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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

C. A. STANFIELD
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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Commanding Officers:
3d Battalion, 197th Artillery
1st Squadron, 18th Air Cavalry (Sep)
2d Battalion, 138th Artillery
5th Bn, 27th Arty
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion, 37th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Reports Control Symbol CSFDR (R1)

TO:

SECTION I (U) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) GENERAL

   a. The battalion's mission at the beginning of the reporting period was general support, Free World Military Armed Forces, Central Coastal Region, II Corps Tactical Zone and attached to I Field Force Vietnam Artillery. Effective 16 April 1968, the battalion's mission was changed to general support, United States, Free World Military Armed Forces and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, II Corps Tactical Zone with no change in attachment. In addition, mission was given to establish fire support coordination in Tuyen Du, Loc Dong, Binh Thuan, and Ninh Thuan Provinces. The new missions necessitated the geographical relocation of the battalion command post to Phan Thiet and the battalion rear to Phan Rang.

   b. The battalion was tasked to provide a fire support coordination element at Phan Rang Air Force Base effective 19 March 1968. Some accomplishments to date are as follows:

   (1) Coordination of available fires for the defense of the Phan Rang Air Force Base.

   (2) Assumption of operational control of the AN/FPQ-4 Counterbattery Radar presently positioned at the base.

   (3) Instruction of air base security personnel in artillery adjustment procedures.

   (4) Establishment of survey control to all artillery positions in Ninh Thuan Province and to RNZ. 11m and 4.2 mortar positions, Du Long Sub Sector. A compass declination station was also constructed at Du Long Sub Sector.

   (5) A trained US fire direction computer has been positioned with the ARVN artillery with the mission of working with ARVN advisory personnel to assist ARVN fire direction centers.

   c. Assigned and attached units 1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968. (See Inclosure 1)
2. (0) INTELLIGENCE

a. Throughout the reporting period this unit coordinated and received intelligence from the following:

(1) Capital Republic of Korea Infantry Division
(2) 5th Republic of Korea Infantry Division
(3) 22nd Army Republic of Vietnam Infantry Division
(4) 23rd Army Republic of Vietnam Infantry Division
(5) Tuy Hoa Garrison
(6) Tuy Hoa Air Force Base
(7) Sector Operations and Intelligence Center, MACV, Tuy Hoa
(8) National Police Headquarters, Tuy Hoa
(9) 5th Special Forces Group
(10) Binh Dinh Self-Defense Sector Headquarters
(11) Operations and Intelligence Center, MACV, Van Binh
(12) 173rd Airborne Brigade
(13) 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division
(14) Operations and Intelligence Center, MACV, Phan Thiet
(15) Phan Rang Air Force Base
(16) Sector Operations and Intelligence Center, MACV, Phan Rang

b. Artillery targeting was performed by the S-2 section throughout the reporting period for both organic and nonorganic batteries. Due to the widespread deployment of the battalion's organic firing batteries, detailed target acquisition and analysis was not possible. Periodic intelligence reports and lists of outstanding artillery targets were forwarded to the batteries as they became available. Firing batteries controlled by the battalion FSCO however, received intensive, detailed target acquisition and analysis from the battalion S-2. Comprehensive target lists were compiled for their areas and continually updated. Acquired and interdiction targets were identified, analyzed and forwarded to the firing batteries with the aid of targeting

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files and overlays depicting the following information:

(1) Visual Reconnaissance: Visual reconnaissance reports were received regularly from NCOs, army pilots, FAC and the battalion's aerial observer. The aerial observer was briefed and debriefed for all visual reconnaissance missions. In addition, all pilots were cognizant of the battalion fire frequencies which they utilized during visual reconnaissance for immediate intelligence feedback and calls for fire.

(2) Rod Hzos: Requests for high priority areas in which rod hazy roadouts were derived on a regular basis were forwarded to higher headquarters each month to be included in the ILGV aerial reconnaissance program. Additionally, periodic flights, including inflight roadout to the F3C0 and firing batteries, were requested as required.

(3) SPAZS: SPAZS were received on a regular basis from the US intelligence sources in the area. When possible, visual reconnaissance of the area was immediately performed and if the criteria for acquired targets were met, fire was placed on the target area.

(4) Agent Reports: Daily agent reports were received by the battalion through US military intelligence channels and ILGV.

(5) Photo, SLAR and imagery interpretation updates were requested as required to support particular operations or probe specific intelligence buildup.

Because the battalion is responsible for fire support in the four southern provinces of II Corps Tactical Zone, it is anticipated that an S-2 representative will be established at all province headquarters and possibly other key locations to serve as a targeting agency. This plan should accomplish the following:

(1) A basic foundation for intelligence and artillery targeting will be laid throughout the battalion's area of responsibility. Coordination between representatives of this battalion and local intelligence channels in the provinces will not only provide a degree of targeting throughout the provinces but will provide a strong intelligence and targeting foundation in case the battalion F3C0 deploys to those provinces in the future.

