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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (11 Jul 68) FOR OT RD 682310

17 July 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st
Air Cavalry Division Artillery, Period Ending 30 April
1968 (U)

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1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery
Commandant of the Marine Corps
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery

for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)

TO: Commanding General

1st Air Cavalry Division
APO 96490

1. (c) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. Operation JEB STUART was in progress as the reporting period began almost simultaneously with the NVA/VC Tet Offensive.

   (1) Organization.

   (a) Direct Support Artillery. The month of February began with the 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery (A/2/19, B/2/19, B/1/77, and C/1/321) in DS of the 1st Brigade, near Quang Tri. The 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery (B/1/21, C/1/21, C/1/77) was in DS of the 3d Brigade, at Camp Evans (YD 533318). The 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division was OPCON to LACD and was conducting operations around LZ Jane (YD 372424), with the 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery (A/1/321 and B/1/321) in direct support. The 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery (A/1/77, A/2/1, C/2/19) was attached to the 2d Brigade, LACD, conducting Operation Pershing II in Binh Dinh province.

   (b) General Support Artillery. The 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery (ARA) was in General Support of the Division. B/2/20 Arty was GSR to the 1/77 Arty; C and C, 2/20 Arty remained in General Support; with A Battery at LZ Shannon (YD 357493) near Quang Tri and C Battery at Camp Evans. Medium artillery support was provided by the 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery. Two of its batteries, A and B Batteries, were present in the JEB STUART AO, B Battery GSR to 2/19 Arty and A Battery GSR to 1/21 Arty. C Battery was reinforcing the 1/77 Arty. In addition, 1/30th Arty was providing technical and tactical control for 0/2/11 Arty (155mm T) which was OPCON to the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and for the 5th 155 Gun Battery. This latter was a Marine Corps artillery battery composed of six 155mm SP guns and two 8" howitzers. Four of its 155 guns and its two 8" howitzers were positioned at LZ Shannon to support the 1st Brigade; its remaining two 155mm guns were positioned at Camp Evans to...
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support the 3d Brigade. On 10 Feb 68, 1/30 Arty was attached to IACD by USANV General Order Number 952.

(c) ADA and Searchlights. 0/4/60 Arty (4 x M42 twin 40’s, 4 x M55 Quad 50’s, and 4 M23 Xenon SIW’s) was OPCON to IACD, with a mission of reinforcing 2/19 Arty. D Btry, 1/44 Arty was providing 9 M42’s, 7 M55’s, and 4 SIW’s, under the operational control of IACD Arty. Those assets were divided between 1/21 and 1/321 Arty.

(2) The Tet Offensive.

(a) The NVA/VC Tet Offensive started immediately prior to the beginning of the reporting period and lasted until the end of February. The 1st Brigade, 1st ACD and 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division remained generally in their previously assigned AO’s. The former 3d Brigade AO came under the direct control of Division. IACD Artillery assigned 1/30 Arty the mission of direct support of the forces operating in this AO (TF Davis). The battalion assumed all the direct support functions, including clearance of fires, air advisories, plus the artillery portion of the defense of the division base camp at Camp Evans. This mission was effective from 4 February - 3 March 1968 while the 3d Brigade was assigned the mission of conducting operations to relieve Hue.

(b) “Crachin” weather continued throughout most of February. This reduced air support, in particular close air support, almost to zero. ADA continued to fly throughout this period in spite of the presence of the worst possible combination of conditions as regards vulnerability to ground fire — low ceilings with good horizontal visibility. 2/20 Arty experienced 30 aircraft hits and two aircraft lost; B/82d Arty had one UH-1B and 3 OH-13’s hit by ground fire.

(c) Supply problems also increased during the period as the supply route north from Hue could not be used due to enemy activity. Class V stockage was marginal but did not become critical due to emergency air drop of ammunition.

(d) The task of relieving Hue was assigned to the 3d Brigade. The DHC-6 CP and the CP of 1/21 Artillery commenced movement to FK 17 (YD 650281), on ANH compound, on 2 February. 0/1/77 Arty displaced to FK 17 c. 3 February and 0/1/21 Arty the following day. On 18 February, 3/1/77 Arty (8” SP) arrived in the JEB STURF AO, via Gia Viet, and was positioned initially at YD 33645032. Upon arrival the battery was placed OPCON to 1/30 Arty and displaced to Camp Evans. On 19 February, 4/1/30 Arty displaced to LZ Nola, in the vicinity of the AN
LO bridge (YD 623302). On the 20th, B/1/03 displaced to LZ Nola. From LZ Nola, both batteries could fire inside the walls of Hue. It was decided not to displace the batteries farther forward due to the vulnerability of the An Lo bridge. Airlift was at a premium and dictated resupply of Class V for these batteries by road. Had the batteries been moved south and the bridge subsequently destroyed, the already tenuous resupply problem would have been further complicated by the requirement to airlift or ford the tonnages required for 155mm and 8 inch ammunition resupply.

(c) The attack by the 3d Brigade began on the morning of 21 February and encountered a heavily defended position in the Ti Ti woods (YD 695240). Tube artillery, naval gunfire, and AUP provided a heavy volume of fire support, and the infantry was able to breach the enemy position. On 21 February the CG 1st ARVN Division requested a liaison party from 14CD to assist in fire support coordination with his FSEB in the Citadel in Hue. The next morning, Division Artillery dispatched a liaison party consisting of a Lieutenant Colonel, a Captain, an NCO and one communications specialist/RTO. The role of this party in coordinating the fire support available to 1st ARVN Division was highly significant and contributed materially to the success of the operation. After the breakthrough at the Ti Ti woods, the infantry elements continued the attack, converging on the west wall of Hue against moderate resistance. As these elements drew closer together, the fire coordination requirements grew more exacting. The presence of refugees outside the city and the proximity of friendly forces to enemy troops compounded the problems. Great care was required in the assignment and execution of each fire mission. Heavy and medium fires were placed within the city itself, in the very last stages before the enemy was driven out. This assisted the ARVN units significantly in their task of clearing the city.

