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AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980
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IN REPLY TO
AGAM-P (M) (27 June 68) FOR OT RD 682150

2 July 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st
Military Intelligence Bn (ARS), Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance
with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should
be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days
of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appro-
priate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current
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1st Military Intelligence Bn (ARS)
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (ARS)
APO San Francisco 96307

AVIH-AOPN

15 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSF065 (R1)

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: - Significant Activities

a. (U) The organizational structure of the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) is indicated by enclosure *. The Battalion and its four lettered detachments are organized under TCE 30-5D, 30-6D, 30-7D, MTCE USARPAC 1/67, and USARPAC General Orders Number 24%, 13 November 1967. The 45th Military Intelligence Detachment (ARS) assigned to this Battalion by USARV General Orders Number 6/92j, 6 December 1967, is organized under TCE 30-7D, MTCE 30-7D, USCONARC 1/68, and USARPAC General Orders Number 44, 23 January 1968.

b. (U) The Battalion was engaged in direct and general combat support operations in the performance of its mission within the Republic of Vietnam during the entire reporting period, a total of 90 days.

c. (U) The following changes in command occurred during the reporting period:

(1) CPT Spencer K. Kawamoto assumed command of headquarters Company from CPT Forrest Norman on 27 February 1968.

(2) CPT Robert S. Troth assumed command of the 54th MI Det (ARS) from CPT Richard Thompson on 11 April 1968.

d. (U) The following change in key personnel occurred during the reporting period:

(1) CPT Joseph J. Murrie became the S1 replacing CPT Alphonse H. Robinson on 15 February 1968.

FOR OTTO 682150

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR65 (R1)

e. (U) During the reporting period the Battalion was informed by USARV Headquarters that the Award of Meritorious Unit Citation (Third Oak Leaf Cluster) had been approved for the period 1 Sep 1966 to 31 Jul 1967 citing the Battalion for meritorious service in Vietnam. The award will be presented to MIBARS by BG Davidson, MACV J2, at a ceremony to be held at Battalion headquarters on 1 May 1968.

f. (U) The primary mission, that of providing tactical interpretation, reproduction, and aerial delivery of imagery and related materials resulting from tactical air reconnaissance operations within the Republic of Vietnam, was successfully accomplished during the reporting period. Support has been rendered to ARVN, ROK, Australian, and Thai units, as well as to US ground, air and naval elements throughout the four Corps Tactical Zones. Significant operational statistics and illustrative examples on the numerous types of regular and special support provided by MIBARS to requesting units are presented below:

(1) QUARTERLY PERIOD 1 February 1968 - 30 April 1968.

(a) MIBARS Detachments:
   Nr. of targets interpreted - 3,612
   Nr. of II Reports - 3,006
   Nr. of prints interpreted - 658,917
   Nr. of items reported - 5,741
   Nr. of Mosaics constructed - 27
   Ft. of photo paper processed - 791,120
   Nr. of aerial sorties - 1,732
   Pounds of cargo hauled - 55,894
   (aerial deliveries)

Requests for aerial imagery of photography on file:
   HHC, MIBARS TASE - 284
   MIBARS Detachments - 911

(b) Combined II Sections (Army/Air Force) at Tan Son Nhut and Phu Cat Air Base:
   Nr. of targets interpreted - 3,908
   Nr. of II Reports - 1,974

(2) MIBARS personnel were provided to other units upon request to provide instruction in hand-held camera and 35mm film processing techniques; to assist in familiarization with the aerial reconnaissance system and to perform interpretation of imagery resulting from hand-held camera programs. This has been especially helpful to units newly arrived in the Republic of Vietnam who are unfamiliar with the advantages to be derived from this program.

(3) Hand-held photography (35mm) was accomplished, processed, and disseminated by MIBARS in support of numerous requesting units throughout the four Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) for operational planning, targeting, interrogation, and other purposes.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR65 (R1)

During the reporting period numerous special studies and mosaics were prepared for use in offensive operations, defensive planning, engineer surveys, and other purposes by various requesting units.

Tactical Exploitation Teams were provided upon request to support tactical units in particular operations. The teams consisted of skilled imagery interpretation and photographic reproduction personnel who can develop intelligence responsive from hand-held photography in a fast-moving operational situation.

The Battalion continued to provide informal logistical assistance (photographic equipment and expendable supplies) to requesting units to aid in the implementation of organic hand-held camera programs.

MIBARS continued to be available for the operational testing of equipment and techniques related to the aerial reconnaissance effort in Vietnam.

During the reporting period the VC/NVA launched the TET Offensive on the morning of 31 January 1968 which effected locations all over the Republic of Vietnam. The Battalion has elements in each CTZ and these were effected in varying degrees. Overall, the Battalion suffered 1 KIA, 2 WIA, one U-6A aircraft destroyed and one ½ ton truck was severely damaged, and moderate damage to 7 other vehicles. The operations buildings occupied by C Detachment at Can Tho suffered moderate damage from mortar shrapnel.