(2) Battalion S-2 representatives will be able to instruct US personnel in a correct method of artillery targeting, eventually enabling the USN to develop a sound program for the acquisition and analysis of artillery type targets.

3. (c) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES

a. Operations:
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7 May 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery for Period
Ending 30 April 1966, Reports Control Symbol 05908-65 (R1)

(1) During the reporting period, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery participated in the following operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIGHLY OR 1 ROAD SECURITY</td>
<td>1 February 1966 to 30 April 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFEND C7 FIA TAKING COMPLEX</td>
<td>1 February 1966 to 30 April 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONS PELALIN</td>
<td>1 February 1966 to 30 April 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAK CHAK UPRUMP</td>
<td>1 January 1966 to 1 April 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MING HD 10</td>
<td>28 February 1966 to 4 March 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COOKLINE</td>
<td>2 April 1966 to 5 April 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAM HD 4 9</td>
<td>13 April 1966 to 30 April 1966</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) HIGHWAY OR 1 SECURITY

(a) Throughout the entire reporting period Battery C (4 Ht) 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery was located at OQ 104 073. From 1 February 1966 until 16 April 1966, Battery C had the mission of general support, Free World Military Forces, 9th Army corps. On 16 April 1966 the mission of Battery C was changed to general support, Free World Military Forces and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, Central Coastal Region, II Corps Tactical Zone. Calls for fire were received primarily from Korean forward observers of 1st Battalion, 29th Regiment, 9th Republic of Korea Infantry Division. Calls for fire were also received from 6th Battalion, 52nd Artillery Liaison Officer at 9th Republic of Korea Infantry Division Artillery Headquarters, MACV, Van Minh Sector, NDK aerial observers and 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery ground and air observers.

(b) Total missions fired by type:

- Confirmed: 76
- Acquired: 100
- Counterbattery: 50
- Preparation: 67
- Interdiction: 4110
AVGC-114-U

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1969, Reports Control Symbol OSFOR (E1)

7 May 1969

Special purpose (registration, calibration, illumination and defensive concentrations) 163

Others (training, demonstration and service practice) 30

Total rounds fired 14,094

(a) Results:

VO KIA (body count) 30

VO WIA 2

Weapons captured 2

Garrisons destroyed 3

Military structures destroyed 3

Outpost destroyed 3

(b) Defense of Nha Trang Complex

(a) Battery D (Prov) (2 HN) was positioned at CP 034 511 during the entire reporting period with the mission of defense of the Nha Trang Complex. Two officers and ten enlisted men from battalion headquarters are permanently assigned at Nha Trang to provide the necessary command and fire direction elements. Battery B has been tasked to provide the two howitzers on a permanent basis. Battery D (Prov) received calls for fire from units of 5th SPGA, Camp McDermott Security Company, Naval Coastal Surveillance, Khanh Hoa District, 183rd Aviation Company, 14th EFAC and Dien Khanh CIDG.

(b) Total missions fired by type:

Confirmed 55

Acquired 56

Counterbattery 28

Preparation 2

Interdiction 431
Operational Report of 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Reports Control Symbol OSFOR-65 (Hi)

Special purpose (registration, calibration, illumination and defensive concentrations) 122

Others (training, demonstrations and service practice) 27

Total rounds fired 5697

(a) Results:

VO KI (body count) 30

VO VI 1

Secondary explosions 4

(b) OPERATION MULAIN

Operation Mulain was in progress at the beginning of and at the end of the reporting period. Concept of operation: The 3rd Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry in coordination with 3rd and 4th Battalion, 44th ARVN Regiment and Regional Forces of the Phun Thiet area conduct search and destroy operations in AO Mulain. Provide security for the Revolutionary Development Teams in the Phun Thiet area.

(b) The mission of Battery D, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery at the beginning of the reporting period was reinforcing the fires of Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 320th Airborne Artillery. Effective 16 April 1968, the battery's mission was changed to general support United States, Free World Military Armed Forces and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces in Long Dong, Tuyen Duong, Minh Thuan and Binh Thuan provinces.

(c) On 4 February 1968, a 2½ ton truck of Battery B was involved in a mine incident. The mine was command detonated and was accompanied by enemy small arms fire. The vehicle was destroyed and four personnel were wounded.

(d) On 4 February 1968, Battery B moved from FSB Judy to vicinity AO 778 108 to conduct an artillery raid. The Battery fired 757 rounds on three confirmed and two special purpose targets then closed back into FSB Judy the same date.