(f) Apart from the 3d Brigade's action, the north was characterized by light isolated contacts. On 18 February the 1st BN, 3d Marines became OPCON to 1st Brigade with the requirement to screen the western and northwestern approaches to Quang Tri City. With the assistance of 1st Brigade, the marines began conducting airmobile operations, making air assaults with artillery preparations fired by Marine and Army artillery, adjusted and controlled by Marine liaison officers. The Marine unit was released from OPCON 1st Brigade on 29 February.

(g) Elements of the 2d Brigade began moving north to the JEB STILIN LT AO just after the middle of the month, bringing their artillery with them. A/1/77 Artillery arrived at Camp Evans on 19 February, A/1/21 Artillery on 21 February. Both batteries were attached to 1/39 Arty, and assisted in the defense of Camp Evans and in operations in the TF Davis AO.
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b. With the end of the Tet Offensive the 2d Brigade, 1ACD completed its deployment to the JEB STUART AO. Brigade AO's and forces were repositioned, and operation JEB STUART continued to completion on 31 March 1968.

(1) Hqs 2d Brigade, Hqs 1/77 Arty, C/2/19 Arty, C/1/30 Arty, and 1/2/20 Arty all arrived in the JEB STUART AO in the first 2-3 days of March. Brigade AO's were repositioned, with the 2d Brigade 1ACD occupying the former AO of the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division; the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division moving down to assume the former 3d Brigade AO near Hua, and the 3d Brigade being assigned the AO around Camp Evans (the former TF Davis AO). Cavalry battalions were placed OCONUS to the Brigades with which they are normally associated. For the first time in over a year, the 1st ACD had control of all its elements. Each of the DS artillery battalions had control of all three of its firing batteries; no cross-attachment of batteries was required. With the return of the 3d Brigade to Camp Evans, 1/21 Arty was able to assume fire support for the base defense of Camp Evans from 1/30 Arty on 3 March.

(2) On 5 March the 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery arrived in the JEB STUART AO. This 105mm M119A1 battalion had arrived in Danang from CONUS in February, and had remained in Danang while completing its in-country training. The Battalion was attached to the 108th Artillery Group at Dong Ha, and placed under the operational control of 1ACD Arty. 4/6/68 was assigned a mission of general support, reinforcing 2/19 Arty; and, with battalion headquarters, was positioned at LZ Sherman near Quang Tri. B and C batteries were assigned the mission of general support, reinforcing 1/77 Arty and were positioned in the 2d Brigade 1ACD's AO, B battery at Wunder Beach (YD 499560) and C Battery at LZ June.

(3) On 7 March, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division was placed under the operational control of the 1st Air Cavalry Division with an area of operations south of Hua. The Brigade's DS battalion, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery, came under the operational control of 1st Air Cav Div Arty at that time. Three days later, the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne with its DS battalion, 1st Battalion, 321st Arty, was released from OCONUS, 1ACD. On 19 March, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division with 2/320 Arty reverted to the control of the 101st Airborne Division.

(4) Operations in the JEB STUART AO during March consisted mostly of light, scattered contacts. Naval gunfire was used extensively along the coastal regions. On 13 March a firebase was established at LZ Kathy (YD 58732336) to support operations into base area 114. A short time later two howitzers from C/1/30 were also positioned at LZ Kathy to provide medium artillery support.
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(5) As conditions stabilized in the AO, base defense programs were reviewed. All major LZs had received mortar and rocket attacks during the Tet Offensive, but ground attacks were limited to probes or harassing attacks. Concentrated maintenance effort was required to insure that the counter mortar radars were operational. An extensive aerial surveillance program was put into effect. From first light to last light, weather permitting, artillery aerial observers were aloft in fixed wing (01-D) aircraft, supplementing the reconnaissance program of the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry. Many rocket and mortar positions were located by this reconnaissance program and the emplacements destroyed by artillery fire or by air assaulting infantry elements to the location. This may have pre-empted many rocket and mortar attacks. Counter fire plans were devised to provide controlled, flexible response, as opposed to massive, counter fires (see Section 2, Lessons Learned). Continuous mortar patrol by ADA, with relief on station, was provided around Camp Evans, and 4 - 5 hours per night were flown around the base camps of the 1st Brigade (LZ Betty) and 2d Brigade (LZ Jane). Mortar and rocket attacks were almost of brief duration, usually less than 3 minutes, never more than 5. Casualties to troops and property damage were light.

b. Activities in the latter part of March concentrated upon preparation for Operation PEGASUS-LAM SCH 207 A, the relief of the 2nd.

(1) A/1/93d Artillery arrived at Wando Beach on 21 March. The next day the battery displaced to a firing position near quarry Tik (TD 337/3507). Plans had already been made for its use in Operation PEGASUS.

(2) Provisional Corps Vietnam Artillery had begun to function by this time, and was re-structuring Corps Artillery support. Control of units which had been OPAK to LACD Arty; e.g., 6/33 Arty, D/1/63d Arty, 5th 155 Gun Battery, ADA from D/1/44 Arty, was assumed by PCV Arty and appropriate artillery mission assigned by that headquarters.

d. Operation PEGASUS-LAM SCH 207 A.

(1) General. This was a highly successful operation, from an artillery as well as division standpoint. Much of this success is directly attributable to the detailed fire support coordination and logistics planning accomplished prior to the start of the operation. The execution phase was also highly satisfying in that targets of a classic type, e.g. trucks, armored vehicles, mortars firing during daylight hours, were engaged, destroyed, and soon to be destroyed. This was quite a different experience from that in operation JEB STUMP.
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and even more so from Operation PERHAPS when artillery targets were ordinarily not so lucrative and surveillance was more difficult to obtain.

