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AD-391 282

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARM
HEADQUARTERS, 18TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
APO 96491

AYST: 15 February 1968

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned During VC/NVA TET Offensive

TO: Commanding General
   United States Army Vietnam
   ATTN: AVHCC-O
   APO 96575


2. (U) In accordance with above reference the lessons learned by the 18th Military Police Brigade during the VC/NVA TET Offensive are forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

James O'Donnell
GPI, AGC
Asst Adjutant

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FOR OR RD
682144
SECTION I - Planning and Preparation Which Affected the Command Readiness

1. (c) Items: Location of CI Field Offices and Criminal Investigation Units.

Discussion: Several field offices are located within the built-up areas of the cities in Vietnam. Many of these facilities are isolated and incapable of total self-defense, and their location presents resupply and reinforcement problems.

Lessons Learned: During the recent Tet offensive, those HP and CI facilities located at Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Vung Tau, Pleiku, Soc Trang, Can Tho had to be evacuated. Personnel were relocated to nearby military installations leaving the facilities, equipment (in some cases vehicles) in the hands of the enemy.

Recommendation: That activities within built-up areas be re-located to the nearest secure military installation or area.

2. (c) Items: Alternate Communication Center and Inadequate Protection of Communication Equipment.

Discussion: In the event of damage to or destruction of the existing AN/GRC-16, there would be no alternate means of communication with subordinate units. Also, it was determined that inadequate protection was afforded the present AN/GRC-16 from rocket or mortar attack.

Lessons Learned: Back-up AN/GRC-16 should be located in close proximity to Brigade Headquarters to function as the alternate unit. Also, this unit and the one currently being used should be protected from either direct or indirect weapons fire.

Recommendation: 1. That primary Comm Center establish a back-up capability wherein relocation of organizational equipment will enable such action.

2. That Comm Center be protected by sandbagging or similar techniques.

3. (c) Items: Alternate Command Post and Tactical Operation Center Locations.

Discussion: During the Tet offensive it was discovered that provisions did not exist for an alternate Brigade Command Post (CP) and Tactical Operation Center (TOC) if the current centers were destroyed by mortar or rocket attack.

Lessons Learned: That an alternate CP and TOC are required to insure continuity of command control, and that such facilities be hardened to withstand a rocket and/or mortar attack.

Recommendation: That alternate CP's and TOC's be constructed...
SUBJECT: Extract from Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 18th Military Police Brigade, Period Ending 22 April 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report, received as an inclosure to ORL, 18th Military Police Brigade, is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-13. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMv:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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CG, US Army Limited War Laboratory
CG, US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
4. (C) Item: Need for Qualified Interpreters.

Discussion: Since 20 October 1967, the 720th MP BN has been assigned a TAVR. During the course of operations in the TAGR, Vietnamese personnel have been used as interpreters. They assist in evaluating intelligence, translate for detainees being interrogated by the S2, assist at checkpoint operations when Vietnamese are detained, and provide a means of communication with village personnel in all phases of operations. This situation also existed at all Provost Marshal Offices, Criminal Investigation Field Offices and Military Police Stations.

Lessons Learned: During holiday periods and during operational alerts, interpreters either failed to arrive for work or were restricted from the post, leaving a definite gap in communication between US and the Vietnamese. Therefore, a need exists for permanently assigned interpreters within military police units and activities.

Recommendation: That interpreters be available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to those units which require contact with Vietnamese.

5. (C) Item: Program 5 Civilianization.

Discussion: During the TET hostilities, LN Employees were not able to report for work. The duties performed by these individuals are mission essential and military personnel must be diverted from other areas. Some duties, such as those of cooks and mechanics, require special training and cannot be performed by other personnel in the affected units.

Lessons Learned: a. Local National Employees are often not available for work during holidays and periods of heavy enemy activity.

b. Local National Employees cannot perform the secondary duties normally performed by the military personnel they replace.

c. In an emergency situation, the capabilities of units utilizing LN Employees in place of military personnel can be seriously limited.

Recommendation: That Program 5 Civilianization be discontinued and TOE positions already deleted under this program be reinstituted in the units' MTE's.
SECTION II -- Conduct of Operations During the Tet Offensive.

1. (C) Item: Excess Billet Dispersion.

