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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (10 Jul 68) FOR OT RD 682071 17 July 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Battalion
15th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 7TH BATTALION 15TH ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96368

AVGM-AB-C

3 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Battalion 15th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

See Distribution

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

A. (C) General

(1) On 1 Feb 68 the battalion continued its assigned mission of General Support US, ARVN, FWMAF, II Corps Tactical Zone. The battalion had control of 3 firing batteries: Battery B, Battery C and Battery C 6th Battalion 16th Artillery. Battery A remained temporarily attached 52d Artillery Group. The firing batteries under battalion control were given a further mission of General Support Reinforcing the fires of 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery.

(2) On 30 Mar 68 the battalion's mission was modified to General Support US, ARVN, FWMAF in the Cochise AO, Reinforcing the fires of the 3d Battalion 319th Artillery, 173d Airborne Brigade.

(3) During the period the battalion provided support to three major maneuver elements in the same geographical area: From 1 Feb to 19 Feb 68 the Air Cav Division (Pershing AO); from 1 Mar to 31 Mar 68 3d Brigade 4th Infantry Division (Patrick AO); and from 1 Apr to date the 173d Airborne Brigade (Cochise AO).

(4) The battalion CP located at LZ Uplift (BR 927749) split once during the period to provide adequate control of Battery B supporting operation Meng Ho #11, a joint operation of US, ROK, and ARVN forces vic grid CR 0835, and Battery C supporting the 173d Airborne Brigade's Operation Velvet Hammer vic BR 6264.

(5) On 20 Apr 68 SP/4 Hiawatha Hicks, US 54969488, Svc Btry 7/15 Arty was hit by a sniper round resulting in a serious head injury. SP/4 Hicks died in the hospital on 21 Apr 68 at 0500 hrs. The incident occurred at the Phu Cu Pass (BR 888878) and was the first fatality sustained by this unit as a result of enemy action.

(6) Throughout the reporting period, the headquarters battery remained at LZ Uplift providing security, supplies and quarters for the battalion headquarters element.

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(7) Service Battery along with supply representatives from all batteries remained at Phu Cat AB (now Camp Fidel BR 900400) during the entire period and provided personnel services, ammo resupply, POL and other logistics supplies. During the period, Service Battery completed construction of a new base camp. The battalion ammunition section constructed a battalion ammunition supply point at LZ Uplift. The operation of this ASP facilitates rapid resupply to firing batteries in the Cochise AO and also provides a management tool for the control of ASP ammunition.

(8) Battery A began the reporting period temporarily attached to the 52d Arty Group but returned to battalion control on 19 Feb 68. On 4 Feb 68, while under the 52d Arty Group, 2 guns in the battery were retubed to 8 inch giving the battery 8 inch/175mm capability. The battery returned in this composite configuration. During the reporting period the battery was GSR to 3 tactical units: the 1/77 Artillery, 1st Air Cav Div during Operation Pershing; the 2/9th Artillery 3d Brigade 4th Infantry Division during Operation Patria; and the 3/31 9th Artillery during Operation Cochise. The battery made two moves in the reporting period and expended 7132 8 inch rounds at 2374 targets and expended 3253 175mm rounds at 1140 targets.

(9) On 1 Feb 68, Battery B remained at its fire base at LZ Uplift (BR 929765) with a mission of GSR 1st Bn 77th Artillery, 1st Air Cav Division. During the period the battery made numerous movements in support of operations and raids (see Inc 2). Of particular note were two operations in support of the Capitol ROK Infantry Division. On 25 Mar 68 Battery B displaced one platoon of 8 inch howitzers to Ba Gi (BR 993334) with the mission of GSR Cap ROK Infantry Division. Primary target area was the southern Phu Cat mountains vic OR 0646 which contained many bunkers and tunnel complexes. The platoon returned to LZ Uplift the same day after expending 88 rounds. The following surveillance of fires was received:

1 VC KIA

17 Buildings destroyed
13 Buildings damaged
8 Bunkers destroyed
5 Bunkers damaged
50 lbs of rice destroyed.

Operation Merg Ho #11 began on 20 Apr 68. On 19 Apr Btry B had one platoon at LZ Uplift and one platoon at LZ Pluto supporting the 173d Airborne Brigade's Operation Velvet Hammer. Both platoons displaced to Camp Fidel (BR 900400) the evening of 19 Apr and remained over night.

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Early on 20 April Btry B displaced from Camp Fidel to Ba Gi to support Operation Meng Ho #11. The mission of the battery was GS to Cap ROK Infantry Division with priority of fires to the 1st Regiment.

