons and support from light fire teams, resulting in 120 enemy killed. On 2 February, the 1/27 Infantry was given the mission to sweep east from Hoc Mon toward Ap Don Outpost (IT801601) and to block enemy reinforcement and/or escape routes. The 2/327 Infantry arrived by fixed wing at Tan Son Nhut.
CONFIDENTIAL

AFFFO-65-1H


Son Nhut to become Task Force WARE reserve. The 1/18 Infantry was airlifted to Thu Duc and given the mission to secure the water filtration plant (XS94C998), power plant (XS18950) and provide area security in the Thu Duc District Compound in coordination with the District Advisor. Task Force MEYER and 4/4 Cavalry became operations control to the 1/18 Infantry on closing at Thu Duc; resultant task force was named Task Force TRONSRUE (1/18 Infantry, A/11 Cavalry Regiment, one company 2/16 Infantry and one armored personnel carrier platoon). Task Force INCHAO (2/27 Infantry, 2/327 Infantry, 3/4 Cavalry and 4/4 Cavalry) conducted an attack to the west of Vietnamese Marines to relieve pressure from a renewed enemy assault on the Co Loa Artillery Training Camp. The attack was successful and 160 enemy were killed (100 enemy killed credited to the Vietnamese Marines). The Newport Bridge (XS892941) was attacked by elements of the 4th Viet Cong Local Force Battalion which captured the eastern end of the bridge. A counterattack by elements of the 720th Military Police Battalion, 1/5 ARVN Cavalry and the 30th ARVN Ranger Battalion recaptured the bridge. 11 enemy killed were found on the bridge. On 3 February, the Thu Duc District Compound was attacked by a two-battalion enemy force. Friendly forces repulsed the attack and the enemy withdrew leaving 40 dead behind. A Viet Cong prisoner stated that more than 60 of the enemy had been killed in the assaults. Thu Due City received extensive damage especially in the area of the District Compound. The 2/327 Infantry moved by helicopter to Nha Be (XS952628) with the mission of securing the storage area and to block enemy movement into or out of that area. On 4 February, Task Force WARE commenced Phase II of the operation by a realignment of the friendly forces in Capital Military District. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces had the responsibility to search and clear Saigon and US Forces moved to the districts surrounding Saigon City with a mission of preventing enemy reinforcement or exfiltration from Saigon. US Forces were given areas in the Tactical Area of Interest of their parent division to facilitate orderly transfer of responsibility from Task Force WARE when the situation stabilized. The heaviest fighting of the day occurred in the Cholon sector and the ARVN Rangers were able to make limited advance against the well-camouflaged and fortified enemy. On 5 February, the 5/40 Infantry (Mechanized) (less two companies) returned to 9th Division control. Task Force WENCE was disestablished when the northwest area of the Binh Chanh province, which encompassed the Hoc Mon and Tan Binh Districts, reverted to 5th US Infantry Division control. The 1/27 Infantry, 2/27 Infantry and 3/4 Cavalry were released to the 25th US Infantry Division at that time. Task Force CUDH (3/4 Infantry (less one company), two companies 5/40 Infantry (Mechanized)) conducted a combined RAG boat/airmobile operation live northwest of Binh Chanh. Forty nine enemy were killed in this combat. On 7 February, Task Force TRONSH (1/18 Infantry, 4/4 Cavalry, one company 2/16 Infantry, one armored personnel carrier platoon) reverted to 1/25 Infantry Division control as the 1st Division assumed responsibility for the Thu Duc area. The 4/39 Infantry replaced 2/277 Infantry at Nha Be and 2/277 Infantry reverted to 101st Airborne Division control. Task Force CUTHELL (6/1/11)
Armored Cavalry Regiment, and A/2/502 Infantry) was formed at Tan Son Nhut to become Task Force WARE reserve. In order to free additional Vietnamese Armed Forces to reinforce the contacts in Cholon (Saigon) the US area of operation boundary was extended to include the south bank of the Kinh Doi Canal on 8 February. Task Force CUTTSLL (3/7 Infantry and two companies 5/60 Infantry (Mechanized)) moved to the Kinh Doi Canal at 1215 hours with a mission to secure the four bridges in the area and prevent enemy movement into and out of that area. On 12 February, Task Force GUBLER (3/7 Infantry (less one company) and two companies 5/60 Infantry (Mechanized)) returned to the racetrack in Saigon to release two ranger battalions for the heavy fighting in Cholon. The 2/3 Infantry replaced Task Force GUBLER in the Binh Chanh area. Acting on a Vietnamese intelligence report on 11 February Task Force CIBLLR (3/7 Infantry (less one company) and two companies 5/60 Infantry (Mechanized)) surrounded a suspected enemy command post in vicinity of Phu Lan (XS782902). Heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire was exchanged and a follow-up sweep of the area resulted in 49 enemy killed and 23 small arms captured. A later check by Vietnamese personnel revealed that one of the enemy bodies was tentatively identified as that of the CUSVN Political Commissar, MC Tran Do. Another intelligence report on 12 February resulted in the 2/3 Infantry locating a large weapons cache near Cho De (XS723832). The cache contained 69 small arms, four crew served weapons, 29,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and other miscellaneous ammunition and equipment. Contact with enemy forces became sporadic and on 18 February Task Force WARE was disestablished. Significant cumulative results of units under operational control of Task Force WARE during the period 31 January to 18 February include 76 US killed and 298 wounded; enemy losses were 875 killed, 262 detainees and 334 weapons (individual and crew served) captured.

(3) Operations Initiated and Terminated During the Reporting Period.

(a) Operation LAM SON 68 was initiated 1 February 1968, succeeding Operation LAM SON 67 and continuing the mission of strengthening local defense, extending developmental projects, elimination of Viet Cong infrastructure, winning the support of the population, and conducting road clearing operations in heavily-populated Binh Duong Province. This operation was conducted by the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division in close coordination and cooperation with elements of the 5th and 18th ARVN Divisions. There were a number of significant contacts: At 0945 hours on 1 February, 1/28 Infantry and 1/4 Cavalry contacted an estimated enemy battalion three kilometers east of Phu Cuong. Friendly forces were supported by artillery, light fire teams and airstrikes. Contact broke at 1830 hours. Friendly losses were five killed and 32 wounded. Enemy losses were 197 killed and 121 detainees. On 2 February, 1/18 Infantry, A/1/4 Cavalry and Task Force MEYER became operational control to Task Force WARE. On 4 February 1968, Phu Loi Base Camp received a mortar and rocket attack that caused moderately heavy damage to aircraft and vehicles. On 7 February 1/18 Infantry, Task Force MEYER and A/1/4 Cavalry reverted to 1st Infantry Division control. The LAM SON area of operation was extended to include the area in and around

CONFIDENTIAL

AVPNC-RS-M
20 MAY 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RG5 CFSOR - 65 (R1) (W-DHO-TU-A) (U)

Armored Cavalry Regiment, and A/2/502 Infantry) was formed at Tan Son Nhut to become Task Force WARE reserve. In order to free additional Vietnamese Armed Forces to reinforce the contacts in Cholon (Saigon) the US area of operation boundary was extended to include the south bank of the Kinh Doi Canal on 8 February. Task Force CUTTSLL (3/7 Infantry and two companies 5/60 Infantry (Mechanized)) moved to the Kinh Doi Canal at 1215 hours with a mission to secure the four bridges in the area and prevent enemy movement into and out of that area. On 12 February, Task Force GUBLER (3/7 Infantry (less one company) and two companies 5/60 Infantry (Mechanized)) returned to the racetrack in Saigon to release two ranger battalions for the heavy fighting in Cholon. The 2/3 Infantry replaced Task Force GUBLER in the Binh Chanh area. Acting on a Vietnamese intelligence report on 11 February Task Force CIBLLR (3/7 Infantry (less one company) and two companies 5/60 Infantry (Mechanized)) surrounded a suspected enemy command post in vicinity of Phu Lan (XS782902). Heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire was exchanged and a follow-up sweep of the area resulted in 49 enemy killed and 23 small arms captured. A later check by Vietnamese personnel revealed that one of the enemy bodies was tentatively identified as that of the CUSVN Political Commissar, MC Tran Do. Another intelligence report on 12 February resulted in the 2/3 Infantry locating a large weapons cache near Cho De (XS723832). The cache contained 69 small arms, four crew served weapons, 29,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and other miscellaneous ammunition and equipment. Contact with enemy forces became sporadic and on 18 February Task Force WARE was disestablished. Significant cumulative results of units under operational control of Task Force WARE during the period 31 January to 18 February include 76 US killed and 298 wounded; enemy losses were 875 killed, 262 detainees and 334 weapons (individual and crew served) captured.

(3) Operations Initiated and Terminated During the Reporting Period.

(a) Operation LAM SON 68 was initiated 1 February 1968, succeeding Operation LAM SON 67 and continuing the mission of strengthening local defense, extending developmental projects, elimination of Viet Cong infrastructure, winning the support of the population, and conducting road clearing operations in heavily-populated Binh Duong Province. This operation was conducted by the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division in close coordination and cooperation with elements of the 5th and 18th ARVN Divisions. There were a number of significant contacts: At 0945 hours on 1 February, 1/28 Infantry and 1/4 Cavalry contacted an estimated enemy battalion three kilometers east of Phu Cuong. Friendly forces were supported by artillery, light fire teams and airstrikes. Contact broke at 1830 hours. Friendly losses were five killed and 32 wounded. Enemy losses were 197 killed and 121 detainees. On 2 February, 1/18 Infantry, A/1/4 Cavalry and Task Force MEYER became operational control to Task Force WARE. On 4 February 1968, Phu Loi Base Camp received a mortar and rocket attack that caused moderately heavy damage to aircraft and vehicles. On 7 February 1/18 Infantry, Task Force MEYER and A/1/4 Cavalry reverted to 1st Infantry Division control. The LAM SON area of operation was extended to include the area in and around

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, I Field Forces Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1963, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R) (2-DHR-TO-A) (U)

Thu Duc. At 1505 hours on 8 February B/1/18 Infantry and A/1/4 Cavalry received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an enemy force of unknown size in a village three kilometers southeast of Thu Duc. A FISTOP aircraft was sent over the area to instruct civilians to leave. The friendly forces continued to advance through the built-up area and enemy forces broke contact by 1705 hours. Thirty-nine enemy were killed; four US were wounded. On 19 February, 1/28 Infantry engaged an unknown number of enemy five kilometers northwest of Thu Duc. Friendly forces continued to advance, engaging small enemy forces sporadically until 1605 hours when the enemy forces broke contact. One US was killed and six were wounded. Enemy losses were 42 killed. On 20 February 1/28 Infantry contacted an enemy force of unknown strength five kilometers southwest of Thu Duc. D/1/18 Infantry and A/1/4 Cavalry reinforced the contact. Artillery, 40 47 (Spooky), light fire teams and airstrikes supported the friendly forces. Nineteen US were killed and 11 wounded. Enemy losses were 123 killed. Three days later, on 23 February, 1/4 Cavalry found 32 enemy killed from previous contact six kilometers northeast of Thu Quang. At 0820 hours on 2 March D/1/26 Infantry contacted an estimated enemy platoon 10 kilometers west of Tan Uyen. US losses were one killed and seven wounded; enemy losses were 42 killed. Operation LAM SON 68 was suspended on 10 March 1968 and US forces engaged in that operation commenced participating in Operation QUYET THANG. Operation OIYET THANG is discussed in paragraph 1d(3)(d). Significant casualties for Operation LAM SON 68 through 10 March were: 76 US killed and 239 wounded; enemy losses were 1,194 killed, 643 detainees, three returnees, 149 small arms and 34 crew served weapons captured.

(b) Operation HCPTnC 1 was initiated on 4 February by 1st Infantry Division in a security mission near My Tho. Task Organization initially included 4/47 Infantry, 6/101 Infantry (Mechanized) and 2/39 Infantry. On 8 February 3/60 Infantry (Mechanized) Reconnaissance Platoon contacted an estimated two enemy companies seven kilometers northwest of My Tho. Companies B and C/60 Infantry (Mechanized) reinforced the contact and 2/39 Infantry was circulated six kilometers north of the contact. At 1605 hours 2/39 Infantry engaged an unknown number of enemy while moving to reinforce the 5/60 Infantry (Mechanized). Friendly forces were supported by airstrikes, light fire teams and artillery. Sporadic contact continued throughout the night. A follow-up sweep of the area was conducted the next morning and 86 enemy killed. Friendly losses were four killed and 25 wounded. At 0144 hours on 25 February fire support patrol base JAGER (XS397994) received an attack from an unknown size enemy force. A heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire was employed against the attacking force. Fighting continued and at 0235 hours the enemy employed bangalore torpedoes to breach the friendly positions. Close-in fighting ensued until the 6/39 Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon arrived and assisted in egressing the enemy from the friendly positions at 0235 hours. During the contact, friendly forces were supported by light fire teams, flare ships and artillery. Friendly losses were 19
killed and 68 wounded. Enemy losses were 100 killed, 29 small arms and 17 crew served weapons captured. On 7 February 5/60 Infantry (Mechanized) and 2/35 Infantry terminated participation in Operation HUPAC I. 3/47 Infantry with the Reconnaissance Platoon from 2/47 Infantry (Mechanized) assumed the Dong Tam security mission. Commencing in February, Dong Tam base camp received frequent attacks by mortar fire, however, damage and casualties were moderately light. Contact with enemy forces was light and sporadic through April. Operation HUPAC I terminated on 28 April. Significant cumulative results include 51 US killed and 401 wounded, 343 enemy killed and 365 detainees apprehended.