Discussion: One of the major problems during the VC attack on the Saigon metropolitan area was the number and dispersion of US military and civilian billets and facilities. The 716th Military Police Battalion was guarding 130 of these facilities during the initial stages of the attack. Before the fifth day of action was completed, the battalion had either dispatched reaction forces or was providing security for an additional thirty facilities. The dispersion of facilities and the resulting dispersion of MP personnel caused two difficulties. First, the manpower and tactical problems encountered in sending reaction forces to every part of the city to reinforce the facilities as they were attacked. Secondly, the logistical problem of resupplying these personnel with rations, ammunition, and relief. In many cases, personnel remained on a static post for 36 hours because hostile fire made it impossible to get to the post.

Lesson Learned: The billets in the Saigon area are far too numerous and widespread to be protected adequately in a war zone.

Recommendation: a. That MOOSE program be fully activated to get the maximum number of personnel out of Saigon as soon as possible.

b. That the remaining personnel be consolidated in secure and defendable areas.

c. That each of these consolidated facilities be provided with a guard force from squad to platoon size, depending on the size of the facility. This force would be billeted in the facility and have sufficient weapons and supplies to sustain itself for extended periods.

d. That each of these facilities have a building defense plan with a security guard force of its own.

2. (C) Item: POL Supply.

Discussion: During the emergency period access to the centralized POL resupply points in the Saigon and Long Binh areas were restricted due to enemy activity or over use. This condition necessitated the commitment of military police personnel who were critically short, to escorting POL resupply vehicles. Because of the shortage of POL, some operations were curtailed.

Lesson Learned: In an emergency situation centralized POL resupply points are often inaccessible.

Recommendation: That stocks of POL, other than unit basic load, be strategically positioned and secured in order to prevent disruption of operations during emergencies.
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3. (C) Item: Long Binh Ammunition Storage Depot.

Discussion: On 31 January 1968, a hostile force estimated to
be a reinforced company conducted a rocket and ground attack on the Long
Binh Ammunition Supply Depot. The force of the attack succeeded in pen-
etrating three (3) concertaion fences and overrunning at least two tower
positions. After penetration was accomplished, hostile forces had clear
access to the ammo dump. Charges were placed on at least three pads which
were detonated. The entire perimeter of the supply depot is based on the
concept of surveillance rather than defensive type positions.

Lesson Learned: a. Tower guards must have ample small arms
ammunition available in their guard towers, and be equipped with hand gre-
 grenades and anti-personnel devices to retard enemy penetrations. Indirect
 weapons fire is also required.

  b. Normal towers do not afford guards any protection.

  c. There is an urgent requirement for communications
     between all towers and the CP.

  d. Due to the size of the ammo supply depot, present
     tower locations are too far apart to provide mutual support and protection.

  e. Also, some ammo storage pads are too close to the per-
     meter fences making them readily accessible to a hostile force.

Recommendation: a. That tower guards be furnished a double
basic load.

  b. That tower guards be armed with M79’s or 3 to 5 hand
     grenades in addition to their individual weapon.

  c. That an anti-personnel mine field be placed inside
     the perimeter fence.

  d. That tower guards be supplied with hand flares.

  e. That pre-planned mortar and artillery fires be estab-
     lished.

  f. That sector commanders conduct rehearsals during the
     hours of darkness to enable the force to become familiar with night operations.

  g. That raised bunkers with sandbag protection be erected,
     thus allowing personnel to remain on post and vigilant regardless of incoming
     indirect fire.

  h. That a communications system among and between towers
     and CP’s be established.

  i. That those ammo storage pads located near the fence
     line be relocated to a more secure area.
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4. (U) Item: Indicators that Enemy is in the Area.

Discussion: In the case of Qui Nhon and Nha Trang, enemy forces had infiltrated into the cities undetected by allied personnel.

Lesson Learned: Absence of civilian personnel on streets, closed shops, and list of normal flow of traffic and workers are indicators that VC may be in the area.

Recommendation: That all allied police agencies direct attention to absence of normal activities within populated areas.

5. (U) Item: Enemy infiltration method.

Discussion: In Qui Nhon, the enemy had occupied entire buildings before initiation of hostilities by tunnelling in through use of underground sewer water systems.

Lesson Learned: US/VN knowledge of sewage and water pipe line could have denied the enemy this avenue of approach.