Operation Meng Ho #11 was characterized by a high volume of artillery fire and air strikes to neutralize the area. The heavy artillery was employed primarily for destroying bunkers and tunnel complexes. Complete surveillance for Operation Meng Ho #11 as follows:

- 201 VC/NVA KIA
- 80 VC/NVA CIA
- 96 Small arms CIA
- 14 Crew served weapons CIA

Elements of 8th Bn 18th NVA Regt, E213 VC Bn, and 300th NVA Sapper Bn were identified in combat.

Operation Meng Ho #11 was terminated 270900 Apr and Btry B returned to LZ Uplift. Expenditures during the reporting period totaled 19,471 rounds fired at 4390 targets.

(10) Battery C continued its mission of General Support Reinforcing the fires of 1st Air Cav Div Artillery from LZ English (BS 878015). The battery displaced to vicinity of Ban Me Thuot (AQ 934268) on 29 Feb with the mission of General Support reinforcing the fires of Battery C 3d Battalion 6th Artillery in support of Task Force 1/12. The battery closed on 3 Mar after an overnight stop in An Khe and a two day stop at Pleiku. During the operation the battery occupied positions at three fire support bases in the vicinity of Ban Me Thuot and conducted three one day artillery raids to attack suspected and known locations of the 32d and 33d NVA Regiments. On 30 Mar 68 two howitzers were retubed to 175mm guns. A total of 6789 rounds of 8 inch ammunition was expended on 1537 missions and 800 rounds of 175mm ammunition was expended on 290 missions while in the Ban Me Thuot area.

The battery displaced from the western highlands on 22 Apr 68 and after an overnight stay in Pleiku closed into LZ Diamondhead (BR 686421) on 23 Apr with the mission of General Support Reinforcing Cap ROK Infantry Division Artillery.

On 24 Apr 68 the battery moved to LZ Pluto (BR 615640) to support the 173d Airborne Brigade Operation Velvet Hammer. Mission was General Support reinforcing Battery C 3d Battalion 319th Artillery. On 29 Apr 68 the battery returned to LZ Diamondhead and at present has the mission of General Support Reinforcing CQID Artillery.
During the reporting period the battery expended 11,875 8 inch rounds on 2371 missions and 887 175mm rounds on 337 missions.

(11) Battery C 6/16 Artillery began the period located at LZ Ollie (CR 790041) and temporarily attached to the battalion with the mission of GSR 1st Air Cav Division Artillery. The unit is a 155mm towed howitzer battery and gave the battalion three calibre capability. In the reporting period the battery made 2 moves (see Incl 2) and was permanently attached to the battalion on 5 Mar 68. The unit also had 3 changes in its mission: GSR 1/77 Artillery, GSR 2/9 Artillery, and GSR 3/319 Artillery. On 12 April C 6/16 Artillery embarked LSTs at Qui Nhon for sea movement to the city of Hue in support of US forces in I Corps Tactical Zone. The first move the battery made in the period was entirely by air to LZ Laramie (BS 793065). While at this LZ the battery had to be resupplied entirely by air. This was accomplished by using Chinooks (CH-47) and requiring approximately 5 sorties per day. The major problem encountered was the non availability of Flying Cranes (CH-54) for airlift of howitzers to and from the LZ. The second move of the battery was to Qui Nhon prior to movement to Hue. During the period the battery expended 11,760 rounds on 2080 targets.

(12) The battalion's organization is shown in Incl 1.

(13) The battalion's tactical displacements are shown in Incl 2.

B. (C) Personnel and Administration

(1) The battalion began the reporting period with a shortage of 56 personnel. Total losses during the period due to rotation and casualties were 235 personnel. A total of 293 replacements were received during the period bringing the battalion to a shortage of two personnel at the conclusion of the period. This is the highest percentage assigned versus authorized, since this organization arrived in country.

(2) Prior notification of assignment of senior enlisted personnel is currently being received, however, no prior notification is received on the assignment of enlisted personnel in grades E1 thru E6.

C. (C) Intelligence

(1) The battalion continued a program of requesting clearances, completing pending clearances, validating clearances and replacing outdated DD Form 873s throughout the reporting period.

(2) The fire planning and targeting responsibility for the southern portion of the Pershing and subsequently Patrick AO remained with this battalion until 13 Mar 68. During this period the battalion also maintained responsibility for aerial surveillance and visual reconnaissance missions in the same
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area. On 13 Mar 68 all of the above functions were transferred to the 7th Bn 13th Artillery which acted in the capacity of a direct support battalion for the southern portion of the AO.

(3) The battalion's visual reconnaissance efforts reached a peak during this reporting period with two O1 type aircraft available daily. Scheduling of two missions of two hours duration per day per aircraft, provided almost continuous coverage of the area of operations. In addition, this program provided an aircraft in the air for immediate response to contact missions as well as special agent reports.