(2) Fire Support Coordination. Fire support coordination for Operation PERHAPS involved many units and agencies. The planning and coordination are best viewed by dividing the operation into a reconnaissance phase and an attack phase.

(a) Reconnaissance Phase.

1 General. The objective to be accomplished during the reconnaissance phase was the destruction by fire of the enemy with emphasis on his anti-aircraft capability between Calu and Kho Sanh in what would be the 3d Brigade AO during the attack phase, and selection and preparation of LZ's for use by 3d Brigade (and to a limited extent by the 2d Brigade). The 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry was given this mission and provisions were made to provide it with air and artillery for the attack.

2 Artillery. Artillery already in position which was capable of firing into the 1/9th reconnaissance AO included: 15th Marine artillery at Kho Sanh (4 x 105 Batteries, 1 x 155 Battery and 1 x 4.2" Battery); one Marine 4.2" mortar battery at Calu; one Marine and one Army 105 battery and one Army 175 gun battery at the Rock Pile and 3 Army 175 gun batteries at Camp Carroll. On 25 March 4/1/68 Arty was moved from the vicinity of Quang Tri to Calu and 4/6/68 Artillery was moved from LZ Sharon to LZ Stud (YD 000425). These batteries were placed under control of a forward Division Artillery FDC manned by personnel of the 1st Bn, 30th Artillery and ccononed assisting calls for fire from 1/9th Cav on D-6 and attacking planned targets that night. Prior coordination with 3d Mar Div (12th Mar Sect); 108th Arty Group and 13th Marines (KHB 227/341) insured that all available targeting information was in the hands of the forward FDC and that lateral communications were established. Throughout the reconnaissance phase enemy automatic weapons, mortar and troop positions were attacked by artillery and destroyed.

3 Tactical Air. Coordination with PCV FSCC and G-3 Air resulted in the allocation to the division of additional tactical air sorties for use by the 1/9th Cavalry. The planning allocations were 24 sorties during daylight hours to be put in under FAC control and 24 sorties during the hours of darkness to be put in under radar control (SKY Spot). The Tactical Air Control Party of the 1/9th Cavalry moved to LZ Stud with the 1/9th jump CP to coordinate the use
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of pre-planned and immediate air strikes. A forward Division ESOC was
established with the forward Div arty RES to accomplish clearance. A
total of 317 sorties were put in by LACD RES and 315 by SKY SPOT during
the reconnaissance phase. Forty-nine specially fused 52 construction
sorties were delivered during this period.

4. Air Light. Coordination with PCV and a team from
the MASC Air Light section resulted in the establishment of planning
allocations for the reconnaissance phase and the attack phase. During
the reconnaissance phase, Arc Light strikes were delivered on targets
developed and recommended by 1/9th Cavalry to assist in destruction of
enemy forces and ES preparation. Strikes were targeted within 10
during the hours of darkness and in areas which would pose no hazard to
1/9th Cav helicopters during daylight hours. Strike requests were sub-
mitted initially to III MAF. Upon activation of the PCV Air Light section,
strike requests were submitted to PCV. A total of 12 Arc Light strikes we
were delivered on LACD targets during the reconnaissance phase.

(b) Attack Phase.

1. General. Fire support coordination during the
attack phase was complicated by several factors. Among these were the
placement of two Marine regiments under LACD OPCO; the assignment of a
mission and an area of operation to the ARVN Airborne Task Force in
cooperation and coordination with LACD; the small size of the brigade/
regimental AO's in comparison with other operations; the presence of a
Marine Direct Air Support Center (DASC) with the 26th Marine Regiment at
the Eighth (this DASC formerly had the authority to request Tactical Air
Strikes directly from 1st Marine Air Wing and the USAF Airborne Command
and Control Center which flew 24 hours a day in the Khe Sanh area); and
finally by the large number of tactical air and Arc Light strikes available.

2. Artillery.

Artillery density for this operation was
greater than for most previous LACD operations. In addition to artillery
present in position and that positioned during the reconnaissance phase,
ten 105mm howitzer batteries, four 155mm howitzer batteries, one 8" bat-
tery and one 4.2" mortar battery became available to destroy the enemy
during the attack phase. Each Cav battalion was supported by the battery
with which it is habitually associated. Each Cav brigade had reinforcing
fire from a medium battery, and the 1st Marines were supported by two
light batteries, one medium battery, and one 4.2" mortar battery. The
additional heavy battery, 3/1/83, moved from Camp Evans to I2 hq with
the mission of General Support of the LACD.
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5 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operation Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, BOS CGFOR-65 (R1)

1. On 30 March, D and C batteries, 1/21 Artillery, displaced to a staging area via LZ Pedro (XD 243435). On 31 March, 4/1/21 and 0/1/30 arrived at LZ Stud, by road, to be in position to fire preparations for the 3d Brigade's air assault the next day. Operation PELASUS began 1 April; 0/1/21 followed the infantry air assault into LZ Miho (XD 932417), 0/1/21 into LZ Gates (XD 928434). The next day, 4/1/21 was lifted into LZ Thien (XD 895406) and 0/1/30 was lifted to LZ Mikes.

On 2 April, also, A, B, C, 1/77 displaced to LZ Stud. The next day, 4/1/30 and 8/1/83 closed at LZ Stud; 4/1/77 followed the infantry assault into LZ Ton (XD 897347), 0/1/77 into LZ Wharton (XD 879364), and one platoon 8/1/77 into LZ Ton. On 4 April, 4/1/30 was lifted into LZ Wharton and 8/1/77 completed its move to LZ Ton. The following day, 4/2/19 followed the infantry into LZ Snapper (XD 815346), 8/2/19 deployed to LZ Stud, and 8/1/85 moved forward to LZ John (XD 983439). Planned artillery deployment was completed on 5 April with the closure of B/2/19 and four tubes, 8/1/30 into LZ Snapper. 0/2/19 and the remaining platoon of 8/1/30 were held at LZ Pedro in support of 2/8th Cav.