Recommendation: That all allied police agencies obtain plans of the water and sewage systems within their area of responsibility. Also a current city map should be available.

6. (U) Item: Enemy In-City Combat Tactics.

Discussion: In Nha Trang, the enemy used the quick withdrawal tactic to draw friendly forces into forward positions where they were then pinned down by heavy concentrations of small arms fire. This afforded the enemy an opportunity to outflank and infiltrate friendly lines. Further, the quick movement of the enemy gave the impression of a much larger force than actually existed.

Lesson Learned: Do not commit all available troops to one location or to an in-city pursuit action. Retain a portion of available troops to act as back-up or reserve.

Recommendation: That friendly forces avoid overestimating enemy strength. Friendly forces should pursue by maintaining base of fire and maneuver element.

7. (C) Item: Lack of Adequate Maps.

Discussion: The available military maps of the Saigon area are neither detailed nor of sufficient accuracy to be used in the conduct of tactical operations. For example, there are numerous roads, alleys, buildings etc., that are not shown. As a result, it was extremely difficult to pass and receive pertinent information via radio pertaining to hostile locations, direction and sources of enemy fire, and the best avenues of approach to certain critical areas.

Recommendation: That present Saigon maps be updated until new maps are made available.

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8. (1) Item: Overcrowding of PW Medical Facilities.

Discussion: During this operational period the PW wards in the 30th Evacuation Hospital and 50th Medical Company (Cleaning) were filled to such capacity that the hospital could not accept more prisoner patients. Many of the patients had minor injuries (skinned elbows) which did not justify their being shipped to the hospital. In addition, many cases arrived without formal job or any other form of identification.

Lessons Learned: It appears that the capturing units were evacuating healthy patients by helicopter in an effort to avoid processing requirements. The 50th Medical Company (Cleaning) presently has inadequate facilities to handle a sudden increase of PW's during a period of increased activity.

Recommendation: a. Capturing units must exercise the responsibility for processing PW's and should not initiate immediate evacuation to hospitals unless the wounds are serious.

b. That consideration be given to expanding existing facilities.

9. (1) Item: Support to National Police.

Discussion: During the TET period, the Vietnamese National Police experienced a critical shortage of Class I and V supplies. They requested and received the following from the 710th MP Bn:

a. Frag grenades - 4 cases.

b. 5.56mm Ammo - 4 cases.

c. Rations - 140 cases.

d. 30 cal carbine ammo - 2 cases.

e. Claymore mines - 2 cases.

Lessons Learned: The National Police must have adequate supplies to enable sustained operations. Also, US units should be aware of the possibility that the National Police may require supplemental supplies when their stocks are depleted.

Recommendation: That military police units take action to pre-stock sufficient quantities of Class I, III and V supplies, to include weapons, for necessary emergency issue to the National Police.

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Military police units usually have one-vehicle military police patrols to dispatch one-vehicle military police units to trouble spots. This concept is drilled into military police operations world-wide. However, in the result of the experience gained in Saigon, it was necessary to change this concept since hostilities were in progress. A single military police vehicle is ineffective in a fire fight and if disabled, is virtually defenseless and cannot provide intelligence information via radio. In Saigon, the police tactics were modified to reflect a combat posture. All military police patrols consisted of two 1/2 ton trucks, each with a crew of at least three armed military policemen. The dual patrol concept which entailed the employment of an integral unit, provided mobile support and assistance. No single vehicles were allowed to move in Saigon to include administrative zones as well. All military police patrol units were armed with automatic weapons and in some cases, M79 grenade launchers.

Lesson Learned: In an active combat zone, etc. especially in a heavily built-up area, military police patrols should consist of two or more vehicles and be armed with M60 machine guns and M79 grenade launchers.

Statements: That all military police units conducting operations in hostile built-up areas immediately switch to the dual patrol concept.

II. (c) Items: 90mm Recoiless Rifle Ammunition

Discussion: The 7th ARVN has no authority to stock and store 90mm ammunition for their assigned weapons. However, after the initiation of hostilities they were able to obtain supplies of this needed item. Fire teams were formed consisting of a 90mm crew and a 1/2 ton truck, accompanied by an M60 machine gun crew and a 1/2 ton truck. These fire teams were kept on a standby basis in the battalion area to be dispatched when needed for a large caliber weapon.