(4) Although not authorized by the present TOE, this battalion furnishes a forward observer party for six operations to the Ha Tay Special Forces Camp. Special forces personnel are trained in artillery adjustment, however they at times unable to call for fire because their primary duty, advising on infantry tactics, requires their full attention. The forward observer party allows special forces personnel to concentrate on their primary duty without sacrificing timely fire support.

D. Training

(1) The battalion training program continued during the reporting period with emphasis being placed on basic artillery procedures and skills including: Fire Direction Control procedures, gun/howitzer crew drill and accuracy checks. Special training was conducted on selected ammunition (Firecracker) to include Fire Direction Center procedures, handling and storage. Fire Direction Centers conducted training to maintain proficiency in this area.

(2) Two 14 day FDC courses were conducted at battalion level during Feb and Mar 68. This training was given to provide trained personnel to the FDCs of the battalion to replace expected June losses, to provide additional trained personnel to the battery FDCs allowing them to operate more easily when the battery splits for artillery raids and to provide refresher training to selected individuals. Two courses are planned for the month of May.

(3) Also during the period 5 newly assigned officers attended FOTC and/or FDCTC for refresher training and Vietnam orientation prior to being assigned to the firing batteries.

(4) A chiefs of section training program was formulated and was underway prior to the close of the reporting period. The objective of this training is to provide inexperienced gun chiefs, primarily those with only towed artillery training, with a working knowledge of the self propelled howitzer operation, capabilities and problem areas.

(5) The batteries conducted required daily, weekly, and quarterly training during the reporting period.
E. (C) Logistics

(1) During the reporting period the clothing records and weapons of the battalion were consolidated at S4. This greatly increased the effectiveness of control and maintenance of clothing records, weapons, and issuing of field equipment. This system greatly assisted the S4 section in in-processing 293 men and out-processing 235 men during the reporting period. This consolidation relieved unit commanders and supply sergeants of accountability and responsibility allowing them to spend more time in accomplishing their combat mission. During the period, a storage facility was established for personnel going on R&R and special leave. This provided greater security and control of personnel equipment.

(2) The establishment of PLL at battery level was accomplished in the reporting period and has continued to prove its value throughout this period. Presently 69 percent of all PLL authorized has a minimum of one item on hand and as a result battery deadline rates were reduced considerably.

F. (C) Civil Affairs

(1) Civil Affairs activities during the past quarter centered around medical and educational activities, furnishing building materials for numerous construction projects, and providing financial support to the Tet Aggression Relief Project. In addition, two psywar projects were undertaken.

(2) Throughout five districts of Binh Dinh Province and in twelve hamlets, weekly MEDCAP visits were conducted by battery and battalion teams. One thousand eight hundred eighty-eight Vietnamese patients received treatment for ailments or injuries ranging from skin disease to tuberculosis to bullet wounds. Three MEDCAPs were conducted at the site of the Binh Chuong Dispensary, while still under construction.

(3) Support for educational institutions included eight thousand piasters worth of teacher kits for two schools, teaching eight hundred Vietnamese high school students in eight English classes, and furnishing writing paper and other school supplies to the Binh Chuong School.

(4) The battalion, in supporting the An Nhơn District Youth and Chieu Hoi Centers, schools in three hamlets, and the Phú My District Advisory team, made the following contributions:

   a. 7250 pounds of cement.
   b. 17,000 board feet of lumber.
   c. 50 gallons of whitewash.
   d. 720 pounds of engineer stakes.
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e. 300 square feet of screen wire.

f. 3800 gallons of edible waste for livestock of local farmers.

(5) Battalion Civil Affairs volunteers supported the program primarily
by transporting items found in paragraph four as well as by teaching English
classes, conducting MEDCAPs, and by supervising and monitoring the progress of
various building projects. Forty-two man days were required to accomplish
these missions. During the same period, the Vietnamese people labored four
hundred seventy man days.

(6) Each battery helped support the Tet Aggression Relief Project. Total
battalion voluntary contributions exceeded one hundred dollars. Solatium pay-
ments to Vietnamese people and other voluntary contributions during the
quarter totaled one thousand six hundred piasters. US/FMAF funds accounted
for an additional seven thousand piasters, which was used to purchase tile for
the roof of the Binh Chuong Dispensary. The battalion, drawing from its own
resources, furnished another two hundred thirty seven thousand five hundred
piasters worth of materials for Civic Action building projects.

(7) In Phu My District ten propaganda posters were made by Popular Force
soldiers using plywood furnished by the unit. In addition, the Battalion
Civil Affairs Officers designed six propaganda leaflets, complete with illus-
trations, for use in the Voluntary Informant Program.

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and
Recommendations.