2. A unique feature of the use of artillery in Operation PELASUS was the emphasis on counter battery fire. The NVA had for some time been able to shell the small airfield and parachute drops to the southeast and northwest of the Marine airfield. As soon as LACD artillery came within range of the enemy guns, rapid and massive counter-battery fires soon achieved fire superiority and the enemy artillery was never a serious deterrent to maneuver. Coordination between adjacent artillery battalions BDC's made the maneuvering of fires a simple procedure. The movement of 8/1/83 west on highway 9 to LZ John extended the coverage of 8th fires available to 2d and 3d Brigade units and to the 26th Marines.

3. Artillery advisory information was transmitted in the normal manner by each BS battalion on a common frequency. The LACD artillery liaison officer with the 26th Marine FSC was responsible for monitoring this net and passing the advisory information to the Marine FSC at Khe Sanh. This was essential to the coordination of AF fixed wing aerial re-supply of the Marine base, since the re-supply aircraft had to fly over the 2d and 3d Brigade AO's prior to making their drops. Due to poor HF communications, there were some problems in achieving this coordination in the early days of the operation, resulting in several flights being turned back to Danang. These problems were resolved with improvement in communications.

4. As mentioned earlier, artillery fires during this operation were highly effective. Targets were more accurately hit and
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surveillance more easily obtained than has been LACD Army's experience in some times. Unfortunately, in the initial stages some enemy convoys escaped to the south out of the assigned AO, though still within tube artillery range. The AO was then extended to the south and this situation was rectified.

Except for phase I (Reconnaissance), 8" fires were not used extensively. Rate of repair of bridges on highway 9 was not sufficiently rapid to permit displacement of the 8" batteries in order to attack enemy artillery in the 00 HOC prior to termination of the operation. As a consequence, the bulk of the counter battery fires were delivered by the 175mm battery located at the Rock Pile, and by the 155mm battery located at LZ Snapper.

3 Tactical Air. Lack of dependable FM and telephone communications made clearance of air strikes, in particular immediate, a difficult and at times lengthy procedure during the first few days of the operation. The integration of the 1st Marines into the tactical air request system posed only minor problems; on the other hand, the integration of the 26th Marines' operations proved more difficult. This was caused by the presence of the BSSC at Phu Bai, which prior to Operation PEGASUS provided a direct means of requesting TAC air from 1st Marine Air Wing or 26th TF without passing through intermediate headquarters. Control of tactical air was complicated by immediate air requests from 26th Regiment which were on occasion transmitted directly by the LSSC to LACD or other agencies without going through the LACD TACF. The abundance of tactical air sorties available assured timely attack of targets of opportunity. The LSSC's 26th TF had full access to the Division's tactical air allocation; pre-planned requests were submitted through American advisors with the TF; immediate requests were submitted through FACs which accompanied the TF. Air strikes were used by all units to assist in preparation of LZ's, both to destroy enemy forces and to clear traces. Throughout the operation, FACs continued to work closely with 1/9th Cavalry reconnaissance helicopters in an effective combination which found and destroyed many weapons positions, trucks, armored vehicles, and ammunition caches. There were 155 FAC and 196 SKY SPOT missions during the attack phase.

4 Arc Light. Arc light strikes were used during the attack phase against enemy artillery positions, troop concentrations and suspected OP locations, and as massive LZ preparations several hours prior to air assault. Request were normally submitted 20 hours before the desired strike time, although some diversions were accomplished in less time. As a consequence, maneuver was often keyed to strike time, on
indication of the importance and effectiveness of the strikes. A total of 40 strikes was delivered during the attack phase of Operation PEGASUS.

(3) Logistics.

(a) Pre-stock. Pre-stock of barrier materials, heavy timbers and steel planking, Class V and Class III materials assisted the smooth transition to operations in the new AO.

(b) Class V.

1. Class V pre-stock requirements were not in sufficient quantity to support planned artillery operations, with the exception, initially, of green bag propellant (D675) for the 8" howitzers. This shortage was rectified, along with other minor individual shortages, by constant contact between TF MacDonald personnel and logistic personnel at Dong Ha. TF MacDonald personnel and Support Command did an outstanding job in providing the required logistical support to afford maximum flexibility in changing tactical situations.

2. Class V re-supply to forward fire bases was entirely by air, as was re-supply of all other classes. All battalion ammunition sections were located in the area sling-out area, in relatively close proximity to the ASP. This co-location facilitated coordination between the various battalion ammunition sections and provided more flexibility and responsiveness to the changing tactical situation.

(4) LWA

(a) Lancer. To support this operation, ADA lancered four sections at LZ Stud during daylight hours and two sections at night. Daylight requirements increased to five sections on three occasions.

(b) SS-11 missiles. A policy of requiring an SS-11 firing capability (Maxwell System) present in the AO during all daylight operations insured rapid response to hard targets. The prestock of 15 missiles proved adequate.

(5) Support for AHW. Division Artillery supplied a liaison party and three forward observer parties to the AHW LHD TF. The personnel came from the 6th Battalion, 3rd Arty, a Corps Artillery battalion reinforcing LIEC Arty. In addition, LIEC Arty assisted in the movement and ammunition resupply of the AHW battery supporting the AHW TF. Though no specific batteries were assigned the mission of reinforcing the AHW battery, the compactness of the AO and the density of artillery

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The tubes permitted fires of up to 12 batteries for support of the TF. Fires of these units were immediately responsive, and the TF commander was highly complimentary of the artillery support received.

