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**IN CICLUSION**

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1. Significant Organization and Unit Activities

1. Introduction:

During the period covered by the previous Operational Report--Lessons Learned (1 Jan -- 30 Apr 66), the 1st Infantry Division began to conduct major operations outside the assigned tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) to extend U.S. and GVN influence into previously uncontested areas. The period covered by this report was marked by even deeper penetrations into areas considered as VC dominated territory. Operations were characterized by rapid reaction to intelligence information and deployment of the bulk of division forces over vast areas of the III Corps Tactical Zone. There has been a significant increase in the integration of ARVN combat forces into 1st Infantry Division operations. The division initiated its first major pacification operation and results to date have been very encouraging. Operations were also conducted within base camp TAORs to locate and destroy remaining VC forces and installations. Three main Force Viet Cong regiments were engaged in five major battles and in each the enemy forces were decisively defeated. The elite 272d VC Regiment was engaged in battle on two separate occasions, one of which occurred on the 49th Anniversary of the formation of the Big Red One, 3 July 1917.

Sergeant Major William Woodrige departed the 1st Infantry Division on 9 July to assume his duties as the newly created Sergeant Major of the Army.

The numerous and varied projects initiated under the Civic Action program have continued to have a high priority. During this period, the scope of the program was enlarged to encompass assistance to ARVN forces through construction, training, and medical care for dependents.

2. Organization:

The 1st Infantry Division continued to occupy five major base camps at AN, PHU LOC, LAM KHE, PHUOC VIAN, and BEG CAT. In a ceremony on 4 July 1966, the 2d Brigade base camp at BEG CAT was officially renamed CAPE COX in honor of Sergeant Martin Cox, Company B, 1st Engineer Battalion. Sergeant Cox was killed in action during Operation ABLEMIN.

The 35th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) arrived in-country 16 June and was attached to the 1st Infantry Division by U.S. Army Vietnam General Order 077 (Incl 4). The entire platoon was further attached to the 2d Brigade for centralized control until training that was incomplete upon deployment from CONUS and refresher training could be completed.

In accordance with guidance from the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, a provisional light assault artillery battery (.3 inch mortar) was formed in July (Incl 5). Assets of the infantry battalion heavy mortar platoons were transferred to Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery. One battalion from each brigade base camp provided the assets, thereby retaining the integrity of the transferred platoons and facilitating the formation of the battery. This plan also enabled each base camp commander to adjust the remaining heavy mortar platoons defending the camp with little or no difficulty. Mortar platoons of the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry (PHUOC VIAN), 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry (LAM KHE), and 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry (CAPE COX) were transferred
and provided the nucleus to train and organize the battery. The battery, commanded by a major, is assigned to the 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery (155mm/8") and has a total strength of 144 personnel. The light assault artillery battery makes available to the division fire power that can be rapidly deployed by UH-1D helicopters when medium helicopters are not available to move a 105mm battery.

In February 1966 modifications tables of organization and equipment were submitted for units of the division. Changes from the current organization are necessitated by the counterinsurgency environment; location of division units at five base camps, separated, in some cases by insecure LOC's; and 105 deficiencies which degrade units' ability to perform their missions. Since submission of the original MTO's, additional modifications have been required by the development of new tactics and issue of new equipment. These additional changes include the establishment of a long range reconnaissance patrol platoon organic to the air cavalry troop; re-authorization of the armored vehicle launched bridge platoon whose deletion was directed prior to deployment from CMIMS; and modification of the general support artillery battalion, engineer battalion, and maintenance battalion required by the impending issue of self-propelled 155mm howitzers and additional engineer equipment. Submission of revised MTO's to incorporate the above changes will be completed in early August 1966.

Requested modifications have been kept to a minimum consistent with the division's mission. Those requested are necessary to meet the operator and maintenance requirements of new equipment and to effectively operate in the Vietnamese environment. Pending approval of division MTO's, the requested modifications have been accomplished in part through the reallocation of excess personnel to requested personnel spaces and temporary authorization of excess equipment, when available. Although this provides a temporary and partial solution to accomplishment of the required changes, it does not provide the complete and permanent modifications required.

Preparation of division MTO's did not include consideration of reorganization of infantry battalions. The six company organization recommended as a result of the ARGOV Study will significantly enhance the fighting capabilities of the division.

The mechanized flame throwers have been transferred to the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry. Very good results of combat support have been received during contact with the Viet Cong.

Division organization is shown at enclosure 2.

3. Intelligence:

a. Enemy Order of Battle: Enemy units, reinforcements, location and units in contact with 1st Infantry Division.

(1) Enemy units in III Corps Tactical Zone include two division headquarters, eleven infantry regiments, one artillery regiment and 46 battalions, 30 of which are subordinate to regiments. Five others are heavy weapons battalions subordinate to the artillery regiment. There are also 40 separate companies and 26 separate platoons. Minimum troop strength is 36,300 of which 26,250 are combat troops and 9,450 are support troops. Additionally, there are 17,650 militia.

(2) Immediate reinforcements from 11 G7s include two main force battalions and one heavy weapons battalion. Reinforcements available in IV G7s include one main force regiment (DHNG THAP 1) and four local force battalions.
(3) The accepted location of the confirmed enemy units are:

5th VC Div
274 Regt
275 Regt
9th VC Div
271 Regt
272 Regt
273 Regt
101 NVA Regt
141 NVA Regt
250 NVA Regt
70 Regt
165A Regt
DONG THAP 17 Regt
880 Artillery Regiment
425 Art Bn
237 Art Bn
239 Art Bn
2L1 Art Bn
2L2 Art Bn
PHU 101 Bn
C340 Bn
276 Bn
860 Bn
2d Independent Bn

Northeast PHOC TUY
West Central PHOC TUY (HAT Dinh)
Northeast PHOC TUY
Northeastern War Zone "C"
War Zone "D"
Western BINH DUONG (LONG HATU)
Southern BINH DUONG (LONG JATU)
Western BINH LONG
Northern War Zone "D"
Southern War Zone "D"
Northern TAY Ninh
Southern TAY Ninh (195 DO)
Western BAY PHU Hiep
Northern TAY Ninh
Northeastern BINH DUONG (195 DO)

165A Regiment, 70th Regiment, the 880 Artillery Regiment and the PHU 101 and C340 Battalions.

b. The VC Main Force Regiments reversed their actions of the previous quarter in which they avoided large scale contact with U.S. forces by engaging in four regimental size battles with U.S. forces in BINH DUONG Province as part of their "January Offensive". Each engagement resulted in a sound defeat for the VC forces and inflicted heavy losses of personnel and equipment on his units. Notwithstanding these defeats there are no indications that the VC are any less determined to seek a victory or that they will cease to attack at a time and place of their choice.

e. VC losses for the quarter include:

1062 XIA (body count)
1302 XIA (probable)
93 VOC
46 Crew served weapons
257 Small arms
1936 tons of rice
28 tons of salt

d. VC Capabilities:

1. Attack ABW posts and U.S. positions in BINH DUONG Province with up to four regiments. Priority areas of attack:

(a) LOC Kinh
(b) AN LOC (include CAM LA Bridge X7 7297)
(c) MOHM Tram

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(d) QUAN LCI

(e) GHEI THAI

(2) Attack ARVN posts in PHUOC LONG Province with up to three regiments. Priority areas of attack:

(a) TAU O (XT 7671)

(b) PHUOC LONG (XU 6303)

(c) BUI LONG (XT 7955)

(3) Increase terrorist activity in vicinity 1st Infantry Division base camps and conduct mortar and recoilless rifle attacks on ARVN - U.S. garrisons.

4. Combat Operations:

a. General. The 1st Infantry Division conducted military operations over a large portion of III Corps Tactical Zone to find and destroy Viet Cong forces and installations. Operations varied in size from squad ambushes to multi-battalion search and destroy missions and were characterized by a rapid response to intelligence.

b. May. During the month of May, the 1st Infantry Division continued extensive operations to find and destroy VC forces, installations and supplies. Operation BIRMINGHAM (Incl 20), initiated on 24 April 1966, continued in close coordination and cooperation with III ARVN Corps Forces and represented the deepest penetration of friendly forces into the Zone since 1961. This operation deprived the Viet Cong of numerous logistical installations and base camps and unprecedented quantities of supplies. Operation LIL PASO I (Incl 19) was conducted in response to a request from 5th ARVN Division based on intelligence indicating the possible presence of up to four VC regiments in the LOC HINH (XU 7310) area. Operation LAC SOM II, was initiated jointly by the 1st Infantry Division and 5th ARVN Division in the vicinity of PIAI VCI (XT 8575) with the mission to clear, hold, and pacify the area. In the HINH SAT Special Zone, GVN and Free World Ground Forces influence was extended over the villages and segurança squares as a result of the joint participation of 1st Infantry Division, ARVN, and naval authorities in Operation LEADEN III. A total of ten separate military operations (battalion size or larger) were conducted against Viet Cong forces by the division.

(1) Operation BIRMINGHAM, a division operation of two reinforced brigades, continued through 17 May. During the course of the operation, all division units participated with the exception of the 1st Battalion, 25th Infantry which was deployed on Operation LAC SOM II. ARVN participation in Operation BIRMINGHAM included three Ranger battalions and one infantry battalion of the 25th Division and three battalions from the ARVN Airborne Division. CIDG Forces from TAY HINH Province participated under control of U.S. Special Forces advisors and were supported by artillery and cavalry elements of the division.

Some of the largest supply caches of the Vietnamese conflict were found and destroyed. As the operational area was shifted westward to the OLD MAI River, the border between Vietnam and Cambodia, large amounts of material confirmed reports of many installations along the Cambodian border. Locations of installations in this area were attributed to the
relative freedom available to transport supplies within Cambodia, the
use of the CHAI RAO River and its tributaries as transport routes, and
the fact that 8-12 strikes have been offset at least 700 meters from the
river. Installations uncovered confirmed "that the area is used for recopera-
tion, training, and supply. CO(SH) logistics bases near the Cambodian
Border were hard hit as indicated by the losses enumerated in paragraph
9b, Inclosure 2d.

From 2 - 7 May, the operation shifted from the Cambodian Border to the
plantation area southeast of TAY NINH City (XY 3250). During this phase
the brigades conducted search and destroy operations to the south and east
of the plantation, but made no significant contacts with the VC. On 8 May,
Task Force HOLLINGSWORTH, consisting of Headquarters 2d Brigade, four U.S.
infantry battalions, and one ARVN infantry battalion commenced a massive
airmobile raid against the suspected location of CO(SH) Headquarters.
However, because of low ceilings and poor visibility the battalion of
artillery and artillery ammunition for subsequent LZ preparations was
delayed. With weather deteriorating to the extent that both surprise and
speed were lost and the lack of assurance that the operation could be
supported by air, the operation was cancelled.

The final phase of Operation BIRMINGHAM began on 9 May with emphasis
shifting to the HICHEM Plantation - LONG HOCEN area, the traditional
base of the 277th VC Regiment and the 2nd LOI Battalion. Previous intel-
ligence reports had indicated the 271st and 273d VC Regiments had left
Zone 3 enroute to Zone C for rest and training and could possibly be in the HICHEM Plantation - LONG HOCEN area. Brigade search and
destroy operations around the Plantation, across the LONG HOCEN area to
Route 13, and along the SAIGON River to the southeast resulted in no sig-
nificant enemy contact. However, additional VC supplies were found and
destroyed along with the tremendous losses previously inflicted on the
enemy. A significant discovery was made on 13 - 14 May when a regimental
size base camp was found and destroyed. The operation terminated on
17 May.

The most significant aspect of Operation BIRMINGHAM was the destruc-
tion of vast quantities of VC supplies and facilities including 2,103 tons
of rice, 190 small arms, 325 tons of salt, 1,240 gallons of cooking oil,
1,204 gallons of motor oil, 12,961 shirts, 5,652 pairs of pants, and 163
boats and sampans. The impact of this operation will have a long term
impact on the VC ability to shelter, feed and equip large numbers of per-
sonnel and had immediate effects on his "Conson Campaign". Retaliation
for the material losses, the loss of prestige and control in an area
formerly considered a safe haven is expected to result in a destabilising
blow to VC stability and influence in TAY NINH Province. It was unfortu-
nate that the weather precluded the penetration of the CO(SH) Headquarters
by Task Force HOLLINGSWORTH. Completion of this raid would have further
lesioned VC prestige and security within this area.

(a) Operation LEHIGH III originally scheduled to commence on 4 May
was cancelled until 21 May when the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry was
alerted for Operation BIRMINGHAM. Phase III of Operation LEHIGH
(ISO) commenced at 0900 on 21 May. This airmobile and amphibious
operation was conducted jointly with U.S. Naval elements and ARVN III
TADM Forces. The success of this operation was due to the manner in
which the battalion conducted its ambush operations. The U.S. Forces
simply moved larger and harder than the VC in the type of swamp fighting
peculiar to the MANG SAT. Arm of the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry moved
with considerable skill through the swamp and enjoyed increasing success
in ambushing the VC who utilized sampans for transportation.
(3) In early May, a VC lieutenant was killed about five kilometers southeast of LOC NHIN District Town. He had in his possession a plan for the attack on LOC NHIN and the Special Forces camp. This event marked the beginning of the Campaign along National Route 1 (Incl 19). In response to this intelligence and at the request of ARVN forces, the 3d Brigade Task Force comprised of three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion commenced Operation ELEPHANT (Incl 59) on 19 May. No major forces were contacted, but the rapid deployment of the brigade discouraged a highly probable VC attack in the area.

(4) Operation LAI SON II was initiated by headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Artillery and 5th ARVN Division on 23 May 1966. Planning and execution of this operation, revealed the closest of association and teamwork between U.S. and ARVN forces. The PNB LOI Pacification Task Force is made up of a combined U.S. - ARVN staff. The successes of the operation are the result of the extremely close cooperation and coordination between the ARVN, Sector, and U.S. Forces.

This specialized operation conducted in the PNB LOI (XT 8115) area has as its aim the clearing and securing of the operational area to be followed by progressive pacification activities in selected areas. Techniques used in attaining this goal include saturation patrolling, village cordon and search, and the utilisation of civil affairs and psychological warfare teams, interrogators, interpreters, engineers, and medical personnel. The phasing of this operation commenced with intensive saturation patrolling followed by the cordons and search of the hamlets. Inhabitants at this time are screamed by intelligence and police personnel, are exposed to the GHETTI Hoi (Open Arms) program and are processed through MECACAP and other personal service teams. Emphasis is then placed on having the hamlet develop its own defenses against the Viet Cong. As this is achieved, civic developmental projects such as school and road construction are introduced, thereby improving living conditions and winning hamlet support for the Government of Vietnam. The PNB LOI Pacification Task Force consisting of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, one battery of the 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery, elements of the 1st Engineer Battalion, elements of the 5th ARVN Division, Binh Duong Province and District Official, National Police, and ARVN reconnaissance and psychological warfare elements, conducted its first hamlet operation with the surrounding of Binh Phu/Binh Phuoc complex (XT 805144) at 250000 H., 1966. Extremely encouraging results were obtained from the first try. Initial screening yielded one VC, two VC political cadre, seven personnel with false ID cards, 11 ARVN deserters, and 34 men of draft age who were turned over to GVN custody for further interrogation. The first native offered to show where mines and booby traps were located. During the "County Fair" (Houston Festival) portion of the operation, MECACAP teams treated 270 patients and intelligence personnel screened 521 adults. Three thousand lunches were served and entertainment was provided by two Vietnamese cultural teams and the 1st Infantry Division Band. Upon attainment of desired military and political goals, similar operations will be shifted to adjacent areas in the LAI SON Task. After action report for the first hamlet search and festival is attached enclosure 12.

(5) During May, 83,206 rounds (2,744 tons) of artillery were fired during a total of 19,318 missions in support of operations. Close air support missions for the 1st Infantry Division totaled 545. The artillery fire supported operations consisted of 461.3 tons of high explosive, 234.6 tons of napalm, 66.9 tons of fragmentation bombs, 19.5 tons of white phosphorus, 425 rockets, and 125 sorties of GB.

(6) June. Throughout the month of June, forces of the 1st Infantry Division operated in XAN KHA, LONG KHAU, PHUOC CHAM, BINH DUC, and...
The Battle of LOG Ninh (29 June - 6 July 1966)

Three significant contacts occurred with the enemy who made a determined effort to repel this major introduction of U.S. forces into the area. Additional reinforcements were planned and the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry and A Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry were ordered to HON QUAN on 8 June. The plan called for Troop A to move up Route 13 and the infantry battalion to move from CASP COX by helicopter to LIT Ninh initially and then to HON QUAN subsequent to the passage of the road column through LIT Ninh. In this manner, the infantry would be in an excellent posture to react to any contact made by the road column. At 1420 hours the column engaged the 273d VC Main Force Regiment while passing through IF ZAN-0, an area between CHEI QUAN (XT 766666) and HON QUAN (XT 755391). During the four-hour battle, combined firepower from tanks and A-10s, artillery, and air strikes inflicted losses on the enemy force that included 93 KIA (20) and 150 WIA (Prob). The battalion, 10th Infantry and 93d Infantry Divisions participated in their location at HON QUAN. The division deployed the 1st Brigade with 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 21 Infantry to HON QUAN.

The second major engagement, the Battle of LOG Ninh Plantation (Incl 15), commenced on 11 June 1966 at 1010 hours. Elements of the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry and GLOD Forces made contact with a battalion of the 273d VC Main Force Regiment located in heavily fortified bunkers. Elements of the infantry were overrun by the infantry rockets, massive artillery, mortar, and air strikes. VC losses were 98 KIA (20) and 150 WIA (Prob).

The third engagement occurred on 30 June when elements of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry and 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry engaged and decisively defeated the 271st VC Regiment in the vicinity of BANH DOONG (KO 7201). The additional reinforcements were planned and the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry engaged and decisively defeated the 271st VC Regiment in the vicinity of BANH DOONG (KO 7201). The division deployed the 1st Brigade with a 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry to HON QUAN.

With an increase in the VC threat against the SONG Ninh Special Forces Camp (XU 1597), 3d Brigade elements were airlifted to the area on 20 June. On 26 June 1966, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry made contact with an estimated 200 VC battalion, inflicting 7 KIA (80) and 21 WIA (Prob) on the enemy force.

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Based on excellent intelligence, a highly successful one battalion air mile raid was conducted on a suspected rice and supply storage area northwest of DAN TENG (XT 442787) on 21 June. During the raid, 1500 tons of rice and 5000 sheets of tin were discovered. From this discovery and other supply caches and base camps located, it became evident the area contained major VC supply storage and distribution points. Because of the large quantity of material discovered a second battalion was airlifted into the area as reinforcements. The caches were destroyed by ground troops and by air and chemical attacks.

(2) Operation LAI SON II, the highly specialized pacification operation, continued with emphasis on developing local self defense capabilities and developmental projects. The Joint PHU LOI Pacification Task Force, consisting primarily of 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 5th ARVN division elements, and BINH DUONG Sector personnel, conducted clearing and saturation operations in designated areas of BINH DUONG Province. Efforts were devoted to locating and destroying main force and guerrilla units, thus part tilling and/or stimulating progressive pacification activities in selected areas. Offensive operations by the U.S. and ARVN forces consisted of platoon size - search and clear operations, squad size ambush patrols, and hamlet seal operations. During the month, 391 platoon search and clear operations were conducted with 16.5 percent making contact and 496 ambush patrols were conducted with approximately three percent making contact. By the end of the month, the effectiveness of operations was showing a sharp improvement as a result of increased knowledge of the terrain and the local enemy, as well as the gradual refinement of techniques.

During June, the Pacification Task Force efforts expanded to significant proportions. Initial ARVN skepticism concerning effectiveness of operations was dispelled during the task force's first operation, 27 May, in the village of BINH CHAN. Combined ARVN-U.S. planning for the second operation went extremely well, and the combined task force was given all the support and forces required. The second major hamlet seal and search operation centered on the TAM PHOC KHANH hamlet complex (XT 524165), 1 - 4 June (incl 13). This operation exemplified the general success of the search technique as evidenced by the return to GVN control of a VC security chief, VC hamlet chief, 118 draft dodgers, 21 deserters, 13 former VC parole violators, and 89 VC suspects. The core of the VC infrastructure was severely damaged if not destroyed by the return to GVN control and capture of these personnel. A VC review of the operation estimated a 50% loss of their capability and a two month period required for recuperation. The people generally cooperated while visiting the 969 interrogation vans for interview, stating they were happy to have Revolutionary Development Cadre and U.S. soldiers present in the village. For example, one girl indicated where ten VC were hiding.

In addition to the TAM PHOC KHANH operation, seven other hamlet seal operations were conducted. Total results of all operations for June included eight VC KIA (Killed in Action), 33 VCOC, 344 VC3 broken down as follows: former VC - 23; individuals on blacklist - 31; false ID cards - 6; deserters (ARVN) - 38; draft dodgers - 175; and unategorized - 279. In all instances of seal and search activities, the results have been encouraging, especially in the villages. Here the cooperation given to the 969 Program and Cadre Teams has been better than in the hamlets.

The Hamlet Festival (County Fair), which normally accompanies the hamlet search, has been continuously successful. Military and civilian agencies which were at first reluctant to participate, have been increasingly more active in the Hamlet Festival and rural construction activities.

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Conversations with villagers at festivals and follow-up activities indicate an upward trend in their interest in the GVN. Use of ARVN Psywar Teams and their vehicles proved imperative for successful face-to-face communication. However, Vietnamese officers and NCO's in charge seem unwilling to use these teams to their fullest capability. The U.S. Psywar officer has continually assisted these teams, accounting for improvements in their techniques. Use of Rural Construction Cadres for internal crowd control during the Tet Holiday proved advantageous. This assisted the cadre in establishing rapport with the population and subsequently permitted them to more easily initiate their development activities in the hamlet.

(3) Operation LEXINGTON III (Incl 18) was terminated 9 June 1966. The 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry operation, conducted jointly with U.S. Naval elements and ARVN III Corps Forces, significantly reduced the VC capability to move freely throughout the Nung Sat Special Zone. The many rivers and canals interlinking the nearly level marsh were interdicted through the use of helicopters and landing craft, thereby denying the VC the important link in their supply system for traffic between SAIGON and VUNG Tau.

(4) Operations ADELAIDE I & II. These 1st Brigade operations were conducted during the respective periods 30 May - 9 June and 10-31 May - 8 June in conjunction with 5th ARVN Division elements to destroy VC forces and bases.

During Operation ADELAIDE I, search and destroy operations were conducted along Interprovincial Route 16 north of TAN Uyen. Security was provided for 1st Engineer Battalion elements improving Route 16 to Class 60 from TAN Uyen to PHOC VIEN. In addition a long term project was initiated aimed at the complete penetration and reduction of the NUNG SAT Special Zone. This dense area has traditionally been a VC safe haven and operating base. The area is to be defoliated and systematically linked into checkerboard squares by bulldozers to provide pioneer roads for 1st Infantry Division and ARVN forces to rapidly move into the area, envelop, and eliminate VC forces.

Operation ADELAIDE II was conducted in coordination with REU GIA District Forces. Search and destroy operations were conducted to eliminate major base areas and minor supply installations in the area. Ground and search operations were conducted around three known VC villages in the area.

(5) Artillery units fired 50,081 rounds in support of operations during June. Close air support sorties totaled 5151 and expended the following ordnance: 493.1 tons of high explosive; 221.8 tons of napalm; 99.9 tons of fragmentation; 180 canisters of GB; and 112 pods of rockets.

d. July. During the month of July, the 1st Infantry Division employed forces on four major operations in BANG LUONG, LONG TRANG, and BAIN LAMO Provinces. All major operations resulted in contact with Viet Cong Forces. Two contacts were made with identified VC Main Force units and in each instance the enemy was soundly defeated.

(1) Operation BI PAMO II/III, initiated on 2 June, continued in the BANG LUONG - BAIN LAMO area of BAIN LAMO Province in conjunction with 5th ARVN Division forces. This large scale operation continued to have excellent results as information gained from interrogation of VC captives was exploited. This intelligence revealed that the VC regiments operating in the area had been given the mission of destroying U.S. and GVN forces operating along National Route 15. 

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The first significant engagement occurred on 1-2 July between the 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry and elements of the 273d VC Regiment (Task Force). Subsequent to the Battle of BONB NGR on 30 June in which the 271st VC Regiment was decisively defeated, the 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry was halifted to positions west of the battle area, approximately three kilometers north of the Cambodian Border (LT 97102A). This area was selected to seal escape routes the 271st Regiment might use and to interdict infiltration routes coming into Vietnam from Cambodia. Shortly after the airlift at 1600 hours, 1 July, Company A made contact with an unknown size VC force approximately 1400 meters south of the battalion CP and 6 Company location. Contact continued and became more intensive and a Company was reinforced by Company C and the Recon Platoon by 1800 hours. During the early evening, all of these units received mortar and automatic weapons fire. Contact was broken at 2000 hours but resumed at 0545 hours on 2 July. Five assaults were made against the perimter by the VC before contact was finally broken at 0900 hours. Artillery and fighter-bomber strikes, brought in under a 200 foot ceiling, assisted in repulsing assaults. During the battle, the 3d Battalion, 273d VC Regiment suffered the loss of 79 KIA (80). Three additional battalions were committed, but only minor contact was made. All forces were withdrawn from operational areas on 4 July for rest, resupply, and maintenance.

Based on two previous successful armor operations, the 1st Brigade positioned forces on 2 July in preparation for a ROAD NUMBER reconnaissance in force from HINH TRANG to HINH THAM. An additional infantry battalion was infiltrated to HINH THAM and another to a position approximately eight kilometers southwest of HINH QUAN. Two forward artillery bases were established south of HINH QUAN. The brigade plan included an overlay designating all landing zones that could possibly be used for the reaction forces to be halifted into the battle area once contact was made and the disposition of VC forces or the withdrawal routes were known. In addition to the infantry battalion and helicopters present southwest of HINH QUAN, an infantry battalion was standing by at the HINH LOC airfield for commitment. The two battalions at HINH THAM were positioned primarily to the east and northeast of the rubber plantation to permit a rapid reaction if needed. Artillery and airstrikes were planned along the route of march. A deception plan was released that indicated a troop (-) would be making the reconnaissance, but the actual column consisted of Troops B and C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry with one attached rifle company. On 2 July, in the vicinity X3 6774, the column received heavy fire from mortars, automatic weapons, and recoilless rifles. The two battalions at HINH THAM moved immediately by foot to strike the VC from the south (rear). Two battalions were moved by helicopter to the northeast and north. The battalion attacked south while the second blocked withdrawal routes to the northwest. The major contact was broken after one hour and 45 minutes and only small skirmishes occurred as the VC infiltrated across the SAIGON River. The 273d VC Regiment's losses for the battle included 236 KIA (90) and 200 WIA (Prob).

Because of the defeats suffered by the VC, the pressure was relieved on the 101st AIR BATTALION - HINH QUAN area. The 1st and 3d Bns, 101st AIR BATTALION were extracted to PHUOC VUI and 6 Inf 118 on 13 and 14 July. The 2d Brigade replaced them and Phase III of Operation ZL PASO was initiated. Local patrols, search and destroy operations, and village cordon and search operations continued for the remainder of July.

(2) The PBH LOC Pacification Task Force continued Operation ZL KSR II with clearing and saturation patrols in key areas of KHONG 271st Infantry. On 16 July, the 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry replaced the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry as the major U.S. element of the combined task force. In addition to supporting national construction plans, the operation also provided essential tactical security to the PBH LOC base complex.
Offensive operations by the U.S. and 5th ARVN Division forces consisted of platoon size search and clear operations, squad size ambush patrols, and hamlet seal operations. During July, 127 platoon search and clear operations were conducted, ten percent of which made contact with the VC. Six percent of the 257 ambush patrols made contact. Effectiveness increased as personnel became more familiar with terrain and the local enemy and techniques were refined.

Task force hamlet seal operations continued with emphasis on Revolutionary Development. Excellent cooperation was given during combined ARVNC - U.S. planning. The hamlet seal operation conducted in PHU CANG (XVII Corps), 13 July, exemplified the continuing general success of operational techniques. A VC cell number, four guerrillas, 20 draft dodgers, and four deserters were captured. An arms cache was uncovered that contained 11 ISAU rifles, two U.S. shotguns, one Thompson submachinegun, and several thousand rounds of assorted small arms ammunition. The people were cooperative and volunteered the names of 14 VC guerrillas. Total results of all operations for the month included: four confirmed VC KIA; 17 confirmed VC captured; 21 false ID cards; 25 deserters; 147 draft evaders; and 46 unclassified suspects.

