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**AUTHORITY**

per AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980; per AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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972d Signal Battalion
4th Psychological Operations Group
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS GROUP
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

AVGM-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
(RCS CSFOR-65) (R1) (U)

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHCC-DST
APO 96375

SECTION I: (C) Significant Activities (U)

1. (U) Group Headquarters (Saigon)
   a. General. None
   b. SI

   (1) During the reporting period, the Group presented 83 awards as follows: Eleven Bronze Star Medals for Meritorious Service, and one Third Oak Leaf Cluster to the Bronze Star Medal; twenty-two Army Commendation Medals for Meritorious Service, and two First Oak Leaf Clusters to the Army Commendation Medal for Meritorious Service; two Army Commendation Medals for Achievement; twenty-six Air Medals, six First Oak Leaf Clusters to the Air Medal, four Second Oak Leaf Clusters to the Air Medal, four Third Oak Leaf Clusters to the Air Medal, two Fourth Oak Leaf Clusters to the Air Medal, two Fifth Oak Leaf Clusters to the Air Medal; one Vietnamese Armed Forces Honor Medal Second Class.

   (2) Ninety-eight recommendations for awards were received from subordinate units, processed and forwarded to Headquarters, USARV.

   (3) During the reporting period, 9 officers departed the Group and 48 officers were assigned, leaving a balance of 141 officers assigned out of 168 authorized.
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(a) Of the 141 officers assigned, 90 (63%) are psychological operations trained.

(b) Seventy-three (81%) of the psychological operations trained officers have completed the long-term course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the remaining 17 (19%) have completed the MATA or short course.

(c) The Group is understrength by 27 officers, however projected replacements for the month of May 68 will alleviate the problem.

c. S2

(1) Organization of the S2 section was finalized stressing the function of the analysis section. All information and intelligence is analyzed and psychological operations intelligence is forwarded to the headquarters' PDC and appropriate battalions.

(2) Inspections of the 7th and 8th Psychological Operations Battalions were conducted from 22 March to 27 March 1968 to assess safeguarding defense information and personnel security procedures. Procedures were adequate and in accordance with USARV directives. Policies formulated were reviewed by G2, USARV, prior to dissemination to battalions to preclude misinterpretation of existing regulations.

(3) Plans were initiated to brief Group PSYOP Mobile Advisory Teams on current enemy situation and PSYOP intelligence in their area of operation.

(4) Essential Elements of Information were developed and plans formulated to inform the intelligence community of PSYOP intelligence needs.

(5) Personnel processed for security clearance: 220

d. Propaganda Development Center (PDC)

(1) A total of 773 leaflets were evaluated during the reporting period. (See Lessons Learned)

(2) Letters were dispatched to CONUS social science research agencies informing them of psychological operations research requirements and requesting that 4th PSYOP Group PDC be placed on distribution for multiple
copies of all studies and reports relevant to our area of interest. Group Headquarters PDC will make further distribution of reports and studies to battalion PDCs. Research organizations queried include the Research Analysis Corporation (RAC), RAND Corporation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Press, the Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS), Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO) and the Joint Publications Research Service.

(3) A sound studio has been constructed for the Audio Branch of the PDC Development Section. Upon receipt of equipment, PDC will be capable of producing audio messages ranging from simple loudspeaker broadcast tapes to short radio programs.

(4) Approval has been obtained for funds to stock the PDC research library with publications not available through Army procurement channels. This fund includes a base amount and subsequent amounts (quarterly) to be used to update reference materials.

(5) Funds have been requested from USARV for the purpose of employing Hoa Chanh and civilian Vietnamese personnel to work in the Group and battalion PDC propaganda development. These indigenous personnel will be used in the development of propaganda materials and on the PDC propaganda evaluation panel.

(6) Approval has been obtained for the hire of two Vietnamese Sociologists, a Vietnamese Anthropologist, a Vietnamese Mass Communication Media Specialist and four Vietnamese Area Specialists within the Group PDC. These personnel will be used in three basic capacities: research, propaganda development and propaganda evaluation.

(7) The Monthly Behavioral Science Symposium attended by civilian and military social scientists in the Saigon area and formerly hosted by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) is now being hosted by the 4th PSYOP Group. The last symposium, held on 8 April 1968, was the seventh since the inception of the program and the third to be hosted by 4th PSYOP Group.

(8) At the request of Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), the PDC developed text and layout for a "PSYOP Cigarette Package." ARPA is handling production and procurement of the finished product. Dissemination is planned to be made by PSYOP and interrogation personnel throughout Vietnam.
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(9) PDC assisted in three exploitations of Dr Le Vinh Can, former Senior Surgeon 1st NVA Division, who rallied to the 4th Infantry Division at Dak To, Kontum Province on 9 February 1968. The first exploitation, utilizing a unique 8x10 leaflet, was conducted when Dr Can rallied. The second was conducted after CPT Vu Nhu Y, a 1st NVA Division Battalion Commander, rallied on 3 March 1968, citing Dr Can’s message as the motivating factor for his return. The third exploitation was conducted on 3 May 1968 when two 1st NVA Division NCO’s rallied. The last exploitation featured photographs of Dr Can, CPT Y and the two NCO’s together in Saigon. The primary objective of the last two exploitations was to counter NVA propaganda claims that Ho Chi Minh is exploited and killed.