(6) Extraction. On 11 April, artillery displacement out of the DELATUS-LA began, in preparation for Operation DELAVARE-LAM SON 216. A/2/19 and the four tubes of 3/1/30 deployed to LZ Sharon; 0/1/77 moved to LZ Stud preparatory to deployment to Camp Evans. The next day, 1/1/83 began its motor march to Camp Evans, A and C, 1/21 moved to LZ Stud, preparatory to movement back to Camp Evans. On 15 April, 0/1/77 and B/1/63 closed at Camp Evans. 3/2/19 displaced to LZ Betty (YD 551479), A and C, 0/1/21 closed at Camp Evans; A/1/63 and 0/1/30 arrived at Dong Ha by road; all on 14 April. The following day, 0/1/30 and B/1/21 closed at Camp Evans; A/1/33, no longer supporting LACD, proceeded south toward Camp Eagle, and 0/1/77 displaced to LZ Jean. This completed the extraction of the artillery from Operation DELATUS.

e. Operation JED STUART II. This was a short-lived operation, consisting for the most part in preparations for Operation DELAVARE-LAM SON 216. There were no significant artillery activities, and no after action report was prepared for JED STUART II.

f. Operation DELAVARE-LAM SON 216.

(1) This is a reconnaissance in force into the A SHAU Valley. The 2d Brigade, with 1/77 Arty (A and B batteries) and 3/1/30, remains near KHE SANG, OFCON to the 3d Marine Division. The 1st and 3d Brigades, LACD, and the 3d ANIH Regiment, 1st ANIH Division, conduct operations in the A SHAU Valley. The 196th Light Infantry Brigade, from the 1st Marine Division, is OFCON to the LACD, conducting operations around and in defense of Camp Evans. The 2/12 Cav operates directly under LACD control in a small AO around LZ June. 2/19 Arty (A, B, C batteries) and 1/21 Arty (A, B, C batteries) are in direct support of the 1st and 3d Brigades respectively. 3/82d Arty (A, C, D batteries) is organic to 196th LID, and 3/3d Arty (D) (3/6/33 and 0/1/77) is in direct support of the 2/12 Cav. 6/33 Arty is providing one liaison and three forward observer parties to 3d ANIH Regiment. On order, it is to air assault one battery to reinforce 0/12 Arty (ANIH), supporting the 3d ANIH Regiment. Each of the LACD Brigades has medium artillery support: 3/1/30, GSR 3/19 Arty; C/1/30, GSR 1/21 Arty. Heavy artillery support is provided by 3/1/03 Arty (2 BF) at Camp Evans and by six tubes, 175mm guns 0/1/03 and 0/0/4 (2 tubes) at POP ECOTOGNE (YD 626095) in the 101st Airborne Division AO.

(2) Pending the arrival of Hq; 3/82d Arty; 1/30 Arty assumed
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direct support artillery functions, including base defense, in the AO around Camp Evans on 19 April. On that date, 4/3/02d Artty arrived at Camp Evans, and 6/1/21 air assaulted into the A SHAU at LZ Tiger (YD 28190861). It had been planned to move 6/1/21 Artty into LZ Victoria (YD 282114). However, hazardous flying conditions (anti-aircraft weapons and poor weather) restricted mobility and the battery did not displace, though the 1/7 Cav did air assault into LZ Victoria. The following day, 1/7 Cav attacked overland to seize LZ Goodman (YD 320071). 1, B, and C batteries, 2/19 Artty arrived at Camp Evans for staging into the A SHAU. B/2/19 and 4/3/02 deployed to LZ Jack (YD 500281) south of Camp Evans, and 6/3/02 arrived at Camp Evans. No moves were made into the A SHAU. On the 21st, as the infantry had not yet secured LZ Goodman, two tubes, 4/1/21 were positioned atop Signal Hill (YD 407035). B/2/19 moved from LZ Jack to Camp Evans. On 22 April D/3/02d arrived from the Anacurnical AO and was positioned at LZ Belcher (YD 465385). The following day, movement continued into the A SHAU, with 6/1/21 and four tubes 6/1/30 being helilifted to LZ Goodman (YD 320071). On 28 April, four tubes; 6/1/21, were lifted to LZ Pepper (YD 355027) and 6/1/30 completed its move to LZ Goodman. B/1/30 Artty moved to Evans from LZ Sharon and occupied 6/1/30's vacated position area. Deployment of the 3d Brigade's supporting artillery was complete. On the following day, movement of the 1st Brigade and its artillery into the A SHAU began. Three tubes 6/2/19 were lifted into LZ Cecile (YD 305500). Movement of artillery did not begin again until the 26th, when 4/2/19, B/2/19, and the 5 tubes of 6/2/19 were lifted into LZ Stallion (YD 375524). All six tubes of 6/1/30 were lifted to Stallion the next day; and the two of the three tubes of 6/2/19 Artty at Stallion were lifted to Cecile. This completed movement of M2CD units into the A SHAU.

(3) Movement into the A SHAU valley has been much slower than planned due primarily to poor weather conditions. The enemy air defense is composed of well trained and disciplined crews using relatively antiquated weapons, fire distribution means, and effective communications links. Artillery, air, and infantry must attack air defense weapons to reduce their toll of friendly aircraft. Ground contact, so far, has been light and there have been no significant artillery activities. However, positioning and supporting artillery batteries in the A SHAU against obstacles of terrain and weather has been an accomplishment. At times the ammunition situation was critical, and called for careful management. On LZ Goodman, vector to swab the 155 tubes has been in short supply. At the end of the reporting period, however, the artillery batteries are positioned in the A SHAU to support the reconnoiter forces and to assist the INDIAN Regiment when it air land, and ammunition is in adequate supply. Further analysis must await the development of operations in the Valley.

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2. All units engaged in operations each day of the reporting period. Troop movements were made on 60 individual days of the reporting period, and on many of these days multiple units made moves. Apart from formal training, such as the Division Combat Leaders Course and courses at the Replacement Training Center, training was given on the job and integrated with operations.

2. (U) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. Operations.

(1) Artillery Battalion for Base Camp Defence.