(3) The 1st Brigade initiated Operation CEDAR RAPIDS I at 0745 hours, 17 July. Two battalions conducted search and destroy operations in Area (C) adjacent to Interprovincial Route 16 in conjunction with relief convoys between DI AN and PHUOC VINH. All convoys were conducted without incident and contact with VC was limited to skirmishes with small groups of VC, and mines and booby traps. On 23 July the plan to reduce the VC safe haven in the PHUOC VINH Jungle was resumed. The 1st Brigade was to isolate, seize and destroy VC forces, bases, and fortified positions in the western sector of the PHUOC VINH Jungle. Three battalions (1/4 Inf., 1/16 Inf., 1/26 Inf.) attacked south while the fourth (2/11 Inf. detached from 15th RDI) blocked on the east. Contact with VC forces was limited to no larger than platoon size elements. However, several base camps, bunkers, and tunnels were discovered and destroyed along with the caches of ammunition and supplies stored in them. One large bunker contained 12 - .50 caliber machineguns and about 2000 rounds of ammunition of various calibers. Fourteen sorts of Navy aircraft employed 1000 and 2000 pound bombs against trenches, foxholes, bunkers, and tunnels. Operation CEDAR RAPIDS II terminated at 1000 hours 21 July.

(4) Operation SPRINGFIELD II was initiated by 3d Brigade to exploit intelligence of VC activity within the TAQR. A rallier gave information on 20 January 1965 which indicated a base camp and headquarters facility for the PNB LOI Battalion and 36 Battalion, 151st Regiment, in the northeastern section of the 3d Brigade TAQR. Read out by imagery interpreters also indicated the possible existence of these facilities and a trail network. Two long range reconnaissance patrols operating in the area on 23 - 24 July confirmed the presence of two battalion size VC units and two large base camps. Both patrols were discovered and had to be extricated. On 27 July, the 3d Brigade initiated Operation SPRINGFIELD II by clearing National Route 13 from LAI KHE to AR HURM with two battalions and establishing an artillery base at AR HURM. Follow-up 8-13 strikes on 28 July, one battalion moved into blocking positions while two battalions conducted air Mobile assaults into the objective area. Numerous base camps, fortifications, and supply caches were discovered, but enemy contact was minor. During the nights of 29 and 30 July, the VC probed the 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry perimeter around the artillery base at AR HURM. M79 fires by air and artillery were placed in the area and the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was moved into a blocking position. Although not south of the VC or more VC regiments appeared imminent, the MI backed off either because of the fire or the rapid deployment of the infantry battalion. Operation SPRINGFIELD II continued into August.
There were 79,492 rounds (2,868.3 tons) of artillery fired and 1,731 fighter-bomber sorties flown in support of the division during July.

5. Training: The status of training in the division is excellent. Since the key to success in the type of combat experienced in the counterinsurgency environment is the proper use of squad and platoon size elements, intensified combat training programs were conducted by squads and platoons rotating to base camps from operational areas. Emphasis was placed on squad and platoon battle drills, designed to correct mistakes observed during operations and integrate replacements into effective fighting teams. The training program includes defensive fires, artillery adjustment, patrolling and small unit fire and movement. The effectiveness of units improved with the initiation of live fire and quick fire reaction courses. Combat training was conducted with emphasis on the OVERWATCH principle of fire and movement (Incl 6).

Because of the large number of replacements received in the months of June and July, emphasis has been placed on indoctrination and training of these personal prior to participation in combat operations. Training in primary MOS duties is being accomplished on the job. To insure that each individual replacement receives a minimum of 40 hours of instruction prior to participation in combat operations, 1st Infantry Division Training Circular Number 20-6 was published 19 July 1966 (Incl 3). This training is required for all replacements since all units must be capable of participating in tactical operations or base camp defense. Training in airborne assault techniques continues to insure smooth execution. Many of the problems involving airlift have been resolved through habitual association between maneuver elements and airborne companies.

The 1st Infantry Division Mobile Training Team to the Philippines Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) completed the final details of their training program in preparation for departure to Fort Hayesay in early August. The team, consisting of two officers and three SOO's, will conduct the tactical training and complement the engineer and medical teams that will accompany the 1st Infantry Division team to the Philippine Islands. While operating in-country under the control of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, the team will provide: an accelerated orientation in general subjects for PHILCAG non-combatants; and an intensive training program for the PHILCAG security battalions. The latter group will receive instruction on defensive and counterguerrilla tactics, application of the older family of weapons to the counterinsurgency in South Vietnam, .303 rifles, and communist weapons and material identification and employment. The training program in-country is expected to require a minimum of 30 days for completion.

Training continues throughout the division to cope with the problem of VC tunnel exploitation, destruction, and denial. The Division Chemical Officer, with attached chemical units, is presently constructing a tunnel system to be used in conjunction with the tunnel operations training program.

The 33rd Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) has been conducting a training program since its attachment to the division on 16 June 1966. The platoon deployed from OCSMS prior to completion of their training cycle and have been completing this training in-country. In addition to the program for untrained dogs, refresher training is being conducted for the older dogs and handlers. Plans are being made to coordinate future training at the ARVN Scout Dog Training Center since the facilities there are more adequate.
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6. Psychological Operations and Civic Action: The intensified use of PsyOp during the reporting period has proven to be of great value in supporting combat operations. The Division Civlic Action Program continues to grow and is constantly supporting the 1966 JSLGAP in close coordination with district and province officials.

a. Psychological Operations.

(1) The 1st Infantry Division installed and commenced operating a 1250W multilight press on 21 June 1966. The availability of this press has proven to be an asset to the Division PsyOp Program. Situations have developed where immediate reaction, in the form of a leaflet, has given the friendly forces a distinct advantage and had a definite bearing on the effectiveness of the VC soldier. Though the support rendered by supporting PsyOp company and JUSPAO has been satisfactory, the responsiveness of a division operated press has provided the tool with which the G5 can produce highly effective and timely PsyOp media. The delivery time for a fast reaction leaflet has been as little as six hours. This includes the development of the text, setting of the plates, printing, cutting, boxing, and delivery on target. During the reporting period 21 June to 31 July 1966, the division press has produced approximately 1,200,000 leaflets, attached as inclosures to reports of some of the leaflets published by the division. The utilization of this press has not restricted the necessity for support from the 266th PsyOp Company and JUSPAO. In addition to leaflets printed by the division, over 30,000,000 were obtained from other sources and delivered by various means, e.g., U-47, H-13, and OH-13 aircraft. Some leaflets were distributed by U.S. military and ARVN personnel while participating in operations.

(2) Tapes and Loudspeakers. The availability of 1000 watt loudspeaker sets, in each brigade, has provided the means of exploiting Chieu Hoi, captured VC, and rallies. The immediate use of intelligence information gained from these individuals has proven most effective. Approximately 200 flying hours were spent in support of loudspeaker missions. This includes time provided by the 5th Air Command Squadron's U-47 and U-10 aircraft. Loud-speaker support is provided for during all operations within the division. In addition to aircraft, vehicular and backpack sets are utilized. The attachment of ARVN 2/2 Psyop teams to the division has provided additional support particularly in the LAM 201 Operational Area.

b. Civic Action.

(1) The fund provided under JCS Directive 37-13 has provided the division with a readily available source of funds to assist in the Division Civic Action Program. The fund was placed into operation on 2 July 1966. The procedures in administering the fund are relatively simple and is not a burden on the controlling officer. The 200,000 plasters per month (July only) was sufficient to meet the requirements of the division. Projects that have benefited from the fund are:

(a) Renovation of THU SOC grade school, 44,100 plasters. Assistance was provided by the Division engineer battalion and local Vietnamese participated in the construction.

(b) Purchase of athletic suite, educational supplies and personal hygiene equipment, 75,000 plasters. Expenditures were utilized in the LAM 201 area.

(c) Newspaper subscriptions for DI AN High School, one year subscription 2,300 plats-area.

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(d) 11%k program in two base camps to supplement local health projects, 12,000 plasters.

(e) Construction of wells in LAI: Son II area. Local Vietnamese were utilized as laborers and paid through this fund, 7,000 plasters.

(f) An LOC Orphanage supported with 20,000 plasters to refurbish the building.

(2) IEDCAP: The Division IEDCAP Program has expanded to support the dependents of the ARVN 5th Division. The IEDCAP activities conducted in conjunction with the LAI: Son Operation can account for the treatment of over 27,000 patients of the 59,000 total for the division. The large increase over the previous report is primarily due to the introduction of LAI: Son II. IEDCAP continues to be conducted in conjunction with all division operations plus the normal treatment around base camp areas.

(3) Civic Action projects consist of support rendered to orphanages, refugee camps, construction of wells and latrines, repairs to existing facilities, churches, schools, and dispensaries. Donations to support orphanages, leper colonies, churches, hospitals and schools were collected through Division Chaplain sources. 32,005.42 and 178,618 plasters were donated. The Division conducted a drive to contribute funds for the III Corps DONG LOC Orphanage, and in excess of 45,000 was donated.

7. Aviation: The 1st Aviation Battalion continued to support the division through planning and conducting air mobile operations, aerial resupply, providing aerial command and control, providing civilian support of division administrative operations, and conducting medical evacuations. The Battalion operates and controls the division's Instrumented Airfield at FOB Loi. In addition to the normal operations support, Division Artillery was supported with personnel and equipment in the area. The 1st Aviation Battalion, 800th Artillery, and 3rd Artillery were deployed in the area and the division conducted a drive to contribute funds for the III Corps DONG LOC Orphanage.

During the period the battalion flew six air mobile assaults/extracts. Rotary wing aircraft flew 17,004 sorties and 6,922 combat hours. Fixed wing aircraft flew 1,126 missions and 743 combat hours. A total of 10,000 passengers and 600 tons of cargo was transported during the period.

8. Logistics:

a. General: During the period 1 July to 31 July 1966 the 1st Infantry Division continued tactical operations in assigned TACs and forward operational areas. Logistic support was provided to division units from five base camps and four forward logistic base areas. All tactical operations were adequately supported logistically despite difficulties in obtaining required amounts of airlift which was curtailed in many instances due to adverse weather conditions. With the exception of airlift, no major logistical problems were encountered.

b. Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Incl 7).

c. Construction. Overall construction throughout the division continued to be satisfactory due to the ever increasing requirements for Engineer Combat Support. Emphasis has been placed on completing base camp areas, particularly the defensive perimeters at Camp Xuan and replacing unserviceable tents with temporary buildings.
(1) Horizontal Construction.

<table>
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<th>Location</th>
<th>Percentages Completed</th>
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<tr>
<td>DI AN (less air strip)</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOC VD</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAI KIE</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHU LOI</td>
<td>64%</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAR CAT</td>
<td>37%</td>
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(2) Vertical Construction.

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<th>Location</th>
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<td>DI AN</td>
<td>94%</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHOC VD</td>
<td>94%</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHU LOI</td>
<td>64%</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAR CAT</td>
<td>37%</td>
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(3) Construction of the airfield at DI AN is 24% complete.

9. Personnel and Administration:

a. Personnel:

(1) Strength:

(a) There was a marked improvement in the division strength during this period. Assigned strength as of 31 July was 114% of the authorised strength. This is an increase of 4% over the previous report period. The present for duty strength compared to authorised strength is 107%. This is an increase of 6% over the previous period. Casualties, both battle and non-battle, took their toll. As of 1 July, the division sustained 215 KIA, 1077 WIA, 12 non-battle dead, and 107 non-battle injured, for a total of 1409 casualties. The total casualties the division has sustained numbered 4543 as of 31 July 1966. Losses due to rotation, 223, administrative discharge and reassignment within Vietnam were 2979 during the period. Division gains during the quarter totaled 5993. The command remains critically short of personnel in the enlisted MOS (84, 96, 115, interrogator). A number replacements from CONUS arrived with class 3 profile. As a result, these personnel cannot be utilized in their infantry 155 field. A replacement short fall has developed in the 45, 46, infantry 108 field as a result.

(b) Division strength as of 31 July 1966 is:

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(c) Casualties (by month)

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<td>339</td>
<td>352</td>
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<tr>
<td>mined</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-battle dead</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-battle inj</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>42</td>
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<th>Non-battle dead</th>
<th>Non-battle inj</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>23</td>
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3. July:

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<th>WIA</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Non-battle dead</th>
<th>Non-battle inj</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4. Statistical analysis of battle casualties attached as Incil 10.

(2) Civilian Personnel:

(a) An additional 463 positions were approved by the Industrial Relations Office, Saigon, for hire. The division now has 9,956 positions established and filled 714 of the authorized 1000 spaces allocated. This is an increase of 202 positions filled since the previous quarter. Skilled labor continues to be short and 200 spaces were reclassified from skilled to unskilled. An additional 1300 spaces will be requested in the next quarter to meet the needs of the 21 and 34 Brigades.

(b) On 1 April 1966 the 1st Infantry Division Temporary Hire Program was authorized 11,907,000WV for the period 1 April 1966 to 30 June 1966. The division hired a daily average of 1030 local nationals during that period. On 1 July 1966 the division was authorized 19,130,000WV for the period 1 July - 30 September 1966. The daily average of local nationals increased to 2600 during the month of July. It is anticipated that the division will operate at the current level for the next quarter.

b. Discipline, Law and Order:

(1) The discipline in the division has been excellent the past quarter. No stragglers were apprehended. No personnel assigned to the division were apprehended as stragglers. There were 91 reported AWOLs and 16 serious incidents reported during the three month period.

(2) During the report period the Court-Martial rate increased from an average of 42 per month to 52 per month. Discipline rates within the division continue to be excellent.

(3) The Division 10 handled 156 complaints and requests for assistance during the period. This is a marked increase over the previous period. However, the majority of the cases were due to adjustment of ADAMS dates and requests for punishment.

b. Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(1) The state of morale within the division remains excellent as a result of continued emphasis on improving services and facilities.

(2) Finance: The 3.25 across the board pay raise was paid to all members of the division during the month of July. A monthly Finance Newsletter has been initiated to keep members of the division currently informed
on pay changes and procedures. The Finance Courier Team initiated a new program of conducting pay clinics at the units to resolve individual finance problems and to assure improved services.

(3) Chaplains: On 20 June 1966, the Reverend Calvin Triulman, White House Chaplain, visited the 1st Infantry Division. On 10 July 1966, the 3d Brigade Chapel was dedicated. During the quarter the Chaplains conducted 1264 religious services and had a combined attendance of 34,471 personnel.

(4) Special Services: Out-of-country MMR quotas increased from 2714 at the start of the last period to 2872 on 31 July 1966. This was a gain of 358 quotas. In-country quotas increased from 1380 to 2720. Thus is a gain of 320 quotas. In July the in-country MMR quota was increased from every 3 days to 25 for every 3 days.

(5) Red Cross: There was an increase of 12% in the total number of services rendered in comparison to the previous period. A total of 2997 new and re-opened cases were handled during the period.

(6) Awards and Decorations: There were a total of 3285 awards given for valor and meritorious service during this period as follows:

- Silver Star: 27
- Legion of Honor: 34
- Distinguished Flying Cross: 34
- Soldier's Medal: 15
- Air Medal: 42
- Bronze Star - V: 442
- Bronze Star - H: 125
- Army Commendation Medal - V: 100
- Army Commendation Medal - 367
- Air Medal: 1137
- Purple Heart: 665

During the report period 34 members of the division were honored by the Vietnamese Government. Awards given are as follows:

- National Legion of Honor 5th Class: 2
- Cross of Gallantry with Palm: 3
- Cross of Gallantry with Gold Star: 27
- Cross of Gallantry with Silver Star: 33

(7) Burials and Graves Registration: During this period the Graves Registration Platoon processed and evacuated 173 remains. Nine of these were non-divisional.

10. Chemical Operations: The Division Chemical Section developed and field tested two expedient type CS munitions. The first of these munitions was a 55 gallon shipping drum of CS-1 fitted with a burster and fuse. These drums were dropped from both fixed and rotary wing aircraft and functioned with excellent results in so far as height of burst and target coverage was concerned. Effects on enemy forces have not been determined. This munition has been used extensively during operations conducted by the division. The chemical section also tested a 105mm base ejection shell filled with CS-1. There was no significant contamination in the target area, and the project was discontinued.

The Division Chemical Section and the attached 266th Chemical Platoon and 243d Chemical Detachment continued to support the tunnel exploitation operations.
progress throughout the division. These personnel are presently constructing a tunnel system at DI AK to assist in the training of personnel in the exploitation, denial, and destruction of tunnel systems.

The division was issued twelve Chemical Pack Personnel Detectors, in June with a total of thirty detectors to be eventually issued throughout the division. A training area has been selected in vicinity Cuy Cox, and a training package has been prepared. Dates have not been set for the course because troops needed to secure the area are currently not available due to other operational commitments. Day and night tests of the detector were conducted by the 266th Chemical Platoon to determine its effectiveness and the requirements of the training program.

Six requests were prepared and submitted for defoliation missions and one has been approved as of 31 July 1966. The 266th Chemical Platoon has accomplished both herbicide and insecticide operations throughout the division forward and rear areas.
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II Commander Observations and Recommendations.

1. Observations (Lessons Learned):

PERSONNEL

Replacements

Item: Replacement pool.

Discussion: Providing a steady flow of personnel to units with out holding a reserve at the replacement detachment has proved to be a problem when units are in contact and sustain large numbers of serious casualties.

Observation: By pooling personnel at the replacement detachment, a ready reserve is on hand, giving the necessary flexibility to react and provide mass replacements for units when needed.

Replacements

Item: Replacement of casualties.

Discussion: Replacements have been requested for casualties that were hospitalized for short periods of time (2 to 4 days).

Observation: Casualties should be carefully screened to preclude requesting replacements for personnel who will be returned to duty within 2 or 3 days.

Finance

Item: Resolution of pay problems.

Discussion: Many man-hours are lost and the individual soldiers are inconvenienced if they are referred to the Division Finance Officer to resolve pay complaints.

Observation: A form has been developed to permit the soldier to communicate his pay problem and receive an immediate answer without personally visiting the Finance Office. In addition, Finance Couriers are used to conduct clinics and provide better service at unit level.

OPERATIONS

Combined Artillery/Air Operations

Item: Artillery and air operations can be conducted simultaneously in the same area.

Discussion: Detailed planning to include the establishment of safe air corridors will allow for the continuation of artillery preparations during airmobile operations without risk to friendly aircraft and personnel. An effective means of simultaneous employment of artillery/airstrikes incorporates the use of fire coordination lines with artillery employed on one side and air on the other.

Observation: All tactical plans, to included employment of reaction forces, must provide for uninterrupted simultaneous employment of artillery and airstrikes. Cease fire of artillery should not be imposed during airmobile operations or airstrikes except in extreme emergencies.
Airmobile Operations

**Item:** Aircraft scheduling for airmobile operations.

**Discussion:** The number of aircraft originally allocated for a given airmobile operation habitually decreases as the operation progresses because of maintenance problems and/or combat losses.

**Observation:** A realistic and comprehensive schedule of aircraft allocations for airmobile operations should be established utilizing an experience factor for aircraft attrition.

**Artillery Observers**

**Item:** Use of aerial observers during heavy contact.

**Discussion:** Engagements with Viet Cong forces assembled in ambush positions along roads provide exceptionally good targets for artillery. Aerial observers contribute to the success of these engagements in the following ways:

1. Provide aerial observation posts with a rapid reaction time in reporting ground activity not detectable by personnel on the ground.
2. Provide accurate and timely observed artillery support to the maneuver elements.
3. Pin-point concentrations of enemy troops during the confusion of battle.
4. Observe and report routes of escape when the enemy breaks contact.
5. Provide battle field surveillance during mopping-up action.

**Observation:** Provision of aerial observers and aircraft for sustained operations must be included in all tactical plans for maneuver of forces or convoy operations.

**Noise Elimination**

**Item:** Reduction of inner-perimeter noise during enemy activity.

**Discussion:** Generators and vehicular noises are distracting to personnel manning perimeters and interfere with their ability to detect enemy movement.

**Observation:** Vehicle batteries may be used as a power source for short periods of time. Generators should have a back-up battery power source for use in emergencies.

**Map Reading**

**Item:** Map- inspected coordinates.

**Discussion:** Units occupying unfamiliar terrain, terrain that is devoid of prominent terrain features, or heavily forested areas have difficulty inspecting their positions from maps. Judgment of the actual location through erroneous map inspection may result in injury to personnel by friendly artillery.
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Observation: Map inspected coordinates should be verified by an airborne observer whenever possible.

Map Reading

Item: Points of origin.

Discussion: Points of origin provide a fast means of locating friendly forces without compromising their positions. They also provide an accurate and simple encoding system for passing target information.

Observation: These are several things that should be considered when a point of origin system is established:

1. The system should be published at the highest level necessary to ensure all interested agencies will have access. It should be published for use both during field operations and at base camps, and changed periodically to cover compromise.

2. Points should originate at random 1000 meter grid intersections to facilitate artillery targeting.

3. The system should incorporate the use of broad categories (colors) for quick reference (Ford, Chevy/Red, Blue).

Deployment of Artillery

Item: Standard 105mm battery package of airlift.

Discussion: A standard package for C130 airlift of a 105mm howitzer battery can be established as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Cargo Bay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm Amm</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Trk</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 Trk</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/47 Trk</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Lift (C130)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observation: Line artillery units should establish a standard combat configuration to facilitate computation of airlift requirements and rapid deployment of units.

Deployment of Artillery

Item: Tactical tailoring of artillery batteries.

Discussion: Tactical planning frequently requires tailoring of artillery when batteries are attached to other headquarters. Although this serves the purpose of providing the artillery support necessary to accomplish the particular mission, it also creates a greater need for early planning and liaison between units.

Observation: In the interest of unity of effort and timely response to orders, the tactical tailoring of units based on habitual association is desirable when practical. When it is not feasible, adequate time for planning and liaison between unfamiliar units is necessary.

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23
Item: Repeated firing of the M110 8 inch self-propelled howitzer after the weapon has settled deeply into the soft ground may result in damage to the weapon.

Discussion: Although the M110 has proven its capability to operate over soft terrain, damage to weapons has resulted from them settling into the mud while firing. As long as the hull bottom remains clear of the ground, the lookout suspension system provides proper support. However, continuous firing in soft terrain causes the tracks and sprodes to sink in the mud until the weight of the weapon is resting on the hull rather than the suspension system with the eventual result of structural damage to the piece. This is probably the major cause of ruptured fuel tanks, since the tanks are an integral part of the hull. It is also probable that damage to hydraulic lines, structural members, and drive shafts may be attributed to "bottoming".

Observation: Firing battery personnel must be continually alert for evidence of "bottoming" when firing in soft ground. When this condition is detected, the howitzer should be moved and realigned immediately.

Helicopter Damage

Item: Helicopter damage caused by radio antennas.

Discussion: Due to extensive use of helicopters in transporting troops and supplies, a continuing hazard exists for unknowledgeable individuals that approach a helicopter while the blade is turning. Individuals have been known to drive vehicles with radio antennas too close to the blades, resulting in severed antennas, damage rotor blades, and flying debris dangerous to bystanders and helicopters. Backpack radios with long antennas constitute an equal hazard.

Observation: Personnel involved in operations around aircraft must be indoctrinated on the possible hazards of rotating blades. Control of vehicular movement around airfields and landing zones must be rigidly enforced.

Aerial Artillery Observation

Item: Aircraft proximity to exploding projectiles.

Discussion: Due to restricted visibility during rain showers, aerial observers will have to fly closer to the target to observe the bursts. Consideration must be given in these cases to erratic fuse action and possibility of shrapnel travelling greater distances than the normal bursting radius of the projectiles.

Observation: Aerial observers must be aware of the possibility of being too close to the point of impact and advise pilots of the hazards involved.

VF Tactics

Item: VC fire discipline.

Discussion: During instances where convoys have been ambushed, the convoy has been preceded by an observer in a 01 aircraft. The ambush areas were crossed at approximately 50 foot altitude. The VC did not fire at the aircraft, but held the fire until the convoy was in the ambush area.
Observation: Personnel must be made aware of the fact that VC are well trained in fire/cover/size discipline and that negative sightings do not necessarily indicate there are no VC present and continuous alertness must be maintained at all times.

HLI Fires

Item: CIV and time fuse HLI fires.

Discussion: A great number of mines and booby traps are emplaced on roads at night. Surplus regulations prohibit civilian travel at night.

Observation: CIV and time fuse HLI fires over likely areas the VC may emplace mines and booby traps on highways and roads will discourage this practice.

Saturation Patrolling

Item: Saturation patrolling is effective.

Discussion: Saturation patrolling can contribute as an effective measure to severely hinder VC activities in populated areas. VC main forces are forced to withdraw because of the difficulty in pin pointing the friendly main forces location by infiltration. Populated areas regain a sense of security achieved from the ever-present network of patrols about the area. Integration of ARVN forces in the saturation patrol plan instills in the people a loyalty to the GVN and activates increased participation of the people in the Revolutionary Development Program.

Observation: Saturation patrolling should be a prime consideration in establishing security in populated areas designated for Revolutionary Development Programs.

Combined ARVN - US Pacification Operations

Item: Combined ARVN - US pacification operations are necessary and workable.

Discussion: To win the cooperation of the people in outlying areas, security against VC terrorism is essential. The people must see stability and the capability of the GVN to maintain peaceful and improving conditions. When a mutual understanding of the goals and the characteristics of ARVN and US personal exists, combined pacification operations will work. Patience and willingness to cooperate are necessary components that both sides must possess. Pacification operations conducted as a combined ARVN - US effort have been productive and these factors are the basic reasons for the definite continued success.

Observation: Combined ARVN - US pacification operations should be employed against the VC operating in the populated outlying areas. Understanding of the goals and a mutual willingness for cooperation and patience must be present.

Revolutionary Development

Item: Dissemination of propaganda material in area undergoing pacification.

Discussion: House-to-house dissemination of propaganda literature has been the most effective method to induce maximum coverage. This form dissemination requires saturation coverage to be effective, a practice that is wasteful and tends to antagonize some villagers.

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dissemination eliminates waste and guarantees adequate population coverage, especially when the activity is supported by a loudspeaker.

**Observation:** Avoid aerial dissemination of propaganda literature in semi-secure areas whenever possible. When security conditions permit, an alternate should be made to distribute literature by house-to-house canvass, supported by loudspeakers. This method allows the villagers to become accustomed to US presence.

**Revolutionary Development**

**Item:** Introduction of Revolutionary Development Cadre at hamlet festivals.

**Discussion:** The Revolutionary Development Cadre members can be used during hamlet festival activities as guides in establishing and maintaining crowd control. This has proved to be an effective technique since the cadre are trained to work with people and do an excellent job in providing crowd control and general assistance. This is one of the best methods to introduce the cadre into the pacification program. Introduction in this manner establishes rapport and enlightens the people to the fact of their existence.

**Observation:** Crowd control at hamlet festivals is essential and Revolutionary Development Cadre are best utilized for this purpose. This will not only take advantage of their training, but is an excellent introduction of the teams into the program.

**Aviation**

**Item:** Flight following.

**Discussion:** Due to the number of aircraft involved in combat operations and administrative flights, a system of flight following is required. This procedure is necessary for the safety of aircraft travelling in congested areas, and through areas in which artillery is firing, rapid search and rescue of downed aircraft, and redirection or recall of aircraft from one mission to another of higher priority with a minimum of delay.

**Observation:** Aviation battalion operations centers should improve flight following techniques and procedures fororganic aircraft operating within the TAD. The battalion should be augmented with air traffic control personnel for control of non-organic aircraft operating within the TAD.

**Military Police Operations**

**Item:** VC collecting points.

**Discussion:** On many occasions the division TAC CP will be collected with a Brigade CP, or units will be operating under division control. It is not feasible for each unit to establish separate VC collecting points.

**Observation:** VC collecting points should be located when two or more headquarters are operating in close proximity to each other. This will not only economize on security forces, but will facilitate processing and interrogation and dissemination of intelligence.

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TRAINING

Artillery Observation

Item: Infantry and armored cavalry should be trained in artillery adjustment procedures.

Discussion: During contact with enemy forces, artillery ground observers with infantry and armored cavalry units will be killed or wounded and require evacuation.

Observation: Infantry and armored cavalry platoon and squad leaders should be thoroughly trained in observer procedures to take over in the absence of an observer from the supporting artillery unit.

INTELLIGENCE

Mobile Interrogation Van

Item: Effectiveness of mobile interrogation teams.

Discussion: The use of mobile interrogation teams during seal and search operations has caused the indigenous population to volunteer significant information concerning VC activity in the area. Once the seal and search of the village is complete, mobile interrogation teams should re-enter the area in an effort to gain voluntary information from civilians. During these interviews, IPW teams should attempt the first phase of the recruitment of informers. It has been effective to reward all persons entering the van on a voluntary basis an appropriate gift. If significant information can be confirmed, the person is rewarded substantially.