The Battalion Headquarters is located in Saigon. Enemy action in the Saigon area began early on 31 Jan 1968. The personnel working in the Imagery Interpretation Section at Tan Son Nhut Air Base were ordered to the mortar shelters at 0300 hours that morning and remained there periodically for the rest of the day. At 0540 hours the Headquarters Compound, approximately 1 mile from the air base, was placed on full alert due to small arms and automatic weapons fire impacting in the Headquarters Compound and immediate area. This fire continued for the next 48 hours. A ½ ton truck with three personnel on the way to the Battalion Motor Pool to relieve the guard on duty came under grenade and small arms fire. Results were two personnel wounded (SP5 James O. Gray, US534343871 and SP4 Sam J. Maestis, RA16897385), and extensive damage to the vehicle. Two of the personnel, SP5 Alan E. Asay, RA16895068 and SP4 Sam J. Maestis, RA16897385, were awarded the Army Commendation Medal with "V" Device for bravery during that action. One of the wounded was evacuated to Japan; the other was returned to duty. At no time did the enemy make an effort to assault or seize the Battalion compound or village, though the possibility of such an attack existed during the entire three day period.

Detachment A (Bien Hoa) received sporadic small arms fire throughout the offensive. No casualties or damage were reported.

Detachment B (Da Nang) received a mortar and rocket attack
and small arms fire at 0330 hours, 30 January 1968. The occasional mortar and small arms fire continued for three days. During this period the detachment devoted much of their time to the defense of the I Corps Compound perimeter. One U-6A aircraft was destroyed by shrapnel and was designated a combat loss.

(4) Detachment C (Can Tho) Officers' Villa came under sporadic small arms fire and an occasional probe by the VC, early on 31 January 1968. At 0325 hours, enemy mortars and rockets impacted in the vicinity of the Villa causing no damage. At approximately 0615 hours, the Can Tho Army Airfield was attacked by an estimated VC company. During this attack, an enlisted man from Detachment C, PFC Leroy Johnson, was killed in action while defending the main gate to the airfield. He was awarded the Bronze Star with "V" Device for bravery during the action. From 31 January to 5 February occasional harassing sniper fire continued. At approximately 1210 hours on 6 February 1968, the detachment operations area received 4 rounds of 82mm mortar fire as part of a larger attack on the Can Tho Airfield. This attack resulted in moderate damage to several detachment vehicles, including one M292 expandable van. There was moderate shrapnel damage to the operations building of the detachment. Sniper fire continued throughout the afternoon of 6 February 1968.

(5) Detachment D (Nha Trang) spent much of 30 and 31 January 1968 on full alert when VC infiltrated the city. The detachment compound was not in immediate danger, but a ½ ton truck was damaged by small arms fire.

(6) 45th MI Detachment (Phu Cat) was on alert from 2 February 1968 through 11 February 1968, but no enemy contact materialized.

The Battalion continued its normal combat support operations during the period of the TET Offensive, in spite of numerous enemy actions. The Battalion experienced a significantly increased workload during this period, due to an increased emphasis on aerial reconnaissance by MACV Headquarters and Field Force Headquarters. The majority of reconnaissance missions interpreted during the TET Offensive were high priority I and II missions, which required the utmost efforts of all personnel to insure that needed intelligence reached tactical commanders on a timely and current basis. The Battalion met this challenge and fulfilled the requirements placed on it throughout the period. In addition to normal operational requirements which were heavy during this period, the following special requirements were fulfilled by the Battalion:

1 Personnel of the J2 Section, MACV, were transported by Battalion aircraft to various locations throughout III and IV Corps to hold discussions with key ARVN personnel.

2 Hand-held camera missions were flown over known areas of enemy activity as requested by supported units. Battalion photographers frequently came under hostile ground fire during these missions. The intelligence gathered by these missions was used for operational planning, targeting, and bomb damage assessment.
Hand-held camera photography was taken from the air of damaged areas of Saigon for reconstruction planning by MAC ORDUS. Enlargements (17" x 24") of the photographs produced in Battalion facilities were subsequently provided to General Earl G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Operations of the Headquarters II Section continue to be fully integrated with those of the Photo Processing and Interpretation Facility (PPIF) of the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) at Tan Son Nhut. Immediate photo readout and Hot and Immediate Photo Interpretation Reports (HOPIRs and IPIRs) are produced by this joint section on all imagery resulting from reconnaissance missions of 460th TRW aircraft. The types of imagery interpreted included photo, infrared, and SLAR (in-country only). The primary objective of these dual section's operations is to provide a "soon as possible" report of significant indicators of enemy activity and the findings in answer to the Essential Elements of Information (EEI) stated by the commander who requested the mission. A Hot Report of particularly significant findings is made immediately by telephone to the intelligence officer on the command primarily concerned. The subsequent Immediate Reports are transmitted by IMMEDIATE teletype message, via the MACV Command Operations Center dedicated net, to the appropriate Field Force or Corps headquarters. A diapositive and duplicate negative are subsequently produced and forwarded to the appropriate MIBARS detachment for further and more detailed interpretation and reporting (Supplemental Photo Interpretation Reports - SUPIRs) on photo missions only.

The MIBARS Detachments of HHC TASE Element can provide any requesting unit with the information as to whether an area in Vietnam has had previous reconnaissance flown over it. In addition, reprints of prior coverage missions can be provided on request. The prints are delivered to the unit (down to division/separate brigade level) by the Headquarters Delivery Platoon, which is presently equipped with seven U-6A Beaver aircraft (eight authorized).