(e) On 21 February 1968, Headquarters, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery deployed one officer and 23 enlisted men to AO Mulain by air. The breakdown of personnel and duties were as follows:
(1) One officer and 2 enlisted men to establish liaison with NVA Sector Headquarters at Than Thiet.

(2) 20 EM attached to Battery B to provide security in order to release maneuver elements for direct employment against the enemy.

(a) On 24 April 1966, Battery B, less two howitzers, from FSB Judy, AB 726 1133, made a combat assault on LZ Cannon, AB 804 409, to be in position to fire a preparation on LZ Circus for a combat assault by Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 520th Airborne Artillery. Preparation fires for LZ Cannon were delivered by the 1st Platoon, Battery B, 39th ARVW, 39th ARVW Artillery. Battery B assumed the additional mission of reinforcing the fires of Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 520th Airborne Artillery.

(b) On 26 April 1966, Battery B (-) hollifted from LZ Cannon to Fort Pitt AB 849184 and resumed their previous mission.

(c) On 27 April 1966, the remaining two howitzers of Battery B, closed out FSB Judy and road marched to Ham Thuan AB 771096 to establish a new fire base with no change in mission.

(i) Total missions fired by type:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquired</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterbattery</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
<td>1,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special purpose (registration, calibrations, illumination and defensive concentrations)</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (training, demonstration and service practice)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total rounds fired</td>
<td>25,510</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(j) Results:

| VC KIA (body count)           | 84     |
| VC WIA                        | 2      |
OPERATION OAK CHAN UPSUM

(a) Operation Oak Chan Upsum was in progress at the beginning and end of the reporting period. Concept of operation: Capital Republic of Korea Infantry Division in coordination with 22nd Army Republic of Vietnam Infantry Division and Binh Dinh Self-Defense Sector forces conduct search and destroy operations within their area of operations to destroy VC/NVA forces. Battery A, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery had the mission of general support of the Binh Dinh Self-Defense Sector. On 28 February 1968 to 5 March 1968, Battery-A, was assigned an additional mission of supporting operation King No 10, with no change in location.

(b) On 20 February 1968, Battery A was placed under operational control of 41st Artillery Group with no change in mission or location.

(c) The morning of 4 March 1968, Battery A was attacked by the D300 NVA Sniper Battalion with small arms, 81-90 rockets, 60mm mortars and explosives. (See After Action Report, Enclosure 2).

(d) On 2 April 1968, Battery A moved north to LZ Uplift, BP 922748, to support Operation Cookies. The Battery returned 6 April 1968 to support Operation Oak Chan Upsum.

(e) On 12 April 1968, Battery A was released from OPCON of 41st Artillery Group and Operation Oak Chan Upsum. The Battery reverted to battalion control and was tasked to support the 2nd ARVN Ranger Group on Operation Blue Bon."
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7 May 1968


Counterbattery 0
Preparation 7
Interdiction 1,458
Special purpose (registration, calibrations, illumination and defensive concentrations) 255
Others (training, demonstrations, and service practice) 17
Total rounds fired 17,752

(a) Results: (Does not include attack on the battery position)

VC XII (body count) 70
VC XII 5
Buildings destroyed 53
Buildings damaged 25
Bunkers destroyed 5
Bunkers damaged 10
Scupons destroyed 20
Scupons damaged 9
Documents 1
Weapons captured 3

(6) OPERATION NING HD 10

(a) Operation NING No 10 commenced on 28 February 1968 and terminated on 4 March 1968. Concept of operation: 1st Regiment, Capital Republic of Korea Infantry Division conduct multi-battalion search and destroy operations in the northern portion of Binh Dinh Self-Defense area. Battery L, supporting Operation Chuk Chum Upem, received the additional mission to reinforce the fires of Battery B (3 DIV), 10th Bk: Artillery Battalion. Battery B (3 DIV) joined Battery L in position 28 February 1968 to support the operation.
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(7) OPERATION COCHISE:

(a) Operation Cochise was in progress when Battery A, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery was tasked to provide additional artillery support in the area of operations. Concept of operation: Elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in coordination with 22nd Army Republic of Vietnam Infantry Division conduct search and destroy operations against the VC/NVA forces of the Dong Son area. On 2 April 1968, Battery A moved to LZ Uplift and assumed the mission of reinforcing the fires of 7th Battalion 13th Artillery.

(b) On 5 April 1968, Battery A was released from Operation Cochise to return to their original position and resume artillery support of Operation Chak Cham Upsam.

