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OPERATIONAL REPORT (LESSONS LEARNED) RCS CSFOR-65

1 MAY – 31 JULY 1966

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Period 1 May 1966 - 31 July 1966, Reports
Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

THRU: Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 20310

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

A. COMMAND:

1. (U) The twentieth of July marked the first anniversary of United States Army Vietnam. In a message to the officers and enlisted men of US Army, Vietnam on this occasion, General W.C. Westmoreland paid tribute to the sacrifice, dedication and plain hard work which characterized the USARV effort at all levels during the critical first year.

2. (U) During the latter part of May and the first three weeks of June, Headquarters, USARV relocated from the cluster of buildings depicted in the photograph at inclosure 2, to a new three-story building identifiable in the photograph at inclosure 3. Movement was programmed to allow uninterrupted continuation of the mission and was accomplished in a highly successful manner.

3. (C) During the period 1 May to 31 July USARV continued to expand. On 31 July the troop strength was 163,394 as compared with a strength of 136,875 on 30 April.

4. (S) There were no major control headquarters activated or deployed during the reporting period. However, the 1st Signal Brigade was activated on 1 April with a 10% manning level, and achieved a 70% manning level by the
end of this period. Planning and coordination for deployment of the 4th Infantry Division was completed during this reporting period and by the end of July lead elements of the division had closed in the Pleiku area.

5. (U) Key personnel assigned to Headquarters, USARV during the period were:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DUTY POSITION</th>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel Wallace R. Buelow</td>
<td>Deputy Aviation Officer</td>
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<td>Colonel Hal H. Bookout</td>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
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<td>Colonel John P. Brown</td>
<td>ACofS, G3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel Earl F. Cole</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff, P&amp;A</td>
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<td>Colonel Weaver H. Gaines</td>
<td>ACofS, G1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel James A. Grimsley, Jr.</td>
<td>Special Assistant to DCg, USARV</td>
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<td>Colonel Stuart A. McKenzie</td>
<td>Adjutant General</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel Walton G. Sugg</td>
<td>Chaplain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel Fred M. Walker</td>
<td>Deputy Engineer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel James A. Wier</td>
<td>Surgeon</td>
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6. (FOUO) Distinguished Visitors:

a. During this reporting period there was an increase from 43 visitors in the previous period, to 111 received by this headquarters and subordinate commands. The categories of visitors were both US and allied members of legislative bodies, national cabinets, military departments, and civic organizations.

b. In addition to the principals involved in the 111 visits there were 252 other personnel who accompanied the official parties. The significant visitors are listed at inclosure 4.
B. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE:

1. (U) On 4 May the MAC began passenger service for replacements/returnees with flights originating at McGuire AFB and returning from Tan Son Nhut to McGuire. To fill seats on CONUS bound flights the 90th Replacement Battalion amends orders for ETS personnel whose homes of record are east of the Mississippi River to assign them to a separation center at Fort Dix. If seats are not filled the 90th Replacement Battalion selects reassigned personnel whose new duty station and leave address are east of the Mississippi. Personnel whose new duty station is west of the Mississippi and whose leave address is in the east will not be routed to McGuire.

2. (U) To improve reassignment procedures for returning personnel, DA will prepare assignment instructions on data processing cards for July, August, September and October 1966 returnees. The 27th DPU will process the cards and forward lists of assignment instructions to the field for issuance of orders. Effective with the November advance overseas returnee (AOR) listing, the 27th DPU will forward the AOR to the field. Upon return of corrected listings the 27th DPU will transmit the finalized AOR to DA.

3. (U) Effective 1 July 1966, USARPAC assumed the responsibility for machine processing of USARV morning reports. Morning reports will be consolidated by 12th DPU and forwarded daily to USARPAC by command pouch. USARPAC will maintain control logs and submit required USARV strength reports direct to DA thereby freeing the key punch facilities of the 12th DPU for other USARV requirements.

4. (U) USARV Message AVAGP-ME 10699, dated 28 April 1966 requested that Department of the Army require units deploying to RVN furnish data on ETA loss projections to the major in-country commanders immediately upon arrival in-country. The request was indorsed by DA Message 769473, 14 June 1966, therein amending paragraph 4h, DA Circular 614-8 to reflect this requirement.

5. (U) Due to cancellation of contract flights, shortfall in opportune aircraft, and unanticipated loss of programmed airspaces, a backlog of rotatees developed at Camp Alpha, Tan Son Nhut during early June. Special airlift reduced this backlog. To prevent a recurrence, a passenger movement section was established in G4 Section, HQ, USARV to manage airlift and control the flow of personnel into the 90th Replacement Battalion. A detailed objective treatment of this development is described in Section II of this report.

6. (U) USARV has advised the Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army of the mechanization of the H1 - B6 and the unprogrammed
loss requisitions. This process requires major commands to forward regular requisitions so as to arrive at this headquarters not later than the 1st calendar day of the fifth month prior to the requirement month. Authority was requested from DA to mechanize the senior enlisted requisitions effective with the February 1967 requisition.

7. (U) This headquarters requested authority from Department of the Army to submit the USARV requisition for senior enlisted personnel (E-7 to E-9) in punch card format. Department of the Army has granted this authority to USARV. Commencing with the March 1967 requisition, submitted in July, punch card format was used.

8. (U) DA Message 773362, 12 July 1966, authorized award of the Vietnamese Campaign Medal to US Army personnel in Vietnam. This medal is awarded by the Republic of Vietnam to all Free World military personnel serving in South Vietnam for a period of six months. The authorization and criteria for this award was distributed to the field by USARV Circular 672-1, 23 July 1966.

9. (U) DA Message 770959, 20 June 1966, authorized delegation of awards authority as follows:

   a. Award authority for Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross and all lesser awards is delegated to commanders in grade of Major General and above, and all Brigadier Generals occupying a Major General command position.

   b. Award authority for Bronze Star Medal and all lesser awards is delegated to Brigadier Generals in command of separate brigades.

   c. Legion of Merit award authority will remain with Hq, USARV.

10. (U) Considering only currently approved spaces, the civilian personnel organization is approximately 97% staffed. The organization has civilian personnel offices fully operative at Qui Nhon, Pleiku, Nha Trang and Saigon. US citizen CPO's are on site and partially operating at Cam Ranh Bay, Vung Tau and Long Binh. The Saigon Area Civilian Personnel Office serves as the office of record for the latter offices and for Can Tho, which is not yet staffed.

11. (U) Large scale recruiting activities for Vietnam have not yet commenced, due to lack of manpower authorization. Up until the last two weeks of July, no more than sixty jobs have been on recruitment at any one time. Due to the limited labor market in Vietnam for the relatively high grade positions which have been on recruitment, the majority of the positions have been placed directly on CONUS recruitment. Aside from positions covered by the ammunition surveillance and safety career programs and eight.
secretarial positions for which name requests were submitted, CONUS recruit-
ment has not kept pace with requirements. For example, fifteen supply
career program positions have been on CONUS recruitment since March and
April 1966. As of the end of the quarter no selections have been made, and
no referral lists have been received by this command. USARV current US
V. current US
citizen strength is sixty-five.

12. (U) The USARV Vietnamese work force has increased to approximately
18,000 as of 29 July 1966. There are currently about 13,500 additional jobs
on recruitment. The rapid increase of the work-force in the Long Binh area
is typical of that which is taking place throughout Vietnam. The Long Binh
Area Civilian Personnel Office opened on 21 March 1966. At that time there
were about 200 employees on the rolls in that area; as of the end of this
reporting period there were 3,300 employees on the rolls and approximately
1,400 positions were on active recruitment. This expansion results from
the arrival of new army units from CONUS and the relocation of logistical
units from Saigon to the Long Binh area.

13. (U) As a result of the locality wage survey conducted under the
auspices of the Army-Air Force wage board (A-AFWB) in February, new wage
schedules for Vietnamese employees were issued by the A-AFWB on 2 May 1966.
Shortly after receipt of these schedules DA directed that action be held
in abeyance pending issuance of further instructions. On 27 May, the
A-AFWB delegated authority to the CG, USARV to determine wage schedules,
pay differentials and allowances and bonuses for Vietnamese employees
without prior approval of the A-AFWB but subject to the requirements of the
American Ambassador's civilian manpower committee. Similar delegation
of authority was given by the A-AFWB to the Commanding General, 7th Air
Force, and by the OIR, Department of Navy, to the Commander, US Naval
Forces, Vietnam. On or about 28 June 1966, the Mission Council approved
an overall 11½% increase in wages for Vietnamese employees of the US
Armed Forces. This increase was implemented on 3 July 1966.

14. (U) On 7 April 1966, a Vietnam marine wage schedule was initially
authorized and included job titles and definitions for twenty-one marine
type occupations. On 23 April 1966, advanced in-hiring rates for Vietnamese
personnel employed in certain occupations on US Army operated liquid cargo
self-propelled tankers of 6500 barrels cargo capacity or over, were authorized.
Again, on 16 June 1966, increased starting salaries were authorized for
the deckhand occupation. Subsequent to the establishment of these advanced
pay rates, some improvement was noted in recruitment for these hard-to-fill
positions.

15. (U) At the completion of the 4th Quarter FY 66 a total of 290
students were attending Central Training Institute courses including inter-
preter/translator, clerk-typist (basic and refresher), English conversa-
tion, heavy equipment mechanic, heavy equipment operator, EAM operator and

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key punch operator. The CTI driver training school has qualified 458 drivers to date; current enrollment is 73.

16. (U) During the quarter ending 31 July 1966, manpower authorization and utilization continued to highlight the activities of the Staff Judge Advocate Section. Additional TD spaces for ten Judge Advocate officers, ten enlisted personnel and two civilian court-reporters were authorized for this section. Upon assignment and arrival of these additional personnel this section will be able to provide complete legal support, especially in the trial of general courts-martial cases.

17. (U) In the field of military justice, twelve general courts-martial cases were tried during the quarter. Subordinate units under general courts-martial jurisdiction held 289 trials by special courts-martial and 208 trials by summary courts-martial. All of these records of trial by inferior courts-martial were reviewed by the USAV SJA for legal sufficiency.

18. (U) US personnel presented 179 claims against the government for loss or damage to personal property. Adjudication of these claims was made by the SJA and a total of $333,867.60 was paid to the claimants.

19. (U) During the quarter, legal assistance was given to 551 soldiers.

20. (U) The out-of-country X&R program continued to expand with a total of 23,298 allocations received during the quarter for USAV as compared to 14,323 allocations for the previous quarter. Jet aircraft (Boeing 727) on Tokyo flights commenced 18 May 1966, reducing flight time from twelve to six hours. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia was added as an X&R location on 18 June 1966. Penang, Malaysia was added on 19 June 1966.

21. (U) The in-country rest center at Vung Tau was expanded during this quarter from 134 to 260 beds. A field ration mess was also opened at the center in June 1966. The Vung Tau rest center is open only to enlisted personnel and the length of stay is limited to three nights. The utilization rate of this facility during the quarter was 82%.

22. (U) During the quarter, new libraries were opened at Phan Rang, Vinh Long, and Tent Camp Bravo at Tan Son Nhut. An appropriate ceremony was held for the opening of each facility.

23. (U) During the last six months of the fiscal year a total of 1.1 million dollars worth of nonappropriated funds and 2.7 million dollars of appropriated funds have been obligated for the purchase of special services supplies and equipment.

24. (U) The number of chaplains in the command increased from 16 at the beginning of the period to 18 at the close of the period. The influx included sixty-six who arrived as individual replacements and nine
who arrived with units. The timely arrival of replacements allowed all spaces vacated by normal rotation to be filled promptly. In most cases the outgoing chaplain was able to brief his replacement.

25. (U) Only sixteen of the seventy-five chaplains who arrived in the command during the reporting period were Catholic. This amounted to 21% which was far below the goal of 33% for desired coverage. It was also below the 23% reported last quarter. However, careful assignment of Catholic chaplains on an area basis resulted in adequate religious coverage for all Catholic personnel in the command.

26. (U) During the reporting period sufficient chaplain's assistants arrived in the command to fill all TOE/TD spaces where chaplains were assigned. This significant improvement in the TMA picture was due in part to a system instituted in coordination with the AG, whereby the Staff Chaplain's Office monitors the assignment in consonance with the faith of the chaplain for whom they are assigned. This system also prevented TMA's from being diverted to other clerical jobs, thereby improving the utilization of personnel in this MOS.

27. (U) During the reporting period the concept of establishing centralized chaplain's funds to serve a geographical area (for example, Saigon-Cholon-Tan Son Nhut) was continued and expanded. This system, as opposed to individual unit funds, allows sufficient monetary reserves to meet all the religious needs in an area, and the sponsoring of welfare and charitable activities as well. It has also reduced the administrative workload because only one set of fund records is required.

28. (U) The chaplains of the command presented a complete religious program meeting the spiritual needs of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish personnel. They averaged 4.2 religious services per week per chaplain and overall attendance at religious services per week averaged 20% of the command. The sacraments of baptism, marriage, confession and holy communion were also administered to Christian personnel.

29. (U) Malaria continued to be a major medical problem during the period, increasing with the onset of the rainy season and correlated with increased troop activities in highly endemic malaria regions. Vivax malaria continued to appear with a total of fifty-four cases in the first seventy-one days of this reporting quarter.

30. (U) The majority of malaria cases continue to be the more serious chloroquine-primaquine resistant falciparum malaria. Earlier recognition and treatment of this disease has resulted in fewer deaths and complications from the diseases, especially since newer drug combination regimens have brought the recrudescence of disease below the 5% figure. A study of the comparison of two treatment regimens, one with quinine and daraprim and
the second with quinine, daraprim and dapsone, was begun in mid-June. The last case to be included in the study will be on 31 July. It is anticipated that over 600 cases and records will be available for interpretation and information regarding disease, therapy response, and failures.

31. (U) Studies made in high risk units of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, with the assistance of the medical research team, WRAIR, continued during this period to ascertain the efficacy of dapsone as a suppressive drug against falciparum malaria. Taken daily, along with the weekly C-P tablet, and where good malaria discipline was enforced, the statistics reflected a 50% lower incidence of malaria in those troops on dapsone. Although the numbers studied are relatively small, this study served as a basis on which to request approval to add daily dapsone to the weekly C-P tablet to all combat units stationed and operating in highly endemic falciparum malaria areas. Approval from the Department of the Army and the FMA was received and appropriate headquarters apprised of this on 16 July 1966. Local implementation of this program is dependent on availability of the drug in sufficient quantity. At present stocks are adequate for issue only to the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

32. (U) In mid-June, a directive was issued cancelling the giving of immune serum globulin to all personnel after arrival in Vietnam. The continued use of the tremendous amount of this valuable and costly commodity used in attempted prevention of hepatitis did not appear warranted as it had not significantly decreased the incidence of hepatitis in the command. Sufficient immune serum globulin will be stocked to give to special high infection risk personnel such as Special Forces Group and for use in controlling localized outbreaks of hepatitis.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Period 1 May 1966 - 31 July 1966, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

C. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

1. (C) Enemy activity and actions continued to be directed towards Communist control through a steady buildup of VC and NVA forces in South Vietnam, and by four separate attempts to seize control of major areas. All four were thwarted by the timely intervention of US, RVN, and other Free World Forces.

2. (C) Despite rising losses, the enemy has continued to maintain, increase, and consolidate forces in South Vietnam. During this reporting period a total of forty-three battalions, five regimental headquarters and one division headquarters were added to order of battle holdings. The total number of enemy units by type now in Vietnam are 168 battalions, 73 of which are NVA; 32 regiments, 19 of which are NVA; and 6 division headquarters, 4 of which are NVA. Total enemy strength including combat, support, militia, and political cadre, increased by 36,016 to a total of 276,492. Enemy strength in combat troops increased by 26,570 to a total of 106,754. Of this, the major increase was in NVA troops where 22,980 were added. Other strength figures as of 31 July are: Militia - 112,760 (an increase of 9,187); Combat Support - 17,803 (an increase of 250); and Political Cadre - 29,175 (no increase).

3. (C) There were four major enemy efforts to seize control of key areas in the Republic of Vietnam during the period. In May and June, elements of the 630th NVA Division attempted to infiltrate and take control of key portions of Pleiku Province, while the 24th NVA Regiment made a similar effort in Kontum Province. Preparations for these efforts were detected by friendly forces, and the enemy units were either blocked or attacked before they could begin operations.

4. (C) In Phu Yen Province during June the enemy attempted to take advantage of a reduction of friendly strength due to operations against the offensive in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces. The 188 NVA Regiment moved east from Pleiku and joined the 95th NVA Regiment in Phu Yen Province with the objective of overwhelming US forces remaining in the province and seizing control of the rice producing areas around Tuy Hoa. This effort was also detected and disrupted by friendly forces before offensive operations could be initiated.

5. (C) During June in Linh Long Province in II CTZ, the 9th VC Division concentrated its elements for the purpose of defeating friendly forces in the province. US forces were introduced into the area however, and in a series of engagements inflicted heavy losses on the 271st and 272d VC Regiments.

6. (C) During July, the enemy made a determined effort to seize control of Quang Tri Province, the northernmost province in the Republic
The 324B NVA Division was infiltrated through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North and South Vietnam. This was the first instance of the enemy using the DMZ to infiltrate and support a major combat unit. Enemy plans apparently envisioned attacking along Route 9 to the seacoast to secure the northern third of Quang Tri Province. Probably in coordination with this effort, the 6th and 953 NVA Regiments were positioned so as to be able to interdict the lines of communication from the south in Quang Nam and Thua Thien Provinces. The presence of the 324B Division was however, detected by friendly forces, and its campaign disrupted by preemptive attacks by US Marines and ARVN troops.

It is estimated that the enemy will continue to build up his forces during the next reporting period in order to maintain a favorable ratio of strength between his forces and those of the free world. He will accomplish this through organization of the Viet Cong-controlled population in the Republic of Vietnam and by bringing more units under the control of division and corps-equivalent headquarters. In this manner the control framework will exist for large-scale operations when the tactical opportunity presents itself. Major enemy ground efforts are likely to include continuation of his attempts to seize control of Quang Tri Province, the central highlands, and the rice-producing areas along the seacoast and in the Mekong Delta. He will continue to maintain large forces in the Saigon area to tie down friendly forces and prevent their interference with operations elsewhere. The increasing concentration of battalions around Saigon, however, also indicates that a major coordinated attack may be contemplated to harass and destroy US and ARVN forces and installations in and around the capital.

During the period of this report VC/NVA forces have proven particularly vulnerable to detection by sophisticated means of intelligence collection and analysis, and to disruption of their planning campaigns by preemptive attacks by US, ARVN and Free World Forces. The inherent weaknesses of the VC/NVA forces are emphasized by the fact that they have been defeated in all of their major campaigns since the introduction of US ground forces into Vietnam in August 1964. Nevertheless, they retain control over a large portion of the area and population of South Vietnam, and are able to maintain a grinding war of terrorism, harassment and small-scale attacks even in areas ostensibly under government control. The cumulative effects of this type of warfare are severely damaging to the fabric of the governmental and economic systems of the Republic of Vietnam. The greatest strength of the VC is still their ability to conceal themselves among the people and obtain their support, whether by winning their loyalty or through terror and intimidation. This ability permits them to conduct local movements and operations often under the very noses of US, RVN, and Free World Forces.
9. (C) Intelligence activities and production increased significantly during the period 1 May to 31 July. The steady influx of new units generated an intensified program of increased production of intelligence estimates and annexes. This included ten specific area estimates, three intelligence annexes for G3 and G4 operation plans and five special studies. The special studies included: a weather history for the period 1 September 1965 through 31 March 1966; procedures followed by United States forces in the handling of captured personnel; a map durability study; VC logistical organization and procedures in the 25th Infantry Division area of interest and a study to determine the feasibility of using the AH/T3-26 as an intelligence base station. In addition, the USARV SICR (Special Intelligence Collection Requirements) program was established, thirteen editions of USARV Weekly Intelligence Summaries were published and the USARV Weather Climate Studies of June, July and August were completed and published.

10. (C) Weekly USARV Intelligence Conferences continued to be a success. A total of twelve conferences were held. During the reporting period several special briefings on third countries (Laos, Cambodia and China) were presented. These briefings included geography, military force structure and political structures. The normal order of battle, current intelligence and counterintelligence subjects were covered at each conference. In addition, a library has been established for special studies and a catalog system has been implemented to assist the subordinate commands.

11. (U) With the increased activities and initiation of new reports, this headquarters provided nine weekly inputs into the USARV Weekly Intelligence Conferences, thirteen updating OB reports, five watch reports, and disseminated thirty-eight VC incidents through spot reports to the General and Special Staff Sections of this headquarters and subordinate commands.

12. (U) This headquarters conducted a total of forty-six liaison visits to the following units and intelligence sections: 1st Infantry Division; 1st Cavalry Division (Airborne); 25th Infantry Division; 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division; 173d Airborne Brigade; 1st Logistics Command; 18th Engineer Brigade; 1st MIBARS; 7th Air Force; Rice Mill port area; Fish Market port area; 3d Ordnance Battalion; 597th Engineer Detachment; and Vung Tau Sub Area Command during the period 1 May through 31 July 1966.

13. (C) The increased troop strength and tactical operations directly increased the workload of the Map and Weather Branch, G2. On two separate occasions emergency resupply of maps was made to divisional units. In addition, map support was provided for the new Australian, ROK and Philippine forces to include photomosaics for the Australian Army base camp area.
AVHC-4-DH
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Period 1 May 1966 - 31 July 1966, Reports
Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

14. (U) With the introduction of the new maps and weather equipment, this headquarters evaluated the 2d edition of JUG Maps, prototype pilotage charts, and requirements for weather satellite receiving set for USAF.

Also, a survey was conducted to determine the requirements for subordinate headquarters for captured VC maps and a stockage plan was established for DECCA overprinted maps.

15. (C) During the reporting period a special orientation team visited South Vietnam to brief the commanders, interested staffs, and receiving units of the AN/TSQ-43 tactical imagery interpretation facility (TIF). This new equipment will allow for a more rapid read-out of photography, radar, and infra-red imagery which will provide rapid intelligence for the commander. The TIF orientation team visited the 1st MIBARS, 131st Aviation Company, 73d Aviation Company, 25th Infantry Division, 1st Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The team also briefed General Westmoreland. There are ten AN/TSQ-43 (TIF) initially scheduled to arrive in Vietnam on or about 1 September 1966. Necessary imagery interpreters have been sent to CONUS to a specially arranged two-week school to receive instructions on proper equipment operation and then will return to their assigned units in Vietnam.

16. (U) In the counterintelligence field, the period was used for the initiation of new programs, expansion of those already in existence, reevaluation of plans and functions and internal reorganization in order to improve personnel and information security. Additional personnel allowed for the expansion of the scope of activity in these fields and for a more functional compartmentalization and delineation of responsibilities. The objectives were to provide the command with a more inclusive and efficient security program.

17. (U) A new program was established for the monitoring and control of unsolicited correspondence and "pen pal" relationships with individuals residing in Sino-Soviet bloc countries. USAVE Regulation 380-8 (Unsolicited Correspondence) was published providing commanders with necessary guidance and direction in the handling and reporting of such correspondence received by members of the command. Also a command letter concerning "pen pal" relationships was published informing commanders of the inherent danger of security in such relationships and directed that this danger be brought to the attention of all personnel during regularly scheduled security briefings.

18. (U) In response to direction received from higher headquarters, an industrial security program was established for the command. The 1st Logistical Command was designated to establish and maintain the program under the staff supervision of this headquarters. Contact was established with the Defense Supply Agency, the Department of Defense agency with overall responsibility for administering the program, and
with the local US contractors concerned in Vietnam. Directives and procedures for the program are in the process of being prepared. Appropriate action has been initiated to provide training for the 1st Logistical Command personnel selected to administer the program.

19. (U) A new system was established to control, monitor and process security violations occurring in the command. USAV Regulation 380-9 (Security Violation Investigations) was prepared and will soon be published. This regulation expands and delineates instructions contained in AR 15-6 and AR 380-5. Explicit direction and guidance is provided concerning reporting of security violations and the conduct and processing of security violations investigations. The number of security violations occurring in the command during the period is noted on the chart on page.

20. (U) The gradual escalation of security services provided within the headquarters and to subordinate headquarters continued during the period. Increase in personnel within the G2 allowed for an expansion of liaison activities with higher, adjacent, and subordinate intelligence agencies and units. Better scheduling and improved inspection techniques developed during the previous reporting period have enabled the USAV counterintelligence team to increase, and improve, its coverage of units and headquarters staff sections. All major subordinate headquarters and the staff sections of the headquarters are scheduled for semi-annual counterintelligence inspections. In addition, the CI team has and will continue to conduct unannounced duty and after-duty hour security checks of USAV headquarters. Currently scheduled for the 2d half of FY 67 is the extension of regularly scheduled counterintelligence inspections to select sensitive units below the level of major subordinate units.