The Battalion continues its program of designing and implementing courses of instruction to assist personnel in accomplishing their duties in support of the aerial reconnaissance effort in Vietnam. The In-Country Imagery Interpretation Course (IIIC) is being constantly revised to meet the needs of all participating units. Instructor support is obtained from CICV, 460th TRW, and Compass Eagle for special blocks of instruction. An objective has been established, however, to teach as much of the course as possible in-house. The course serves the primary purpose of acquainting newly arrived personnel with Vietnam imagery and shortening the "break-in period" of 60-90 days, which has previously been the time required for a newly arrived II to acquire knowledge of the unique features of the area. During the reporting period 2 IIIC courses were presented with a total of 20 students receiving training. The course has been received favorably by those personnel having attended. In addition, the MIBARS School continues a regularly scheduled G2 Air Course which provides a basic working knowledge of the Aerial Reconnaissance System, as it is designed and functions in Vietnam, to the many personnel performing G2/S2 Air duties who
have little or no prior G2 Air experience. During the reporting period, two G2 Air Courses were given, and 17 students received the training. Course on the ES-38 and the Tactical Imagery Interpretation Facility (TIIF) are given when requested by units for their personnel. The ES-38 Course provides photographic personnel with a knowledge of organizational maintenance and repair techniques related to the ES-38 Photographic Darkroom Group and the equipment contained therein. The TIIF Course provides a course of instruction on the TIIF and its components. The ES-38 Course and TIIF Course are presented by manufacturers' technical representatives in MIBAM facilities, under the auspices of the Battalion. Special instruction was also provided during the last quarter to G2E1 personnel on the Aerial Reconnaissance System and Hand-Held Camera Program. The MIBAM School fills an important gap in turning newly arrived personnel into proficient technicians in the counterinsurgency environment in Vietnam. The role of the School is becoming greater as various units are made aware of the advantages of having personnel attend. A quota arrangement has been established for the IIC Course by Headquarters, USA RV, for Army units, which greatly facilitates the scheduling of courses. In addition, this increases the degree of the commanders' awareness of the facilities available for the training of their personnel.

k. (U) As part of the support to the Hand-Held Camera Program, the MIBAM Detachments provide briefings and/or instruction to personnel of supported units in each of the CTZ. The instruction covers the basic techniques on identification, basic camera operating procedures, techniques of hand-held photography, target location and identification, and basic processing procedures. This instruction has proven to be a great aid in the successful development of organic programs by supported units and enhance their quick reaction intelligence gathering capabilities.

l. (U) The Battalion Special Projects Photographic Team and Detachment personnel continued field test and evaluation programs to develop more practical techniques by which to enhance the capabilities of the Hand-Held (35mm) Camera Program. The testing includes the use of various photo lenses and a combination of lens/cameras and film processing methods to obtain a product of even greater quality than has been obtained up to now for the derivation of intelligence.

m. (U) The ES-38 reproduction facility continued to be a source of problems during the past quarter. The floors and sides of the shelter continued to deteriorate, due to the climate and continuous operation of the facility. In addition, it has been found that the increased workload in conventional photography and hand-held imagery has made the ES-38 less than adequate for operational needs. This is especially true of the processing of 35mm imagery, which is not readily processed with the equipment in the ES-38. The Battalion has submitted a request to retain its present ES-38s, in addition to the new ES-38s, which are now programmed for delivery to this unit. The presence of the additional ES-38s will alleviate the workload on present facilities and also make more down time available to properly maintain and protect the facilities from deterioration and
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR65 (R1)

excessive operational wear. The requirement for a second ES-38 in each Reproduction Section in the Battalion is reflected in MTOEs to be submitted to HQ USARV in the near future.

n. (U) The Battalion continues its program of gathering materials to supplement the MIBARS In-Country Imagery Interpretation Key, as part of the constant effort to up-date and provide the latest in intelligence reference material in support of the reconnaissance effort. The key has proven to be most valuable as part of the POI at the MIBARS School IIC Course and also to the imagery interpretation personnel engaged in operational activities in the Republic of Vietnam. The key has also been reproduced and is currently used by the US Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, for the training of the new imagery interpreters.

o. (U) The Battalion continues the program of supplying imagery, II reports and related training materials to various CONUS agencies. Copies of the In-Country Imagery Interpretation Key and MIBARS Information Booklet are also supplied upon request. Actual RVN imagery and associated reports provide valuable training material for use both at USAINTS, Fort Holabird, and by units engaged in training in CONUS.

p. (U) On 21 November 1967, the 45th Military Intelligence Detachment (ARS) arrived in-country and was assigned to 1st MIBARS. The location of the Detachment at Phu Cat Air Base, instead of Pleiku, had been approved by COMUSMACV. The imagery interpreters of the 45th MI Detachment were integrated into the operations of the PPFF of the 66th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Operational Location AA, at Phu Cat. It was believed that a Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron would be located at the Phu Cat Air Base, however, this did not materialize. The Air Force decision was to keep reconnaissance assets centralized at Tan Son Nhut. The workload was such at Phu Cat that the 45th MI Det was reduced from authorized personnel strength and the personnel were utilized in meeting operational commitments elsewhere in the Battalion.

The situation in I CTZ became critical during the reporting period. A command post designated MACV Forward was established as the situation approached a climax. Provisional Corps Vietnam was the successor to the MACV Forward headquarters with responsibility over a large number of maneuver units in I Corps. A need arose for Imagery Interpretation support beyond the capabilities of Detachment B (Da Nang), which was supporting all of I Corps including both III MAF and PCV. As a result, on 24 March 1968, Commanding General, PCV, requested a MIBARS detachment in direct support of his headquarters.