(e) Operations CORONADO XI and XII. The 9th Infantry Division initiated Operation CORONADO XI in cooperation and coordination with elements of the 21st ARVN Division and 9th ARVN Division on 14 February to locate and destroy enemy forces located southwest of Can Tho. Under operational control of the Senior Advisor IV Corps, the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division with 3/47 Infantry and 3/60 Infantry commenced beach assaults on the east and west side of the Dinh Truong Hue Canal and maneuvered north along the canal. The 43d ARVN Ranger Battalion, 9th ARVN Division and 1/31 Infantry (NVA) located north of Can Tho conducted a sweep to the southwest. Elements of the 2d Brigade continued their movement northwest along the canal. Sporadic contact continued throughout the day and resulted in seven US killed and 20 wounded; 12 enemy were killed. Contact continued the next morning and remained sporadic throughout the day. Contact broke at 2000 hours. Results of the engagement were two US killed, 12 wounded; the enemy sustained 28 killed. During the period 15-20 February the 2d Brigade and elements of the 21st and 9th ARVN Divisions continued reconnaissance in force operations southwest and north of Can Tho. Light and sporadic contacts during this period resulted in seven US killed and 52 wounded; enemy losses were 73 killed and 43 detainees. On 22 February elements of 3/47 Infantry moving southwest along the Kinh Lai Hien Canal in Ba Xuyen Province engaged a large Viet Cong Force occupying positions along the canal. Companies B and E 3/47 Infantry were inserted immediately into the area of contact. Friendly forces were supported by light fire teams, artillery and airstrikes. Enemy forces lost 61 killed from support fires and light contact with ground troops. The success of the attack made by the Mobile Riverine Force units against the estimated Viet Cong battalion was probably due to the fact that the enemy had set up its positions facing toward possible helicopter landing zones, and was not prepared for a waterborne assault from the canals. Operation CORONADO XI, conducted in Phong Dinh and Ba Xuyen Provinces, was the first operation involving US forces in that area of the delta region. On 26 February 3/360 Infantry conducted an air mobile assault eight kilometers southwest of Can Tho and immediately contacted an unknown size enemy force. 3/47 Infantry and Companies A and E 3/60 Infantry reinforced the contact, with support by artillery, light fire teams and airstrikes. Contact was maintained with enemy forces until 2330 hours. Sixteen US were killed, 67 wounded, 11 helicopters were
AVFDC-ItK-

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for Period ending 30 April 1968, RCS SFOR - 65 (R)- (WING-TOA) (U)

Damaged and one helicopter was destroyed. Enemy losses were 59 killed and 12 detainees. The following day friendly forces continued the attack. Sporadic contact with enemy forces continued throughout the day. At 1055 hours Companies C and 3/47 Infantry found a cache nine kilometers southwest of Can Tho containing 28 small arms, five crew served weapons and 754 mortar and 60mm rounds. Small quantity of other types of ammunition and equipment were also found in this area. On 1 and 2 March, the 2d Brigade continued offensive operations 8-12 kilometers southwest of Can Tho. Two heavy contacts resulted in seven US killed, 39 wounded and one missing in action. Enemy losses were 27 killed. The Mobile Riverine Force was released from operational control of the IV Corps Senior Advisor on 3 March and returned to Dong Tam. Operation CORONADO XII terminated on 4 March and Operation CORONADO XII was initiated to continue operations in Bien Hoa, Binh Thung and Long An Provinces. 4/47 Infantry exchanged missions with the 3/47 Infantry and became part of the Riverine Forces. The 3/47 Infantry assumed the Dong Tam security mission. CORONADO XII was suspended on 7 March and the 2d Brigade commenced participation in Operation WEST THAH. Significant cumulative results of Operation CORONADO XII include 39 friendly forces killed and 196 wounded (17 Navy). Enemy losses were 265 killed and 320 detainees captured.

(d) Operation WEST THAH was initiated on 11 March 1968 as a combined offensive reconnaissance in force operation (Regional) designed to destroy enemy forces in the rural areas and provide security for the rural population from Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army harassment. The operations were to commence in and around Saigon and continue outward into the rural areas of Capital Military District, Long An, Binh Thung, Bien Hoa and Bien Hoa Provinces. Task organisations included the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division with 1/25 Infantry, 1/38 Infantry, 4/16 Infantry, 1/26 Infantry, 2/28 Infantry, 1/23 Infantry and 1/4 Cavalry; 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division with 3/3 Infantry, 1/39 Infantry, 3/39 Infantry, two companies 3/40 Infantry and one company 5/60 Infantry (Mechanised); and the 1st, 2d and 3d ARVN Divisions. 15th Infantry Division with 2/22 Infantry (Mechanised), 2/7 Infantry, 2/27 Infantry, 2/34 Armor, 2/12 Infantry, 1/5 Infantry (Mechanised), 3/22 Infantry, 4/23 Infantry (Mechanised), 3/4 Cavalry (less one troop). Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Task Organisation included the 75th ARVN Division, 5th ARVN Division, 5th ARVN Ranger Group, and Airborne Task Force and a Marine Task Force. On 11 March 8 and 9 2/24 Infantry found a cache four kilometers east of Trung Lap containing 60 small arms, five crew served weapons and 1,350 60mm and mortar rounds. On 12 March the 1/11 Cavalry, in direct support of elements of the 44th ARVN Regiment, contacted an estimated enemy battalion six kilometers north of the area. Friendly forces were supported by air strikes, artillery and light fire teams. 81 enemy were killed. Friendly losses were seven US wounded, five ARVN killed and 14 ARVN wounded. An additional US troop contact was located by the 3d Battalion, 44th ARVN Regiment in the area of contact on 13 March. The following day, friendly forces continued the attack and were reinforced.
by the 51st ARVN Ranger Battalion. Ten ARVN were killed and 19 wounded. Enemy losses were 97 killed (credited to ARVN). On 17 March, contact was made and continued resulting in 57 enemy killed (50 credited to ARVN). Commencing at 0330 hours on 25 March, an estimated enemy battalion initiated coordinated mortar and ground attacks against two Regional/Popular Force camps in vicinity of Trang Bang. The 2/23 Infantry (Mechanized), Task Force 2/34 Armor and the 34th Ranger Battalion reinforced the contact, supported by light fire teams, airstrikes and artillery. Contact lasted until 0245 hours on 26 March. A follow-up sweep of the area was conducted the following morning. A total of 287 enemy had been killed (130 by ARVN). US losses were nine killed and 64 wounded. ARVN losses were 14 Rangers killed, eight Regional Forces killed, 17 Rangers wounded, 15 Regional Forces wounded, and National Police and one Regional Force missing. On the same day, 26 March, the 2d and 9th ARVN Airborne Battalions, conducting offensive sweep operations eight kilometers east of Hoc Mon, located 128 enemy dead from previous contacts. On 27 March, Task Force 2/34 Armor with B and C/2/14 Infantry under its operational control contacted an unknown size enemy force five kilometers northeast of Trang Bang. Friendly forces were supported by light fire teams, artillery and airstrikes. Two US were killed and 16 wounded; 97 enemy were killed and five detained. Interrogation of detainees identified the North Vietnamese Army 245th, 246th and 247th Battalions as having participated in the recent battles in the Trang Bang area.

On 1 April Co B/2/18 Infantry, participating in a battalion reconnaissance in force operation near Thu Due, contacted an estimated VC platoon, killing 12 VC and apprehending two detainees; friendly losses were 3 US wounded. After 1 April the number and size of contacts with enemy forces declined, as did the number of casualties inflicted on the enemy. This is demonstrated by the fact that during the six days beginning 2 April, an average of only 22 VC were killed as compared to an average of 53 each day during the first 21 days of the operation. QUIET THANG was terminated on 7 April. Significant cumulative results were: US forces: 105 killed and 920 wounded; ARVN losses: four killed and eight wounded; enemy losses: by US forces, 1,120 killed and 442 detainees, and 400 small arms, 104 crew served weapons, and 107,66 tons of rice captured; by ARVN forces: 31 Viet Cong killed and one prisoner and one crew served weapon captured.

(e) Operation HUNGOSS was initiated on 11 March as a reconnaissance in force operation (Regional) to destroy enemy forces operating in the rural areas of Tay Ninh Province. The initial Task Force Organization includes the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, with the 1/9 Infantry, 2/14 Infantry and 2/22 Infantry (Mechanized). Contacts were light and sporadic with the following exceptions: At 1230 hours on 16 March 14 kilometers south of Tay Ninh Light fire teams from Troop 9, 3/17 Air Cavalry engaged an estimated two companies of Viet Cong. There were no friendly casualties; 25 of the enemy were killed in the brief engagement. On 7 April, final day of the operation, 1/9 Infantry moved into a position about 12 kilometers east of Tay Ninh and conducted a combat assault and reconnaissance in force operation along the east side of Highway LTL 26. On route Company B came under fire by what was estimated to have been a reinforced Viet Cong platoon.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR - 65 (HL) (MJHÖ-TO-A) (U)

As Company 3 returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons, it was reinforced by a light fire team and Companies A and D 4/9 Infantry. This contact resulted in 14 Viet Cong killed. Seven American troops were killed and 17 wounded. Operation WJLQStK&SS was terminated at 2400 hours, 7 April. Significant cumulatives wire US losses: 21 killed, 154 wounded, three missing in action; Civilian Irregular Defense Group: 30 killed, 256 wounded, 61 detainees.

Operation BOX SPRINGS was initiated on 16 March by 3/187 Infantry, 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division as a reconnaissance in force (Regional) operation in Binh Duong Province. On 17 March, the task organization was expanded to include 2/506 Infantry (less one company), 3/17 Infantry and B/3/11 Cavalry. On 18 March 3/187 Infantry contacted an estimated enemy battalion 10 kilometers south of Phuoc Vahn. Friendly forces were supported by airstrikes, light fire teams and flareships. Fifty-five enemy were killed. US losses were 13 killed and 33 wounded. The 4/12 Infantry and A/3/11 Cavalry terminated participation in Operation BOX SPRINGS on 21 March. Contact with enemy forces was light and sporadic during the latter part of March and Operation BOX SPRINGS terminated on 28 March. Significant cumulatives include 24 friendly forces killed and 90 wounded. Enemy losses were 106 killed.

Operations continuing into the next reporting period.

(f) Operation TRUCKS CONG MNH was initiated on 7 March 1968 as a combined strike operation by the 2/39 Infantry, 2/60 Infantry, 3/60 Infantry and 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division in close cooperation and coordination with elements of the 7th ARVN Division. Basic objective of the operation is to locate and destroy the Main Force Battalion and other Viet Cong elements in the vicinity of My Tho and Cai Lay. Initial air assault and ground assault four kilometers north and six kilometers south of My Tho by the 4/47 Infantry and the 3/60 Infantry on 7 March resulted in light contact. At 7:15 hours on 8 March seven kilometers east of My Tho, Company B, 4/47 Infantry received fire from an unknown enemy force. Company B was reinforced by Companies C and E; the contact continued sporadically throughout the night resulting in five US killed and 61 wounded; and 37 Viet Cong killed. From 9 to 17 March reconnaissance in force and security of engineer up-grade operations in the vicinity of Highway 4L4 from My Tho to Cai Lay by the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division were a part of Operation TRUONG CONG DINH. On 17 March the 1st Brigade initiated Operation PRÜPLAS ROAD. Contacts by units of the 2d Brigade continued to be light and sporadic throughout the remainder of March. On 4 April, 3/47 Infantry conducted a riverine move from the Mobile Riverine Base at Dong Tam to a point six kilometers northeast of Ben Tre on the Song Ba Lai River. At 0840 hours, Company B, C and E received fire from small arms, automatic weapons including .50 caliber machinegun, and RPG rockets. At 0930 hours two hundred meters to the north, two of the companies came...
under fire again from an unknown number of Viet Cong employing the same type weapons. The 3/47 Infantry returned fire and called in artillery, light fire teams and tactical airstrikes. The contact continued until darkness. Known losses were four US killed and 70 wounded, and four Viet Cong dead. At 1135 hours that same day Companies B, C and A, 4/47 Infantry, conducting a similar riverine move from the mobile Riverine Base to the south side of the Song Pa Lai River, eight kilometers east-northeast of Ben Tra, came under fire from the north side of the river. The enemy employed small arms and automatic weapons. Company G, 4/47 Infantry received small arms fire again at 1500 hours after moving about one kilometer to the south. Company C returned the fire with organic weapons, assisted by gunboats of Task Force 117, which was supporting both the 3/47 and 4/47 Infantry. At 1530 hours both elements came under heavy fire, Company C from small arms, and the Navy element, located in the same vicinity, from .50 caliber machineguns. At 1550, Company A beached 100 meters west of Company C and immediately received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. By 1730 hours all three companies of the 4/47 Infantry were engaged. The contact lasted throughout the daylight hours, assisted by Troop G/7/1 Air Cavalry and tactical airstrikes. Losses of 4/47 Infantry were one US killed and 10 wounded; Viet Cong losses were two killed and two detainees. Casualties taken in G/7/1 Air Cavalry operation were one US killed and 16 Viet Cong killed. Airstrikes in support of Operation THANH OAI D方位 that day accounted for 19 Viet Cong killed. On 17 April both 3/47 and 4/47 Infantry conducted riverine operations, 3/47 Infantry following with a reconnaissance in force from a point on the King Tong Doc Loc Canal - nine kilometers northeast of Ca Luy. The 4/47 Infantry, operating approximately five kilometers to the west, contacted an enemy force of unknown size at 1117 hours. Company A received small arms, automatic weapons and 60mm mortar fire from an estimated reinforced platoon. By 1440 hours three elements of 4/47 Infantry were in light contact, but at 1605 hours it began to receive heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. Returning the fire, the 3/47 Infantry called in support from artillery and light fire teams. The Viet Cong broke contact with both battalions at 2020 hours. Results of the day's operation were 90 Viet Cong killed and six detainees. US casualties were five killed and 55 wounded. On 23 April the 2d Battalion, Vietnam Marine Corps, in close cooperation and coordination with 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, conducted beach assaults and reconnaissance in force operations in the vicinity of US93816 (approximately 10 kilometers northwest of Sa Dec). Throughout the day, 2d Battalion, Vietnamese Marine Corps encountered light contact, but at 1845 hours two companies received heavy fire resulting in two Vietnamese Marines killed and 14 wounded. Contact broke at 2000 hours with 11 Viet Cong killed. The 3/47 Infantry, conducting similar maneuvers about ten kilometers to the south, found no enemy forces but encountered extensive booby traps. The 4/47 Infantry, operating some 10 kilometers to the east, established contact at 1715 hours and maintained it until 1902 hours, meanwhile apprehending 55 detainees, in small groups. At 1615 hours Task Force 117, in support of the operation, began receiving fire which resulted in six US Navy wounded. The operation was supported by 3/34 Artillery and 336 Armed
Helicopter Company. Total casualties for the operation were one US killed and 12 wounded; Viet Cong losses were 31 killed and 55 detainees. Through the remainder of April, contacts were generally light and sporadic. On 30 April 3/47 Infantry was released from participation in the operation. THUONG CONG DINH continues. Significant results to date are 51 US killed and 401 wounded, and 343 Viet Cong killed and 365 detainees apprehended.