(a) OBSERVATION. LACD requires a non-divisional light artillery battalion for defence of its base camp.

(b) EVALUATION. The resources of divisional direct support battalions are fully committed to supporting the maneuver brigades' operations. A commitment to defense of the division's base camp taxes these resources greatly. DS artillery battalions depart from base camp as required to support their brigades with resultant turbulence in provision of artillery support for defense of the division's resources. A non-divisional artillery battalion can more effectively perform base defense functions and can provide permanence and continuity to the defense. Further, a non-divisional artillery battalion can provide Forward Observers to provisional base defense companies or to new observation teams, whereas all the FOs of a DS battalion are committed to the rifle companies. In addition, a permanent base defense artillery battalion can provide support to the Division Replacement Training Center and to Divisional Artillery Forward Observer and Fire Direction Officer Training Courses.

(a) RECOMMENDATION. Recommend this division be provided a non-divisional light artillery battalion for defense of its base camp.

(2) Counterservice Plan.

(a) OBSERVATION. Whenever bases, particularly large bases, come under mortar/rocket/artillery attack, the countermass
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program must be carefully controlled.

(b) EVALUATION. It is extremely important to give target acquisition agencies; e.g., mortar patrol, DIS, GM radars, an opportunity to locate the source of the incoming rounds before the acquisition system becomes saturated with counterfires. Counterfire plans should provide flexible response. Sample plans follow:

Plan 1. All ground fires are held until the direction of attack is determined. Mortar patrol (RA or gun ships) expands immediately on preselected targets in proleared areas.

Plan 2. Ground fires are held until the direction of attack is determined, then counterfires are directed in that direction. Counterfires are either counter mortar, counter rocket, counter battery, or general (quick fire) dependent upon information as to the type of rounds being received.

Plan 3. Firing is conducted for a limited period (up to 5 minutes), then ceased. Fires are resumed once information regarding the direction and nature of the attack has been received.

Plan 4. Counterfire response is immediate, with 6400 rail, general coverage.

Examples of flexible response are:

1. If weather precludes mortar patrol, plan 1 is negated, and plan 2 is announced and implemented.

2. Mortar patrol is on station. AIR/Gunships expand; plan 2 or plan 3 is placed in effect.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Recommend Counterfire plans be designed to provide controlled, flexible response.

(3) TARGET ACQUISITION.

(a) OBSERVATION. This division requires the support of a target acquisition battery.

(b) EVALUATION. This division possesses a limited capability for determining the locations of hostile mortar, rocket, and artillery positions. For this purpose, Division Artillery employs its
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FOs with the rifle companies, additional observers in towers at major fixed installations, and counter mortar patrol, an extensive aerial surveillance program, and its four AN/MPQ-4A counter mortar radars. With the exception of the radars, the above means are limited by adverse conditions of visibility. The four radars can provide only marginal coverage of the division's AO, and have only limited success in locating hostile rocket or artillery positions. A requirement exists for additional target acquisition equipment and personnel support. This support can best be supplied by a standard target acquisition organization.

(a) RECOMMENDATION. Recommend such a battery be provided in the Corps troop list.

(4) Adjustment of Defensive Targets.

(a) OBSERVATION. Adjustment of close-in defensive targets requires particular care to avoid accidental injury to friendly troops.

(b) EVALUATION. There is always a degree of risk involved in the adjustment of defensive targets. If the targets are close enough to the perimeter to be of value as final protective fire, they are also close enough to be dangerous to friendly troops. The decision to fire in defensive targets rests with the maneuver force commander, with recommendations made by the artillery forward observer or liaison officer. The maneuver force commander must decide whether he wants the adjustment completed with shell, HE or with a less dangerous shell; i.e., smoke or high burst WP (200 meter HOB).

(a) RECOMMENDATION. When the maneuver commander makes the decision to fire in defensive targets, the following procedures should apply:

1. The maneuver commander should warn all personnel in the area and insure that proper protective measures are taken. The FC should place himself in a position to verify physically that this has been accomplished. The FC should not permit firing to commence until he is satisfied that proper protective measures have been taken, and should command check fire during the course of the mission if any unsafe conditions arise. Proper protective measures must continue to be observed until completion of the mission and all clear is commanded.

2. An aerial observer should assist the ground observer, if possible. He can verify the grid of the maneuver element and check to see that no friendly forces are out beyond the perimeter near the
3. The firing battery should have an outline of any major static fire base on its firing chart.

4. The piece closest to the perimeter of the maneuver element should be used.

5. The first adjusting round should be shell, smoke or WP, HOD 200 peters. It should be directed at a point sufficient distance from friendly troops to insure no effect whatsoever on friendly locations, and subsequent rounds brought back toward the target by "creeping."

6. Rounds should be fired and sensed singly, with sufficient separation in time so that each round can be positively identified.

7. Shift from shell, smoke to shell, HE should not be made until the smoke round has been positively identified. If the first round is in a safe distance from friendly troops, shift to shell, HE should be made at that point, rather than creep the shell, smoke in and then shift to shell, HE. PO's should not request range or deviation corrections when switching from shell, smoke to shell, HE.

8. PO's and FO's must be especially alert when firing in defensive targets. If each round cannot be positively identified, check fire should be commanded so that all firing data can be verified. If adjustment is in the HE phase then check fire is ordered, firing should be recommenced with shell, smoke or high burst WP.

5) Verification of the Azimuth of the Orienting Line.

(a) OBSERVATION. The azimuth of the orienting line should be verified, as a measure of safety, prior to the battery's being laid.

(b) Although it is accepted artillery practice that the firing battery executive officer should verify the azimuth of the orienting line, by measuring its magnetic azimuth with a compass or sighting circle, this procedure is not prescribed in any official or semi-official publication. EM 6-40, Field Artillery Cannon Gunnery, paragraph 4-5 (5)

(b) prescribes a check for the orienting angle, but not for the azimuth of the orienting line. The USAR's semi-official publication, Notes for the Battery Executive, also prescribes only a check of the orienting angle.
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(a) RECOMMENDATION. Recommend USLIT take steps to
correct this apparent deficiency in FM 6-40 and in Notes for the Battery
Executive.

(6) Sticking Reset Counter Knob Panoramic Telescope M113, M102
Howitzer.

(a) OBSERVATION. The reset counter and the reset knob
of the Panoramic Telescope M113 requires particular attention.

(b) EVALUATION. The counter reset knob of the Panoramic
Telescope M113 has a tendency to stick, resulting in erroneous readings on
the counter when in actuality the sight has not moved. This can cause
dangerous errors in deflection.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Recommend firing battery personnel
pay particular attention to the reset counter and knob during daily checks
of the Panoramic Telescope M113. Reciprocal hay checks should be performed
at least daily and at any time doubt is raised as to the proper functioning
of the counter.

(7) Operations during poor flying weather.

(a) OBSERVATION. The extended period of bad flying
weather throughout February and early March caused a departure from
standard ARA attack tactics.

(b) EVALUATION. Targets were frequently engaged at
slightly more than rocket aiming range due to low ceilings and poor
visibility. "Pop-Up" firing techniques were frequently used which caused
an increase in aircraft vulnerability. Overfly of the target will also
occur under these circumstances with a corresponding increase in the
incidence of aircraft hits. Standard ARA tactics can be described as the
initiation of a firing run at approximately 1500 meters, or greater, with
the break from the target occurring prior to 500 meters.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That deviations from standard ARA
attack tactics be made only when made necessary due to the tactical
situation and that deviations be carefully weighed against the hazards
involved.

(8) Crew Survival.

(a) OBSERVATION. Two crews of ARA helicopters, after
sustaining damage from hostile fire and encountering bad weather, were

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forced to land their aircraft in enemy held territory. Their survival efforts until rescue (18 hours) were successful with all eight crewmen unharmed although the group was in contact with VC for the last ten hours of their period on the ground.

(b) EVALUATION. Some actions that proved beneficial in their escape, evasion, and rescue follow:

1. The senior man present took immediate command and organized his assets quickly.

2. All personnel departed the immediate vicinity of the helicopters taking with them the survival kits, URC-10 radios, maps, SOI's, weapons with ammunition, and buried all other usable items that they could not carry. A position area for defense was picked that would allow visual contact with the aircraft location to simplify pick-up.

3. A difficult area (high bamboo, rough ground) was chosen for establishment of a position area to discourage tracking. This caused slow progress and physical strain, but proved to be the best decision.

4. One person followed the main group to erase all signs of movement that might compromise their position and route.

5. All smoking, loud talk, or excessive movement was forbidden.

6. The two URC-10 radios were used alternately to call "Mayday" by voice and to activate the emergency beep signal. Patience paid off after 14 hours of this procedure, as it was by that means that search and rescue aircraft were led to their location to accomplish recovery.

7. Personnel were forbidden to return fire unless it was obvious that they were located and under threat of being overrun. The order to fire would come only from the commander. Solitary enemy would be engaged with survival knives rather than shot. This technique enabled the group to keep from revealing their position even though enemy groups fired into their position (suspect that the VC were using recon by fire to attempt to locate their position).

8. A "cool head" as a leader inspired confidence in all involved and resulted in a team effort that resulted in complete success.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1960, RCS GSFCR-65 (RL)

(a) RECOMMENDATION. That these proven survival tips be given wide dissemination to assist other crews that might face this situation.

2. Organization.

(1) Liaison Personnel for the Airmobile Division Artillery.

(a) OBSERVATION. Liaison parties are required for Division Artillery.

(b) EVALUATION. The TOE for Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Airmobile Division Artillery (TOE 6-70), makes no provision for liaison personnel. For two successive years, NTOE action has requested that liaison parties be added to the TOE, but as yet, no approval has been forthcoming. On three occasions during the reporting period, Division Artillery was required to furnish liaison parties:

1. During the operation to relieve Hua, it furnished a liaison party to the 1st ARVN Division FSCB.

2. During Operation REGISUS-LAI, SCH 207-A it supplied a liaison party to the 26th Marines at Hau Sa, and to the ARVN Airborne Task Force.

3. During Operation DELACRES-LAI, SCH 216, it was providing liaison to the 3d Regiment, 1st ARVN Division.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Recommend this headquarters be authorized liaison personnel. NTOE actions will continue to reflect this request.

(2) Artillery Liaison and Forward Observer Parties for Air Cavalry Squadron, Airmobile Division.

(a) OBSERVATION. The Air Cavalry Squadron with the Airmobile Division requires artillery liaison and forward observer parties.

(b) EVALUATION. The TOE for the Airmobile Division Artillery makes no provision for liaison and forward observer parties for the Air Cavalry Squadron. Since this Division's arrival in Vietnam it has been considered essential that an artillery liaison party be provided for the Squadron headquarters and one forward observer section be provided per cavalry troop for the following reasons:

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SUBJECT:  Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1960; RCS CSFOR-65 (RM)

1 Magnitude of fire support problems. The Cavalry Squadron may perform its reconnaissance and security missions in any part of the Division AO. While there is no direct support artillery provided for the Squadron, every artillery battery is prepared to fire in support of Squadron operations if requested. In addition, ADA, naval gunfire, and FAC air support are available. There is a continuing need for an artilleryman immediately available, knowledgeable in the current locations of artillery units and the proper employment of all fire support resources, and capable of obtaining these resources quickly.

2 Individual area of operations. Often the Cavalry Squadron is given an area of operations (as in Operation PULASKI, reconnaissance phase). In these circumstances, the Squadron has the same fire support requirements and responsibilities as a brigade. Often the Squadron is assigned an LZ defensive mission. The planning of fires, counterfires, illumination fires and the coordination of ADA counter mortar patrol require a trained artilleryman.

3 Ground troop. The fourth (D) troop of the Squadron is a ground troop and functions normally in an infantry role. It requires an Artillery PO party just as does an infantry company. In addition, D troop’s operations often necessitate splitting the PO section, so an additional NCO is required one to accompany the Forward Observer, a second to accompany the Liaison Sergeant.

4 Clearance to fire. Within this division, artillery liaison officers operate for the ground commanders in clearing all types of fires. Cavalry operations in particular require close coordination to inure safety since the Squadron’s mission will normally take it into other units’ AO’s. Since the Air Cavalry Squadron is normally employed in general support of the Division, it is most appropriate to provide the Liaison and Forward Observer personnel from Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery. For the past two years, NECE action has requested one liaison party and four forward observer parties be added to TEN 6-7011 for utilization with the Air Cavalry Squadron, but no approval has been forthcoming.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Recommend this headquarters be authorized one liaison party and four forward observer parties for employment with the Air Cavalry Squadron. NECE action will continue to reflect this request.

William H. Volk Jr.
Col, Artillery
Commanding

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AVDACG (5 May 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968

1st Air Cavalry Division, APO San Francisco 96490

TO: CG, PCV, ATTN: D&T, APO San Francisco 96308

1. Attached is the Operational Report Lessons Learned of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Division Artillery for the period ending 30 April 1968.

2. Distribution is being made in accordance with AR 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CONRAD L STANBERRY
COL, GS
Chief of Staff
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AVII-GC (5 May 68) 2d Ind
ITC Clark/kted/2157
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for
Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

DA, HQ, PCV, APO San Francisco 96308 10 JUN 1968

TO: Commanding General, USARV, APO 96385

1. (U) The inclosed ORLL, 1st Cav Div Arty, is forwarded in accordance
with USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (C) Comments on section 2, Lessons Learned, commander's observations
and recommendations are listed below:

   a. Item, Arty Bn for Base Camp Defense, page 13, para 2b(1). Divisions
      are responsible for large AO's and additional light artillery is needed to
      support maneuver forces. PCV Arty has 2 nondivisional light Bns with which
      to reinforce 3 divisions. A third Bn is desirable but at a lower priority
      than additional 175mm, 8", 155mm and automatic weapons Bns. Defense of base
      camps is a collateral, not a primary mission. 1st Cav Div Arty has been
      informed that no action is being taken to obtain a nondivisional light Bn
      for base camp defense.

   b. Item, counter fire plans, page 13, para 2b(2). Concur.

   c. Item, target acquisition, page 14, para 2b(3). Concur. To partially
      compensate for the most critical deficiencies, PCV has requested of USARV a
      radar officer, survey officer and personnel and equipment for 2 survey
      sections and a survey information center.

   d. Item, adjustment of defensive targets, page 15, para 2b(4). Concur.
      The recommended procedure will be incorporated into the fire support annex
      of the Corps SOP.

   e. Item, verification of the Azimuth of the Orienting Line, page 16,
      para 2b(5). Concur. The recommended check has been incorporated in the
      fire support annex of the Corps SOP.

   f. Item, sticking reset counter knob, panoramic telescope M13, M102
      Howitzer, page 17, para 2b(6). Concur. Check will be included in fire support
      annex of the Corps SOP.

   g. Item, operations during poor flying weather, page 17, para 2b(7).
      Concur. No further action considered necessary.

   h. Item, crew survival, page 17, para 2b(8). Concur with recommendation.
      Further recommend that proven survival tips be included in PACAF Jungle
      Survival School, Clark AFB, Philippines.

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AVII-GC (5 May 68)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)

1. Item, liaison personnel for Air Mobile Div Arty, page 19, para 2f(1). Concur. The division artillery can expect to have unprogrammed requirements to provide liaison teams to other service or allied forces for the foreseeable future.

2f. Item, artillery liaison and forward observer parties, page 19, para 2f(2). Concur. Ground reconnaissance squadrons have a need for one FO party per troop. Air cavalry needs are greater because of the corps areas in which a troop operates.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. L. NURDIN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 20 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning target acquisition, page 14, paragraph 2b(3), and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2e. PCV request for additional target acquisition means is under active consideration by USARV Headquarters.

   b. Reference item concerning liaison personnel for the airmobile division artillery, page 19, paragraph 2f(1); and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2i. MTOE including desired liaison personnel were reviewed by this headquarters when submitted. These personnel were included as additional space requirements; due to the space ceiling limitation imposed on USARV, they could not be financed. MTOE submitted at a later date will be reviewed as before; if spaces are available at that time, consideration will be given to providing the desired liaison personnel authorization.

   c. Reference item concerning artillery liaison and forward observer parties for air cavalry squadron, airmobile division, page 19, paragraph 2f(2); and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2j. The same comments made in paragraph 2b above, apply to the desired liaison and forward observer personnel.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ, 1st Air Cav Div Arty
H3, PCV
GPOE-DT (5 May 68) (U) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Air Cav Div Arty for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 JUN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C.I. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
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Organization, 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery

2d Battalion, 19th Artillery
Hqs, Hqs and Svc Btry; A, B, C Batteries

1st Battalion, 21st Artillery
Hqs, Hqs and Svc Btry; A, B, C Batteries

1st Battalion, 77th Artillery
Hqs, Hqs and Svc Btry; A, B, C Batteries

2d Battalion (Aerial Artillery) 20th Artillery
Hqs, Hqs and Svc Btry; A, B, C Batteries

1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (attached)
Hqs, Hqs Btry, Svc Btry, A, B, C Batteries

Plt (-), Btry C, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (OPCOM)
4 x M55's, 4 x M42's, 4 x M23 xenon Searchlights

Btry E (Aviation) 82 Arty

Incl 1
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968

CO, 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery

5 May 1968

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N/A

N/A

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N/A

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