(g) Total missions fired by type:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquired</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterbattery</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special purpose (registration, calibrations, illumination and defensive concentrations)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (training, demonstrations and service practice)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total rounds fired</td>
<td>2854</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) VC KIA (body count)                     | 1        |

Buildings destroyed                        | 15       |
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AVCM-AH-C
7 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Reports Control Symbol OPRB-65 (21)

Counterbattery 1
Preparation 1
Interdiction 90
Special purpose (registration, calibrations, illumination and defensive concentrations) 4
Others (training, demonstrations and service practice) 0
Total rounds fired 1148

(a) Results:
Secondary explosion 1

(b) OPERATION D.JI HAO 9

(a) Operation Dcn Hoc 9 commenced on 13 April 1968 and was in progress at the end of the reporting period. Concept of operation: The 2nd ARVN Ranger Group in coordination with Regional and Popular Forces of Tay Son Dau and Long An provinces conduct search and destroy operations along CL 20 between Drilt and Ben Loo cities. Battery 2, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery was released from Operation Chai Chun Isum 12 April 1968 and assigned the mission of general support of the 2nd Ranger Group. A battalion liaison team accompanied the battery. The battery and liaison section was airlifted from Phu Cat to Dcn Trang by C-130 aircraft 13 April 1968 to assume their new mission in an eight man section with necessary equipment from Service Battery was airlifted 13 April 1968 to Drilt airfield to establish a FSA to support Battery... 

(b) To further extend artillery coverage and provide the desired support to maneuver elements the following moves were conducted:

(1) On 17 April 1968, Battery A motor marched to BN 058363 with no change in mission.

(2) On 20 April 1968, Battery A motor marched to BN 970847 with no change in mission.

(3) On 23 April 1968, Battery A motor marched to BN 151009 with no change in mission.
7 May 1968


(a) On 26 April 1968, Battery 4 motor marched to HP 225193 with no change in mission.

(b) Total missions fired by type:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquired</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterbattery</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special purpose (registration, calibrations, illumination and defensive concentrations)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (training, demonstration and service practice)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total rounds fired 765

(c) Results: None

b. Training

(1) Adjustment of artillery:

(a) On 25 to 29 March 1968, approximately 400 Air Force security personnel of Phan Rang Air Base in classes of 25 men each, attended two hours of classroom instruction on adjustment of artillery. One hour was devoted to artillery terms and general information. The remaining hour to simple adjustment techniques. A final live fire service practice was conducted with selected students adjusting a total of 10 missions. Members of the battalion survey team installed and oriented maps with direction finders in each base perimeter guard tower. Tower personnel were then instructed on the use of the direction finders.

(b) On 30 May 1968, the battalion S-2 and aerial observer conducted two hours of forward observer procedure classes for Air Force Forward Air Controllers assigned to Sector, MACV Phan Thiet. The class was well received and of such initial success that more classes will be given in the near future to both the P.L.O.'s and Army Aviators of the Phan Thiet area.
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(2) ARVN Training:

(a) On 13 April 1968 the battalion FSCO team at Phan Rang installed a qualified fire direction computer with ARVN Artillery of Minh Thuan Province. This mission is to teach all aspects of FDC on a continuing basis. To date, on the spot instruction has been provided 2nd Platoon, Battery B, 39th Artillery Battalion, ARVN for 12 days and 1st Platoon, Battery L, 231st Artillery Battalion, ARVN for 5 days. The instruction was well received and marked improvement of FDC procedures shown. Instruction included physical layout of the FDC, fire direction procedures, conduct of registrations and application of registration corrections.

(b) Associate Battery Programs:

(1) The battalion presently is participating in the I FFORCEN/ARVN Associate Battery Program. The program is designed to augment existing advisory programs so that the effectiveness of ARVN forces can be improved. The following assignments of associate batteries have been made:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARVN</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>BAT-LICHT UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/4/231 Arty</td>
<td>Phan Thiet</td>
<td>Liaison team at MLG assisted by Battery B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/4/232 Arty</td>
<td>Minh Hoa</td>
<td>Battery C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4/232 Arty</td>
<td>Nha Trung</td>
<td>Battery D (Prov)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) An initial liaison visit has been made to all units to determine immediate requirements. However, in the case of 2/4/232 at Minh Hoa, Battery C has been providing instruction, material and maintenance aid for the past eight months. (For complete report see Enclosure 3)

(3) Battalion Training:

(a) The battalion sent three battery fire direction officers, six battery FDC personnel and two radio repairmen to Chu Lai for PABAC training 14 April to 20 April 1968. Areas stressed were programming for type caliber, input of firing data, program test procedures and use of test equipment. The battalion received four PABAC's, eight 3 KW 400 cycle generators and the applicable test equipment at the conclusion of the school. The PABAC's are presently being deployed to the firing batteries.

(4) Routine Training:

(a) When operational missions permitted, batteries conducted an average of 2½ hours training per dry. Special emphasis was given to improving fire

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direction and howitzer section proficiency. During the reporting period the battalion conducted an equivalent of 32 days of training.