(b) Operation PEOPLES ROAD was initiated 17 March 1968 with the mission of securing an engineer paving project on 24 kilometers of Highway QL 4 in Dinh Tuong Province, between Cai Lay and the vicinity of My Tho, in the IV Corps Tactical Zone. Initial task organization included: 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division with 2/39 Infantry, 5/60 Infantry and 5/60 Infantry (Mechanized). On 30 April 5/60 Infantry (less Company C) was released from Operation PEOPLES ROAD and went under operational control of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Throughout the period of this report, elements of the 5th Brigade conducted continuing operations in the vicinity of the highway, but made few significant contacts. By the end of April, engineers of the 20th Engineer Brigade had completed some 60 percent of the upgrade project on the highway. Cumulative results of Operation PEOPLES ROAD through 30 April are: 17 US killed and 107 wounded, and 225 enemy killed and 293 detainees apprehended.

(c) On 8 April 1968, II FFORCEN initiated Campaign TOAN THANG as a large scale combined offensive operation encompassing the entire III Corps Tactical Zone and employing all forces under I COR and Commanding General, III Corps operational control. The task organization of United States/Free World Military Assistance Forces includes: 1st Infantry Division: 1st Brigade; 1/28, 1/16 and 1/2 Infantry; 2/2 Infantry (Mechanized); 7/3/7 Air Cavalry; 3d Brigade; 2/18 and 2/16 Infantry; 3d Brigade; 2/26 and 3/10 Infantry; 7/5 Air Cavalry (Less Troop C), 1/6 Cavalry. 2d Infantry Division: 3d Brigade; 3/59, 8/5/60 and 4/2/60 Infantry; 4/39 and 4/3 Infantry, 5/27 Infantry (Mechanized), Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment. 3d Infantry Division: 1st Brigade, 4/9 Infantry, 4/21 Infantry (Mechanized), 2/3 Armor and 5/7 Air Cavalry (Less Troop A and B); 2d Brigade, 2/14, 2/27 and 1/37 Infantry, 1/5 Infantry (Mechanized); 3d Brigade, 3/22 Infantry, 2/26 Infantry (Mechanized), 3/4 Cavalry; 17th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light); 3/7 4/12 and 3/12 Infantry, 5/37 Cavalry; 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division; 1/306, 2/306 and 3/306 Infantry; 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment; 1st Australian Task Force, 2d, 3d and 7th Royal Australian Regiment, A/3 Cavalry Regiment and G/1 Armored Regiment. TOAN THANG ("Complete Victory"), replaces and broadens the scope of Operation QUEST THAO ("Revelation Victory"), which terminated 7 April. This latter operation had been directed against specific enemy units in the provinces surrounding Saigon. By early April QUEST THANG had succeeded in destroying enemy units around Saigon to the point that they
began to disperse into more remote areas. TOAN THANG was initiated to complete the destruction of Viet Cong/Vo North Vietnamese Army units still near Saigon and the heavily populated areas while reaching out to destroy main forces in the remote regions of the III Corps Tactical Zone, and penetrating his base areas and denying him the use of them. After the initiation of TOAN THANG, intelligence reports revealed that the enemy’s planned second large-scale offensive would probably occur in late April. To counter this threat, II FFORCEN redeployed major elements of its forces and executed, within the framework of TOAN THANG, a series of combined spoiling attacks to keep the enemy off balance and on the move, to prevent his gathering forces for a concerted attack, to interdict his infiltration routes and movement of forces, and to disrupt the execution of his planned attacks. Contacts throughout the reporting period were generally sporadic due to the enemy being dispersed, and apparently avoiding becoming engaged prior to the initiation of his planned offensive. There were, however, significant contacts, the result of United States/Free World Military Assistance Forces aggressively seeking out the Viet Cong in his base areas. One of the most successful battalion operations during the period took place on 12 April. This action involved the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry and the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry (Mechanized), operating as part of the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in Viet Cong Base Area 355, about eight kilometers northwest of the Kichelin Rubber Plantation. The previous day, the battalion (less A Company), had conducted a reconnaissance in force operation in a clearing about 300 meters in diameter. At 0232 hours, Company B, on the southwest of the battalion perimeter, began receiving light probing fire from the west. The perimeter forces returned the fire with small arms, automatic weapons and claymores. Between 0300 and 0330 hours the battalion’s position was attacked by 60mm and 82mm mortars, firing a total of between 100 and 200 rounds. The mortar fire lifted at 0400, and was followed immediately by a ground assault from an estimated Viet Cong battalion. The main attack came from the southwest engaging Company B and one platoon from Company D, with supporting attacks against all other points of the perimeter. The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons, RPG rockets, mortars, and grenades. Friendly forces answered with a heavy volume of highly effective small arms, automatic weapons and claymore fire. Artillery was requested but could not fire until 0415 hours because of an attack on the artillery position. By 0430 hours the enemy had penetrated the Company B position. Also at 0430 hours, light fire teams reinforced the attack. At 0500 hours airstrikes commenced employing 500 and 750 pound bombs on the enemy force. Company A was reinforced by the reconnaissance platoon, and began to push the enemy back. At 0615 hours the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (Mechanized) reinforced the contact, and by 0630 hours the perimeter was restored. Contact broke at 0700 when the enemy withdrew. Significant results were 16 US killed and 47 wounded, 153 Viet Cong killed, and 54 rifles and 13 light machineguns captured. The following day, the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry (less Company D) continued reconnaissance in force operations in the same general area. At 0937 hours the unit contacted an enemy force of unknown size. Maintaining contact until 1135 hours, the
battalion employed organic weapons, artillery and air strikes, killing 51 Viet Cong. Seven US were killed and 65 wounded. On 13 April in the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division area, 1/4 Cavalry remained overnight in a defensive position during a reconnaissance in force operation in DUY III area of operation. At 0345 hours approximately 19 kilometers east of Ben Cat, the squadron began receiving mortar and automatic fire, which resulted in six US wounded. During the day the squadron received fire from small arms and RGO. At 1505 hours Troop A made contact with an unknown number of Viet Cong in bunkers. The Viet Cong used CS riot control agents on six occasions attempting to break contact. They succeeded at 1730 hours, after losing 57 killed. US casualties were two killed and four wounded.

That same day at 2145 hours, Company C/3/7 Infantry made contact with a Viet Cong force of unknown size located in an extensive base area 20 kilometers west of Sinh Hoa. Companies A, B, and D reinforced the contact, supported by air strikes, light fire teams and AC-47 (Spooky). Losses were eight US killed and 50 wounded, and 39 Viet Cong killed. The next day, 19 April, 1/4 Cavalry made contact with an unknown number of Viet Cong at 1427 hours approximately 14 kilometers north of Phuoc Vinh, and continued the engagement until 1630 hours. Results were 26 Viet Cong killed and two US killed and eight wounded. On 23 April, 3/7 Infantry conducted an airborne assault on a position one kilometer west-northeast of Sinh Hoa and followed by a reconnaissance in force toward the southeast. At 1400 hours, Company A made contact with an estimated Viet Cong battalion and was reinforced by Companies B and D. The Viet Cong utilized small arms, claymores, grenades and light and heavy machineguns. Friendly forces were supported by light fire teams, tactical air and artillery. At 1610 hours Company C reinforced the contact. As the contact developed, the three companies received fire from small arms and automatic weapons including both light and heavy machineguns. The enemy force also employed claymores, 105mm booby traps and grenades. Friendly elements were supported by light fire teams, artillery and air strikes. At 1610 hours, Company D reinforced the contact, which broke at 1715 hours. The action resulted in eight US killed and 33 wounded, and 33 enemy killed. Contacts were frequent but on a small scale during the remainder of April. Campaign THAM THANG continues.

Logistics and Transportation:

The 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Areas (FSA) at Loc Ninh, Katum and Song Be were phased out on termination of Operations FARGO, YELLOWSTONE, and SAN ANGELO. The Logistical Support Area at Phuoc Vinh continued...
to support the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. The road to Phuoc Vinh was opened for approximately four days each month which allowed two heavy convoys to resupply the Logistical Support Area. As a result there were minimum requirements for resupply of Phuoc Vinh by fixed wing aircraft. Operations by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) in the vicinity of Bunard were supported by an air line of communication. This was accomplished without a pre-D-Day logistical buildup and no problems were encountered.

(2) The 101st Airborne Division (-) was deployed to I Corps Tactical Zone by a combination of air and sea. During the period 9-20 March the 308th Combat Aviation Battalion, 188th Assault Helicopter Company, 17th Assault Helicopter Company and the 200th Assault Support Helicopter Company were deployed to I Corps Tactical Zone by air and sea.

(3) Inclosure 3 summarized United States Air Force C-130/C-123 sorties flown in support of II FFORCIV units during the reporting period.

(4) The exchange of gasoline powered armored personnel carriers for diesel powered models continued during the period. All II FFORCIV units except the 9th Infantry Division and 199th Infantry Brigade, are now equipped with the diesel powered armored personnel carrier. The program is scheduled to be completed in II FFORCIV by 31 May.

(5) A program to replace M109 self-propelled 155mm howitzers with latest production models commenced in April. Nineteen have been issued to the 25th Infantry Division and 35 to 2/35 Artillery. The program is scheduled for completion 31 July.

(6) Due to a shortage of M68A1 tank assets, M68A2C tanks were issued to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The resulting reduction in requirement for the M68A1 tanks and the assets gained by the exchange greatly improved the tank operational readiness posture in II FFORCIV.

(7) A II FFORCIV Regulation 750-4 concerning maintenance of the M16A1 rifle was published 8 March 1968. The purpose of the regulation is to consolidate the information furnished from various sources and to provide command guidance and policies regarding maintenance of the M16A1 rifle.

(8) Thirty-six AH-1G (Cobra) helicopters were received during the reporting period. Twenty-seven aircraft were issued to the 7/1 Cavalry Squadron to fill Table of Organization and equipment needs and nine aircraft to the 1/4 Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division. Thirty-eight OH-58A helicopters were received by II FFORCIV. The aircraft were allocated by USARV and issued as follows:
CONFIDENTIAL

AVNOR-RH

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RG 1400 - 65 (M) (AVNOR-RH-RH-TO-A) (0)

II aircraft to the 25th Infantry Division,
9 aircraft to the 9th Infantry Division,
9 aircraft to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(g) During this period emphasis was placed on stimulating command interest, and improving mess equipment and mess accounting procedures for field ration messes in the assigned and attached units of II FFORDV. Specific improvements included:

(a) Commanders making unit fund money available for table clothes, curtains and decorations to improve the atmosphere of their mess halls.

(b) The procurement of new heavy duty ranges, baking ovens, grills, coffee urns and deep fat fryers. This equipment is operated by liquid petroleum gas. Units also procured frozen food cabinets, and food preparation tables. The use of this equipment caused a marked improvement in the quality of food served. The utilization of leftovers, forced issue rations and mess sanitation measures improved as a result of procurement and use of new mess hall equipment.

(c) Increased emphasis on the quarterly review of mess records, which resulted in a noticeable improvement in accounting procedures.

(10) Status of Primary Land Lines of Communication as of 30 April 1968.

(a) For the purpose of this report the following definitions of condition of land lines of communication are defined:

1. Condition I: The route is capable of carrying up to Class 50 loads (all division loads).

2. Condition II: Up to Class 5 loads (the majority of logistical transport e.g., 5000-gallon fuel tankers).

3. Condition III: Up to Class 10 loads (armored personnel carriers and 22 ton trucks).

4. Condition IV: Can carry only light civilian traffic; therefore, it is open only to light reconnaissance vehicles.

5. Condition V: Closed to all traffic.

(b) Route QL 1.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968, NCS CPOR - 65 (II) (D) (U)

1. Cambodian border (XT284244) to Co Dau Ha (XT382250), bridge blown at XT383250, route condition V.

2. Co Dau Ha (XT382250) to Cu Chi (XT628126), lowest bridge capacity class 60, route condition I.

3. Cu Chi (XT628126) to Saigon (XT793942), lowest bridge capacity class 60, route condition I.

4. Saigon (XT793942) to RJ 316 (YT072130), lowest bridge capacity class 60, route condition III.

5. RJ 316 (YT072130) to Xuan Loc (YT456090), lowest bridge capacity class 40, route condition II.

6. Xuan Loc (YT456090) to II Corps Tactical Zone boundary (YT160041), lowest bridge capacity class 30, route condition III.