A. Personnel

(1) Infusion of Personnel

a. Observation. Units arriving in Vietnam should begin infusion
immediately and should complete the infusion program by the end of the first
six months.

b. Evaluation. Since the battalion's arrival in Vietnam on 1
July 1967, it has undergone continuous infusion of personnel. The infusion
was initiated on 10 July 1967 and has continued through 15 April 1968. The
infusion of personnel was not pressed and as of this date there remain 158
enlisted, 6 commissioned officers, and 3 warrant officers returning to
CONUS in June 1968.

c. Recommendations. Immediately on arrival in country, a unit should
begin infusion of personnel. This infusion should be finalized MIF six months
after arrival. By doing this, all reports could be submitted by the gaining
unit for control purposes. If this is not done, many coordination and forwar-
ding problems are incurred in the area of correspondence. When large numbers
of personnel are infused they should be broken down into groups of 25-30 individuals. This facilitates in and out processing, transportation, billeting at base camp, reduces confusion, and still leaves the unit with an operational capability.

(2) Morning Reports

a. Observation, Morning Report preparation by units in field locations is difficult and produces undue delays.

b. Evaluation, All preparation of morning reports is accomplished by the battalion personnel office. One clerk is designated the battalion morning reports clerk and is responsible for preparation of all morning reports and suspense cards. Effective dates are kept to a minimum by using this system, since 95% of all entries are originated or received by the personnel office prior to receipt by individual batteries. Morning report suspense cards are more accurate due to the location of the individual 201 files and DA Form 20. During a recent USARV Personnel Management Team visit, comments were made that our morning reports were the best they had seen in RVN. This was mainly the result of having the morning reports in the personnel office under close supervision of the personnel officer.

c. Recommendation. All morning reports should be moved to the battalion personnel office and a morning report clerk designated. He will prepare all morning reports and suspense cards for the batteries, and dispatch an information copy of all morning reports to the respective batteries. The end result is up to date morning reports, less effective dates, morning reports out to DPU on time and battalion strength current at all times.

B. Operations

(1) Preparation of Artillery Firing Positions

a. Observation, Artillery batteries require engineer support when occupying new fire bases. This especially true of isolated fire bases.

b. Evaluation, Recently the enemy has broken his pattern of thorough preparation for attacks and has conducted mortar attacks on an artillery battery on their first night in a new position area. This points out the need for rapid construction of fortifications, ie gun parapets, dug outs for the fire direction centers and individual protective shelters. An artillery battery is not equipped to accomplish this task in the time allowed. Engineer support in the form of bulldozers and trenchers should be made available on a priority basis to make hasty preparation for defense immediately upon occupation of position or ahead of the battery if time and the tactical situation allows.
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c. Recommendation. Either a construction engineer or combat engineer company operating in the same area with a non-divisional artillery battalion be assigned a priority mission of supporting artillery displacements.

(2) Support Vehicles on Artillery Raids

a. Observation. On artillery raids batteries should insure that only necessary vehicles remain in the position area overnight.

b. Evaluation. In the employment of artillery on raids it is necessary to use many support vehicles in the initial move to the position area and to keep the element resupplied. If the vehicles are allowed to remain in the position overnight it necessitates additional security personnel, requires an enlarged perimeter and time in insuring that the vehicles do not interfere with the operation of the firing batteries or hinder the reaction of the battery to ground or mortar attack.

c. Recommendation. During artillery raids firing batteries should do everything possible to have all vehicles not necessary to complete the mission returned to base camp by nightfall.

(3) Heavy Artillery Ammunition Resupply.

a. Observation. Ammunition resupply to heavy artillery batteries presents a serious problem when the batteries are moved to isolated fire bases.

b. Evaluation. The battalion had one major operation involving a heavy battery moving into an isolated area for an extended period of time. The area was such that resupply of ammo, food and other essential items had to be transported by air. This necessitated numerous sorties for ammunition alone as the Chinook (CH-47) can only transport 27 complete 8 inch rounds per sortie. Experience indicates a heavy battery will expend between 200 and 300 rounds per day. This requires 7 to 11 ammunition sorties per day.

c. Recommendation. Whenever the mission permits, heavy artillery should be emplaced in positions which permit resupply by road net. When the tactical situation requires occupation of an isolated fire base, all headquarters concerned with the operation must be made aware of large number of sorties required to resupply an isolated heavy artillery battery.

C. Training

(1) Junior NCO Training.

a. Observation. Many junior NCO's lack the troop leading ability for performance of complete range of duties.
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b. Evaluation. The battalion has many junior NCO's who, because of present short time in grade and time in service requirements for promotion eligibility, have little experience as troop leaders. Although junior NCO's generally perform their TOE duties (ie gunner) adequately, they occasionally fail in duties requiring greater knowledge of leadership principles and supervisory techniques.

c. Recommendation. That an NCO academy be established to train junior NCO's to be more effective leaders.