COMUSMACV concurred that the addition of two Army divisions and a Marine Regiment in III MAF area of responsibility, plus the formation of a Corp level Command with cognizance over the two northern most provinces (Quang Tri and Thuy Thien) (PCV) required that this new command be provided with its own capabilities within the aerial reconnaissance system concept,
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15 May 1968

Commensurate with its command responsibilities. By direction of CG, USARV, this Headquarters took immediate steps to bring the 45th MI Detachment (ARS) to full TCE strength and prepare for the move by Priority 1 Airlift from Phu Cat to Hue-Phu Bai. The advance party went to Hue-Phu Bai on 15 April 1968. Assets were supplied by all units of the Battalion to insure full capabilities for the 45th MI Det. The last of the designated personnel and equipment closed Hue-Phu Bai at 301530Z April 1968, with the exception of the Detachment ES-38 which the unit has not possessed since arrival in country. The lack of an ES-38 seriously hinders the ability of the 45th MI Det to accomplish its mission, and creates an unacceptable workload on Detachment B, who must provide this support.

The 45th MI Det (ARS) is operational at its new location in Hue-Phu Bai and is providing general support to requestors in Quang Tri and Thuy Thien Provinces.

q. (C) The lack of adequate communications continues to be a problem area, adversely affecting the conduct of the Battalion's operations. The Headquarters Imagery Interpretation Section has access to the MACV Command Operations Center dedicated teletype net, as mentioned in para 9 above. However, access to this net is granted only for the transmission of Immediate Reports. Even so, excessive delays are sometimes encountered between the time that a report is delivered to the communications center and the time that the message is received at its destination. For other communications requirements, the Battalion is entirely dependent on common user telephone circuits, common user teletype nets, and couriers. These communications are inadequate to provide the necessary command and control of the Battalion's operations on a responsive basis or even to provide the units of the Battalion with local communications during enemy attacks. Under the best of conditions, communication by common user telephone with the distant detachments or other headquarters is a time-consuming and unsatisfactory process. During the period 31 January 1968 through 6 February 1968, while the city of Saigon was in a state of red alert, under attack by VC/NVA Forces, this Headquarters was unable to communicate with its subordinate detachments, or with higher headquarters. Further, the Battalion Headquarters and detachments have no means to call for assistance and reinforcements when operational and administrative areas come under direct attack, as was the case during the TET Offensive.

Since 1966, this headquarters has sought to have established a dedicated teletype net that would connect the Battalion Headquarters, the IPIR Section at Tan Son Nhut, and the MIBARS detachments.

The graphic demonstration of the inadequacies of the communications capability provided during TET prompted this Headquarters to submit an emergency request for activation of a dedicated Teletype net. This request was granted and the Battalion is presently in the process of setting up such a net and obtaining criptofacilities. The system will be a dedicated, point to point net between Battalion Headquarters (Saigon), each of the detachments located in Bien Hoa, Can Tho, Nha Trang, Da Nang, and Hue-Phu Bai, and the Headquarters IPIR Section at Tan Son Nhut.

It is expected that the Teletype Net will be operational o/a 1 June 1968. The net will appreciably enhance the capabilities of the Battalion in providing timely intelligence to requestors. In addition, it will enable this Headquarters to exercise vital command and control over the operations.
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of the subordinate detachments or to determine the status of detachments under attack.

To meet the requirements for local communications by the units of the Battalion, especially during emergency situations, a request for an Emergency MTOE has been submitted to Headquarters, USARV requesting an AN/VRC-46 and one AN/VRC-47 radio for each detachment. Two AN/VRC-46 radios and an AN/VRC-47 were requested for the headquarters. These additions will be reflected in the MTOE, which will be submitted to USARV, c/o 1 June 1968.

r. (U) During the reporting period the Battalion published and distributed the Aerial Observer Handbook and Hand-Held Camera Guide. This publication is designed to give the aerial observer in the field some of the fundamentals of aerial observation in Vietnam. The format includes hand-held aerial photographs of selected items of enemy activity to serve as an aid in locating enemy targets. The publication has been favorably received by units in distribution and requests have been received for further distribution. The Battalion will continue to update and improve this publication as materials are made available and new techniques developed.

s. (C) As part of Project CESARO the Battalion continues research and development of new photographic equipment and processes provided by Advances Research Projects Agency (ARPA), Office of the Secretary of Defense. MIBARS is evaluating the GC-51U developer, an extended dynamic range process, which is designed to produce an image from which usable information can be extracted from the bright and dark areas. The second evaluation report on this developer and other equipment is being prepared for submission c/o 1 June 1968.

t. (C) During the reporting period, Detachment A (Bien Hoa) has developed a program of enlarging segments of aerial film. The program, known as Tactical Enlargement Program (TEP), includes plans to procure a 4" x 5" enlarger that will expand the capabilities of the aerial enlargement program. With this capability, larger segments of the film can be covered. The 4" x 5" enlarger affords better resolution, less distortion, and a more flexible light source.

u. (C) Detachment B (Da Nang) produced numerous special studies to provide intelligence on enemy troop movements during the past quarter. An extensive study of Khe Sanh and route 9 from the Laotion Border to Khe Sanh was completed on 4 March 1968. A supplemental study of this area was made up through 5 April 1968 with overlays, mosaics, and reports being forwarded to major units supported in I Corps Tactical Zone. It is noteworthy that the supplemental report presented definite indications that the enemy was moving away from the Khe Sanh area.