(c) Route QL 4.

1. RJ 31 (XS845910) to Ben Luc (XS618752), lowest bridge capacity class 60, route condition I.

2. Ben Luc (XS618752) to III-IV boundary (X3599600), lowest bridge capacity class 35, route condition II.

(d) Route QL 13.

1. RJ 13 (XS879971) to An Loc (XT755885), lowest bridge capacity class 35, route condition II.

2. An Loc to Cambodian border (XU683233), route condition V.

(e) Route QL 14, Dong Xoai (YT079759) to II Corps Tactical Zone boundary (YT763572), two bridges out (YT502012) and (YT166820), route condition V.

(f) Route QL 15.

1. Bien Hoa (YT002110) to Baria (YS360607), lowest bridge capacity class 60, route condition I.

2. Baria (YS360607) to Yang Tan (YS274444), lowest bridge capacity class 12, route condition IV.

(g) Route QL 20, RJ QL 1 (Y343101) to II Corps Tactical Zone boundary (YT765372), lowest bridge capacity class 30, route condition III.
CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 1968

AVSEC-Rm-I

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968, HCS GSPOR - 63 (A) (U) 95-70-A (U)

(h) Route LTL 16, Bien Hoa (YT002114) to RJ LTL 1A (XT667737), lowest bridge capacity class 50, route condition I.

(i) Route LTL 1a.

1. Dong Xoai (YT079759) to Huoc Vinh (XT970490), lowest bridge capacity class 40, route condition II.

2. Huoc Vinh (XT970491), to RJ QL 13 (XT012140), lowest bridge capacity class 60, route condition I.

2. Song Be (YT45073) to Dong Xoai (YT079759), lowest bridge capacity class 16, route condition III.

(j) Route LTL 2, RJ QL 1 (YT437045) to Baria (YT5800607), lowest bridge capacity class 24, route condition III.

(k) Route LTL 5A, Saigon (XT81080) to Can Dao Perry (YT079759), lowest bridge capacity class 16, route condition III.

(l) Route LTL 23.

1. Baria (YT006067) to (YT628653), lowest bridge capacity class 40, route condition II.

2. YS628653 to II Corps Tactical Zone boundary (YT09700), route condition V.

(a) Route TL 9A and LTL 5A, Saigon (XT750810) to Ben Tre (XT455044), lowest bridge capacity class 50, route condition III.

(b) Route LTL 26 and 239, Tay Ninh (YT5050460) to Bau Xoc (YT540460), lowest bridge capacity class 50, route condition I.

Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

(1) Significant Psychological Operations Activities.

(a) The II AFGRISV Psychological Operations effort in support of tactical operations decreased significantly during this quarter, approximately 2,500 sorties were flown by United States/Free World Military Assistance Forces and Air Force aircraft in support of psychological Operations this quarter as opposed to 3,842 sorties flown last quarter. The aerial dissemination of leaflets decreased from slightly over 221 million this quarter compared to over 466 million for the previous quarter. In addition, the number of hours of aerial loudspeaker broadcasts decreased from 2,800 hours last quarter to slightly over 1,700 hours this quarter. This significant decrease was due in part to the
CONFIDENTIAL

AVPDC-11-11


Increased emphasis placed on face-to-face and other means of communication and security, due to the extensive effort put forth to update all psychological operations material and produce better quality material for the coming quarter.

(b) During the quarter 344 Hoa Chanh were reported in III Corps Tactical Zone. This is a decrease of 19% over the previous period but many high local Viet Cong officials have rallied during the period and a slight increase has been noted during each month with 197, 177 and 120 for Februrary, March and April respectively.

(1) Significant Civil Affairs/Civic Action activities.

(a) Military Civic Action in II PFCGV continues at an accelerated rate and a record number of civic action projects were completed during the quarter in the wake of the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VNAF) Offensive Campaign. Priority of effort was given to health, sanitation, improving lines of communication, construction and repair of dwellings, and distribution of commodities.

(b) Medical Civic Action (MCA) continues to be one of the most effective means for reaching the Vietnamese people. During the reporting period more than 194,000 patients were treated.

(c) Reports submitted under operational control of II PFCGV units reflect the emphasis given to maintaining lines of communication. Fifty-six bridges were built or repaired during the reporting period. In addition, 1,097 kilometers of road were upgraded representing an increase of 39% over the previous quarter.

(d) Commodity distribution made the most favorable impact on the Vietnamese people during the quarter. To offset the vast destruction of the TET Offensive more than 2.1 million pounds of building materials, food and clothing were distributed throughout the III Corps area. These commodities were gratefully received.

(e) During the period 1 to 15 March the 2d Civil Affairs Company was reorganized on an area-oriented basis in compliance with a plan developed by MACV and approved by MACV. Prior to reorganization the company had 22 generalist Platoons attached to and in support of II PFCGV operational control units. At present 19 generalist teams have been placed in direct support of the province senior advisors in nine provinces of III Corps Tactical Zone and the municipal city of Vinh Phuc. One team was also sent to province in IV Corps Tactical Zone. The Civil Affairs teams will serve as the province senior advisor's principal means for matching US/ROF, RVNAF, and voluntary civilian agency resources with the requirements needed to support provincial revolutionary development plans. In addition to providing

CONFIDENTIAL
civie nation continuity and coordination these eco-oriented teams will also provide tactical commanders with optimum planning and operational assistance in refugee care and control. Seven specialist teams from the company headquarters will provide general support to the field teams in such fields as public health, language, maintenance and supply.

Civil Operations and revolutionary Development

(1) General.

(a) Incidents of Viet Cong terrorism against civilians increased significantly in 1968. Incidents reported in 1967 totalled 3,433; however, 1,775 incidents were reported during the period 1 January to 30 April 1968. Of these, 1,317 were reported during the quarter beginning 1 February. Forty-six attacks against revolutionary development (RD) cadre were reported during the quarter, resulting in 40 killed, 61 wounded and nine kidnapped. During the same period, 97 attacks against National Police resulted in 60 killed, 76 wounded and one kidnapped. The greatest number of terrorist attacks were reported in January and February, with a slight decrease in March and a large reduction in April.

(b) The total Viet Cong infrastructure killed, captured or rallied during the first quarter of 1968 was 396, an average of 132 per month. (Statistics for April are not yet available.) Previous monthly averages have been approximately 120. Progress in the RD program has been relatively slow due to the need for immediate military field operations. Inspection of Military Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (MIOC) revealed urgent need to provide training for both US and Vietnamese elements. It is also essential that directives be issued to the MIOC through Vietnamese channels to their personnel, which will parallel US directives.

(c) There appears to be a generally good spirit on the part of both US and Vietnamese MIOC elements to work together more closely in operating the MIOC. One matter of concern is the lack of personnel. In general, the MIOC are understaffed, and the staffs have many heavy requirements consuming order of battle tactical business. Since that material is perishable, Vietnamese commanders investigating received less attention. There was some hope of getting two US advisors for each MIOC in all the priority provinces surrounding the Saigon-Da Nang area, but apparently this will not be achieved.

(d) The operations in the various MIOC vary from almost nonexistent to good. Some are considered very good. This condition exists because of a lack of security in the various areas, a lack of personnel, a lack of training, and the need for parallel direction between the
Government of Vietnam and US personnel relating to DIOCC functions. Some of these directives should be in the form of specific guidelines for both US personnel and Vietnamese personnel about eliminating the Viet Cong Infrastructure. Forty-four of the DIOCC are operational to the extent that they have advisors; seven are without advisors.

(2) Revolutionary Development.

(a) The 1967 revolutionary development program is now in its final phase. As a result of the 17th Offensive, the deadline for completion of the program was extended to 30 April 1968. In spite of the extension, the program will not be one hundred percent completed even though four hamlets were approved to be dropped from the plan when it became apparent that they could not be worked within the existing time frame. While the 17th Offensive delayed the termination of the 1967 program, completion was already well behind schedule prior to the initiation of attacks.

(b) The ambitious objective of completing 215 hamlets with 74 revolutionary development teams and 12 Truong Son teams, coupled with a very late start in 1967, produced a situation where the teams were forced to work too quickly and were often moved too soon. This resulted in many hamlets being rejected as not completed by the division tactical area inspection teams. Earlier organization of civil-military revolutionary development teams could have offset this difficulty, and the current plan for 40 civil-military revolutionary development teams in 1968 will greatly increase the capability to complete the 1968 program. As mentioned in the last report, the objective to eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure was not met effectively. A weakness in meeting the objectives of organizing the people and making the local administration effective and just, has also been highlighted in post-17th reviews of the existing revolutionary development program. These three objectives will be given emphasis at all levels of command and operations during the remainder of 1968. It is expected that during 1968 the revolutionary development criteria will be revised to reduce the number of cadre tasks to a realistic and practical program. In this revision the above mentioned points will receive the most attention.

(c) The 17th Offensive also spotlighted a weakness in the 1967 program. No follow-up activities had been effectively programmed or carried out in hamlets worked in the years prior to 1967. Many had regressed because of inattention. The case with which the Viet Cong moved in and through these hamlets and built their attack bases without reports from the population on their activities brought the situation into the spotlight. The corrective measure currently being adopted within III Corps Tactical Zone under the direction of the Minister of Revolutionary Development is a defensive belt, the local popular force unit and a

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, III Field Forces Vietnam for period ending 30 April 1967

The operational report for the period ending 30 April 1967 covers the three-month revolutionary development cadre team to work selected criteria in hamlets surrounding provincial and district capitals and/or lines of communication. While official approval has not been made, the III Corps Tactical Zone provost currently plans to cover 302 hamlets in this program. This will require approximately 4,200 personnel, 900 revolutionary development cadre and 70 million piasters. It is also anticipated that village councils will be called upon to assist in the program. Approval and implementation of this program was delayed by the impact of Presidential Circular No. 1, dated 1 March 1968, concerning reorganization of Governmental structure. Additionally, the Minister of Revolutionary Development has not followed up on the approval of the defense belt plan which was scheduled to have been completed by the III Corps Tactical Zone Council during the last week of April. While it had been hoped that this plan could be implemented by mid-May, it is doubtful that much will have been accomplished by that time.

3 Territorial Security.

(a) The most significant event during the period was the 72nd Offensive. Regional Force/popular Force statistics during the period 29 January to 12 February were as follows: friendly, 221 killed, 461 wounded, 65 missing, 274 deserters, 621 individual weapons and 13 crew-served weapons lost; enemy, 594 killed, 257 individual and 62 crew-served weapons captured. Sixty-three outposts and nine light towers were seriously damaged or destroyed. During March, 254 revolutionary force companies were authorized and 251 assigned. The assigned figure reflects an increase of two companies during March. Regional force companies were authorized 78,421 personnel with 42,079 present for duty (56% more than in March). The present for duty, 57% of the authorized strength was 83% as compared to 61% during a similar earlier period. Of 143 popular force platoons authorized, 769 were assigned, an increase of four platoons over February. Of the 77,203 popular force personnel assigned, 25,501 were present for duty, or 56 percent of the authorized strength. A decline of one percent for the month. The total of regional force and popular force personnel authorized was 36,211 while the present for duty strength was 81 percent of this figure, up from 83 percent a month earlier.

(b) On 22 March, Message No. 10243/TW/TV/TV/70/2/VC, addressed to Arm of Vietnam corps and divisional units from the Joint General Staff stated that as a result of the issue of L-16 rifles to the Army of Vietnam, 12 carbines and Browning automatic rifles would be released for issue to regional forces and popular force units to upgrade their firepower. A plan has been approved for the issue of L-16 rifles to these units after all active army units have been supplied with them. This program is at least four to five months away.

(c) A vigorous program was developed in March and April to...
CONFIDENTIAL

JUB/JC: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, ROCS CSFCR - 65 (II) (J-300-70-4) (U)

8 MAY 1968

improve the morale and welfare of the individual soldier. Called 22/
FP Outpost Month, it also contained specific actions to improve these
unit offensive operations, support defenses, reaction forces for
outpost relief and intelligence collection. To counter infiltration
by Viet Cong infrastructure and to establish psychological programs
to counter Viet Cong propaganda directed against them. The program,
as approved by Commanding General, II Field Forces and Commanding General,
III Corps runs from 20 April to 20 May.

(d) During March, the Deputy Commanding General, III Corps, the
Deputy Chief of Staff, a regional force/regular force and a representa-
tive of the revolutionary development sector visited all prov-
inces within III Corps Tactical Zone. After a briefing at each location, the
Army visited local outposts, revolutionary development center teams and hamlets throughout each province to assess
their overall effectiveness and to make suggestions and recommendations
for improvement.

(e) In conjunction with the month of April, III Corps Tactical Zone
began receiving National Advisory Teams from the Vietnam
Advisory School. Between April 10 and April 20, advisory teams were deployed
making a total of 157 new teams in III Corps Tactical Zone.

(4) Refugees.

(a) The TET Offensive finally focused a great deal of attention
upon the needs of refugees and caused much reaction from Vietnamese and
American officials who worked together in a spirit of cooperation to a
degree which has not been experienced previously, in an attempt to al-
leviate the major problems.

(b) It was found necessary to allocate portions of the problem—
primarily reporting---to other staff sections in this headquarters, and
to call together many Vietnamese officials and staff agencies to react
to the programs of the National Recovery Committee. This Committee
still meets weekly and continues to attack the major problems, although
its work has only begun.