Lesson Learned: Military police units operating in a combat zone, especially in built-up areas, can effectively employ the recoiless rifle against bunkers and buildings but must be authorized ammunition.

Statements: That 90mm units in towns and cities be authorized recoiless rifles and ammunition, and storage authorization.

II. (c) Items: Communication Equipment

Discussion: During the 1st hostilities period the rapidly changing situation necessitated constant communications between patrols and headquarters. In the case of the fighting at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, patrols were often forced to abandon their vehicles and operate on foot, thus leaving them without a communications capability.

Lesson Learned: In the rapidly changing combat situations encountered in Viet Nam, communications, both vehicular and portable are essential to an effective military police effort.
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Paragraph 12: The combat zone was monitored by the military police units operating in a

12. (C) Item: Filing of Records - Casualties.

Paragraph 13: ERGt: UN secret, subject: "Casualty Reporting, Graves Registration and Mortuary Procedures", dated 23 December 1967, re-

13. (C) Item: Reporting of Road Conditions.

Paragraph 15: During the recent VC/NA TCH hostilities, problems arose concerning the reporting of road data, to include the security condition of the roadway as well as damaged bridges, obstructions, etc. Some confusion exists as to the proper method of handling the records of casualties at the graves registration facilities. Therefore, the Graves Registration facilities be instructed to comply with provisions of USARV, subject: "Casualty Reporting, Graves Registration and Mortuary Procedures", or that other provisions for those records be established.

Paragraph 16: During the recent VC/NA TCH hostilities, some confusion exists as to the proper method of handling the records of casualties at the graves registration facilities.

Recommendation: That graves registration facilities be instructed to comply with provisions of USARV letter, subject: "Casualty Reporting, Graves Registration and Mortuary Procedures", or that other provisions for those records be established.

Recall: During the recent VC/NA TCH hostilities, problems arose concerning the reporting of road data, to include the security condition of the roadway as well as damaged bridges, obstructions, etc. Some confusion exists as to the proper method of handling the records of casualties at the graves registration facilities. Therefore, the Graves Registration facilities be instructed to comply with provisions of USARV letter, subject: "Casualty Reporting, Graves Registration and Mortuary Procedures", or that other provisions for those records be established.

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the conditions became a relatively simple matter to control and report.

Lesson Learned: A single agency should be established to accept and disseminate road condition data.

Recommendation: That the 18th MP Bde be designated the central agency to accept and disseminate road condition data.


Recommendation: A problem peculiar to Saigon exists where numerous BCQ's, BEQ's, or even 100 building clusters found in clusters throughout all sections of the city. A great majority of these billets received automatic weapons fire and personnel residing therein were not equipped to defend themselves against VC attack. Eventually the occupants received weapons of various size and description. A new problem area was when nervous occupants, often untrained civilians, started firing without benefit of an enemy target. There were many nights when indiscriminate, uncontrolled fire was directed at streets, buildings, rooftops, vehicles, alleys, friendly troops, National Police and US military police. This firing came from US billets and civilian hotels occupied by US and other national-guard personnel, and at times they produced greater danger than the VC. As a result it was necessary to dispatch military policemen to the various billets in order to stop the firing.

Lesson Learned: Military personnel billeted throughout Saigon were unarmed and unprepared to defend themselves against the VC. Defense plans and fire discipline measures were non-existent.

Recommendation: That individual billet defense plans be developed, and all occupants fully briefed on local conditions, and on their role in the defense plan. Each billet should have an internal weapon and ammunition source which should be secured and strictly controlled. It is not intended that each occupant should have a weapon, but a variable number of weapons should be available based on the location of the billet and the number of billeting occupants. There should be a radio in each billet on a common communications net to facilitate the passing of information.

7. (4) Pages: Casualty Reporting.

Recommendation: USARV Regulation 600-1, subject as above, dated 20 October 1966, requires that a telephonic report of casualty be called to USARV Casualty Section within 12 hours and if incomplete data is available, within 24 hours. During the recent VC/NVA TET hostilities, information was often not available due to the tactical situation and number of casualties being processed.

Lesson Learned: Because of tactical conditions, units are not always able to identify casualties promptly and furnish the required report within 24 hours as prescribed by USARV Reg 600-1.