(10) Development of a magazine for Vietnamese employees of US agencies in Vietnam was initiated with proposed publication of the initial issue in August 1968. The magazine will be designed to enhance US/Vietnamese employee relations, and provide general information of interest and entertainment.

(11) Studies and reports were completed by the Group Headquarters PDC as follows:

(a) Doctrine Pamphlet: Guidelines for the Production of Taped Propaganda.

(b) Study: VC/NVA Propaganda, Political and Militär Activities Directed Towards the Montagnards.

(c) Study: Vietnamese Superstitions Related to the Hoot of an Owl.

(d) Study: The Drop in the Chieu Hoi Rate.

(e) Study: How the Peasant Perceived the Tet Offensive.

(12) Studies and reports initiated or continued from the last reporting period include:


(b) Doctrine Pamphlet—Techniques of Development: Leaflets and Posters.
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(c) Doctrine Pamphlet—Techniques of Audience Analysis.

(d) Study: The PSYOP Interrogation in Vietnam: Lessons Learned.

(e) Study: Connotations of Borders around Hoi Chanh photographs.

(f) Study: A Study of Unit Defections.

(g) Study: Psychological Vulnerabilities Resultant from VC Interdiction of Route 4, Dinh Tuong Province.

(h) Study: Friction Between Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army Forces.

(i) Study: Psychological Vulnerabilities and Opportunities: Malaria Within VC/NVA Ranks.

(13) A total of 496 documents were translated during the reporting period. Primary categories of translated documents include leaflets, posters, captured enemy diaries, captured enemy directives which have a bearing on PSYOP and newspapers and questionnaires administered by interrogation personnel in response to collection requirements of the Audience Analysis Section.

(14) Four hundred eighty-four interviews were conducted during the period. Categories of interviews included leaflet pretests (e.g. one leaflet by 26 sources), data collection for PDC studies (e.g. three studies by 456 sources) and two in-depth PSYOP interviews.

e. 53

(1) During the reporting period the headquarters printed 245,714,000 leaflets; 635 leaflet bombs were packed for high altitude dissemination.

(2) Monthly fragmentary leaflet orders continued to be prepared for the Frantic Goat Campaign for NVN and the NVA Infiltrator Campaign. It is anticipated that both of these orders will continue to increase in volume during the forthcoming reporting period.

(3) Off-shore leaflet requests for the months of April and May were completed and submitted to MACPD.

(4) One officer was sent TDY to Thailand to test the Delayed Opening Leaflet System (DOLS).
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(5) During the period Group PSYOP Mobile Advisory Teams were sent
to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)
to assist in establishing effective PSYOP programs in their tactical
areas of operation.

f. S4

(1) One of the most significant developments during the reporting
period was the attainment of approximately 85% fill of the non-standard
(non-federal stock numbered) spare parts necessary for repair of 4th
PSYOP Group mission-essential equipment. The vast majority of these
stocks were obtained through the Quick Reaction Procurement (QRP) System.
Some supplies were received through local procurement requests (e.g.,
Northwest Procurement Agency) and some through the MILSTRIP system.

(2) Eight new Addressograph-Multigraph Model 1250LW Offset Duplicating
Machines were received through local procurement channels. It is
anticipated that the replacement presses will significantly increase
production in the 4th PSYOP Group.

2. (C) Tactical PSYOP Battalions (U).

a. (U) 6th PSYOP Battalion (Inclosure 1).

b. (C) 7th PSYOP Battalion (Inclosure 2) (U).

c. (U) 8th PSYOP Battalion (Inclosure 3).

d. (C) 10th PSYOP Battalion (Inclosure 4) (U).

SECTION II: (U) Lessons Learned. Commander's Observations, Evaluations
and Recommendations.

1. Personnel: None

2. Operations:

a. Rally for Awards

(1) OBSERVATION. Many propaganda appeals attempt to entice ralliers
through the promises of monetary or similar material reward alone.
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(2) EVALUATION: Excessive mention of reward money or similar material reward as an inducement for rallying is blatant and counter-productive. The well indoctrinated enemy soldier will tend to be fighting for his beliefs and not for his purse. Greater emphasis should be placed on the social and ideological benefits to be derived from following the GVN cause: better education for themselves and their families, greater freedom of expression, in general, the opportunity to lead a more rewarding and productive life.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That monetary rewards, when used, be held up as only incidental incentives for rallying. The overriding motivation should be from conscience and a sense of what is right and what is wrong.

b. Development of a Leaflet

(1) OBSERVATION: Elimination of "forced" translations within messages which characterize the propaganda as originating from a foreign source.