(c) Since TET, a great deal of interest in refugees has been gen-
erated. It is most necessary that this interest be maintained and that a
Recovery Committee or similar high-level, impact group be a major part of
the refugee program.

(d) The greatest lesson to be learned from this quarter's oper-
ations is the importance of a comprehensive, responsive refugee staff, able
to immediately act upon commodity and fund requests benefiting
refugees. This group, as represented by the National Recovery Committee

CONFIDENTIAL
should have ample resources and the power to use them.

(5) Chieu Hoi.

(a) During the period, 344 Hoi Chanh rallied to the Government of Vietnam as compared with 976 and 2,572 for the corresponding periods in calendar years 1966 and 1967 respectively.

(b) The reduction in the number of Hoi Chanh can be accounted for by the following factors:

1. The Tet Offensive and consequent loss of security.

2. The inability of the Armed Propaganda Teams to undertake psychological operations missions due to this lack of security, and the need to make use of their services to improve the defense of Chieu Hoi centers.

3. The large number of Viet Cong killed during the Tet Offensive, many of whom may have been potential Hoi Chanh.

4. North Vietnam Army personnel, who tend not to rally for a variety of reasons, are replacing losses in Viet Cong units in much greater numbers.

(c) In addition, the following factors gleaned from recent rallies, are also relevant:

1. Increased propaganda by the Viet Cong to:

a. Counter the Chieu Hoi Program.

b. Keep alive the promise of ultimate victory.

c. Reassure their rank and file of the "reality of a coalition government".

2. Greatly increased security measures exercised by the Viet Cong to prevent their members from rallying.

3. Lack of military operations by friendly forces of the order and magnitude of that of early 1967.

(d) Employment of Kit Carson Scouts by US military units increased each month during the quarter with the peak total of 166 employed, almost doubling the 76 reported for December 1967. By the end of April more than 160 were employed on a continuing basis.
CONFIDENTIAL

20 MAY 1968


(c) The lessons learned are:

1. That friendly propaganda must be credible, relevant and carefully targeted.

2. That Chieu Hoi Centers must be adequately fortified to provide Ho Chi Minh with the protection he has been promised.

3. That tactical military pressure must be maintained at all times.

4. Unless these are accomplished, it is considered that the returnee rate will continue to remain depressed.

(g) New Life Development

(a) Logistics

1. During April, provinces continued recovery from the ASE Offensives. Delivery of commodities by contract truck to most provinces was almost back to normal and supplies were moving in quantities to all provinces. Deflated trucks continued to plague the four provinces which pick up commodities in Saigon, but they have been assisted during the quarter by contract truck deliveries. Supplies in country remain in good quantity and most rebuilding needs have been satisfied. All major highways have been open since February.

2. All provinces were cleaning up warehouses and were attempting to issue the balance of cement and roofing to families whose homes had been damaged or destroyed. Erection of province vehicle mainenance shops proved well in eight provinces but none were completed in the first quarter of 1968. It is felt that interruption of progress in the supply and maintenance field has been temporary and all provinces look forward to excellent progress in the second quarter.

(b) Agriculture

1. In the fall of 1967, about 250 hectares of improved rice strain, IR-6, were planted in Vo Dat District, Binh Tay, Province. These crops have been harvested with a yield of about 2.5 tons per hectare. This compares with an average of 0.69 for the local strain which was usually raised in the area. Maximum yield of native rice in Vo Dat has been 1.2 tons. (Top yields for IR-6 in Vietnam have been as high as eight tons per hectare on controlled plots.)

2. In preliminary discussions with the Ministry of Agriculture regarding the purchase of IR-6 seed rice from the farmer-producers in the Vo Dat area, American advisors propose an exchange of eating rice,

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR - 35 (RL) (W-DMO-TO-4) (0)

kilo for kilo, plus a bonus of Vietnam 210 per kilo of seed obtained. Later, recognizing the shortage of rice in the area we changed our proposal to an exchange based on a three for two ratio with no monetary exchange. The Government of Vietnam, after a long delay in announcing a plan, offered the farmers six kilos of regular rice for each five kilos of seed. There was no seed forthcoming. Ministry Officials finally went to Vo Dat and negotiated with the farmers. They arrived at an agreement whereby the farmers would exchange some of their seed for regular rice at a three to two ratio. An exchange as consummated.

This was a case of Government officials not recognizing the farmer's understanding of economics. These farmers knew they had a product of real value. The attempts of the Government to purchase at less than real value were not appreciated. But when we got officials out to talk frankly with the farmers, in a free exchange of ideas on the farmers' own ground, it was possible to come to a common ground of understanding.

(a) Education: In the field of education, in response to the Viet Cong TET Offensive, surveys were started as early as 19 February of damage to school buildings, diverted use of buildings (for refugees), school supplies, equipment and school personnel. Most schools in relatively secure areas in the III Corps Tactical Zone were open prior to the 1 April opening date prescribed by the Ministry of Education. A successful effort was made to locate teachers from Phuoc Long and Tay Ninh who were not able to leave the Saigon area after TET, and to provide air transportation for them to return to their jobs. Teacher recruitment is under way with priority to female candidates to reduce the impact of military draft of teachers. Recruitment has exceeded teacher position allocations for 1968. Two seminars were held in Bien Hoa for regional education personnel: one for teachers who will conduct training courses in the provinces this year, and one for province and regional education officials regarding this year's program planning and implementation.

b. Staff Judge Advocate.

(i) During the reporting period the Staff Judge Advocate personally visited the following unit: in the field to assist and advise the commander and his key personnel in the proper administration of military justice and Article 15, to inform the commander and his key personnel as to the proper method of submitting claims for personal property damaged or lost as a result of hostile action, and to render legal assistance services to all personnel requiring such assistance.
OPERATIONAL REPORT OF HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCES VIETNAM
FOR PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (J-3-D-TU-A) (U)

6th Battalion, 27th Artillery
2d Battalion, 35th Artillery
Battery B, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery
Battery B, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery
Battery E, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
Battery A, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery
Battery B, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery
Headquarters, 2d Artillery Group
Headquarters, 54th Artillery Group
Headquarters, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery
Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery
Battery A, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery
Battery C, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery

(2) During the reporting period the Staff Judge Advocate classified a number of detainees as civil defendants or prisoners of war.

(3) During the reporting period there were four general courts-martial conducted for such offenses as war crimes, manslaughter, possession of marijuana, absence without leave and misappropriation of a government vehicle.

(4) During the reporting period the office of the Staff Judge Advocate received frequent requests from the office of the Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development, II FCVCV, for legal support. These matters included assistance in the drafting of correspondence, orders and memoranda, assistance in negotiations with USAVC and IACV on questions dealing with compensation for private property occupied by elements of II FCVCV and its operational control units. Additionally, it was found desirable to coordinate with elements of Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support on questions of classification of detainees to obtain evidence pertaining to such cases and to ensure that within the limits of international law all classifications were made in the manner most likely to advance the long-term interests of the United States and to avoid conflict with appropriate agencies of the Republic of Vietnam.

(5) During the reporting period the office of the Staff Judge Advocate also provided considerable day-to-day legal advice to units and personnel of the III Corps Advisory Team, since it also serves the Commanding General, II FCVCV, although assigned to IACV.

(6) During the reporting period the office of the Staff Judge Advocate devoted considerable time and effort to what would be normal post camp or station functions, for example, legal advice to and about non-appropriated fund activities, to include drafting and review of contracts for construction and maintenance of facilities and concessions.

CONFIDENTIAL
Communications.

(1) General. Significant improvements in command and control communications have been accomplished during the period ending 30 April 1966. Both the means and methods of communications have been increased to provide greater flexibility and response in direct support of command operations.

(2) As a result of the T.P Offensive, II FFORC^V established a task force to coordinate and participate in the combat operations in the Saigon area (Capital Military District). This task force deployed the last part of January. To provide adequate communications, for the necessary command and control of the combat battalions involved in the operation, a VHF system was established from Headquarters II FFORC^V to Saigon, along with required FH and AM radio nets. Army signal support organizations assisted communications requirements by providing circuits to the Capital Military District Tactical Operations Center in Saigon and to the Joint Defense Operations Center at Tan Son Nhut. Throughout the operation communications were effective and provided a reliable means for control of combat operations.

(3) Base camp communications have continued to expand and improve. As a result of the T.P Offensive overhead cable systems located at Plantation were damaged, resulting in the loss of communications to certain major units. An extensive program of rehabilitation of existing facilities to include providing required communications to the II FFORC^V underground Tactical Operations Center was immediately undertaken. In March, the major portion of the underground cable distribution system for Plantation complex was completed; a wire head was established in a conex adjacent to the command bunker to terminate a 300-pair cable to Hurricane Tactical Operations Center switchboard; a 200-pair cable to Plantation switchboard; a 200-pair cable to Hallmark switchboard; a 100-pair cable to the underground Tactical Operations Center, and a 50-pair cable to the command bunker. Still programmed for construction is a 200-pair cable from Hurricane Tactical Operations Center to Plantation; a 100-pair cable from Hurricane to Hallmark and a 100-pair cable from Hurricane to the units at the north end of Plantation: 99th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light), 503rd Infantry Research Battalion, 12th Aviation Group, and the 79th Engineer Group. The Hallmark - Patch cable is to be completed by 5 May, the other in June. Upon completion of these cable projects, reliable communications within Plantation to the major units will be assured with minimum susceptibility to enemy action.

(4) During this period a total of 18 radio relay systems were installed to support tactical operations within III Corps Tactical Zone and to provide the required communications from Headquarters, II FFORC^V to major operational control units. Significant 12-channel
OPERATIONAL REPORT OF HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCES, VIETNAM
FOR PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL 1968, BES GAPPH - 85 (H) (AMC)

Radio relay systems installed include a system to Headquarters, III Corps, a system to Long Binh, and a system to Long Tan. In addition, a four-channel system was established to the office of the Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, and a four-channel system to 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to support combat operations.

(5) In April, dial trunks were installed between Plantation and Bien Hoa, giving the Plantation subscriber the ability to dial Bien Hoa local and army numbers. Additionally, at this time, the three-digit emergency numbers for fire, ambulance and military police were installed. As additional dial central offices are installed throughout the III Corps area, the direct dial capability will be expanded. Both dial trunks between Plantation and Cu Chi are presently being engineered.

(6) Communications security within II FORCIV was enhanced by major improvements to the signal publications of units assigned to Headquarters, II FORCIV. Signal publications improvements for II FORCIV are forthcoming and should provide the entire II FORCIV with an increase in communications security. All units operating in the III Corps Tactical Zone and IV Corps Tactical Zone received new consolidated tactical FM frequency authorizations which improved the problem of FM interference within these two Corps zones.

3. Information Office.

(1) II FORCIV Information Officer continued to publish the Hurricane magazine with increased circulation to units throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone. Each month a two-man team travels TDY to Tokyo to lay out the magazine for the next month and to pick up the current magazine. This office has greatly expanded its coverage of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, Regional Force/Popular Force, Republic of Vietnam and other national areas of the III Corps Tactical Zone. With this increase, this office's material also found its way into more in-country and out-of-country newspapers and periodicals, the result being more publicity for the less well known areas of the III Corps Tactical Zone.

(2) With the advent of the T.C Offensive during this reporting quarter, this office handled a great influx of international news media wishing to visit and report on areas of fighting, revolutionary development, regional Force/Popular Forces, Republic of Vietnam Army and United States forces. By dealing with these correspondents and helping to provide them with transportation and other accommodations, there was a noted increase in the amount of the national Vietnamese areas receiving coverage as opposed to United States activities. Although difficulties were encountered, it was found that most were remedied by constant contact with the divisions—United States and Republic of Vietnam Army—and
Civil operations and Revolutionary Development Support personnel who assisted at all times in helping to get press representatives to the areas that they wished to see.

(3) During the reporting quarter this office sole and over 1,500 hometown news releases to media in the United States. Following the Tet Offensive more than 700 of these releases were processed, and by feedback reports, most were printed in hometown newspapers.

(4) Members of this office continued to travel extensively in the III Corps Tactical Zone to gather material and background for stories. In turn, each was able to produce in-depth, detailed and factual accounts for release. During the reporting quarter, this office continued to be assisted by the 16th Public Information Detachment.

2. (C) Section 2: Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.
   a. Command. None
   c. Intelligence and Counterintelligence. None
   d. Plans. Operations and Training. None
   e. Logistics:
      (1) Repair of Office Machines.
         (a) OBSERVATION. Considerable delays are being encountered in getting office machines, primarily typewriters, repaired for field organizations.
         (b) EVALUATION. Light Equipment Maintenance Companies have the responsibility for the repair of office machines, however, they are usually short of skilled technicians and repair parts are difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. Most machines are quite old and are of varied makes and models. Machines are usually evacuated and repaired at higher levels of maintenance or by local contract, after long delays.
         (c) RECOMMENDATION. That office machines issued to field organizations be standardized, more skilled technicians provided to the Light Equipment Maintenance Companies, and repair parts programmed into the supply system.
   f. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.
      (1) AEM-ABS-4 Loudspeaker Broadcast System.
         (a) OBSERVATION. The AEM-ABS-4 loudspeaker system mounted in a 1/4 ton truck permits the maximum mobility required in a fluid situation. It allows optimum positioning of the broadcast station and can reach the largest number of people in the target audience.
         (b) EVALUATION. The AEM-ABS-4 Loudspeaker Broadcast System mounted on a 1/4 ton truck proved most effective in populated areas during the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army TST Offensive. Broadcasts based on current intelligence information were directed against Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces. The civilian population was informed of impending action and warned against condoning the use of private and public buildings by enemy forces for cover and concealment. As the tactical situation permitted loudspeaker systems were used to direct the civilian population to specific

areas where medical aid, food and water were available. Loudspeaker systems proved invaluable in issuing instructions and maintaining order as the number of homeless civilians continued to mount. The use of this loudspeaker system in communicating with the North Vietnamese Army troops in their northern dialect proved extremely effective in inducing the enemy to surrender or rally to the Government of South Vietnam.