Recommendation: That USARV Reg 600-1 be changed to extend the required casualty reporting time from 24 hours (incomplete data) to an indefinite reporting time.

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19. (U) Item: Special Training for City Fighting.

Discussion: Units of the 18th MP Bde while fighting in
build-up areas encountered an entirely new style of fighting. Normal MP
training did not include street and house to house fighting. As a
result military police were initially over aggressive and fired without
the benefit of an identifiable target.

Lessons Learned:

a. Combat in built-up areas involves
different techniques from those normally taught.

b. Military police were unfamiliar with the principle
of house-to-house fighting, wider and search procedures, and the rules
of engagement and target acquisition.

Recommendation:

a. That combat-in-city training, as
outlined in FM 31-50, part two and training from Army Sub Schedule
19-951 on fire discipline be given to all military personnel stationed
in built-up areas.

b. That floor plans of critical installations and
buildings be made available to aid military personnel in recapturing
buildings which have been overrun and occupied by the enemy.

19. (C) Jtgp: Alert Disaster Team Organization and Equipment.

Discussion: The current emergency mission for the 716th
MP Bn is to provide support for US Army Headquarters Area Command (USAHC)
in the conduct of disaster recovery operations in the Saigon/Cholon/Tan
Son Nhut area by providing security and damage control. The concept of
operations envisages a large scale disaster or enemy destruction such as
the blowing up of a US helipad (similar to the destruction of the
Viet Cong's headquarted by VC personnel. After confirmation of a disaster by
the Provost Marshal, the 716th MP Bn is required to dispatch a 25 man
alert force to the affected area. The team is organized into a control
and cordon team which seals off and clears the damaged area of all un-
authorized personnel; a rescue team which evacuates casualties from the
building; and a search team assists EOD personnel in locating other
bombs or explosives. The plan makes no provision for the use of battalion
military policemen as fighting units.

Lessons Learned:

a. Twenty-five man dispatched at onet ime
into an unknown situation in a built-up area such as Saigon proved un-
weary and dangerous. Tactics were changed in that 11 to 13 man teams
were deployed to make contact, explore enemy strength capabilities,
and/ or to sweep the area prior to commitment of further forces.

b. The use of 2½ ton trucks for the dispatch of troops
proved unsuitable. One of the 25 man teams was almost totally destroyed
in a 2½ ton truck when hit by an initial explosion followed by automatic
weapons fire, grenades, rockets, patchel charges, and intense small arms
fire.
c. The M-79 grenade launcher and M-60 machine gun established themselves as invaluable aids to these teams.

Recommendations:  

1. That Alert Disaster Teams be organized at a strength of 11 to 13 personnel and be armed with a M-60 machine gun and several M-79 grenade launchers.

2. That these teams travel in vehicles no larger than 1/2 ton and 3/4 ton trucks, and if possible in either APC's or V-100's.
DISCUSSION: Under the circumstances that developed in Saigon during the Tet Offensives, it became evident to the CG, 716th MP Bn that under the existing tactical situation police methods were neither adequate nor appropriate to cope with the situation. The 716th MP Bn is operationally controlled by the CG, USAHAC. This cumbersome and completely inadequate control mechanism created a situation which compelled the Battalion Commander to act without the benefit of command guidance. For instance, the battalion was not included or involved in any USAHAC plan for the defense of Saigon, nor does the battalion have a definitive command and control posture for such contingencies. In addition, a designated communication channel to any higher or supervisory channel has not been established. Information was obtained from monitoring the military police operational net and calling various agencies/units for information. The Provost Marshal, USAHAC is a staff officer and is not familiar with the capabilities and limitations of the unit and therefore, is in no position to control the battalion. It should be noted that reinforcements and resupply of the 716th MP Bn came from 8th MP Gp, 18th MP Bde. In the administrative and logistics area (89th MP Gp responsibility) there were clearly defined channels of communication, and these channels worked extremely well. Initially supplies were delivered by helicopter. Subsequent supplies were delivered via escorted supply vehicles furnished by group. Due to the excessive amount of manpower commitments, two platoons of military policemen were brought in from the 92nd Military Police Battalion (arranged through the 89th MP Gp) to reinforce Company C at MACV Headquarters. As tactical commitments began to diminish on 4 February 1968, these troops were returned to the 92nd MP Bn.