(2) EVALUATION: Whenever a propaganda item is originated in English and then translated into Vietnamese and disseminated it is invariably identified by the target audience as being foreign. Experience has shown that ideas are not expressed in the same manner in English and Vietnamese, therefore, requiring that messages are developed entirely in Vietnamese.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That Vietnamese are furnished only the information necessary to write a message to include target audience, theme of the message, conditions of the target audience and the psychological objective, and then are required to write the message. Several translation checks (minimum of three) by Americans and Vietnamese will insure accuracy of the message.

c. Improper Use of Rally or Die Appeals

(1) OBSERVATION: Incorrect use of "rally or die" appeals motivates the enemy to increase their resistance and question the credibility of future propaganda messages.

(2) EVALUATION: "Overwhelming Allied Firepower" and reports of enemy lack of supplies, food, medicine and ammunition have occasionally led to the production of appeals to self-interest. These appeals urge the reader to escape hardships by surrendering or rallying. Many sound like this:

"NLF AND NVA SOLDIERS! ARE YOU STARVING?"
We know you are hiding in the forest, clinging to a hopeless cause while you starve to death. Why continue this miserable life? Rally to the GVN to avoid a miserable death."

Such themes are commonly called "rally or die" appeals. Rallier and PW interrogation reports have revealed that this approach is usually counter-productive unless handled with extreme care and subtlety. The "rally or die" and "surrender or die" themes should not be used for several reasons. To accept such an appeal, the target audience must first admit that he is more concerned with saving himself than fighting honorably in the defense of his cause and comrades. He is likely to perceive rallying and surrendering to avoid hardships to be cowardly acts and to infer that the propaganda source, ralliers and prisoners - who presumably have been persuaded by these appeals - are essentially cowardly. He is further likely to conclude that the propaganda source, because it urges him to act in a manner morally unacceptable to him, does not understand him.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Propaganda materials should not appeal directly and plainly to the individual's unselfish, unheroic desire for self-preservation. Fear of death, however, remains a real and exploitable vulnerability if approached in an indirect manner. The target must be totally convinced of the futility of further resistance, and must be given an honorable reason for not continuing to fight, such as duty to his family, comrades or native land.

d. Use of Specific Detail in Propaganda Materials

(1) OBSERVATION: The result of a psyoperator unconsciously assuming that the target audience is aware of or will be convinced by facts that are common knowledge to the communicator is that important detail, essential to the persuasiveness of the propaganda message, is left out.

(2) EVALUATION: It should always be assumed that the target audience will suspect the simplest assertion and refuse to believe the most obvious fact. Civilian targets will generally be apathetic and not want to get involved on either side. Before they act in accordance with the wishes of the communicator, they must be convinced that it is in their self-interest to do so. This can only be done if the individual is convinced that the situation as described in the leaflet exists and effects him directly. Twenty-nine civilians killed by a VC mine does not interest him, but the fact that one of those civilians was the old lady named Ba who sold vegetable to him at the market place and that she was traveling on the road that he himself often travels on, does interest him and also indirectly involves him.
AVGH-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
(RGS GSFOR-65) (N1) (U)

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Every detail about an event that can be included as evidence that an event happened the way the psyoperator claims it happened should be included short of counterproductive information.

3. Training: None

4. Intelligence: None

5. Logistics:

Surface Shipment of PSYOP Cargo

(1) OBSERVATION: Water transportation of cargo, while being less effective than air shipment, remains an acceptable media for resupply of the tactical battalions of the 4th Psychological Operations Group.

(2) EVALUATION: During the period covered by this report, the 4th Psychological Operations Group experienced a requirement to ship more than 400 tons of cargo to organic battalions. Due principally to the restrictions placed upon air shipment by the situation during the TET offensive, it became apparent that surface shipment of cargo was necessary. Often experiencing excessive lead times between transportation request and actual loading of cargo, it was ascertained that all cargo consigned had been received by the using units. During the report period, the 4th Psychological Operations Group shipped in excess of 250 tons of cargo by surface means and approximately 150 tons of cargo via air shipment. Of the 150 tons of cargo shipped by air, 100 tons were shipped in April, which indicates that the lessening of enemy activity was a contributing factor to the increase in military airlifts.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Air shipment of cargo should be used to the maximum extent possible to provide more rapid and efficient delivery of mission-essential cargo. Heavy or bulky cargo that is required on a routine basis should be shipped via surface.


7. Other: None

Withdrawn, Hq DA

WILLIAM J. BECK
LTC, Infantry
Commanding
AVHGC-DST (20 May 68) 1st Ind (U)    CPT Arnold/dls/LoN 4485
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
(RCs corOR-65) (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375    11 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN. GFOF-DT, APO 96558
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group as submitted.

2. Comment follows: Reference item concerning surface shipment of PSYOPS cargo, page 9, paragraph 5: Concur. Air shipment of PSYOPS cargo to the maximum extent possible is based on transportation priority, required delivery date and availability of airlift. Air shipment of cargo will not be used in lieu of adequate prior planning that would allow cargo to be shipped by surface.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. Nakatsukasa
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ 4th PSYOPS Gp
GPOP-DT (20 May 68) (U) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th PSYOP Gp for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C.L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
Report Title
Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group

Experiences of unit engaged in counterintelligence operations. 1 Jul - 30 Apr 1948

CU: 4th Psychological Operations Group

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