(b) The firing batteries of this battalion spent the equivalent of 11 days conducting tactical moves during the reporting period. The remaining time of the reporting period was spent supporting combat operations. (See Enclosure 4).

(c) Army aircraft Utilization:

(d) Aircraft support was excellent throughout the reporting period. The battalion at the beginning of the reporting period received one UH-1H onclermant days. On 2 April 1968, the UH-1H began reporting onch Tuesday, Friday, and Sunday. From the beginning of the reporting period to 16 March 1968, the battalion received one 0-10 on a daily basis. Since 16 March 1968, the battalion has received two 0-10’s daily. This has enabled the firing batteries to be registered an average of five days per week. Additionally the number of hours available for surveillance and target acquisition has increased. Medium helicopter support has been on an as-required basis for combat assaults and resupply.

(e) Aircraft utilization and times for the reporting period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Utilization</th>
<th>UH-1</th>
<th>0-1</th>
<th>CH-47</th>
<th>CH-54</th>
<th>Total hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>322:15</td>
<td>33:45</td>
<td>12:50</td>
<td>0:00</td>
<td>872:05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire missions</td>
<td>3:25</td>
<td>173:40</td>
<td>0:00</td>
<td>0:00</td>
<td>177:05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance</td>
<td>5:55</td>
<td>187:20</td>
<td>0:00</td>
<td>0:00</td>
<td>193:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resupply</td>
<td>11:10</td>
<td>0:00</td>
<td>121:45</td>
<td>0:00</td>
<td>132:55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total hours</td>
<td>342:45</td>
<td>394:45</td>
<td>134:35</td>
<td>0:00</td>
<td>872:05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft days</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>89</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. (c) LOGISTICS

a. During the period 1 February 1968 through 30 April 1968 the battalion logistical operation was as wide spread as the area of tactical operation. Until 13 April 1968 the logistic support for the battalion evolved principally from five centers from Qui Nhon in the north to Phan Thiet in the south. The base of the battalion logistical operation was located at Nha Be, with the
battalion headquarters. All TA and TOE equipment was controlled by the central Issue Facility and the property book sections. This equipment was drawn from the Cam Ranh Bay Depot and transported by road to Tay Hoa by the Battalion S-4 Section. Generally speaking the current requisition procedures and the support rendered by the Cam Ranh Bay Depot have been creditable. Most shortages have been temporary in nature with only those items in short supply country-wide being a problem.

b. The 356th Light Maintenance Company (DS) located in Tuy Hoa, supported the battalion maintenance section with repair parts and with 3rd echelon maintenance support. The support provided by this company steadily improved during this period with the greatest single improvement being the addition of a signal equipment repair section. With this addition and the accompanying local x signal PLL, 3rd echelon repairs for all signal equipment was greatly facilitated. The 356th with a direct support capability, experienced considerable difficulty in providing adequate artillery maintenance support. The primary causes of this deficiency was the large geographic area that the company was assigned and the shortage of assigned personnel. The Tuy Hoa Sub Area Command provided the battalion with class I, III, and V supplies for the battalion headquarters elements and for Battery C.

c. During the same period Battery A was located in the Qui Nhon Sub Area Command area of logistical support. The 5th Maintenance Battalion with its organic support companies provided the battery with good 3rd echelon maintenance support. In contrast to the case in Tuy Hoa, the 618th Maintenance Company (GS) provided the battery with very creditable artillery support. The general support role of the company greatly increased the support capability in terms of authorized and assigned personnel. In addition to the added manpower resources, the unit was better equipped in terms of equipment and facilities. A major advantage of this GS unit over the DS unit in Tuy Hoa, in terms of organic capabilities, was the ability to repair optic equipment at the unit rather than to evacuate the equipment to Cam Ranh Bay, a procedure which has proven to be very costly in terms of time. In addition to the maintenance support provided by the 5th Maintenance Battalion, other agencies of the Qui Nhon Sub Area Command provided Battery A with nearly all of its logistical needs. Battery A drew all class I, III, and V directly from the respective issue points.

d. During the initial portion of this period, Battery B received nearly all supplies from the Forward Supply Activity at Phan Thiet operated by the 1st Logistical Command.