(2) FDC Training.

a. Observation. This battalion conducts a two week FDC course for all new FDC personnel just arriving in country.

b. Evaluation. FDC personnel arriving in country have received instructions in basic artillery fire direction, however they require additional training in areas that are peculiar to the Vietnamese environment. For this reason, this battalion has established a two week course of instruction including a review of basic fire direction procedures, instruction in PADC operation, 6400 mil capability, grid clearance procedures, and air advisory computation, concluding with instruction in the particular type weapons assigned to this battalion.

c. Recommendation. That all artillery battalions consider establishment of a course in fire direction to insure the proficiency of newly assigned fire direction personnel.

D. Intelligence

(1) Forward Observer Experience.

a. Observation. Experience has proven that FDO's having been employed as artillery forward observers have a better appreciation for the forward observer and an improved knowledge of the proper method of engaging targets.

b. Evaluation. Although this battalion is not authorized Forward Observers by TOE, it has been the battalion policy to have each FDO act as a forward observer. This policy has proven very effective in providing the officer with an insight into the problems and situations encountered by the forward observers and has instilled in the officer an appreciation for timely and accurate fires. This experience gained by the FDO also gives him the ability to correctly select the manner in which to engage any target the battery may be called upon to fire.
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E. Logistics.

(1) Battalion Maintenance Operations

a. Observation. The motor mount bolts on the engine side on the M107 gun and M110 howitzer have broken causing damage to the transfer case.

b. Evaluation. Motor mount bolts have broken off resulting in damaged transfer cases on M107/M110 self propelled artillery pieces. The mount is installed on the engine by ordnance personnel but through many hours of engine operation and long road marches over rough terrain, the motor mount bolts become loose and the weight of the engine plus the vibration during engine operation shakes the mount bolts resulting in a cracked transfer case and perhaps a smashed oil pan. A complete check of motor mount bolts in this battalion resulted in finding two thirds of the motor mount bolts loose.

c. Recommendation. The battery maintenance section should check the motor mount bolts once a month in a stationary position and as soon as possible after a long road march. This check should also be included in the Q2 and Q4 service performed by the battalion maintenance section.

(2) Bunkers and Barrier Material

a. Observation. Bunker and barrier material should be stock piled to provide for rapid delivery to batteries deployed on artillery raids.

b. Evaluation. Experience has shown that artillery raids are generally planned and executed on very short notice. In order to assure proper defensive protection in forward positions, bunker and barrier material must be pre-stocked and readily available for dispatch. By stock piling quantities of timbers, concertina and allied items at a battalion base camp, it gives the necessary flexibility to provide this support while maintaining a minimum stock pile on hand.

c. Recommendation. That bunker and barrier material be stock piled at artillery base camps, readily accessible for rapid delivery to forward area.

F. Organization

(1) Implementation of MTOE
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a. Observation. The MTCE contains necessary changes in our present TOE and should be implemented as soon as possible.

b. Evaluation. The MTCE is scheduled for implementation on 15 June 1968. The additional personnel and equipment authorized under the MTCE will greatly enhance the combat effectiveness of this battalion.

c. Recommendation. The MTCE should be implemented as soon as possible in order to provide the best possible fire support.

G. Other

(1) Infectious Hepatitis Prophylaxis

a. Observation. Gamma globulin, which has been known for some time to be of value in preventing the development of clinical infectious hepatitis, has again had its efficiency demonstrated under field conditions where a source or reservoir of infection was unable to be traced.

b. Evaluation. During the past quarter there occurred one case of infectious hepatitis in the battalion. All personnel who lived in proximity and might therefore have sustained contact were given 5cc of Gamma Globulin intramuscularly as a prophylactic measure. 170 such injections were administered to men in 2 batteries. No source of infection of the original case was determined, but as of 6 weeks later, no new cases had occurred.

c. Recommendation. That Gamma Globulin be given as a prophylactic measure to contacts of hepatitis cases.

(2) Sterile Equipment

a. Observation. In an artillery battalion it is very important that sterile instruments be available, to save time, man power, travel, and to conserve the fighting strength.

b. Evaluation. On numerous occasions there has arisen a need for sterile equipment including minor suture kits and sets for incision and drainage. Superficial lacerations requiring suturing, but not much else in the way of treatment, can result in a considerable loss of man hours, if the patient is required to travel from the field to the nearest treatment facility where this service is routinely available. The same is true of abscesses and the like, requiring surgical intervention. In several instances it was possible to borrow the needed sterile equipment and perform the minor procedure at the aid station, thus saving much time and travel. These materials were then returned to the appropriate facility (in this case, an autoclave in a dental clinic was used to re-sterilize them).
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(3) Aid Station Construction

a. Observation. In planning an aid station, it is important to plan for the potential mass casualty situation, and this means adequate, sheltered (bunkered) space in the event that large numbers of patients must be held for a period of time.

b. Evaluation. During a recent mass casualty situation involving a nearby artillery unit, approximately 50 casualties were brought to this facility for first aid and to await evacuation to hospitals. Because it was night time, with less than desirable weather conditions for flying, the majority of the patients had to be kept until daylight, a delay of several hours in evacuation to a hospital. In this instance, adequate sheltered space for holding the patients was not available. A new aid station, bunker type is now under construction.

c. Recommendation. That planning for an aid station include a program to enable the handling of mass casualties.