v. (C) In an effort to increase aerial hand-held photographic capabilities of supported units, Detachment C (Can Tho) has made arrangements to conduct informal classes on photographic darkroom techniques to include all facets of 35mm film developing and processing. Several units at Can Tho Airfield have expressed interest in the proposed program.
Subject: Operational Report of 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR65 (R1)

w. (C) During the reporting period, C Detachment's Hand-Held Camera Program was revised and updated to meet increasing operational commitments. With the addition of a new permanent lab facility, the Reproduction Section can efficiently handle all Hand-Held Camera requirements at Corps level. Missions are logged in and transferred to a Hand Lab Instruction Sheet where specific instructions to honor the requestor's needs are noted. The aerial photographer makes his report in the Observer Record Book, including all information pertinent to the mission, to include: activity observed and coordinates, date flown, mission number, observer's name and type of aircraft. The status map is then annotated for future identification. The observer is debriefed by an imagery interpreter and completed prints are annotated before being delivered to the requestor. Hand-Held negatives are stored in the Film Library under a new index system. Once processed, the negatives are cut into strips of six (6) negatives each. When printing requirements have been accomplished, the negatives are placed in an envelope where sufficient identifying data is noted, to include: suspense date, mission number and aerial photographer. When a suspense date is reached (90 days hence), negatives are kept at C Detachment for future reference if needed.

x. (C) Detachment C continued a target folder program during the past quarter, as an effort to provide an additional usable intelligence product to assist supported US and ARVN tactical units in operational planning. The targets are developed through identification of significant areas of enemy activity from USAF and RVNAF photography. Further exploitation is obtained by hand-held photography over the area of interest, as required. The result is a compact, graphic portrayal of selected areas of enemy activity. Ten detailed target folders were prepared during the quarter for various requestors. These target folders covered, Tan Dinh Island, Dinh Tuong Province, Ba Tri, Thanh Phu, Kien Tuong Province, Kien Phong Province, Seven Mountains Giau Doc Province, Twin Rivers (Druong Thien Province), portions of Vinh Long Province, and Gia Rai (Bac Lieu Province). These target folders proved especially helpful in directing naval gunfire in support of offensive operations.

y. (C) During the reporting period Detachment D (Nha Trang) provided two Tactical Exploitation Teams (TET) in support of Long Range Reconnaissance (LRRP) operations were halted after two days. Another TET operation consisting of one hand-held photographer was initiated in Lam Dong Province in support of PHOENIX operations there. The purpose of the operation was to photograph villages and hamlets in the province. The photographs will be used by PHOENIX personnel to brief and debrief personnel operating in the area. This project is identical to a project previously completed in Knotum Province. Reports from personnel in Knotum Province have been highly laudatory. A total of two missions were flown in Lam Dong Province totaling three hours. Total prints produced—435.

z. (C) Joint Army/Air Force Delivery System: On 15 March 1968 a new schedule of delivery flights from Tan Son Nhat was initiated. Two deliveries daily are made to the II CTZ. All deliveries are made by T-39 aircraft on the following schedule: Pleiku—0205 and 1005, Nha Trang—1440 and 1140. On 25 March 1968 a joint delivery system was initiated between the 460th TRW, the
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AVTH-AOFN 15 May 1968
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1st MI Bn (ARS) and the 14th AGW. The basic concept is that the 14th AGW
aircraft augment the 1st MI Bn Delivery Platoon aircraft to provide twice
a day delivery to requestors. Deliveries in II CTZ are accomplished from
both Nha Trang and Pleiku. All deliveries from Pleiku are accomplished
by 14th AGW aircraft at approximately 0800 and 1400. Reconnaissance pro-
ducts delivered to Pleiku by T-39 aircraft at 0200 are delivered at
0800 to Ban Me Thout, Hensel, Kontum and Dak To as required. The 1400
delivery serves only Hensel, Kontum and Dak To. Material for Ban Me
Thout is routed via Nha Trang on the 140 T-39. Morning deliveries from
Nha Trang are by 14th AGW aircraft to Tigertown and L.Z. English. After-
noon deliveries from Nha Trang are by 1st MI Bn (ARS) aircraft and cover
all of II CTZ as required. Responsibility for unscheduled delivery of
priority I reconnaissance products remains with 1st MI Bn (ARS). This
change in the delivery system insures two deliveries daily, places the
reconnaissance products into the hands of the requestors at times compatible
with working hours of the full staff and enables the delivery aircraft to
operate during daylight hours.

aa. (U) The Battalion has continued its civic action program by means
of donations of food, clothing, toys, scrap lumber, and money to the Don
Boaco and Go Vap Orphanages in Gia Dinh Province, the Can Tho Orphanage
and the Vinh Son Orphanage in Nha Trang. Donations to the TET fund for
refugees is encouraged and results have been gratifying.
2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned; Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. (C) Operations

(1) (C) Tactical Exploitation Team Support of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Two Tactical Exploitation Teams (TET) were dispatched from D Detachment in support of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRP) operations during the reporting period. The first team consisted on one hand-held photographer and provided support in the An Khe area to "E" Co, 20th Inf for a period of nine days. No reproduction personnel were used for the operation inasmuch as there was no location available to set up an adequate photographic lab. Reproduction was accomplished at the detachment photo lab in Nha Trang. Exposed film was picked up at An Khe by 1st Mi Bn (ARS) aircraft and taken to Nha Trang for developing and printing. Finished prints were delivered back to the team member the same way. Hand-held photographers were rotated during the period to gain maximum use of the valuable experience gained on an operation of this type. The second team consisted of one hand-held photographer and one reproduction specialist and provided support to "E" Co, 20th Inf LRP operations in the Ban Me Thout area. Support for this operation was planned for a 14 day period but actually lasted only two days because the operation ended early. Processing and printing was accomplished at the National Police Headquarters utilizing their reproduction equipment. No major problems were encountered during the brief operation. The operation was considered beneficial in that it demonstrated the capabilities of the TET operation. However, because of the short duration, the results of the operation were not considered outstanding.

(b) EVALUATION: The value of both teams was degraded somewhat by a short reaction time in planning for the operation. Prior to dispatch to the field, it is desirable that the team research the area of operations (AO) and establish an intelligence base primarily oriented to the requirements of the LRP mission. If enough lead time is allowed, the intelligence base can include, but not be limited to, complete available photographic coverage of the AO, trail and landing zone studies, other terrain information available, to include items peculiar to the specific AO, and all available OB information. It is important that the TET personnel be utilized during the planning phase of the operation so they can provide pertinent information relative to the operation objectives. A factor which downgraded support in the An Khe operation was the lack of on-site reproduction personnel and equipment. One of the major advantages of the TET operation is the exceptionally fast reaction time. With the reproduction facilities located at a considerable distance from the team, this reaction time is lessened. All possible efforts should be made to insure on-site reproduction facilities. The major problem to overcome is the lack of fresh water.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That TET personnel be given enough time to completely prepare an intelligence base for the proposed area of operation. An ideal time would be 7 days, however, 4 days would be suitable to prepare a usable data base. That supported units render every assistance possible to insure that reproduction facilities are located close enough to the operations area to provide maximum response to photo requirements.
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Operational Report of 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR65 (R1)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR65 (R1)

1. (U) Air Movement of ARS Detachment

(a) OBSERVATION: The Battalion headquarters was notified on 7 April 1968 of the requirement to move the 45th MI Detachment by Priority 1 airlift to close Hue-Phu Bai by 17 April 1968. Difficulty was encountered in obtaining the required aircraft on that date, due to the priority of the move. When the 17 April 1968 date could not be met, the required delivery date was adjusted to 20 April. Movement from Phu Cat did not begin until 14 April and the air portion was not completed until 21 April. Although all equipment was to have been moved by air, the 5 ton tractor and 12 ton supply van were moved by ground and sea, and did not arrive at Hue-Phu Bai until 29 April, an unacceptably late date, in terms of the operational schedule established for the Detachment.

(b) EVALUATION: While the supply van was too big for a C-124, it could have been carried by a C-133. It was felt that use of this aircraft was justified to insure the orderly and timely delivery of the Detachment. A C-133 is required to move the T11F. Also, it can be loaded on a C-124 if all tires are completely deflated, however, there was some damage to the interior of the C-124 during loading. Further, it cannot be assured that the T11F can be tactically deployed from the airfield after it has been driven on and off the aircraft on the wheel rims. Probable damage to tires and tubes is great. A lead time of a week to ten days is required to obtain use of a C-133. A message must go through command channels and DA to Military Airlift Command. The experience of moving this Detachment by air indicates that the following sorties are required for a timely, coordinated movement: Seven sorties of C-130 aircraft; three sorties of C-124 aircraft; and two sorties of C-133 aircraft (T11F and 5 ton tractor/supply van).

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: In planning a future move of an ARS Detachment a minimum of 2 weeks lead time between notification of movement and required delivery date is needed to ensure that all required aircraft can be arranged for (based on Priority 1 movement).

2. (C) Target Folder Program

(a) (C) OBSERVATION: During the past quarter a total of ten (10) target folders have been constructed of various areas of enemy activity and significance within the IV CTZ.

(b) (C) EVALUATION: Through liaison visits to intelligence officers of supported units, it has been proven that the use of target folders is desired because of the manner in which they portray the enemy's significant activity and buildup in an area under scrutiny.

(c) (C) RECOMMENDATIONS: Target Folder programs should be further developed and information disseminated with timeliness. As target folders are developed, their value will be further enhanced by continuous updating of intelligence pertinent to the particular target.
Influx of New Units

(a) OBSERVATION: The large increase of new friendly units deployed in RVN during this quarter created new demands for data base, basic photo coverage, and liaison between the new units and this Battalion.

(b) EVALUATION: Early coordination and continuous close liaison between MIBARS detachments and newly deployed tactical units has provided maximum aerial reconnaissance support to their supported tactical units to meet their needs. Early liaison visits insure timely distribution of II Reports, photos and data base to new requestors, and assist II and G2 personnel to quickly become oriented on their new area of operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That early coordination and continuous close liaison between MIBAR's detachments and supported tactical units be continued in order to provide the best possible air reconnaissance support on a timely basis.

ES-38 Photo Lab Operations

(a) OBSERVATION: Problems with B Detachment's KS-38 Photographic Darkroom Group have been relatively minor, however, this does not indicate that the unit is free of problem areas. The clutch assembly on the drive unit of EN6A is inoperable at present, and in order to continue operation we have borrowed an EN6A Continuous Printer from the 2A5th Avn Co pending arrival of Technical Representative to supervise repairs. While maintenance is continuous on this unit, deterioration of the unit has been slowed but not stopped. Further, the unit is not equipped to accomplish the volume of work presently required which has been approximately 20,000 feet a week or 210,000 feet for the quarter. Due to the age of the unit and continuous usage (24 hours a day) it cannot be determined how long the present unit will be able to continue operation without a major overhaul. A second unit would eliminate continuous use of already overworked equipment and allow sufficient downtime to allow major overhaul.

(b) EVALUATION: That based on experience factor, the present KS-38 authorization is inadequate for needs of MIBARS Detachments in Vietnam.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That additional KS-38's be procured to equip each detachment with two units and that other type units such as the KS-40 be procured and evaluated for possible usage. Justification for two KS-38's in each MIBARS Detachment will be included in forthcoming MTOE's.

Hand-Held Camera Program

(a) OBSERVATION: Hand-held camera missions increased during this quarter in proportion to overall increased aerial reconnaissance support in I CTZ. Special emphasis was placed, during this quarter, on using hand-held camera support to augment photography obtained from mounted aerial sensors, for special studies conducted by B Detachment in selected high-interest areas such
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as KHS SANY, A SHAU VALLEY, and NVA road construction projects near the Laotian Border in the western portion of I CTZ. Requests continue to be received for additional 35mm Pentax cameras with 200mm lens. Use of hand-held cameras at tactical unit level (Inf Brigade and above) have proven extremely valuable to these units.

(b) EVALUATION: The hand-held camera program for special projects to augment fixed sensor aerial photography for special studies and use of this program at supported tactical units continues to be a valuable contribution to the intelligence effort. Repeated requests from units for additional 35mm cameras with 200mm lens cannot be filled because additional cameras are not available. This headquarters is presently conducting a study on the standardization of hand-held cameras for inclusion in TO&Es and MTO&Es of designated units. This study should be completed by 20 May 1968.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the hand-held camera program be continued and expanded, and that sufficient camera and field processing equipment be made available to adequately satisfy requirements of requesting units.

c. (U) Training. None

d. (C) Intelligence:

(1) (C) Plotting of Enemy Movement

(a) OBSERVATION: Through the use of a large 1:100,000 wall map of the IV CTZ, Detachment C, 1st MI Bn (ARS) has been able to post all major enemy movement pertinent to IV CTZ intelligence situation. Being readily viewed by all Imagery Interpreters, this mapping of enemy movement definitely creates enthusiasm and increased interest by all members of the Detachment and provides an up to date indication of where enemy activity may be found.

(b) EVALUATION: In analysis of the plotting of enemy movement, it has been found that Intelligence Summaries and Periodical Intelligence Reports are fully exploited when used in conjunction with a large wall map as described above. Enemy units are easily depicted and day to day patterns of movement are formed. With further refinement this plotting of enemy fortifications, enemy supply and base areas and enemy activities to include stand-off and ground attacks of watchtowers, outposts and major ARVN and allied installations. The possibilities of including friendly movement and activities is also within the realm of being and would create a greater appreciation for the Imagery Interpreter's endeavors.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That progress be made in the eventual development of a concise Intelligence Situation map that will afford the individual imagery interpreter full appreciation of the intelligence situation within his area of interest.
e. Logistics

(1) (U) Acquisition of Photographic Supplies

(a) OBSERVATION: Experience gained by units of this battalion indicate that correct supply procedures used over a long period of time will create a proper demand for expendable photographic supplies.

(b) EVALUATION: Requisitions should be made on a steady and continuing basis, utilizing a 12 priority. Supplies should be requisitioned based on a previous usage factor, usually the previous week. Use of the 02 or 05 priority requires the local support agency to pass the requisition on to the next higher agency. In this case the local supply depots cannot list the requisition on their record of demands. If a priority 12 requisition is received, however, and cannot be filled at the local support agency, the information is logged and becomes part of a record of demands for the item.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That units establish valid usage factors by requisitioning on a 12 priority over an extended period of time to establish a demand on the local supply system.

(2) (U) V-81 York Air Conditioner

(a) OBSERVATION: This air conditioner located in the M292 Van is situated above the cab of the Van. When maintenance problems occur, causing down time on the air conditioner, it must be disconnected and manually removed to a maintenance support facility.

(b) EVALUATION: Removal of the air conditioner can be accomplished without the assistance of material handling equipment, but certain precautions must be observed. Due to its comparatively light weight it can be handled by two to four men with relative ease. One item that must be observed is the position used in transporting the air conditioner. An oil reservoir is located next to an electrical motor. Turning the air conditioner on any side other than its installed position allows the oil to drain into the electrical motor necessitating extensive maintenance on the item and an additional delay in down time of 3-5 days.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The air conditioner must be maintained in its original installed position at all times during its evacuation to field maintenance. The use of other than manual removal should be avoided in order to prevent the air conditioner from turning over.

(3) (U) Maintenance of EN-6A Continuous Contact Printer

(a) OBSERVATION: Through consultation with ES-38 Project Officer, USAECOM, maintenance procedures for the EN-6A were observed and initiated on detachment machinery. The items to be stressed are stated to avoid repeated future errors.
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(b) EVALUATION: It is stressed that the optical system of the EN-6A remain untouched without consultation with technical representatives. The optic system is expensive (over $1,000) and very delicate. The touch of the finger to the surface of the density filter wedge or light-drawer mirror can do severe damage to the items. A small hand tire-pump may be used to blow dust and sediments from the optics (this is done with the drawer in an inverted position). Use a minimum of oil on bearing and mechanical components of the EN-6A. Excessive oil saturates electronic components and fogs optics. (Some optics can not be cleaned.) Excessive oil residue is caused by overfilling the printer's drive motor. There have been considerable instances where the motors have been filled to capacity instead of to the level indicated on the motor and in the TM's. Excess oil in this motor is scattered throughout the machine; the optical system becomes one of the most vulnerable items. It is recommended by Project Officer, USAECOM, that 90 weight, Pen-O-Lead oil be used. Excessive replacement of the DLG light bulb for the EN-6A indicates the possibility of a defective light box blower fan. Another indicator is brown burn spots on the heat-absorbing glass immediately in front of the DLG lamp. Prolonged operation without this blower can produce heat which leads to extensive damage of the electronic and optical components within the printer's light drawer assembly.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that all personnel involved with minor or major maintenance of the EN-6A Continuous Contact Printer be informed and instructed of these maintenance procedures.

(l) (U) Maintenance of the EH-29 Processor

(a) OBSERVATION: Through consultation with the ES-38 Project Officer, USAECOM, general maintenance difficulties for the EH-29 were determined. The correct procedures have been incorporated into the maintenance requirements for the EH-29.

(b) EVALUATION: The squeezy motor is one of the most vulnerable and essential components on the processor. When higher temperatures are reached and paper is drying sufficiently, the squeezy motor should be turned off, and used only when necessary. This conservation extends the life of the motor extensively. Detachment personnel have discovered that the rollers on the paper track can be greased on a weekly basis with heavy GOB grease. The rollers are well worn from age and create extensive friction on the paper drive motor. The grease reduces friction greatly and is fairly resistant to the photo chemicals. The grease apparently has no harmful effects on the chemicals. The paper drive motor on the processor should only be filled to the level indicated on the motor or in the TM's and NOT to capacity. Advisable oil is 90 weight Pen-O-Lead.
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(U) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that all ES-38 maintenance personnel be instructed on the maintenance procedures discussed above.

f. Organization. None

g. Other. None

Copies furnished:
2 - DCSOPS, ATTN: STAG
2 - Dir Surveillance and Reconnaissance, OACSI
2 - CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT
5 - ACOs, J2, USMACV
3 - ACOs, G2, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-JST
2 - ACOs, G2, Eighth US Army
2 - ACOs, G2, USA Support, Thailand
1 - CO, 525th MI Gp
2 - CO, 460th TRW
2 - CO, 2nd MI Bn (ARS)
2 - CO, 15th MI Bn (ARS)
2 - Commandant, USAINTS
2 - CO, USAINT
2 - CO, USAACDCINT
2 - Commandant, USARPAC Intel School
1 - CO, Det A, 1st MI Bn(ARS)
1 - CO, Det B, 1st MI Bn(ARS)
1 - CO, Det C, 1st MI Bn(ARS)
1 - CO, Det D, 1st MI Bn(ARS)
1 - CO, 45th MI Det (ARS)
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SIGNED: Operational Report of 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, HCS CSFOR65 (R)

To: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, A'TTH: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (AIMS).

2. (C) Pertinent contents follow:

a. Reference item concerning Tactical Exploitation Team (TET) support of Long Range Patrol operations, page 12, paragraph 2B(1): Concur. Close coordination between the supporting F Detachment (FIS) and the supported G2/S2 will ensure that TET personnel are incorporated into the initial planning of Long Range Patrol operations. In addition to the Tactical Exploitation Teams, action is being taken to authorize TETs to use 35mm cameras to LDP units, on the basis of one per patrol, to increase the organic intelligence collection capability of the patrols.

b. Reference item concerning air movement of 2C Detachment, page 13, paragraph 2B(2): Concur. Normally a two week or more lead time for movement is desirable; however, it may not be possible due to operational requirements. Any movement which is authorized for C-130 should be so noted and a requirement placed with USAV to provide the appropriate aircraft.

c. Reference item concerning V-38 Photo Lab Operations, page 14, paragraph 2B(3): Concur. USAV is aware of the deterioration problems inherent in the present model of the V-38. Most of the problems results from the fixed mounting of the enlarging and developing units to the floor of the van. This makes removal for cleaning behind these units difficult and time consuming. V-34 -120s have been ordered for USAV units, and are expected to start arriving in June 1968. The V-34-120 incorporates significant changes in the models now in use. The V-38-120 vans will be issued to Serial Surveillance Command and F Detachments (FIS) based on the age and condition of existing models in these units. The F Detachments (FIS) are scheduled to receive five of the first 14 arriving in USAV.

DOWNGRADED AF 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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d. Reference item concerning Plotting of Enemy Movement, page 15, paragraph 2d(1): Concur. 1:100,000 maps are now available and initial distribution of these maps has been completed.

Copy furnished:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Capt, AGC
Assistant Adjutant

27 MAY 1968
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GPOP-DT (15 May 68)  2d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Military Intelligence Bn (ARS) for Period Ending 30 April 1968,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 20 JUN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report
and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as
indorsed.

2. (C) Reference (page 12) paragraph 2b(1): The
following comments are pertinent:

   a. Current doctrine requires a photographer (imagery
      interpreter) to be within the area of operation while
      the photo reproduction specialist with the reproductive
      equipment is located at an intelligence base some distance
      from the area of operation. Exposed film must be transported
      back to the photo laboratory for developing and printing
      and then finished prints are delivered back to the team
      members. This method causes considerable delay in
      reaction time.

   b. To reduce reaction time and make possible timely
      intelligence to the LRRP, it is suggested that two
      actions be taken: (1) On a high priority basis, develop
      a 35mm polaroid land camera capable of using positive/
      negative roll film and (2) train imagery interpreters
      as photographers. Such action would:

         (1) Eliminate need for reproduction specialist and
             supporting photographic laboratories.

         (2) Shorten reaction time to near-real-time with the
             interpretation of photography being made on the spot.

         (3) Negatives could still be sent back to the
             intelligence base for additional prints when necessary.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

Copy furnished:
CGUSARV

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, 1st Military Intelligence Bn (ARS) (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68

CO, 1st Military Intelligence Bn (ARS)

15 May 1968

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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