(c) Recommendations. That this system be more widely used as a vehicle broadcast station to provide a versatile and powerful means of battle field communication capable of covering large areas.

(2) U-10 Loudspeaker System.

(a) OBSERVATION. The loudspeaker system mounted in a U-10 aircraft can be utilized to communicate with ground forces, and in the area adjacent to II Field Force Headquarters it proved very effective during the TET Offensive.

(b) EVALUATION. The loudspeaker system mounted in the U-10 aircraft provides a means of communicating with both friendly and enemy personnel on the ground. During the TET Offensive, enemy troops in the area adjacent to II Field Force Headquarters were encouraged with live aerial loudspeakers to surrender to U.S. forces in the vicinity. Broadcasts in North Vietnamese dialect were directed at North Vietnamese Army troops, followed by English directed at U.S. forces. This technique proved effective because it kept the U.S. forces abreast of the situation and let them know what was expected when enemy troops surrendered.

(c) Recommendations. That more use be made of the U-10 mounted loudspeaker system in fluid tactical situations to communicate with the enemy and keep friendly forces informed of current developments.

(3) Aerial Loudspeakers in Support of Ground Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION. The U-10 aircraft loudspeaker system when used to supplement the employment of a UH-1D helicopter-mounted ADG-K-4 Loudspeaker Broadcast System, can be an effective aerial loudspeaker system mounted in different type aircraft. In the optimum range of using aerial loudspeakers in support of extended ground operations (two hours or longer), the U-10 has the advantage of being able to stay airborne and remain in the target area for long periods of time. The ADG-K-4 loudspeaker system mounted in a UH-1D helicopter is a very effective loudspeaker system, but is limited because of the length of time the aircraft can stay airborne. This system also has the advantage of being able to hover over the target area. The use of both aerial loudspeaker systems simultaneously permits two different targets to be attacked at once.
(a) OBSERVATION. The U-10 mounted loudspeaker system and the AS-1-A-4 loudspeaker broadcast system mounted in the UH-1 helicopter be used together to support ground operations in excess of two hours duration.

(b) Color mixing and shading.

(a) OBSERVATION. A more extended use of color and color combinations on printed material will improve the attention-getting quality of the printed matter.

(b) EVALUATION. The use of color mixing and shading has increased the attention-getting quality of printed material. The quality of printed material is graded according to the number of impressions made to the viewer. Each additional color adds an impression, thus the more colors or shades on each piece of material, the larger number of impressions made.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That an increase in the color mixing and shading be used on printed material to improve the quality of material produced.

(5) Identification of dead and wounded civilians and enemy soldiers.

(a) OBSERVATION. When chaos and confusion are predominant in a village after an enemy attack, well trained and experienced civil affairs teams can be invaluable in assisting the local villagers with the location of dead and wounded civilians, and with the disposal of dead enemy soldiers.

(b) EVALUATION. During the initial phases of the enemy attack on the Bien Hoa-Long Binh complex, approximately 250 civilians were killed or wounded along with numerous enemy soldiers. One of the missions assigned to civil affairs platoons during the hamlet-by-hamlet survey conducted in the vicinity of II Field Force-355th Division was to locate dead and wounded enemy soldiers. In the case of dead civilians, the hamlet or village chief was notified of the death, and in turn assumed the responsibility for notifying relatives and/or removing the remains. Wounded personnel were either evacuated to a local hospital for treatment or to a US military evacuation hospital for treatment. When a dead enemy soldier was located, the civil affairs platoon leader notified the C, II Field Force, who had a detail of men with truck escort available for this purpose. The civil affairs platoon guided this detail to the dead soldiers, which in turn removed the remains to a location designated by district and/or province officials.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That civil affairs platoons continue to assist in the identification and removal of civilians and enemy soldiers killed.
confidential

May 20, 1968


(1)

or wounded in populated areas as a result of enemy action.

(6) Restoring Order in the Villages Adjacent to 2 FFORCEN Headquarters.

(a) OBSERVATION. When numerous homes are damaged and destroyed as a result of military action and enemy forces have infiltrated into a village or hamlet, the natural reaction of the local people is to congregate in an area of relative security often without personal belongings and food. A tremendous burden is thus placed on the local government for the control, feeding and provision of shelter for these people. A well organized civil affairs team, with emergency commodities on hand can move into the area, coordinate with the local officials and help to alleviate suffering and assist in restoring order in a minimum time.

(b) EVALUATION. As a result of the concentrated enemy TNA attack on the Bien Hoa-Long Binh complex several civilians were destroyed or damaged. In addition, 50 civilians were killed and approximately 200 were injured. Over 15,000 people were temporarily displaced from their homes in the area immediately adjacent to 2 FFORCEN Headquarters. By 1000 hours on the day of the attack a task force of four civil affairs platoons from the 2nd Civil Affairs Company were mustered and prepared for deployment into the affected areas. Concurrently, plans were made to obtain emergency rations, water, temporary shelter and medical care. At 1230 hours the task force moved into the towns of Ho Kai and Khu Gia to contact the local officials and begin a hamlet-by-hamlet survey to determine the number of dead, wounded and homeless civilians. The next pressing problem encountered was the gathering of over 7,000 homeless and temporarily displaced persons in a church and a hospital. Immediate relief was provided in the form of rice, bulgur wheat and C-rations for food, and five general purpose tents for shelter. By 1800 hours the civil affairs platoons had made outstanding progress towards restoring order in the hamlets which were directly affected by the attack.

(c) OBSERVATION. That civil affairs platoons be utilized as rapid reaction forces to assist government officials in restoring law and order in villages subsequent to an enemy attack and in providing care for the homeless civilians suffering as a result of enemy action.

(7) Storage and Distribution of Commodities in Support of Civil Recovery Activities.

(a) OBSERVATION. Subsequent to the attack on hamlets and villages adjacent to 2 FFORCEN Headquarters, US units utilizing captured rice, US Agency for International Development and Catholic Relief Services commodities, provided food relief to the numerous homeless and temporarily displaced civilians until relief could be provided through Government channels.

Confidential
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDLC-4D
GO HAYNES


(b) EVALUATION. During the first week after the offensive commodity support through Government channels was extremely limited. Civil Affairs teams of the 2nd Civil Affairs Company reported that there were 15,000 homeless and temporarily displaced persons in the area adjacent to II FFQHQ headquarters at the end of the first day of the IX Offensive. By the following morning distribution points had been established and water points provided from the resources available to II FFQHQ CROU units. The immediate reaction of US units, coupled with food stuff stores on hand for emergency situations precluded any serious food shortages and provided adequate relief until Government relief channels were established.

(c) CONCLUSION. That II FFQHQ units stored at brigade, division and field force level sufficient quantities of non-perishable food to meet emergency situations where large numbers of homeless and displaced persons have been generated, and provide relief until Government relief channels can be established.

(c) Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.

(1) Failure of the Outpost System of Defense for Hamlets and Villages.

(a) OBSERVATION. That the present system of Regional Force/Popular Force defense of hamlets and villages from outpost positions is inadequate.

(b) EVALUATION. The Viet Cong IX Offensive demonstrated clearly that in some cases RF/PF outposts could not provide adequate security for villagers, even immediately outside of their village gates. During this offensive some outposts were overrun and in other cases outposts were abandoned in the face of Viet Cong attacks. Those outposts which proved to be ineffective exhibited one or a number of the following weaknesses.

(1) The defensive capabilities of the post were inadequate for the task of withstanding a determined Viet Cong attack.

(2) Units occupying village and hamlet outposts were poorly armed in comparison to the attacking Viet Cong forces.

(3) Radio communications and facilities lacked the desired degree of effectiveness due to a shortage of modern equipment.

(4) In some places a feeling of complete isolation coupled with a lack of self confidence and hope for relief once under attack from Viet Cong forces reduced effectiveness.

72
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CHFOR-65 (M) (D-WHO-70-A) (U)

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That priority be given to the following aspect of the RF/PF village and hamlet defense system:

1. Emphasize and assist in the upgrading of RF/PF outposts and positions.

2. Provide better and more modern arms and radio communication equipment to RF/PF units.

3. Promote self confidence within RF/PF units by having them undertake offensive operations in limited areas of operation assigned near their posts. Combined operations with ARVN/FLAM units are essential to a successful beginning.

4. Provide for adequate reaction forces for RF/PF outposts attacked by superior Viet Cong forces.

h. Staff Judge Advocate.

(1) Corps Level Personnel Requirements.

(a) OBSERVATION. The activities of II FORCIV and the additional duties performed by the Commanding General generated a very heavy legal workload. Actually this workload is greater than that which would be performed by a normal tactical Corps Headquarters since the II FORCIV performs many functions not normally assigned to a corps.

(b) EVALUATION. The acceptance of a reduction in TOS 52-17 from the authorized six Judge Advocate officers to four officers was a mistake which should be corrected. A Field Force headquarters requires more, rather than less legal support than a normal tactical corps.

(c) R.C. OBSERVATION. That TOS be amended to restore the two Judge Advocate officers that were deleted.

(2) Recorder-Reproducer machine.

(a) OBSERVATION. A major logistics problem faced by this office is the time required for repair work on the Recorder-Reproducers. This office has two qualified court reporters, both trained in the stenomask system, but only one operable machine.

(b) EVALUATION. Since the same machine is used both in court and for transcription of the record of trial, the lack of a second machine means a waste of skilled manpower and unnecessary delay in the disposition of military justice matters.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That a maintenance float for Recorders-Reproducers be established so that when one machine is turned in for
maintenance an operable machine is issued immediately to the section on a one-for-one basis.

(3) Staff Visits.

(a) OBSERVATION. The rapidity of personnel turnover among commanders and staff officers of subordinate units makes the use of memoranda, directives and circulars of limited utility as a means of instruction to them on legal matters.

(b) EVALUATION. Command policy on legal matters and command emphasis on specific problems, such as the prompt submission and processing of claims by military personnel for personal property lost as a result of hostile action, lose much of their effectiveness soon after being issued.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Frequent, repetitive staff visits by the Staff Judge Advocate or his deputy are required, at least once each quarter to all subordinate units of battalion size and if possible the company or battery level.

(4) Legal Assistance.

(a) OBSERVATION. Every staff visit made in recent months has shown that military personnel, particularly at isolated fire support bases, have serious personal legal problems. Many of these personnel are key noncommissioned officers who are reluctant to discuss such problems with company grade officers, and who are equally reluctant to ask for time off to visit a Legal Assistance Officer.

(b) EVALUATION. This situation, if allowed to continue, can result in a serious deterioration of morale among the noncommissioned officers. A man with an unsolved serious personal problem is more likely to become a casualty, an accident victim, or disciplinary problem than one who is receiving needed help.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That staff visits by Judge Advocate personnel should also provide for a legal assistance clinic for the units visited and that commanders be advised and reminded, from time to time, that if men of their unit have problems and cannot be spared from their duties, upon request a legal assistance officer will be sent out to visit their unit. (Because of the age problem and lack of library facilities such visits should be made by mature, field grade Judge Advocates.)

(5) Legal Support for the Office of Assistant Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS 06-10-65 (LR) (D) (U)

(a) OBSERVATION. The present system of providing legal support to Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support on an "on-call" basis means that the Staff Judge Advocate must depend on laymen to determine when they have a problem which has legal implications.

(b) RECOMMENDATION. To provide proper legal support for COORD would require having a Judge Advocate attend briefings and conferences at that office on a regular basis and pay frequent visits to staff elements to be aware of problems with legal implications which require professional assistance. This office currently does not have available sufficient officers to accomplish this.

(c) OBSERVATION. The full Corps TOC complement of Judge Advocate officers is restored to this office, that one field grade Judge Advocate be assigned to this function as a primary duty.

(d) Legal Support for Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities.

(1) OBSERVATION. The Staff Judge Advocate becomes involved in these matters in two ways. The first is the requirement that the Staff Judge Advocate approve a finding that a given detainee should be classified as a "civil defendant" rather than either an "innocent civilian" or a "prisoner of war". This involves the Staff Judge Advocate in an examination of the II prisoner interrogation report. These have sometimes been inadequate for a proper determination. There are other times when the evidence is such that the Staff Judge Advocate can properly make either determination. The second way the Staff Judge Advocate becomes involved in these matters is through his provision of support to JCS-3, who is charged with the JCS-3 program. When the Staff Judge Advocate has discretion because of the state of the evidence, he has consulted with the appropriate personnel of JCS-3 to determine what findings would be in the best interest of the United States and produce least conflict with the affected agencies of the government of the Republic of Vietnam. This consultation has frequently led to a request to Military Intelligence to interrogate a given detainee to produce further information which would be of assistance to the Staff Judge Advocate in making his determination and which might also produce information which would assist the JCS-3 program.

(2) RECOMMENDATION. The interrogation of prisoners of war section is composed in large measure of young, inexperienced officers with limited interrogation experience. The Staff Judge Advocate, because of the nature of his profession, has had extensive experience in interrogation techniques and thus may provide assistance to the Military Intelligence personnel involved, over and above the legal question which involves him. The Staff Judge Advocate became informed of the JCS-3 program because of his fortuitous attendance at a COORD briefing where it was
OPERATIONAL REPORT OF HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE, VIET-NAM
FOR PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL 1968, HOI II F.F., VIET-NAM (U) (1)

Mentioned. Conversation with prisoners of war interrogation personnel
subsequent to this briefing indicated that they were either totally
unaware of POW/MIA or did not see how their work in interrogation of
prisoners of war could assist that program. The staff judge advocate,
because of his contacts with both agencies, was thus in a good posi-
tion to help them improve their liaison and mutual support.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That staff judge advocate and his deputy,
to be of optimum value, must have an understanding and appreciation
of intelligence and civil affairs (particularly public safety and
counterinsurgency matters), and that, upon arrival and assignment, new
incumbents should be thoroughly briefed by G2, G3, and CSWSD person-
nel on these matters.