Established: The operational channels between USAHAC and the 716th MP Bn proved inadequate in a combat situation. Only through the close coordination and cooperation of the 89th MP Gp was the 716th MP Bn able to perform effectively and contribute greatly to the defense of Saigon.

Recommendation: That the 716th MP Bn be placed under the operational control of the 89th MP Gp.

21. (C) Item: Selection of 716th Military Police Battalion.

Essentially: Three companies of the 716th MP Bn are located in an extremely untenable location (Capital/St George BEQ Complex) in Saigon. These billets are located in an area that does not lend itself to ingress and egress for a 24-hour operational unit. The vehicle parking area is small and extremely congested. It has only one entrance/exit which if blocked or brought under fire would preclude vehicles from exiting. If the billets were destroyed or overrun, 3/5 of the battalion would be ineffective. There is only one approach road into and one narrow one-way route out of the area. Company C, 716th MP Bn, at MACV Annex, Tan Son Nhut, was reinforced with a platoon from the security guard company. On the afternoon of 31 January, Co C was reinforced with two platoons from the 92nd MP Bn. These platoons were eventually returned to their parent
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Unit. On 6 February, one platoon (-) with vehicles was obtained from 8th MP Co to reinforce the 716th MP Bn. With the aspect of NBC, and NBC Annex area growing in size and importance, and considering that communication and road access between north and south Saigon was blocked several times, there is every indication that an additional company is needed in the Tan Son Nhut area. Further, as the HOSES program progresses, more of the 716th MP Bn's commitments will be in the northern area of the city, and less in Saigon/Cholon.

Lesson Learned: The companies of the 716th MP Bn can be better positioned to accomplish their mission in the Saigon area.

Recommendation: a. That two companies be relocated to Tan Son Nhut area.

b. That two companies be relocated to the International Hotel.

c. That one company be located at the Ky Son Annex BEQ, which is adjacent to a secured sub-port pool of the battalion.

d. That the Capitol/St George BEQ be vacated.

22. (C) Item: Ammunition and Rations.

Discussion: Units within the Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhut area were not familiar with locations of supporting depots and procedures for re-issuing ammunition and rations; therefore, reaction time was increased during this period.

Lesson Learned: Units were not prepared to cope with requirements for immediate reaction for resupply. Commanders had not prepared procedures in advance nor indoctrinated personnel as to location and proper submission of requests to supporting depots.

Recommendation: That maps should be prepared indicating locations and routes to supporting depots. Updated requests should be prepared in advance so when a requirement arises for resupply, units need only to take and submit requisitions to supporting depots. All commanders should insure that basic loads of ammunition and rations are current and are maintained at authorized stockage levels.

23. (C) (NOFORN) Item: Effectiveness of the National Police.

Discussion: In the initial stages of the TET attack only limited numbers of National Police were available. As a result, their effectiveness was impaired.

Lesson Learned: The National Police are not aware of the requirement or necessity for constant police operations and protection to the populace. In preparing plans that involve the National Police, consideration must be given to this characteristic, as well as their belief...
Recommendations: That programs be developed to instill in the National Police a sense of urgency and responsibility as well as to upgrade their professionalism.

2. (c) Issue: Sealing off City Areas.

Discussion: Each Provost Marshal Office in II CTZ has developed plans to provide for the sealing off of certain areas in the event of terrorist activities. In a combat situation, these same techniques were implemented and extended to provide a blocking line for city defense and isolation of enemy personnel.

Lesson Learned: Techniques employed for terrorist reaction can be applied during hostile periods to prevent enemy infiltration.

Recommendation: That all contingency plans for terrorist reaction be reviewed and tailored for utilization during hostilities.

3. (c) Issue: Utilization of the V-100 Commando Vehicle.

Discussion: The 89th MP Gp dispatched two V-100's to the 716th MP Br for use as required. They were used in areas where sniper and automatic weapons fire was prevalent. They were also employed to accomplish the following:

a. Ammo resupply to isolated units and company basic loads.

b. To extricate friendly units pinned down or cut off.

c. Convoy escort of priority one items (i.e. ammo, gasoline.)

d. To draw fire from suspected sniper positions.

e. To destroy - neutralize VC sniper or light machine gun positions, especially those located in elevated positions.

f. To extricate dead or wounded personnel.