(4) Control of Amoebiasis

a. Observation. It is not sufficient to be concerned solely with the field sanitation of one's own units, but a careful look must be taken at the surroundings of a field unit (battery) wherever it is located, in dealing with infectious, especially arthropod-borne diseases.

b. Evaluation. Although this battalion has been remarkable free of enteric diseases, there recently occurred 2 mild cases of amoebic dysentery in one firing battery. Field sanitation was at an acceptable level, and a generalized outbreak did not occur. This battery is located immediately adjacent to a Special Forces-CIDG camp where reside large numbers of indigenous personnel, some of whom are thought to be asymptomatic carriers of the organism causative of amoebiasis. The field sanitation of the Vietnamese forces often leaves much to be desired, and it is thought that at least localized spread of insect-borne diseases might have occurred. Steps are being taken to improve the field sanitation of the proximal Vietnamese camp.

c. Recommendation. That proximity of indigenous personnel camps be taken into consideration in considering reservoirs of infection.

(5) Sick Call Regulation

a. Observation. Careful regulation of the sick call procedure is needed in a battalion where elements are widely separated, to prevent unauthorized absence from duty.
b. Evaluation. Efforts are being made to regulate the circumstances surrounding the sick call visits made by members of the far flung batteries, specifically there have been instances where the man receiving permission from his first sergeant to go on sick call for a minor matter, not requiring hospitalization, was not returned to duty within a reasonable period of time. This is especially true where the sick call visit involves travel over insecure roads, open only during daylight hours, and the patient remains overnight at the battery where the battalion surgeon is located. The temptation is then very strong for the soldier to remain longer than necessary in the "rear" area. This is controlled by judicious use of DD Form 689, with written notice of such items as time and date patient left his unit, was seen by surgeon, and such recommendations made to the patient as "To return to duty ASAP".

c. Recommendation. That fairly rigid insistence be made on the proper use of DD Form 689, within the framework of existing circumstances surrounding the sick call visit.

(6) Civil Affairs

a. Observation. That District Advisory personnel can coordinate the production of propaganda posters to be displayed at village entrances, etc.

b. Evaluation. In March 1968, at the request of the Phu My Sub Sector Advisor, the battalion began furnishing plywood to Popular Force soldiers of that district for making propaganda posters. The signs served to remind the local populace of their own government's concern for their welfare as well as the opportunities that are available in a free society to better their standard of living. The signs and posters could be of particular benefit if used immediately prior to Tet, or big elections, or on any other occasion which the communists might attempt to exploit.

c. Recommendation. That Battalion Civil Affairs Officers coordinate closely with District Advisors in an effort aimed at supplying materials for making such posters and signs.

RAYMOND E GATTI
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
5 - 41 Arty Gp
2 - CINCUSARPAC (ATTN: GCPM-DT)
3 - CG, USARV (ATTN: AVLOG(DST))
TO:
Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, ATTN: AVFA-AT-D,
APO San Francisco 96350

1. (C) Reference paragraph 1A(9), page 3. Enemy elements identified in Operation Meng Ho #11 were 8th Battalion, 18th NVA Regiment, E2B local-force VC Battalion, and 300th NVA Sapper Battalion.

2. (U) Reference paragraph 2A(1), page 7, Infusion of Personnel. Concur. 41st Artillery Group is attempting to reduce battalion rotational hump below 15% allowed by achieving replacement fill in May 1968. Battalion has received approximately 70 personnel in May 1968.

3. (U) Reference paragraph 2A(2), page 8, Morning Reports. Validity of recommendation depends on effectiveness of communications between battalion personnel office and batteries/tactical command posts. Each battalion should resolve this problem based upon its situation.

4. (U) Reference paragraph 2B(1), page 8, Preparation of Artillery Firing Positions. Concur. 41st Artillery Group S-3 coordinates engineer support with S-3, 35th Engineer Group on a priority basis. 41st Artillery Group policy directs supported battalions to have utilization plans drafted before engineer support is received to aid effective and efficient use.