Observation: Mobile interrogation teams should be utilized to gain information from sympathetic civilians. The teams should be interviewed rather than interrogated. The teams should be combined Vietnamese and US and the number of teams should be tailored to the population figures.

National Police Screening

Item: National Police screening is effective in population control.

Discussion: Detailed screening of all draft-age men can contribute greatly to the population control of a particular hamlet or village. Not only does effective screening filter out those men avoiding the draft, but the National Police are successful in apprehending deserters, holders of false ID cards, and VC suspects indicated on the "blacklist." The National Police are also able to exert their influence on the local population, after which, plans can be made for the introduction of permanent police forces in the hamlet for purposes of security and population and resources control.

Observation: Detailed screening of all draft-age males by the National Police should be a prime consideration when planning for a hamlet seal and search operation.

VC Tactics

Item: VC use route of attack as initial route of withdrawal.

Discussion: Several VC captives have stated during interrogation that the initial route of withdrawal from an objective area or ambush site was the same that was used in moving to the attack. This makes it easier for
the soldier to find his way back to assembly areas. In three regimental
line attacks against division convoys the VC never attacked through the
column. Their withdrawal was always in the direction from which they
attacked.

Observation: When VC routes of attack are known, they should be covered
with blocking artillery fire or airstrikes when it appears the VC are
attempting to break contact and withdraw.

VC Strength

Item: VC have shown ability to recuperate rapidly after heavy losses.

Discussion: On 6 June two battalions of the 272d VC Main Force Regi-
ment were badly mauled when they attacked a US column on National Route
13 and lost an estimated 300 personnel. On 9 July, the same regiment
attacked another column with three battalions. Captives from this battle
stated up to 800 NVA replacements had joined the regiment on 7 July. On
30 July a returnee from the 271st VC Main Force Regiment stated his regi-
ment had lost approximately 570 men on 30 June while it attacked a US
column of Route 13. All NVA replacements were trained soldiers and gave
the VC regiments the capability to regain combat effectiveness in short
order.

Observation: Enemy units that are badly defeated cannot be considered
deleted from enemy order of battle. The VC have the capability to replace
battle losses with trained personnel quickly and because a unit is defeated
in one battle it should not be eliminated as a threat. The intelligence
effort should continue to determine its location.

Integrate Intelligence

Item: An integrated intelligence effort will result in a clearer picture
of the enemy situation.

Discussion: Many sources of information are available to intelligence
gathering agencies. Some of these sources are aerials, aerial photo-
ography and imagery interpretation, airborne sensory devices (infra red
and side looking airborne radar), long range reconnaissance patrols, and
captured VC and documents.

Observation: All efforts at gathering intelligence must be integrated
to form the complete enemy situation if the enemy is to be located and
destroyed.

COMMUNICATIONS

RC-292 Antenna

Item: Elevating the RC-292 antenna.

Discussion: Heavy vegetation and dampness in Vietnam decreases the
effectiveness of the ground wave in RI communications which in turn
decreases range.

Observation: To overcome this difficulty, and to get the maximum use of
the RC-292 antenna, it can be elevated higher than the mast sections pro-
vided for in the issued kit. This can be done by using one each 2½ foot
AB 215/0 with stakes GP-3 (21: 607-37) which will provide an antenna height
of 60 feet (24 feet higher than maximum height of the conventional RC-292).
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This additional height increases the range of the VRC-12 series radios from 30 miles to approximately 50 miles. There is little variation of readability or signal strength during adverse weather conditions.

N/ARC-24

Items: AV/PRC-23 transmitting difficulties.

Discussion: Difficulties have been experienced while transmitting in heavy jungle, especially rubber plantations, while utilizing the short whip antenna.

Observation: When difficulty in transmitting with the whip antenna exists, the long antenna should be tried. If this does not clear up the problem, an airborne relay station should be established.

Radio Moisture

Items: Retransmit R/U and audio connectors are susceptible to moisture.

Discussion: During the rainy season in Vietnam, moisture collects in the audio connectors on the face of the radio set, which causes the set to automatically key down in operation.

Observation: Use of canvas covers will help prevent moisture from getting on the face of radio sets. The AV/PRC-23 is provided with rubber audio connector caps secured to the set by a nylon cord. These caps are also fit the RT-324. Precautions should be taken to secure the cap to the set to prevent loss.

Rectifier RA-91

Item: The rectifiers, RA-91, can be utilized as a power supply for AV/PRC-12 series radios.

Discussion: During short duration tactical operations where radios are mounted in vehicles, it is practical to remote radios into the tents. This is not so when operations are to be set up in one place for extended periods of time. Extended idling of engines to keep batteries charged causes the engine to carbon up. If the engine is not used to charge the batteries, a separate generator for each radio in operation will have to be used. This shortens battery life and causes excess wear on generators. Retaining of radios also ties down a vehicle that could be used for other purposes, requires extra gasoline for generators, and a higher consumption of batteries for remote units.

Observation: Radios can be removed from the vehicles and placed in a tent. The power source consists of two 10 amp, 12 volt batteries (in series) which are charged by a 12 amp RA-91 rectifier, powered by a 120 volt 60 cycle 3 kw generator. The rectifier has the capability of a constant control of separate output, eliminating the erratic output common to de generators which is harmful to all radios.

N/ARC-69

Item: Overheating of equipment in the N/ARC-69 causes tube failure.

Discussion: The high temperatures experienced in Vietnam combined with the normal amount of heat generated through operation of the equipment, causes the components of the N/ARC-69 to overheat with subsequent tube failure.

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The most assured way to reduce the temperature within the AN/ARC-59 is through the use of air conditioners. The following expedient methods are recommended for use in the absence of air conditioners:

1. Keep exhaust fans in continuous operations, keeping the air path clear.

2. Leave the shelter door open for circulation of air.

3. Pull equipment components slightly from recesses to allow the heat to escape.

4. Paint the top of all shelters white to reflect the heat from the sun. Sandbagging the entire structure will give some relief from the sun and also protection from enemy fire.

Base Camp Communications

Item: The AN/MTO-3 and the AN/MTO-1 is inadequate for division main base camp communications.

Discussion: As the division became more firmly established, and base camp facilities began to expand, it became evident that an AN/MTO-3 switchboard at Support Command and an AN/MTO-1 at Division Main would be totally inadequate to handle either the internal base camp communications or the growing demand for trunking facilities. Because of this ever expanding requirement and the large number of calls being placed, it was necessary to install a second AN/MTO-1. Three AN/MTO-1 switchboards are now in use in the Division Main Base Camp, one for Division Main locales, one for Support Command locales and one for all trunking facilities. This last change over took place in 5 June 1966. Each of the three switchboards has trunk lines interconnecting it with the remaining two switchboards in the base camp.

Observation: Even though all of the telephone requirements of the division, are being filled at the present time the point has been reached where it would be definitely advantageous to replace the three existing AN/MTO-1 switchboards with one AN/MTO-9. This change is necessary for two reasons. First, the local and trunking needs of the division are ever increasing and second, the use of one switchboard and one frame (AN/MTO-9) as opposed to three switchboards and frames (AN/MTO-1) would increase capabilities and operating efficiency while at the same time greatly reducing the number of personnel needed to operate the board.

Wire Communication

Item: Utilizing a wirehead to allow a "Clean Patch" state in the patch panel.

Discussion: The 121st Signal Battalion has developed wireheads to be utilized in conjunction with the patch panel in each base camp signal complex. The wirehead has provided more efficient and effective circuit control in base camp installations where temporary tactical and permanent administrative circuits are integrated.

The wirehead at Division Main was built inside a standard Comax container. The interior was framed and lined with 1/4 inch plywood. Junction boxes J-1077 and J-2117 were installed to terminate 26 pair cables from the patch panel and commercial cable from local subscribers. Jumper wire was used to connect appropriate circuits to the switchboard frame. Comax trunk circuits between Division Main and Ranger LD switchboards were wired directly between frames, by-passing the wirehead. This was done primarily to conserve jumper wire.
The principle advantage of the wirehead is that it takes advantage of the "normal through" characteristic of the patch panel. The resulting clean-patch feature reduces considerable congestion in the limited space available within the SH-61 patch panel. As a result, the facility of the patch cords due to handling, heat, dirt and moisture is eliminated. Additionally, most of the patches in base camp signal center are of a permanent nature. The only exception to the clean-patch feature is that temporary tactical circuits are established to forward areas by switching as necessary in the patch panel. Permanent circuits which are interrupted, pre-empted or re-routed as a result of circuit outage or installation of temporary tactical circuits, are quickly restored by pulling the patch cord and re-routing back to the normal through characteristic of the patch panel and the original patch found in the wirehead.

The wirehead necessitates additional circuit records. Tagged or color coded jumper wire is a necessity with the wirehead.

Observations: In permanent or semi-permanent signal center, the advantages of a wirehead outweigh the disadvantages. In effect, permanent patches are made in the wirehead resulting in a normally unaltered patch panel board. Circuit outages as a result of patch cord failure are thereby eliminated. Temporary circuits and re-routes are accomplished with patches in the patch panel. Circuit testing and restoration is enhanced significantly as a result of the clean patch.

Aircraft of SH-61 Shelters

Note: Equipment shelters SH-61 are structurally unsound for aircraft.

Discussion: The 121st Signal Battalion has experienced an increasing requirement to provide highly mobile and flexible communication support to the infantry brigades. Due to difficulties experienced in highway movement, brigades are normally airlifted to and from areas of operations. The Forward Signal Platoons must also deploy by air. As a result of the last five division sized combat operations, the SH-61 Shelters have been proved to be structurally unsound for slinging in helicopters. The AH-60-69 shelters have been dropped from altitudes of 250 feet and 3000 feet while being carried by SH-47 helicopters. Of at least two other SH-61 Shelters, the lifting points have been examined closely and have been found to be pulling loose from the frame of the shelter.

Air safety standards require a minimum of six feet of nylon slings on each leg of load slings. Inherent vibrations and oscillations in rotary winged aircraft are believed to be the cause for lifting point failures. The lifting points are inadequate for anything except lifting
the shelter on and off vehicles. Examination of lifting points after an airlift has revealed that the shelter frame is not durable enough to carry the strain applied to the upper shelter corners during lift-off, varying air currents in level flight, and rotary winged vibrations.

Observation: In order to support an infantry division under current concepts of tactical deployment in the Republic of Vietnam, signal equipment must be air transportable. Signal shelters (21 ton truck variety) are structurally unsound and unsafe in meeting the demands imposed by airlift. If the S144 shelters are to be used in this manner, reinforcement of the shelter and lifting points is necessary. An alternate solution is to discontinue lifting the shelter and remove the equipment for installation in other suitable shelters. This solution has been adopted in this unit. One stack (radio and carrier equipment) has been removed and mounted in a 3/4 ton trailer. This presents a package similar to the new AN/ARC-111 Radio Relay Terminal. The trailer mounted package can be loaded internally into UH-47 Chinooks.

CAMERA BOMBS

Item: Need for cameras with water-proof housings.

Discussion: The 703 cameras for still photography utilized by the division photographic section are not suitable for combat photography in this environment. The extremes of rain, dust, and heat have caused an inordinate number of malfunctions. Further, the rough handling of cameras is unavoidable when the combat photographer is photographing friendly forces engaged in ground operations against a hostile force.

Observation: There is available a relatively inexpensive, extremely sturdy, 35mm camera which is enclosed in a water-proof housing. Three of these cameras (by Minox) have been requisitioned (over authorized allowances).

CIVIL AFFAIRS/PSYOP

Civil Affairs Planning

Item: Preparing and planning GA projects in pacified areas.

Discussion: One important phase of any pacification plan is the development of GA projects. Prior to initiating and completing a project, coordination must be effected with sub-sector officials and their advisors. Coordination informs these officials of projects being developed in their area and will preclude any duplication of effort.

Observation: Planning of GA projects (all of which are of the self-help variety) must include utilization of village help. Coordination with village officials will assist in listing village help. Projects become meaningless, no matter how imposing or important they may be, unless the villagers associate themselves with it by actual participation.

For One Leaflet Printing

Item: Use of a multilith press at division level.

Discussion: The availability of a multilith printing press at the division level, provides the CS with a capability to produce highly effective and timely PSYOP media. Immediate exploitation of combat situations gives US forces a definite advantage in the PSYOP area.
The availability of the press at division level increases the capability of the division to employ printed Psyop media rapidly. The time for initiation of request for a leaflet has been reduced from 2 or 3 days to generally 12 to 24 hours.

**MEDICAL**

**Helicopter Evacuation**

Items: Army air ambulances equipped with "Forest Penetrators" and "Stokes Litter".

Discussion: In many instances wounded personnel must be evacuated from landing zones where clearance is less than the minimum required for Army air ambulances. In these instances Air Force helicopters equipped with the "Forest Penetrator" capability have been called.

Observation: Army air ambulances equipped with the modified "Forest Penetrator" and "Stokes Litter" would decrease the time lag that now exists between request for evacuation and determination that Air Force assistance will be required.

**Helicopter Evacuation**

Items: Standby "Dust Off" air ambulances.

Discussion: As operations have penetrated deeper into northern provinces, the flying distance from forward areas to medical facilities has increased. This requires more time for "Dust Off" aircraft to make the circuit from their base and back to the medical facility.

Observation: "Dust Off" aircraft have been centrally located in or near the area of operations. This has reduced the distance of the first leg and gets the casualty to the medical facility much sooner.

**Superficial Wounds**

Items: Superficial cuts and wounds should be given immediate treatment.

Discussion: Superficial cuts and wounds are being neglected, especially those associated with bamboo. Wounds of this type often lead to boils and skin infections which require treatment with antibiotics.

Observation: Personnel must be made aware of the seriousness involved in neglecting these types of wounds and that immediate first aid measures must be taken when personnel receive a cut or wound.

**CHEMICAL**

**Tunnel Support**

Items: Chemical Section Tunnel Team.

Discussion: Numerous spider holes, wells and clay mines are found during division operations and are mistaken for tunnel systems. In several occasions the Chemical Section Tunnel Team was called only to find out that they were not needed.

Observation: There is a requirement to have trained tunnel teams in the infantry battalions able to exploit, destroy and/or destroy Viet Cong tunnels. A training program has been set up by the Division Chemical Section to provide these personnel and a training facility is under construction.
Field Scattered Munitions (CS)

**Item:** Fifty-five gallon drums of CS-1.

**Discussion:** Fifty-five gallon drums of CS-1 can be successfully constructed into field expedient munitions and employed against suspected or known enemy targets.

1. The downwind area of effectiveness may be as much as nine kilometers.
2. The application of agent CS should be about thirty drums (2400 lbs) per square kilometer of target area, when area is to be exploited by ground forces, and ninety drums (7200 lbs) for temporary denial.
3. CS strikes should always be followed by air and artillery preparation and then, when possible, exploited by ground forces.

**Observation:** Massive CS attacks on suspected or known enemy concentrations are feasible and practical.

**Power Driven Decon Apparatus**

**Item:** Power Driven Decon Apparatus, truck mounted 400 gallon, 49.

**Discussion:** The use of defoliants in the 40 PPIA has caused damage and leaks to the connection and discharge valve after prolonged use.

1. Hose reel group: Deterioration of rubber gasket at hose connection.
2. Gun group: Deterioration of gaskets and packing.
3. Discharge and pipe systems: Deterioration of joint and pipe sealants.
4. Drive assembly and clutch: Clutch and drive assembly becomes coated with defoliant causing friction and deterioration of belts and clutch disc.

**Observation:** After continuous use of herbicide, orange, purple, and blue, extensive repairs on the above listed items had to be performed. Shortage of spare parts for the PPIA in this command resulted in a high deadline rate of these items.

**40 GPH Insecticide Sprayer**

**Item:** 40 GPH Insecticide Sprayer.

**Discussion:** The use of "orange" defoliants in the 40 GPH Sprayer causes deterioration to the O-Rings and clustering of the strainer.

1. Deterioration of O-Ring in the flow control gage.
2. Clogs and stops flow of liquid through suction strainer line.
3. Clogs and blocks flow of agent through line strainers.

**Observation:** The entire flow system must be flushed immediately after use and all strainers must be removed and cleaned with solvent.
Tunnel Destruction

Acetylene Tunnel Destruction Device

Discussion: This device has been employed several times around the perimeter of the 1st Infantry Division Base Camp on tunnels that were found in the area. Listed below are the findings of personnel who have been exploiting tunnels for the Division Chemical Section during the past year.

1. The Acetylene Destruction Device systems demonstrated are extremely bulky when compared to the combination of explosives and CS-1 presently being satisfactorily utilized by the division.

2. The situation for satisfactory use of the device requires a certain size air opening, a certain size tunnel passage and some room compartment in the tunnel. When this device was tested on the tunnels in the division area the tunnels were not collapsed but were just flashed through by the explosion yielding little if any tunnel collapse. These tunnels tested by the division, though typical, were too straight or had openings too wide, or had too much overburden for the device.

3. The item required liquid oxygen to obtain any destruction in the tunnel. The liquid oxygen dispenser provided had to be recharged every forty-eight hours. The only supply of liquid oxygen for this division is at the two main air bases near CÀI BÀN and it is impractical to reach these areas while on combat operations.

4. The concept of not exploring the tunnel before it is blown is impractical. The tunnel direction must be known for safety of personnel above ground when the device is exploded. These tunnels run in zig-zag patterns and, therefore making exploration a mandatory precaution.

Observation: The Acetylene Destruction Device has very limited application in this area of Vietnam and because of its limited application it should only be stocked in limited quantities at division level.

2. Recommendations:

a. Organization:

(1) Recommend approval of the 1st Infantry Division Modification Tables of Organization at the earliest practicable date in order that the changes can be implemented in the near future.

(2) Recommend an increase in the support capability of Air Traffic Control Teams. A major problem in air safety exists during operations due to the lack of control teams and facilities available for control of the very large number of fixed and rotary wing aircraft involved in logistical and administrative flights and assault helicopters operating out of the same airfield. Provisional control teams, primarily staffed with pathfinder personnel, are being utilized by the division, but do not have the capability nor the equipment to cope with the situation. It is further recommended that the control teams be provided with the following items:

(a) A reliable navigation beacon to aid O-130 aircraft in locating forward airfields.

(b) A lightweight GCA radar for use during periods of marginal weather.
(e) Sufficient runway lights for lighting a minimum of 3000 feet to facilitate the landing of USAF aircraft.

b. Equipment:

(1) Recommend a suitable camera with water proof casing be procured. The camera currently issued for combat photography is not water proof and as a result requires constant repair. Requests have been submitted for the purchase of an interim camera, however, the need exists for the development of a water proof camera for combat photography.

(2) Recommend a new type of ration using other than tin cans be developed to replace the present "O" Ration. "O" Rations are too bulky and heavy and create a disposal problem in the field.

(3) Recommend a lightweight poncho be developed, designed both for an individual outer raincoat and shelter.

(4) Recommend that a sufficient amount of the canister round for the 79 Grenade Launcher be issued for training of all personnel. Initial tests conducted with the rounds indicated different sighting characteristics from those of the standard round.

(5) Recommend a standard fusing system be developed for dissemination of C3-1 by aerial delivery. The expedient methods currently being used create a wide variance in height of burst. A device is needed to obtain a height of burst from 25 - 50 feet to reduce downward loss of agent from the target area.

(6) Recommend additional tests be conducted in-country with experimental fuse M999 (jungle penetration fuse). The previous tests were inconclusive because the canopy was not greater than 30 meters.

g. Personnel:

(1) Recommend that enlisted personnel records be screened more closely to insure replacements with Class 3 profiles effecting duties in a combat MOS are not assigned to fill these allocations. This problem is being coordinated with U.S. Army Vietnam, but arises with the individual at the time he receives overseas orders.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL: W.J. GLIBOON JR
Chief of Staff

R.G. BORRE
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - ACOS
1 - CINCUSAF
1 - 20 USAF
1 - CQ DITY
1 - G-3

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INCLOSURE 1

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME, GRADE, SN</th>
<th>DATES</th>
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<td>O0</td>
<td>DEPUTY, WILLIAM B.</td>
<td>1 May</td>
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<td>BRIG GEN, 033741</td>
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<td>1st Inf Div</td>
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<td>1 May - 24 Jul</td>
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<td>1 May - 24 Jul</td>
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<td>1 May - 24 Jul</td>
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For Official Use Only
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INCLOSURE 2

ORGANIZATION CHART
INCLUSION 3

SWITCHBOARD DESIGNATORS
1st Infantry Division
1st Brigade
1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry
2nd Brigade
2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry
3rd Brigade
3rd Battalion, 2nd Infantry
1st Battalion, 16th Infantry
2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry
Division Artillery
1st Battalion, 5th Artillery
6th Battalion, 6th Artillery
1st Battalion, 7th Artillery
2nd Battalion, 3rd Artillery
1st Aviation Battalion
1st Engineer Battalion
1st Medical Battalion
1st Squadron, 6th Cavalry
121st Signal Battalion
1st HQ/Headquarters Company
Support Co - 1
701st Maintenance Battalion
1st Administrative Company
11th Radio Research Unit
1st for Unification Task Force

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

45
INCLUSION 4
USARV QD 4079
GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 4079

SECTION I
REALIGNMENT OF UNIT

SECTION II
DETACHMENT OF UNITS

SECTION III
ATTACHMENT OF UNITS

SECTON III

3. TO C15. Pol units ATTACHMENT dir as indi.

35TH INF. PT. PLATOON (SCOUT DOG)
Atch to: 1st Infantry Division
Eff date: 16 June 1966
Auth: VECO date dir
Sp instr: NA

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

RICHARD J. SEITZ
Brigadier General, US Army
Chief of Staff

/s/ K.D. RIELTON
Lt Colonel, AGO
Asst Adjutant General

"A TRUE COPY"

WILLIAM L POWDER JR
Major, Artillery

Enclosure 4 Operational Report: Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
INCLOSURE 5

LIGHT ASSAULT ARTILLERY BATTERY
MISSION. To provide direct support artillery to maneuver elements of the division.

ASSIGNMENT. Assigned to the 6th Battalion, 6th Artillery.

CAPABILITIES. a. Furnishes one or two air mobile six gun firing platoons in direct support of division maneuver elements.

b. Personnel and equipment are provided from division assets.

c. This unit is dependent on Hq and Hq Battery, Division Artillery for all survey and radio repair support.

d. This unit is capable of participating in the defense of its firing positions.

MOBILITY. a. Assault elements of this unit are airmobile by UH-1 aircraft.

b. The entire unit is mobile by vehicle or CH-47 aircraft.

STRENGTH. 5 Officers, 139 Enlisted Men.
Inclusion 5 Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Light Assault Artillery Battery (Con't)

**MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT.**

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<td>Truck, Cargo 3/4 Ton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Truck, Platform Utility 1/2 Ton</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer, Cargo 1/2 Ton</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer, Cargo 3/4 Ton</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar, 4.2 Inch</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio Set, AN/VRC-46 std in 1/4 Ton</td>
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<td>Radio Set, AN/VRC-47 std in 1 Ton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio Set, AN/VRC-47 std in 3/4 Ton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio Set, AN/VRC-25</td>
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</table>
1. The basic fighting element in an infantry division is the rifle squad. Although on the one hand, it is the smallest tactical unit; it is on the other hand in many respects, the most difficult and challenging to command properly.

2. The division commander deals with brigades and battalions; the brigade commander with battalions and companies; the company commander with platoons and squads; platoon commander with squads; but the squad leader deals almost directly with individuals. It is much easier to deal with organizations than with individuals and it is for this reason that squads are divided into fire teams so that the squad leader, also, will have an organizational framework with which to operate.

3. When a squad is well organized and team leaders are strong, and when every member of the squad understands fully the fact that the two teams constantly support one another, than the squad will operate well. However, if the squad is not well organized and tightly controlled, it tends to break down into six, eight, or ten individuals and loses its integrity. It is a constant struggle in combat to maintain integrity. There are many forces and factors which tend to make the soldier think of himself as an individual instead of as a member of a team or of a squad. Fatigue, hunger, thirst and fear are the greatest enemies of squad integrity. When the time comes that the individual members of the squad are preoccupied with any or all of these factors, and they are no longer thinking in terms of mutually supporting fire teams, the squad, at that point in time, ceases to exist as a military organization. Then the squads cease to exist, neither the platoon, company, battalion, brigade or division can operate or function properly. Therefore, of all the problems in an infantry division, the first and most important problem is to maintain the organizational integrity of the rifle squad while in combat.

4. Because the impact of hunger, thirst, fatigue and fear are persistent and great, they can only be overcome by repetitive training, indoctrination and practice. The individual soldier must be reminded daily of his place and duties in the fire team and the role of the two fire teams as they relate to the support of one another. As in baseball, there is a requirement for a constant flow of instructions from squad leaders to their teams, and from team leaders to their men. To the extent that such instructions continuously flow, to that same extent is the squad an integrated team. To the extent that the instructions do not flow, to that same extent the team begins to disintegrate. If a squad is left on the field of battle under fire for ten minutes without instructions or orders, chances are it will disintegrate into individual soldiers each one of whom will consider the odds against him to be great. However, under a steady barrage of orders and instructions, the individual soldier knows that he is not alone on the battlefield, but rather continues to be a member of a functioning military unit.

5. Relatively speaking, those military units which serve a piece of equipment such as a tank, a helicopter, a ship or a battleship, have the great advantage of a machine of war around which to organize their efforts. By the very presence of the helicopter on the field of battle, each artillery piece knows 24 hours a day how his contribution leads to the accomplishment of the mission. In the rifle squad, however, there is no single piece of equipment around which all activity is centered and to which all thought is devoted. Instead, the rifle squad exists only when
all the members of the squad understand what it is the squad is doing and how it proposes to accomplish its mission. The squad leader, therefore, has the greatest command challenge of any infantry leader.

6. The turnover in squad and team leaders is great and thus a simple system must be adopted which can be easily taught and readily understood.

7. The key concept which can be expressed in one word is "OVERWATCH.
Within a rifle squad, it is the duty of the two teams always to support one another. It is important that the A Team understand that it must always come to the aid of the B Team and vice versa. In the defense this is clear and simple as long as each individual soldier has selected a proper position, with cover and concealment and preferably with both.

8. However, when the squad is advancing or moving, the relationship of mutual support becomes even more important. When the leading team is advancing, whether in the attack, in movement to contact, on patrol, or on its way to a base-of-fire position, the following team must understand at all times that it is in an OVERWATCHING position -- that is, it follows the lead team, prepared to support it with fire or with maneuver. The normal formation for a rifle squad is with one team leading and the other following. Only when the platoon as a whole is in the assault, or after the second team has maneuvered, should we find the two teams on line.

9. When a squad is simply moving from point A to point B as an interior unit -- that is, it is not the leading element, or a flanking element, or an independent element -- it is in a travelling formation in which one team follows the other at close interval with the individual soldiers 5 meters apart to reduce their vulnerability to mortar fire and recoilless weapons, as well as claymores and booby traps. Unless there is some reason to be moving single file while passing through a defile or through thick jungle where trail breaking is necessary, each team should normally be a 'V' formation with the team leader leading at the apex of the 'V'. The distance between teams in a squad which is in the travelling formation is again only 5 meters. However, when the squad is the leading element or a flanking element or on patrol, or on its way independently to an OVERWATCHING fire position (a base of fire), it moves either in a Travelling or in a Bounding OVERWATCH.

10. TRAVELLING OVERWATCH. The TRAVELLING OVERWATCH formation simply means that the second team drops back 25, 50, 100 or in open country 200 to 300 meters so that it is not engaged by the same fire which may be directed upon the leading team. This will permit it to maneuver and to employ OVERWATCHING fires in support of the leading team. This formation permits the squad leader to act as a military commander to influence the battle, to take initiative and avoid bringing the entire squad under the same fire at a time and place selected solely by the VC. Naturally, the teams rotate so that one team is not always leading. This rotation is taken care of by the desire of the soldiers to share the dangers of the leading element by alternating the teams. The TRAVELLING OVERWATCH is useful when the squad must move out with some speed or when contact with the enemy is either not imminent or the enemy situation is unknown.

11. BOUNDING OVERWATCH. When contact with the enemy is imminent or when light sniper fire has already been received or when crossing dangerous areas, the squad should resort to the BOUNDING OVERWATCH. This technique simply means that one team is in firing position to cover the movement of the other team and then in a leap-dropping manner, the teams alternate.
between advancing and OVERWATCHING from stationary positions. The distance involved in each bound is entirely dependent upon the terrain and the judgment of the squad leader. As in the TRAVELLING OVERWATCH, movement by bounds should prevent the entire squad from being surprised or from being caught in the open or should prevent both teams from being engaged by the same small group of enemy forces.