Lesson Learned: That V-100's are an extremely valuable addition to military police battalion operating under combat conditions in a city - smaller built-up area. It has an excellent combat-in-cities capability -- firepower, communication and excellent maneuverability. In addition, it suppresses the psychological deterrent factor inherent of armored vehicles, without the limitation of excess size, noise and street destruction.

Recommendation: That the 18th Military Police Brigade's request for 72 V-100's be approved as soon as possible.
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Discussion: During street fighting in Qui Nhơn, it was sometimes impossible to discern the enemy from innocent civilians. At one point, friendly forces were on one floor of a building, the enemy on another floor of the same building.

Lesson Learned: The enemy often wears civilian clothing to make his immediate identity in a combat situation impossible.

Recommendation: That psywar be tasked with instructing civilian and friendly forces in emergency procedures. Contingency plans should include plans to designate certain markings to be worn only in combat. A variety of these markings should be available.

27. Armored Vehicles.

Discussion: Armored ½ ton trucks patrolled streets and highways without difficulty in maneuvering. Their armor provided protection to personnel from small arms fire. As a result, patrols were able to maneuver to more desirable firing positions from which to lay a base of fire for supporting elements. The unprotected ½ ton truck was extremely vulnerable to small arms attack. One such vehicle was abandoned in Qui Nhơn when small arms fire punctured the tires. At least two men were shot in the leg due to the vehicle's lack of protection.

Lesson Learned: Armored ½ ton trucks and other types of armored vehicles provide adequate protection and mobility while engaging a hostile force in a city. The unprotected vehicle is easily immobilized by small arms fire.

Recommendation: That more ½ ton trucks be armored; that each area obtain V-100 vehicles and use APC on a temporary basis for city fighting.


Discussion: All units participating in firefights with VC in built up areas employed the M79 grenade launcher as a highly effective close-quarter weapon. The M60 machine gun was also very effective for suppressing VC bases of fire and gaining fire superiority. The M16, used by personnel from other units fighting side-by-side with XPh, was found to be superior to the M14 in this type fighting. The M16 delivers a greater volume of firepower at fleeting targets, thus improving chances of a hit and also reducing exposure time of the firer. The .45 caliber pistol was seldom used throughout the TET hostilities.
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Lesson Learned: The M71 grenade launcher and M60 machine gun are well suited for close combat in built up areas. The M16 is superior to the M1A for this type of fighting, and the .45 caliber pistol is of little value in this type of combat involving short ranges.

Recommendation: a. That all military police units be equipped with M16 rifles as soon as possible to improve unit capability to effectively perform rear area security missions in built up areas.

b. That MP patrols in built up areas have rifles available in their vehicles at all times. That the number of M79 and M60 be increased by action of the USAGCCPA.

29. (C) Item: Military Police Fighting in Cities.

Discussion: As was the case during TLT hostilities, Military Police may be used as initial assault and reaction forces for an extended period. Security of billets and installations may become a secondary mission.

Lesson Learned: MP need contingency plans for extended operations in cities to allow for delays in replacements, additional forces and supplies.

Recommendation: That plans allow for greater MP commitment, extended duration and action in sustained combat.

30. (C) Item: Inadequacy of TOE Weapons Allowance.

Discussion: The TOE for the 177th MP Det allows only four M1A, leaving eight personal with only .45 caliber pistols.

Lesson Learned: When the PN station is under attack, current TOE weapons are inadequate for defense.

Recommendation: That TOE authorization provide for an increase in weapons other than .45 caliber pistol.

31. (C) Item: Communications (FM Radio).

Discussion: Radio communications in each area was marked by overwhelming of the net and lack of coordination on frequencies with other allied police agencies. Some of the most common discrepancies were stations interrupting other stations. Transmission of unnecessary traffic and failure to plan message before transmission.
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Lessons Learned: inadequate communication liaison with other allied police agencies caused unnecessary duplication and traffic on the net.

Recommendation: that all personnel receive extensive instructions in radio communications procedure, and separate and sole-user frequencies be made available to all Military Police units.

32. (C) Item: Ammunition Supply Depot (ASD) Security.

Discussion: The ASD at QN received mortar fire at 0320 hrs, 31 Jan 68. Security personnel manned the towers and security CP. CP security personnel supervised and controlled security operations. A reaction force augmented the pad guards and patrolled the depot perimeter. Confusion resulted from dual chain of command and responsibility and excessive personnel at the depot.