e. On 13 April 1968 with the movement of battalion headquarters from Tuy Hoa and Battery A from Qui Nhon the logistical operations of the battalion became oriented to a southerly flow of supplies from Cam Ranh Bay. The battalion central issue facility and the property book sections have been relocated in
Phan Rang with the mission of operating the OIF for the issue and turn-in of TA-50-901 equipment for incoming and departing personnel and the issue and turn-in of all TOE equipment as it is moved from Cam Ranh Bay to Phan Rang and then to the respective batteries. Additionally the battalion established two forward supply points - one in Phan Thiet and a second in Dalat for class I, III and V. Third echelon maintenance support in the Dalat, Phan Rang and Phan Thiet areas is provided by the 69th Maintenance Battalion (GS) from Cam Ranh Bay. Due to the large operational area bounded by these three cites, maintenance support is accomplished by mobile contact teams from the 69th.

f. Under the present battalion disposition, Battery B and Battery D are the only elements dependent upon a northerly flow of supplies from Cam Ranh Bay. In both cases the batteries draw class I, III, and V supplies directly from Nha Trang Sub Area Command or from the Cam Ranh Bay Depot. Maintenance support is provided by the 63rd Maintenance Company, an organic company of the 69th Maintenance Battalion.

g. The primary problem area that the battalion has had and continues to have is the inability of support maintenance units to provide adequate 3rd echelon maintenance for the M101A1, 105mm howitzers in the battalion. Frequently the lack of repair parts has prevented support maintenance units from accomplishing timely repairs. Although the battalion has experienced some other logistical problems they have been either minor or short lived and have not significantly hampered this unit's ability to perform its mission.

h. On 4 March 1968 the battalion requisitioned the additional TOE equipment authorized under the G-series HTOE which became effective 1 May 1968.

5. (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS

a. All batteries of this battalion were active in civic action projects during the reporting period; however the extent of participation by each battery was dependent upon the tactical situation in their area. The projects undertaken consisted of donation of ammunition boxes to orphanages for building furniture, medical treatment of sick and wounded civilians, contribution of food and assisting in building a school in Tho Lam Hamlet, Phu Yen Province.

b. The school building was a joint effort between the district advisor and this organization. This battalion provided building materials and transportation to haul the building materials. The labor was provided by the local villagers. The project was not completed by this organization because of it's relocation from Phu Yen Province to Binh Thuan Province. The 6th Battalion, 32nd Artillery took over this project to assist in its completion.
CONFIDENTIAL 7 May 1968

SUBJECT:  Operational Report of 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, Reports Control Symbol OSFOR-65 (21)

a. The battalion became interested in the Lam Hamlet as a result of a visit to the village following an incident involving allied artillery fires of another unit in which two Vietnamese Nationals were killed and five wounded. To show the deep regret and sorrow felt by this battalion, families of the victims were given food, money and building materials to repair their homes which were also damaged by the artillery fires. Later a NGDCAP project was started to treat the villagers on a continuing basis. Subsequently, it was felt that something should be done which would promote lasting friendship with the villagers. After consultation with the district advisor the school project was initiated.

d. Battery B, in conjunction with the civic action officer of 506th Infantry Battalion, 101st Airborne Division and the Vietnamese National Police participated in a civic actions project in Muong Nan Hamlet which led to the discovery and arrest of the village's Viet Cong infrastructure. Battery B conducted NGDCAP visits, showing motion picture films to the villagers and passing out candy to the village children.

SECTION II (U) LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. (U) PERSONNEL: None
2. (U) OPERATIONS: None
3. (U) TRAINING: None
4. (C) INTELLIGENCE: Improving Artillery Targeting.

a. OBSERVATION: United States liaison parties located with or near ARVN artillery headquarters should help develop and utilize ARVN targeting capabilities.

b. EVALUATION: ARVN Artillery Officers are both eager and receptive to a formal targeting procedure. Explanation of a sound method of targeting has assisted the ARVN to develop a similar system, utilizing their own intelligence channels and aerial observers as well as US agencies. A functional ARVN targeting program can often lead to more timely artillery fire on acquired targets since the ARVN possesses certain intelligence information that is delayed in getting into US channels. Additionally, an effective ARVN targeting program builds in both ARVN and US troops greater confidence and esteem in the ARVN Artillery.
c. RECOMMENDATION:

(1) US Artillery units with liaison parties at NAGV or ARVN headquarters should instruct, as a minimum, the following individuals in proper artillery targeting procedures:

(a) ARVN artillery liaison officers to NAGV Province or District headquarters. This individual is often the battery commander or platoon leader of the local ARVN artillery unit.

(b) The ARVN Artillery Battery Commander and his key subordinates.

(c) The ARVN province or district S-2.

(d) The ARVN province or district S-3.

(2) It is recommended that the responsibility for targeting be placed upon the artillery liaison officer if he is co-located with the ARVN S-2 representative. If there is no artillery liaison officer or if he is unable to meet daily with the S-2 representative, it is recommended that the ARVN S-2 become the primary artillery targeting agency. Emphasis should be placed on the fact that the ARVN S-3 is usually not the best qualified individual to perform actual artillery targeting. Though he may contribute valuable information to the overall program, the S-3’s knowledge of detailed artillery procedures and current intelligence estimates is not sufficient to make him an effective primary targeting agency.