21. (U) During the period, in order to increase command emphasis and awareness in the area of security and security education, the routing of results of counterintelligence inspections was changed from intelligence channels to command channels. During FY 67, commanders of units with serious security weaknesses noted during inspections will be required to notify this headquarters as to corrective action taken to remedy such deficiencies.

22. (U) This headquarters has provided subordinate headquarters with security posters and special pamphlets of security interest in such areas as SAEKA and personnel security to act as an aid in the security education field. In addition, appropriate articles concerning items of security interest to commanders were published in the weekly USAV Intelligence Review.

23. (U) Added emphasis was placed in the area of transmission security with excerpts of Radio Research Unit reports being provided to commanders.
along with recommended actions to improve TRANSEC posture. The number of TRANSEC violations are noted on the chart on page

24. (U) Control of national agency checks was assumed from USJYIS by G2. Request for NAC's are now forwarded direct to the newly created DOD National Agency Check Center. To date, sufficient returns have not been received to evaluate reduction in investigative lead time.

25. (U) USARV Regulation 381-1 (Polygraph Activities) was published to implement the revised Department of the Army polygraph policies. Requirements for accrediting examiners and requesting and approving examination are prescribed within the regulation.

26. (U) Meetings were held with representatives of MACV and the 525th Military Intelligence Group to delineate responsibilities, functions, and priorities in the personnel security investigation field. It is anticipated that responsibility for security clearances of US Army personnel assigned to MACV will be assumed by USARV.

27. (S) Additional augmentations for the Military Intelligence Organization (MIO) were submitted for approval. This additional military intelligence augmentation was a part of the Phase IIIE requirement which was presented and approved by MACV, CINCUSARPAC and CINCPAC. The justification for the increased strength of intelligence units corresponded directly with the increased enemy buildup. The increased and urgent task of identifying, locating and penetrating the Viet Cong infrastructure, in addition to normal order of battle, were and remain a primary concern to the commander. The large geographic areas of intelligence interest, combined with the complex nature of the conflict require that intelligence personnel collect, evaluate and process a wide spectrum of information not normally needed or considered in the production of intelligence. This includes the determining in detail of an extremely complicated enemy order of battle, associated clandestine political infrastructure, and the consideration of the political, economic, and psychological factors which are extremely diversified in RVN. The augmentations were primarily requested to support 525th Military Intelligence Group, US tactical forces and 5th Special Forces Group.
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D. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

1. (S) This reporting period was significant in the buildup of US and Free World Military Forces. Concerning the deployment of major units, the following actions are notable:
   a. Operation MOONLIGHT commenced on 8 March with the arrival of B Company, 1/69th Armor at Qui Nhon and terminated on 9 May with the closure of the last elements of the 25th Infantry Division into base camps in the Cu Chi area twenty miles west of Saigon. This operation pertained to the deployment of the 1st Brigade; 1/69th Armor; Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division; and divisional support units.
   b. Operation HARDIHOOD, which terminated on 19 June, completed the deployment of Australian elements into Vietnam. This tended to round out the 1st Australian Task Force, Vietnam.
   c. Operation ROUNDOUT II was conducted during the period 8-11 June. This operation consisted of the deployment into Vietnam of the Republic of Korea (ROK) logistic support package (support units), required to support ROK forces in-country. These ROK units arrived through the aerial/surface port of Nha Trang by C-130 aircraft and ROK Navy LST's.
   d. Operation ROBIN, deployment of the 4th Infantry Division, began with the arrival of the advance parties of the 2d Brigade at Pleiku on 21 July. Phase I began with the arrival on 29 July of the 4th Engineer Battalion at Qui Nhon. Personnel of the battalion were debarked on 30 and 31 July and airlifted to Pleiku. Cargo and equipment were moved by land LOC to the base area in the vicinity of Pleiku. Operational planning for the deployment of the remainder of the division was completed in July.

2. (S) In this reporting period, operational planning was completed for deployment of the following major units:
   a. The Republic of Korea 9th Infantry Division will arrive in RVN during the period 31 July - 15 October. The code name is Operation STABLE.
   b. The 196th Infantry Brigade will arrive during the period 15-19 August. The code name is Operation BLUE JAY.
   c. An advance party arrived on 29 July for the Philippine Civic Action Group, Vietnam. The main body will close on or about 15 November. This operation is code named WREN.

3. (C) During this quarter concepts for implementing the Road Runner program were developed by USARV units. The concept is to have specially tailored forces traverse main and secondary roads to demonstrate the intention and ability to use and keep open existing roads.
4. (C) Action is continuing on the relocation and/or diversion of USARV units from the greater Saigon area. This headquarters published a letter directive on 7 June designating those units to be diverted or relocated during the months of October, November, and December. Another letter directive was published on 17 July requesting information from subordinate commands which will allow the publishing of a schedule of all planned relocations or diversions of units through 31 March 1967. By 31 July 1966, a total of 6,885 personnel were relocated or diverted from the Saigon-Cholon-Tan Son Nhut area.

5. (C) The port security mission for II, III, and IV CTZ's has been given to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command. To assist in the performance of this mission, two military police physical security companies have been placed under the operational control of the 1st Logistical Command.

6. (S) The tracker dog project is presently being delayed pending approval of the Government of Malaya. British clearance has been obtained. Personnel for the first two-man teams have been selected and are currently being processed. Training will be done with the assistance of the British Far East Land Force, Singapore. The teams are to be trained at the British Jungle Warfare School in Malaysia.

7. (C) During the month of May, Training Circulars Number 2 and 3 were published by this headquarters.

   a. Training Circular Number 2 requires combat units to establish replacement training programs in unit base camps. Replacements, particularly those produced by CONUS training centers, have received no training at unit level. This training circular directs that a program of small unit tactical training, weapons training, and related subjects be administered prior to utilization of new replacements in a tactical situation. This training is designed to develop proficiency in counterinsurgency tactics and techniques by instilling confidence and expediting integration into the combat team.

   b. Training Circular Number 3 established a requirement for the conduct of a familiarization firing program for USARV units. Individuals arriving in Vietnam, in many instances, have not had the opportunity to fire the weapons with which assigned upon arrival in-country. This directive establishes the requirement for each individual assigned a weapon to fire that weapon for familiarization and proper zero prior to assignment to duties involving use of firearms.

8. (C) The USARV Master Training Directive (USARV Regulation 350-1) is currently being prepared for distribution. When published it will establish training requirements for all combat, combat support, and combat service support units in RVN.
9. (C) Concurrent with the arrival of new types of equipment in-country, equipment training teams from CONUS have been actively supporting the training effort. At the present time CONUS teams are instructing in the use and maintenance of the following types of equipment: SML7 mine dispersing sub system; M578 light armored recovery vehicle; and AN/GRC 106 radio.

10. (C) Plans were developed to send a team of two officers and three enlisted personnel from the 1st Infantry Division to the Philippine Islands in August to provide orientation training for the Philippine Civic Action Group. The one week period of instruction will cover operations in VC and Free World Military Forces in preparation for the Philippine group's operations in Vietnam.

11. (C) During the reporting period arrangements were completed to provide training aids to major units in-country. Nine accounts have been established with the training aids center at Fort Buckner, Okinawa to supply these aids to requesting units.

12. (C) This headquarters has taken action to improve the army pathfinder program for better support of air assault operations. Action was motivated by a shortage of pathfinder personnel in Vietnam, an inability to identify pathfinders because of a lack of an MOS designator, and apparent needed changes in the pathfinder training program in CONUS. Every aviation battalion in Vietnam is authorized a pathfinder augmentation of two officers and thirteen enlisted men. Units in Vietnam are short approximately 150 pathfinders of 200 authorized. Of the group on hand only 25% are school trained. The United States Army Infantry School (USAIS) has indicated that the following actions are being taken to improve the pathfinder program:

a. The pathfinder course POI is being revised to emphasize helicopter operations and to capitalize on experiences and requirements in Vietnam.

b. Proposing courses of action to USCONARC to increase student input into the program by including lower grades of enlisted personnel whose assignment, actual or anticipated, requires performance or knowledge of pathfinder duties.

c. Recommending to Department of the Army that a system to identify pathfinder qualified personnel be established.

d. Recommending that authority be granted to commanders in combat zones, i.e., Commanding General, USARV, to award the pathfinder badge to personnel who have adequately performed such duties in combat.

13. (U) Based on DA requirement, this headquarters prepared a detailed report identifying each MTOE space change by grade, branch and MOS. This report included all MTOE actions previously submitted to USARPAC and contained several thousand line entries. The complete report was submitted to USARPAC.
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and DA on 30 July. Information contained in this report was reviewed by DA to effectively program personnel into the training base to meet IRO requirements.

14. (U) USARV Regulation 310-31, Organization and Equipment Authorization Table, has been approved and is being processed for publication and distribution. This is a comprehensive METES regulation which will eliminate any of the administrative format errors now causing METES processing delay. The regulation is designed to supplement DA 310-21 and to provide specific guidance for submission of METES in this command.

15. (U) During the reporting period thirty-two METES actions were received at this headquarters for processing and nineteen METES actions were dispatched; fourteen to USARV with a recommendation for approval; and five were approved and returned to originating units. The remaining thirty are being reviewed and/or staffed within this headquarters.

16. (U) Volume II of "Battlefield Reports - A Summary of Lessons Learned" was published by this headquarters in July.

17. (U) An ad hoc committee formed from various staff sections studied a USARCAC proposed revision in content and format for Field Manual 31-73, Advisor Handbook for Counterinsurgency. USARCAC comments and recommendations were forwarded to USAID on 1 July.

18. (C) Expansion of Army Aviation assets continued. Four more aviation companies were deployed and an aviation battalion headquarters was organized within RVN. A Decca Chain was completed and became operational on 22 July. The completion of this chain in Central South Vietnam makes available two Decca Navigation Systems in-country, providing 90% coverage of South Vietnam. This will improve the capability of aviation units and individual flights to locate remote landing zones at night and during adverse weather.

19. (C) The 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate) developed and tested a new helicopter weapons subsystem. This device drops 81mm mortar rounds from army helicopters. The mortar rounds are detonated by an air force 20-pound bomblet. The use of the air force bomblet was necessitated in view of the absence of any force to activate the mortar round as is normal when the round is propelled from the mortar tube. The air force bomblet activates itself on the basis of spin, rather than pressure. The system has a thirty round capacity which can be reloaded while the aircraft is airborne. The ammunition capacity and the number of rounds which can be dropped during one flight are limited by the weight-carrying capability of the aircraft. The mortar air delivery system (MADS) has been effectively utilized to supplement air delivered ordnance and conventional artillery. The optimum drop altitude of this weapon is 2500 feet. Pilots experienced in this system, have "bombed" as close as twenty-five meters to friendly troops. DA has approved the use of the MADS system without safety clarification. Aviation units throughout USAID are being provided construction diagrams and authority for local manufacture and use of this new weapons system.

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20. (C) Operation MARKET TIME: Eight UH-1B Army Helicopters were placed on loan to the US Navy during June to support US Navy-RVN river patrol operations. Navy pilots and crews were trained in UH-1B operations by Army pilots of the 12th Aviation Group. During training operations two UH-1B aircraft were lost. One experienced tail rotor failure and was autorotated into the South China Sea. All crew members escaped injury. The second aircraft crashed into the South China Sea immediately after take-off during night training operations. The pilot was killed and the copilot escaped with minor injuries. Cause of the crash is unknown at this time. It is anticipated that navy crews will be trained and operational by 15 August 1966.

21. (C) Three armed and armored Chinook helicopters arrived in RVN during May to undergo theater testing. To date one of these aircraft has received extensive damage from hostile fire while supporting combat operations. This aircraft can be repaired in-country and will then resume testing. The data collection portion of this aircraft test began on 15 July and will be completed in approximately ninety days. During this period these aircraft will perform combat operations in the II, III and IV Corps tactical zones. It is planned that the aircraft will be assigned to the lst Cavalry Division (Airmobile) when testing is completed.

22. (C) The 20mm XM-31 helicopter weapons subsystem has been evaluated while performing combat operations in RVN. The evaluation was conducted from April to July in units stationed throughout the II, III and IV CTZ's. During the evaluation, serious electrical problems developed in one of the subsystems which required extensive modification. The system designed for high speed air force fighters does not receive adequate air cooling in the lower speed helicopters. Interim test reports were forwarded to appropriate army agencies throughout the testing period. USAMCOM has been asked to determine if a hydraulic charging device could replace the present electrical system. The hydraulic charger would operate directly from the aircraft hydraulic system and would decrease the subsystem weight by more than 100 pounds. By 15 September 1966, ACTIV will complete the report of test to include recommended density of XM-31 weapons subsystems in USARV aviation units. The two test aircraft with weapons subsystems are being assigned to the 197th Aviation Company.

23. (C) The USARV Flight Standardization Board was formed using as a guide USARPAC Regulation 95-1, dated 29 March 1963, with change 1, dated 22 May 1963. USARV Regulation 95-6, dated 25 June 1966, was published after a flight standardization conference held on 23 May. The purpose of the regulation is to establish and maintain standardized army aircraft operating procedures in Vietnam. USARV orders have been published providing membership to the flight standardization board from all units processing organic or assigned aviation.

24. (C) The USARV telecon facility located in the headquarters building has become operational. This telecon facility will be used on a scheduled basis and will be controlled by the USARV Signal Communications Security Branch.
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25. (C) A Table of Distribution and Allowances was prepared and submitted
for the proposed Southeast Asia Pictorial Agency. This agency will provide
central direction for all pictorial and audiovisual resources in the command.
To lay the groundwork for the agency's activation, a mission, organization
and functions document was prepared.

26. (C) Department of the Army instituted a requirement in March 1966
for a written report of all damage to Army aircraft as a result of hostile
action. This form, FOR Form 48, commonly referred to as a Combat Damage
Report, was reproduced as USARV Form 232. The primary intent of this report
was to lessen the administrative effort required at unit level for completing
reports of aircraft accidents. The added requirement to report hit damage
not involving aircraft accidents negated the effect of easing the administra-
tive burden and duplicated a report required by MACV Directive 335-7. (JSIRD).
Units are also required to report hits through the OPREP-5 system, a CINCPAC
requirement.

a. A comparison of hit report data was conducted by the Analysis and
Management Division of the Aviation Office for the month of May 1966. Total
hits reported were compared from the three sources with the following results:

1) OPREP-5: (Army only) 402 hits (CINCPAC requirement)
2) Combat Damage Form 48: (Army only) 320 hits (DA requirement)
3) JSIDR's: (All services) 209 hits (MACV requirement)

b. Through informal discussions with unit commanders, a number of
reasons were cited for noncompliance with either requirement in the lengthy
report areas (Form 48 and JSIDR). In addition to communications problems
involved in telephonically reporting, the most often stated reason was the
complexity of both forms, and problems of reproduction at unit level.

c. The two reporting systems, JSIDR and Combat Damage Reports, provide
valuable statistics for vulnerability assessment, and could have an impact on
future procurement and force development with regard to Army aircraft. The
JSIDR system is oriented primarily toward providing timely operational intelli-
gence regarding daily locations and intensities of hostile fire directed at
aircraft operating over RVN. Combat Damage Reports are limited principally
to statistical evaluation.

d. When units are burdened with similar and duplicate reports, all
reports in the subject area will lose some validity because of the additional
administrative burden placed on tactical units. In the aircraft hit reporting
area Army units are not utilizing either of the lengthy hit reports to the
maximum with a subsequent loss of valuable data. The Combat Damage Report
portion of the FOR Form 48 could be eliminated and interested agencies could
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be included in distribution of output for the JSIDR system. Accordingly,
action has been initiated to revise the MACV JSIDR Report. Upon completion
of this action, this headquarters will forward the modified JSIDR report
to the US Army Board for Aviation Accident Research and the Ballistics
Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, with the recommendation
that it replace the current Combat Damage Report portion of the FOR Form
48.

27. (U) Filming began on 4 July to produce a complete motion picture
film on army communications in RVN. The film is for the purpose of pro-
viding the 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) and other interested agencies
a training, information, and historical record of the present communica-
tions system in RVN. Over 15,000 feet of Eastman color negative film
had been exposed by 28 July. The entire program is scheduled for com-
pletion by 1 August.

28. (S) In May planning began at the USARV Signal Office to provide
long lines communication support and base camp support to meet force
development requirements. At the same time USARV Signal Office was tasked
by MACV to plan for and provide this same type support for Free World
Military Forces being deployed to RVN. Units and locations for which this
planning was accomplished, include the following: the 4th Infantry Di-
vision elements at Pleiku, Ban Me Thuot, and Tay Hoa; the 196th Brigade
at Tay Ninh; the ROK Marine Brigade south of Chu Lai; the 9th ROK In-
fantry Division for Tay Hoa, Minh Hoa, and Dong Ba Thin; the ROK Logistics/ROK FFORCEN Headquarters, north of Nha Trang; and the Philippine
Civic Action Group at Tay Ninh.

a. To support the units identified above, the following require-
ments developed: Seventeen 12 channel VHF radio systems; four 24 channel
long distance tropo scatter systems; and six 45 channel microwave systems.
While the microwave systems were included in the planning, equipment was
not immediately available. When it arrives it will replace some of the
multiple 12 channel VHF systems. Planning also included base camp support
involving switch boards, communications centers, data terminals, and
photographic support.

b. Implementation of plans began in July with the relocating
of some in-country equipment to be installed in August and September.
In-country assets are inadequate to meet the total requirements; accord-
ingly additional support is enroute from CONUS and includes both personnel
and equipment.
LODGISTICS:

1. (U) On 1 July, the Transportation Branch of the G4 Services Division was assigned the responsibility for managing the Military Airlift Command (MAC) passenger space allocations to USARV, and monitoring all aspects of USARV passenger movements from Vietnam. The assignment of this new function to the ACofS, G4, was based on a review of the causes that created a 900-pax passenger backlog in the USARV Replacement/Rotatee Facility during a portion of the month of June 1966. As a result of this review it was determined that staff transportation should manage MAC space allocations by receiving the allocations and further allocating the space to major subordinate commands. By this method of managing spaces, an early determination can be made to insure sufficient spaces are available to meet the command's personnel movement requirement and insure a flow of rotatees into the USARV Replacement/Rotatee Facility equivalent to spaces available.

2. (C) In May 1966, a review of rotatees during the "peak" rotation period (June through August 1966) indicated that the handling of all replacements and rotatees through the facilities at Saigon would place a severe strain on the USARV Replacement/Rotatee Facility, create air traffic congestion at the Tan Son Nhut Airport, and require additional in-country air transportation. Accordingly, preliminary planning was begun to acquire special mission aircraft operating between CONUS and Pleiku, Vietnam, to support passenger movement of approximately 18,000 rotatees and replacements of the 1st Cavalry Division (AH). Coordination between DA, MAC and USARV resulted in the first C-130 aircraft, operating between CONUS and Pleiku in support of 1st Cavalry Division (AH) replacement/rotatee operation, arriving at Pleiku on 5 June. While this particular operation was scheduled to terminate on 31 August, it has been extended through December and has been expanded to include all units in the Pleiku-An Khe area. To date the program has been highly effective in accomplishing this command's objectives of an orderly turnover of 1st Cavalry Division (AH) personnel and providing the desired transportation services.

3. (U) The ACofS, G4, was host to a briefing presented by representatives of American Export Isbrandtsen Lines and Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation. This briefing, concerning project Expedite, was sponsored by Department of the Army. Project Expedite itself is the discharge of containerized cargo from ships to helicopters. While the project was favorably received by Department of the Army, no action has been taken to implement it in RVN until the comments and recommendations from the commanders in RVN are received and evaluated by Department of the Army. These comments and recommendations are currently being consolidated by this headquarters for submission to Department of the Army.
1. (U) Representatives of Headquarters, USAV, 1st Logistical Command, and USA Headquarters Area Command and USA Support Command, Saigon, met on 23 June with the objective of eliminating duplication in providing vehicular support to activities in the Saigon-Cholon-Tan Son Nhat area. As a result, vehicular support was withdrawn from certain activities where duplication appeared to exist. On 7 July, a survey revealed that re-adjustments had made forty-one vehicles available to support more valid transportation requirements.

5. (U) During the period May to July 1966 representatives of USAV GH and the 1st Logistical Command prepared and submitted a proposed rail plan to MACV for approval. This plan included procedures for maintenance and control of 200 U.S. rail cars and proposed rail construction facilities for US Forces' use. Also included was an estimate of future rail rolling stock requirements.

6. (U) During the month of July 1966, a detailed study was conducted to determine the adequacy of total port throughput capability versus programmed tonnage requirements for the period July 1966 through June 1967. The purpose of the study was to evaluate requirements for port construction. The study confirmed the validity of the current port construction program. Any cutback on port construction will have an adverse effect on mission accomplishment.

7. (U) During the period 1 - 7 May 1966, the USAV Graves Registration Officer attended a mortuary conference in Hawaii for the purpose of finalizing details for the Army's assumption of mortuary operations in Vietnam. In preparation for the Army's takeover of mortuary responsibilities USAV Regulation 638-30, Subject: Deceased Personnel, was written, staffed, and distributed to the field on 7 May 1966. This regulation prescribes policies and procedures for the handling of deceased personnel in Vietnam. The US Army assumed mortuary operations from the US Air Force on 1 July. Since that date a plan has been developed and executed to airtlift remains of deceased personnel to Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, as well as to Travis Air Force Base, California. Entering its final stages during this quarterly period was the plan to establish a personal effects depot under the control of the US Army Mortuary. Target date for this project is 1 September. During this period USAV Regulation 643-53, Personal Property - Disposition of Personal Effects - Republic of Vietnam, was staffed. This regulation will be published in August and become effective 1 September.

8. (U) USAV Regulation 755-20, Subject: Property Disposal, was published and distributed to the field. This regulation prescribes policies and procedures to be followed for the disposition of excess, surplus and foreign excess personal property at disposal activities.
9. (U) During the month of July 1966, USARV Regulation 700-3, Subject: Mail Order Service - Individual Clothing, was written, staffed, published and distributed to the field. This regulation establishes a mail order system throughout Vietnam to provide a source of uniform items to personnel who do not have access to the clothing sales store. The system is operated by Headquarters Area Command out of the clothing sales store in Saigon.

10. (U) Three liaison visits were conducted during this reporting period to the US Army Procurement Agency, Japan. These visits proved most valuable in that decisions were made which permitted the agency to make all outstanding contract awards prior to the close of FY 66.

11. (U) In order to eliminate the inflationary impact of US procurement activities on the Vietnamese economy, studies were made by the USARV staff on the reduction of plaster spending, as well as service contract analysis. Troop support requirements eliminated from procurement in Vietnam will be shifted to other sources. These studies were used as a basis for command policy governing procurement activities and local purchase procedures.

12. (U) A draft USARV regulation was developed in late July to outline command policy on the logistical support of nongovernmental and nonmilitary agencies and individuals in Vietnam. Target date for publication and distribution of this regulation is 15 August 1966.

13. (U) On 21 - 25 June 1966, the USARV Class I officer attended a conference at Fort Mason, California on the problem of refresher vessel scheduling. The purpose of the conference was to inform Headquarters, NSTS PAC of the tonnage requirements for the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang. The problems of offloading and throughput rates at the USARV ports and the restricted amount of in-country refrigeration were also discussed. NSTS PAC has requested two more refrigerated vessels of the R-2 type to be assigned to the Vietnam route and indicated that ships of opportunity would make up the shortfall. Schedules have been adjusted to allow six days of port time at each port. The refrigerated ship "Taquc" (R-1) has been assigned to USARV for depot storage purposes and is now being utilized at Cam Ranh Bay. Requirements and delivery status of subsistence were discussed with Headquarters, Defense Personnel Support Center, Oakland, during this visit.

14. (U) 32d Medical Depot.

a. Action is currently pending to bring the 32d Medical Depot, now at reduced strength, to full strength. This action will provide two additional officers and forty enlisted men to the depot.
b. At the request of the Surgeon General this command is currently evaluating the possibility of procuring MUST utility elements for use in existing USARV hospitals.

c. MUST is the acronym for Medical Unit Self-Contained, Transportable, which represents a new concept in housing and providing utility requirements for field-type hospitals. MUST is composed of three basic elements which may be configured as required, e.g., as expandable shelter for clinics and the various specialties, wards, and utilities shelters. The utility element which provides electric power, air conditioning, and other services appears to be ideally suited to compensate for the unfavorable climatic and environmental conditions which affect USARV hospitals.

15. (U) Logistics - Swap Program. During June 1966, a program was initiated by Department of the Army to modernize the USARV UH-1B helicopter fleet. The program was designed to withdraw a total of 121 high-time helicopters for rebuild in CONUS. The helicopters are being withdrawn from RVN at the rate of fifteen per month. They are scheduled to begin arriving back in RVN (after rebuild) in September 1966. To date, a total of thirty UH-1B helicopters have been returned to CONUS under the rebuild program (SWAP).

16. (U) UH-1B helicopter personnel rescue hoists were made available in the form of a kit and MTO which modifies the air frame to accept the hoist. A hoist will give a unit the capability of evacuating personnel from areas unsuitable for landing. Use of the hoist was prohibited by USARVCOM as a result of two reported failures of the hoist cables. Shipments of hoist modification kits were received in July and it is anticipated that the hoist will be operational by 1 August.

17. (U) The signal portion of USARV Regulation 750, Organization, Policies, and Responsibilities for Maintenance Operations, was staffed as was the signal portion of the USARV Education and Training Regulation. A study for the establishment of a Readiness Division within the USARV Signal Section was prepared.

18. (U) A study was prepared and recommendations formulated on calibration of signal items for the 1st Signal Brigade (USA STRATDC). 

19. (U) A directive is being published by this headquarters which establishes command organizational maintenance policies and procedures to be followed at all echelons. A readiness assistance team has been organized at USARV headquarters to provide technical guidance to all units which have a need for this service. An intensive preventive maintenance program is presently under development. The purpose of the program is to stimulate and train personnel in the employment of preventive maintenance.
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indicators, which will ultimately improve their overall maintenance posture. USARV, with the assistance of the US Army Maintenance Board and PS Magazine, is working toward development of a Vietnam-oriented program. It is envisioned that this program will be one of information and education. Plans include preparation of posters, flyers, leaflets, letters from Connie Rodd, radio spot announcements and development of bulletins and news letters.

20. (U) With the assistance of USAMC, this command has initiated a standardization program aimed at reducing the multiplicity of makes and models of generators, MHE, and construction equipment in USARV to a manageable level. Lack of standardization has caused serious logistical problems in the past and this program is expected to produce significant reductions in requirements for repair parts, maintenance support and training. To date 98% of all commercial forklifts within the Saigon area have been standardized. Overall command deadline rate for this item has declined from 43% in March, to the present 13%. Conversely, the other items scheduled for future standardization continue to show excessive deadline rates due to inadequate repair parts supply. Parts are being requisitioned using RED BALL procedures and it is through the effectiveness of this system that the present mix of makes and models is being supported. New D73 bulldozers begin arriving during September at the rate of twenty-five per week. Rough terrain forklifts and generators are scheduled to start arriving in quantity during the first and second quarters of this fiscal year. It is expected that as these items arrive our maintenance problems and deadline rates will be significantly reduced.

21. (U) The US Army Marine Maintenance Activity Vietnam was activated 1 July. This unit provides general support maintenance for all US Army marine craft and amphibians in the Republic of Vietnam. The activity provides a tailored organization of 496 personnel to support the present and future marine craft and amphibian fleet.

22. (U) A command deadline report has been established to serve as a management device for measuring the status of materiel maintenance in USARV. The report includes selected maintenance of significant equipment from the major subordinate commands. Management by exception data will be provided through studying the deadline trends and projections.

23. (U) A contract has been negotiated with Vinnell Corporation to provide and operate fully-equipped, third and fourth echelon shops for maintenance of construction equipment, marine equipment, and track and suspension components in RVN. Facilities will be located at Cam Ranh Bay and are scheduled to become operational in October.

24. (U) Major General H.B. Anderson, CG, USAMC, visited RVN at the request of the DCU, USARV, to review the current status of the
USARV M107 and M110 maintenance and supply system. General Anderson arrived on 13 July. During the period 14–21 July, he visited all heavy artillery battalions and all of the logistical activities within RVN which are concerned with the support of these weapons.

25. (U) A 175mm gun (M107) exploded on 26 June killing three personnel and injuring five. A USAMC Team arrived in RVN on 5 July to conduct an investigation of the incident. A preliminary report indicated the failure of the weapon was not due to metal fatigue, but to an overpressure which exceeded the design limits of the breech mechanism. All ammunition items identified with the accident were suspended until the final report is received.

26. (U) A final report on the 3 April, 175mm gun incident (reported in the previous CRILL) was received on 15 June. The cause of the accident was determined to be a 3/8 inch fatigue crack at the origin of the rifling due to a low fracture roughness. All 175mm gun tubes of the same manufacture have been returned to CONUS for further tests.

27. (U) The deadline rate of the 175mm gun M107 and 8 inch Howitzer M110 has declined appreciably from an average daily rate of ten in March, to five in July. Factors contributing to this favorable condition are: an increase in the quantity and scope of the replenishment of repair parts, by virtue of the success of the RED BALL EXPRESS system; increased emphasis upon unit and direct support maintenance of the weapons systems; and the full-time assistance of two in-country technical assistance teams.

28. (U) Countermortar radar AN/MQ-4A equipment availability has been acceptable. Sacramento Army Depot is preparing to implement the cyclic overhaul program which is tentatively scheduled to deliver four sets initially and two per month thereafter.

29. (U) Support for night vision equipment is provided at Sacramento Army Depot since repair parts continue to be in critical supply. Experience and more effective procedures have resulted in improved equipment turn-around times. Depot repair processing of these items in less than forty-eight hours is not unusual.

30. (U) An existing USARPAC contract with Kentron Hawaii, Ltd, for electronic test instrument repair was extended to include RVN. Kentron Hawaii will provide six technicians, thereby increasing the overall USARV capability to repair complex electronic test equipment.

31. (C) On 17 May, 1st Logistical Command requested the 2d Logistical Command to fabricate gun shields and hatch armor for installation on M113 APC's. Production was begun on 19 May, and the last shipment of
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gun shields and hatch armor arrived 24 June. In view of the excellent
results obtained from these kits, 1st Logistical Command has requisitioned
thirty additional gun shields and hatch armor to be fabricated and shipped
to the 1st Infantry Division.

32. (C) Department of the Army recently stated that the program to
modernize and upgrade the M113/M113A1 APC currently in use, or programmed
for USARV, will continue on an expedited schedule. The three major pro-
grams in progress are: development of firing/observation kits for se-
lected vehicles; retrofit of the M74A cupola to accommodate twin 7.62mm
machine guns with vehicles; and modification of selected M113's with
side-facing M60 machine guns with small gun shields, and caliber 50
machine guns with hatch armor.

33. (C) Ammunition status continued to improve with approximately
95% of the sixty-day stockage objective on hand at the close of this
reporting period. The 2.75 inch rocket and selected illuminating rounds
remain in short supply.

34. (U) The USAMC was provided with USARV's present and programmed
weapons densities for tactical units through May 1967 as requested by
them.

35. (C) In late July 1966, the ASR on 105mm HE was removed. This
action was taken after being informed by Department of the Army that
USARV would be allocated additional stock to meet requirements. Sub-
sequent information outlined additional proposals which, if approved,
will provide further assistance in enabling USARV to overcome the ad-
verse situation that has existed over the past several months.

36. (C) USARV has taken action to correct the high rate of malfunctions
related to the functioning of the 81mm mortar rounds armed with M52
series fuses. The 1st Logistical Command is now operating four renova-
tion lines in-country at Long Binh, Can Tho, Pleiku, and Qui Nhon.
These lines are refusing all 81mm rounds assembled with the M52 series
fuzes with the M525 fuse. By the end of the reporting period, 257,449
rounds had been modified in-country. Modified rounds from Okinawa be-
gan arriving in-country in July. All units have been directed to turn
in unmodified 81mm ammunition to their supporting ASP on a one-for-one
exchange basis. An ASR of five rounds per weapon per day was established
for 81mm HE ammunition due to low stockage level of 81mm ammunition in-
country.

37. (U) On 1 April the ACOefs, G4 established the Materiel Readiness
Office (MRO). By definition, the MRO has the responsibility for deter-
mining the quantitative and qualitative status of equipment in relation
to standards established for specific end items, as well as organizational
material.
38. (U) On 29 May, through the publication of USARV Regulation 735-2, Accounting for Property Lost, Destroyed, Abandoned or Damaged as a Direct Result of Insurgency or Counterinsurgency Activity, a simplified procedure for reporting combat losses was established. Through use of a Department of the Army form already in use as a part of the Army Equipment Records System (TAERS), combat loss data was reduced to keypunch data for machine processing. Monthly combat loss summaries and total loss consolidations are provided by the 12th DPDU. This combat loss data can be readily used by commanders and support personnel to: determine equipment loss rates and forecast resupply requirements; preposition replacement requirements; provide data for after action reports; and plan for procurement of equipment.

39. (U) The status of real estate acquisition in RVN for US Forces in II, III, and IV CTZ's as of 31 July is shown on the photographs attached hereto as inclosures 5 through 19.
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F. FORCE DEVELOPMENT:

1. (S) During the months of April and May, USARV prepared and published the Phase III (Roundout) troop list. Concurrently, it prepared a corps contingency force (CCF) troop list to support CINCPAC planning objectives. Both troop lists and supporting documents were taken to USARPAC for coordination on 15 May.

2. (S) During the USARPAC conference, 16 May - 25 May, seven major tasks were accomplished by the USARV team attending. These were:
   a. Listing all new requirements to Phase II since the January conference (CINCPAC directed that these new requirements be called CY 66 adjusted).
   b. Listing of CY 67 requirements to round out Phase IIA (R) forces (CINCPAC directed that these requirements be called CY 67 requirements).
   c. Listing corps contingency force (CCF) requirements.
   d. Preparing IBM data processing card decks for all Phase II, CY 67, and CCF requirements.
   e. Rejustifying each unit (regardless of phase) not yet approved by JCS.
   f. Posting master list of JCS SM303 unit availabilities with approximately 600 changes.
   g. Updating the IBM card deck; and updating the USARV Impact Study of 25 April based on 22 May availability dates.

3. (S) During the CINCPAC conference 2 June - 10 June, USARV representatives assisted in compiling data for the CINCPAC evaluation of the requirements. CINCPAC directed that only those units required in CY 66 would be included in CY 66 adjusted requirements. There were approximately thirty-three of these units requested for deployment in CY 67 which were needed to support current concepts. In order to maintain the integrity of this package, the required date for these units was accelerated to December 1966.

4. (S) USARV reviewed JCS Document SM303, updated as of 22 May 1966, to validate the command's capability to support current deployments and concepts of operations. The review revealed that in the updated list there were some adjustments in availability dates. Shortfalls, however, existed in the same areas as in the 24 March DA data base which was

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evaluated by USARV in April 1966. The critical areas continued to be aviation, construction, and supply. See the charts on pages 5.

5. (S) Another study concerned the addition to the troop list of sixty-one infantry companies, one each for all in-country, programmed, and requested infantry battalions. The added company was based on the ARGUS Study which proposed a reorganization of the infantry battalions in Vietnam. Its purpose was essentially the same as the fourth battalion in the separate brigades: increased capability to conduct operations and provide security. The study specifically excluded consideration of the effect of the battalion reorganization on the brigade and division bases. To insure that spaces would be available if required to expand the bases, 16% of the strength of the sixty-one companies and three battalions previously listed for the separate brigades was added to the requirements list.

6. (S) Another study concerned itself with evaluating unit force structure requirements and the basis of allocation of selected units.

a. This study's input related the expected capabilities of certain selected type units with their performance in-country. This study's results proved that certain type units are performing up to their expected capabilities as recommended in FM 101-10-2, applicable TOE's, and/or professional expectations. These units are: Ordnance Ammunition Direct Support Battalion, HHD, (TOE 9-86F); Medical Evacuation Hospital, (TOE 8-581E); Medical Surgical Hospital, Ar., Mobile, (TOE 8-571E); Medical Depot, (TOE 8-667E); Engineer Panel Bridge Company, (TOE 5-77E); Engineer Port Construction Company, (TOE 5-129 E).

b. Due to a high deadline rate of equipment; shortages of personnel, materials, and equipment; capabilities of supporting units; traffic congestion; local limitations; and local conditions-some type units are not meeting their expected capabilities. Units falling in this category are: Ordnance Ammunition Detachment Team II (Renovation), (TOE 9-500E); Engineer Combat Battalion, (TOE 5-35D); Engineer Float Bridge Company, (TOE 5-785E/05); Engineer Construction Support Company, (TOE 5-114D); Transportation Terminal Service Company, (TOE 55-117D); Transportation Heavy Boat Company, (TOE 55-129D); Transportation Medium Boat Company, (TOE 55-128E); Transportation Light Amphibious Company, (TOE 55-138E); Transportation Light Truck Company, (TOE 55-18E and 55-18F); Transportation Medium Truck Company, (TOE 55-18E and 55-18F).

c. A comparison between the actual performance and expected capabilities of signal units could not be accurately made. Signal personnel and signal type units are a critical shortfall in RVN. Units available have been providing support to the maximum of their capability.
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CY 66 SHORTFALL
AVIATION UNITS

REQUIREMENT

AVAILABILITY

NUMBER

OF 20 UNITS

20

30

40

1st QTR

2d QTR

3d QTR

4th QTR

12

10

10

3

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Modifications, Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE's) and Troop Unit Change Requests (TUCR's) have made some of these units unrecognizable as far as original TOE structures are concerned. Many variations now exist between TOE's, FM 101-10-2, and the actual structure of units in-country. Many units have been "built" for specific missions and/or operations.

d. Based on the information available, the actual performance of the type units is expected to remain basically the same in the foreseeable future. Availability of authorized personnel and essential equipment and lower deadline rates of on-hand equipment could considerably improve the actual performance of many units and bring them more in consonance with programmed capabilities.

7. (U) As of 28 July 1966, this headquarters was in receipt of COMUSMACV OPLAN 60-67, Emergency Evacuation of Noncombatants from RVN. This plan is being reviewed and USARV's supporting plan will be published by 28 October 1966.
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G. COMMAND MANAGEMENT

1. (U) Commercial branches of the Chase Manhattan Bank and the Bank of America opened in downtown Saigon in July 1966. These banks offer no services to US personnel except paper checking accounts, in accordance with policies established by the US Treasury Department and the Government of Vietnam. However, it is planned to open a military banking facility, operated by the Chase Manhattan Bank in Cholon. The US Army Headquarters Area Command has advised that 1 October 1966 is the target date for site availability, as the proposed site is now occupied by the US Navy.

2. (U) The following savings bond awards were issued to units in the command: Minuteman Flags-3; Secretary of the Army Savings Awards-4; Minuteman Awards-42; Commander's Savings Citations-8. An intensive savings bond campaign was carried out during May and June 1966. As a result of this campaign, the USARV participation rate climbed from 69.9% as of 31 March 1966 to 80.4% as of 30 June 1966.

3. (U) This headquarters was notified by CINCPAC that the accounts office functions for USARV disbursing offices will be relocated to USARH A and USARJ. Formerly all functions were handled at USARV. As of 1 September 1966 all USARV disbursing offices will submit accounts to either USARH A or USARJ.

4. (U) Hospitals in USARJ receiving patients from USARV have been requested to cash designated depositary checks issued by USARV disbursing officers and payable only in MPC. DA approved the cashing of these checks, and procedures were established for the redemption of the checks by the USARJ Finance and Accounting Offices.

5. (U) DA has approved plans to implement the 141PVS in Vietnam. Plans are being made for the orderly conversion to this system by non-divisional finance sections. Finance offices of in-country divisions and separate brigades have converted to the system.

6. (U) COMUSMACV authorized conversion of MPC to US currency for PCS personnel within the confines of the 90th Replacement Battalion. Conversion is now made for out-bound as well as in-bound personnel, thereby reducing congestion at the Tan Son Nhut civilian air terminal.

7. (U) USARV finance officers were authorized to make health-and-comfort casual payments, not to exceed twenty-five dollars, to individuals evacuated to hospitals within RVN, without a casual payment record. This policy is necessary to allow such individuals, who are without funds, to purchase necessities.
8. (U) DA has authorized USARV disbursing officers to exchange cash for negotiable instruments drawn by US contractors, in those areas where US banking facilities are not available.

9. (U) Effective 1 August 1966, Operation and Maintenance, Army funds are to be used in lieu of Assistance-in-Kind (AIK) funds for salary payments to all direct hire local national employees. Trainees will continue to be paid from AIK funds.

10. (U) All obligation authorities for FY 66 funds received in this headquarters for the 4th quarter have been closed and a final report was submitted to USARYIS reflecting an obligation rate of 99.9%. Total recorded obligations for FY 66 were $135,001,911.

11. (U) This headquarters received authority to incur obligations against FY 67 O&M funds on 1 July 1966 from USARYIS. It is expected, however, that this command will convert to allotment funding on 1 August 1966. This will involve converting certain July 1966 O&M transactions to reflect appropriation accounting. The impact of this change will be the maintenance of management and accounting data in-country by the 7th Finance Section, where it will be readily available for analysis and decision-making by this command. Another benefit to accrue from this change will be improved control and utilization of O&M funds in support of operations in Vietnam.

12. (U) A midyear budget review by this headquarters resulted in the receipt from MACV of Assistance-in-Kind funds in the amount of $VN33.4 million. It is anticipated there will be a considerable shortfall in AIK funds available to meet requirements for the balance of calendar year 1966. This is the result of strict limitations by GVN on the amount of AIK support to be furnished MACV. During the quarter, action was taken to fund all requirements, other than the temporary hire of local nationals, from appropriated funds. The priority use of AIK funds for the remainder of calendar year 1966 will be for hire of temporary local labor.

13. (U) Audit procedures have been developed to conform with the provisions of AR 36-75. During the period covered by this report, forty audits of nonappropriated funds were performed and twenty-two audits of USARV clubs and messes and eighteen MACV mess associations. In addition, several assistance visits were made to newly established funds to aid them in establishing proper procedures. On 15 July 1966 audit responsibility for fourteen nonappropriated funds of 1st Logistical Command subordinate units was transferred to Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command.

14. (U) To reduce the administrative workload in Vietnam, this headquarters continued to control the number of reports. The buildup in troop strength can be expected to generate an increase in reporting.
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requirements. Thus, it remains essential that USARV take appropriate measures to control that workload. Accordingly, while a total of 112 non-USARV and twenty-four USARV reports were added during the period, twenty-one non-USARV and thirteen USARV reports were either discontinued or the command was granted relief from making them. The net result was a leveling-off of approved recurring reports during the last two months.

15. (U) The delineation of functions by various headquarters in Vietnam continues to be a subject of concern. Accordingly, USARV studied delineations of functions between this headquarters and Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. Among the functions considered were: medical regulating; personnel management of MEDS personnel; control of engineer construction materials; logistical force development and logistical planning; followup on FOM requisitions; operation of army postal units. Subsequent action as a result of the study has streamlined the management effort.

16. (U) Modification of the Organizations and Functions Manual continued during the quarter. Staff sections submitted their respective parts, which were reviewed by the Comptroller and returned with appropriate comments.

17. (U) A basic problem was resolved concerning the exercise of general staff supervision, where the general staff section chiefs were colonels, over special staff sections headed by general officers. As a result of this study, two general postulates were established:

a. To exclude such special staff sections from general staff supervision tends to weaken the general staff in the performance of its responsibilities and could result in its being bypassed in the decision-making process.

b. That general staff supervision does not imply a requirement to make a minute and detailed review of the technical aspects of the work of the special staff, but rather a broad based review of actions to assure coordination and conformance to command policies and priorities and furtherance of the command mission.

18. (U) Recognizing the limitations in USARV's DPU capability to meet requirements of rapidly increasing troop strength and DA reports, USARPAC assumed responsibility for the USARV personnel strength and accounting function on 1 July. All data reduction of morning reports is being accomplished by USARPAC, and a monthly updated personnel status accounting function to USARPAC allows the 12th DPU to revert to the operational control of USARV, and provides the commander and staff with a vital and effective management tool. Significant improvements in the USARV personnel requisition and replacement system are anticipated and improvements have already been noted. In addition, the personnel
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Management capability in this command will be further enhanced by
Personnel Service Companies equipped with the UNIVAC 1005.

19. (U) The depot punched card machine (PCM) modernization program
is an extension of the DA program, which involves replacement of IBM
407/609 (tabulator/calculator) equipment with UNIVAC 1005 card processor
computers. On 27 July 1966, two of the eight UNIVAC 1005s scheduled for
the depot modernization program (Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon and
AMMC) arrived in Saigon. Both systems are currently operational and
being used to test programs written by the 14th ICC/AMMC for the depot
ADP system. The arrival of the first two UNIVAC 1005 systems is another
milestone toward achievement of the goal for total automation of supply
operations in this command.

20. (U) Those DS units supporting aviation in this command will use
a low volume requisitioning system consisting of a Friden Flexowriter/
IBM 026 card punch machine configuration to increase the speed and
capability of aviation supply operations. The system prepares elementary
stock accounting documents and punched card requisitions (DA Form 2765),
which will serve as direct input to the mechanized Aviation Material
Management Center (AMMC) of the 34th General Support Group (AM&S).
The 1st Cavalry Division (AM) is on the system, and communicates directly
to the AMMC via a sole user data transceiver circuit. Twelve Flex/026
packages are due in to the AMMC, and will be installed initially at DS
units in Vung Tau, Qui Nhon, Dong Ba Thin and Nha Trang. A USAVCOM
technical representative is currently instructing DSU personnel in
the operation and installation of the system.

21. (U) The Control Data Corporation in its role as subcontractor
to RMK-BRJ Construction Company, the US Navy's primary construction con-
tractor in SEA, has installed and is operating two 3100 series computers
equipped with 32K memory, nine magnetic tape units (IBM compatible),
two paper tape readers and two printers. ThGIS headquarters has been
instructed by Department of the Army that computer time on the CDC system
is available. Thus, action has been taken to have the lst Logistical
Command, 34th General Support Group (AM&S), and 12th Data Processing Unit
review their requirements for possible applications which could be used
advantageously on the CDC system. Sound systems planning will definitely
optimize the benefits to be accrued through utilization of the CDC Com-
ter Service Center.

22. (U) The extension of highly disciplined supply procedures into
forward tactical areas has created a critical need for mechanization of
data processing at the DS/GS unit level, which is compatible with organi-
sational structures found at both higher and lower echelons of supply.
As Phase I of a two-phased, DA sponsored DSU/GSU mechanization program,
this command is receiving thirteen NCR 500 computer equipment/personnel
packages in accordance with this headquarters' desire for vertical implementation through mechanization of DS/GS activities in combat units and those 1st Logistical Command units located primarily in the Saigon Support Command. The first sets of equipment are due to arrive in September 1966, and will be operated and maintained by a ten man enlisted team. In addition, a new equipment introduction (NEI) team, consisting of two officers and ten enlisted men will be responsible for orientation of recipient units, assisting in file conversion, and being available for on site operational guidance.

23. (U) The five-year program development for army information and data systems (AIDS) is designed to develop master data processing plans for the orderly development of systems, and to establish a firm base from which planning of information and data systems can be prepared. All data processing installations (DPI) in the command prepared input data outlined in the program concerning DPI and ADPE Plans and DPI operations plans, which was used as guidance for the overall master plan for this command as prepared by the Comptroller.
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H. INSPECTOR GENERAL:

1. (U) Within this reporting period, forty-seven complaints and 149 requests for assistance were received by the inspector general, this headquarters. Twenty-nine of the complaints were considered to be justified. Of these complaints, twenty pertained to personnel actions; seven to unit conditions; one to unjust treatment; and one to dependent problems. The majority of requests for assistance were related to assignments; re-assignments; late departure for CONUS; pay; and promotions.

2. (U) Activities consisted of staff liaison visits and informal inquiries into general conditions existing throughout the command. The inspector general also conducted staff visits to various units of the command.

3. (U) Annual General Inspections were conducted in the following units: 89th Military Police Group; 46th Engineer Battalion; 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate); 16th Transportation Battalion; 299th Engineer Battalion; 11th Aviation Battalion; 6th Battalion, 71st Artillery; 69th Signal Battalion; 10th Aviation Battalion; 588th Engineer Battalion; and 3rd Battalion, 18th Artillery.

I. INFORMATION:

1. (U) The 11th and 16th Public Information Detachments arrived in-country during the quarter. There are now four detachments operating in the field, as follows: I FFV - One AE Team (Press Camp); II FFV - One FA Team (PI); 25th Inf Div - One FB Team (PI Aug); 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div - One FB Team (PI Aug).

2. (U) Teletype communications between USARV IO and MACV have been installed. MACV provides relay service to IO Offices at Nha Trang, An Khe, Pleiku and Headquarters, II FFORCEN.

3. (U) During this quarter, USARV produced the following:

FACT SHEETS
Guidelines to Good Relations
The Pilferer and You
Your R&R Program
Resupply in Vietnam
No License to Kill
USARV's 1st Anniversary

TROOP TOPICS
Armed Forces Day
Malaria, Dengue and Dysentery

POSTERS
Rules for Fools
Malaria Prevention

4. (U) Circulation of USARV's command newspaper, "The Army Reporter," was increased to 40,000 copies weekly. This was an increase of 10,000
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copies over the preceding quarter.

5. (U) Twenty-eight copies of a 16mm color film, "To Prevent Con-
quest," were distributed to major subordinate commands.

6. (U) A total of 116 special feature radio tapes of 5-10 minutes
length were produced to support command information objectives.

7. (U) Command Information Pamphlet 1-66, a booklet in cartoon form,
was produced to emphasize standards for personal conduct in Vietnam.
An initial distribution of 20,000 copies was made in July.

8. (U) A total of 1,000 Hometown News Releases were made during
this quarter, consisting of: 321 editorial; 189 photographic; 99 TV
film; and 391 radio tape.

9. (U) A US Army press kit was prepared for hand-out to in-country
press and information office visitors. This kit includes histories of
all USARV major subordinate commands and photographs of the Commanding
General and Deputy Commanding General, USARV, plus maps of Saigon and
South Vietnam provinces.

J. CIVIL AFFAIRS:

1. (U) The number of civic action projects has continued to increase.
There were 13,061 projects during this quarter as compared to 11,159 in
the preceding four months: a 17% increase. The most noticeable increases
have been in health and sanitation, and community relations. These
increases are reflected in the number of Vietnamese civilians receiving
medical treatment and the amount of monetary contributions by USARV
personnel as shown on page Although less impressive, there were gains
in the number of construction projects completed and quantity of relief
supplies distributed. Gains in the civic action program are attributed
to two primary factors: (1) increased number of US troops in-country
and (2) improved coordination procedures with local officials of the GVN.

2. (U) Fourteen committees, organized throughout the USARV area of
interest, held at least one meeting each month. This is considered sig-
nificant in the field of community relations and friendship councils,
a subject of command interest. Price-controls and other anti-inflationary
measures were the items most frequently discussed at the meetings.
Troop behavior in the community was a subject discussed frequently.
However, incidents reported have not been disproportionate for the size
of the areas reporting. Local commanders continue to exercise their
command influence through the use of strict pass policies, curfews and
off-limits lists which tend to reduce exposure, therefore, lessening
the number of incidents. As a major committee function, civic action
## CIVIC ACTION
### HIGHLIGHTS May - July 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>2d Qtr FY66</th>
<th>Jan-Apr 66#</th>
<th>May-Jul 66</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese civilians Receiving medical Treatment</td>
<td>64,112</td>
<td>318,040</td>
<td>433,574</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction Projects Completed</td>
<td>100(est)#</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution ($VN) by USARV Personnel</td>
<td>3,112,790</td>
<td>5,697,832</td>
<td>8,798,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief Supplies Distributed (Tons)</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>1,477,92</td>
<td>1,656,64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* A four month period

# Comparable data not available
projects were evaluated and assigned priorities with the cooperation of GVN officials. Requests for engineer assistance continued to be the predominant item and maximum effort was devoted to providing this type of aid.

3. (U) Trash and garbage have been accumulating in Saigon and the surrounding Gia Dinh Province. In May, USARV contacted the Gia Dinh Advisory Group and the USAID Advisor to the Mayor of Saigon to offer assistance. Beginning 17 June, trucks and front-end loaders were made available on a recurring basis to province officials. Equipment was provided by the Ist Logistical Command and the 97th Artillery Group. USA Headquarters Area Command provided the city government considerable assistance of a technical nature; e.g., driver and mechanic training, as well as some equipment support.

4. (U) More than 800 tons of relief supplies became available to USARV units during the latter part of July. This material, collected in CONUS during November 1965, as part of the American Christmas Trucks and Trains project sponsored jointly by the National Junior Chamber of Commerce, Young Democrats, and Young Republicans Clubs, was distributed to needy Vietnamese by US units. The breakdown and distribution, after delivery to a USAID warehouse in Cholon, were coordinated by MACV POLMAR Directorate. USARV notified the consignees, transported the material to selected distribution points, and arranged for storage for those units that could not effect immediate air shipment. Initial reports of Vietnamese reaction have been favorable.

5. (U) Although there are several sources of material and financial support for civic action and community relations programs, in many cases support is not immediately available. Consequently, there is an inability to react in a manner which is responsive to the need. Civic action, in order to be effective, must be conducted within a time and space framework which is calculated to achieve the maximum psychological impact favorable to the sponsor. Accordingly, funds responsive to USARV unit requirements were requested from Headquarters, USMACV, and Headquarters, USARPAC during the preceding quarter. The funding activities as indicated in the following subparagraphs were in response to these requests.

a. MACV Civic Action Fund: Headquarters, MACV announced by letter, MACPD, Serial Number 3756, dated 25 April 1966, the establishment of a special civic action account for funds donated to Headquarters, MACV for use in the civic action program. USARV prepared and distributed letter, Subject: MACV Civic Action Fund, dated 17 May 1966, which encouraged utilization of this special fund and provided guidance for preparation of requests for funds from this account. The 173d Airborne Brigade, for example, was granted over $4,000 from this fund for use in...
construction programs within its area of responsibility.

b. US-Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMF) Civic Action Fund: A revolving fund for US and FWMF to finance high impact civic action programs that require rapid accomplishment and for which other funds are not available, was announced in the publication of MACV Directive Number 37-13, dated 15 June 1966. This fund authorized an initial grant of up to 200,000$VN per division and 100,000$VN per brigade or similar sized unit.

c. Collateral Activities Program: USARV received notification from USARPAC of approval and availability of $22,500 in collateral activities appropriated funds for support of community centers and youth activities during FY 67.

d. Subsector Fund: During the period of this report the subsector funds authorized by MACV Directive 37-11, dated 20 April 1966, were curtailed. This has created a greater demand for the US/FWMF Civic Action Funds established by MACV Directive 37-13 (paragraph 5b above).

6. (U) At the request of Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters, USMACV, on 25 June 1966, the USARV Civic Action Office, started a study of the status of the Military Food Supplement Program for GVN Popular Forces and their dependents. The program was instituted to make service in the popular forces more attractive by issuing foodstuffs provided under PL 480. The study was accepted by the Deputy Chief of Staff, MACV on 21 July 1966 and is presently being coordinated at Headquarters, USMACV.

7. (U) Civil affairs annexes and appendices were prepared for Operation SLEEPY DOG (U); Operation Plan 1-66; and CY 67 Support Plan.

8. (U) In response to questions posed by Commanding General, US Command and General Staff College, USARV sent definitive answers with supporting reference documents. Certain questions dealt with military-civic action and resources control in Vietnam. Answers were also provided for questions in regard to coordination with GVN, the applicability of the "oil spot technique," and the nature of the revolutionary development program.

9. (U) A briefing on the civic action program of USARV was conducted on 24 June 1966 for Reverend Calvin Thielman, a White House sponsored guest in Vietnam, whose major field of interest was the USARV military-civic action program. Reverend Thielman toured selected areas of Saigon and Gia Dinh province, and he saw military-civic actions in progress and the results of some completed projects.
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SECTION II. PART I

OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

A. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, DISCIPLINE AND MORALE:

1. (U) Item: Movement of replacements and returnees during peak hump periods.

Discussion: Through a coordinated US Army - US Air Force effort, replacements and returnees of the 1st Cavalry Division are processed at a provisional processing facility at Pleiku. Replacements are airlifted by air force C141 aircraft direct from Travis Air Force Base to the Pleiku Airfield, offloaded, and within thirty minutes are replaced by returnees for the return trip to Travis Air Force Base.

Observation: Decentralizing replacement/returnee processing during peak hump periods of large commands facilitates the processing of replacements/returnees, relieves congestion at the Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base and at USARV replacement/returnee facilities.

2. (U) Item: Casualty reporting.

Discussion: a. Casualty reporting in RVN is unique in that emphasis is on speed without sacrificing accuracy. These requirements are a result of the highly sophisticated communications systems available both to the news media and the armed services. Department of the Army must render all possible information to next of kin officially, prior to any release through news media. Since the American public is entitled to be kept informed of developments in Vietnam, the US Army does not censor release of casualty information. Official notification from Department of the Army, therefore, must be factual, detailed, and rapid.

b. Normal combat casualty reporting procedures have not been implemented in Vietnam.

c. Casualty reporting in Vietnam is done telephonically, in clear text from the custodian of the personnel records to the Casualty Branch, Headquarters, USARV. USARV Casualty Branch is the sole reporting agency to Department of the Army for Army casualties. Information concerning casualties is relayed by immediate precedence message in all cases requiring notification of next of kin.

Observation: Modern communications systems and the desire of Department of the Army to "put the personal back into personnel" require a highly responsive and accurate casualty reporting system.
3. (U) **Item:** Scheduling CONUS returnees to provide "even flow" to USARV replacement/returnee processing facilities and use of available airlift seats.

**Discussion:**

a. The 90th Replacement Battalion was responsible for coordinating and estimating daily airlift seat requirements with the tri-service ATCO. No transportation movements personnel were assigned to the processing facility to perform this function; hence, the facility lacked the technical skills required for moving large numbers of personnel.

b. The movement of returnee personnel through the aerial POE was satisfactorily handled for many months without major problems. In late May 1966, the unannounced cancellation of 817 seats by MAC caused a major backlog of returnees at the returnee processing facility. The situation was further aggravated by lack of unscheduled and opportune airlift (usually available the last of each month) and overbooking of available flights by the ATCO.

c. Positive steps taken to prevent recurrence of returnee backlog and provide for even flow of returnees to the processing facility include:

1. The Adjutant General was tasked with responsibility for estimating passenger movement requirements and coordinating with ATCO and with G4, USARV.

2. Establishment of a passenger movements section in G4.

3. Active participation in the passenger movements section meetings of ATCO on breakdown of airlift seats by date to insure that USARV obtains a daily "even flow" of airlift seats for all available flights.

4. Allocation of daily seats by flight number to major commands. USARV commanders will match available seats to named passengers.

5. Movement of CONUS returnees to the returnee processing facility not earlier than seventy-two hours nor later than twenty-four hours prior to the scheduled flight.

**Observation:** Scheduling and coordinating transportation of personnel should be left wholly in the hands of technically qualified transportation movements personnel and not assumed or left to non-transportation oriented personnel.

4. (U) **Item:** Reduction of administrative reporting.

**Discussion:** Deployment of US Army units against hostile forces intensifies the need, both in terms of quantity and timeliness, of required
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operational information. Conversely, these units are required to perform
operational missions which restrict the time and personnel available to devote
to administrative functions.

Observation: Administrative reporting requirements applicable
to units performing vital operational missions should be continually screened,
reduced and maintained at a level so as not to limit the unit's mission
performance.

5. (U) Item: Rotation of essential witnesses.

Discussion: The rotation of personnel who are essential witnesses
in general courts-martial has caused difficulties and delay in processing and
trying these cases. In most cases, depositions of the witnesses scheduled
for rotation can be taken for use at the trial provided the Staff Judge Advo-
cate of the command exercising general courts-martial jurisdiction is notified
sufficiently in advance of the date of the witnesses' rotation.

Observation: All commanders forwarding court-martial charges
should insure that the rotation date of each witness is included in the file.

6. (U) Item: Many mail complaints are the result of failure to complete
locator cards.

Discussion: Individuals are required by regulation to complete
DD Form 1175 (Change of Address and Directory Record). Investigation of most
mail complaints reveals that individuals fail to receive their mail because
of failure to fill out the locator card. This not only delays the mail, but
also results in directory mail being returned to sender. Mail complaints can
be minimized by:

a. Commanders and heads of staff divisions establishing
controls to ensure that each individual joining or departing the command
completes locator cards.

b. Unit postal officers requiring completion of locator
cards as a mandatory part of the unit inprocessing and clearance procedures.

Observation: All personnel should be made aware of the
importance of completing the locator card.

7. (U) Item: Timeliness of notification of approved retirements or
resignations.

Discussion: a. Personnel applying for retirement or resigning
from the service should submit their applications in sufficient time to permit
arrival at Department of the Army at least sixty days before the requested
date of separation.
b. DA requires approximately thirty days to process an application, which consists of screening the 201 file, reviewing physicals, and obtaining branch clearance or coordination. Upon approval of an application, thirty days are required to notify the individual and for the individual to have ample time to prepare for return to CONUS. There have been a considerable number of cases where DA had to extend the requested date in the application for thirty to sixty days due to insufficient time to process applications.

Observation: Applications for retirement or resignation submitted by personnel in Vietnam should be submitted by the individual approximately 3 1/2 months (105 to 120 days) prior to requested date of retirement or release from military service. This time frame will insure adequate time for processing an application.

8. (U) Item: Assignment of chaplain's assistants.

Discussion: While a company commander has the resources of the company to enable him to accomplish his mission and a principal staff officer has a staff section, a unit chaplain has only one man who serves as driver, clerk and guard and also assists at religious services. Without a versatile, highly skilled assistant (71M20), a chaplain cannot function at maximum efficiency. Since the two work closely together as a team, it is important for assistants to be assigned with the chaplains' religious faith and denominational background in view. The USARV Staff Chaplain's Office monitors the assignment of chaplains' assistants in coordination with the Adjutant General, USARV. This procedure has significantly improved the 71M20 situation in the command. At the beginning of May, there was a shortage of twelve 71M20's while at the end of July, there were no shortages and replacements were being assigned from seven to fourteen days before the DEROS of the outgoing assistant.

Observation: To assure that chaplains are provided with properly trained enlisted assistants, it is necessary for the Staff Chaplain's Office to monitor the assignment of chaplains' assistants in coordination with the AG.

9. (U) Item: Chaplain conferences.

Discussion: The environment of counterinsurgency operations and the interaction of the American and Vietnamese religious and cultural backgrounds create many professional problems that cannot be completely resolved by routine telephone or letter communications.

Observation: A quarterly command chaplains' conference has proven a valuable means of disseminating command policy, resolving mutual problems and sharing the knowledge gained by other supervisory chaplains.

10. (U) Item: Malaria prevention.
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Subject: Trials with dapsone taken daily along with the weekly C-P tablet by well disciplined troops may reduce clinical malaria incidence by 50%. The same trials revealed that dapsone will not stop malaria by 50% if taken erratically or if an individual is bitten by enough infected mosquitoes. Prevention of bites is still the first line of defense.

Observation: Dapsone has been directed for daily use by combat troops in highly endemic falciparum malaria areas, along with the weekly C-P tablet. A stringent program for anti-malaria discipline is a concurrent requirement.

11. (U) Item: Flying evaluation board action.

Discussion: Occasionally an accident report will indicate that exceptionally poor judgement was exercised by a pilot, but no action is taken by the commander to have the individual evaluated. The demand for aviators is very great and any time the demand exceeds the supply, some quality is usually sacrificed. A lot of new aviators are coming into the theater and even though they have completed the mechanics of their training, they may lack good flying sense. This situation, plus a lack of good judgement, has been a cause factor in several accidents.

Observation: That commanders should closely monitor accident reports and take appropriate action as deemed necessary.

12. (U) Item: Delegation of authority for awards and decorations.

Discussion: Prior to 1 July 1966, decorations were awarded within USARV under peacetime criteria as modified by DA. This allowed the Commanding General, USARV to award the Silver Star and all lesser awards and decorations, while major subordinate commanders could award only the BSM and all lesser awards. As of 1 July 1966, the Commanding General, USARV was granted authority by Department of the Army to delegate the authority for granting awards for the Silver Star and all lesser awards and decorations to commanders in the grade of major general and above, and to all brigadier generals occupying a major general command position. At the same time, Commanding General, USARV was allowed to delegate authority for award of the Bronze Star and lesser decorations to commanding generals of separate brigades. Commanding General, USARV delegated this authority to major subordinate and separate brigade commanders on 1 July 1966.

Observation: That in future periods of combat by US forces, delegation of authority to grant awards on a wartime basis be instituted at earliest possible date to prevent unnecessary delays and insure prompt award of decorations to deserving personnel.
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13. (U) Item: Submission of the revised FY 67 Command Operating Budget and FY 68 Command Budget Estimate.

Discussion: The USARV FY 67 O&M Command Operating Budget was submitted to USARYIS and CINCUSARPAC 25 February 1966 within the timeframe required by those headquarters. Total FY 67 funding requested in that budget was 233.1 million. Subsequent to submission of that further requirement was established by CINCUSARPAC directing submission of an FY 68 O&M Command Budget Estimate. Since an order of magnitude submission is based largely on the prior year, it was necessary to submit, with the FY 68 CBE, a revised and updated FY 67 COB. The revised FY 67 COB listed total requirements of $446.8 million with 1st quarter requirements of $234.6 million, a substantial and significant increase over original FY 67 estimate. The increase was based on refined estimates of troop buildup and projected monthly end strengths during FY 67, as well as additional known requirements which became evident subsequent to the initial submission. Based on order of magnitude estimates the FY 68 CBE reflected fund requirements of $582.9 million.

Observation: Budget development in a combat theater is subject to more unknowns and contingencies than at a CONUS installation. Subsequent to submission of the original FY 67 COB in February 1966, it became increasingly evident that, due to swift deployments and rapid troop buildup, numerous unprogrammed fund requirements were being generated. These requirements could not have been foreseen in February 1966. Continuous revisions and updating of budget requirements are necessary in order to inform higher headquarters of unanticipated increases in funding requests. In the case of the FY 67 budget, for example, a dollar increase of $213.7 million was reflected in the revision, representing an increase of approximately 90% over original estimates.
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2. Operations:

1. (U) Item: Positive control over all airfields in RVN is necessary in order to obtain current airfield data for tactical planning and to insure that proper airfield maintenance is being performed.

Discussion: Responsibilities for airfield surveys were assigned to subordinate commands on an area and/or airfield basis. Updated surveys are required quarterly.

Observation: Airfield data is being adapted to automatic data processing cards. Machine runs will be disseminated to interested agencies and units on a quarterly basis.

2. (U) Item: JCS, CINCPAC, MACV, USARV, and other commands have stressed the necessity of limiting overseas telephone traffic.

Discussion: It has been emphasized that overseas telephone traffic should be limited to calls that are necessary for the conduct of official business which requires a timeliness of action that cannot be satisfied by teletype or air mail. Commanders have been directed to take the necessary action required to implement this policy.

Observation: Traffic surveys were conducted at the Saigon joint overseas switchboard during June and July. The traffic survey conducted prior to the implementation of the command policy indicated approximately 293 overseas calls were originated by USARV units and organizations. During an identical traffic survey after the policy implementation, USARV units originated approximately 231 overseas calls, a reduction of about 22%. This reduction indicates that with proper command management and emphasis, proper utilization of the overseas telephone systems can be realized.

3. (U) Item: Experience has indicated that additional types of equipment and training are required for signal cable construction units being deployed to Vietnam.

Discussion: With the anticipated heavy usage of polyethylene insulated cable (PIC), units should be equipped and trained in the following:

a. Aerial construction techniques.

b. Buried construction techniques.

c. Cable splicing techniques.

d. Cable fault location.
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e. Cable pressurization techniques.

A majority of the signal construction units presently in-country are of the field cable construction type and lack experience and training in the installation and maintenance of field plant telecommunications systems presently under construction in Vietnam.

Observation: Anticipated heavy usage of polyethylene insulated cable (PIC) and the numerous outside plant projects programmed for Vietnam, make it most desirable that units arrive in Vietnam properly equipped and trained in its characteristics and capabilities.

4. (C) Item: Installation of base camp communications.

Discussion: In most instances of planning for base camp communications requirements, unit commanders lose sight of overall requirements in a desire to satisfy whatever communication problem seems most pressing at the time. Additional expense, labor, and maintenance problems have been the result.

Observation: Thorough consideration must be given to future requirements in the planning of base camp communications.

5. (U) Item: Command and Control Teletypewriter Communications Center during a headquarters move.

Discussion: In order to maintain control and continue operations it is necessary to move elements of the headquarters in echelons. During this critical period signal plans must include provision for service to the General and Special Staff in two separate areas.

Observation: Close coordination is essential between the general and joint staff and the signal staff to insure that the exact location of each element of the headquarters is known in order to properly route messages.

6. (U) Item: Stockage of spare parts for communications security equipment in a counterinsurgency environment.

Discussion: The lack of a secure communication zone in RVN creates transportation difficulties in issuance of replacement parts for communication security equipment. As a result, parts cannot be centralized in one area and moved to units as needed. The amount of float items must be computed based on each user's requirement, thus insuring that replacement items are available at all echelons.

Observation: Computing maintenance float items on a theater-wide percentage basis would not provide replacement equipment down to...
the smaller user levels in the present counterinsurgency environment.

7. **(C) Item:** Separation of communication security equipment in-transit from non-communication security component cables and mounting kits should be avoided.

    **Discussion:** A shortfall developed with installation of KY-8 tactical secure voice equipment when component cables and mounting kits were shipped in separate packages.

    **Observation:** Crypto equipment that is controlled and shipped through crypto logistical channels should contain within that shipment all non-communication security components. When a complete communication security item arrives, centralized control for further distribution can be maintained, thus precluding a shortfall.

8. **(U) Item:** Experience with the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade has shown a definite need for separate brigades to be augmented with a "division slice" of a division signal battalion.

    **Discussion:** The "division slice" should consist of a forward area signal center platoon. The platoon is needed for tactical communications between units of the brigade, to other units and to the base camp. The platoon is also needed when a unit first arrives in RVN, as limited army resources caused by slippage of signal units necessitate that a brigade provide assistance in manning fixed base camp communications. This remains a continuing need until army facilities are available. A brigade communications platoon is inadequate for these tasks. Steps have been taken to state this augmentation as a requirement for all separate brigades that may deploy to RVN in the future.

    **Observation:** All separate infantry, armor, mechanized, and airborne brigades should arrive in-country with a forward area signal center platoon.

9. **(U) Item:** The deployment and redeployment of large items of signal equipment within the country in support of operations places a severe strain on in-country air and sealift resources.

    **Discussion:** Routine airlift of outsized pieces of cargo takes seven to ten days. Equipment lift on a priority basis requires submission of special requests and close coordination at all levels.

    **Observation:** Operations must be planned far enough in advance to permit deployment of outsized signal items. Where possible, equipment should be prepositioned or held in staging areas.
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10. (U) Item: Effect of buildup of US Forces on employment of AN/TRC-24 equipment to support long lines communication systems has ramp complexes, and combat operations.

Discussion: Frequencies employed on AN/TRC-24 radio relay systems were previously assigned on an individual-system-basis by Headquarters, USARV. To reduce the reaction time experienced in resolving frequency interference problems and the coordination effort expended by tactical units prior to an operation, a block allocation plan was adopted. Based on known and anticipated requirements and available frequencies, allocations were provided to the commands concerned.

Observation: A block allocation system provides the major tactical commands immediate access to frequencies, thereby enhancing the timely planning required to support combat operations. The allocations have been designed to permit use of any frequency at collocated sites without prior coordination with other users. Reaction time experienced in resolving interference problems and restoring these multi-channel systems will be considerably reduced.
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C. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION:

1. (C) Item: Survival during and after an aircraft accident.

Discussion: The analysis of aircraft accident reports and interviews with personnel involved in crashes has made the following points apparent:

a. The only gear that personnel normally have in their possession after an accident is the items attached to their body. Loose weapons and survival gear are often lost, burned, or pinned in the wreckage.

b. Safety or seat belts must be worn on all flights. Accident reports indicate that adherence to this apparently obvious rule cannot be taken for granted.

c. Survivors should remain near the wreckage. The wreckage is normally easier located from the air than an individual.

Observation: That above survival points must be aggressively emphasized by commanders.

2. (C) Item: Coordination of new equipment training (NET) with the physical introduction of new equipment into the USARV inventory.

Discussion: There have been several instances where new equipment training (NET) was conducted a month or more in advance of the receipt of new equipment. The following problems resulted:

a. Trainees do not retain information over an extended period without being associated with the equipment.

b. Trainees are often rotated before the equipment arrives.

c. There is insufficient motivation for trainees to attend NET when equipment is not to be delivered in the immediate future.

Observation: NET should precede, but be closely associated with the actual issue of new equipment.

3. (U) Item: Radio equipment density.

Discussion: Radio is the primary means of communication during combat operations in Vietnam. Communications for command and control, logistics support and supporting arms (air, artillery and naval gunfire) are in most instances over radio channels. As a result, radio equipment has been issued to units based on needs rather than TOE's to assure vital communication links.
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However, a concurrent increase in personnel has not occurred. Transfer within
a unit of other resources, such as wire, communications center switchboard,
and radio relay personnel would be appropriate. But units are presently
providing for their base camp communications using these assets.

Observation: Until base camp operations are taken over by
programmed units and facilities, tactical units must accept the increased
equipment capability and provide for a similar capability in the quality
of their assigned personnel. Specifically, training in operation and care
of radio equipment must be continuous.
D. INTELLIGENCE:

1. (U) Item: Security violations.

Discussion: Analysis has revealed that the majority of recent security violations were caused by poor control and receiving procedures.

Observation: There is a need for greater command emphasis in the area of document control and accountability. Document registers (DA Form 455) have been found to be poorly maintained, e.g., lack of complete identifying data, and inaccurate description of the material. Receiving has also been found to be incorrectly administered in that inadequate control and reviews of receipts (DA Form 631 and DA Form 1203) have often resulted in their loss. In addition, receipts have been utilized which inadequately or incorrectly describe documents. To overcome these weaknesses, commanders must institute a continuous orientation and training program for all personnel who handle classified material.

2. (C) Item: Communications security (COMSEC).

Discussion: A recent study of varied callword systems used by three field units was undertaken in an effort to determine if the vulnerability of US communications to radio traffic analysis could be reduced. During the test, all three radio nets were reconstructed by traffic analysis within three days. The results of the test indicate that none of the callword allocation systems were effective safeguards against radio traffic analysis.

Observation: Since radical callword systems will not prevent interception, analysis or intrusion of friendly radio voice communications, standard historical solutions to callsign security are the best means to impede initial net reconstruction and subsequent derivation from detailed traffic analysis. These historical solutions include, but are not limited to, the random assigning of callwords and callword expanders; changing callwords simultaneously with frequents; changing callwords at the beginning of each new operation, and promoting a readiness to conduct authentication.

3. (U) Item: Denial of information to Sino-Soviet intelligence agencies procured through "Pen Pal" correspondence between individuals residing in Sino-Soviet bloc countries and US service personnel.

Discussion: ACSI, DA, reports that the East German Intelligence Service is increasing its use of "Pen Pal" correspondence as a means to contact US service personnel. This technique is not limited to use against US personnel stationed in Europe but is apparently being utilized on a worldwide basis. There have been three instances reported where personnel of this command have been possible targets of hostile intelligence agencies using this technique. It is also well-known that all mail to Sino-Soviet bloc
countries is subject to censorship by hostile intelligence services. Thus, "Pen Pal" correspondence may act as a source of information, even though the correspondent in the Sino-Soviet nation is not an intelligence agent himself.

Observation: That "Pen Pal" relationships between personnel of this command and individuals residing in Sino-Soviet bloc countries are a danger to security. US service personnel could easily become unwitting sources of information on identification of units, personnel data, and other essential elements of information. On 8 June 1966, this headquarters published a letter making all commanders cognizant of the danger to security inherent in such correspondence and directing them to orient all personnel concerning this matter. This preventive action should make the security of this command less vulnerable to a confirmed hostile intelligence technique.

4. (U) Item: Special mission airlift of topo maps.

Discussion: Forecasted requirements for large-scale topographic maps for the immediate future appeared to warrant special efforts to expedite shipment of L7014 series 1:50,000 maps between 12 degrees and 15 degrees north latitude. Inquiry to Army Map Service in Washington as to their capability to deliver ample quantities of these map sheets to Saigon and Nha Trang by 1 July received a positive response. The first fifteen tons arrived by special airlift at Nha Trang on 19 June, the second increment at Saigon on 25 June. Arrival data for the remainder is expected in the near future.

Observation: AMS has the capability to arrange direct special airlift of maps to meet USARV requirements.
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E. LOGISTICS:

1. (U) Item: GH's function for managing MAC passenger space allocations.

   Discussion: Prior to 1 July 1966 no one activity had sufficient
information on the overall forecasting, posting, and managing of MAC
passenger space allocations to insure the even flow of passengers as
compared to MAC space allocations. As a result, on occasions a backlog
of CONUS bound passengers existed in the USARV replacement/rotatee facility.
The number of personnel reporting for movement exceeded the space alloca-
tions.

   Observation: To monitor CONUS bound passenger movements one
central activity should submit long range space forecasts, receive subordinate
commands' short range forecasts, coordinate direct with the ATCO for MAC
space allocations and manage the allocation of spaces to subordinate commands.

2. (U) Item: Use of special assignment airlift missions (SAAM's) for
passenger movements.

   Discussion: The use of SAAM's for movement of 1st Cavalry
Division (Airmobile) replacements and rotatees has achieved the objectives
of dispersing passenger air traffic, gaining maximum utilization of resources
and providing a desirable transportation service.

   Observation: Depending on the volume of rotatees in a specific
organization or area, availability of suitable airfield and adequate
replacement/rotatee processing facilities; the use of SAAM's for passenger
movement is highly desirable.

3. (U) Item: Briefings conducted within a command for proposed new
concepts.

   Discussion: In view of the rapid advancements being made in
modern transportation equipment and systems, detailed briefings to inter-
ested USARV personnel should be conducted for possible introduction of
these concepts into RVN. The briefings and comments relative to Project
Expedite informed USARV personnel of the advantages of the concept as well
as advise the briefers of problem areas of which they were unaware.

   Observation: Prior to approval of new or revised concepts,
military personnel directly involved in implementation must be thoroughly
informed and provided an opportunity to exchange comments with concept
designers.
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4. (U) Item: Periodic review of vehicular support missions.

Discussion: With the personnel and equipment buildup and the establishment of new subordinate commands, some of the vehicular support missions resulted in duplication. This duplication was noticed by reviewing vehicle records and as a result, interested parties met to review requirements. This review resulted in readjusting vehicle missions thereby creating additional vehicular support.

Observation: Vehicle support missions should be reviewed periodically to insure proper utilization.

5. (U) Item: Packet, subsistence, long range patrol.

Discussion: Field tests were conducted and it was determined that the requirement for hot water to reconstitute the dehydrated portion of the packet was a disadvantage to troops on extended patrols.

Observation: This was reported to the General Equipment Test Agency and future procurement will provide specifications for reconstitution of this item with cold water.

6. (U) Item: Trained NCO's for depot operations.

Discussion: The original complement of the 32d Medical Depot deployed to RVN included many inexperienced personnel. The problem has been reduced through OJT and actual experience. As the tour for these personnel approaches completion, the same problems will again appear unless replacements are properly screened and selected. The lack of key NCO's trained in depot operations has been a particularly acute problem. Since CONUS depots are staffed primarily with civilians, there is very little opportunity for NCO's to receive depot training except in overseas commands.

Observation: It appears proper to review the staffing policies of CONUS depots with a view to providing more NCO spaces.

7. (U) Item: Hospital equipment project.

Discussion: In the past this command has requisitioned items of hospital equipment on an item by item basis as individual requirements became known. Since several new hospitals have recently arrived in RVN and additional hospitals are programmed in the future it appears desirable
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to discontinue requisitioning individual items insofar as possible and to
submit requirements on a package basis.

Observation: A proposal to implement above action is now pending in DA.

8. (U) Item: Supply of signal repair parts.

Discussion: Informal reports have reached this office indicating
a critical lack of repair parts for mission essential signal equipment.
Investigation of these reports has, in many cases, indicated a disregard
for, or lack of understanding of the operation and flow of requisitions for
repair parts. Often the originating unit or the direct supply support
agency has failed to record the demand and/or failed to take required
followup action in accordance with AR 735-35. This in turn has resulted
in "under the table" action to "scrounge" parts, thus short-circuiting
the supply system.

Observation: Since parts stockage at all echelons of supply
are based on demand data, it is imperative that standard supply procedures
be followed in all cases and that accurate demand data be generated and
properly recorded.

9. (C) Item: Control of additional ammunition for tactical operations.

Discussion: It was discovered during the reporting period that
some units were failing to return unexpended ammunition under ASR control
to the camp or supporting ASP at the conclusion of tactical operations.

Observation: Effective 1 July 1966, the policy of this
headquarters is to include the following instructions in all messages
dispatched approving additional ammunition for tactical operations: "It
is the responsibility of the command to which this additional allocation
is made to insure that ammunition not expended for the express purpose
for which requested is returned to the ASP or base camp at the conclusion
of the operation. Commanders will enforce this requirement."

10. (C) Item: Prefire inspection of 175mm ammunition.

Discussion: A second 175mm gun tube was recently damaged when
the breach mechanism was blown off during a fire mission. This accident
may have been caused by any one of several malfunctions. To assist commanders
of 175mm gun units in preventing a recurrence, a prefire check or inspection.
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of 175mm gun ammunition is necessary.

Observation: Zone 3 charges must be closely examined for broken igniter tubes at the firing site prior to firing. Rounds with broken igniter tubes should be returned to the supporting ASP.

11. (C) Item: Individual equipment.

Discussion: Experience has indicated that there is a need to add certain items of individual equipment for the combat soldier in RVN to provide comfort and protection in a hot, damp environment.

Observation: Prototype items of jungle hats with headnets, ground cloths, drawings, and neckerchiefs (sweat cloths) were requisitioned from CONUS for testing in RVN. Upon receipt, these items will be tested by units in the 1st Cavalry Division and 1st Infantry Division. Based on results of field testing and evaluation thereof, a decision will be made as to feasibility of requisitioning sufficient quantities to equip all combat personnel in-country.

12. (C) Item: Repair of electronic test equipment.

Discussion: Establishing a USARV command-wide calibration program resulted in a heavy influx of test equipment for maintenance. Equipment in the field contained faults which were not apparent to using personnel. Increased equipment maintenance backlogs approached unacceptable levels.

Observation: An additional test repair capability is being obtained through contract with a civilian electronics firm to augment military capabilities.
AVHGC-DH
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Period 1 May 1966 - 31 July 1966, Reports
Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

SECTION II, PART II

RECOMMENDATIONS

None.

JEAN E. ENGEL
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Commanding General

24 Incl
1. Distribution
2. Photo, Old Headquarters Area
3. Photo, New Headquarters Building
4. Listing, Significant Visitors to USARV
5-19 Photos, Current Status of Real Estate Acquisition
20. USARV Weekly Progress Reports (Attached to cys 1 and 9 only)
21. Commander’s Notes, 30 Jun 66, w/ch 1, 11 Jul 66 (Attached to
cys 1 through 25 only)
22. Commander’s Notes, 1 Aug 66 (Attached to cys 1 through 25 only)
23. Comptroller Bulletin, Lessons Learned (Attached to cys 1
through 25 only)
24. USARV Combat Lessons Bulletin Number 2, 28 Jul 66 (Attached to
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### SIGNIFICANT VISITORS TO USARV, 1 MAY THROUGH 31 JULY 1966

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<td>MG Richard J. Meyer, USA</td>
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<td>STRATCOM</td>
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<td>LTG Chang Kuo-Ying</td>
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<td>9-18 May 66</td>
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<td>MG Chia Wei-Lu</td>
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<td>MG Chang Chih Siu</td>
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<td>MG Liu Chin Ti</td>
<td>Commandant Military Police School</td>
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<td>Mr. Thomas D. Morris</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>LTG James V. Edmundson, USAF</td>
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<td>Mr. Frank A. Bartimo</td>
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<td>Ambassador Sigismund</td>
<td>German Observer at the UN</td>
<td>13 May 66</td>
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<td>Vong Braun</td>
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<td>Ambassador Kopf</td>
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<td>13 May 66</td>
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<td>Honorable Howard H. Callaway (R-Ga)</td>
<td>House Sub-Committee on Military Operations</td>
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<td>Honorable Donald Rumsfeld (R-Ill)</td>
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<td>Mr. Herbert Roback</td>
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<td>BG Hal D. McCown</td>
<td>Director Vietnam Support Expediting Task Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judge Clair Voss</td>
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<td>Mr. Dominick Strada</td>
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<td>16-20 May 66</td>
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<td>Mr. Sanford Satullo</td>
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<td>BG Lee</td>
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<td>Mr. Richard Carr</td>
<td>Director, Information and Reports Directorate, Air Munitions Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>MG Sir Stephen Weir</td>
<td>New Zealand Ambassador to RWN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Duncan McIntyre</td>
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<td>Mr. Hugh Watt</td>
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<td>Mr. Logan Francis Sloane</td>
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<td>Mr. Allan Martyn Finlay</td>
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<td>20-26 May 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Arthur E. Quentin Pope</td>
<td>Charge d' Affaires New Zealand Embassy</td>
<td>20-26 May 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. William Moyers</td>
<td>Special Assistant to the President</td>
<td>21-24 May 66</td>
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<td>GEN Dwight E. Beach, USA</td>
<td>COMUS Korea</td>
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<td>MG James H. Skeldon, USA</td>
<td>Chief, Army Advisory Group, Korea</td>
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<td>MG William R. Peers, USA</td>
<td>Special Assistant for CI and Special Activities, Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>Deputy Special Assistant to the President for Non-Military Construction in RVN</td>
<td>25 May 66</td>
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<td>Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.</td>
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<td>BG Alvin E. Cowan, Jr.</td>
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<td>RADM L.B. McDonald</td>
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<td>26-30 May 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Bruce E. Kendall, USA</td>
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<td>MG Carl C. Turner, USA</td>
<td>Provost Marshal General</td>
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<td>BG Samuel Goodwin, USA</td>
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<td>BG Armond G. Conroy, USA</td>
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<td>LTG James Polk, USA</td>
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<td>MG John J. Tolson, USA</td>
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<td>BG Harry A. French, USA</td>
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<td>GEN James F. Collins (Ret)</td>
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<td>Mr. W. Bobisch, GS-16</td>
<td>Naval Facilities Engineering Command</td>
<td>14-24 Jun 66</td>
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<td>BG Hahn Hyung Dai</td>
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<td>Lord Walston</td>
<td>British Foreign Office, London</td>
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<td>Mr. Robert H. Milhbough</td>
<td>Ohio Candidate for US House of Representatives</td>
<td>18 Jun 66</td>
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<td>Rev Calvin Thielman</td>
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<td>18 Jun - 2 Jul 66</td>
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<td>Rev Father Calvin Lyons</td>
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<td>MG Arthur S. Collins, USA</td>
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<td>Mr. Robert E. Quick</td>
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<td>Mr. John Malcolm Frazier</td>
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<td>Mr. B. White</td>
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<td>BG G.V. Tobias</td>
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<td>MG Lee So Dong</td>
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<td>USACDC, Combined Arms Group</td>
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<td>Dr. Stephen Enke</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economics)</td>
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<td>ADM Horacio Rivero, USN</td>
<td>Vice Chief of Naval Operations</td>
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<td>RADM A.F. Schade, USN</td>
<td>ACNO, Plans and Policy</td>
<td>16-21 Jul 66</td>
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<td>RADM A.C. Husband, USN</td>
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<td>RADM F.G. Bennet, USN</td>
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<td>RADM C.E. Miller, USN</td>
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<td>CPT H.H. Epes, Jr., USN</td>
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<td>Mr. Whitney N. Young</td>
<td>Executive Secretary, Urban League</td>
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<td>GEN Ernesto S. Mata</td>
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<td>BG Jose B. Ramos</td>
<td>Commanding General, PAF</td>
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<td>Mr. Clifford Miller</td>
<td>Bureau of Budget</td>
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<td>MG Frank Osianski (Ret) USA</td>
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<td>Mr. James Petersen</td>
<td>Consultant to AID, Rand Corp</td>
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<td>GEN John K. Waters, USA</td>
<td>CINCUSARPAC</td>
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<td>Mr. Thomas Rodgers</td>
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<td>Mr. Leonard Sullivan</td>
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<td>Wing Commander J.E. Gerver</td>
<td>Commanding Officer, Air Support, RAAF</td>
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<td>Dr. Robert A. Brooks</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of the Army (I&amp;L)</td>
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<td>Professor Henry Kissinger</td>
<td>US State Department</td>
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<td>LTG Alfred D. Starbird, USA</td>
<td>Director, DCS</td>
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<td>GEN Harold K. Johnson, USA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, US Army</td>
<td>30 Jul - 9 Aug</td>
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<td>MG Keith L. Ware, USA</td>
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*FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY*
Real Estate Acquisition, NW

A - Red: Approved for Army use, open land, rent-free.
B - Green: Same as red; pending approval by JGS.
C - Brown: Same as A except approved for USAF use.
D - Blue: Requested, but disapproved by JGS.
E - Yellow: Real estate for Hawk Missile sites.

arams Vietnam, 1:50,000
Real Estate Acquisition, RVN

Red: Approved for Army use, open land, rent free.
Green: Same as red; pending approval by JCS.
Town: Same as A except approved for USAF use.
Gray: Requested, but disapproved by JCS.
White: Real estate for Hawk Missile sites.

Map, Service Vietnam 1:50,000
Real Estate Acquisition, HYN

- Approved for Army use.
- Open land, rent free.
- Same as red; pending approval by JCS.
- Same as A except approved for USAF use.
- Requested, but disapproved by JCS.
- Real estate for Hawk missile sites.

- 50,000
Real Estate Acquisition, RVN

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Map Series Vietnam, 1:50,000
Real Estate Acquisition, RVN

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D - Blue: Requested, but disapproved by JGS.
E - Yellow: Real estate for Hawk Missile sites.

Map Series Vietnam, 1:50,000
Real Estate Acquisition, LTV:

- **Red**: Approved for Army use, open land, rent free.
- **Green**: Site as per; pending approval by JCS.
- **Brown**: Same as A except approved for ARM use.
- **Blue**: Requested, but disapproved by JCS.
- **Yellow**: Real estate for Hawk Missile sites.

For Series Vietnam, 1:50,000

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YUNG TAU

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Real Estate Acquisition, VN

A - Red: Approved for Army use, open land, rent free.
B - Green: Same as red; pending approval by JCS.
C - Brown: Same as A except approved for USAF use.
D - Blue: Requested, but disapproved by JCS.
E - Yellow: Real estate for Hawk Missile sites.

Map Series Vietnam, 1:50,000
SUBJECT: Change Number One (1) to "Commander's Notes"

TO: See Distribution

The following correction to para 22, "Commander's Notes", HQ, USARV, dated 30 June is submitted as Change #1, dated 11 July 1966:

Change, "Commanders are reminded that these restrictions or others do not apply to fund raising for Civic Action/Community Relations Programs", to read: "Commanders are reminded that these restrictions do apply to fund raising for Civic Action/Community Relations Programs."

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

GERALD H. RAGSDALE
Colonel, GS
Secretary, General Staff
1. The primary purpose of the Commander's Notes, as stated in the "Message from the Deputy Commanding General" contained in the first issue dated April 1966, is to provide information to commanders and key staff officers.

2. Because the Commander's Notes may include, from time to time, advance information on matters of command interest which are still in the planning stage, and other matters which should not be disseminated indiscriminately, the following policy has been established to govern the distribution and circulation of this document.

   a. Basis of distribution within H. U. S. V. will be one copy for each general and special staff section.

   b. Basis of distribution to the field will be one copy for each general officer and each commander at battalion level and higher.

   c. Circulation within H. U. S. V. and subordinate headquarters will be limited to commanders and key staff officers.

3. The foregoing policy should not be construed to restrict commanders from disseminating information contained in the Commander's Notes as deemed appropriate. However, no reference will be made to the Commander's Notes as a source of information. Dissemination must be consistent with security regulations, and in no case will any portion of the Commander's Notes be disseminated to other than U.S. Army personnel.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

RICHARD J. SEITZ
Brigadier General, US Army
Chief of Staff
## Commander's Notes - Use, Distribution and Circulation

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1. (U) Assignment of RVN Volunteers. This headquarters has been advised that a forthcoming change to DA Circular 614-11, dated 22 December 1965, will establish a procedure whereby volunteers for service in RVN are so identified by Department of the Army. Pending receipt and implementation of such a change, action has been taken to effect identification within USARV. Due to lack of identification in the past, volunteers have on occasion been diverted to assignments outside of their military specialties. Such diversion has the effect of breaking faith with the individual soldier and is clearly not within the intent of the DA circular. Subordinate commanders were directed by USARV Message, AVA-MP 15082, 17 June 1966, to identify volunteers from 201 files, where possible, and insure that they are assigned in accordance with their qualifications. Additionally, replacement non-volunteer enlisted personnel would be assigned to Infantry and Armor combat units only if they have completed branch AIT or have been awarded an MOS in the appropriate Career Group.

2. (U) Reassignment Instructions. Department of the Army assigns officers from Oversea Returnee Rosters produced in Department of the Army from Morning Report data prepared by USARV units. The lack of complete data is a contributing factor to the lateness in receipt of reassignment instructions. As a preventive measure, when officers are within 75 days of DEROS, their names are reported through this headquarters to Department of the Army. Procedures to be followed are discussed in letter, Headquarters USARV, AVAGP-MP, subject: Non-Receipt of Assignment Instructions (Officers), dated 15 April 1966.

3. (U) Accuracy of Strength Reporting. As a function of personnel management, commanders at all echelons should periodically review the status of personnel within their commands to insure proper utilization and reporting of assigned personnel. It is essential that Morning Report data and all other feeder reports submitted by USARV units be accurate in every respect. Major commanders should insure that authorized, assigned, and present for duty strength figures submitted for any specified period have been verified and are correct for all reports submitted. The use of personnel management teams to make "on the spot" verification and corrections within company, battalion, group, and brigade size units is encouraged.

4. (U) Out-of-Country R&R.

a. During the period 27 May 1966 - 18 June 1966, the utilization rate of R&R quotas dropped from 100% to 92%. To counteract this trend, USARV Message, AVA-S 15593, 22 June 1966, reminded commanders of the importance of this program as a morale factor and requested that planning be initiated at all levels to insure full utilization of R&R allocations.
b. The Secretary of Defense has approved initiation of R&R to Hawaii. The program is expected to start in August, and flights will depart every five days alternating between Tan Son Nhut and Danang.

5. (U) Motion Picture Service. Motion picture projectors are still in short supply. The USARV Signal Office has indicated that 500 projectors will be procured from CONUS commercial sources and should be available in RVN in 30 to 60 days.

6. (U) Library Program. Paperback book kits which are mailed through APO channels directly from the publisher to the addressee are now being received in RVN on a monthly basis.

7. (U) Army Motor Vehicle Accidents. The increasing incidence of motor vehicle accidents indicate the need for refresher driver training. Virtually every accident that has occurred during the past five months reveals driver negligence, i.e. carelessness, inattention, following too closely, and failure to recognize the dangers of Vietnamese driving habits. At least 50% of the traffic accidents can be prevented through closer supervision.

8. (U) Area Civilian Personnel Offices (ACPO's). Area offices of the Office of the Civilian Personnel Director are located at Saigon (Cholon), Cam Ranh, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, Pleiku, Vung Tau, and Long Binh. These Area Civilian Personnel Offices (ACPO's) provide service to all users of civilian manpower in their geographic area and information on all matters concerning the employment and administration of civilians. ACPO's may be reached by phone as follows: Saigon, ARVN 60182; Cam Ranh, 340; Nha Trang, 961; Qui Nhon, 226; Pleiku, 14 ring 4; and Vung Tau, 656 ring 2.

9. (U) Vietnamese Employee Training. The Central Training Institute, a facility of the Office of the Civilian Personnel Director, USARV, provides basic, refresher, and advanced training in English language and clerical skills to Vietnamese employees of USARV. Commanders are encouraged to nominate deserving employees for appropriate training. Further training information may be obtained from the Office of the Civilian Personnel Director or any of the Area Civilian Personnel Offices.