12. The techniques at platoon level are the same as at squad level in that a platoon leader moving forward without expecting imminent contact, will always place one squad sufficiently far in advance so that the platoon does not come into the beaten zone of fire directed at the leading squad. The squads leading or flanking the platoon will use either the TRAVELLING or BOUNDING OVERWATCH, or if they are back in the column, will move in a TRAVELLING formation. Platoon leaders moving in areas in which contact is imminent will not only advance a squad to a forward OVERWATCH position to the front, but on many occasions will advance squads to flanking OVERWATCH positions with the understanding that as the platoon moves through the area and the OVERWATCH position is no longer useful, the squad leader without further orders will rejoin the platoon column. Thus, the platoon leader is able to walk across the countryside from squad position to squad position, and at all times at least one of his three major maneuver elements is in a stationary OVERWATCH, prepared to place fire in support of his advance, or to repel any enemy movement within his area.

13. If the squads and platoons of the Division will master and employ these tactics, the effectiveness of the infantry element will be increased by several hundred percent. Furthermore, because each squad and platoon leader understands exactly the tactics being followed by all others, the control of the infantry element will be simplified and units will be able to work together with greater effectiveness. Commanders at all times will be able to visualize the formation of the infantry unit on the ground, the amount of terrain covered by them and the techniques by which they are advancing or attacking. The BOUNDING OVERWATCH does not change in concept when the firing starts - when contact is made - the tactics are identical. The only difference is that the movement from one stationary OVERWATCH position to the next will be done with greater care and more attention to the selection of routes of advance. Whereas, prior to the fire fight, teams and squads will advance to forward OVERWATCH positions at a walk, taking advantage of cover and concealment as available, once the fire fight starts, these forward movements will usually be accomplished by running or crawling. The distances between the successive OVERWATCH positions will be less. Once a squad leader or platoon leader has moved his elements toward the enemy, always endeavoring to maneuver around the flank, and all his units are engaged, he will endeavor to advance his line by crawling. The next higher commander will automatically make a wider envelopment.

14. All commanders will establish battle runs and will repeatedly exercise their teams, squads and platoons until they have achieved a high level of effectiveness. Training will be continuous and also will be conducted by reserve elements on operations.
INCLOSURE 7

SUPPLY AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES
1. Supply: The average strength supported during the reporting period was slightly under 21,500 troops. The supply levels for the division as of 31 July 1966 were as follows:

### Class I

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*Note "A" Ration supplements are on hand for issue with "B" Rations.

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Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Cont)

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<tr>
<th>TYPE OF SUPPLY</th>
<th>DAYS OF SUPPLY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>On Hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) MOSG</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Diesel</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Package Lubes and Oils</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Base Areas</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Division Reserve</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Class II & IV (less repair parts). The following items are in short supply and may be critically required in the division in the near future:

1. Batteries - E45C, B261, B261, and B21309.
2. Replacement radios for combat losses. (New family, ARVRC-12 radios.)
3. Tentage and poles.
4. Underwear and socks.
5. Quick release strap.
6. Canteen collapsible, 2 qt.
7. Survival kit.
8. Armor (satinweb).
9. Tropical clothing.
10. Generators.
11. Insulated food containers.
12. Expansible paper plates, steel wool, securing powder.
13. Components of demolition sets.
15. Watch, non-maintainable.
17. 5.56 rifles and magazines.
18. N6 plotting boards.
19. Office furniture.
20. Oxygen and acetylene (gas and bottles).

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Exhibit 7 Operational Report—Lesmam Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Cont')

(21) Trailer, water.
(22) Insignia.
(23) Decorations.
(24) Aviators gloves and sunglasses.
(25) Petroleum handling equipment, i.e., miniports, light weight pumps, and 10,000 gallon tanks.
(26) Typewriters.
(27) Folding chairs.
(28) Camouflage covers for steel helmets.
(29) Water cans (plastic).
(30) Lointer sight, 14.
(31) Pump for water purification equipment 1500 gal.
(32) 600 gal water purification sets.
(33) 1-1937 fire units.

A. Class II & IV (Repair Parts). Parts for the new series radios are in short supply. The short and long antennas for the 34/ARC-25 radios are in critical short supply.

The following is a summary of repair parts and assemblies received and shipped by the Technical Supply Activities of the 701st Maintenance Battalion for the 2d Quarter, 1966:

(a) Hq & Company A, 701st Maintenance Battalion
   Received - 560.5 tons
   Shipped - 601.0 tons

(b) Company E, 701st Maintenance Battalion
   Received - 610.9 tons
   Shipped - 430.9 tons

(2) The following is a summary of requisitions handled by the Technical Supply Activities of the 701st Maintenance Battalion for the 2d Quarter, 1966:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO/PRT</th>
<th>REQ 100</th>
<th>12/10</th>
<th>1/64</th>
<th>PRTNS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Co A</td>
<td>37,918</td>
<td>18,726</td>
<td>7,993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co B</td>
<td>6,542</td>
<td>1,912</td>
<td>2,863</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C</td>
<td>3,477</td>
<td>3,234</td>
<td>3,331</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D</td>
<td>10,286</td>
<td>5,292</td>
<td>7,129</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co E</td>
<td>12,524</td>
<td>1,951</td>
<td>4,978</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>78,193</td>
<td>32,920</td>
<td>25,994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
### Operational Report - Lessons Learned

**At Inf liii,, 31 Jul 66**

**The supply portion of the maintenance program has remained critical. Due to inadequate repair parts and field maintenance equipment, the division has experienced long delays in repair and maintenance activities.**

#### The Following Items/Services Were Procured by the Logistic Branch to Support Divisional Requirements During the Reporting Period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item/Service</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potable and non-potable water</td>
<td>34,779,777 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood pellets</td>
<td>275,064 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bread</td>
<td>90,000 loaves</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Combat Service Support Activities:

- **Medical Services:** The following number of personnel were treated during the reporting period:
  - Admissions: 2,926
  - Discharges: 2,058
  - Deaths: 12
  - Non-discharge: 358
  - Transfers: 510

- **Procurement:** The following quantities of supplies and equipment were procured during the reporting period:
  - Potable and non-potable water: 34,779,777 units
  - Wood pellets: 275,064 units
  - Bread: 90,000 loaves
c. Services.

(1) Maintenance.

(a) Support of 3107/1110 Artillery: The float 1110 of the 23d Artillery Group was converted to a 1110. Support for 23d Artillery Group units has been assigned to the 23d BDE. The entire support of the group will soon be assigned to 23d BDE, but no date has been announced.

(b) Repair Parts for 31937 Ranges: These repair parts are extremely critical to the division. Some parts were received at the end of May; however, no appreciable quantity has been received since then. These parts are essential for proper food preparation and the shortage is of concern to the Division Food Service Advisor. A message has been sent to 1st Logistical Command for assistance in obtaining these parts.

(c) Combat Vehicle Parts: Combat vehicles are being used extensively on all combat operations in the division. Due to this fact repair parts must be on hand to support these vehicles during these combat operations. Major assemblies for 155mm tanks and 313 personnel carriers are most critical. Also, other pieces for these vehicles are either critically low stockage or at zero balance. Every effort is being taken to procure these items from all available sources. Without these combat vehicles the tactical mission of this division would be seriously hampered. A plan is needed for phase-out of these vehicles and to replace them with rebuilt vehicles.

(d) Cleaning Equipment for 3116 Rifles: Cleaning rods, chamber brushes and bares brushes for 3116 rifles are not on hand in sufficient quantity to properly maintain these weapons. Without these, stoppages occur and the combat effectiveness of a fighting unit is impaired. A message was sent to 1st Logistical Command to initiate expedited action in obtaining these items for combat units. A test was made to determine why so many stoppages occurred when a full magazine was used. Normally the second round failed to feed. It was determined this was caused by dirty chambers, thereby increasing the force required to extract the spent cartridge. The bolt would not retract far enough to the rear to properly feed the next round and a failure to feed would result. This can only be resolved by having the proper tools to keep these weapons clean.

(e) Cracked Truck Frames: A number of vehicles have had cracked frames with relatively low mileage. RFR's were submitted and an answer has been received. A new frame is presently undergoing extensive testing to provide a stronger frame for these vehicles.

(f) Calibration Team: A calibration team started calibrating all test equipment in the maintenance battalion. Equipment was last tested and calibrated in February 1966.

(g) A draft regulation on Operation, Maintenance and Care of Artillery Generators was written and published. USAEC Generator Instructor team conducted classes in LAM HHC, BAAJ CBT and 314U LOI to 1st Division units in each area. These classes consisted of organisationale maintenance and operation of generators at unit level. Classes of this type have now been conducted in all base areas.
(h) A liaison visit was made to the 1st Cavalry Division for the purpose of obtaining all data plus data pertaining to loading methods, use of special types of equipment and problem areas they have encountered on construction equipment. The visit was successful.

(i) All TD-25 tractor repair parts have been turned-in and no new parts for this tractor are being requisitioned.

(j) Repair parts for 500C scoops loaders and 250 GZ Joy Air Compressors were in short supply. Some assemblies for scoop loaders have been received, but quantities of other required parts were not received.

(k) Requisitions for end items required for construction equipment maintenance float have not been filled. Follow-up action has been accomplished with negative results. Due to the amount of time required to requisition and receive construction equipment repair parts it is imperative that the units have float assets of this type stock.

(l) Aircraft Maintenance: Back up support continued to be a problem due to the many mission and flying hours required during the last quarter. The problems are restricted to the 1st Aviation Battalion and 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, as these are the units which participate in all missions required by the 1st Infantry Division. These problems will continue as the aircraft are rapidly approaching the flying hour time when engine changes, transmission changes and general overhauls are required.
INCLOSURE 8

1ST INFANTRY DIVISION TRAINING CIRCULAR 23-6

62
Replacement Training Program

1. PURPOSE: This training circular prescribes policy and provides guidance for commanders in establishing a training program for replacement personnel.

2. OBJECTIVE: To insure that each individual replacement receives, as a minimum, 40 hours of instruction prior to his participation in combat operations in Vietnam. This training is required of all personnel assigned to the division since all combat support and service units must be capable of conducting combat patrols, defending base camps and actively engaging in close combat when required.

3. GENERAL: Individual replacements arriving in Vietnam directly from CONUS training centers are well-trained but lack unit experience. Transition training emphasizing teamwork, the combined arms team, and adjustment to a new environment is required to prepare them for combat.

4. RESPONSIBILITY:
   a. The AGofS, G3, has staff responsibility for the program and will monitor training of replacements.
   b. The Adjutant General will establish a briefing program for officers and senior NCO's in grades E7 through E9 in accordance with the proposed briefing program at Inclosure 1 and guide sequence of events at Inclosure 2 for all incoming personnel that will include as a minimum the following subjects:
      (1) Orientation to Vietnam
          (a) Unit history, organization and mission
          (b) Personal security measures
          (c) Unit security plan
          (c) Issue, handling of firearms and ammunition
          (c) Local off-limits areas
(f) Uniform regulations
(g) Safety program
(h) Leaves and passes
(i) Guidelines to good relations in Vietnam

(2) Character guidance
(3) Medical orientation
(4) Law and order

c. Major subordinate (base) commanders will establish training programs in accordance with the proposed training program at Inclosure 5 for all replacements to include as a minimum, the following subjects:

(1) H-16 Training
   (a) Characteristics
   (b) Assembly and disassembly
   (c) Zeroing, care and cleaning
   (d) Qualification

(2) Mines and booby traps

(3) Squad tactics, battle drill and immediate action drills

(4) Patrolling
   (a) Combat patrols and raids
   (b) Recon patrols

(5) Hand grenades

(6) Demolitions with emphasis on tunnel operations

(7) Fundamentals of air mobile operations

(8) Personal hygiene and field sanitation in Vietnam

(9) Combat Intelligence in Vietnam
TRAINING CIRCULAR 20-6, HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, 19 July 1966

5. IMPLEMENTING PUBLICATIONS: Two copies of all PQI's, lesson plans and implementing publications will be forwarded to this headquarters, ATTN: AVID-T not later than 15 August 1966.

6. REFERENCES:

a. USAFV Training Circular #1 dated 27 April 1966, Subject: Command Information.

b. USAFV Training Circular #2 dated 7 May 1966, Subject: Replacement Training.

c. USAFV Regulation 360-2, dated 5 November 1965, Subject: Command Orientation.

d. USMACV Circular 612-2, dated 10 January 1966, Subject: Orientation Briefing (AVID-T).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL: W. H. GLASGOW JR
GEORGE P. REYNOLDS Col., GS
Major, AGC
Chief of Staff

Asst., AG

5 Incl: Proposed Officer and Senior NCO
Briefing Program for 1st Inf Div Replacement Detachment
2-Sequence of Events for the Processing of Incoming Officers and Senior NCO's at 1st Inf Div Replacement Detachment
3-Proposed Replacement Training Program for 1st Inf Div Replacement Detachment
4-Sequence of Events for the Processing of Incoming Personnel at 1st Inf Div Replacement Detachment
5-Proposed Replacement Training Program for Major Commands

DISTRIBUTION: B and D
Plus 25 G-3
PEOPLE OF LONG-TANH

THE VC OFTEN TELL YOU THAT THEY WILL COME AND LIBERATE YOU. WHY DO THEY MORTAR AND KILL THE INNOCENT CHILDREN. THE VC TELL YOU THEY ARE FRIENDS OF THE PEOPLE, YET THEY KILL THE LITTLE CHILDREN.

GOVERNMENT AND ALLIED FORCES ARE HERE TO HELP THE PEOPLE. WE WANT TO GET THE VC WHO KILL INNOCENT CHILDREN. TELL US WHERE THE VC ARE. IF ANYONE KNOWS WHERE THE VC ARE THAT KILLED YOUR CHILDREN. TELL US. TELL THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES OR NEAREST ALLIED FORCES. HELP TO CAPTURE THE EVIL VC.
"Attention Citizens:

You are in an area protected by GVN and the 1st Infantry Division. In order to protect you from the VC, the 1st Infantry Division must fire small arms, artillery, and drop bombs. We do not wish to hurt those loyal to the GVN. If you are loyal to the GVN, do not enter this area after today. If you are caught in this area, you will be considered VC, and will be turned over to the District Chief."
SOLDIERS OF THE 9TH DIV.

YOU ARE IN THE OPERATING AREA OF THE POWERFUL 1ST U.S. INF. DIV. WE KNOW YOU ARE SOUTH EAST OF MINH-TANH.

MORE UNITS OF THE 1ST INF. DIV. WILL BE UPON YOU. SURRENDER OR DIE.

IF YOU WANT TO SURRENDER REMOVE YOUR SHIRTS. SLING YOUR WEAPONS MUZZLE DOWN, AND PUT YOUR HANDS BEHIND YOUR NECK. THEN REPORT TO THE FIRST SOLDIER YOU SEE.

SURRENDER NOW OR DIE UNDER THE POWER OF THE 1ST INF. DIV.
FRONT: The government of Republic Vietnam helps the people. The people who remain in the villages appeal to the VC to rally with the National Government now.

BACK: To the people who Love Peace. We know that the people are very afraid of the fighting going on around their villages. As long as the VC are there, the government will have operations to destroy them. The government will use its airplanes, tanks, artillery and superior firepower to stop all VC terrorist action. By letting the VC hide-in your village, it will become a battle field. Rally to the National government and they will help you construct a new and better village. Then you can live in peace without fear.
FRONT: (CAPTION) "THE ALLIED FORCES WORK FOR THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE"

BACK: (TEXT)

THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ASSISTS THE GVN IN MANY WAYS. IN ADDITION TO ACTUALLY FIGHTING THE VC, THE SOLDIERS OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION AID IN MANY CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS IN SUCH FIELDS AS SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION AND MEDICAL HELP. ONE OF THE PROJECTS THEY ARE CURRENTLY WORKING ON IN THE TAY-NINH AREA IS ROAD IMPROVEMENT.

ENGINEERS OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION HAVE IMPROVED THESE ROADS TO EASE TRANSPORTATION IN THE AREA AND TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR FARMERS TO GET THEIR PRODUCE TO MARKET.

IN VC CONTROLLED AREAS THE PEOPLE GET FALSE PROMISE AND TERRORISM WHILE IN GVN AREAS THE GOVERNMENT IS CONSTANTLY BUILDING TOWARD A BETTER LIFE FOR THE PEOPLE.
INCLOSURE 10

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF BATTLE CASUALTIES
A statistical analysis of the 4160 battle casualties sustained as of 31 July 1966 by the 1st Infantry Division reveals the following:

a. The 4160 battle casualties were distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sq 1st Inf Div</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1st Bn 29th Inf</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Admin Co</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sq Co 2d Bde</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sq Co &amp; Bn Spt Cmd</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>2d Bn 16th Inf</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st S &amp; T BN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1st Inf 10th Inf</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70th Maint BN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2d Bn 10th Inf</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Med BN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sq Co 34 Bde</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Ave BN</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2d Bn 24 Inf</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st MP Co</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1st Bn 16th Inf</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Sqdn 4th Cav</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>2d Bn 20th Inf</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Hqs BN</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>Sq Bky Div Arty</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Inf BN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1st Bn 5th Arty</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sq Co 1st Inf Co</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8th Bn 6th Arty</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn 26th Inf</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>1st Bn 7th Arty</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn 33rd Inf</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>2d Bn 33rd Arty</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Chem Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>256th Chem Plt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Mil Hist Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>234th Arty Det</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The following is a breakout of battle casualties by hours:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOUR</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>HOUR</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0300</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0200</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0330</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0300</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0400</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0400</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0600</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0500</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0700</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The five most critical days for battle casualties were:

1. 5 Dec 65 - 170
2. 9 Jul 66 - 150
3. 12 Nov 65 - 134
4. 17 Feb 66 - 129
5. 11 Apr 66 - 129

The prevalent location of wounds:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>% OF CASUALTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leg</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>1143</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arm</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chest</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stomach</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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10-1
### Operational Report - 31st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66

**Statistical Analysis of 4160 Battle Casualties as of 31 July 1966 (Cont')**

**e. The source of wounds is broken out as follows:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WFA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>% OF CASUALTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mortar</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td>1113</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body Trap</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sniper</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**f. Grades of casualties are broken out as follows:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>AUT</th>
<th>CAS</th>
<th>% OF CAS</th>
<th>% OF AUT</th>
<th>% OF CAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>1158</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>1830</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**g. The majority of the battle casualties were sustained by individuals possessing the following MRS:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MRS</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>AUT</th>
<th>CAS</th>
<th>% OF AUT</th>
<th>% OF CAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Infantry and Armor</td>
<td>5284</td>
<td>5244</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>77.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Combat Engineer</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**h. A break out of the 160 battle casualties by situation is as follows:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WFA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>493</td>
<td>2392</td>
<td>2885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**i. The following is a breakdown of non-battle casualties by month during the past six months:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WFA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

For Official Use Only
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>KH</th>
<th>WHA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following is a breakout of battle casualties by month during the past six months:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMALL BOODY</th>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>KH</th>
<th>WHA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following is a breakout of battle casualties by month and by source of wounds:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION</th>
<th>KH</th>
<th>WHA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Area</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Flight</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Ambush Site</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following is a breakout of battle casualties by situation and source of wounds:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>KH</th>
<th>WHA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
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<td>Apr</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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INCLOSURE 11

OUT-OF-COUNTRY VISITORS
MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE I. FORSTNER, USAFRAC, O-3
General orientation visit, with emphasis on tactical operations and Force Development.

7 May 1966

COLONEL L.O. JONES
COLONEL P.H. BUSH
MR. G.C. DALLAPA, CE-13
MR. C.R. EMBRY, CE-14
(U.S. Army Aviation Command Liaison Team)
Determines aviation supply and maintenance needs and help to improve requisitioning, packaging and replacement flow of items.

12 May 1966

HONORABLY LEWIS D. CALLAGHAN, Congressman (R-Ca)
HONORABLE DONALD BENSFELD, Congressman (R-III)
MR. HENRY ROBBACH
(Staff Administration, Congressional Subcommittees on Military Operations) To obtain first hand observation of U.S. Forces at lowest possible level. Orientation visit.

16 May 1966

COLONEL J.E. WISNER
NITENANT COLONEL WILLIAM STAY III, USMC
To discuss current and future resource support problems and discuss civilian casualties.

24 May 1966

GENERAL DAVID E. BEECH, Commanding General, 1st Command Korea and Commanding General, 8th U.S. Army
MAJOR GENERAL J.H. SHELTON, Chief Army Advisory Group, Korea
COLONEL A.J. CANTARO, Chief Marine Advisory Group, Korea
LIEUTENANT COLONEL J.L. LAYNE, Aide-de-Camp, General Beach
Orientation visit.

25 May 1966

MAJOR GENERAL, THE HONORABLE, HILDEGARD FISCHER HENRY, CBE, KCMG, Director of Management and Support of Intelligence Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom.
CAPTAIN B.E. ELYA, British Royal Navy
Orientation visit.

26 May 1966

MAJOR GENERAL J.R. FEHR, SAGLA, JOG
COLONEL R.L. ALLEN, USA, Office of SAGLA, JOG
CAPTAIN J.R. REMMEL, USA, Office of SAGLA, JOG
Orientation visit. To observe Prop, Political Warfare and Civil Action operations in the 1st Infantry Division.
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Inclosure 11 Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
List of Official Visitors from out-of-country (DA's)

31 Jul 1966

MAJOR GENERAL BRUCE E. KENDALL, Deputy Commanding General Designate, USARCTIS
COLONEL PAUL A. FISHER
CAPTAIN R.W. HAGT
SENIOR MAJOR CLAYTON G. ROBERTS
Orientation visit for newly assigned DG Designate for USARCTIS
with emphasis on 6-4 aspects.

31 Jul 1966

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT A. CHEN, Representing the Commandant of the
U.S. Army Infantry School. To identify, through personal contacts
and on-the-scene observations, the current needs of USARCTIS
students who are being trained for duty in Vietnam.

MAJOR GENERAL CARL G. TURNER, Provost Marshal General, DA
LIEUTENANT COLONEL HENRY H. TUPPS, DA Escort
MAJOR JACK G. FRENTZ, DA
To identify requirements for DA support of Provost Marshal activities,
control of blackmarketing, and handling of POW's.

1 June 1966 - 30 June 1966

13 June 1966

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES H. POLK, AG/SD
LIEUTENANT COLONEL D.L. GOLIGHT, Office of AG/SD
LIEUTENANT COLONEL R.L. HACKETT, Office of AG/SD
LIEUTENANT COLONEL T.E. FLANN, Office of AG/SD
LIEUTENANT COLONEL W.E. HENRY JR., Office of AG/SD
MAJOR R.N. GHIALE, Office of AG/SD
To identify the support of AG/SD
in the areas of ammunition operations, logistic units, Army Aviation,
operational and organizational concepts of DDS.

M.R. A.J. DELAHAYE, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs for Far and South-eastern Affairs, United Kingdom.
M.R. SMITH, UNITED KINGDOM Ambassador to Vietnam
Briefing on 6-5 activities in the RVN 107 area and visit major ARVN
units.

13 June 1966

GENERAL J.F. COLLINS, (Ret) President American Red Cross
MR. ROBERT G. LIEBE, 60-77, Vice-President American Red Cross
MR. HAMPTON COLLINGS, Director ARS, Southeast Asia
Also orientation of Red Cross activities in the 1st Infantry Division.

17 June 1966

MR. ARTHUR L. CHAFFEE, Executive Secretary of the Society of the 1st
Infantry Division.
To discuss ways the Society can assist members of the 1st Infantry
Division to complete plans now under way by the Society to honor
personal who are fighting in Vietnam.

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Enclosure 11 Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
List of Official Visitors from out-of-country (Con’t)

18 June 1966

MR. ROBERT H. HILDEBRODT, Ohio candidate for U.S. House of Representatives,
   Visit U.S. Forces to obtain first hand information and meet constituents.

COLONEL R.L. JOHNSON JR., USAF, USTRICHE:
COLONEL WILLIAM PRESSLY, USAF, USTRICHE:
LIEUTENANT COLONEL R.C. HAMBY, USA, USTRICHE:
MAJOR F.J. O'PIT, USA, USTRICHE:
   Study on airlift data (ALDC) and characteristics of on load and off
   load of aircraft and problem areas.

20 June 1966

REVEREND CALVIN THOMAS, Minister of Montreat Presbyterian Church,
   Montreat, N.C.
REVEREND FATHER DANIEL LYNNS, S.J., Professor, Gonzaga University,
   Spokane, Wash.
CAPTAIN LLOYD V. YOUNG, USA, Office Secretary of Defense
   Visit Military Civic Action Activities in the 1st Infantry Division
   area.

24 June 1966

MR. COLE, Special Assistant to the President on Pacification
   To see LST 382 II operation and talk to action people.

27 June 1966

MAJOR GENERAL ARTHUR B. COLLINS JR., CG, 4th Infantry Division
LIEUTENANT COLONEL KITCHEN, 4th Infantry Division Staff
LIEUTENANT COLONEL HEDICK, 4th Infantry Division Staff
LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRAHMS, 4th Infantry Division Staff
   To gain first hand information of current situation.

28 June 1966

BRIGADIER GENERAL G.V. TOHLAS, CO, Philippine, FMAG
COLONEL BANJAL, DCO, Philippine, FMAG
LIEUTENANT COLONEL ZAGAL, Construction Group Service Officer
MAJOR HILTON, Engineer
MAJOR ZIZLDA, Engineer
CAPTAIN HADID, Aide-De-Camp
COLONEL LMAS, JUSLIO, Philippines
COMMISSIONER HILUNHALON, FMAG, Philippines
LIEUTENANT COLONEL HEDICK, Asst JUSLIO, Philippines
MAJOR ZILY, FMAG and Lorence LIO
Receive orientation briefing from 1st Infantry Division and FMAG
   construction group. Discuss with LIEUTENANT, O-3 the procedures
   for the mission of fire support, area security, and other tactical
   procedures in III Corps Tactical Zone.

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List of Official Visitors from out-of-country (Con't)

1 July 1966 - 31 July 1966

3 July 1966

MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL S. DAVIDSON, Commandant, USAGODC (Designate)

To observe operations and conduct discussion with Field Commanders relative to the responsibilities of the Commandant, US Army OSOG and CO, Combined Arms Group, QG.

8 July 1966

REPRESENTATIVE ROY G. PRUSK, (D-III)
REPRESENTATIVE ILDO IREZALIO, (D-Wp)

Visit, briefing and tour I Division area. See civic action and aid programs. Talk to troops and meet constituents.

COLONEL JACK T. PINK, Director of Army Education and Morale Support Directorate, Department of the Army

MAJOR DONALD H. CHRISTENSEN, Plans and Requirements Officer
MISS JAMES P. CRAMPFORD, GS-14, Chief Librarian
MISS BITTER VALANCE, GS-12, Assistant Service Club Director
MISS R COMPANY TURUT, GS-12, Assistant Director Crafts Branch

Department of the Army Special Service Team conduct a survey of the Special Service Facilities, programs, and recreational activities in the Republic of Vietnam.

10 July 1966

IR. CARL ORLANDO, US Army Electronics Command, New Material Introductory Team

IR. THOMAS PATTERSON, Team Member
IR. JOHN GLENN, Team Member

IR. RAYMOND WILSON, Team Member

Present briefing on the AN/TSG-43 (Tactical Imagery Interpretation Facility)

14 July 1966

IR. YOZO KATO, Former Minister of Defense, Japan

To observe Civic Action program.

COLONEL JAMES E. TERRY, USAGODC, Combined Arms Group
COLONEL B.C. CAMPBELL, LNO, USAGODC f-s QG

To discuss doctrinal matters and to coordinate collection of operational data required by HQ, USAGODC.

21 July 1966

PROFESSOR HENRY KISSINGER, Special Assistant to the President

To discuss international affairs as they pertain to Vietnam.

21 July 1966

GENERAL JEROME K. MATE, CHINCHNAPAC

LIEUTENANT COLONEL B.J. KUTCHER, AD.

DEPARTMENT MAJOR PH. NICHOLLI, Command Sergeant Major

COLONEL D.B. DUMB (4th Escort)

LIEUTENANT COLONEL F.J. ROY (USAGODC LNO)

Receive up-date briefing covering events since his last briefing in March 1966.

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30 July 1966

SERGEANT MAJOR T.L. DOSOL

Making the presentation of the Dobol award.

31 July 1966

77th Bomber Wing

LIEUTENANT COLONEL W.O. COOKE

MAJOR L. TAYLOR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROCK

CAPTAIN SMITH

CAPTAIN HARDISON

MASTER SERGEANT MERRICK

354th Bomber Wing

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVIS

MAJOR DEPEN

CAPTAIN GUNNAR

CAPTAIN KIDD

CAPTAIN KIDD

MASTER SERGEANT SMITH

To more closely identify the contribution made by ARNIGHT Strikes to the total U.S. effort in RVN.

T O: See Distribution

1. References: 1st Infantry Division OPLAN 10-66 (Lamson II)

2. The Phu Loi Pacification Task Force conducted its first "Hamlet Fair" and hamlet search operation beginning 200300 May 66. By 1600 hrs the Task Force had completed a comprehensive effort to attack VC infrastructure while gaining a psychological initiative with the population. While the two hamlets were being searched, the villagers were collected near the center of the hamlets. Here they were screened, and moved to the Hamlet Fair area. While all males between the ages of 15-45 were taken to the National Police Hqs. for further records check. The approximately 2000 people remaining; in the hamlet were moved into a Hamlet Fair area. Here 16 teams, plus the village, District and Province Chiefs were used to explain the purposes of the operation, feed and control the crowd, and obtain intelligence information.

3. Extensive measures were taken to allay the fears of the people and explain the reasons for the search operation, entertainment and pay activities, official speeches, rice distribution, medical assistance, intelligence interrogations, records checks, VC apprehensions and feeding and on the spot compensation for damage. All these contributed to impressing the hamlet residents that government forces, assisted by the US, were determined to conduct a strong but fair campaign to permanently destroy VC influence in the Phu Loi hamlet area. After several initial control problems were solved on the spot, this portion of the operation proceeded satisfactorily.

4. The primary accomplishment was the demonstration of an effective technique to bring the government, including necessary force to initiate law and order, to a contested hamlet. Without the cordon and search the operation would have been merely a festival. Without the "Hamlet Fair" the operation would have been another "police action". Together, the effort was a useful means of beginning a pacification drive. All participants, US and ARVN, were impressed with the demonstrated potential. In addition to the efforts of police to speed necessary checks, other gestures of concern had a visible effect on the crowd as the day progressed. People relaxed, ate, and began to talk among themselves, and left in a generally friendly mood.

5. Problems areas encountered by the Task Force and assorted civil and military units were defined at several critiques attended by all GVN, ARVN and US staff and command elements involved. A detailed listing of these problems and solutions is attached Appendix 1. Emphasis is centered primarily on US/Vietnamese coordination and the lack of understanding of functions and relationships within the

Exh 12 Operation Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
CONFIDENTIAL

operation. In addition, several essential items of equipment and operating techniques were identified. The experience gained in this operation provides the basis for positive improvements in the next meal.

FOR THE COMMANDER,

/s/ Willing J. Strickfaden
/s/ WELLINGTON J. STRICKFADEN
Major, Artillery
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
Special
5 - 5th ARV
5 - Dinh Duong Sector

"A TRUE COPY"

William L. Ponder Jr.
Major, Artillery

Incl 12 Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Omn't)

CONFIDENTIAL

92
The following problem areas in the conduct of the pacification operation were identified by Binh Duong Province, 5th ARVN Division, PAVN Advisory, and Pacification Task Force personnel and a combined critique conducted at Binh Duong Sector Headquarters.

1. Planning Phase:
   (1) Problem: Difficulty in identifying and orienting all individuals, both US and Vietnamese, who were to be actually involved in accomplishing the planning and execution of the operations.

2. Search Phase:
   (1) Problem: Insufficient number of search dogs to accompany search teams.

   Solution: The number of dog teams available will be dependent on the number of search areas in a particular hamlet. As a general rule two (2) dog teams should be assigned directly to each group of 5 - 10 search teams.

   (2) Problem: Lack of flashlights for inspecting tunnels.

   Solution: It will be the responsibility of the search element chain of command to insure that a flashlight is assigned to each search team prior to the operation.

   (3) Problem: Search OP operation was hampered by overflow and area congestion from Hamlet Development Fair site and inadequate communications.

   (a) Solution: The search command post will be placed in a location so congestion is not caused by vehicles, civilians, or PAVN suspects being processed or interrogated.

   (b) The Search OP will have adequate communications with all search leaders as well as Fair officials.

   (c) Sector will provide PRO-6’s to net with search control headquarters.

   (d) Problems: Search teams were not trained in search team techniques.

   Solutions:

   (a) It will be the responsibility of the National Police to instruct all personnel of the search teams in proper methods of searching.

   (b) Rehearsals will be scheduled on local houses to insure search teams are aware of their responsibilities.

   (c) A check list will be available for each house to insure that all areas of the search have been conducted. It will be the responsibility of the area team chief to personally inspect the check list at each house. (Checklist attached) on each house is

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APPENDIX 1 TO "HAMLET FAIR" AFTER ACTION - PROBLEM AREAS AND STATISTICAL SUMMARY

In 12 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Omn's)
searched, it will be given a number applicable to a number system on a master overlay to the search command post. Each search team chief will ensure marking material is available.

(d) It will be the responsibility of each search team leader to know his exact location at all times in accordance with the master overlay.

e. Assembly Area Phase.

(1) Problem: Adequate control of the population.

(a) It will be the responsibility of the National Police to establish screening teams in the assembly area for those men being evacuated to the National Police and those being taken to the Fair. Loudspeakers will be available from PA war units to assist in this control.

(b) National Police units will also insure that control is present for movements of the population from the assembly area to the Fair.

(c) Engineer tape should be used to encircle the entire assembly area as well as the County Fair.

(d) NP/TF forces should secure area.

(e) Loudspeakers should be used to explain to civilians why the men between 15-45 are being taken to National Police Headquarters. They should state that they will return as soon as possible.

2. Problem: Air and ground loudspeakers did not broadcast the same text.

Solution: Since a sufficient number of ground units are available, ground elements only will be used.

e. Hamlet Fair Phase.

(1) Problem: Fair operations require an OIC.

Solution: District Chief is in charge of the search and Fair operation; the Sector S-5 will be directly responsible for the Fair operations. A parallel chain of command will be formed.

(2) Problem: A requirement exists for better control and coordination of the hamlet fair area.

Solutions:

(a) A fair coordination and control point will be established and manned by the ARM OIC and US representatives to coordinate the over all activities and to facilitate immediate reaction to problems.

(b) Each station within the hamlet fair area should have ARM and US representatives in charge responsible to the ARM and US OIC for control and coordination.

Incl 12 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Comm)
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(a) All personnel in the hamlet fair area must initially be briefed in detail by the ARW OIC as to the procedures to be followed and activities available in the fair area.

(b) A program will be prepared covering the schedule of fair activities.

(c) Engineer tape and rope will be used to assist in controlling movement between stations.

(d) When the people are released to the fair area they will be subdivided into initial groups.

(3) Problem: Tendency of people to leave the fair area prior to completion of the search.

(4) Problem: The ID and 969 area tends to distract the people from the rest of the activities in the hamlet fair area.

Solutions:

(a) Detailed explanation of the 969 and ID area should be accomplished by the District Chief in the Assembly area.

(b) The 969 and ID area should be cordoned off from the rest of the Hamlet Fair stations with adequate ARW guard and control personnel present.

(c) A segment of the people in the assembly area should be designated for the 969 and ID card stations. The remainder of the people will be free to take part in the other activities in the Hamlet Fair area until such time as they are required to enter the 969-ID area.

(5) Problem: Insufficient number and type of stations in the hamlet fair area.

Solution: The ARW/US staff should increase the number and type stations for each activity dependent on the population density.

(6) Problem: Overcrowding of the entertainment area by ARW and US soldiers and National Police.

Solutions:

(a) It will be the responsibility of the OIC (US) of the Hamlet Fair area to insure that US soldiers stay away from the Hamlet Fair area and particularly the entertainment stations unless absolutely necessary.

(b) The OIC (ARW) of the Hamlet Fair area will insure that ARW soldiers not mingle with the villagers within the fair area unless absolutely necessary.

(c) National Police officials will insure that members of National Police search teams stay within their areas of responsibility and out of the Hamlet Fair area. Those National Police assigned to the fair perimeter guard will not leave their posts to mingle with the villagers unless called for by the Hamlet Fair officials.
(4) All troos w11 be brieded on this problem prior to movement to the target area.

(7) Problems: There is a need for a clearly defined relief area.

Solution: Two latrine screens for male and female will be located adjacent to the Hamlet Fair area and appropriately marked.

c. Miscellaneous.

(1) Problems: Vehicles loaded with perishable market goods were detained in the hamlet area resulted in spoilage.

Solution:

(a) After the hamlet area is sealed, all vehicles trying to enter the area should not be allowed to enter.

(b) Personnel with perishable goods on hand could be given priority to process through the 969 van and temporary ID card stations and allowed to depart the area.

(c) The District Chief did pay compensation for those items that spoiled during the day of the Hamlet Fair. He will continue to pay villagers for this spoilage.

(2) Problems: ARVN and US vehicles blocked the road along the Hamlet Fair area.

Solution: Parking area should be specified for ARVN and US vehicles and should be located away from the Hamlet Fair area. Only vehicles essential for the hamlet Fair operations will be allowed to remain in the area.

2. STATISTICAL SUMMARY:


(1) Total screened 294
(2) W Cadre captured 2
(3) ARVN deserters 3
(4) Tunnels 2

b. 969 Van Interviewed 420

c. MIRCAP 750

d. Materials Distributed.

(1) Rice (kilo) 1000
(2) Candy (cases) 8
(3) Milk (cans) 600

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1. Psychological Operations

   (1) Leaflets (total 76,000+969)
      (a) Airdropped in operation area 36,000.
      (b) Hand Distributed (including routes) 40,000.

   (2) Other printed material.
      (a) "Support ARVN" posters 500.
      (b) "Why your men are in the Army" 500.
      (c) "Why fight the VC" 300.
      (d) "Defeat the VC" booklet 300.
      (e) GVN song book 300.
      (f) Honolulu Conference 300.

   (3) Audio Communications.
      (a) Face to face: 2,000 people, continuous operations 8 hours 40 minutes, alternating 8 Payloc and entertainment units.
      (b) Loudspeaker ship: 5 hamlets in B, C areas OPLAN 10-66 2 hours, 20 minutes Curfew regulations.

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### Checklist for House Search

**House Number**

**Search Party Number**

1. House checked inside?  
   - Yes [ ]  
   - No [ ]

2. House checked outside?  
   - Yes [ ]  
   - No [ ]

3. Garage or storage area checked?  
   - Yes [ ]  
   - No [ ]

4. Outside wooded area checked?  
   - Yes [ ]  
   - No [ ]

5. Pro-Government in house or surrounding area?  
   - Yes [ ]  
   - No [ ]

6. Pro-Vo indications in house or surroundings?  
   - Yes [ ]  
   - No [ ]

7. Tunnels
   1. Depth of tunnel or cave?  
      - 0m [ ]  
      - 1m [ ]  
      - 2m [ ]  
      - 3m [ ]  
      - 4m or more [ ]
   2. Number of side passages?  
      - 1 [ ]  
      - 2 [ ]  
      - 3 [ ]  
      - More [ ]
   3. Checked?  
      - Yes [ ]  
      - No [ ]
   4. Requires Dog Team check?  
      - Yes [ ]  
      - No [ ]

8. Rice Pits or Water Barrels
   1. False bottoms checked?  
      - Yes [ ]  
      - No [ ]
   2. Requires mine-detector check?  
      - Yes [ ]  
      - No [ ]

9. Waterholes
   1. Number of waterholes checked?  
      - 0 [ ]  
      - 1 [ ]  
      - 2 [ ]  
      - 3 [ ]  
      - 4 [ ]
   2. All water-hole bottoms checked?  
      - Yes [ ]  
      - No [ ]
   3. Requires Mine-detector check?  
      - Yes [ ]  
      - No [ ]

---

**Follow-Up Check**

**Area Team Check**

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Read by [signature]
INCLOSURE 13

TAI PHUOC KHANH - OPERATION SUMMARY
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HEADQUARTERS
PHU LOI PACIFICATION TASK FORCE
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO US Forces 96345

11 June 1966

SUBJECT: TAN PHUOC KHANH Operation Summary

TO: See Distribution

1. GENERAL: The second major hamlet seal and search operation conducted by the Phu Loi Pacification Task Force centered on the Tan Phuoc Khanh hamlet complex, XT804168. Initial skepticism concerning the effectiveness of search operations was dispelled during the TF's first operation in Minh Kheam, XT809744. Combined US-ARVN planning for the second operation went extremely well, and at the decision briefing given to the commander, 5th ARVN Division and the 151st Inf Div, the combined task force was given all the support and forces required. As a consequence, the task organization expanded to include, in addition to 1/26 Inf, A/1/4th Cav (+) and 1st Inf Div MEDCAP and support troops, and the 2/7 Inf, 5th Recon Co, Paywar, Civic Action, and cultural teams, and the Division Band, all from 5th ARVN Division. In addition, numerous Binh Duong sector forces were committed to include: 202 RP Co; 205 RP Co; Platoon 775 RP Co; Sector Intel Platoon; National Police Platoon; 2P-Co Band; Chieu Hot Squad; Sector Cultural Team and the Province Youth and Agricultural Services. Six search dog teams were furnished by the III Corps Adv Gp. Two interrogation teams were furnished by NAUV. Task organization utilisation is depicted in appendix one.

2. SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS:

a. The operation commenced at 071530 June when elements of the 1/26 Inf (-), with attached A/1/4th Cav (+) and the 7th Co, 7th ARVN BPt, initiated movement to surround Tan Phuoc Khanh, XT804168. A, B and C 1/26 conducted airborne assaults into LB's north, east, and south of the target area, while the remaining elements moved by ground. The rapid movement to seal the village, accomplished by 2010 hours, 1 Jun 66, was essential in order to offset the loss of strategic surprise occasioned by the publicity given to the previous operation. In order to cut off possible VC escape routes north, a night airborne assault was conducted, landing A/1/26 Inf in blocking positions via XT885190 at 012200 June 1966.

b. At 020600 June the 2/7 Inf (-), ARVN entered Tan Phuoc Khanh hamlet complex, population approximately 9000, and established common lines dividing the hamlet into three sections, Binh Duong Province search forces followed, and after they had deployed throughout the village, all men ages 15-45 were assembled, with search force assistance, and moved to the National Police headquarters at Phu Duong for questioning. Of the total of 740 men screened, interim reports from the National Police show: 25-VU suspects, 9-deserters, 4 with false ID cards, 13-former VU (probation violation), and 62-draft dodgers. All the above are being detained at National Police headquarters.

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SUBJECT: TAM PHUOC KHEH Operation Summary 11 June 1966

a. After the men had departed the hamlet, internal cordon elements changed to divide the hamlet complex in half. All search forces (three companies (+)) were concentrated in the northern and eastern portion of the hamlet and the residents of this area were moved to the hamlet festival area. After search of the first half of the village had been completed search forces were redeployed to the western half of the hamlet where they searched until 1700 hours. The search forces - in conjunction with both internal and external cordon elements, were successful in apprehending an additional twenty-five (25) suspects, to include three women carrying medical supplies, and ten men hiding in haystacks and wooded areas. Two tunnels were found by attached scout dogs.

d. At 0203/30 June the Binh Duong Province Band sounded the start of the Hamlet Festival. Hamlet residents began arriving in the area by 0900 hours, and were greeted by members of the Binh Duong Revolutionary Development Cadre Team A. After the 5th ARVN Band played the Vietnamese National Anthem, cultural teams from 5th ARVN Division and province presented traditional dances and pantomimes. The Province Chief, Lt Col Ba, and District Chief, Capt Phuo, spoke to the people explaining the government’s program and urging them to the GVN cause. The Province Chief was present throughout the day, talking to elders, heads of households, and on one occasion taking over the Youth Services Session. Detailed layout and function of the Hamlet Festival are depicted in Appendix Three.

e. At the MEDCAP station 1,087 men, women and children were treated by medical and dental teams from Div Arty and 5th ARVN Division. 3600 meals of hotdogs, potato salad, and cold milk were served by Task Force elements - the people responded favorably to the change in their menu. The response to the agricultural team's demonstration of big mac wheat preparation was equally impressive. Six 699 interrogation tents were utilized. Of the 325 individuals interrogated, two were on the blacklist and turned over to National Police authorities. One of these was allegedly the VC village secretary. Also of note is the fact that a sketch of Huu Loi was found on the body of one VC KIA. The majority of the persons questioned in 969 facilities were cooperative and in numerous cases information concerning VC tax collection, guerrillas, and cadre was offered. This information will be exploited. In the late afternoon, VNAH representatives showed movies to a sizable collection of adults and children. The Hamlet Festival was concluded at 1700 hours by the 1st Infantry Division Band marching through the town. After search forces had completed their assigned sectors in the eastern half of the hamlet they moved to the western portion of the hamlet where they searched until 1700 hours. By 1730 all elements of the Hamlet Festival, and three elements of search forces, the 2/7 Inf Co, 5th ARVN Division and three elements of 5th ARVN Division had completed their search areas. Tents remaining in the Hamlet Festival were secured by the 2/7 Inf the Task Force OP area was secured by the Sector Intell Platoon.

f. During the night of 2 June the 1/26 Inf (+) continued to seal the village area. The following morning search forces re-entered Tam Phuoc Kheh at 0615 hours and deployed throughout the western portion of the hamlet to once again search that area while residents from that half of the village assembled for the second day of the Hamlet Festival. The search showed remarkable success - during the day 48 VNS were located in various hiding places throughout the village, from haystacks and tunnels to woodpiles and watch towers.

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SUBJECT: TAM PHUOC KHANH Operation Summary 11 June 1966

The cooperation of the villagers in assisting search forces was heartening. At the mobile interrogation facility, one individual volunteered information concerning a VC hiding in a pottery factory, as a consequence, National Police were successful in apprehending 10 VC. Another village indicated that 4 VC hiding near their house and search teams were able to capture the men. VC captured included two female nurses, one intelligence specialist, two finance and economy cadre, and one cell leader.

g. By the end of two days, activities of the hamlet festival elements had succeeded in softening and changing the attitudes of individuals hostile to the government. Over 2000 people had gone through either the 1/526/F or dental facility, a two day total of 6000 meals had been served, and 1200 bags of rice had been distributed. The cadre team was extremely effective in controlling the movement of people within the area as well as influencing their attitudes. By introducing the teams via the hamlet festival, the transition from primarily a military presence to the civilian aspects of revolutionary development was facilitated. Late in the afternoon, the Provost Chief stopped the festival in order to show the people a number of captured VC and weapons. The psychological impact of this presentation was impressive.

h. By the close of the second day of searching through Tam Phuoc Khanh, there was still a substantial amount of intelligence relating to VC yet hiding in the village, which had not been exploited. As a consequence, it was decided to extend the operation further. At 0400 June search forces consisting of an RF company, an intelligence platoon, and a National Police platoon returned to the hamlet to conduct searches in select locations. A total of 19 persons to include 2 females, were apprehended in the village area. One VC suspect was brought to the RF BN by villagers who found him hiding in a wooden area. A confirmed VC led an intelligence platoon to a VC weapons cache consisting of one US M-1 Carbine, one GH.IOM Carbine, 35 rounds of .30 cal ammunition, web equipment, and VC tax collection statistics.

i. During the third day of operations, 4 June, a total of 92 civilians were screamed within the 969 interrogation tents. One woman who had volunteered information leading to the apprehension of a VC suspect hiding in a coffin was given 200 VN. All villagers appeared to be very cooperative and sincere about their answers. Very few men volunteered to furnish information in order to obtain a sack of rice and the women questioned generally did not know information concerning VC installations. Many women did, however, furnish numerous names of VC sympathizers in the Tam Phuoc Khanh area. These names were added to existing "blacklists".

j. As the day's operation closed, it was evident that the civilian population truly wanted to assist friendly units securing their village. Many individuals spoke of VC harassing tactics in the village and stated that, if they had sufficient security, many more people would come to live there.
transport to the National Police Headquarters at Phu Cau and, once the women and children had left their dwellings for the hamlet festival area, commenced searching of the area. The search was completed by 1200 hours, and from the meagre results, it was clear that the Viet Cong living in the area had departed while the Task Force was operating in Tan Phuoc Khanh proper. A number of women questioned at the 969 tents indicated that small groups of VC (2-3) had passed through the village headed north when Tan Phuoc Khanh was surrounded.

1. The Tan Phuoc Khanh operation was concluded at 1700 hours on 5 June when the last elements of search and hamlet festival forces had cleared the area. As the results cited above and the statistics noted in Appendix Two indicate, the operation was a significant success. A VC review of the operation estimated a 50% loss to their capability and a two month period required for recuperation.

3. CONCLUSION:
   a. Varying the time for surrounding the village area enabled the Task Force to gain tactical surprise.
   b. Internal cordon forces as used in this operation must be closely supervised to be effective. There was a tendency for internal cordon elements to permit flow of traffic and women between the two halves of the village.
   c. Search forces must be carefully instructed on their duties. A number of search teams performed their assigned tasks in an exemplary manner; others however forgot flashlights and search checklists and did not report the locations of houses in which VC were found. With the prolonged search period of three days, this disadvantage was overcome.
   d. Interrogation of the VC within the Task Force CP location often was hampered by unauthorized spectators and occasionally by improper techniques. Prisoners were not isolated from their cohorts when interrogated, and in addition, the flow of information between the National Police HQ's, the 969 vans, and the IPW area was not as rapid as is desirable.
   e. The recording and display of information within the Task Forces and search headquarters lagged the actual operation considerably. Though this did not hamper the execution of plans, it did cause delay in the changing of instructions. Closer coordination within the combined staff should overcome this difficulty.
   f. Introduction of the cadre to the people via the hamlet festival facilitates the transition from a primarily military presence to the civilian aspects of the pacification program.
   g. Displaying VC weapons and captives at the Hamlet Festival is an effective psychological technique for alienating the Viet Cong from the populace.

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SUBJECT: TAN PHUOC KHANH Operation Summary
11 June 66

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Appendices:
One - Utilisation of Task Organisation
Two - Results
Three - Hamlet Festival

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"A TRUE COPY"

WILLIAM L. FORDER, JR.
Major, Artillery

13 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Gov't)
### Appendix One (Task Organization Utilization) To Tan Phuoc Khanh

**Operation Summary**

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**Operations Report—Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Con’t)**

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Appendix Two (Statistical Summary) to Tan Phuoc Khiem Operation Summary

The following totals have been obtained during the Tan Phuoc Khiem area operations from 011900 June 1966 to 051400 June 1966:

1. Personnel Statistics

- WO XIA-2
- WV 85-4
- WV-19
- WV-69
- Deserters-21
- False ID’s-4
- Draft Dodgers-118
- Foreign VC (Probation Violation)-13
- Allied XIA-0
- Allied WIA-9

2. Enemy Equipment and Material Losses

- 3 Carbines
  - 1 Russian Rifle
  - 1 .45 Cal Revolver US Double Action
- 10 Grenades 7 US/2 CHINO/1 Home made
- 24 Rds .30 Cal Ammo
- 2 Russian Stocks
- 4 Magazines w/.30 & .45 Cal M11
- 6 M40 Pouches
- 6 Dry Batteries, Electrical Pans and Wiring
- Military Supplies
- 2 Web Belts w/Tent stakes

Documents: Sketches of Div Art, Phu Loi, Minh Duong

indicating important installations,
- WO tax collection receipts,
- False ARM discharger paper (issued by WO to a Guerrilla)
- Sketches of US Signal equipment, FRC-6, FRC-9, and wire reel
- Propaganda booklets.

3. Hamlet Festival

- Teeth pulled-107 (2 days)
- XECLAP-2403 (2 days)
- Meals Served-6400 (2 days)
- Bags of Rice (2-kilo)-1388 (3 days)

Entertainment:
- EP-JP Band-3 days
- V19 Combo-3 days
- Province Cultural Teams-3 days
- 5th ARM Band-1 day
- 1st Inf Div Band-1 day
- 9th ARM Cultural Teams-1 day
- Youth Service Team-3 days

Agricultural Service Demonstrations-2 days-300 samples
- Ondra Teem-2 days

Leaflets:

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Ind 13 Operational capture losses: 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Omm’d)
Appendix Three (Hamlet Festival Operation) to Tan Phuco Xanh Operations Summary

I. HAMLET FESTIVAL ORGANIZATION

A. Organization of Hamlet Festival Activities

1. 969 - ID (Request for information and district issuance of special passes) stations are used in conjunction with each other. As civilians are required to process through the ID station this enables the intelligence people to choose those they wish to question. It is advisable to locate this station away from noisy activities such as the entertainment area. Since the civilians are apt to crowd this area to receive passes while engineer tape is used to block off the area and funnel them into the stations. One GP medium is sufficient for the ID teams while one small hex tent suffices for each interrogation team. Approximately 5 minutes are allowed for each interview.

2. MEDFP Stations: This area is best located near the 969-ID station as civilians tend to congregate there. Medical teams should be adequate to handle 40% to 50% of the population. For high impact value include a dentist. One GP medium tent can handle 4 MEDFP teams with supplies. A wash facility is set at the rear outside the tent. Each team includes a doctor, specialist, and interpreter. Follow-up visits to the same hamlet after one or two days are a must.

3. Entertainment activities: This station attracts much attention continually thus it is imperative that it is run smoothly. A stage and platform trailer is used as a stage. Stairs and a public address system must be provided. Also, a cover for the stage is necessary for protection from the sun and rain. If possible stagger the arrival of the entertainment teams and pre-schedule their performances to alleviate initial confusion. This area is good for color. Street banners depicting SWH revolutionary themes and have all speeches by Vietnamese officials conducted here.

4. Youth Service activity: This service is a function of the district and necessary to entertain and control the children at the festival. Games, singing and a candy hand-out are their primary capabilities. One GP medium for shelter is adequate. Movies provided by the Vietnamese Information Service and US military will help them control the children.

5. Vietnamese Information Service: This service is involved in a multitude of activities. They provide two entertainment groups; a jazz combo and a cultural team. Their speakers are used in conjunction with the US public address system in the entertainment area and they provide the equipment for movies. A GP medium is adequate for the movies. This service also gives miscellaneous pamphlets and magazines for distribution.

6. Vietnamese Agricultural Service: This service can provide information to the elders about farming. This is an invaluable service as the villagers are most interested in knowing how SWH can help them in this area. As bulgar wheat is a food commodity not necessarily liked by most individuals; this team cooks bulgar over an open fire and distributes samples.

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7. PayWar/CA Teams: The initial ordaining stage requires crowd control. The Vietnamese teams work well here. At the beginning of the search phase they return to the Hamlet Festival for crowd control and to single with the crowd to discuss GVN opportunities. The CA team is used initially to guide and control the civilians entering the festival area. During the festival they mingle with the crowd to find out what the people want and need and help the youth service control the children. They are helpful in handing out clothes, etc., to the civilians.

8. Internal Control Cadres: Groups used in this function have been the RP-PF Revolutionary Development cadre and PayWar/CA teams. All have done a tremendous job, but the same group should be used continuously to prevent initial confusion as to their duties. Where is a need for ushering the civilians from the assembly area to the festival, giving them at the entrance, helping them find the various activities, providing control of various activities and serving luncheon lines.

9. Reception Center: A small tent is used for a control center to greet VIP personnel and to solve problems that arise in the festival area. A radio or telephone is located here.

10. Shelter Tents: An adequate number of tents should be provided for the population to protect them from the sun and rain. This feature helps control as it demonstrates interest in their welfare and keeps them at the festival. Tents also provide a good atmosphere for small discussion groups.

II. FUNCTIONING OF HAMLET FESTIVAL

Interest displayed by the Task Force's combined staff helped Hamlet Festival operations in Tan Phuoc Khean and Tan Phuoc to become a significant success. Ample planning time and continuous coordination resulted in smooth assembly and deployment of the large Festival Task Force. Movement from the assembly area to the Hamlet Festival area was controlled by members of the 5th ARVN Division PayOps team. At the entrance the civilians were greeted by members of the Revolutionary Development cadre and then assembled at the entertainment area where the RP-PF Provincial band was playing. The district chief explained the reasons for our presence and the opportunities GVN would bring to them. Next, the sector 3-5 spoke explaining the Hamlet Festival and its activities. Cadre members then separated the gathering into groups taking them to the various activities. Entertainment continued throughout the day. The 1st Infantry Division Band played, ending their program by marching through the hamlet streets. Other entertainment groups included the Provincial RP-PF Band, cultural teams and VNTS jazz combos. 5th ARVN Division provided their band and cultural teams. Medical aid to include dental service for civilians and RP-PF families was given by elements of the 1st Inf Div Army and 5th ARVN medical teams. For the enjoyment of everyone the Vietnamese Information Service provided Western and Cultural movies for adults and children. The Vietnamese Youth Service organised the Hamlet children into singing troops and various ball games. In one instance the Provincial Chief played ball with the children, to the delight of everyone. After cooking bulgar wheat over an open fire the Vietnamese Agricultural Service served samples to the hamlet population. As this commodity is sometimes discarded by the Vietnamese as an unfavorable food this helped convince them that when prepared properly it can be an appelling dish. A "969" Volunteer Information Service interviewed many civilians in an attempt to gather Viet Cong intelligence. A 2-kg bag of captured WC rice was given to all those interviewed.

inc: 22 "confidential" Report-Loosene's Learning, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Conf)
Results of this service can be found in the S-2/3 portion of this report. Coupled with the above activity the Province National Police ran an identification check and issued temporary passes for civilian control. At noon a luncheon consisting of hot dogs, potato salad or rice, milk, juice and all the extras was served to the people. Even though the people commented about the unusual and strong taste of the food they all returned for seconds and thirds. Mingling with the crowd throughout the day were elements of the 5th ARVN and Binh Dong province Paywar teams. They formed small discussion groups relating the facts of GVN opportunities. Many villagers were found to have little knowledge of the government of South Vietnam. During all Hamlet Festivals shelter is provided for the population. Without shelter from the sun or rain many women with small children and the elderly desire to return home. Since apprehensions run high with the 15-45 year old age group of men gone every consideration is given to the families remaining. As this demonstrates interest in their welfare this is a step in convincing the people that GVN can meet their needs.

III. SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Suggestions: More Hamlet Festival activities will bring more GVN opportunities to the people and establish greater rapport for their return.

Recommendation: More activities such as the Vietnamese Educational Service, Agricultural Service, NACO and Veterinarian Services should be called upon to place displays at the Hamlet Festival.

B. Suggestions: There is a need for extensive internal control. Someone is needed to lead the people from the assembly area to the festival, greet them when they enter and show them the various activities. The people would serve in the mess lines and station themselves at different activities to guide the civilians.

Recommendation: A special team consisting of Vietnamese personnel should be organized at Province level for use at the Hamlet Festival for internal control.

C. Suggestions: In that some villagers are ignorant of GVN activity around them and others fully aware of it we would gain psychological advantage by showing what we find.

Recommendation: Prepare a weapons and equipment display for the people. The display would consist of things found in and around the village. Captured personnel could also be displayed by the Province or District Chief.
B. Schematic of Festival Operations

* O Indicates Water Points

End of Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Conf)
INCLOSURE 14

PHOTOS OF CAPTURED WEAPONS
INCLOSURE 15

NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF LOC NINH PLANTATION
Resume of Battle of LOC MINH RUBBER PLANTATION

The Battle of the Lao Ninh Rubber Plantation was conducted under the canopy of the gently rolling Lao Ninh Rubber Plantation two kilometers west and north-south of Lao Ninh, coord X715097. Vegetation under the 60 ft. rubber trees was negligible. Weather for the operation was fair with the exception of heavy ground fog in the early morning. The fog delayed the heliborne portion of the operation from 0630H until 0815H when the fog dissipated sufficiently to allow the supplies helicopters to make their lift of one CIDG platoon and one platoon from A Co into the 12Z via coord X702112. Touchdown was 1108JUN 66 following a five minute gunship preparation in the area.

The ground blocking elements, two platoons from A Co, departed the Lao Ninh area at 0715H along Route Red and Route Blue, respectively. At 0735H these elements reported receiving S/A fire from approximately one platoon of VC via coord X701093. A Co's 81M mortars were fired into the area with unknown results. In the same area, at 0900H, the blocking elements had three wounded by S/A fire from the VC positions at the top of Hill 150. The 81M mortars from A Co were again called on the hilltop. Following the mortar barrage the two blocking platoons moved into positions to the south and east of the VC locations on Hill 150, via coord X715097.

The heliborne elements after their initial landing, headed south toward their original objective of the Village Nr. 10 complex, centered at X710100. At 0845H the blocking elements reported receiving S/A fire from one bunker at via coord X717095. A Co's 81M mortars were fired into the area with unknown results. In the same area, at 0910H, the blocking elements had three wounded by S/A fire from the VC positions at the top of Hill 150. The 81M mortars from A Co were again called on the hilltop. Following the mortar barrage the two blocking platoons moved into positions to the south and east of the VC locations on Hill 150, via coord X715097.

Due to the intensity of the fighting C Co was alerted at 0910H to be prepared to move on foot to assist A Co. At 0940H C Co was ordered to move in support of the elements around Hill 150. By 1030H A and G Co had linked up, G Co moving around toward coord X715097. As C Co moved to effect tie in, A Co indicated that VC were moving to the NW toward Hill 177, via coord X727111. C Co was then ordered by the Battalion Commander to move north to intercept and attack the VC in that vicinity.

Upon approaching coord X720104 C Co ran into intense ground fire from at least one VC company firmly entrenched in bunkers with overhead cover in the vic of Hill 177. Artillery and 4.2 mortars fire was called on the VC positions and to the north to prevent the VC from counterfire. At 1200H C Co requested gunship resupply and further assistance to maneuver against the enemy force. At least two 155M and two helicopter loads of ammunition were air dropped to C Co's front lines. The room platoon was immediately
dispacted on foot from Loc Ninh with still additional ammunition and a mission of aiding the G Co attacking elements south of Hill 177.

The Recon element moved to A Co's CP location, via coord XU120092 and then proceeded north to assist G Co, killing three VC snipers along the way. At 1330H Recon and G Co linked up with Recon being placed on G Co left flank via coord XU17104. In preparation for an assault, more artillery was fired on the VC positions around Hill 177. The attack commenced at 1425H with G Co on line east to west and the Recon Platoon pinching in on VC trenches from the west along a ridgeline running north via coord XU171513.

At this point the VC concentrated their fire on Recon and G Co platoon on the left, hurling grenades and firing 81mm from the treets. Simultaneously, the VC began hitting the Recon Platoon's left flank with intensified 81mm and 88mm fire. The Recon in turn attempted to fall back to prevent the VC enveloping movement. While in the process of accomplishing this maneuver, the VC moved a machinegun into a trench occupied by the remaining Recon elements, resulting in the VC overrunning the positions. G Co immediately countered with its reserve platoon, eliminating the VC resistance, pushing the enemy off Hill 177 into the artillery volleys to the north and northwest, terminating this portion of the battle at around 111515H Jun 66.

Meanwhile, in the A Co area to the south, consecutive assaults from the north, south, and west failed to dislodge the VC from their entrenched positions. A CIDG company moving west on patrol was diverted into a blocking position via coord XU 700000. A Company's rim mortars continued to pound the VC positions, but to no apparent avail. The BN Commander then decided to commit his final reserve, B Co., at 1430H, at the same time moving the CIDG company east to XU173090 into a more advantageous blocking and maneuvering location.

When B Co linked up with A Co at 1500H the A Co elements were repositioned to allow the artillery to fire a preparation all along Hill 150 prior to an assault by B Co. In the meantime the CIDG platoon attached to A Co and positioned via coord XU174093 retreated to the south after their interpreter had been killed by the VC, thus creating a gap in the A Co lines on the south. The SF advisor then joined A Co until the battle ended.

Following a sixteen volley artillery bombardment B Co assaulted Hill 150 at 1630H, completely overrunning the VC positions. The VC fled to the south and ran into a heavy volume of fire from the CIDG blocking force, causing the VC to scatter SW in complete disorganization.

After the final assault, consolidations were made in the Battalion Zone of Action. Casualties were then evacuated, ammunition resupply was effected, and the battlefield was policed of VC bodies and equipment with a thorough search of the entire area. The BN then moved on foot back to base camp location around the Loc Ninh airstrip, final elements closing at 111910H Jun 66.

1. Casualty Figures:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>98 (VC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>1 (Captured)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

15-2
The enemy force was estimated to be from two to three main
forces VC companies. Because of the nature of resistance
this estimation was never apparent until approximately
1200hrs.

2. Enemy Equipment Captured:
   a. 60mm mortar – 1 ea complete w/ammonition
   b. SKS Russian Carbine – 1 ea
   c. Panzerfaust – 1 ea w/ammonition
   d. M-42 Machinegun – 1 ea
   e. VC Webgear
   f. VC medical Supply
   g. Numerous grenades, mines and S/A ammunition

3. Ammunition Expended:
   a. 81mm mortars – 400 HE, 14 Ill.
   b. 4.2” mortars – 95 HE, 5 WP
   c. 105mm Arty – 1143 HS
   d. Small Arms – Two basic loads

4. Air Sorties Flown:
   Air was used to block VC route of escape to the west side
   of the battle area. Sixteen sorties were flown by P-100’s,
   P-40’s and Navy AVH aircraft. Ordnance expended as follows:
   CBUs, Napalm, 250 lb. fragmentation bombs, 20mm cannon.

3 incl
1 RETURN OVERLAY
2 F filing ORDER
3 OPERATION OVERLAY

*A TRUE COPY*

WILLIAM J. POMMER JR
Major, Artillery

15-3

/’s/Kyle W Bowie
/’s/LTLE W. BOWIE
Lt Col. Inf
Commanding
FRCQ ORDER (OPERATION BL.PASO II)

REFERENCE: MAP, SOUTH VIETNAM; 1:50,000 LOC NINH 6346 IV; LOC TIIEM 6346 III.

1. MISSION: A Co w/1 platoon CIDG conducts search of Village Nr. 10, Loc Ninh Rubber Plantation, via coord XU7209, to clear area of local VC.

2. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of operation: A Co (-) w/CIDG platoon attached, at 110600H commences move by foot and UH-1D helicopter to surround Village Nr. 10 and clear it of VC and VC sympathizers.
   b. A Co: At 0630H two platoons follow Route Red and Route Blue to blocking positions east and south of Village Nr. 10. At 0630H one platoon from A Co w/one platoon of CIDG helilifted to LZ XU7011/2, move south, conduct search and clear of VC in Village Nr. 10.
   c. B Co: Be prepared to reinforce A Co on 20 min. alert.
   d. C Co: Be prepared to reinforce A Co on 5 min. alert.
   e. Heavy Mortar GS, priority to A Co.
   f. Recon: Reinforce on call.
   g. After Action support on call.
   h. Coord. Instructions:
      (1) A Co send one man to maintain constant coordination with CIDG.
      (2) Gunship prep of LZ five minutes prior to landing.
      (3) VC and VCUS evacuated to Loc Ninh on foot.
      (4) Evacuate casualties to rear on foot if possible. Dustoff on call. Dustoff freq: 45.
      (5) FAC freq: 43.6

ACKNOWLEDGE:

BOWIE
Lt Col

ANNEX: A

DISTRIBUTION: B

OFFICIAL:

Regarded to FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY upon execution. RDAI-1357/121
upon completion.

Opinion: "Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div.

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INCLOSURE 16

NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF SHOK DONG AND HO XRIGOU

/26
NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF SHOK DONG 9 AUG 1966
30 JUN 1966

INTRODUCTION (U)

The 271st Viet Cong Main Force Regiment was defeated on 30 June 1966, near the village of SHOK DONG in one of the classic engagements of the Vietnam conflict. In continuing their efforts to repel the 1st Infantry Division from the US PAGO II area of operations, the VC attempted to ambush Troops B and C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry and Company G, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry. As a consequence, the 271st Regiment suffered heavy losses and was soundly defeated.

BACKGROUND (U)

Operation US PAGO II commenced on 2 June 1966 when intelligence indicated that three Viet Cong and one North Vietnamese regiment were poised to resume their "Monsoon Campaign" by attacking USN and U.S. Special Forces compounds in MINH THanh, MINH Quan, LOC Minh, and BEO BE. Because of this threat, Commanding General, II Field Force, Vietnam, directed one infantry and one artillery battalion be deployed to LOC Minh to strengthen the defenses in this area. Subsequently, additional elements were deployed by 4th Field Artillery to LOC Minh until by mid-June the majority of the division was operating throughout MINH Long and PHUC Long Provinces. 1st Infantry Division troop dispositions as of 300000 June are indicated on attached Map 1. Two significant engagements had been fought with the VC prior to 30 June. On 8 June, Troop A (1-13), 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry had spotted an ambush on Route 13, set by the 272d VC Main Force Regiment while passing through TAU GO, an area between CHOM THANH and MINH Quan. Then the 4-hour engagement ended, the VC had lost 105 KIA and an additional 250 probably killed. The second significant engagement involved elements of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry and 3d Cavalry in the Battle of LOC Minh Plantation on 11 June 1966. One battalion of the 272d Main Force Regiment was employed in trenches and heavily fortified bunkers but after massive artillery and mortar fire strikes, the positions were overrun. VC losses were 89 KIA (30) and 150 KIA (Probable).

For about two weeks the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry with the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-) had the mission of securing the division base at PHAN LOI and the MINH Quan airfield. From 8 June, the cavalry squadron had been performing reconnaissance to the east, south, southwest and to the north limited by the destroyed bridge on Route 13 at XT 122973. In coordination with ARVN forces the banks of the stream were prepared to permit employment of an armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) just to the left of the one that had been damaged. An operation was planned in conjunction with the employment of AVLBs to commence on 30 June. The squadron plan was submitted to Lt Col Herbert Moiryst, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, and was approved for operations in the area indicated on maps 2 and 3. The mission assigned to Lt Col Leonard Levent, Commanding Officer, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, was basically threefold. First the squadron (-) was to cross Check Point GOLDEN GATE (AVLB) and proceed north along Route 13 conducting a reconnaissance in force. Troop A was to operate in area of operation 800 EAST while B Troop would initially operate in FOOTBALL and later in TERMIN. Second, B Troop, in conjunction with operations in TERMIN, would escort an engineer scoop loader from LOC Minh to Check Point GOLDEN GATE. Third, the operation was to deceive the enemy as to the actual area in which the division was planning to operate in the near future. Both troops were to close back into MINH Quan by 1330 on 30 June.

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DEQ MSN 5900.10

CONFIDENTIAL
Troop B would have one platoon of C Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry attached, while the remainder of C Company would move with C Troop. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry maintained B Company on alert as the rapid reaction force. With final planning completed, the operation would begin on 30 June.

The vegetation in the area of the contact is wooded on both sides of the road. The only open areas are rice paddies, some stream lines, and small lakes. Even here, there is adequate concealment due to the chest-high grass. There are heavily forested areas as indicated on map 3 and the sketch maps, with the trees 150 -200 feet high. Although movement in the grass is difficult to observe from the ground, it can be observed from the air except where the terrain is heavily forested. The chest-high grass comes up to the shoulders of the road. The weather at the time of contact was clear and hot.

THE BATTLE OF SHOK DONG (U)

On 30 June, Troop B, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, with attached 1st Platoon, C Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry and AVLB section departed the squadron perimeter at Hon Quan enroute to Check Point GOLDEN GATE. The column was located at the bridge site by 0659 hours. Troop C was to depart Hon Quan at 0710 with C Company (-). However, this column was delayed until Troop C could reconnoitre after the search operation conducted until 2400 hours the previous night. At 0910, the column crossed GOLDEN GATE with B Troop leading and proceeded north on Route 13 to the operational areas specified in the order. Upon arrival at Check Point 1, the 3d Platoon with the platoon of infantry turned east and conducted a reconnaissance to the ford at Check Point 2. Due to the depth of the ford, the platoon retraced the route to Check Point 1, turned north on Route 13, passed through the 1st Platoon, and continued north. Order of march was now 3d Platoon with attached infantry, Troop Command Group, 2d Platoon, and 1st Platoon.

Troop C turned west at Check Point 1 and proceeded to the first stream. Three mortar carriers, ten infantry-man, and the 3d Platoon remained at Check Point 1 and established a perimeter. The mortars were laid west to support the troop. As C Troop moved west, they clanked the road on both sides. After crossing the stream, the infantry dismounted and deployed.

At about 0930 hours when the lead personnel carrier of B Troop, moving north on Route 13 toward LOG KHEII, reached a point about midway across the rice paddy (sketch map 1), it began receiving mortar, small arms and recoilless rifle fire and appeared to be the only one engaged. 1st Lieutenant James P. Flores, B Troop Commander, could see the mortar rounds bursting from his position in the column about 100 meters to the rear of the lead vehicle. He immediately called Col Lawman, who was over the area in an OH-13 helicopter. The 3d Platoon then reported receiving heavy fire from the north and northwest. A preplanned airstrike was currently in progress vicinity XZ 7493, which Col Lawman diverted to XZ 721018 at Lt Flores' request. Lt Flores then called the 2d Platoon forward and deployed them around the 3d Platoon. The 2d Platoon brought their two tanks and one from the 1st Platoon forward. By this time all but one tank and a personnel carrier of the 3d Platoon had returned to Check Point 1 with wounded and to replenish ammunition. All platoons were now in contact on both sides of the road, with the heaviest volume of fire coming from the west.
The Viet Cong had set up an ambush in the shape of an "L", with a heavy security element crossing the road along the trail north of the paddy. The logs piled at mador to the east of Check Point 1 afforded good protection and some of the recoilless rifles were probably located here. Mortars were reported by a forward air controller in the woods to the north of the village. The ambush extended for about 2000 meters, but with the exception of a security element to the northeast of Check Point 1, the eastern side of the road was lightly defended. The VC appeared to be lined up all along the west side of the road with the heavy weapons about 150 meters from the road in the heaviest vegetation. The VC were wearing a variety of khaki, black, and green uniforms. One strong point had been established by the VC in vicinity XU 722007. The recoilless rifles caused the most trouble, and were also the most difficult to locate. During the first 30 minutes of the contact, the enemy concentrated on knocking out the tanks. All four B Troop tanks were disabled from hits on the tank commander's cupola and subsequent wounding of the crew.

The 1st Platoon of B Troop was carrying the wounded to GOLDEN GATE with an intermediate aid station set up at Check Point 1. They also helped with the establishment of a strong point at Check Point 1. Because the incoming fire at Check Point 1 was so intense, Dust Off aircraft could not land so the squadron S-5 set up the Dust Off L5 at GOLDEN GATE and wounded were collected at Check Point 1 and then moved south.

Troop B concentrated on laying down a heavy base of fire to the west. Airstrikes, which had been continuous from the initial strike, were being placed to the north and west. Artillery was attacking targets on the east of Route 13 and armed OH-13s and OH-17s were making firing passes north and south on the areas immediately adjacent to the road. When the 1st Platoon reported receiving fire at Check Point 1, it appeared to Lt Flores that the VC were attempting to cut him off from Check Point 1. An airstrike was immediately called in and the fire slackened at this location. The remaining elements at the head of the column were still receiving heavy fire from all types of weapons and Lt Flores called requesting C Troop come up and help.

When the first contact was reported, Captain Stephen Slattery, C Troop Commander, ordered the infantry to mount up and prepare to move back to Check Point 1, establish a strong point, and be prepared to assist B Troop. The 3d Platoon had been receiving some light fire at Check Point 1, but when the other platoons arrived at this location, the fire became more intense. Several of the infantry riding on the personnel carriers were hit as mortar rounds started falling into the area. Capt Slattery ordered the platoons to deploy and push out the perimeter, primarily to the north. The 3d Platoon was operating northwest of the crossroads, 1st Platoon east, and 2d Platoon west and southwest. The mortars had been re-laid to fire to the north. Check Point 1 was becoming very jammed with C Troop maneuvering and vehicles returning with B Troop wounded. Check Point 1 continued to receive heavy small arms fire with most of it coming from west of the road. Mortar and recoilless fire was being answered with a heavy volume of .50 caliber fire from the personnel carriers at the road junction. Col Levene called and ordered C Troop to push north and relieve the pressure on B Troop. The 3d Platoon was finally able to start moving north with the tank from 2d Platoon. About 200 meters from Check Point 1, the tank was hit in the turret and the commander, Sergeant Allison, and the loader were seriously wounded. They were pulled from the tank and evacuated. The tank continued north. The
C Troop column consisted of the 2d Platoon, 1st Platoon, and Troop Command Group (sketch 2.1). The 3d Platoon, C Company (-), and mortars remained at the crossroads. Intense fire was received all the way to B Troop's position, but a heavy base of fire was maintained by the personnel carriers and the tank. The brush was so thick and close on both sides of the road, grenades were just tossed over the sides of the vehicles. About 600 meters after the first hit, the tank was hit again, but the driver kept going even though the gunner, Sergeant Riddle was wounded and evacuated. When the Troop C column arrived at the tail of the B Troop position, Lt Flores said to go farther north and fire to the west. The 1st and 2d Platoons moved up and deployed as best as they could since they were confined to the area immediately left and right of the road. Fire was directed east and west with the heaviest volume to the west. Col Lewane ordered C Troop to hold at this point until B Troop could be extracted and move south. The C Troop tank went almost to the 01 grid line before it turned around and came back. Three men from the 2d Platoon joined Sergeant Wilson in the tank and although power to the turret was gone, they succeeded in getting the gun bearing to the north and northwest. Sixty rounds were fired before the ammunition was exhausted. The tank was then moved along side a disabled B Troop tank and the ammunition transferred. WC could be seen jumping across the road to be withdrawing. Artillery was firing north and east and airstrikes were being concentrated on the west, but appeared to be too far west. Captain Slattery asked Col Lewane to move them in closer and the next strike came in to north with CEB which landed very close to the road.

With the arrival of C Troop, Lt Flores pulled all the remaining elements of B Troop back to Check Point 1, to regroup, rearm, and establish a block along the road west from Check Point 1. When the first lifts of A Company, 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry were approaching the LS, Lt Flores pulled back. Troop B remained at Check Point 1 for about 40 minutes to rearm and get the wounded and dead back to COLUM. The next 30 minutes were taken to move the 1st and 2d Platoons down the road to block. The 3d Platoon handled the evacuation of wounded (sketch map 3).

Lieutenant Charles D Cole with the 3d Platoon of C Troop had been handing casualties between the forward elements and COLUM. He loaded C Company on the personnel carriers and moved to the head of the column. After the infantry were dropped, the 3d Platoon deployed west of the road while the 2d Platoon moved off to the east in an attempt to push the WC out onto the LS (sketch map 4). Lt Cole's platoon hit a WC strong point. He was hit in the chest and several others were wounded before they could pull back. The mechanized flame thrower with Lieutenant John K Lyon's 1st Platoon assisted in the extraction of 3d Platoon. As the infantry began to land on LS 2 and C Company began to deploy, the fire slackened. Fire from the personnel carriers was directed more to the west. The WC started withdrawing and many were killed as they jumped to run through the high grass.

After a delay of about 30 minutes caused by enemy fire received from both sides of the road, B Troop was occupying their blocking position. Initially, the head of the column halted just west of the stream until information was received that a reinforced ARVN APC troop would assist. The block was then extended to about the WC H-B grid line. From the blocking position, WC could be seen withdrawing along the trail that parallels the road and were taken under fire.
Troop C established a perimeter along Route 13 until the infantry started making the sweep. By 1530 contact along the road had practically ceased and the personnel moved into the brush to search for dead and wounded VC and weapons. The 3d Platoon, B Troop, returned to the blocking position with the Aero Rifle Platoon of D Troop. By 1700 movement had ceased and the two troops remained in position the remainder of the day.

REACIION (U)

For a week prior to 30 June 1966, B Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry had been maintained on a 30 minute alert as a rapid reaction force and was in this posture at the time B Troop made contact. When it became obvious that both troops and the attached rifle company were heavily engaged, B Company was alerted for probable deployment. Two questions had to be answered first: how they would be employed and by what means of transportation. All helicopters were fully committed on other missions. Twelve 3/4 ton trucks were collected from the various units in the vicinity of the battalion command post at QUAN LOI, and B Company was prepared to move prior to their arrival. At 1026 hours the helicopters supporting the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry in the Song BE area were diverted to QUAN LOI, but by 1040 hours had not arrived. Company B departed by vehicle for the squadron command post at Binh QUAN, and at 1105 passed to control of Col Lowane.

Between 1015 and 1020 hours, A Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was alerted, pulled off the perimeter, and instructed to be on the airfield in the event helicopters became available. Company A was assembled on the airfield by 1100 hours. General DePuy called Col Mochrystal to the division command post about 1040 hours to be briefed on what had happened in his battalion. General DePuy made the decision to divert 12 helicopters from Song BE. All helicopters closed the QUAN LOI airfield at 1130 hours. Col Lowane was informed of the current status of Companies A and B and asked where and how he wished to deploy them. A command and control helicopter arrived for Col Mochrystal and he and the battalion S-3 went forward for reconnaissance.

Col Lowane had selected two landing zones; LZ 1 in the rice paddy on the east of Route 13 (XU 727012) and LZ 2 across the road. He decided on the latter with the direction of attack south. At 1145, Col Lowane informed that the first lift of A Company was loaded. The company commander was briefed that he would land on LZ 2; he should operate his radio on the squadron frequency, and he was under control of the squadron commander. The LZ was prepared by air strikes and artillery. It was marked with smoke from Col Mochrystal’s aircraft. A Company closed in two lifts.

Company B proceeded north on Route 13 toward CP GOLDEN GATE. Upon arrival at that location, the company would be moved into the battle area by helicopters or personal carriers. Major Taylor landed at the bridge and discovered there were a number of wounded requiring evacuation by Dust Off helicopters and the pick-up zone would become too congested with assault helicopters landing there also. An alternate pick-up zone was selected at XU 734067 and the road column of B Company was diverted to this location. Company B then made an immediate assault into LZ 2 utilizing four lifts of five aircraft. A command group from the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry had been prepared for lift after B Company had closed the LZ. As one helicopter in the 1st lift of B Company landed, it apparently struck a 20 MM bumble. All personnel cleared the damaged ship.
As the companies started pushing south, A was west of Route 13 and A to their right (sketch map 5). Company A met resistance about 200 meters south of the LZ while B Company was mopping up the remaining elements of the enemy just to the west of Route 13. About 300 meters south of the LZ, B Company uncovered C Troop and C Company (-). At this time, Col MoChrestal assumed command of these elements. Company C was ordered to reorganize and search the immediate area, while C Troop was to reorganize, recover disabled tanks and personnel carriers, and support from Route 13 as Company B continued sweeping south and A Company southwest. Company B ceased to meet resistance by the time they had progressed about 800 meters from the LZ. However, A Company met stiff resistance along the creek, vicinity XU 715005 (sketch map 6). The Viet Cong had established a strong combat outpost line east and west of the creek. Company A sustained a few wounded. Since no headway was being made, C Company was committed on the right flank of A Company. The link-up was made by 1515 and the strength of the two companies forced the VC out of their positions. Dust Off was completed and the sweep continued south to the blocking positions held by 2d Troop and the ARVN forces.

At 1600, Col Barry, 1st Brigade Commander, landed and directed the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry to assemble at LZ 2 and become the brigade reserve. The units returned to an assembly area just south of the LZ in the order B, A, and C Company, where the battalion remained overnight. The reconnaissance platoon, and mortar platoon of the battalion were flown in at 1700. Three ambush sites were established on the south, southwest, and the west, but no enemy activity was experienced during the night.

During the time the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was preparing for deployment, the 1st Brigade Commander was alerted at 1001 to move one infantry battalion and the brigade TAC OP in that order to QUAN LOI. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry commenced the move at 1234 hours using C-123 and CV-2 aircraft. The brigade closed the airfield at QUAN LOI at 1530. At 1532, the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry commenced an airborne assault into LZ BLUES, (map 2) and by about 1715 had closed into the area and begun sweeping eastward.

Shortly after the contact was reported, the Binh Long Province Chief offered units immediately available to him for support of the 1st Infantry Division. The 3d Troop, 1st Cavalry, and 2d with 20 APC's reinforced with the 3d Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment, ARVN, were attached to the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry. At 1100 hours the U.S. Advisor reported to the 1st Infantry Division G-3 for a mission. He was directed to immediately proceed north on Route 13 to link up with U.S. elements at Check Point 7. This was accomplished and the blocking position established at approximately 1300 hours (sketch map 5). The 9th Regiment had one other company immediately available for operations which moved to secure the bridge at Check Point 17. The NLF forces were securing the road between the bridge and NAM. One company of the 9th Regiment was called back from an operation south of QUAN LOI as a possible escort for the move of an artillery battery north on Route 15.

At about 1100 hours, two QLNR companies were sent from LOC Binh and assumed blocking positions north of the battle area.
The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, was ordered at 1000 hours to move from BONG B to QUAN LOI. The battalion closed at QUAN LOI at 1600 and A Company, 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery moved by CH-47 from BONG B, closing at 2245. This battery was moved to LZ BLUE (map 2) at 1115 hours, 1 July.

At 1400 hours, the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was ordered to terminate its operation, return to LAI KHE and prepare for movement on order. At 1430 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry was ordered to move one company from the 2d Brigade Base Camp to PHUOC Vahn and the battalion (-) to LAI KHE. The 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry closed into LAI KHE at 1715 and the last of C Company, 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry was on the way to PHUOC Vahn in fixed wing aircraft by 1815.

The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry commenced moving from LAI KHE at 1600 hours utilizing C-130 and CV-2 aircraft. All elements of this battalion had closed into QUAN LOI at 1710.

1 - 2 JULY (V)

On 1 July, follow up action continued against remnants of the 271st VC Regiment. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry secured LZ BLUE as Battery A, 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery was lifted by CH-47 to support future operations. Company C remained to secure the LZ while the remainder of the battalion moved to seize the bridge at ZT 663799; link up with the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-); and with B Troop proceed to Objective 7 (ZT 59027). Troop C joined Company C, 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry at LZ BLUE.

The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry conducted an air mobile assault into LZ GREEN (ZT 663996) at 1000 hours. The battalion moved to secure Objective DUBHALL (ZT 663996); left one company in blocking positions; and proceeded to vicinity of ZT 721021 to conduct a search of the battle area of the previous day. Light contact was made with small groups of VC.

The 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry continued to search the battle area and uncovered numerous shallow graves and additional VC bodies. At 1600 hours, the battalion conducted an air mobile assault on LZ PINK (ZT 590265) and occupied positions for the night as shown on Overlay 1. Company A made contact with the VC and Company C and Bn Platoon were sent to reinforce. Mortar and small arms fire was received until contact was broken at 2030 hours. At 0545 hours 2 July, the overnight positions of A Company, C Company, and Bn Platoon, were taken under fire by VC automatic weapons and mortars. The VC then launched a series of five assaults from all directions, but the attack was countered by fire support from artillery, gun ships, and fighter bombers. A total of 61 sorties were flown by USAF fighter bombers and included close air support by three flights using SKY BLOT (radar bombing) techniques. Company B was moved at 0730 hours to reinforce Companies A and C and contact was broken at 0900 hours. A body count of 10 VC dead revealed that the attacking 3d Battalion, 273d VN Main Force Regiment suffered the loss of 76 killed.

At 0710 hours, the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry moved from overnight positions to support the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry. Link-up was made at 0830 hours and both battalions searched the area around the defensive perimeter. The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry then continued north toward LZ HANS (ZT 5904) but made no contact.

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The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, minus C Company at the artillery base, assembled on Route 13 and was helilifted into LZ AM (XV 657050), closing at 1320 hours. This LZ and adjacent LZ HITS (XU 657037) were secured by Troops B and C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry and attached ARVN APO troop and rifle company.

The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry was helilifted into LZ PLKN and relieved the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry which returned to control of 1st Infantry Division at 1530. During the night the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry came under mortar attack which appeared later to have been a cover for the withdrawal of the VC to the southwest and northwest. A sweep of the area was made with only minor contact.

FIRE SUPPORT (U)

At the time B Troop made contact, a preplanned air strike was in progress vicinity XT 7459. The aircraft had commenced dropping CBU at the time Col Lewane notified the forward air controller (FAC) that the armored column was in contact. The pilot pulled out of his southeast to northwest direction of flight and brought his aircraft down the west side of Route 13, expending the remainder of his CBU, Napalm, and 20mm. A large group of VC were seen running east along the trail north of the rice paddy. The next flight concentrated on the logs at Check Point 3 and the trail. A second FAC arrived about 1030 and started working along the trail. Col Lewane requested the area along Route 13 about 300 meters from the road be hit, however, the troop commanders requested it be moved closer to the road. During the dash of Lt Cole's 3d Platoon forward with the infantry, a napalm strike was placed along side the west of the road assisting his movement. Col Lewane called for a preparation on LZ 2, but delayed the actual landing when he was notified that aircraft were on station with CBU. This strike was placed from the 00 grid line to the LZ. After the LZ preparation, air strikes were directed to the west to cover trails on which VC were withdrawing in groups of from 5 to 15. Napalm strikes were placed ahead of the advancing 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry.

From the initial preplanned strike, close air support was continuous and unlimited. A total of 88 sorties were flown as follows:

- A4 = 24
- F100 = 40
- A1 = 10 (Will)
- F5 = 6
- F4 = 8

Ordnance expended included:

- High Explosive - 42.3 tons
- Napalm - 46 tons
- CBU - 11.5 tons
- Rockets - 150

There was a minimum of one FAC on station at all times. These FACs were in constant communication with either the squadron commander, B-5, or troop commanders.

Artillery direct support was provided by Battery B (155mm) and Battery D (8", 10th Battalion, 6th Artillery located at Phu QLX (XU 763399)). Battery B fired 344 rounds and Battery D fired 277 from the time contact was made until about 1900 hours.

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Defensive concentrations had been plotted along the route which facilitated ground observers with the column to call for fire. However, most of the missions were adjusted by air observers. Within minutes after contact began, an air observer was over the battle area. Fire was most intense from the northeast and northwest and artillery was fired on the trail north of the rice paddy. These fires were shifted to the wooded area north of SROX DONC. Col Lewane then directed that artillery would fire to the east of Route 13. This was continued until such time as he directed that artillery be placed as a block along the streamline to the west. Artillery was also used in the preparation of LZ 2 and shifted prior to the landing to the woods on the north. Artillery continued to block along the streamline to the west after the infantry deployed. Groups of VC were seen to walk into the fire, lying down or getting in holes between valleys. By 1700, resistance had ended, but air and artillery continued to interdict likely assembly areas and routes of withdrawal. Interdiction continued throughout the night.

In addition to air and artillery, helicopter gunships supported the engaged units. At 0945 hours an armed UH-47, 00-00 154, received an ambush reaction mission in support of the armored column. Contact was made with Col Lewane at 1000 hours. The pilot was briefed on the situation and made an immediate attack on the enemy forces 100 meters west of Route 13. The first attack was made at 1008 hours using 20mm and 50 caliber guns and 40mm grenades. After the first pass, Col Lewane requested that fire be moved to within 25 to 50 meters from the road and the second attack was made using the same weapons. A third pass was made using M-16 (7.62 Miniguns) and 50 caliber side and rear guns. The Miniguns appeared to have little suppressive affect and the aircraft received several hits. Transmission warning lights, oil pressure, and temperature gauges indicated heavy damage and an immediate landing was made in the rice paddy east of Route 13. A check indicated the aircraft was safe to fly and the aircraft returned to QUIN 101 to ascertain the extent of damage. At 1130 hours, VQG TAU was contacted for a replacement aircraft which arrived at 1300 and continued attacks on enemy troops, evacuation routes, assembly areas, and close support of elements occupying blocking positions.

Operations with armed Chinooks ended at 2015 hours. Numerous sorties were flown by armed UH-1B's both as combat for the armed Chinooks and against targets selected by Col Lewane.

**RESULTS**

**Enemy losses included:**

- 770 KIA (Estimated)
- 300 KIA (Confirmed)
- 7 VC Captives
- 40 Small Arms
- 25 Crew Served Weapons
- 1655 Rounds of Ammunition

**Casualties noted:**

- 30+ Wounded
- 30+ Killed

**Casualties to 3rd Platoon, 11C:**

- 7 Casualties

**Armament:**

- 470 RDS
- 196 RDS

**Crew:**

- 470 RDS
- 196 RDS

**Troop:**

- 7 Casualties
- 196 RDS

**KIA:**

- Total: 12

**WIA:**

- Total: 3

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Seven armored personnel carriers and four tanks were damaged. One personnel carrier and one UH-1D were destroyed.

CONCLUSION

As the reaction forces continued to search the battle area, conclusive evidence was found that the 271st VC Regiment had been decisively defeated and again failed in its assigned mission to destroy U.S. armored forces along Route 13. The rout of 271st Regiment can be attributed to several significant factors:

From the first indication of contact until the VC withdrew in defeat, Lt Col Lewane was in complete control of the situation. At the time of contact, the squadron was under OPCON 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry. Because he had complete control of the situation, subordinate elements of the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry were placed under his control when committed to the battle. Except for short periods of time when he returned to refuel, he was over the battle area. During his absence, he had his S-3 replace him to control the action and coordinate the fire support. Col Lewane was in constant communication with his troop commanders, artillery observers, forward air controllers, and gunships. He coordinated all the fires to insure that the maximum amount of uninterrupted firepower could be brought to bear on the enemy forces.

Lt Col McChrytal's plans for deployment of the rapid reaction force saved many valuable minutes, preventing a larger number of VC from withdrawing.

The decision of General DePuy to divert helicopters for the lift of 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, coupled with the movement of B Company by vehicle to the pickup zone cut to a minimum, the time between landing of the two companies.

Preplanned airstrikes were available for diversion to the area of contact and subsequent close air support was continuous. There was unlimited support with varying quantities and types of ordnance.

Medium and heavy caliber artillery was available within range of the battle area and rapidly responded to requests for fire by Col Lewane.

Troop C was not initially engaged and was available for immediate reinforcement on Col Lewane's order.

Widely based on air and ground by the tanks and personnel carriers, coupled with the tenacity with which personnel fought and the outstanding leadership given the men, were instrumental in overcoming the numerically superior VC force. As squad and platoon leaders were wounded or killed, assistants immediately assumed command so that at no time were the troops lacking direction.
The time contact was made is particularly significant. The battle started at 0938 leaving ten hours of daylight for the battle to develop, a reaction force to be committed, and a search of the battle area to be conducted after contact was broken. This denied the enemy the capability to police the area.

Weather conditions did not limit the ability of the forward air controllers or artillery observers to place effective fire on the enemy.

Incl — MAP 1 - 1st Inf Div Troop Dispositions
MAP 2 - Area of Operation 1:50,000
MAP 3 - PICTOMAP Area of Operation 1:25,000
Sketch Maps 1 - 6
Overlay - Battle of NAGNOU

Prepared By:
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1st Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96345
(G) In early May 1966, a Civilian Irregular Defense Group patrol, led by U.S. Special Forces personnel, killed a Viet Cong Lieutenant about five kilometers southeast of LOO NINH District Town, along National Route 13 in northern BIANK LONG Province. Among the papers discovered on the body of this officer was a map and a plan for the attack on LOO NINH Town and the Special Forces camp by three Viet Cong Regiments and one North Vietnamese Army Regiment. The discovery of this document marked the beginning of a prolonged campaign along National Route 13, leading from SAIGON through TNOI DAU, NHT, the provincial capital of BIANK LONG Province; onward to the north through OOH THAM District Town; through NOW QUAN (AN LOO), the provincial capital of NINH LONG Province; and finally north through the LOO NINH Plantation to the Cambodian Border.

(C) On 17 May, a CIDP Force and one battalion of the 9th ARVN Regiment engaged a two battalion VC force which included the 24 Battalion, 272nd Regiment and possibly a battalion of the 271st Regiment. The action which took place vicinity XU 5904, about two kilometers from the Cambodian Border, resulted in heavy casualties by both sides.

(U) The 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, was dispatched to LOO NINH with three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion on 19 and 20 May 1966. Between 19 and 26 May, this brigade established a defensive perimeter around the LOO NINH airstrip and patrolled and conducted search operations westward to the Cambodian Border without substantial contact. The brigade returned to its base at LIL I 20 on 26 May 1966.

(G) Subsequently, intelligence from a number of sources indicated that the VC, having postponed their attack, intended to go ahead with their original plans. Agents reported through the Vietnamese Army that the VC were inaugurating a campaign to last from 20 May until 20 August to destroy friendly forces along Route 13; to interdict the route; and to harass or attack LOO NINH, NOW QUAN, OOH THAM, NINH THAM, and SONG BS. VC Forces involved consisted of six regiments. It was assumed that these regiments included three of the 9th Viet Cong Division, 271st, 272nd, and 273rd; and another grouping of the 101st, 141st, and possibly the 250th Regiments of the North Vietnamese Army.

(G) The 3d Brigade returned to LOO NINH on 2 June 1966 with one infantry battalion and one artillery battalion. At this time, the 5th ARM Division Commander, with headquarters at PHU LOI, informed the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, that he believed the Viet Cong would attack the NINH LONG Provincial capital, HOW QUAN. The decision was made to move one troop of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, with two ground units to HOW QUAN.

(U) On 6 June, the 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry was moved to LAI KIH airfield as an infantry reaction force and a Special Forces, 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry commenced its move from LAI KIH through OOH THAM to HOW QUAN. Although road blocks, mines, and minor engagements were encountered, Troop A arrived at OOH THAM about 1500 without significant combat. At this point the 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry was moved by helicopters to the HOW QUAN airfield, placing it in a better position to react to any engagement between OOH THAM and HOW QUAN. At 1640 hours, approximately 15 kilometers south of;
HON QUAN in a densely wooded area, the lead tank received a direct hit from a 75mm recoilless rifle. The ambush by all three battalions of the 272d Viet Cong Regiment was triggered. During the three and a half hour duration of the battle, Troop A was supported by a number of airstrikes, and 105mm, 155mm, and 6" artillery. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was committed in an air mobile assault to the north of the battle area and swept both sides of the woods in support of the cavalry. Coupled with the valiant fight by A Troop, these measures destroyed 90% of the 1st Battalion, 272d Regiment, including the battalion commander. Fifty percent of the 2d Battalion was destroyed, while the 3d Battalion was generally south of the major action. The Chief of Staff, 272d Regiment, reportedly was also killed during the engagement. Troop A and the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry continued to HON QUAN the following day.

(c) On 11 June 1966, A Company, 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry committed one rifle platoon with a CIDG reconnaissance platoon in an air mobile reconnaissance operation to the western edge of the LOC MINH Plantation. The remainder of A Company moved by foot from the LOC MINH airstrip to effect a link up. Light contact was made at 0900 and about noon, C Company was committed to assist. By 1400 hours it was apparent that the VC force consisted of at least one battalion and the remainder of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry moved by foot to the LOC MINH Plantation. Massive air and artillery fire power assisted the infantry in overrunning the positions and by 1900 the VC withdrew leaving 46 dead and numerous weapons on the battlefield. Subsequent reports from plantation workers and captured VC revealed that the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry had destroyed over 50% of the 1st Battalion, 272d Regiment.

(c) The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry under OPCON of the 1st Brigade conducted an air mobile raid on 21 June in the area of a reported rice storage area along the SONG River west of the MINH MINH Plantation. This raid discovered 1506 tons of rice and large quantities of other supplies. A second unit, the 2d Battalion, 4d Infantry, was committed before the operation terminated on 26 June.

(c) The 1st Infantry Division was deployed, on 30 June as shown on Inclosure 1. The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry was conducting operations to the southeast of SONG BE; the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry to the northeast. The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, under division control with attached 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-), was conducting armed reconnaissance and infantry reconnaissance patrolling in the general area of the QUAN LOC - MINH LOC Plantation. The 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was securing engineer finishing the airstrip at MINH MINH. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, under control of the Division Artillery Commander, continued its pacification operations in the PHU LOI area with the MINH MINH Province Chief and the 7th ARVN Regiment.

(c) About 0900 on 30 June, Troops B and C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry and C Company, 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry proceeded north from HON QUAN and engaged an AVLB adjacent to the damaged O'M BE Bridge. The column then moved north to conduct an armed reconnaissance along Route 13 and secure engineer equipment to be brought on the return trip from LOC MINH to the bridge site. Four thousand meters from the bridge site, Troop B started receiving recoilless rifle, small arms, and mortar fire and this triggered an ambush by all three battalions of the 271st Viet Cong Regiment. The Commanding

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General, 1st Infantry Division was notified of this action while he was with the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry southwest of SONG R1. On the return flight, he alerted the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry at PHUOC VINH for a fixed-wing aircraft to QUAN LOI. At 1500 the 3d Brigade Commander was instructed to retract the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry from its operation to the SONG R1 airstrip and be prepared upon receipt of helicopters to move to the airfield at QUAN LOI. At 1600 hours, the 1st Brigade Commander was ordered to move the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry and the Brigade Command Post to QUAN LOI in that order and upon arrival to take command of the operation. By 1730 hours, the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry had been committed into a landing zone north of the cavalry, and placed under the operational control of the squadron commander. It is interesting to note that when the battle started, the Commanding Officer, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry was under the OPCON of the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry. However, because he was in command on the ground, the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was placed under his command. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry closed QUAN LOI by fixed-wing aircraft at 1530 hours and by 1800 hours was introduced by airmobile assault into an LZ west of the battle area. By 1900 hours, the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry had closed into QUAN LOI and was prepared for an airmobile assault. The 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry was ordered to move from LAI AH by fixed-wing aircraft to QUAN LOI and assume the mission of security for QUAN LOI - HOM QUAN. With the infantry sweeping south the U.S. and ARVN cavalry blocking along Route 13 and the road south of the battle area; air strikes and artillery covering the routes of withdrawal, the 271st Viet Cong Regiment was defeated by 1700 hours and began withdrawing to the west and northwest. Eighty-eight VC prisoners indicated the 271st Regiment would rally. A heavy proportion of their force in the immediate area of this landing zone.

(c) At 1630 hours, 1 July, the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was lifted by assault helicopters from their perimeter along Route 13 into two LZ's farther to the northwest. At 1800 hours, a Company proceeded to a major trail crossing and became heavily engaged. C Company and the Recon Platoon were sent to reinforce A Company. Company B was 1500 meters farther to the north and the battalion command post was 1000 meters to the north. Companies A and C received a heavy volume of mortar and automatic weapons fire against their perimeter during the early evening. During the night a VC battalion surrounded the two companies. The battalion headquarters had no significant contact. At 0530, 2 July, the VC launched a series of five assaults against A Company, C Company, and the Recon Platoon. The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry was sent from the south to link up with B Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry from the north. Fighter-bomber strikes were brought in under a 200 foot ceiling and artillery fire was delivered from the landing zone occupied by the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry. The VC attack was repulsed with losses to the 2d Battalion, 273d VC Regiment that included 75 killed. The

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1st Battalion, 24 Infantry, minus one company at the artillery base, was assembled on Route 13 and airlifted to an LZ east of the battle. The landing zone was secured by the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry. The 3d Brigade was ordered to move its headquarters back to LOC MINH at 0900 together with the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry. At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry was ordered to move by fixed-wing aircraft from LAI KHE to LOC MINH and provide a reaction force to be used in the northwest. The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry linked up with the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry at 0930 and then proceeded to the lake at XU 5904. The battalion was lightly engaged enroute. A large VC force was then located between the Infantry-Cavalry force on the east and the two infantry battalions on the west. At 1500 hours, the 2d Battalion, 24 Infantry from QUAN LOI relieved the 24 Battalion, 18th Infantry, preparatory to a sweep to the east. During the night, the 2d Battalion, 24 Infantry was under mortar attack which later seemed to be a cover for the withdrawal of the VC both to the southwest and northwest. After sweeping the area with only minor contact, all forces were withdrawn from the operational area on 4 July. The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, and 1st and 2d Battalions, 2d Infantry were assembled at the QUAN LOI plantation. The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-) assembled at the HOI QUAN airfield. These troops stood down for two days for rest, resupply, new uniforms, and for maintenance on armored vehicles. The first Chapter of the Campaign Along Route 13 was closed.

While the battles with the 271st and 273rd Regiments took place north of HOI QUAN, the 272d Regiment at least partially recovered from its battle south of HOI QUAN, moved to an area north of CHON THANH and NCON QUAN. Further reports indicate that another regiment may have taken up positions along Route 13 between CHON THANH and NCON KHE. When the 272d Viet Cong Regiment ambushed a reaction force to be used to the northwest, the 2d Battalion, 24 Infantry were ambushed at the QUAN LOI plantation. The 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry (-) assembly at the HOI QUAN airfield. These troops stood down for two days for rest, resupply, new uniforms, and for maintenance on armored vehicles. The first Chapter of the Campaign Along Route 13 was closed.

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INCLOSURE 18

AFTER ACTION REPORT OPERATION LEXINGTON III
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (Operation LEXINGTON III)

THRU: Commanding Officer
2d Bde, 1st Inf Div
ATTN: S-3
APO US Forces 96345

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVID - T
APO US Forces 96345

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation LEXINGTON III, Battalion search and destroy operation in Rung Sat Special Zone.

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 210900 May - 091200 June 66.

3. (C) GENERAL: Operation LEXINGTON III was initiated by Headquarters MACV. The operation called for a single battalion operating in the Rung Sat Special Zone, N. V. Monkey, Vietnam 1:50,000, Sheets: 63421, 63421T, 62427, 62427T.

The operation was conducted in five phases. Phase I included a airlift and sealift into Operation Base SHARK YS65547 in TACR "B" (Incl 1 - Overlay of TACR "B") and a motor march into Operation Base PURCHASE (WING TAU). Phase II covered company size search and destroy operation in TACR "B" and several in TACR "A" (Incl 2 - Overlay of TACR "A"). Phase III was the move from Operation Base SHARK in TACR "B" to Operation Base BARRACUDA in TACR "A". The move was made by helicopter airlift and sealift. Phase IV covered company size operations in TACR "A". In phase V the 1/18 Inf and A 1/77 Arty moved from Rung Sat Special Zone back to Bien Hoa by helicopter airlift and sealift.

Throughout Operation LEXINGTON III 1/18 Inf maintained a company size rapid reaction force at the operation base.

The operation was unique in that the 1/18 Inf employed airlift by HU1D and sealift by ICH and LCD. The fire support included A 1/77 Arty in DS of 1/18 Inf, Lp 2m (HUID), Naval Gunfire, USAF and Navy Air. A USMC LNO with Naval Gun Fire Team supported the 1/18 Inf in the active operation.

a. Reporting Officer: Maj J.C. Bard, Commanding

b. Task Organisation:
   (1) CORPS ARMY LNO: LT Col A. C. Smith Jr, USMC
   Maj R. King, USMC
   (2) Co A: Capt L.R. Miller: Commanding
   (3) Co B: Capt J.F. Roberts: Capt E. Allen: Commanding
   (4) Co C: Capt P.R. Tosco: Commanding
   (5) 1/18 Arty (DS): Capt Mahogen: Commanding
   (6) RAG 1st Co, VON
   (6) Battalion Troops
   (7) NMC 1/18 Inf (-)
   (8) Recon Plt

4. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Information: Available information on VC Forces prior to commencement of Operation LEXINGTON III indicated that there were supposedly one (1) Engineer Battalion, and Local Forces consisting of four (4) companies, six (6) Platoons, and two (2) squads within the operational area of TACR "A" (QUANG YEN District) and TACR "B" (CAM R10 District). Initially eighteen (18) specific target areas (17 in TACR "A", 1 in TACR "B") outside TACR's) were furnished by the Naval Advisory Group. With one (1) more in TACR "A" added during the course of the operation. Information on suspected supply routes and other installations and units were also furnished by MACV intelligence estimates and Combined Intelligence Center reports.

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The RSSZ was also suspected of being a thoroughfare for the 4th Rn, 165A Rgt and three (3) other companies. The RSSZ was considered VC controlled without population domination. It was further considered a VC transportation corridor for the movement of arms and ammunition and an important link in the VC resupply system for traffic between Saigon and Wung Tau, from the western region, and by sea from NVN. Also it was considered by the VC as a lucrative area for the interdiction of the shipping channels leading to the port of Saigon, thereby disrupting the economy of the RVN and the friendly war effort.

b. Enemy Situation: There were no large engagements with VC Forces. The W 225th Engineer Battalion or its elements, as well as the other local forces companies were not encountered. Large masses of VC Forces was not anticipated, and none took place. Contacts with local forces units and guerrillas were expected and took place. Except for a limited amount of booby traps, sniping, SA harassing fire, and one meeting engagement, our forces moved unopposed. It is estimated that the Battalion encountered only local forces and guerrilla elements. The VC forces encountered within or near base areas showed no intention of defending these facilities, as was expected. The majority of the VC KIA's were as a result of night ambushes along streams and/or waterways. Base camps and facilities were found generally near the streams indicating the need for ease accessibility in this type of terrain. Although none of the specific target areas were checked due to lack of transportation or fire support, as well as denial of operating areas, maximum effort was placed against suspected routes into the target areas with significant results. Targets 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12 did not have installations or activities as reported. The area in the Southern tip of TAM K' (bounded by the RACH GAMI W. T. LOW, the SONG DOM TRAN), and the South China Sea, although not a specific target area, did prove lucrative in that a large base camp was uncovered and contact was made with an undetermined amount of VC, resulting in two (2) VC KIA and two (2) weapons captured. This area could not be pursued further as the operation was terminated at this time. However, use was made of RED HAZE and SLAR missions. Despite constant surveillance by these devices, no significant movements were noted in the TAM. The very few SLAR returns indicated there was a limited number of boats used by the VC or the VC chose not to move because of his knowledge of the SLAR capability as well as his presence in the area. RED HAZE sightings were primarily in and around populated areas and main shipping channels.

e. Significant Incidents:
   (1) Seven (7) ambushes against VC in camps resulting in twenty-six (26) VC KIA, twelve (12) weapons captured or destroyed, and seven (7) VC camps destroyed.
   (2) Engagement with VC squad resulting in three (3) VC KIA and two (2) weapons captured.

d. Significant VC facilities uncovered:
   (1) Large incomplete base camp with only fortifications near the LONG TRAN W. C. controlled village TIS00692.
   (2) Company size base camp with 1200 feet of 60 and 6 camps via TIS00626.
   (3) Large size 2x VC camps containing fourteen (14) weapons, grenades, and repair tools.
   (4) Base camp via TIS00609 w/13 huts (60 bed capacity), one (1) operating room, 6 camps, and a few medical supplies.
   (5) Base camp w/capacity for forty (40) personnel via TIS00778.
   (6) Large size base camp w/loading dock via TIS006613.
   (7) Base camp w/twenty (20) huts and forty (40) bunkers via TIS00751.
   (8) Large base camp (150x x 75) w/five (5) large huts via TIS00665.

e. Terrain and weather were as expected. Showers or thunderstorms did appear in the afternoons, and at times early evening. Mangrove swamp forests were encountered. Concealment from air and ground in this area was excellent. There were LZ's available in TAM "B" (GAM GI R District), but very few in TAM "A" (RIAM XUEN District). The major obstacles were, of course, the waterways tide level, and the dense, low evergreen mangrove forest areas.

f. Limitations: Aerial photographs requested were not initially available. When they did arrive, the operation had already been completed for the particular area covered. However, the photographs were excellent, with minimal cloud cover, and HAZE and SLAR infight reports were not available until the last few days of the operation. This occurred only because circuit liaison was finally made with the surveillance unit, only after repeated requests through channels failed to produce results.

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e. VC Losses and L-Ammun Captured: (see Para 9)

1. Pay War:
(1) Pay War effort included use of U-10 aircraft for loudspeaker appeals and for dissemination of printed matter, and foot movement for audio appeals and visual contact.
(2) Pay War personnel accompanying the Med Cap team on visits to the communities of Dong Hoa and Can Gio succeeded in establishing a friendly atmosphere. US aims and reasons for being in Vietnam were explained to villagers.
(3) Nine loudspeaker missions were flown over the operational area by U-10 aircraft, for a total of 27 hours broadcast time.
(4) Leaflets dropped on Operation LEEXTINGTON III were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How to surrender</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN vs. VC Life</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symptoms of Disease</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical treatment for rơies</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<td>AF IER</td>
<td>20,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>50,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(5) Areas of drop and broadcast were the southernmost section of the Rung Sat Special Zone.

4. Civil Affairs: During the operation the Battalion Civic Action Team accomplished the following tasks:
(1) Held Medical Sick Call in villages near Battalion CP, especially by Phnom Penh and Dong Hoa 1659-76. Boats were used to convey medical personnel to all villages in Can Gio sub-sector area via Kea Lung. Organic Battalion personnel were augmented at times by teams from 26 Bde and Division Headquarters. Advice was given on cleanliness and sanitation for preventive purposes.
(2) Attempts were initiated to procure certain items such as insect repellant which would be distributed by local NAC officers.
(3) Efforts were made to distribute an aerial anti-mosquito spraying of Dong Hoa and Lyphon. Both attempts were unsuccessful due to danger to crops in Dong Hoa area.
(4) In an attempt to fire 30 mortar rounds into an area in which small arms fire was observed from operational base SHARE, four rounds landed in the village of Dong Hoa 1659-76, killing 7 persons and wounding 30. The Battalion Surgeon and medical personnel immediately rushed to the village and began administering to and separating the wounded for evacuation. The wounded were evacuated by helicopter within 3 hours to hospitals at Long Binh and Vung Tau. Em P'l personnel quickly visited them at the hospitals, getting their names, conditions and locations for relatives. The next morning, transportation was provided to convey relatives to Vung Tau to visit those hospitalized. Also, aid was given in the purchasing and transporting of coffins for the dead. Work was begun immediately on assessing damage and making repairs. Organic personnel augmented by Division Engineers worked quickly to repair damage. This included carpentry, cemeting, and roof repair. Two completely new roofs were installed and repairs were made on approximately nine others. A total of 100 sheets of corrugated roofing was used, many villagers requested compensation for damage or repairs made, rather than having the work done by US personnel. This was done through personnel from 0-5, 1st Infantry Division. Emergency supplies of food and textile kits were distributed to the families of those killed or injured. One woman was given an immediate payment of 2000 Piastres due to her being widowed after losing her husband. The people were advised to submit claims for deaths and injuries, as well as crop damage, through appropriate VN channels. NACV personnel in the area worked to have those claims expedited as soon as they were submitted.
(5) Local advisors in both areas in which the Battalion worked extenstively expressed appreciation for the work of the troops, and indicated that their own efforts had been aided. In reference to Dong Hoa, it was stated that the quick and thorough action taken offset much of the bad feelings possibly encountered.

5. (C) MISSION: 1/18 Inf conducts extensive patrolling, ambushes and search and destroy operations in "AGR 14" and "18".

6. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Maneuver: This operation was conducted in five (5) phases.
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motor march to Operation Base PURPOSE EXCLAM, a sealift from Mike Beach, Saigon to Operation Base SHARK and an airlift from Rear to Operation Base SHARK to clear Operation Base SHARK.

Phase III: Frag Order 1 thru 7 to OPORD 11 thru 16 directed the move from Operation Base SHARK to Operation Base BARRACUDA in TA Or "A". The move employed air assault by Co A on Operation Base BARRACUDA to clear and secure this area.

Operation Base SHARK to Operation Base BARRACUDA from Operation Base PURPOSE as the BN rapid reaction force. A Btry 1/7 Arty was airlifted by CH-47 from Operation Base SHARK to Operation Base BARRACUDA. Supplies and Supply personnel moved by sealift using LCUs and LCAMs during this phase.

Phase IV: Frag Order 1 thru 15 covered the search and destroy operations in TA Or "A". Operations in TA Or "A" were controlled from Operation Base BARRACUDA with A Btry 1/7 Arty in DS.

Phase V: On OP1000 June 66 LEXINGTON III was terminated, Co A and HHC (-) moved by sealift to Mike Beach, Saigon and then by motor convoy to Bearcat. Co B and Co C were airlifted from Operation Base BARRACUDA and Operation Base PURPOSE to Bearcat. The BN rear located at Operation Base PURPOSE conducted a sealift from Operation Base PURPOSE to Mike Beach, Saigon and then moved by motor convoy to Bearcat.

b. Fire Support: Fire Support was provided by Artillery, Naval Gunfire, FAC Air and MUSD Fire Teams. A Btry 1/7 Arty was in direct support of the 1/18 Inf during the entire operation.

7. (c) EXECUTION:

a. Chronology:

18 May
1/18 Inf published OPORD 11 thru 16 (LEXINGTON III)

19 May
191200, sealift convoy departed base camp for VN Navy dockyards, Saigon, and arrived at 191400.
191700, Bn LCUs completed loading and departed embarkation point to anchor over night on SHING MEA River.
191730, BN was notified of 24 hr delay in Operation LEXINGTON III.
191800, Convoy Commander and vehicles returned from Saigon.
193040, BN was notified of 24 hr daily.
Normal security measures taken for Base Camp security.

20 May
1/18 Inf published Frag Order 1 to OPORD 11 thru 16.
203030, BN was notified of LEXINGTON III will begin on 21 May 66.
Normal security measures taken for Base Camp security.

21 May
1/18 Inf published Frag Order 2 to OPORD 11 thru 16.
211130, 1/18 Inf initiated LEXINGTON III with the first lift of Alpha Company.
211200, FAC destroyed a sampan at YSI1522.
211440, Co A and HQ's (-) landed at LZ TROUT via YSO59473.
211803, motor convoy departed 1945 hours to Vung Tau with Co B and Recon
2/18 Inf providing security.
211130, the sealift portion had landed and unloaded at LZ TROUT and the land tail closed up.
211345, Co C lifted of ammoo to Vung Tau.
211700, Co B closed Vung Tau.
211730, Danger 7/F visited Operations Base SHARK.

No contact was made during the day. During the night, the rifle companies established a Battalion perimeter with listening posts to the front of each company.

22 May
1/18 Inf published Frag Order 3 to OPORD 11 thru 16.
220700, Naval Gunfire Team (ANHEL) arrived Operation Base BE River.
220720, Three (-) LCUs beach on SHARK.
220515, Gunships fired on sampans in BN TA Or, at YS101550.
221000, VN LN boats conducted deceptive extraction of Co C.

Co A remained in OP area via YSO59473 as the BN reserve and established ambushes during hours of darkness. Co B and Bn trains remained at Rear operation base, YISOB165, all elements will remain in present locations with A & C Companies conducting night ambush patrols in respective areas.
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223300 Bn monitored call from Artichoke 37 for Darkoff. Bn answered call and a Navy PCS landed at Op Base SHARK YSO15618. One (1) man was off loaded and 4 others given medication.

223350 Medevac of casualty from Navy PCS completed.

230000 H & 2 fires by Co A, 65 element and Naval Gunfire during the night.

23 May

1/24 Inf published Frag Order 4 to OPCFRD 11 = 66.
230650 6 shkns arrived at OP Base SHARK.
230700 First lift of Alpha arrived.
230714 Aircraft received 3.5 fire from 11 YS015715, fire team notified.
230814 Aircraft of Alpha completed into Op area JAGUAR.
230836 Co C closed OP Base SHARK from PANTHER.
231020 Fire team destroyed a sampan with no one aboard at YS107976.
230920 Aerial observer received 3A fire from YS12498, arty fired into area with unknown results.
230120 Fire team received fire from via YS109529.
231010 Co B requested airmesc for Op Base SHARK.
231010 LCU closed Op Base SHARK with Co B.
231400 Co C departed Op Base SHARK for Op Base PORPOISE.
231458 Pay War Ship over Op Base SHARK.
231530 1st Div CO arrived Op Base SHARK.
231710 Co C closed Vung Tau.
232000 Co B's L element via 065597 received A/A fire. During the day Bn continued operations in TAOR W/adj enemy contact. FF II Commander visited Battalion, Co B established two (2) night ambush sites. Bn continues operation in TAOR "B" and prepares for TAOR "A".

24 May

1/24 Inf published Frag Order 5 to OPCFRD 11 = 66.
230205 Co B's H-2 ambush position fired on two sampans moving west to east.
240305 Arty fired, results unknown.
230530 Co B's L element received auto weapons fire from YSO24572.
230730 Co B departed Op SHARK for LION by LCN.
230910 Co B's L LCU.
231000 Co C damaged sampans with letters and also papers in it.
241000 Naval advisor reported a mine at YS015618 and a boat hit by a mine at YSO15656. Also contact with VC at YSO15610, 4 VC kiln, captured one (1) 9MM, one (1) MG or two (2) carbines, located 6 or 7 bunkers, one (1) hut.
241020 Co C departed PORPOISE for SHARK by LCU.
241210 Co B, helilift extraction completed from JAGUAR.
241230 Co C departed Op Base LCC.
241100 Requested mosquito spray for civic action program but request denied.
242000 Airmesc patrol of Co C sank one sampan, killed 2 VC (2) at YSO15658.
1/25 Inf continues Operation UMBERTO XIII. Co A at Op Base PORPOISE. Co B operates in LION (7), Co C as Bn perimeter defense. No contact during the day.

25 May

1/25 Inf published Frag Order 6 to OPCFRD 11 = 66.
230645 Co C airmesc patrol confirms 1 VC kiln. Founds papers.
230745 Remainder of Co C departed Op Base SHARK to PUNA.
230945 Strike delivered on YSO15656 suspected mines.
230910 Co C landed at PUNA.
230915 Co C located a base camp at YSO15655 which had not been used for some time, destroyed one (1) hut.
251010 Co B extracted from LION by LCN boats.
251100 Co B closed OP Base SHARK.
251100 Co A arrived Op Base SHARK by LION.
251205 Co B departed Op Base SHARK for Op Base PORPOISE by LCN.
1/26 Inf continues operations. Co A at Op Base SHARK, Co B at Op Base PORPOISE.
Co C in area PUNA. No contact during the day.

26 May

1/26 Inf published Frag Order 7 to OPCFRD 11 = 66.
260500 Airmesc from Co C killed 3 VC (2) via YSO15657 in a sampan travelling W to E. Captured two (2) sampans and two (2) packs which sank along with the sampan.
260910 Co A Eagle Flight airlift began.
260912 Co A Eagle Flight completed.
260940 Co B departed Op Base PORPOISE.
261045 Co A landed quot 2 base camp at YSO100492, had auto upms positions and building material.
261140 First element Co A returned from Eagle flight.
261230 Co B arrived Op Base SHARK by LCN.
261250 Co C departed area PUNA f= - Op Base. 160 CONFIDENTIAL
261303 Co C returned to Op Base PURPOSE at 261305.
261305 Element from Co A landed by helicopter at LZ FINE Y3025659.
261305 All elements of Co A were extracted back to Op Base SHARK.
261345 Co B returned from ambush at Y3025624, also returned one round of sniper fire from some location.
291405 Four (4) mortar rounds landed in DONG HOA, crater analysis and tail fins indicated they were 81mm mortars from 241st SVN. Casualties were 7 dead civilians, 21 wounded civilians, and 6 wounded P.F. soldiers.
291420 Co C began civic action program to repair damage from mortar rounds.
291420 Co C began civic action program to repair damage from mortar rounds.

27 May

1/18 Inf published Frag Order 8 to OPORD 11 - 66.
270725 Co B departed Op Base SHARK by LCV boats for Operational area OCELOT.
270830 Co B closed OCELOT.
270835 two (2) raiders turned themselves in to 1/18 Inf in village N4 of

1/18 Inf Co.
271007 Co C departed Op Base PURPOSE for Op Base SHARK.
271020 Co A closed Co C by LCM for Op Base PURPOSE.
271512 Chinook arrived with supplies for DONG HOA.

Contact during the day, Co A at PORPOISE, Co B conducting S & D operations with saturation ambushes at night in OCELOT, Co C in perimeter defense.

Civil action will continue in DONG HOA.

28 May

1/18 Inf published Frag Order 9 to OPORD 11 - 66.
280650 Co B made contact with two (2) sampans, 11 VC at Y30891492, resulted in nine (9) VC KIA (4k), destroyed 3 sampans.
280700 Co C began airlift to BARRACUDA.
280730 Co C closed BARRACUDA.
280800 Extraction of Co B by LCM's began.
280900 Co A commenced airlift from Op Base PURPOSE to BARRACUDA.
281036 Co A closed BARRACUDA.
281037 Co B closed Op Base SHARK and aided in civic action in DONG HOA.
281045 A 1/7 Arty began airlift.
281135 A 1/7 Arty closed Op Base BARRACUDA.
281240 Co B began extraction by LCU from Op Base SHARK.
281945 Co B closed Op Base PURPOSE.

Contact during the day resulted in nine (9) VC KIA, five (5) sampans destroyed and two sampans sunk, Co A and Co C in perimeter security of Op Base BARRACUDA.

29 May

1/18 published Frag Order 10 to OPORD 11 - 66.
290330 Hq (-) received one suspected 77mm RB, resulting in one (1) minor WIA.
290720 Co A departed BARRACUDA.
290740 Co entered area LEOPARD.
291405 Contact was made with an unknown number of VC armed with one 30 cal.

1004 via Y3944626.
391330 Contact was broken, resulting in two (2) friendly WIA, one later died.
391335 Estimated company size base camp at this location was destroyed and the following equipment was captured: 1,540 rd 74 mm area, one bag of documents and six sampans destroyed.

Co B remains in area PORPOISE, Co C remained at BARRACUDA. Co A conducted saturation ambushes in its area of responsibility.

30 May

Co A continued to patrol area LEOPARD.
301215 an unoccupied base camp was destroyed via Y3943613.
301330 Co A at Y3956616 found a weapons cache consisting of 7 rifles (6-mm & 1-30L) and 70 rd ammo.
301410 Co A found an inboard motor sampan at Y3956613 and destroyed it.

Co B remained at PORPOISE and Co C at BARRACUDA.

31 May

1/18 Inf published Frag Order 11 to OPORD 11 - 66.
The operation for Co C was cancelled due to pending operations of Vietnamese forces in the area, as a result Co A continued patrolling in area LEOPARD.

311605 Co A received 81 fire from Y3913651, Army and mortar fire was fired into the area with negative results.

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310325 CO A located a small hospital with 15-20 huts vio 0954609, huts destroyed by burning.

311025 CO patrol from CO made contact with a VC squad at 0959577, resulting in 3 VC KIA (SC) and two weapons captured.

311010 CO and VC made a foot march back to BARRACUDA and closed at 311710.

Co C conducted saturation ambushes in their area. Co A departed BARRACUDA by LCM at 311930 for PURPOSE, Co B perimeter security along with Co C (-) at 1 June

1/18 Inf published Pfrag Order 12 to GFOID 11 - 66.

010000 CO C (-) departed BARRACUDA for PMU.

020000 CO C (-) found one (1) weapon (US bolt action) at 0201568. At 0201568 CO C (-) received 50 fire from estimated 6 VC vio 0202560, fire was returned with unknown results.

021953 CO C (-) located squad size base camp that had not been used recently vio 02092585.

031120 CO C located a larger base camp at 030878, 1 VC KIA (BC) and one US soldier via 030578, a second base camp was located vio 03102701. Co A remained in PURPOSE, Co B remained as perimeter security for BARRACUDA.

2 June

1/18 Inf published Pfrag Order 13 to GFOID 11 - 66.

1/18 continued Operation LEXINGTON III with Co B conducting search and destroy operations in Target 19.

020712 CO C is ready for extraction.

020610 Direct fire with M-54 Depth Charges was begun to clear channel for Co B. 020510 all CO elements landed vio 0206285, 0306165, 0506067.

032000 CO A and Recon Pit mortar & BARRACUDA.

031540 Co B located small base camp of two huts vio 03079613, night ambushes were conducted in area.

3 June

Operation LEXINGTON III continues with Co B conducting search & destroy operations to the northwest of the area vio 032615.

031030 Recon Pit located 1 hut w/storage bin empty, capacity 2-3 tons, 03107595.

031040 CO B found a fortified VC position vio 03052610, platoon size, also found several oil 105-109, 70 or 90cm shell cases.

031450 Recon attached one sampan killed 4 VC (SC) captured one RN carbine at 03155388.

031550 CO B ambushed a sampan resulting in 3 VC KIA, one (1) Russian carbine and one (1) grease gun captured vio 0315614.

Co B continues saturation ambushes. Co A at BARRACUDA and Co C at PURPOSE.

4 June

040615 CO A departed Op Base BARRACUDA by LCM.

040600 CO C received SA fire vio 0407912.

041025 CO B requested Artillery fire 0411614 on a suspected enemy position.

041250 CO A found 10 tons of rice vio 04091526.

041310 CO B was airlifted from 0419.

041515 CO B closed BARRACUDA.

042200 CO G ship located 2 huts & 2 sampans vio 04015617.

045641 & G ship spotted sampan at 0459607, PAC checked out w/unk results. During the morning RN utilized Air Force Air armed with 1000 lb GP with Delayed Fuzes to clear future LZ.

6 June

1/18 Inf published Pfrag Order 14 to GFOID 11 - 66.

Co A continued to patrol in assigned area.

050925 Recon closed BARRACUDA and brought in a RN carbine and documents.

051250 Co A located an abandoned base camp consisting of 20 huts vio 05096560.

052210 Radio of TC to Co A was completed by the C & G ship.

Co A conducted saturation ambush during the night. Co B remained in area PURPOSE, Co C in area BARRACUDA.

6 June

1/18 published Pfrag Order 15 to GFOID 11 - 66.

060700 CO C departed BARRACUDA for area of operation.

060600 CO C landed vio 06071667 conducted extensive patrols to the south, south east and south west.

061115 CO A extracted by LCM from vio 06084397 and moved to BARRACUDA.

061225 CO B moved from PURPOSE to BARRACUDA by LCM.

061330 CO B departed BARRACUDA for PURPOSE, Co C engaged a sampan vio 06147615 resulting in two (2) VC KIA (BC) and one sampan destroyed.

Co C conducted saturation ambushes during the night. Co B located at BARRACUDA.

7 June

Co C continued extensive patrolling with negative contact.

070230 CO C spotted a sampan moving south at 0745578. Sampans turned around and a fire team was called out to locate area with negative results.
Co C conducted saturation raids. During the night, Co B remained in area BARRACUDA. Co A remained at C&G-122.

8 June

Operation LEXINGTON III continued with Co B conducting a sealift by ICW's at 0600z

061500 a base camp was located via Y8995520 with one bunker; one (1) VC was sighted in the area of base camp who fled in a SE direction from Y8995520. Upon pursuing the VC, two (2) booby trapped grenades and a trail with punji stakes was located at Y8005515.

061550 contact was made with unknown number of VC at Y8014532 resulting in one (1) VC KIA (10) and one (1) 7.62 rifle captured.

061740 heavy small arms fire was received from vio of Y8005516 resulting in one (1) US WIA and one (1) US injured.

061715 contact was made with 5 VC at Y8995538 resulting in one (1) VC KIA (6) and one (1) Japanese 7.62 weapon captured, VC broke contact and fled into swamp.

080730 Co C was sealifted out of their AO and brought to BARRACUDA.

081040 Co B departed BARRACUDA for other support.

070600 Co A departed POPPONIC.

091200 Co A arrived at BARRACUDA, assumed perimeter security for battalion.

9 June

1/18 published Flog Order 16 to 1/18 11 - 66.

091700 Operation LEXINGTON III terminated.

091910 Co B and Recon airlifted out of AO, both elements had negative contact.

092130 12B Air 1000m snaed two (2) VC KIA (6) and sank (1) ship, Y8970666.

092600 Co B and Recon closed base.

093050 Co A, Battery 1/7 Art and elements of En Headquarters moved by LCUs from BARRACUDA.

Elements moving by sealift will remain over night aboard ICW and ICW in Saigon Harbor. Four area at POPPONIC was sealifted by LCUs to Saigon Navy Yards on 10 June and 11 June.

8. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery: 1/7 Art (105 How) was direct support of 1/18 Inf during the entire operation. By occupying the same operations base as the 1/18 Inf the fires were timely and accurate.

b. Air Force:

(1) 11/18 Air was employed on pre planned strikes, 11/18 Air coordinated air request with 1/18 and submitted all requests to Bn.

(2) Two missions were flown utilizing 2000 lbs Frog with Daisy Cutter Razzi. These were used to clear future LZ's for helicopter assault. The first mission was flown on 11 June. Other than for the Razzi, the missions were very successful, the mission was flown with 24-54 depth charges to clear suspected water mines. Results unknown.

b. Army Aviation: Army Aviation was used every day of the operation. Numerous moves of company and platoon size were made. Fire teams were on station or on call at the operation base (on a daily base) and the C & G ship was used seven to ten hours daily. Due to the inaccessibility of the RAREP the 1/18 Inf depended greatly on the Army aviation support which was exemplary. Support was provided by the 18th and 128th Aviation companies of the 11th Aviation Bn. The aircraft were used to their maximum capability on numerous occasions in the evacuation of wounded and in the resupply and extraction of platoon size elements. The success of LEXINGTON III was directly proportional to the outstanding effort and accomplishments of Army Aviation.

9. (C) RESULTS:


b. Enemy Losses:

VC KIA (2): 37 (3 by Army Air)

INSTALLATIONS

Base Camp - 11
Amo facilities - 2
Hospital - 1
Fortified positions - 4

Brooks - 10
Veh - 16
Leasing dock - 1
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WEAPONS AND AMM (cont)
Salt peter - 100 lbs
Knives - 2
Sling shot - 1

MATERIALS
Combat packs - 2
Saw - 37
Fuel oil - 1002 gal
Dry cloth - 300 sheets (12" x 12")
Water jugs - 30 (20 and 50 gal cap)
Nails - 20,000 lbs
Conc. = 200 lbs
Salt - 5 lbs
Ground prods/hold - 1
Eating dishes and utensils - 25 sets
Mirror - 1
8" boat propeller - 1
2½ T-T hydraulic jack - 1
75 lb anvil - 1
J2 wood cutting saw - 3
Portable loudspeaker - 1
10 gal cans - 8
Kerosene - 1 gal
Soldering rods - 20
Pistol belts - 3
Nail thorning machine - 1
Misc clothes - for 40 pers.
Misc tools - wrenches, files, spades, picks, shovels, rivets, nuts and bolts, planes, wedges,
Fishing tackle gear w/100 pieces of lead
Misc and supplies (vitamins, penicillin, saline solution ampules, gauge, etc)
Green parrot
Dong Ho village government - bbe - niamp

DoCuments
Propaganda books
Medical training books
Receipt from LY NHON Finance Agent
Roster of party members (pass LY NHON village)
Sketch of unknown hamlet
VC instructions on use of claymore mines
6 envelopes sent to C702 unit from various other units w/code numbers
VC receipt pod for amm (no unit shown)

o. Installation Locations:

BASE CAMPS
Y901555
Y901955
Y902055
Y903486
Y954761
Y996928
Y996978
Y596913
Y996988
Y996941
Y998656
Y996941
Y996941
Y996941
Y996941
Y996941
Y996941

AMM FACILITY
Y9095656
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
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Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616

HOSPITAL
Y9018613
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616
Y9956616

FORTIFIED POSITIONS
Y9986564
Y996941
Y996941
Y996941
Y996941
Y996941
Y996941
Y996941
Y996941
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Y996941

10. (O) ADMINISTRATION:

a. Personnel:

21 May 66

<table>
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<th>FWD</th>
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<td>122</td>
<td>127</td>
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<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>144</td>
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8 June 66
b. Administrative Plans: Flow of personnel, mail, etc. was best handled by using the O & C helicopters on a scheduled run daily between base camp and the REAR CP.

11. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. Several rice caches discovered in the Rung Sat Special Zone were destroyed by dumping it into the salt water which is found throughout the area. The base camp installations were well constructed and beyond the destructive capability of the companies operating in the AO. Engineer demolition team was on call at the operation base and also conducted instruction on demolition techniques to the companies when in reserve in the same area. Due to the many rivers and streams in the AO it was necessary to carry river crossing equipment on many operations. Nylon ropes and air mattresses were adequate. Sampans captured were also difficult to destroy. The most successful and fastest method used was a clamp on the bottom of the sampan.

b. The salt water predominant in the RSSZ caused medical problems when operation lasted more than 48 hours. Immersion foot, infection of any insect bites or small cuts were serious enough to place these individuals on light duty and cut down the combat strength of the unit.

12. (C) COMMANDER ANALYSIS: DJANGO III was termed a highly successful operation by COMSOUTH and COMSOUTHAVN. The high kill ratio and the damage to Viet Cong base camps and to their equipment and food stocks were not only effective in reducing the VC disruption of friendly shipping through the RSSZ, but they were major factors in maintaining the high morale and aggressiveness of the US troops involved. The conduct of Phase III operations improved the operation in two respects. First of all, TACR Alpha was by far the most lucrative area for operations. Second, by lengthening the time a unit spent in the swamp to 48 hours its effectiveness was increased while the favorable by-products of increasing the units time at Vung Tau and at the REAR operation base were also significant. When the 1/25 Inf returns to the RSSZ Phase III type operations should be duplicated in whatever target areas are selected.

As in overall movement in US Army Military operations in the RSSZ it would be a definite advantage for the US Army unit commander to have complete tactical freedom in his TACR, not only for his ability to respond immediately to the latest intelligence, but perhaps equally as important, to provide him an opportunity to plan ahead with some assurance that the plan will be executed. This is necessary when such requirements as LCM’s, LCPV’s, Monitors, Commandos, salvage ships, Mark 24 Depth Charges, Air Force or Navy air strikes, and others must be fulfilled. Coordination lead time involved is at least two days, preferably four or five days if L2 preparation using Daisey Cutters is required.

13. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Conclusions:
   (1) When operating in the RSSZ, operations should not exceed 48 hours without an opportunity for troops to "dry out". Two to four days of remaining dry and treatment of sores and infections were adequate to allow units to go on another operation.
   (2) A great deal of coordination is necessary with the FMF to conduct timely and effective operations. The COMSOUTH LOG’s presence in the 1/25 Inf TOP proved invaluable in accomplishing this coordination. By accompanying the RE Co in the Command and Control helicopter duringerals his direct radio contact with the R&B Force Company’s Naval Adviser provided the necessary link in this difficult coordination.
   (3) Army Aviation (RUUD and HUUD aircraft) is an absolute necessity in operation in the RSSZ.
   (4) More freedom of action by the Battalion operating in a REAR is necessary to take advantage of the most recent intelligence and activities of the VC. The time required to clear areas at this was too long to take advantage of the operation.
(5) With the exception of targets not being counted as reported, the intelligence base for the operation was largely valid in that the VC forces:
(a) Did have unreported freedom of movement.
(b) Used the waterways as a primary route of travel as evidenced by the several successful ambushes thereon.
(c) Had the majority of their facilities within a short distance from the waterways, thereby facilitating movement and the transporting of supplies and personnel to and from these facilities.
(6) That few booby traps were encountered probably resulted from the fact that the area was considered safe by the VC because of difficult terrain, excellent concealment from air and ground in the mangrove forest areas, and that few operations had penetrated the area previously.
(7) VC personnel and mortar-l losses will probably have an adverse effect on VC future plans and operations. They have probably suffered a loss of prestige in the RSSZ because of VC casualties as compared to their losses. Some of the VC propaganda of "ownership" and invulnerability in this area as a result of unrestricted US movement and VC losses.
(8) Although no contact was made with the VC 225th Engr Bn or its elements, it still cannot be confirmed whether or not a unit does exist with this identity.
(9) The fact that locations of bases found are now known, as well as the fact that the VC were forced to evacuate and disperse, will cause them to have to relocate, reconstruct, or repair these facilities. Because of the terrain, VC efforts in this regard will be hampered for some time, and the capability to support travel of VC units through the area is reduced.

b. Lessons Learned:
(1) New arrivals have a tendency to fire prior to identifying the enemy or insuring that moving objects are not friendly troops. Green troops must be indoctrinated to let the enemy close, with the idea of a first round kill.
(2) Insect bites and open sores became infected quickly in the dirty salt water found throughout the RSSZ. Operations in this area should not exceed 48 hours, troops should be given adequate time for personal hygiene and treatment of infected insect bites.
(3) When the radio terminals of the PRC-25 radio get wet the radio becomes inoperable. Corrective action of using a cigarette lighter or matches can dry these terminals. A wet handset also makes transmission impossible and by covering the handset with aluminum foil from the accessory pack of C-Rations or with a plastic bag this problem is greatly reduced.
(4) Extreme caution must be exercised in selecting landing sites during sealift operations due to tidal changes and the inconsistency of the soil composition in the RSSZ. This data can be obtained from 5-2, which is a helping factor in selecting time and place. Detailed reconnaissance insures the best possible landing sites.
(5) L2's and P2's are few and far between in the RSSZ; however by clearing some of the B-52 bomb craters, extraction could be performed by one KC-135 going in at a time. Delay cutters can be employed to clear areas for L2's. Three L2's were cleared for operations in an area inaccessible by any means except air-lift.
(6) When the short or jungle antennas are inadequate the erection of a field expedient antenna will increase the transmission range to where good communication is established. RTO's should be indoctrinated on the use of field expedient antennas.
(7) Communications between individuals in the RSSZ can be accomplished by hand clapping as this is a prevalent background noise in the mangrove swamp.
(8) River crossing equipment to include a 100-150 ft rope and air mattresses should be carried by each platoon for river crossing operations.
(9) The pace chart changes considerably in the mangrove swamp and each unit should check its pace for 100 meters. Approx 280 steps were used to measure 100 meters.
(10) The 125,000 Plate-Maps of the RSSZ are considerably better than the standard 1:50,000 maps. These maps should be made of all Vietcong and issued through normal channels. The few that the battalion used were given by the COM/LAVAN LNO.
(11) The few aerial photo maps available proved to be invaluable and units going into this area of operations should request aerial photos of their entire TAN prior to the commencement of the operation.
Two more M-60 MG's for the weapons platoon of each rifle company added considerably to the fire power of the platoon and company. Whenever the weapons platoon of a rifle company is used as a fourth rifle platoon the M-60 MG's should be made available.

Each platoon should have 4 PRC-25's due to the number of squad size ambushes each platoon is required to place out at times.

The platoon column is the only practical formation in the RSGZ because of the dense undergrowth.

Individually morale and alertness decreased after about 48 hours in the swamp. Rotating troops approx every 48 hours and giving them a 2 - 4 day break solves this problem.

The VC in the RSGZ did not appear to be well trained or aggressive.

The ambush was the most successful maneuver throughout LEXINGTON III. Maximum ambushes should be established on this type of operation. The use of RH and SHAR reports assists in picking ambush locations.

In open areas such as rice paddies, 1 ton mounted radar is very effective.

The use of sectionized paper plates proved most satisfactory in serving 8-man size in the PMZ area. S-4 should assure that an adequate number of paper plates is kept on hand. By using paper plates men-hours and cargo space are saved.

The COMPANY LNO, located right in the BN TOC proved most valuable in coordination requirements with SVN and US Navy. Whenever possible a LNO should be attached or some arrangement for coordination should be established daily.