1. Communications.

(1) Use of Under-ground Telephone Cables.

(a) OBSERVATION. During the TET Offensive in early February,
overhead telephone cables on plantation and throughout the Saigon/
Long Binh/Dien Bien Phu area sustained extensive damage. During the in-
creased fortification activity in the weeks following TET, three of
the four native underground cables in plantation were severed.

(b) EVALUATION. In both of the rocket attacks on this head-
quarters after TET, damage to overhead cables was sustained. In all
three attacks, loss of communications to one or more units was en-
countered. With the start of the rainy season, minor damage to cables
becomes noticeable as moisture penetrates them. No damage to under-
ground cables was caused by enemy action. All damage was attributed
either to inadequate marking or failure of personnel to observe proper
caution during excavation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That tactical circuit distribution systems
be underground, and that accurate cable records and proper marking of
underground cable coupled with command emphasis on protection of under-
ground cables, can assist in maintaining reliable on post distribution.

(2) Use of Discrete Frequency.

(a) OBSERVATION. Each maneuver battalion in III F.F. was issued
one discrete frequency.

(b) EVALUATION. Maneuver battalions experienced major difficulties in
communicating from their command and control ships to their ground units.
A majority of these battalions had primary and alternate frequencies
which were shared with other units in the III and IV Corps Tactical
Zones. During periods of enemy contact, a shared frequency on a battalion
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFB-82-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR - 65 (RL) (W-DHO-TO-A) (U)

command net hindered the effectiveness of the FM communications to both internal and air support elements. The quantity of sole user frequencies was increased to each major unit in II FFORCEV thereby providing frequencies to maneuver battalions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That each maneuver battalion have one sole user FM frequency that precludes the interference these units experienced when their command nets were assigned to a shared frequency. In the future, all maneuver battalions should receive at least one sole user frequency.


(a) OBSERVATION. Recently all major units operating in III and IV Corps Tactical Zones received a consolidated FM radio frequency authorization.

(b) EVALUATION. Prior to instituting the consolidated radio frequency authorization, FM frequencies were issued to units piecemeal, based on continuously changing requirements on the part of the units. Under this procedure an undue number of interference problems were caused when units used outdated frequency assignments. Since consolidated frequency authorizations came into use, such instances have been reduced from 20 to two, and major units are better able to administer their blocks of authorized FM frequencies.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That consolidated radio frequency authorizations continue to be employed, issued on a quarterly basis.

j. Information Officer. None

FRED C. WEYAND
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
CINCUSARPAC - 2
CG, USA RV - 6
Copy furnished:
CG, USA AIRS - 1
CG, USAARMS - 1
CG, USACOM - 1
CG, USAAMS - 1
CG, USAINFHRU - 1

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-BD-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968, ECS CSFRM - 65 (II) (J-DX-TO-A) (U)

ACofS, G2, II FFORCEN - 1
ACofS, G2, II FFORCEN - 1
ACofS, G2, II FFORCEN - 5
ACofS, G4, II FFORCEN - 1
ACofS, G5, II FFORCEN - 1
DETCOMS - 1
7th Mil Hist Det - 5
CONFIDENTIAL

AVNGC-DST (20 May 68) lst Ind (C) CPT Arnold/SA/LEN 4485
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968, ROG CSPORL - 65 (RL) (K-02-HO-TO-A) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 11 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-DT, APO 96558
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning repair of office machines, page 68, paragraph 2e (I): Concur. The number of typewriter repairmen authorized on the TOE of the Light Equipment Maintenance Company is based on an assumed population of typewriters to be supported. This assumed population has been exceeded several times. With the shortage of military spaces it is not considered feasible to increase the number of TOE repairmen spaces. Contract maintenance support has been provided and continuing efforts are being made to both increase and upgrade this type of support. 1st Logistical Command has standardized on a few FSN's for replacement requisitions of typewriters. This should ease the publications and parts problems eventually. The repair parts problem is tied to the publications shortage problem which is tied to the multiplicity of makes and models procured and issued even against one FSN. The inclusion of typewriters and all office machines in the appropriate TOE and TDA and the elimination of the CTN as a source of authorization would control the office machine population explosion and provide the opportunity for review in advance for the sufficiency of either organic maintenance support or outside sources.

b. Reference item concerning aerial loudspeakers in support of ground operations, page 69, section 2, subparagraph (3).

(1) Use of the U-10 aerial loudspeaker system in a supplemental role "to support ground operations in excess of two hours duration" is considered to be a misdirection of resources. The very qualities, cited in the basic report, of sustained air time and cruising range of the U-10 aircraft (in I C II CTZ the improved O-2B) make it more acceptable for use against large targets located in widely dispersed areas throughout the corps area.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHCC-DST (20 May 68) 1st Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Forces Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR - 65 (El) (U)

(2) It would appear that properly scheduled heliborne systems, with relieving aircraft immediately available, would provide the same results as discussed in the report, and would be more responsive to the tactical commander on the ground. This responsiveness is provided by more compatible air-ground radio systems.

(3) Nevertheless, the practice of using two loudspeaker systems to attack a given, known, target has proven to be quite effective. Note should be taken of the operation conducted by 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division on 1 May 1968, when a ground loudspeaker was supplemented by a heliborne system. Carefully combining the regulation of heavy firepower with loudspeaker appeals from two directions, this brigade was able to induce 95 enemy to surrender.

(4) Recommendation: That the employment of the U-10 system be used as a supplement to heliborne systems only when more appropriate targets are not available; but that an effort be made to combine aerial and ground broadcasting when the tactical situation so permits.

c. Reference item concerning identification of dead and wounded civilians and enemy soldiers, page 70, paragraph 2f (5): Concur. The Civil affairs platoons can assist in locating and identifying civilians and enemy soldiers killed and wounded, but this should not be a primary mission. Removal should always be coordinated with the local officials.

d. Reference item concerning the restoration of order in the villages adjacent to III FFV, page 71, paragraph 2f (6): Concur only insofar as assisting in the control and care of homeless civilians is concerned. The restoration of law and order is primarily a GVIII function; with assistance provided by MACDST/PSD.

e. Reference item concerning storage and distribution of commodities in support of civil recovery activities, page 71, paragraph 2f (7): Non-concur. There is no authorization for the stockage of food for homeless or displaced persons. CA platoons should always be aware of existing stocks of goods in their local area that could be obtained under emergency conditions.

f. Reference item concerning failure of the outpost system of defense for hamlets and villages, page 72, paragraph 2g (1): Concur.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVABC-DST (20 May 68) 1st Ind (C)

1. The inadequacies noted by II ForcesV have been addressed in previous studies. Action is being taken to correct the situation.

a. A USAF RF/PF advisory school has been established at Di An under the supervision of USAF G3.

b. Mobile advisory Teams have been organized to emphasize and assist in the upgrading of RF/PF village and hamlet defense systems. These teams encourage self confidence of the RF/PF units by assisting in limited offensive operations in the vicinity of the outposts.

c. Modern arms and communications equipment are being provided through the Military Assistance Program. Presently, equipment is issued through the Army supply system.

g. Reference item concerning Staff Judge Advocate Corps level personnel requirements, page 73, paragraph h (1). HQ II ForcesV has received an increase in troop strength for general courts-martial jurisdiction, and it is contemplated that by August 1968 the Commanding General, II ForcesV, will have between 18,000 to 19,000 troops under his general court-martial jurisdiction. It has also been noted that II ForcesV has had a significant increase of trials by general court-martial (3 from January-May 1968; 4 from January-December 1967). The troop strength involved is comparable to an infantry division in Vietnam. Divisions are staffed with at least five Judge Advocate officers. Accordingly, it is recommended that USAF and DA approve this recommendation in part to restore one of the two JAGC officers that were deleted.

h. Reference item concerning recorder-reproducer machine, page 73, paragraph h (2): Nonconcur. At the present time only the 25th Infantry Division has the capability to repair the recorder-reproducer machines in Vietnam. GCI jurisdictions have been forwarding their machines to USAF Depot which takes approximately two weeks for repair. This system of maintenance has been satisfactory with other general court-martial jurisdictions in Vietnam and due to the fact that each jurisdiction has two machines there should be a minimum waste of manpower while one machine is in maintenance. Since there is no depot maintenance available in Vietnam, if the recommendation were adopted, one of the GCI jurisdictions would have the responsibility of providing replacement machines and would be required to issue on hand receipt which
would in effect place that jurisdiction in the supply-maintenance field.

i. Reference item concerning staff visits, page 74, paragraph h (3): Concur in part with the recommendation contained in paragraph h (3)(c) insofar as this is possible without harming the quality of work or delaying the processing of legal services within the command. However, this policy has been accepted doctrine for all Judge Advocate offices for many years.

j. Reference item concerning Legal Assistance, page 74, paragraph h (4): Concur in part. It is important that whenever legal personnel make staff visits, personnel with personal legal problems be counseled. However, this is current doctrine in every command in Vietnam. Nonconcur with the recommendation that legal assistance be provided only by "mature, field grade Judge Advocates" because there is a serious shortage of field grade officers in JAGC. Furthermore, every Judge Advocate officer is carefully selected before he is tendered a commission; generally these officers must be in at least the upper one-third of their law school classes; and they are about 25 years of age or older upon entrance on active duty as a Captain. These officers are completely capable of providing the very best of legal advice and assistance.

k. Reference item concerning legal support for the Office of Assistant Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, page 74-75, paragraph n (5). Concur in part. Based upon the discussion relating to Staff Judge Advocate Corps Level Personnel Requirements, page 73, paragraph h (1), if II FFORCEnV amends its TOE to provide for five Judge Advocate officers, the staff Judge Advocate of II FFORCEnV will be able to provide full legal support to D-PCCRDS. Accordingly it is recommended that if II FFORCEnV submits a request for a modified TOE authorizing five Judge Advocate officers, USARPAC and DA approve this recommendation.

l. Reference item concerning legal support for intelligence and counter-subversion activities, page 75, paragraph h (6): Nonconcur. The Staff Judge Advocate's function is to provide legal advice to the action agencies; not to become the action agency itself. In addition, while one Staff Judge Advocate may have "extensive experience in interrogation techniques," in general, this would not always be true.

m. Reference item concerning the use of discrete frequencies, page 76, paragraph 21 (2): Concur. At the present time each division can be allocated
15 discrete frequencies. To achieve maximum security value these discrete frequencies should be rotated among battalions and changed on an unscheduled basis in accordance with USARV Regulation 380-13, paragraph 6b (1).

n. Reference item concerning consolidated radio frequency authorization, page 77, paragraph 21 (3): Concur. The II FFORCEV is the controlling agency for all FM frequencies in its area of responsibility. All measures which reduce interference and help to overcome the problems of congested frequencies, small geographic areas, and overall shortages of frequencies are encouraged.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
HQ, II FFORCEV
GPOP-DT (20 May 68) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, II Field Force Vietnam, for Period Ending 30 Apr 68, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 3 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Ass't AG
## II FFORCEV ORDER OF BATTLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>STATION</th>
<th>COORD</th>
<th>CONTROL NO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II FFORCEV</td>
<td>BIEN HOA</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>YT051111</td>
<td>COMUSMACV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
<td>BINH DUONG</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>XT772383</td>
<td>II FFORCEV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde, 1st Inf Div</td>
<td>BINH LONG</td>
<td>QUAN LOI</td>
<td>XT815905</td>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2d Inf</td>
<td>BINH LONG</td>
<td>QUAN LOI</td>
<td>XT815905</td>
<td>1st Bde, 1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-26 Inf</td>
<td>BINH LONG</td>
<td>QUAN LOI</td>
<td>XT815905</td>
<td>1st/1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-28 Inf</td>
<td>BINH LONG</td>
<td>QUAN LOI</td>
<td>XT815905</td>
<td>1st/1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bde, 1st Inf Div</td>
<td>BIEN HOA</td>
<td>DI AN</td>
<td>XT907073</td>
<td>2d Bde/1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-18th Inf</td>
<td>BIEN HOA</td>
<td>DI AN</td>
<td>XT907076</td>
<td>2d Bde/1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-18th Inf</td>
<td>BIEN HOA</td>
<td>DI AN</td>
<td>XT903077</td>
<td>2d Bde, 1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-16th Inf</td>
<td>BIEN HOA</td>
<td>DI AN</td>
<td>XT905077</td>
<td>2d Bde, 1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde, 1st Inf Div</td>
<td>BINH DUONG</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>XT764378</td>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-16th Inf</td>
<td>BINH DUONG</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>XT770379</td>
<td>3d Bde, 1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2d Inf (Mech)</td>
<td>BINH DUONG</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>XT784379</td>
<td>3d Bde, 1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-28th Inf</td>
<td>BINH DUONG</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>XT764380</td>
<td>3d Bde, 1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4th Cav</td>
<td>BINH DUONG</td>
<td>PHU LOI</td>
<td>XT869175</td>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf Div Arty</td>
<td>BINH DUONG</td>
<td>PHU LOI</td>
<td>XT867157</td>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5th Arty (105T)</td>
<td>BINH LONG</td>
<td>QUAN LOI</td>
<td>XT815905</td>
<td>1st Inf Div Arty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-7th Arty (105T)</td>
<td>BIEN HOA</td>
<td>DI AN</td>
<td>XT909071</td>
<td>1st Inf Div Arty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-33d Arty (105T)</td>
<td>BINH DUONG</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>XT760375</td>
<td>1st Inf Div Arty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incl 1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-15th Arty (1097)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>XT760379</td>
<td>1st Inf Div Arty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-6th Arty (155/8-GP)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>XT867157</td>
<td>1st Inf Div Arty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Avn</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>XT781171</td>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Engr</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>XT764379</td>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121st Sig</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>XT764380</td>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co P, 52d Inf (IRF)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>XT761381</td>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>XT163002</td>
<td>II Pro Gov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde, 9th Inf Div</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>XT163013</td>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-39th Inf</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>XT163018</td>
<td>1st Bde, 9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-47th Inf (Nhaeb)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>XT271606</td>
<td>1st Bde, 9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-39th Inf</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>XT163042</td>
<td>1st Bde, 9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bde, 9th Inf Div</td>
<td>Dien Tuong</td>
<td>XT417439</td>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-47th Inf</td>
<td>Dien Tuong</td>
<td>XT417439</td>
<td>2d Bde, 9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-60th Inf</td>
<td>Dien Tuong</td>
<td>XT417439</td>
<td>2d Bde, 9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-47th Inf</td>
<td>Dien Tuong</td>
<td>XT417439</td>
<td>2d Bde, 9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde, 9th Inf Div</td>
<td>Long An</td>
<td>XT556668</td>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-60th Inf</td>
<td>Long An</td>
<td>XT669633</td>
<td>3d Bde, 9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5d Inf</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>XT077222</td>
<td>3d Bde, 9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-39th Inf</td>
<td>Long An</td>
<td>XT835725</td>
<td>3d Bde, 9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-60th Inf (Nhaeb)</td>
<td>Long An</td>
<td>XT609953</td>
<td>3d Bde, 9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-31st Inf</td>
<td>Gia Dien</td>
<td>XT720790</td>
<td>3d Bde, 9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enclosure 1

CONFIDENTIAL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th Inf Div Arty</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-11th Arty (105H)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4th Arty (105H)</td>
<td>Long An</td>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-34th Arty (105H)</td>
<td>Dien Tuong</td>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-84th Arty (155H/SP)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Avn</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Engr</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Sig</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co E, 50th Inf (KBP)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTAVR (Sep)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>II FFORCEV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th ACR (Sep)</td>
<td>Long Khanh</td>
<td>11th ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-11th Cav</td>
<td>Long Khanh</td>
<td>11th ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-11th Cav</td>
<td>Long Khanh</td>
<td>11th ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-11th Cav</td>
<td>Long Khanh</td>
<td>11th ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>919th Engr Co</td>
<td>Long Khanh</td>
<td>11th ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Div</td>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td>II FFORCEV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-23d Inf (Mech)</td>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td>25th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde, 25th Inf Div</td>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
<td>1st Bde, 25th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-14th Inf</td>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
<td>1st Bde, 25th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-34th Armor (-)</td>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
<td>1st Bde, 25th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-22d Inf</td>
<td>Bien Dong</td>
<td>1st Bde, 25th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enclosure 1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Artillery Type</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-9th Inf</td>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT168520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bde, 25th Inf Div</td>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT655150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5th Inf (Mech)</td>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT655150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-27th Inf</td>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT655150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-27th Inf</td>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT655150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4th Cav</td>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT655150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde, 25th Inf Div</td>
<td>Bien Dong</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT483480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-12th Inf</td>
<td>Bien Dong</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT483480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-22d Inf (Mech)</td>
<td>Bien Dong</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT483480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Div Arty</td>
<td>Hau Kogia</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT655150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-8th Arty (105M)</td>
<td>Hau Kogia</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT655150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-77th Arty (105M)</td>
<td>Bien Dong</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT483480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-77th Arty (105M)</td>
<td>Hau Kogia</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT655150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-11th Arty (105M)</td>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT168520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-13th Arty (155/175)</td>
<td>Hau Kogia</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT655150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Arm</td>
<td>Hau Kogia</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT655150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65th Engr</td>
<td>Hau Kogia</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT655150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129th Sig</td>
<td>Hau Kogia</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT655150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co F, 50th Inf (INF)</td>
<td>Hau Kogia</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT655150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde, 101st Abn Div</td>
<td>Bien Dong</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT960490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-506th Abn Inf</td>
<td>Bien Dong</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT960490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-506th Abn Inf</td>
<td>Bien Dong</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT960490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-507th Abn Inf</td>
<td>Bien Dong</td>
<td></td>
<td>XT960490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Location 1</td>
<td>Location 2</td>
<td>Code 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Abn Div Art'y</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>YT023152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>325th Engr</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>YT014144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Am</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>YT013143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-319th Art'y (105Y)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>XT960490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co F, 51st Inf (IRF)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>YT012155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199th Inf Bde (Sep)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>YT077122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-12th Inf</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>YT077122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-7th Inf</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>YT077122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-12th Inf</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>YT077122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/17th Cav</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>YT077122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-40th Art'y (105Y)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>YT077122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87th Engr Co</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>YT077122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ 1st ATF (Sep)</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>Nui Dat</td>
<td>YS436667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d RAR</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>Nui Dat</td>
<td>YS436876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d RAR</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>Nui Dat</td>
<td>YS4386858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th RAR</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>Nui Dat</td>
<td>YS436668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d SAS Sqdn</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>Nui Dat</td>
<td>YS438664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Sqdn/3d Cav Regt</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>Nui Dat</td>
<td>YS429669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Fd Regt RAA (105 PK)</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>Nui Dat</td>
<td>YS429687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Fd Sqdn RAA</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>Nui Dat</td>
<td>YS429665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104th Sig Sqdn</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>Nui Dat</td>
<td>YS429666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Sqdn/1st Arm Regt</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>Nui Dat</td>
<td>YS429664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161 (Indep) Recce Flt.</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>Nui Dat</td>
<td>YS429662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, II FFORCENV Art'y</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>YT051112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2d Art'y (40mm AMSP)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>YT128114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-25th Art'y (TAB), WNB</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>YT052112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 23d Art'y Op</td>
<td>Bien Duong</td>
<td>Phi Loi</td>
<td>XT967152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inclusion 1 -

CONFIDENTIAL

89
CONFIDENTIAL

2-13th Arty (105T)  GIAC DANH  SAIGON  XT828919  23d Arty Grp
1-27th Arty (155 SP)  BINH DUONG  DAN TIPHO  XT497481  23d Arty Grp
6-27th Arty (96/175SP)  BINH LONG  QUAN LOI  XT809903  23d Arty Grp
2-32d Arty (86/175SP)  TAY MINH  TAY MINH  XT154513  23d Arty Grp
HQ, 54th Arty Grp

7-8th Arty (86/175SP)  Binh Hoa  Binh Hoa  XT022152  54th Arty Grp
7-9th Arty (105T)  Binh Hoa  Long An  XT166909  54th Arty Grp
2-35th Arty (155 SP)  Long Khanh  Xuan Loc  XT714096  54th Arty Grp
5-42d Arty (155T)  Binh Hoa  Long An  XT168977  54th Arty Grp
Co A, 5th SFGA

12th Cbt Avn Grp  Binh Hoa  Long An  XT059118  12th Cbt Avn Grp
11th Cbt Avn Br

128th Aalt Hel Co  Binh Duong  Phu Loi  XT860159  11th Cbt Avn Br
162d Aalt Hel Co  Binh Duong  Phuoc Vinh  XT961092  11th Cbt Avn Br
173d Aalt Hel Co  Binh Duong  Lai Khe  XT802380  11th Cbt Avn Br
213th Aalt Hel Spt Co  Binh Duong  Phu Loi  XT860160  11th Cbt Avn Br
145th Cbt Avn Br

68th Aalt Hel Co  Binh Hoa  Binh Hoa  XT95102  12th Cbt Avn Br
118th Aalt Hel Co  Binh Hoa  Binh Hoa  XT99102  145th Cbt Avn Br
135th Aalt Hel Co  Long Khanh  Long Giao  XT399995  145th Cbt Avn Br
190th Aalt Hel Co  Binh Hoa  Binh Hoa  XT987229  145th Cbt Avn Br
334th Arm Hel Co  Binh Hoa  Binh Hoa  XT991129  145th Cbt Avn Br
210th Cbt Avn Br

120th Aalt Hel Co  Binh Hoa  Long Khe  XT076065  210th Cbt Avn Br
25th Avn Co (Corps)  Binh Hoa  Long Khe  XT050105  210th Cbt Avn Br

Enclosure 1

CONFIDENTIAL

90
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Code</th>
<th>Unit Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Phone Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54th Util Apl Co</td>
<td>PHUOC TUY</td>
<td>VUNG TAU</td>
<td>8295471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73d Surv Apl Co</td>
<td>PHUOC TUY</td>
<td>VUNG TAU</td>
<td>8295472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74th Recon Apl Co</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>PHU LOI</td>
<td>XT65155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184th Recon Apl Co</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>PHU LOI</td>
<td>XT62160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214th Cbt Avn Bn</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Long Thanh</td>
<td>YT167003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117th Aalt Hel Co</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>YT068113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191st Aalt Hel Co</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Long Thanh</td>
<td>YT167005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>195th Aalt Hel Co</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>YT065112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210th Aalt Hel Co</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Long Thanh</td>
<td>YT167006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222d Cbt Spt Avn Bn</td>
<td>PHUOC TUY</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>8296472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205th Aalt Spt Hel Co</td>
<td>Bien Duong</td>
<td>PHU LOI</td>
<td>XT860159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273d Aalt Spt Hel Co</td>
<td>Bien Duong</td>
<td>PHU LOI</td>
<td>XT860159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>269th Cbt Avn Bn</td>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td>Cu Chi</td>
<td>XT656157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116th Aalt Hal Co</td>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td>Cu Chi</td>
<td>XT657158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187th Aalt Hal Co</td>
<td>Tai Ninh</td>
<td>Tai Ninh</td>
<td>XT78521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222d Aalt Spt Hal Co</td>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td>Cu Chi</td>
<td>XT6562152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>561st Armd Hal Co</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Di An</td>
<td>XT909056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Sqdn, 17th Air Cav</td>
<td>Tai Ninh</td>
<td>Tai Ninh</td>
<td>XT180120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Sqdn, 1st Air Cav</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Di An</td>
<td>XT909056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53d Sig</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>YT505110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162th Engr (Cbt)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Di An</td>
<td>YT355058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>588th Engr (Cbt)</td>
<td>Tai Ninh</td>
<td>Tai Ninh</td>
<td>XT505215</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enclosure 1
STATISTICAL SUMMARY
USAF 0130/0123 SKIES
1 Feb 68 - 30 Apr 68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>POP</th>
<th>CS</th>
<th>JR</th>
<th>TACs</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Div</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Abn Div</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II FFORDAV arty</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th CdG</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>176</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53d Sig Bn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79th Angr Gr</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co A, 5th SFG</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGIWS</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th ACR</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>303d RR Bn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>573</td>
<td>1,121</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1,834</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Inclosure 3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
STATISTICAL SUMMARY
TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT
1 Feb 68 - 30 Apr 68

1. (C) FAC - controlled air sorties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FAC</th>
<th>RVwAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9,081</td>
<td>2,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. In support of HVwAF:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By FAC</td>
<td>1,271</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By RVwAF</td>
<td>2,507</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. In support of RVwAF:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By FAC</td>
<td>7,810</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By RVwAF</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. In support of FAC:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,825</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. In support of:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVwAF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf Jiv</td>
<td>2,426</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Inf Jiv</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Jiv</td>
<td>2,073</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Abn Jiv (III CTZ)</td>
<td>389</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199th Inf Bde (Lt) (Sep)</td>
<td>335</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th ACR</td>
<td>380</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th ACR</td>
<td>688</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II FFORCEN</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (C) Radar - controlled (Combat Sky Spot) missions in support of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FAC</th>
<th>RVwAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>216</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf Jiv</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Inf Jiv</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Jiv</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Abn Jiv (III CTZ)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199th Inf Bde (Lt) (Sep)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th ACR</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st ATF</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II FFORCEN</td>
<td>193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (C) Results of tactical air support:

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KBA (DC)</td>
<td>976</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBA (Est)</td>
<td>1,642</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures destroyed</td>
<td>2,667</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures damaged</td>
<td>2,085</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inclosure 4
STATISTICAL SUMMARY
ARMY AVIATION SUPPORT
1 Feb 66 - 30 Apr 66

Note: Figures below indicate missions flown by 12th Combat Aviation Group in support of II FFORC/III Corps. They do not include missions flown by aviation organic to OPCOM units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FIXED HMG</th>
<th>ROTARY HMG</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. (C) Sorties flown</td>
<td>28,597</td>
<td>415,503</td>
<td>444,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (C) Flown by US aircraft in support of RVacF</td>
<td></td>
<td>33,805</td>
<td>33,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. (C) Hours flown in support of II FFORC</td>
<td>29,543</td>
<td>157,915</td>
<td>187,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. (C) Tons of cargo carried in support of II FFORC</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>87,923</td>
<td>88,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. (U) Passengers flown in support of II FFORC</td>
<td>27,268</td>
<td>780,787</td>
<td>808,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. (C) Enemy losses from Army aviation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures destroyed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. (C) Friendly losses of aviation personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inclosure 5
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, II Field Force Vietnam (U)**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations.**
Feb - 30 Apr 68.

**CG, II Field Force Vietnam**

**Description:**

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, II Field Force Vietnam (U)

**Abstract:**

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310