(3) The ARVN individuals concerned with targeting should be instructed in all facets of artillery targeting employed by the US Artillery. Particular emphasis should be placed on timely analysis and reaction to ARVN S-2 agent report and visual reconnaissance. A sense of urgency must be developed in all individuals concerned for the acquired artillery targets just as for support of troops in contact.

(4) Free exchange of information and targets between the individuals performing targeting for both the ARVN and US artillery units must be emphasized. This procedure will improve targeting for the artillery of both countries and, particularly will provide a continual liaison for the ARVN through which their procedures may be eventually perfected.

5. (U) LOGISTICS: None

6. (U) ORGANIZATIONS: None
7. (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS: Rehabilitation of Civilians.

a. OBSERVATION: During time of war innocent civilians often suffer at the hands of enemy as well as friendly forces in both material damage and human suffering.

b. EVALUATION: When these incidents do occur there must be immediate action initiated to aid and rehabilitate the victims. Delays will only cause needless discomfort, suffering and distrust. Immediate action can win the trust and cooperation of the people.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Unit civic action teams must be deployed immediately following destructive actions to determine assistance required, initiate immediate repairs and rehabilitation and expedite restitution claims.
AVFA-AT-D (7 May 66) 1st Ind


DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-CC-OT, APO 96350

1. (C) Reference paragraph 4(c), section 2, page 17, Improving Artillery Targeting. Concur. All subordinate units will be informed of this recommendation by separate action.

2. (C) Reference paragraph 7(c), section 2, page 19, Rehabilitation of Civilians. Concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

GERALD G. YOUNG
Major, Artillery
Adjutant
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1966, RG3 OSPOR-65 (R1)

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVAOC-DST, APO 96375

Concur.

ROBERT C. GREGORY
ASSISTANT COMMANDER

Copy furnished:
FOR THE COMMANDER:

IPFORCEN Arty
AVHOC-DST (7 May 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 5 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery as indorsed.

2. Concur with report as submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ, I FFV
HQ, 5th Bn, 27th Arty
GPOP-DT (7 May 68) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ 4th Bn 27th Arty
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 14 JUN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and
forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report
as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

K. P. OSBOURN
M.T. AGC
Asst AG
1. (U) Assigned and attached units 1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968

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<td>Battery C, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery</td>
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 5TH BATTALION 27TH ARTILLERY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96316

AVC-AB-0

12 March 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report

Commanding General
Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96350

1. The morning of 4 March 1968, Battery A, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery was attacked by an unknown size force of NVA with small arms, B-40 rockets and 60mm mortars. The attacking unit was later reported to be the 5300 Sapper Battalion.

2. At 0130 hours, security personnel of OP1, furnished by 942nd Regional Force Company, observed movement to their east (See diagram, Point C) and began firing small arms and a 60mm into the area. They were augmented by a 60mm mortar firing shell US and illumination and a .30 cal machine gun organic to the EF Company. The Battery A Commander went to OP1 to make an estimate of the situation. At this time fire was further augmented by a .30 cal machine gun of Battery B (-), 10th ROK Battalion. The battery commander having observed the enemy move toward the perimeter fence (See diagram, point D), ordered OP1 reinforced with an N-60 machine gun from OP2 of the US Battery. Battery A then fired self-illumination with a 105mm howitzer. The N-42 (40mm) was directed to sweep the hill to the north with fire (See diagram, point D). The N-55 (and 50) was used to fire on routes of withdrawal (See Diagram, point C). The place (and 50) was used to fire on routes of withdrawal (See Diagram, point D). The N-42 (40mm) accordingly fired their counter-battery program (See diagram, point B). Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 17th Artillery fired illumination as requested. During the attack, Battery L continued firing in support of contact at the Tuy Phuoc District Headquarters. Firing continued until drybreak, 0630 hours. At drybreak a sweep of the area by US, ROK and EF personnel was conducted and several additional enemy were killed and two captured. The sweep of the area continued until approximately 1000 hours.

3. Total result by the three units are as follows:

a. Enemy losses:

67 KIA (30)
2 CIA

b. Casualties:

67 KIA (30)
2 CIA

Incl 2
SUBJECT: After Action Report

6 AK-47
6 AK-50
1 9mm pistol
1 Machine Gun (unknown)
2 Grenade Launchers
12 8-40 Rocket Launchers
18 3-40 Rockets
490 Assorted size and type hand grenades
1 Bacsoo Bengalare torpedo
6 US 60mm HE mortar rounds
2 US 60mm WP mortar rounds
3 Chicco 60mm HE mortar rounds
Also personnel gear and documents

b. Friendly losses:

1 WIA (VI)

4. Throughout the period of activity Battery A did not fire artillery in defense of the battery position. Proximity of friendly villages and individual houses prevented firing in other but emergencies. The battery was firing continuous missions for the Tay Phuoc Forces and at no time did the situation seem critical enough to discontinue this support. Point of furtherest penetration was the outer perimeter fence (See Diagram, point F).