10. (U) Military Cash Awards. Military personnel are now eligible for cash awards up to $25,000 on the same basis as civilians for suggestions, inventions, and scientific achievements through the Incentive Award Program. Guidelines have been published as Change 4 to Army Regulation 672-301, and USARV Regulation 672-2.
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2

11. (FOUO) "Pen Pal" Correspondence. On 8 June 1966, a letter was published by Headquarters, USARV, directing the attention of commanders to the danger of "Pen Pal" Correspondence with individuals residing in Sino-Soviet Bloc countries. USARV recently was informed that Sino-Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services were using "Pen Pal" Correspondence as a technique to collect information from unwitting US service personnel. Even if the "Pen Pal" is not a hostile intelligence agent, such correspondence is still subject to censorship by hostile intelligence agencies and thus poses a potential threat to the security of USARV. Accordingly, commanders have been directed to orient all personnel to this danger at regularly scheduled security presentations.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-3

12. (U) Training. During this period, two Training Circulars have been published. The first required combat organizations to establish as a minimum a 40 hour replacement training program to be accomplished prior to participation in combat operations. Emphasis during this training period is centered on small unit tactics and integration of newly arrived personnel into the unit as members of a combined arms team.

The second training circular established a requirement for all personnel to fire individual weapons on a quarterly basis for zero and familiarization. In response to this requirement, over 1,000 personnel in the Saigon area have fired or are programmed to fire through the month of June at the Quang Trung Training Center.

Arrangements have been concluded with Fort Buckner to provide training aids support to this headquarters and subordinate units. Training aid catalogues and procedures for requesting and handling aids have been disseminated to the field.

13. (U) USARV Combat Lessons Bulletin. USARV presently publishes on a quarterly basis a publication entitled "Battlefield Reports - A Summary of Lessons Learned". Recognizing that significant lessons learned must be disseminated on a more timely basis, USARV will publish a bulletin entitled "Combat Lessons Bulletin". These bulletins will be published on an "as required" basis to insure that appropriate subordinate commands derive maximum benefits from lessons learned in recent operations. The principal input sources are unit after-action critiques, after-action reports, and reports from USARV staff visits. The contents of these bulletins will also be incorporated in the quarterly USARV
Battlefield Reports - A Summary of Lessons Learned. The first USARV Combat Lessons Bulletin covers lessons learned from Operations AULTIN VI and CRAZY HORSE and was disseminated on 27 June 1966.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-4

14. (U) Ammunition Waivers. Two requests for waivers, one for Vung Tau Ammunition Depot and one for the Qui Nhon ammo storage area, have been approved by USARPAC and are in effect. Cam Ranh Bay has been granted a 60 day extension on the request for waiver to be submitted for that site. The Long Binh area does not require a waiver at this time. Other Class V sites will be reviewed and requests submitted as required.

15. (C) Class V Prestock Points. Following is current status, by CTZ of ammo prestock points:

II CTZ: All prestock points in this corps are now non-operational and are not required due to location of 1st Logistical Command ASP's and Depots. Class V supply in this area appears to be no problem.

III CTZ: All but nine prestock points in III CTZ are non-operational. The remaining points are the minimum required to adequately support operations. Quantities of 2.75" Rockets, 7.62mm ammo, and 40mm Grenades have been reduced to a more realistic amount.

IV CTZ: All 14 of the points in this zone are operational and should remain as such due to the unique resupply situation in the Delta. Again, as in III CTZ, quantities have been reduced to provide a more realistic amount and stockage level.

To eliminate any more of the operational PSP's at this time would further over-tax an already over-committed air resupply system. It would be impractical for mission assigned aircraft to return to a Logistical Command ASP because of flying time involved.

The 1st Aviation Brigade is submitting, through channels, a request that recommends all PSP's in III CTZ be placed entirely under US control and the ones in IV CTZ be placed under US control to the extent possible.

16. (U) Coast Guard Teams. Two Coast Guard Explosive Handling Supervisory Teams arrived in-country in early June. These Teams are being used at the four major ammunition unloading ports in-country to assist in general port safety activities, to include explosive handling.
port security, and advising in proper explosive handling practices ashore and aboard ship. Each team consists of one (1) officer and seven (7) enlisted personnel. Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay are the home bases of the teams. Administrative control of the teams is with Commander, Coast Guard Squadron One. Operational control is with USARV. OPCON has been delegated to 1st Logistical Command by this headquarters.

17. (C) 81mm Modification Program. Due to the high rate of malfunctions related to the premature detonation of 81mm Mortar rounds armed with the M52 series fuze, this command has taken certain action to correct this unsatisfactory condition. 1st Logistical Command has begun operating four renovation lines in-country at Long Binh, Cam Ranh Bay, Pleiku, and Qui Nhon. The purpose of these lines is to refuze/modify all 81mm Mortar ammo in-country that is fuzed with the M52 series fuze prior to issuing to using units. Concurrent with the in-country modification program in support of USARV, Okinawa has also been directed to begin a modification program in support of USARV requirements. To date, a total of 122,226 rounds have been modified in-country. The first modified rounds from Okinawa are scheduled to begin arriving in-country the first of July with a weekly input of 25,000 rounds of modified ammo through November, at which time USARV is scheduled to begin receiving modified rounds from CONUS production.

18. (U) Mess Refrigerators. DA has advised that contracts have been let for 1264 ea 70 cu. ft. mess refrigerators requested by USARV and ICP, USARPAC. Refrigeration units for these refrigerators will be a mix of electrically operated and gasoline engine operated units. Contracts provide that this equipment will be available F.O.b. contractors' plants by 29 August 1966.

19. (U) Personal Effects Centers. It is anticipated that by 31 July 1966, revised MACV and USARV directives concerning the processing and shipment of household goods and baggage will be published. These regulations will formalize the establishment of USARV Personal Effects Centers at various locations in RVN and require personnel to process shipments at the nearest Personal Effects Center. This new procedure will decrease intransit time to locations outside RVN by eliminating double handling and documentation at TSN.

20. (U) Evacuation of Repairables. The USARV program for evacuation of unserviceable items of equipment was published on 9 May 1966. The CG, 1st Logistical Command, published implementing instructions on 11 June 1966. These directives should receive command attention at all echelons.

21. (U) PCS Travel. USARV personnel departing Vietnam on PCS orders will be provided transportation on Military Airlift Command (MAC) aircraft or MAC charter aircraft. PCS travel from Vietnam by commercial airlines is not authorized for personnel below the rank of general officers. Requests for commercial travel for general officers will be considered on an individual basis.
CIVIC ACTION

22. (U) Solicitation of Gifts and Contributions. The policy expressed in USARV Regulation 1-100, Administration, Gifts and Contributions, in that "no individual, unit, agency, or nonappropriated fund activity will solicit gifts from any source except as authorized in AR 600-29 regarding charitable fund raising campaigns." AP 600-29, Fund Raising Within the Department of the Army, does not authorize exceptions to the above stated policy in regards to solicitation of personnel, corporations, organizations, or other entities in CONUS, or elsewhere. Commanders are reminded that these restrictions or others do not apply to fund raising for Civic Action/Community Relations Programs. Accordingly, local fund raising efforts on behalf of charitable organizations located near USARV units are authorized and encouraged.

23. (U) US/FWMAF Civic Action Fund. USMACV Directive 37-13, Financial Administration, US/FWMAF Civic Action Fund, dated 15 June 1966, is being distributed. The Directive establishes an open-ended fund for use on high impact civic action projects that require rapid accomplishment and for which other funds are not available. An initial grant of $290,000 per division and $100,000 per brigade will be made only if requested. Accounting and other procedures are contained in the Directive.

SIGNAL

24. (U) Base Camp Communications. Provisions of base camp communication is the responsibility of USARV Signal units except at Pleiku, Nha Trang, Da Nang, Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, Minh Thuy, Phan Rang, and Tuy Hoa, which are the responsibility of 7th Air Force.

Additional line losses are inserted by tactical switchboards. For optimum long lines communication service, all units are encouraged to utilize the area switchboard service within the base camp and refrain from the establishment of their own tactical switchboards. Tactical switchboards should be reserved for use by the unit when away from base camp on tactical missions.

Units requiring base camp communications will request telephone service from the local area signal coordinator.
25. (U) Upgrading of the Long Distance Telephone System. The long distance telephone system is being upgraded with the installation of new and improved long distance switchboards. The AN/MTC-9 switchboards which have recently arrived in-country are to be installed in Saigon, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh Bay as dedicated long distance switching centers. The AN/MTC-9 switchboard has nine operator positions and is modified for automatic signalling and supervision of the long distance trunks. Installation of the AN/MTC-9 switchboards is to be completed by 30 July 1966.

Long distance service at Pleiku and Can Tho will be improved by the installation of additional switchboard equipment. An AN/MTC-1 three operator position switchboard is scheduled to be installed at Pleiku to provide dedicated long distance switching. The Can Tho switchboard is now being expanded to provide improved local and long distance service to the Can Tho area.

26. (U) USARV MARS Program. USARV presently has 10 Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS) stations in operation throughout the country. Serving primarily as an emergency communications system, the network also provides personal message and phone patch service to OAHU and Hawaii. Since activation in December 1965, the MARS network has sent and received over 35,000 personal messages for troops in the field. Additionally, phone patch service will be provided to wounded-in-action personnel in hospitals at Long Binh, Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh Bay. Commanders are urged to support and publicize this valuable morale-building program.
27. (U) Food Handlers. USARV Regulation 40-31, subject: Mess Sanitation, dated 28 January 1966, requires that all food handlers receive a pre-employment physical examination and be re-examined annually thereafter. Commanders must insure that no prospective employee is permitted to serve as a food handler until results of the physical examination are complete and certificates are signed by the physician.

28. (U) Rabies in Vietnam. This virus disease is prevalent in animals, particularly dogs, throughout Vietnam. Transmission occurs through a bite or licks of abraded skin. The development of symptoms in the individual signals the onset of disease which is always fatal. Prevention of rabies infection is the only method that succeeds. This is accomplished through routine periodic immunizations of animals and following a bite, through prompt immunization of the individual. Pets recently immunized (within three months), or those lacking immunization, can carry and transmit the virus for a period of time without the pets showing symptoms of disease. During January to May 1966 58 animals involved in bite incidents were quarantined by the USARV Veterinary Service. Brain tissue examinations were performed on 27 animals, and six were proven rabid. Commanders must insure that all personnel are aware of the danger from rabies and that pets are registered promptly with the area veterinarian. All individuals who are bitten by pets or stray animals must report without delay for treatment at the nearest medical treatment facility. All attempts should be made to detain the animals for quarantine purposes. If the animal dies or its destruction becomes necessary, the head must be preserved frozen for subsequent examination by the veterinarian.

29. (U) Cam Ranh Bay. The T-2 tanker French Greek arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on 24 June. The mooring of the ship was completed on 27 June and started to off-load. The Lone Jack is scheduled to arrive at Cam Ranh Bay at 0600 hours, 30 June. Twenty-nine employees of the Vinnell construction crew arrived in-country on 27 June. Arrangements are being made to transport them to the Cam Ranh construction site. The supply ship Vantage Progress is scheduled to arrive on 12 July with construction material for the land distribution system.
30. (U) **Federal Voting Assistance.** Commanders are urged to review AR 608-20; DA Pamphlet 360-503, Nov 65; and letter, AVADAl, this headquarters, subject: Absentee Voting, 16 Feb 66. With the coming elections—this fall, the importance of exercising the right to vote cannot be over-emphasized. Commanders must insure that each member of the Army in Vietnam is advised of his rights, privileges, and responsibilities and provided current voting information, the opportunity to vote (use of SF 76, Application for Absentee Ballot), and assistance in the procedures for voting to include the services of an officer or other official authorized to attest to oaths. In addition, unit voting officers must insure delivery of SF 76 to each military member regardless of eligibility and each eligible civilian employee.

31. (U) **Enlisted Personnel Holding Engineering Degrees.** Due to critical vacancies within the 18th Engineer Brigade, enlisted personnel with baccalaureate degrees in Civil, Electrical, Mechanical, and other engineering degrees are encouraged to submit applications for reassignment to the 18th Engineer Brigade. Applications for reassignment to 18th Engineer Brigade will be submitted through unit personnel officers. In addition, commanders are requested to screen records of incoming personnel to identify such individuals and encourage them to apply for reassignment.

32. (U) **Officer Procurement.** Commanders at all echelons are requested to seek out and encourage qualified personnel to apply for commissions as second lieutenant, U.S. This headquarters was granted authority to appoint second lieutenants, U.S., in March 1965 and to date has received only 23 applications. Six new lieutenants have been commissioned in the USAR by this headquarters, and nine applications are pending. The following branch quotas are still available to the command: 18 - Infantry, 13 - Artillery, 5 - Armor, 5 - Signal Corps, and 3 - Corps of Engineers.

33. (U) **Army Emergency Relief Fund Campaign.** The Annual Joint Fund Campaign for Army Emergency Relief and Army Relief Society is being conducted by the command from 21 June through 31 July. Commanders at all levels are asked to give their support to this campaign. Detailed instructions regarding the campaign have been distributed.

34. (U) **Emergency Leave and Ordinary Leave for Compassionate Reasons.** Commanders are reminded that prior to granting emergency leave, the circumstances surrounding the request must meet the criteria established in AR 630-5 and USARV Regulation 630-1. Recently this headquarters has noted
an unusual increase in emergency leaves. During the first quarter of 1966 an average of 75 Army personnel per day departed this command on emergency leave. A review of the orders authorizing this type of leave revealed instances where the circumstances did not meet the criteria for emergency leave, but did meet the criteria for ordinary leave for compassionate reasons. Although the granting of emergency leave when justified is encouraged, commanders are reminded that these personnel are returned to CONUS on a space required basis at government expense and take space on aircraft previously allocated to rotatees. This has an adverse effect on the morale of rotating personnel. Individuals on ordinary leave for compassionate reasons are returned to CONUS on a space available basis.

35. (U) Assignment and Utilization of Aliens. Aliens are identifiable from information recorded on their enlistment record (i.e., Form 1), record of induction (DE Form 2), and enlisted qualification record (DE Form 20). Commanders should treat an entry of alien status on the aforementioned records as an assignment restriction in accordance with AR 600-200 until favorable background investigation (BI) is completed. Upon completion of a BI which discloses no unfavorable resolution of any derogatory information, an alien will be considered eligible for assignment to any duty for which he is otherwise qualified.

36. (U) Line of Duty Determinations. Continued emphasis on the expeditious completion of line of duty determinations is necessary at all levels. Delays often adversely affect survivors benefits and cause unnecessary hardships for next of kin. Investigations must be initiated as soon as possible after the incident to ensure that the facts are determined when witnesses are readily available and the details are vivid in their minds.

37. (U) Casualty Reporting. Major subordinate commanders reporting casualties and rendering health and welfare reports to Headquarters USARV or Department of Army should ensure that reporting personnel have verified all information prior to submission. Reports submitted to this headquarters are immediately furnished Department of Army and other agencies. Inaccuracies cause embarrassment to the Army. All reports must be submitted promptly, but accuracy must be emphasized.

38. (U) Piaster Revaluation. On 18 June 1966 the Government of the Republic of Vietnam changed the official rate of exchange between piasters and dollars. Prior to 18 June 1966 the official exchange rate was 72.765 piasters per one US dollar. The new official exchange rate is 79.2 piasters per one US dollar. This change did not affect the special currency fund exchange rate of 118 piasters per one US dollar. Piasters acquired at the 118 per one US dollar rate may be used only for personal transactions by individuals. Piasters acquired at the 79.2 piasters per one US dollar rate must be used in all transactions by official and quasi-official agencies of the US Government.
39. (U) **Piaster Expenditure by Clubs and Messes.** The recent devaluation of the official rate of piasters from 72.765 per $1.00 to 79.2 per $1.00 has caused some problems in USARV clubs and messes. Commanders are urged to insure that clubs and messes under their command continue to expend official piasters at the old rate before using piasters at the new rate. Co-mingling of piasters (old and new rates) will cause cash balances to be incorrect.

40. (U) **Savings Bond Campaign.** The command is continuing to place emphasis on the Savings Bond Campaign. The President personally is following the progress of the Savings Bond Campaign and has stated he will accept nothing less than an immediate goal of 75 percent, will consider adequate nothing less than realization of a long-range goal of 90 percent, and will be satisfied with nothing less than achievement of 100% participation. The USARV participation rate was 74.6% as of 31 May 1966. While this compares favorably with the Air Force rate of 39.4%, the Navy rate of 37% and the Marine rate of 22.8%, it is still substantially below the USARV goal of 90%. Commanders are urged to implement aggressively the Savings Bond Campaign and to continue to stress the advantages of savings bonds to all members. Commanders and their staffs should "set example" by their own participation in the Savings Bond Program.

41. (U) **Nonappropriated Fund Financial Statements.** Commanders are reminded that nonappropriated fund financial statements are due at this headquarters, ATM: AVG, not later than the 10th day of the month following the close of the accounting period. At the present, 10% of the statements received by this headquarters are from one (1) day to three (3) weeks delinquent. (Reference paragraph 21, USAR Regulation 230-60).
COMANDER'S NOTES

USE, DISTRIBUTION, AND CIRCULATION

1. The primary purpose of the Commander's Notes, as stated in the "Message from the Deputy Commanding General" contained in the first issue dated April 1966, is to provide information to commanders and key staff officers.

2. Because the Commander's Notes may include, from time to time, advance information on matters of command interest which are still in the planning stage, and other matters which should not be disseminated indiscriminately, the following policy has been established to govern the distribution and circulation of this document.

   a. Basis of distribution within HQ USARV will be one copy for each general and special staff section.

   b. Basis of distribution to the field will be one copy for each general officer and each commander at battalion level or higher.

   c. Circulation within HQ USARV and subordinate headquarters will be limited to commanders and key staff officers.

3. The foregoing policy should not be construed to restrict commanders from disseminating information contained in the Commander's Notes as deemed appropriate. However, no reference will be made to the Commander's Notes as a source of information. Dissemination must be consistent with security regulations, and in no case will any portion of the Commander's Notes be disseminated to other than US Army personnel.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

RICHARD J. SEITZ
Brigadier General, US Army
Chief of Staff

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

/08
# Commander's Notes

## Use, Distribution and Circulation

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1. (U) **Service Group Life Insurance.** Department of the Army is experiencing difficulty in certifying necessary documentation required for payment of SGLI. The principal delay in effecting payment is caused by the nonreceipt of DA Form 3054 or the new VA Form 29-8286. As of 23 June 1966 DA had not certified documents for 177 claims resulting from deaths occurring in Vietnam. The original copy of the DA Form 3054 must be forwarded to DA immediately upon death. If service member dies in hospital in RVN, the unit personnel officer will accomplish the DA Form 3054 upon receipt of the CROWN report. If service member has been transferred to a hospital outside the RVN, individual’s personnel records are transferred to the hospital concerned, which becomes responsible for submission of the DA Form 3054 at time of death. A USARV Circular is being published covering this matter in detail.

2. (U) **Congressional and Special Interest Correspondence.** This type of correspondence decreased in June after an upward trend for five consecutive months. Our high rate is still attributable to soldiers writing their Congressmen about problems that could and should be solved at the local level.

3. (U) **Record of Emergency Data (DA Form 41).** Emphasis must be placed on the need to maintain information current in Emergency Data Cards. The importance of this should be stressed to individual soldiers and periodic checks made. An ideal time for such checks is during in-processing and while troops are being paid.

4. (U) **Officer Procurement Program.** In March 1966, Headquarters, USARV was given authority to take final action on applications for appointment as 2d Lt USAR in Infantry, Artillery, Armor, Signal Corps, and Corps of Engineer. To date only 41 applications have been received and 10 appointments made. The opportunity for direct appointment for qualified applicants should receive command emphasis at all levels.

5. (U) **Publication Accounts.** Publication accounts are not being used to maximum advantage by subordinate units. All battalion and larger units are authorized their own publication accounts with CONUS Publication Centers in Baltimore and St. Louis for DA Publications, and with USA Printing and Publication Center, Japan (PPCJ). For CONUS centers, accounts are established by submitting DA Form 12 Series which serves as the basis for pin-point (initial) distribution. The DA Form 12 Series may be resubmitted at any time to reflect changing needs, and DA Form 17 may be submitted direct to the Centers for resupply. For PPCJ a letter request will establish an account, and DA Form 17 is submitted for all DA blank forms. Large numbers of inquiries and complaints received at this headquarters indicate that not all units are following the above procedures (as further outlined in USARV Reg. 310-3). Maximum utilization of these procedures provides the most efficient, decentralized, and timely service possible.
6. **Change of Address and Directory Record.** Individuals are required by regulation to complete DD Form 1175 (Change of Address and Directory Record). Investigation of most mail complaints reveals that individuals fail to receive their mail because of failure to fill out locator cards. This not only delays the mail, but, in many instances, results in mail being returned to the sender indorsed, "No Record". Unit Commanders must require completion of locator cards as a mandatory part of the unit in-processing and clearance procedures for all arriving and departing personnel.

7. **Advanced Overseas Returnee (AOR) Listing.** During the months of May, June, and July, unit commanders failed to properly report enlisted personnel on the basic AOR in accordance with AR 600-200, AR 614-220, and USARV Regulation 614-220. This resulted in the retention of some personnel beyond normal DEROS and the receipt of numerous complaints by this headquarters. To insure complete and accurate reporting of all personnel, commanders should:

   a. Cause each basic AOR list to be screened and add or delete personnel from the unit roster prior to return of the listing to the Data Processing Unit.

   b. Subsequent to a change of grade or MOS or any other change in EM's status, i.e., medical evacuation, KHA, or extension of FST, submit a supplemental AOR on USARV Form 46 to 12th DPU, APO 96309.

   c. The excessive number of "add-ons" to monthly AOR listings previously submitted to Headquarters, Department of the Army, indicates that positive command action must be taken to insure proper verification of AOR listings. The November AOR roster was submitted to DA on 14 July 1966 and on 19 July, over 746 "add-ons" were received from major commands.

8. **Incentive Awards Program.** USARV Reg. 672-301, Incentive Awards, has recently been published. This regulation provides policy and procedures wherein supervisors may recommend honorary or cash awards to military personnel and civilian employees for suggestions or accomplishments which contribute to efficiency, economy, or other improvements in operation.

9. **Employment of Daily Hire Vietnamese Employees.** As a general rule, daily hires may be used only to accomplish work of short duration, approximately 30 days. Continuing needs for Vietnamese civilian manpower will be requested in accordance with USARV Reg. 616-2, Manpower Management of Local Nationals. Commanders are requested to contact the U. S. citizen in charge of the nearest Area Civilian Personnel Office on all matters concerning the employment and administration of Vietnamese civilians. ACPO's may be reached by phone as follows: Saigon, ARVN 60182; Cam Ranh, 340; Nha Trang, 807/984; Qui Nhon, 226; Pleiku, 14 ring 4; and Vung Tau, 656 ring 2.
10. (U) **Activation of 5th Weather Squadron.** On 8 July 1966, 5th Weather Squadron, USAF, specializing in weather support to the US Army in RVN, was activated. In Air Weather Service a vertical command structure parallels the structure of the supported command. Headquarters 5th Weather Squadron is co-located with Hq USARV. They exercise USAF command authority over weather detachments providing weather support to subordinate command echelons of USARV and provide staff weather advice to Hq USARV. The 5th Weather Squadron, through its higher and lower echelons, has resources to provide weather service to the following elements of the US Army:

   a. Hq Elements - Staff weather advice.
   b. Ground Combat Elements - Weather forecasting and observing.
   c. Aviation Units - Weather forecasting and observing.
   d. Support Elements - Weather forecasting.

11. (FOUO) **Status of Tactical Imagery Interpretation Facility (TIIF).** The TIIF is a mobile van containing equipment to assist in the rapid read-out of combat intelligence for photographic radar, infra-red, and moving-target imagery. There will be ten of these facilities brought into the country initially and three more at a later date. Personnel to operate this new equipment will begin a school of two weeks in duration on 2 August 1966 at Fort Holabird. Ten (10) TIIF's (AN/TSQ-43) are scheduled to arrive on/or about 1 September 1966. There is a special maintenance team provided, consisting of two officers and six enlisted personnel, who will provide the necessary maintenance support until USARV can assume their maintenance support role. This team will be in Vietnam for one year. They are scheduled to arrive on 20 August 1966.

12. (U) **USARV Regulation 310-31.** USARV Regulation 310-31, which outlines procedures for the preparation, submission, and utilization of Modification Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTUE), will be published and distributed by 25 August 1966.

13. (U) **Liaison Officer. US Army John F. Kennedy Center For Special Warfare (Airborne) (U).** A liaison officer has been attached to this headquarters from the US Army John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare (Airborne) (USAJFKCENSPWAR) (ABN), Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
The purpose of this attachment is to represent the Commanding General, USAJFKCESPWAR (ABN) in matters pertaining to the following:

a. Special Forces Activities.

b. Psychological Operations.

c. Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Techniques.

d. Advisory Activities.

e. Adjustments in Special Warfare School POI in Counterinsurgency and advisory training to more efficiently meet need of overseas commands.

The priority mission of this liaison officer is to collect 189 EEI for the purpose of updating and improving the programs of instruction taught by the Special Warfare School. It is expected that this liaison will result in more efficient preparation of graduates for their duties in various assignments and specialties in Southeast Asia. The incumbent liaison officer is Lt Col Middleton, who may be contacted at the Doctrine and History Division of the ACofS, G-3, telephone 31469.

14. (U) Battlefield Reports. Volume II, "Battlefield Reports - A Summary of Lessons Learned", which reflects the experience and lessons learned as reported by US Army units during the period 1 October to 31 December 1965, has been placed in distribution to battalion level. To facilitate reference for study or training purposes, the various lessons were arranged in topical classification to correspond to those of FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations.

15. (U) Operational Report - Lessons Learned. Headquarters USARV Regulation 870-2, Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) was published on 19 July 1966. The ORLL gives the commander an opportunity to comment on all aspects of his command. Pertinent inclosures such as copies of after action reports and photographs are encouraged. When written inclosures are attached, information contained therein should be referenced, but need not be incorporated, in the body of the ORLL. In view of the submission date of this report, fifteen days after the close of the reporting period, close staff supervision will be required. Normally, this report is personally signed by the commander and should reflect the highest quality of command reporting.

16. (U) Organizational Museums. Organizational museums and collection/retention of historical properties in Vietnam are authorized by AR 870-5. Items included in the definition of historical properties are weapons, military equipment, articles of uniform or personal equipment, flags, works of art, unit and individual decorations, battle streamers, and all other objects except official records, which constitute relics or evidence of battle experience or other activities of national significance of United States or foreign armed forces. Commanders operating
organizational museums or having custody of historical collections are responsible for classification, cataloging, utilization, security, and maintenance of historical properties and for maintaining accountability.

17. (U) **New Series TOE.** Golf Series TOE for elements of the infantry division are being published and distributed. Commanders are urged to request reorganization under the new series TOE.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-4

18. (U) **Transportation (U).** USARV personnel departing Vietnam on PCS orders will be provided transportation on Military Aircraft Command (MAC) or MAC charter aircraft. PCS travel from Vietnam by commercial airlines is not authorized for personnel below the rank of general officers. Requests for commercial travel for general officers will be considered on an individual basis.

19. (U) **Passenger Movement System.** The revised USARV passenger movement system for personnel departing the RVN became effective 1 July 1966. Basically, the system requires subordinate commanders to make their daily movement requirements known 30 days in advance of the month of travel. These requirements are compared to the daily number of spaces allocated to USARV and in turn suballocations are made to subordinate commands. The main objectives of the revised system are to insure sufficient spaces have been "reserved" to meet subordinate commands requirements and to reduce the time personnel must remain in the replacement battalion awaiting transportation to CONUS. Commanders are reminded that to accomplish the desired objectives, requirements must be accurate and a specific individual designated and port called for each allocated space.

20. (U) **Urgent Tactical Bridging Requirements.** The condition of existing LOC bridging and the tactical situation have and probably will cause the placing of urgent requirements on this command for the issue or diversion of on hand tactical bridging. Commanders should be prepared to promptly respond to the high priority requirements placed by MACV on USARV.

21. (U) **Lightweight POL 50-GPM Filter/Separator.** The US Army Materiel Command has advised that a new lightweight (58 pounds) filter/separator is undergoing final stages of engineering service and environmental tests. This new filter/separator will utilize the standard military filter elements presently in the supply system. The lightweight filter/separator is planned to replace the standard model in units which participate in air mobile operations.
22. (U) 50,000 Gallon Collapsible POL Tanks. Four (4) 50,000 gallon collapsible tanks, each with a twelve (12) point refueling system, are scheduled to arrive in the RVN in early August. The concept for utilization of this equipment is to place each system at a semi-permanent installation for refueling aircraft. Each system will have the capability of refueling twelve (12) aircraft simultaneously.

23. (U) Aircraft Maintenance Management. Indications are being received that large numbers of UH-1 and CH-47 aircraft may be grounded because of required scheduled maintenance coming due on a majority of a unit's aircraft at the same time. Unit commanders are responsible for the programming of required scheduled aircraft maintenance as well as the programming of flying hours. WM 710-12 specifies the desired standards of availability which aircraft unit commanders are expected to maintain 80% for UH-1 and 60% for CH-47 aircraft. If operation planners consider these standards and unit maintenance officers are allowed to manage their unit fleet by providing only these percentages for daily operations, the "peaks and valleys" of our NCO rate should stabilize. Additional benefits will be better forecasting and use of aircraft components which require time-change replacement, better maintained aircraft generally, and more opportunity to apply "poole" to keep aircraft in latest configuration. The understanding and enforcement of good maintenance management practices by commanders and staff officers is as important as knowledge of tactical operations. Maintenance management is essential to the sustaining of our aircraft fleet in a combat ready posture not only for this week's operation, but also for the long weeks and months ahead.

24. (U) Prevention of UH-1 T-53 Aircraft Engine Failures. This command is experiencing an excessive number of premature T-53 engine failures in UH-1 helicopters. A survey of using units revealed the following conditions which are believed to be contributing directly to these premature failures: flying aircraft over gross weight; flying with low oil level in the oil tank; use of the emergency fuel control system during engine starting; flying with an engine output shaft speed of 6750-6750 RPM (allowable maximum: 6650 RPM); jockeying of the throttle to control exhaust gas temperature, and improper use of the emergency system during normal flight; failure to clean the compressor or engine inlet area as required; failure to utilize the engine inspection guide, TM 55-2800-301; failure to conduct daily continuity check of engine chip detector; failure to remove oil coolers and flush system after removal of engines due to chips in the oil system; increasing the oil pump pressure on engines that have the oil filter in by-pass without checking to determine if the filter is clean; failure to inspect the 72, 73, and 74 oil strainers at the same time the main oil filter is inspected; failure to stabilize engine and instrument readings for two (2) minutes prior to shut down, causing thermo-shock from rapid cooling. These operator malpractices are hazarding both aircraft and personnel aboard and must be stopped. All units with UH-1 aircraft should review current aviator operating procedures and take positive corrective action to eliminate these conditions.

25. (U) Radio Sets AN/FTT-4 and AN/FTL-9. USAVN has expressed an urgent requirement for accelerated procurement of Squad Radio Sets. In response to this request, 5190 AN/FTT-4 and 5600 AN/FTL-9 were procured
at the end of June 1966 for delivery beginning in November 1966 and comple-
ting in May 1967. The new squad radio sets will replace Radio Set AN/PRC-6,
which has proven to be unsatisfactory for infantry combat operations in
Vietnam. Initial basis for issue within this time frame will be to issue
one each PRT-4/PMR-9 for each authorized AN/PRC-6.

(U) The AN/PRT-4 is a small transmitter-receiver weighing 16 oz. The
AN/PMR-9 is a small receiver weighing eight oz. The AN/PRC-6 being replaced
weighs seven and one half pounds. The new transmitter (AN/PRT-4) and the
old (AN/PRC-6) each have a range of approximately one mile. The AN/PRT-4
and the AN/PMR-9 are available in the Signal Office for display and demon-
stration.

26. (C) Tunnel Destruction. Recent tests in SWV have proven the
effectiveness of an acetylene gas generating system in tunnel destruction
operations. An allocation of the limited amount of equipment on hand was
made to divisional size units and the 18th Engineer Brigade. Additional
equipment has been requested to allow distribution to all brigade size
tactical units in USAV. Pending receipt of this equipment, support for
tunnel destruction operations for units without this specialized equip-
ment may be obtained by contacting the 18th Engineer Brigade or the Engineer
Group providing support in their area.

27. (U) Movement to Long Binh. The movement of U.S. ARV units from the
Saigon area is expected to be completed prior to 1 April 1967. Contract
construction directives and troop construction directives have been issued
for construction work in excess of 25 million dollars. Currently, the troop
construction program has resulted in a 30 day slippage of the expected com-
pletion date due to diversion of efforts to higher priority projects. Con-
traction construction programs have slipped approximately 75 days due to
weather, lack of equipment, and diversion to higher priority projects.
Rapid build-up of contractor effort and good weather conditions are expec-
ted to alleviate this slippage after the end of the wet season.

28. (U) Power Stations at Major Bases. A project has begun to pro-
vide fixed electrical power and distribution at major cantonment and logis-
tical sites in RVN. Eleven power generating ships will be moored at five
locations and in some places will be supplemented by on-shore generators.
Two ships have arrived at Cam Ranh Bay. The remainder are due before the
date of CY 66. Construction of high-tension distribution lines has begun at
Cam Ranh Bay.
29. (U) Pay Raise for Government Employees. Legislation was enacted in July providing for an increase in pay for US Armed Forces personnel and Civil Service Employees. The increase in pay is retroactive to 1 July; however, the increases will not be included in July payrolls for most employees. Commanders should take this opportunity to place increased emphasis on the Command Savings Program. Personnel should be urged to consider placing all or part of this increased pay into US Savings Bonds, Soldier's Deposits, or other savings media. By taking this extra money out of circulation, they will be helping to curb the inflationary trend in the RVN economy.

30 (U) Nonappropriated Funds (Clubs/Messes). Numerous discrepancies in financial controls and proper accounting continue to occur in USAPFV clubs/messes. The deficient areas discovered most often are (1) cash and inventory accountability and controls, and (2) the lack of adequate and accurate subsidiary records (accounts receivable, accounts payable, fixed assets, etc.) Commanders are urged to continually stress the necessity for proper accounting for the funds of nonappropriated funds. Special interest should be given to cash and inventory accountability and proper recording of incurred liabilities. See USAFV Regulation 230–60 with Changes 1 and 2 for the prescribed controls and procedures.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM

LESSONS LEARNED
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96307

AVG

27 July 1966

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

TO: See Distribution

Due to the operating conditions which prevail in the Republic of Vietnam our attention has been focused on many problems not previously encountered in those theaters of operations in which the Army has traditionally fought. In some cases modern Army doctrine and techniques have been modified to meet the existing challenge.

Attached are "Lessons Learned" in areas of Comptroller interest. They are disseminated in the hopes that interested agencies will find them useful in carrying out their functions of developing, teaching and implementing Army doctrine, policies and procedures.

Incl

H. E. BLOMGREN
Colonel, GS
Comptroller

DISTRIBUTION:
Comptroller of the Army
Chief of Finance
Commandant, USAC&GSC
Commandant, USAFS
Commandant, USAMS
Commandant, USAIMC
Director, Army Comptrollership School
CO, USACDC Finance Agency
LESSONS LEARNED

Assistance Audits

Item: Assistance Audits to newly formed clubs/messes.

Discussion: Courtesy visits are not only desirable but almost necessary to assist newly formed clubs and messes to begin operations correctly from a record keeping point of view. This practice is beneficial to both the club/mess and simplifies later audits.

Observation: Assistance at the outset pays great dividends in the future.

Frequency of Audits

Item: Semi-annual audit of NAF clubs and messes.

Discussion: Semi-annual audits are required due to lack of trained bookkeepers and custodians available in the theater, and the rapid turnover of personnel.

Observation: Audits of clubs and messes should be accomplished at least semi-annually in combat theaters.

Audit Team Size

Item: Audit teams should be made up of three auditors each.

Discussion: Audit teams have been established at three auditors. This number is small enough to facilitate travel (local travel by vehicle and helicopter is limited too often by space) but large enough to diversify tasks and permit a minimum time per audit.

Observation: Audit teams must be readily mobile and capable of rapid operations in a combat theater.

Audit Reports

Item: Improved format of reports of audit.

Discussion: Audit reports have developed from command letters, which only listed discrepancies, to a format which includes recommended action for each noted discrepancy. The report is transmitted by a command letter. This change greatly assists the club/mess in their corrective actions, tends to make accounting procedures more uniform throughout the theater and facilitates writing the report itself.
Observation: All assistance possible should be given to bookkeepers and custodians of clubs/messes in the theater to improve and simplify their operations.

Currency Conversion

Item: Conversion from U.S. Dollars to Military Payment Certificates on Payday.

Discussion: During the review of a loss of funds it was discovered that the currency conversion which occurred on 31 Aug 1965 caused an inordinate amount of confusion. This was caused by the fact that Military Payment Certificates were introduced into Vietnam on a payday. Normally a Finance Office is working at maximum capability on a payday. The introduction of MPC's on a payday requires that every unit and most staff sections of the larger headquarters appoint class A agent conversion officers to convert currency. The combination of the payroll, piaster sales and currency conversion class A agents all converging on the Finance Offices on 31 August 1965 caused two of the Finance Offices to lose control of their cash accountability.

Observation: Conversion of dollars to MPC or conversion of one series of MPC to another series should not be scheduled on a payday.

Check Envelopes

Item: Storage of Envelopes in High Humidity Areas.

Discussion: Experience in Vietnam has shown that envelopes, check mailing, used by disbursing officers will seal themselves while in storage. This is caused by the high humidity in Vietnam.

Observation: One method of preventing check envelopes from sealing is to store them in a container with an electric light burning. In some combat units this is not practicable, so consideration should be given to providing envelopes that will not seal in areas of high humidity.

Safeguarding of Funds

Item: An adequate supply of safes are required for the safeguarding of funds and related documents in Finance Offices of divisions.

Discussion: The TO&E prescribes one safe for the Division Finance Office. One safe is inadequate for performance of duty in the Republic of Vietnam. Fifteen safes are required for adequate safeguarding of funds and related documents in an overseas area which does not contain a large built-in fire-resistant vault for the Division Finance Office.

Observation: A modification to the Division TO&E will be requested.
Deployment of Division Finance Sections to Vietnam

Item: Division finance sections, including personnel and equipment, should be flown to Vietnam rather than moved by ship.

Discussion: Because of extremely limited space available on troop ships, it is not possible to perform any office work on board ship. Ships are loaded to maximum capacity, leaving no office space. This means that at least 20 to 30 days, and in some cases more, of working time will be lost. Most units will be in transit over one payday, and will both expect and require prompt payment upon arrival in Vietnam. This means that a method must be devised to allow the finance section to compute the month's payroll and be prepared to make payment shortly after arrival of the main body at the base camp. The 1st Cavalry Division solved this problem by flying the division finance section to Vietnam. Only five days time was lost in transit. The main body of division started arriving in An Khe on 15 September, and on 30 September the first payday in Vietnam was successfully accomplished.

Observation: Finance sections of divisions deploying to Vietnam should not deploy by ship but should remain behind to prepare the first month's payroll, and should be flown to Vietnam so as to arrive about the same time as the main body arrives.

Dependent Support Allotments for Personnel Assigned to Vietnam

Item: It is vital that every member with dependents who is scheduled for movement to Vietnam establish Class E allotments of sufficient magnitude to provide for his dependents' needs prior to departing for Vietnam.

Discussion: Wives and families must have an assured, constant monthly income in order to effectively deal with the problems faced while the husband is serving in Vietnam.

The Class L allotment system gives the dependent only the net pay, rather than providing a fixed amount for the dependent. Under the present system the service member reserves a specified amount for himself and the balance is sent to the family. Thus, all court martial charges, CPID's, collection of over payments, etc, are taken out of the wife's portion of the pay and the service member draws his normal constant amount. This situation can cause hardships for dependents. In addition, vagaries in the postal system can cause delays in arrival of the checks from Vietnam. To provide dependents with certainty regarding their financial resources, each member should establish a
class E allotment prior to departing for Vietnam.

Observation: Commanders of units scheduled for deployment to Vietnam should establish and rigidly enforce the policy that all members with dependents initiate class E allotments for dependent support prior to deployment. Commanders of installations from which individual replacements are reassigned to Vietnam should establish the requirement that each member with dependents initiate a class E allotment before he is cleared from the post.

Instructions to Class A Agents

Item: It has been noted that some disbursing officers do not give written instructions to Class A agents each time funds are advanced.

Discussion: Failure to provide Class A agents with instructions each time funds are advanced can lead to fund losses. If the disbursing officer fails to provide the agent with instructions, the disbursing officer may be held responsible for a fund loss because of this failure.

Observation: Disbursing officers should insure that Class A agents receive written instructions each time funds are advanced.

Errors in Reenlistment Bonus Payments

Item: Paragraph 5-82, AR 37-104-2, is responsible for errors occurring in reenlistment bonus vouchers.

Discussion: Paragraph 5-82, AR 37-104-2, prescribes that the unit personnel officer will submit a Reenlistment Bonus Inquiry to the Finance Center, US Army, 60 to 120 days prior to ETS for personnel who have indicated a desire to reenlist. The purpose of this inquiry is to determine the amounts of previously paid reenlistment bonuses. However, paragraph 5-82 further states: "Preparation of the Reenlistment Bonus military pay voucher will not be delayed pending receipt of reply from the Finance Center, US Army." This sentence is interpreted by some DO's as meaning that payment should be made prior to receipt of the inquiry. Use of this sentence by finance officers as authority to make payment prior to receipt of the inquiry causes errors to be made on reenlistment vouchers, since all data on previous payments may not be available.
Observation: Finance officers should not make payment on reenlistment bonus vouchers before receiving the inquiry from the Finance Center, US Army. Paragraph 5-82, AR 37-104-2 should be changed to remove the ambiguous sentence and explicitly state this policy. If personnel officers perform their duties in a timely manner the reply to the inquiry will be received prior to date payment is required.

Mechanized Military Pay Procedures in Vietnam

Item: Mechanized military pay procedures are not adaptable for use in Vietnam.

Discussion: Because of the short rotation period, casualty losses, and ETS losses, mechanized military pay procedures are not feasible in Vietnam. The problem of transfers-in and transfers-out more than negates any savings from mechanization. The only feasible course of action is to convert to manual pay procedures.

Observation: Finance sections of units scheduled for deployment to Vietnam should convert to the manual system several months prior to deployment, to insure complete familiarity with the new system prior to deployment.

Inadequacy of Finance Unit TOE Equipment Authorizations for Operations in Vietnam

Item: TOE equipment authorizations for finance sections of divisions and separate brigades, and for finance sections organized under TOE 14-500E, are inadequate for operations in Vietnam.

Discussion: Additional equipment requirements which are essential for effective finance operations in Vietnam have been determined, based on experiences of finance offices in Vietnam. These requirements have been stated through official channels by USARV. The additional equipment requirements for divisions and separate brigades are listed at Inclosure 1, and for teams under TOE 14-500E at Inclosure 2.

Observation: Finance unit TOE's should be revised to reflect the additional equipment requirements.
Folding Chairs

Item: An adequate supply of folding chairs is required for performance of duty by personnel in Finance Offices, both divisional and independent finance sections.

Discussion: TC&E's do not prescribe folding chairs as an authorized item of issue for Finance Offices. A requirement exists to insure that a folding chair is authorized for all persons assigned to the office.

Observation: A modification to the TO&E will be requested.

Data Processing Personnel

Item: There is a definite lack of qualified data processing personnel in RVN.

Discussion: The problem caused by the lack of sufficient numbers of ADP personnel is not limited to USARV. Nevertheless, this command was severely handicapped in the functional area of personnel statistical accounting because a data processing unit (DPU) rotated the majority of its machine oriented personnel during a two week period in Nov 65. No qualified replacements were available. To complicate matters further, new equipment (two UNIVAC 1005 computers) was received in Jan 66. The critical shortage of data processing personnel still exists throughout this command. The problems inherent to a short tour only add to the basic problem. The current output of ADP personnel from schools being conducted by TAGO is definitely not meeting the requirements of this command. Furthermore, TAGO does not even provide schooling for MOS 74C (Personnel Accounting Specialist).

Observation: The utilization of on-the-job training of military personnel and local national civilians has served as a temporary, but unacceptable buffer while awaiting the arrival of filler personnel. Accelerated training program for ADP personnel should be undertaken in CONUS.

Contractor Maintenance (Friden)

Item: Maintenance of Friden flexowriter equipment is accomplished solely by contractor personnel.

Discussion: The maintenance capability for repair of Friden equipment was almost non-existent until the successful negotiation of a contract with Friden which became effective 1 Apr 66. Nonetheless, the problem of no spare parts and no trained military maintenance personnel still exists. It is only a matter of time before the spare parts problem is
alleviated. The density of Friden equipment in RVN justifies the requirement for Friden trained military maintenance personnel. In addition, because equipment is scattered throughout RVN among divisional units, it is difficult for the Friden maintenance personnel to provide the response required for efficient and effective operation of Friden equipment.

Observation: Military personnel should be trained in the maintenance of Friden flexowriters.

Maintenance of IBM ADPE

Item: The availability of spare parts and maintenance personnel has shown marked improvement in the quality of maintenance performed on IBM ADPE.

Discussion: The arrival and formation of data processing installations (DPI) during the period (Nov 65 - Jan 66) overtaxed the maintenance capability available in-country at that time due to a lack of spare parts and experienced maintenance personnel. To further complicate the problem, some of the DPI's were and are still located outside the Saigon area and accessible only by air. During this period, work loads increased significantly as more staff sections began to utilize the data processing capability that was available. "Downtime" also increased as the available maintenance support was unable to keep pace.

The parts problem has been solved by the initiation of separate IBM spare parts accounts for each DPI with the IBM supply office in Japan. DPI's now correspond directly with IBM to obtain necessary parts. The problem caused by the lack of military maintenance personnel is a continuing problem throughout the command. However, IBM now has four (4) customer engineers (CE) for in-country "back-up" maintenance support. The number of IBM CE's in-country increased from one (1) to four (4) in early Mar 66.

Observation: When employing ADPE in underdeveloped countries, serious thought must be given to contractual arrangements with commercial firms to ensure the presence of adequate maintenance support to include "back-up" and, if necessary, 1st echelon maintenance. Members of the DA staff are now aware of the maintenance problems encountered in RVN. It is recommended that only experienced military maintenance personnel be sent to RVN and that exceptions be granted in the grade structure of TOE/TD units to allow utilization of experienced personnel who exceed the authorized grade structure.

Generators/Air Conditioners for ADPE

Item: Stable power source and climatic controls are required for efficient operation of automatic data processing equipment (ADPE).

Discussion: The lack of adequate power supply becomes more critical with the continuous buildup of ADPE in RVN. Generators provided by TCE are in many cases, not equal to the 24 hour a day operation required in a combat zone. In many instances, generators sit idle because spare parts are not readily available. Furthermore, generators deteriorate much more rapidly due to the extreme heat and high humidity found in this geographic area.
Air conditioning as provided by current TOE and TA is not adequate in this environment. Commercial air conditioning is difficult to obtain and frequent breakdowns are common. Maintenance of air conditioners is practically nonexistent as many units have been "in maintenance" for over six months. The implementation of the punched card modernization program for RVN involves the replacement of punched card machines with UNIVAC 1005 computers which require stable power and air conditioning. Commercial power is either not available or is so erratic as to preclude its use. Frequent failure of ADPE can be directly attributed to power surges and cyclic variance when utilizing local commercial power. Currently, air conditioners and generators are not readily available in RVN.

Observation: Data processing activities slated for deployment to RVN are being advised to bring the air conditioners, generators, repair floats, and spare parts necessary for their respective operations.

UNIVAC 1005 Implementation

Item: UNIVAC 1005 computers are to be utilized for logistical and administrative units in RVN.

Discussion: In line with the DA punched card modernization program, all units using conventional punched card machines (PCM) are scheduled to receive the UNIVAC 1005 card processor. It is anticipated that PCM equipment will be retained until all machine operations are converted to the 1005. Arrival dates for the 1005 were furnished by Hq 2SARPAC. Upon notification, this headquarters took the action necessary to train programmer personnel required. Planning and site preparation are now being accomplished for this equipment. In addition, teams have been assigned to program standard packages for supply functions throughout RVN. The UNIVAC 1005 will greatly enhance the capability of units to provide timely and accurate ADPS support. Problems are being experienced where units deviated from standard supply procedures. However, the introduction of UNIVAC 1005 computers forces all units to adhere to established procedures and thus ensures compatibility.

Observation: Future conversions required by upgrading of equipment should be planned to allow a reserve of trained personnel to be available for assistance when installing new ADP systems.

Funding

Item: Funding Procedure for Vietnam (QMA)
Discussion: During 1966 OMA funds were issued to this command by means of Obligation Authority (DA Form 14-114) from USARYIS. This method was utilized to reduce the administrative workload in-country. However, since many of the obligations were incurred far from the place of commitment - notably in Japan - certain difficulties were encountered as the end of the fiscal year approached in that vagaries in mail service, time factor, and distance involved made it extremely difficult to purify commitments and obligations in both Vietnam and USARYIS. To alleviate this problem FY67 funding authority will be extended by the operating agency to Japan Procurement Agency, Northwest Procurement Agency and other areas where requirements exist for obligations and disbursements for supplies, services, and equipment incurred for Vietnam.

Observation: The use of the obligational authority as a funding media is a highly useful and satisfactory procedure in a theater of operations for an extended period when the volume of fiscal business stays within an overall in-country OMA budget of approximately $100 million. Beyond this magnitude of operations, and whenever procurement is made in other countries funding authority, insofar as possible, should be extended to the command in which certification of availability of funds, obligation and disbursement are expected to occur, through the use of allotments.

Other Sundry Funds

Item: Sundry funds other than open messes.

Discussion: Other Sundry Funds are desirable in a combat theater in order to maintain troop morale. Primarily, isolated units benefit because they can furnish limited recreational (beer, soda, etc.) facilities normally provided by open messes or much larger clubs when establishment of open messes is not feasible. The system prescribed for accounting for the funds of these Other Sundry Funds is a single-entry type system, similar to the Council Book system, not burdensome to small unit commanders.

Observation: This type fund does much for troop morale. Simplified record keeping relieves burdensome administration.
**LN AUDITORS**

**Item:** Using LN auditors to audit nonappropriated funds.

**Discussion:** There are three Vietnamese auditors assigned to this office. They were transferred from MACV when the responsibility for the audit of MACV mess associations was assigned to this headquarters in April 1966. The LN auditors have proven to work out very well; they are generally knowledgeable in their field and get along well with US personnel. LN auditors must meet certain criteria and undergo hardships that US military do not normally experience. They must overcome difficulties in obtaining transportation, must speak fluent English, and are required to work without direct military supervision on most occasions.

**Observation:** Local national auditors are desirable and valuable assets for the audit of NAF's.

**Internal Review Activities**

**Item:** Internal reviews in the appropriated fund area.

**Discussion:** During the 1st year's operations of the Army headquarters, the audit of nonappropriated funds was the main function of the internal review division of this office with audit responsibilities extending to 140 clubs and messes widely scattered over RVN. In view of the magnitude of the USARV operations now financed by appropriated funds, a definite need does exist for reviews in the areas of finance and accounting, budget, procurement, property accountability, supply, R&U and sales activities.

**Observation:** That a short fall of combat support and combat service support units during a theater troop build up accelerates construction and the furnishing of services by civilian contractor. As the magnitude of the contracted effort assumes major proportions, a requirement is generated for internal review of activities financed by appropriated funds.

**LN PCM Operators**

**Item:** Local Nationals can be employed advantageously as Punched Card Machine (PCM) Operators.

**Discussion:** The USARV Data Center employs seven (7) local national women keypunch operators with the following break-out: One (1) VGS-5 Working Keypunch Supervisor, four (4) VGS-4 Keypunch Operators and two (2) VGS-4 Verifier Operators. The average productivity for keypunch operators is 500 cards keypunched per day from documents ranging from field prepared TAERS forms to machine listings and typed forms. Initially, the
supervisor's position was vacant resulting in poor communication, lack of guidance and non-compliance of civilian personnel regulations by local national employees. This was evidenced by frequent absences, unusually high personnel turnover and a lackadaisical attitude. Many misunderstandings were caused by the language barrier. However, with the addition of a local national keypunch supervisor, productivity has increased, sick leave has decreased and the attitude of the entire work force has changed for the better.

Observation: Local National keypunch operators can be effectively employed, when supervised by a local national.

Management of automatic Data Processing Equipment and Systems

Item: There is a need for centralization of responsibility in an element of the general staff for management of all ADP activities in a command.

Discussion: The Army has made substantial progress over the past several years in the development and application of automatic data processing techniques in support of management (business, personnel and logistics), research and development, operations and intelligence activities. In order to ensure a compatible parallel between the growth of the Army element and managerial capability in RVN, a command decision was made to utilize those proven ADP techniques in personnel statistical accounting and logistics, which would favorably enhance the posture of management, in USAIV. Thus, coincident with the rapid evolution of what is now US Army Vietnam, the management of ADP became an integral part of the Comptroller's mission when the ADP Division, consisting of 4 officers and 6 enlisted men, was officially recognized with approval of TD P5-2500, on 1 October 1965. The need for centralization of ADP management responsibility at the general staff level was recognized because of the necessity to coordinate plans for and use of great amounts of data processing equipment which, because of cost and complexity, requires consistent and specialized management. On 1 Oct 65, there were three (3) data processing installations (DPI) in RVN. Currently, there are nine (9), and by year's end there will be approximately twenty-five (25). Thus far, the general staff level surveillance over all ADP, USAIV, as provided by the Comptroller, has been highly effective. With the impending introduction of numerous ADP projects into this command, which have DOD, and possibly higher executive and legislative level interest, it is imperative that the ADP's program management responsibility be maintained in a central staff agency that is directly responsible to the command group. When the advantages of ADP are exploited to the full, its utilization normally transcends organizational jurisdictions within a command, and often justifies revisions in organization such that it becomes an instrument at the top level of command.
Observation: The need for centralization of responsibility for the management of AD is apparent. The future outlook for ADP in USA RV dictates the adoption by this command of DA's preferred organizational arrangement placing the responsibility for the staff management and operation of information and data systems in a central agency that is directly responsible to the Chief of Staff. This will insure that formulation of policy is devoid of political stigma and implication and, will serve to emphasize to major subordinate commands that ADP has established itself as a device which is destined to play a significant and permanent role in all major operations in USA RV.

Finance Disbursing-Examination Teams

Item: Capabilities of Finance Disbursing-Examination Teams in Vietnam.

Discussion: Due to the unique conditions in Vietnam, disbursing-examination teams are capable of servicing 70% of the populations indicated in TOE 14-500E. Several factors cause this reduced capability.

a. The military pay option system in effect in Vietnam, under which an individual may receive his pay in one of four ways: (1) All in cash; (2) All by Treasury check sent outside Vietnam; (3) Part in cash and part by Treasury check sent outside Vietnam; (4) Part in cash and the balance accrued on his voucher. Under this system finance officers must issue and account for approximately twice as many checks as are normally used.

b. Treasury checks may not be used for in-country check payments. Instead, designated depositary checking accounts are maintained, requiring additional record-keeping and reporting.

c. Due to lack of banking facilities and limited postal money order facilities, finance officers must exchange Treasury checks for cash for transmittal of funds out of Vietnam, causing additional workload in writing and accounting for Treasury checks. Treasury checks, postal money orders and other negotiable instruments must be cashed.

d. Facilities must be made available for the sale of piasters to individuals, and for the exchange of NPC for US currency and vice versa for individuals departing from and arriving in Vietnam.

e. Environmental conditions of dirt, dust, heat and humidity prevalent throughout Vietnam cause adding machines, accounting machines, typewriters, and other equipment to become clogged with dirt, dust, and break down. There are only very limited in-country repair capabilities for office equipment.
f. Accelerated rotation increases workloads because of the requirement to prepare prior month pay vouchers for incoming personnel and because of the increased number of travel vouchers required. It also requires that more time be spent training replacements with corresponding reduction in productive time.

g. The increased number of pay and allowance entitlements in Vietnam increases workloads.

h. Difficulties are encountered in communication and transportation. Funds must be transported by aircraft. Long delays awaiting transportation are often experienced. Mail service is exceedingly slow, causing delays in correspondence.

i. Power outages throughout Vietnam are frequent, unpredictable and often prolonged, causing delays in processing workloads.

j. Shortages are frequently encountered in required forms, office supplies and equipment. Time is lost waiting for required items and in use of inefficient substitute procedures.

Observation: The 14-500K should be completely restudied and revised so that capabilities and personnel and equipment authorizations are in line with combat requirements in an overseas area under the military pay voucher system.

Controller Organization

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<th>Item: Requirement for a comptroller organization within an Army Component Command Headquarters in an action theater.</th>
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Discussion: The first 12 months of experience for the U.S. Army Vietnam as an Army Component Command had demonstrated dramatically the requirement for a Comptroller Office at the general staff level with the following general characteristics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MGT &amp; ANAL DIVISION</th>
<th>FINANCE SERVICES</th>
<th>PHOG &amp; BUD DIVISION</th>
<th>INTERNAL REVIEW</th>
<th>ADP</th>
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</thead>
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<td>LN 1</td>
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<td>LN 4</td>
<td>LN 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[133\]
b. Management and Analysis Division. This was an exceptionally active division during the first six months' operation in view of the responsibilities assigned to the Comptroller in delineating functions for USARV vis-a-vis MACV, and in playing a key role in absorbing functions incident to the phase out of the Navy's Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon (HSAS) Other major responsibilities charged to this branch included the establishment of a Reports Control Program, publication of an Organization and Functions Manual, Quarterly Progress Report and Staff Directory.

c. Finance Services Division. The major effort of this branch took the form of planning for the deployment of Finance units so that the rapidly expanding troop population in Vietnam could be adequately supported. Additionally, directives were drafted and published to provide necessary guidance to finance officers regarding the provision of finance services under the unique environmental conditions in Vietnam.

d. Program and Budget Division. During the first year's operation no formal programing occurred, with the major effort directed toward continual up-ward revisions of fund estimates as a result of the rapidly expanding troop buildup.

e. Internal Review Division. The greatest task faced by this division was initially to publish detailed accounting procedures to govern approximately 160 clubs and messes in Vietnam and to initiate an audit program to insure at least two formal audits of each non-appropriated fund annually.

f. Automatic Data Processing Division. Starting literally from a "zero point" this division developed during the first year a comprehensive data processing program for USARV, to include an inventory of all assets and development of plans for progressive modernization. A major problem encountered in this effort was the lack of logistics-oriented data processing personnel within the Army headquarters and at lower echelons with whom data processing modernization plans could be developed on a coordinated basis.

Observation: A Comptroller at the general staff level is an integral and necessary element of an Army Component Command in an active theater of operations. In retrospect, the energies of this particular office, under these particular circumstances were very roughly divided: 85% planning for the future; 10% analyzing the past; 5% current operations.
Item: Reduction of Administrative Reporting

Discussion: Deployment of U.S. Army units against hostile forces intensifies the need, both in terms of quantity and timeliness, of required operational information. Conversely, these units are required to perform operational missions which restrict the time and personnel available to devote to administrative functions.

Observation: Administrative reporting requirements applicable to units performing vital operational missions should be continually screened, reduced and maintained at a level so as not to limit the units mission performance.
Additional Equipment Requirements for Finance Sections of Infantry Division and Separate Brigades (TOE's 12-37E, 12-177E)

<table>
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<tr>
<td>N/Avail</td>
<td>Document copying machine, dry type</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Equipment identification per SB 700-20

Inclosure 1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>LINE</th>
<th>NOMENCLATURE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>J48028</td>
<td>Gen set gas engine: 5KW 60 CY 1-3 PH AC 120 120/240 120/280 V Skid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>X60833</td>
<td>Truck utility: ½ Ton W/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>C71089</td>
<td>Calculating machine: Non-listing hand-elec 10 Digits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>X80074</td>
<td>Typewriter: Nonportable 13 in carriage elite type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>A17126</td>
<td>Adding and subtracting machine: Listing, hand-elec columnar 10 digit AC/DC 110V W/Credit balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>L63994</td>
<td>Light set gen illum 25 outlet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>E49481</td>
<td>Coincounting machine: Manual operated tube type auto model CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>N/Avail</td>
<td>NCR Class 33 accounting machine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>N/Avail</td>
<td>Bill counting machine, elec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>E03581</td>
<td>Checksing machine: Elec auto feed, 10,000 checks per hour reset N/Reset Regis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>E03992</td>
<td>Checkwriting machine: Elec 10 key Colm 99,999,999.99 K/B Cap, Model 10 ES-CS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>D64865</td>
<td>Case field office machine: 18½ L 13½W, 17D inside dim plywood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>D84380</td>
<td>Chair folding: Front to back folding upholstered back and seat green plastic cover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>H42342</td>
<td>Filing cabinet: Letter size 1 drawer H W/Padlock hasp olive green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>S27405</td>
<td>Safe: 2 Shelves 1 drawer 2 compartment 26H 17W 17½D in Mil-S-2364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>U93477</td>
<td>Table folding Legs: Enamel finish U/AS Camp Utility Table</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>X48777</td>
<td>Truck hand two wheeled: Gen Utility type aluminum 22x58</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Inclosure 2

137
T X65258 Trunk Locker: Plywood 31L 15 1/8 W 11 7/8 D
W/Tray Clothing

U N/Avail Document copying machine, dry type

NOTE: Equipment Identification per SB 700-20
GENERAL

This Combat Lessons Bulletin is devoted solely to ways and means of preventing or minimizing the effects of VC mortar and recoilless rifle attacks on fixed or semi-fixed installations and counterattacking the enemy force.

There is reason to believe that the Viet Cong will continue these harassing attacks which have caused concern in the past.

The allocation of combat forces necessary to prevent VC mortar and recoilless rifle attacks against our installations is prohibitive. In order that USARV combat units retain flexibility to conduct maximum offensive actions, commanders of combat support and combat service support units, for the most part, must provide for their own area security. The examples of actions contained in this bulletin point up measures (both active and passive) that can be taken to minimize loss of or damage to our resources and to inflict maximum punishment upon the enemy when he chooses to engage in this type of operation.

1. ENEMY THREAT. The VC hit-and-run mortar and recoilless rifle attacks are thoroughly planned, rehearsed, and executed. Beginning with a thorough reconnaissance of the target area and ending with movement and emplacement of weapons and ammunition, VC activity gradually increases in the target area. Previous attacks have occurred generally on moonless nights between the hours of 2100 to 0500. The duration of the attack generally ranges from 5 to 20 minutes.

2. EARLY DETECTION. Thorough and logical preparation by the VC make every attack susceptible to detection. Changes in the normal indigenous activity in vicinity of the target are sometimes valid indicators of an impending attack as is a period of frequent but sporadic mortar and small arms fire. All available means of surveillance and intelligence should be employed to the utmost.

Item 1: SF Det Camp - Jan 66 .
Discussion: The Starlight Scope was used to detect the preparation of VC mortar positions. After observing these preparations for several nights, the completed positions were destroyed by a demolition patrol.
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COMBAT LESSONS BULLETIN NUMBER 2 dated 28 July 1966, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96307

Observation: The Starlight Scope offers another means for detection of enemy activities prior to an attack.

Item 2: An Khe - 20 Apr 66. (Source: I FFORCEN)

Discussion: Reports were received of unidentified Vietnamese in the vicinity of the airfield for a number of mornings prior to the attack. In addition, cattle were herded by men (normally done by women and children) up to a location which subsequently became a point of actual penetration by attacking VC.

Observation: Every effort should be made to observe any unusual activities by the local populace and to report such activities to the commander responsible for security.

Item 3: Pleiku - 22 Apr 66. (Source: I FFORCEN)

Discussion: At 2300 hours on 21 April, only hours before the attack, a security patrol surprised a group of Vietnamese carrying a basket near the airfield. The Vietnamese dropped the basket and ran. Not until the next morning, after the attack, was the basket searched and found to contain several fused 81mm mortar rounds.

Observation: All unusual incidents should be immediately and thoroughly investigated.

Item 4: Phu Loi - 30 Jan, 26 Feb, 21 May 66. (Source: 23d Arty Op)

Discussion: Reports from ARVN intelligence agencies forewarned of two of the three attacks on the base camp. The indicators used were changes in VC unit locations and in the pattern of VC activity in the local area.

Observation: ARVN intelligence reports should be aggressively sought and used.

3. LOCATION OF WEAPONS. To reduce the intensity and duration of an attack, it is imperative to locate weapons positions as early as possible. The duration of attack is generally less than 20 minutes, providing little time for location efforts. The high volume of fire that may be attained with mortars (18 to 30 rounds per minute per 81mm mortar) makes every minute critical in reducing the degree of casualties and damage. In some instances, the enemy weapon positions were located only by daylight ground reconnaissance the following morning. In other cases, visual ground and aerial reconnaissance and counter-mortar radar have succeeded in effectively locating enemy emplacements thereby allowing counteraction to cause curtailment of the attack.

Item 1: Attacks on ARVN and MACV compounds. (Source: MACV)

Discussion: Observers in guard towers have successfully located VC weapons. By visual observation of a flash from two or more towers and the reading of an azimuth target coordinates can be determined.

Observation: Trained personnel in towers, with direct communications to an FDC can provide the essential first step in the rapid suppression of enemy fire.
Item 2: Phu Loi - 26 Feb 66. (Source: 23d Arty Gp)
Discussion: An L-19 observer conducting reconnaissance over the installation observed and reported the first muzzle flashes thereby permitting effective suppressive fires.

Observation: Aerial observation is most effective in locating weapons. When indicators exist of an impending attack, observation should be continuous with stand-by aircraft prepared to cover during refueling stops and contingencies.

Item 3: Phu Loi - 21 May 66. (Source: 23d Arty Gp)
Discussion: An AN/MPQ-4 countermortar radar located an enemy mortar position during the attack on 21 May. The confirmed result of friendly mortar fires was ten VC KIA and one 81mm mortar destroyed. (The AN/MPQ-4 cannot provide 360° surveillance since its search beam is stationary and covers an arc of only 32° (±5 mils). It can, therefore, be oriented only against the most likely direction of attack. Area coverage can be increased by locating the radar at the side of the installation opposite to the side facing the most likely direction of attack. When this is done, it may be necessary to elevate the radar to avoid masking the beam by terrain or structures. Illustration follows.)

Observation: The use of the AN/MPQ-4 countermortar radar can be a valuable asset in the defense of installations. FM 6-161 provides guidance for deployment of the AN/MPQ-4 only to field positions against conventional forces. Employment of this equipment in the current counterinsurgency environment of RVN to attain the maximum benefit within its design capability requires imagination and a logical analysis of the situation.
Item 4: Vinh Long - 7 Jun 66.  (Source: 13th Avn Bn)
Discussion: Armed helicopters flying reconnaissance over the area had just landed for refueling when the mortar attack commenced, indicating that the VC purposely awaited the touch-down of the armed ships. The helicopters immediately scrambled and took the mortars under fire.
Observation: If practicable, aerial reconnaissance should be made continuous by the use of standby aircraft to cover during periods of refueling and contingencies.

Item 5: Soc Trang - 22 Jun 66.  (Source: 13th Avn Bn)
Discussion: At commencement of the 75mm RR attack, a flare ship and an armed helicopter were in the air thus permitting an immediate alert and scrambling of other armed ships. The immediate release of a flare and the quick alert were instrumental in limiting the attack to five minutes during which 22 rds of 75mm RR were fired.
Observation: Aerial reconnaissance is effective in immediately locating weapons positions and early use of flares will assist armed aircraft in locating and destroying the attacker.

4. SUPPRESSION OF FIRES. Airborne firepower, artillery, mortars, and ground forces may be available to counterattack and suppress enemy fires. Due to the short duration of the usual mortar and recoiless rifle attack, only airborne firepower, artillery, and mortars can immediately suppress and curtail the attack (unless ground troops happen to be in the vicinity of the enemy weapons). To use both air and indirect fire simultaneously in the first minutes of an attack may be inhibited by a lack of good communications and failure to provide for exact coordination.

Item 1: Phu Loi - 30 Jan 66.  (Source: 23d Arty Gp)
Discussion: Preselected artillery concentrations were fired on likely areas for enemy mortar positions immediately upon commencement of the attack. The result was to lessen the intensity and duration of the attack. One enemy 81mm mortar was confirmed as destroyed by the artillery.
Observation: The selection, where practicable, of concentrations on all possible areas where the enemy may emplace mortars and the capability to immediately and accurately fire these concentrations can assist in rapid suppression of enemy fires.

Item 2: Vinh Long - 18 May 66.  (Source: 13th Avn Bn)
Discussion: Within three minutes after the enemy mortar attack began, two armed helicopter platoons scrambled in accordance with the defensive plan. They spotted the mortar positions and took them under fire causing the VC to break off the attack. Live rounds were later found abandoned by the VC.
Observation: Armed helicopters and a quick reaction plan can be most effective in rapidly suppressing enemy fires.

**Item 3: Vinh Long - 29 May 66.** (Source: 13th Avn Bn)

**Discussion:** Armed helicopters in flight were able to immediately suppress some fires. Additional armed helicopters were immediately scrambled to further assist in suppression. In this case it was noted that the VC used separated firing positions, thus requiring more time to silence a group of weapons with one ship.

**Observation:** Airborne armed reconnaissance can be most effective in bringing fires to bear immediately after commencement of an attack. Armed helicopters should operate in 'airs' so as to take under fire more than one mortar position simultaneously.

5. **MINIMIZE DAMAGE AND CASUALTIES.**

**Item: All past attacks.**

**Discussion:** The most significant damage has occurred to aircraft, vehicles, communication systems, and POL storage facilities. The various means of providing some protection for these items have been employed at most installations. However, as with all static defensive positions, improvement through innovations, construction, and reinforcement can always be made. For aircraft and vehicles, dispersed parking is essential as is the random changing of parking areas. Sand bagged parking places for aircraft and vehicles can also prevent some damage. Communication facilities should be completely underground or fully revetted with sandbags. Antennas and wire are quite vulnerable and cannot be easily protected; hence, a requirement exists for immediately available repair crews and spare parts. In one instance (CA MAU - 23 Feb, 2d Sig Gp) a MRC-69 signal van was destroyed. To preclude a repeat loss, the replacement equipment was dismantled and placed in a concrete bunker. POL facilities may be placed partially or wholly below ground level or can be partially revetted by sandbags. To minimize personnel casualties, a thorough understanding by all personnel of alert procedures and individual protective measures is required as are appropriately placed bunkers, trenches, and foxholes.

**Observation:** VC mortar and recoilless rifle attacks on fixed and semi-fixed installations will continue, therefore there is a continuing requirement for protection of personnel and equipment. Installation plans should provide for continued improvement of shelters and defensive positions. Loss of personnel and damage to equipment are reduced when personnel are completely familiar with installation defense plans. USARV SOP for Emergency Operations provides guidance on passive defense measures.

6. **ELIMINATIN OF THE ATTACKING FORCE.** As noted in the preceding paragraphs, some of the attacking force has been destroyed by air-delivered fires, artillery, and mortars.
However, the complete entrapment and destruction can be accomplished only by an immedi-
ately responsive ground force.

Item: Vinh Long - 29 May 66. (Source: 13th Avn Bn)
Discussion: An ARVN reaction force was deployed to blocking positions shortly after the attack. A follow-up ground action netted 13 VC KIA and one captured. If the troops to be employed are stationed in the area under attack, the decision to move them by air during the attack must be carefully weighed against the possibility of increased casualties.
Observation: Rapid deployment of a reaction force to blocking positions can contain the attacking force until it can be searched out and destroyed.

7. COMMAND AND CONTROL. Centralized command and control in the implementation of defense measures, both passive and active, is essential. Communications from a command facility should be duplicated and well protected to ensure continuous operation during an attack.

Item 1: Vung Tau - 12 Mar 66. (Source: 1st Log Comd, 2d Sig Gp)
Discussion: Perimeters manned by US units were not integrated, resulting in adjacent units directing their fire into friendly units. Because there was no emergency operations center and insufficient communications at the time, the overall defense of the installation was not centrally controlled and coordinated.
Observation: A centralized operations center with good communications is necessary for coordination and execution of defensive plans.

Item 2: Phan Thiet - 21 Mar 66. (Source: 2d Sig Gp)
Discussion: During the attack, vital communications were temporarily interrupted by explosive effects against the highly vulnerable antenna and wire system. A repair crew was immediately available which, under fire, succeeded in restoring communications.
Observation: Communications vital to command, control and fire direction should be duplicated. Maintenance personnel with equipment should be ready to replace or repair particularly vulnerable items such as antennas and wire lines.

Item 3: Phu Loi - 26 Feb 66. (Source: 23d Arty Gp)
Discussion: Communications were lost by a direct hit on the sole circuit.
Observation: Alternate communications are required between operations center, fire direction centers, and other elements involved in the defense.

Item 4: An Khe and Pleiku - 20-22 Apr 66. (Source: I FFORCEV)
Observation: The sudden, intense volume of fire makes immediate reaction
imperative. A requirement may therefore exist for a fire control net from observation posts or aircraft directly to all friendly indirect fire means.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

RICHARD A. SEITZ
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Chief of Staff

S. A. MACKENZIE
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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