Lesson Learned: Excessive personnel at the depot hindered the security mission; pad guards firing inside the depot endangered lives and ammunition within the depot.

Recommendation: That minimum personnel for operational requirements be present at any time; that pad guards be replaced by roving vehicle patrols within the perimeter; that one clear chain of command for all ASD personnel be established for control purposes.

33. (C) Item: Ammunition Re-Supply.

Discussion: Military police detachments in Dalat and Ban Me Thout encountered some difficulty in being re-supplied with ammunition. Other US units in the area were in short supply of ammunition, thereby limiting their capability to assist the military police. Also complicating the problem was the fact that some of the military policemen were armed with the M-14 rifle and some (dog handlers) were armed with the M-16 rifle. Ammunition had to be re-supplied from Cam Ranh Bay and Pha Trang and, initially, some difficulty was encountered in acquiring aircraft.

Lesson Learned: Small, isolated military police units can encounter difficulties in being re-supplied due to non-availability of aircraft or the hostile situation. Personnel should not be armed with different types of weapons.

Recommendation: That double basic loads be stockpiled at isolated units and that all personnel assigned to these locations be armed with the same type rifle, preferably the M-16.

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34. (A) Item: Notification of Friendly Forces and Non-combatant Personnel.

Discussion: In Qui Nhon and Nha Trang, many US military personnel and civilians live in houses without numerical designations or telephones.

Lesson Learned: Many unarmed personnel did not receive protection and information because their locations were unknown.

Recommendation: That Payvar initiate a plan whereby personnel may be instructed in emergency measures by aircraft loudspeakers.

35. (B) Item: Log System for Tactical Emergencies.

Discussion: Headquarters, 16th MP Group established a journal-log system covering each event by area, rather than by enemy operation.

Lesson Learned: Keeping a log by area of operations rather than occurrence of enemy activity provided a ready reference of information for evaluation.

Recommendation: That each major MP headquarters institute a log by operational area, listing enemy activity and disposition of friendly troops.

36. (C) Item: Coordination with Allied Military Police.

Discussion: Much of the city fighting was conducted by combined US, VN and ROK MP. In some instances, confusion and duplication resulted from lack of overall command supervision among allied police agencies.

Lesson Learned: More positive and accurate information for decisions and deployment of troops would have been affected under a centralized police headquarters.

Recommendation: That a combined Police Operations Center be established, consisting of representatives from all police forces of the area concerned. The primary mission of the center would be to coordinate and control police operations during hostile activities.

37. (D) Item: Reporting of Combat Equipment Losses.

Discussion: While experienced difficulty in the procedures for reporting combat losses, combat losses often had to be returned to units for additional information.

Lesson Learned: That personnel responsible for preparing combat losses were unfamiliar with procedures required for submission of these reports.

Recommendation: All commanders must insure that their personnel are thoroughly familiar with submission procedures for combat losses.
38. (C) Lack: Lack of Intelligence Information.

Discussion: There was a lack of intelligence information available during the Tac hostilities. Reports were often incomplete or incorrect and rumors were often taken as facts.

Lesson Learned: At each level of command, there should be one specific agency established solely for collecting and disseminating intelligence information. Before reporting spotted intelligence information, personnel must ensure that their information is complete and accurate. A system is needed to facilitate the timely and accurate exchange of information.

Recommendation: Command emphasis should be directed toward improving the intelligence system at all levels of command. Coordination should be effected with all available operation centers and intelligence agencies to include ARVN, PWP, and National Police. Most importantly, intelligence information should be rapidly evaluated and disseminated.

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Extract from Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, 18th Military Police Brigade (U)

Experiences of units engaged in counterinsurgency operations: Feb - 30 Apr 69

CC, 18th Military Police Brigade

13. ABSTRACT

N/A

12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

N/A

10. OTHER REPORT NOTES (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)

N/A

9. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER

682144

8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.

N/A

7. PROJECT NO.

N/A

6. REPORT DATE

13 February 1969

5. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES

20

4. REPORT TITLE

Extract from Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, 18th Military Police Brigade (U)

3. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Company name)

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

2. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

1. REPORTING ORGANIZATION

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310