7. (U) Reference paragraph 2C(1), page 9, Junior NCO Training. Concur. NCO Academy is needed. Junior NCO's could profit from additional leadership training. However, training should be accomplished in COMUS.

8. (U) Reference paragraph 2C(2), page 10, FDC Training. Concur. 41st Artillery Group policy directs battalions to conduct battalion-level FDC training to offset the difference between number of FDC personnel authorized and number needed for 24-hour operations with complete double-checks.


10. (U) Reference paragraph 2E(I), page 11, Battalion Maintenance Operations. This is the first appearance of problem with M110 - M107 motor mount bolts.

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AVGK-C (3 May 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery for Quarterly Period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR – 65 (R1)

Frequent inspection at unit level should preclude damage to power pack components. 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery is submitting an Equipment Improvement Report on motor mount bolts to the US Army Tank – Automotive Command.


12. (U) Reference paragraph 2F(1), page 11, Implementation of MTOE. Concur. Personnel will be assigned according to MTOE as soon as they become available.


A. V. ARNOLD, JR.
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding
AVFA-AT-0 (19 May 1968) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (RCS: CSFOR-65) (R1)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, AFO 96350

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-CC-OT, AFO 96350

Concur with observations and recommendations contained in basic correspondence and preceding indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

GERALD C. YOUNG
Major, Artillery
Adjutant
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT (3 May 68) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)


TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

(C) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs. Reference paragraph A(1) Section 2, page 7, Infusion of Personnel. This headquarters is now managing the infusion program for artillery units.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ROBERT C. GABBARD
Major General

Copy furnished:

I FF0404V Artty

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL
AVHGC-DST (3 May 68) 4th Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Battalion 15th Artillery for  
Period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)  

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 1 JUN 1968  

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
AFO 96558  

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned  
for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 7th  
Battalion 15th Artillery as indorsed.  

2. Comments follow:  

a. Reference item concerning battalion maintenance operations (N107/  
M110 motor mount bolts), page 11, paragraph 2e (1): Concur. This pro-  
cedure should be a part of PM SOP of this unit. The units recommendation  
will be published in the next USARV Maintenance Letter.  

b. Reference item concerning infectious hepatitis prophylaxis, page 12,  
paragraph G(1): Nonconcur. Gamma globulin (Immune serum globulin, human)  
has been documented to be effective in preventing or attenuating infec-  
tious hepatitis (IH) when administered soon after exposure to infectious  
hepatitis virus. It should be administered prophylactically when personnel  
are exposed to fecally contaminated water or food, or infected food handler.  
However, gamma globulin should not be given to casual contacts of a lone  
case of IH, unless there is reason to believe that the patient contaminated  
food or water that the contacts consumed. The evidence cited here as  
proof of the effectiveness of gamma globulin is insufficient. Frequently  
one case of hepatitis occurs in an individual of a unit without any other  
clinical cases developing in the contacts. The source of a single case of IH  
can rarely be traced.  

FOR THE COMMANDER:  

C. S. NAKATSUKASA  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General  

Copies furnished:  
HQ, 7th Bn 15th Arty  
HQ, I FFORCEV
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 7th Bn 15th Arty for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 JUN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

Cl: [Signature]

GTT, AGC

Asst AG
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Inclosure 1 (Organizational Structure) to Operational Report of 7th Battalion 15th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

1. During the reporting period (1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968) the following units were assigned to the battalion:

   Hq and Hq Btry, 7th Bn 15th Arty
   Btry A, 7th Bn 15th Arty
   Btry B, 7th Bn 15th Arty
   Btry C, 7th Bn 15th Arty
   Svc Btry, 7th Bn 15th Arty

2. During the reporting period, searchlights sections 42B and 46B Btry B 29th Arty were attached to the battalion for class I, III, and V logistics support and employed in GS of CRID.

3. During the period 1 Feb to 5 Mar Btry C 6/16 Arty remained temporarily attached to the battalion. On 5 Mar 68 Btry C 6th Bn 16th Arty was permanently attached to the 7th Bn 15th Artillery.

Inc 1

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Inclosure 2 (Tactical Displacements) to Operational Report of 7th Battalion
15th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

1. Firing Battery Tactical Displacements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BATTERY</th>
<th>DISPLACEMENT</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>INCLUSIVE DATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Located at Cav Hill (YA963271) at start of quarter</td>
<td>OPCON 52d Arty Gp</td>
<td>1-19 Feb 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cav Hill to Camp Radcliff (BR 4648)</td>
<td>GSR 2/9 Arty</td>
<td>19-20 Feb 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Camp Radcliff to LZ Pony (BR 800832)</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>20 Feb to 30 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A(-)</td>
<td>LZ Pony to LZ Tion (CS 899089)</td>
<td>1 day arty raid no change in mission</td>
<td>30 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B(-)</td>
<td>LZ Uplift to LZ Crystal (BR 983662)</td>
<td>1 day raid, no change in mission</td>
<td>3, 9, 10, 16, 17 Feb 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LZ Uplift to LZ Salem (BR 937806)</td>
<td>Overnight raid, no change in mission</td>
<td>3-4 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LZ Uplift to LZ Crystal</td>
<td>1 day raid, no change in mission</td>
<td>7 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LZ Uplift to LZ Salem</td>
<td>1 day raid, no change in mission</td>
<td>14 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LZ Uplift to LZ Crystal</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>17-19 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LZ Uplift to Ba Gi (BR 993334)</td>
<td>1 day operation, GSR GRID Arty</td>
<td>25 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B(-)</td>
<td>Ba Gi to LZ Uplift</td>
<td>GSR 3/319 Arty</td>
<td>25 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LZ Uplift to CR 0378</td>
<td>Assault gun operation with 1/50 Infantry</td>
<td>27-29 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CR 0378 to LZ Uplift</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>29 Mar to 2 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LZ Uplift to LZ Ollie (BR 912847)</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>2-8 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LZ Ollie to LZ Uplift</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>8 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LZ Uplift to LZ Crystal</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>8-20 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 2 (Tactical Displacements) to Operational Report of 7th Battalion 15th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, ROCS GSFOR-65 (A1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BATTERY</th>
<th>DISPLACEMENT</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>INCLUSIVE DATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B(-)</td>
<td>LZ Crystal to LZ Pluto (BR 615640)</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>15-20 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LZ Crystal to LZ Uplift</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>20 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LZ Pluto to Ba Gi</td>
<td>GSR CRID Arty</td>
<td>20-27 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LZ Uplift to Ba Gi</td>
<td>GSR CRID Arty</td>
<td>20-27 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Ba Gi to LZ Uplift</td>
<td>GSR 3/319 Arty</td>
<td>27 Apr to present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>LZ English to An Khe (BR 4648)</td>
<td>Overnight stop while displacing to Arty Hill, Pleiku</td>
<td>29 Feb to 1 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An Khe to Artillery Hill (AR 7549)</td>
<td>Temp attach to 52d Arty Gp</td>
<td>1-3 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pleiku to Ban Me Thuot (AQ 943268)</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>3-14 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ban Me Thuot to 1FSB (AQ 828102)</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>14 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1FSB to 2FSB (AQ 830070)</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>14-20 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C(-)8&quot;</td>
<td>AQ 762980</td>
<td>Arty raid, no change in mission</td>
<td>30 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Howitzer AQ 762980</td>
<td>Arty raid, no mission change</td>
<td>31 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>2FSB to Ban Me Thuot East (AQ 882015)</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>5-22 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C(-)8&quot;</td>
<td>Ban Me Thuot East to AQ 778037</td>
<td>Arty raid controlled by radio w/FDC remaining at Ban Me Thuot East</td>
<td>11 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ban Me Thuot East to AQ 331039</td>
<td>Arty Hipshout</td>
<td>22 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AQ 331039 to Pleiku</td>
<td>Overnight stop while displacing to LZ Diamondhead (BR 686421)</td>
<td>22 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incl 2

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BATTERY</th>
<th>DISPLACEMENT</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>INCLUSIVE DATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Pleiku to LZ Diamondhead</td>
<td>GSR 3/319 Arty</td>
<td>23-24 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(BR 686421)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LZ Diamondhead to LZ Pluto</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>24-29 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(BR 615640)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LZ Pluto to LZ Diamondhead</td>
<td>GSR CRID Arty</td>
<td>29 Apr to present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C 6/16</td>
<td>LZ Ollie to LZ Laramie</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>17 Feb to 8 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(BS 798045)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LZ Laramie to Camp Fidel</td>
<td>No mission</td>
<td>8-12 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(BR 900400)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Camp Fidel to Qui Nhon</td>
<td>Departed for Hue</td>
<td>12 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Tactical Displacements of Support Elements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELEMENT</th>
<th>NEW LOCATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bn Metro</td>
<td>Began period at LZ Uplift</td>
<td>Feb 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bn Metro</td>
<td>Camp Fidel</td>
<td>3 Feb 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bn Metro</td>
<td>LZ Uplift</td>
<td>3 Mar 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bn Metro</td>
<td>Camp Fidel</td>
<td>19 Apr to present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bn CP</td>
<td>LZ Uplift</td>
<td>1 Feb to 19 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bn CP</td>
<td>Camp Fidel</td>
<td>19-27 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bn CP</td>
<td>LZ Uplift</td>
<td>27 Apr to present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. REPORT TITLE
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968

CO, 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery

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13. ABSTRACT

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