5. Discussion: The attack and the resulting action provided no new lessons learned. However, certain basic principles of perimeter defensive were verified. Most noteworthy of these were as follows:

a. Preparation of Defensive Positions: The battery was recently able to obtain a bulldozer to prepare the area between the hills for clear fields of fire. The area cleared was felt to be a likely avenue of approach. The outposts of the US and ROKs had grazing interlocking fire while the RF outpost on top of the large hill had plunging fire in this area. Interlocking small arms and machine gun fire backed by II-79 grenade launchers and proper illumination provided a strong defense.

b. Integration of Forces: Responsibility for manning outposts up until recently was divided between US and Vietnamese with limited integration of forces. After a reorganization the battery commander decided to integrate all defensive positions. This allowed a positive communication channel to both the US and RF commanders. An English speaking Vietnamese Liaison Officer was present in the battery providing close liaison between units. The ROKs also provided a liaison officer to the battery FDC with both radio and wire communications.
c. Coolness Under Fire: At the onset of the action the battery commander as the defense coordinator of the position, made an estimate of the situation. He determined his primary mission should be continued even though under ground attack. He further felt that by reinforcing the sector under attack with a machine gun from another outpost that he could keep the situation in hand. He did not over react by pulling fire power from the other side of his position. At all times the position area was prepared to repel an attack on any point of the perimeter should the initial attack prove to be a diversionary action.

d. Position Area: Defense with Artillery: Where friendly villages and friendly personnel are near the action, firing of HE or Beehive should be withheld until the position is definitely threatened. In the situation presented, the bulk of the casualties were in an area that was in close proximity of HE outposts on the large hill. If artillery had been fired further out to avoid hitting friendly troops, then the rounds would have impacted or detonated near friendly villages. As an example, BOK artillery took approximately three enemy under direct fire with HE. Six rounds impacted in a friendly village resulting in the death of one female civilian.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ Robert L. Singelus
/s/ ROBERT L. SINGELUS
Capt. Artty
Adjutant
RESULTS OF ASSOCIATE BATTERY PROGRAM
BATTERY 0, 27TH BATTALION, 27TH ARTILLERY AND
2ND PLT, BATTERY A, 232ND ARTILLERY

1. The initial phase of this program in Battery C consisted of getting acquain-
ted with as many ARVN personnel as possible. The entire artillery platoon vi-
sited the U.S. battery where operating procedures and techniques were briefly
explained, a firing demonstration was conducted and a lunch was served in the
battery mess.

2. The second stop was a reciprocal visit to the ARVN unit during which U.S.
personnel determined shortages of equipment and deficiencies in training.
This artillery platoon was well maintained but lacked several small items of
supply in FDC. These were later furnish by Battery C. It was determined that
they needed additional firing battery and FDC training particularly in proper
safety procedures and accuracy checks.

3. The third phase consisted of training assistance at the ARVN artillery pla-
toon by Battery C personnel. The subjects covered were FDC procedure, bore
sighting, laying the battery and storage of ammunition. These training ses-
sions were interspersed with social activities between the units.

4. The forth phase of this program is the ongoing improvement of the tactical
and technical capability of the unit. The platoon has been registered by the
5th Bn, 27th Arty serial observer, defensive concentrations have been fired-in
around Battery C's position, they are included in the countermortar program
in the area. A direct wire line has been established between FDC's in enabling
target data to be passed between units. NET messages are also provided to
the ARVN FDC. Battery C is planning a combined artillery raid with the plato-
toon in the near future. Social interchange has been continued to include
exchange of foods, volleyball games and unit parties. The ARVN battery com-
mander and U.S. advisor have also visited Battery C and been briefed on this
program.

5. The following factors have contributed to fine success of this program be-
tween these units:

   a. The units are located only 8 KM apart and can be visited by vehicle over
      relatively secure roads.

   b. Both units have remained in their present positions over an extended
      period.

   c. Enemy activity in the area has been relatively low accommodating the
      conduct of formal training.

   d. The ARVN platoon commander speaks and understands English eliminating
      the need for an interpreter.

   e. Close coordination and cooperation between Battery C and U.S. advisory
      personnel have precluded any conflict in effort or direction.

Incl 3
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Incl 4

CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (U)

Experiences of unit deployed in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 April 1968

CO, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery