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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (8 Nov 67) FOR OT RD-670728

14 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 5th Special Forces Group(Abn)
1st Special Forces, Period Ending 31 July 1967

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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
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5th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)

1st SPECIAL FORCES



*For OT CD File
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OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD
ENDING 31 JULY 1967

DDC CONTROL
NO. 82915

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⑥ *Lessons Learned*
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS,
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO San Francisco 96240

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① 15 Aug 67

SUBJECT: ⑨ Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jul 67.

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
APO 96375

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THRU: Commander-in-Chief
United States Army Pacific
APO San Francisco, 96558

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TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

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SECTION 1 (S) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General: Throughout the country CIDG operations during the past quarter were characterized by aggressive pursuit of enemy units in the field, numerous large-scale contacts, and several determined attempts by the enemy to inflict defeats on friendly elements. Shortly after the beginning of the reporting period, on 4 May, Camp Lang Ve1 was attacked by an estimated company size force supported by mortars and aided from inside the camp by VC who had infiltrated the CIDG units posing as recruits. One platoon of VC succeeded in gaining entry to the camp, but was quickly ejected. Four days later, on 8 May, Camp Con Thien was attacked by two battalions of the 812th NVA Regiment with sappers attached. Supported by mortars, rockets, and flamethrowers, the attackers made brief penetrations into the perimeter, which was defended jointly by USMC, USASF, VNSF, and CIDG personnel. Although 14 CIDG and 44 US Marines were killed in the action, the NVA paid a high price. A total of 212 enemy bodies were counted the following day, and many others were estimated to have been killed by airstrikes and artillery.

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VC and NVA forces have generally shown increasing willingness to accept severe losses in order to accomplish limited objectives. In several cases during the last three months the enemy has massed his forces and made concerted efforts to surround and overwhelm smaller CIDG units in the field, despite taking heavy casualties from airstrikes, artillery, and friendly defensive fires. Rapid reaction by Mike Force units and supporting firepower proved to be crucial factors in extracting embattled CIDG units on these occasions.

The increased tempo of fighting is reflected in the statistical data for the reporting period. A total of 1,931 VC/NVA were killed, an increase of 18% over the previous quarter. Also, there was a 26% increase in USASF killed, a 35% increase in CIDG killed, and a 7% increase in RF/PF killed. A significant number of the increased friendly casualties were the result of mines and booby traps.

Special operations continued to penetrate enemy base areas and interdict routes of infiltration. Three operations were particularly noteworthy for their tactical developments. Blackjack 33 was the first operation in which a mobile guerrilla force was employed in conjunction with long range reconnaissance elements (Project Sigma). On 13 May two Mike Force companies from Nha Trang conducted a parachute assault in the Seven Mountains region of IV CTZ. A quick reaction operation, the jump was made only 18 hours after approval was given. Blackjack 42 marked the first infiltration by sea of Special Forces assets into an enemy base area.

In IV CTZ much effort was devoted to preparations for the upcoming flood season. A training program with emphasis on boat tactics and operations was implemented, and camps were improved and rebuilt to withstand the flood waters. The airboat facility at Cao Lanh was completed in May, but suffered severe damage during the VC attack on 3-4 July. The VC evidently realize the tactical potential of the airboats in flooded areas and are attempting to eliminate them before the season begins.

Two CIDG camps, Plei Mrong and Vinh Gia, were turned over to VNSF control and the USASF detachments withdrawn. These are the first two camps to be turned over under a program designed to conserve USASF manpower and thus facilitate the opening of new camps in other locations.

Revolutionary Development support activities were highlighted by two highly successful refugee resettlement projects, one at Bonard in III CTZ and the other in the vicinity of Camps Duc Co and Plei Ma in Pleiku Province. Other highlights were the building of a sawmill at Tra Bong and the establishment of a rice buying association in I CTZ. The handling of refugees in the vicinity of Ba To left much to be desired, but was significant in that many valuable lessons were learned from this experience.

The Group's Concept of Employment for CY 1968 was completed this quarter and was submitted to COMUSMACV for approval. Planning has been initiated on the implementation of the proposed concept.

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2. (C) Intelligence:

a. During the reporting period the orientation and subsequent deployment of the MI augmentation detachment, throughout all Four Corps Tactical Zones, was accomplished. In consideration of the country-wide mission of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), it was concluded the MI augmentation detachment could most effectively be employed using a field team concept. Four field teams and a headquarters team were organized. The composition of each field team is as follows:

1. Counter Intelligence/Counter Espionage Section - 5 to 8 personnel.
2. Collection Section - 3 to 6 personnel.
3. Analysis Section
 - (a) 1 to 3 photo interpreters
 - (b) 2 interrogators
 - (c) 4 to 6 OB specialists

In addition to field teams and headquarters team, select personnel were assigned in support of Group special operations.

b. The regulations, directives, reporting procedures, and guidelines outlining the scope, purpose, and objectives of the Group intelligence program were published in final form. These publications include Military Intelligence Program, Intelligence Information Reporting Procedures, Military Intelligence Operational Planning Procedure, Source Administration Procedure, and Intelligence Fund Expenditure and Reporting Procedure. A new program, subject: Effective Means of Combating the Viet Cong Infrastructure, was completed in draft form. This program is being coordinated with ICEX (U) representatives for region IX and will be coordinated in all corp tactical zones when completed in final form.

c. The emphasis of the intelligence effort, since formulation of basic programs has been completed, is shifting to the timely acquisition, accurate reporting, thorough and speedy analysis, and rapid dissemination of intelligence back down to the "A" detachment. Production of tactical OB continues to receive priority emphasis since this type intelligence is vital to survival of the "A" detachments. Production of infrastructure intelligence is being upgraded but will, of necessity, remain the secondary effort at present.

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3. (C) Operations and Training:

a. Plans

(1) During this quarter, the companies submitted input for the group CY 1968 Concept of Operations. This input was incorporated into the Group country plan and submitted to COMUSMACV. See Incl 4.

(2) Contingency plans for employment at the 5th SFCA assets in a general war posture were published.

(3) Studies are presently being conducted to determine the feasibility of utilization of the USASF/VNSF/CIDG as Vietnamese border police during the post hostilities period.

(4) Planning continues for the implementation of the remainder of the CY 1967 Group concept for deployment of CIDG camps. During the second semester of CY 1967, six CIDG camps will be converted and six new camps established.

(5) Planning has been initiated for the implementation of the proposed CY 1968 concept of operations.

b. Operations.

(1) Summary of significant operations by Corps Tactical Zones.

(a) I CTZ: On 4 May at 0330 hours, Camp Lang Vei, A-101, Quang Tri Province, was subjected to an attack by an estimated company size force supported by mortars. About one platoon of VC gained entry into the camp. With the assistance of fire support from Khe Sanh, enemy elements were repelled from the camp by 0500. Two USASF were killed and five wounded; 17 CIDG were killed, 35 wounded, and 38 missing. Enemy losses were seven killed and five wounded. Subsequent intelligence and PW interrogation has indicated that the attackers were aided from inside the camp VC who had infiltrated the CIDG units posing as recruits. One PW said that he had been contacted by the VC prior to the attack and directed to join the CIDG at Lang Vei in order to obtain information on the camp. After joining the CIDG, subject recruited four other CIDG to assist him. One man was to determine the locations of all bunkers within the camp, the second was to report on all the guard positions and how well the posts were manned, the third was to make a sketch of the camp, and the fourth was to report on supplies brought into the camp from Khe Sanh. The VC contacted subject PW on four occasions prior to the 4 May attack to obtain the information that had been collected. On the night of the attack, subject PW and another CIDG killed two of the camp guards and led the VC force through the wire and mine field defenses into the camp's perimeter.

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On 7 May at 0150 hours, RF OP #1 in Son Ha District, Quang Ngai Province, was hit by mortar, recoilless rifle and small arms fire from an estimated two company force. RF forces manning the OP returned fire, supported by AG-47's and 4.2 inch mortar fire from Camp Ha Thanh, A-104. The enemy finally broke contact at 0735 hours while an airstrike was in progress. An exploitation force from Camp Ha Thanh confirmed the following enemy losses: 30 VC killed, two wounded, and 14 individual weapons captured. Also, personnel on the OP observed the enemy carrying dead and wounded as they withdrew. Friendly casualties were one RF killed and two wounded.

On 8 May Camp Con Thien, A-110, Quang Tri Province, was attacked at 0230 hours by two battalions of the 812th NVA Regiment with sappers attached. The assault was supported by mortars, rockets, and flame throwers. Artillery and air support were employed against the enemy throughout the attack. The perimeter, which was defended jointly by USMC, USAF, VNSF, and CIDG personnel, was penetrated at two positions. Of the 212 enemy confirmed killed in the attack, 38 were credited to USASF/VNSF/CIDG forces. Friendly losses were 14 CIDG killed, four USASF and 16 CIDG wounded, two CIDG missing, in addition to 44 USMC killed, 110 USMC and five USNCB wounded. Enemy weapons captured included four flame throwers, four crew-served weapons, 12 40mm rockets, and over 100 individual weapons. Throughout the month of May the camp was subjected to constant harassing fire by mortars, artillery, rockets, and recoilless rifles. The total number of rounds received was over 1,500; on one occasion some 250 rounds landed in a period of four minutes.

On 13 May a combat patrol from Ba To, A-106, Quang Ngai Province, consisting of two USASF and 30 CIDG working in conjunction with elements from Task Force Oregon in Operation Malheur, made contact with an estimated platoon of VC, resulting in 21 enemy killed, six wounded, one rifle and two LMG's captured. One USASF was wounded. On 18 May another combat operation of the same composition, while at their night patrol base, made contact with an estimated squad of VC attempting to penetrate the CIDG perimeter. The engagement resulted in 17 enemy killed, one 60mm mortar and three AK 50 submachineguns captured. Friendly losses were two CIDG missing, one of whom later returned to the camp. On 25 May a patrol of 50 CIDG and two USASF from Thuong Duc, A-109, Quang Nam Province, made contact with an estimated two squads of VC resulting in nine VC killed, one captured, and five individual weapons captured. There were no friendly casualties in the encounter.

Operations from Tra Bong, A-107, Quang Ngai Province, accounted for much of the action during June, with four significant contacts. On 12 June a company size combat patrol came under heavy automatic weapons and small arms fire from a platoon size enemy force resulting in one CIDG killed; three USASF, 24 CIDG, and one interpreter wounded. A platoon size heliborne operation engaged an estimated company of VC on 19 June, resulting in two VC killed, seven captured, 20 bunkers, 159 structures, and 1500 kilos of rice destroyed. Seven secondary explosions were observed and 57 VC were killed during airstrikes requested by the patrol. On 22 June another platoon size operation from Tra Bong made contact with an estimated company of

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VC in fortified positions resulting in two CIDG killed and two wounded. Enemy losses were one VC killed and four bunkers destroyed. Finally, on 27 June a reconnaissance patrol made contact with one enemy squad, producing five VC killed without incurring any friendly casualties. In other actions during the month, a reconnaissance patrol from Ha Thanh, A-104, Quang Ngai Province, was ambushed on 12 June by two companies of VC. One USASF and two CIDG were killed, four CIDG wounded, and two individual weapons lost. On 28 June a platoon size patrol from Minh Long, A-108, Quang Ngai Province, killed four VC and captured one along with one weapon. No friendly casualties were sustained in this operation.

On 19 July a helicopter operation from Gia Vuc, A-103, Quang Ngai Province, received sniper fire from an unknown number of VC while being inserted. During the remainder of the day/three more contacts were made with elements up to company size. Total results were nine VC killed, eight VC wounded, one CIDG killed, and seven CIDG wounded. On 25 July a company size helicopter operation with two USASF from Camp Tien Phuoc, A-102, in Quang Tin Province, made contact with an estimated two companies of VC armed with mortars, automatic weapons, and small arms. The VC succeeded in surrounding the CIDG, who attempted to break out of the encirclement by adjusting airstrikes and artillery fire on the enemy positions but were forced to break up into small groups in order to evade the superior enemy force. Helicopter medevac and extraction of small groups of CIDG were accomplished under intense enemy fire. A company size reaction force from the camp was unable to link up with the besieged friendly unit due to heavy enemy activity. On 28 July one CIDG company and two USASF from Camp Tien Phuoc and one company from Camp Thuong Duc, A-109, in Quang Nam Province, were helilifted into the battle area. Supported by airstrikes and artillery, they conducted a sweep operation in order to pick up stragglers and recover bodies of personnel killed in the action on 25 July. Ten CIDG bodies were recovered, and one USASF who had been missing since 25 July was able to contact the friendly unit. The total results were 16 CIDG killed, one USASF and six CIDG wounded, one VNSF and 22 CIDG missing in action. Forty weapons and three radios were lost. Confirmed enemy losses were 58 VC killed. On 20 July a CIDG/RF/PF operation, with four USASF, from Camp Tra Bong, A-107, in Quang Ngai Province made contact with seven VC while in a blocking position in support of a combined ARVN/ROK Marine operation. Six VC were killed, and two weapons, two grenades, and one improvised mine seized without incurring any friendly casualties.

(b) II CTZ: Between 8 and 14 May a search and destroy operation from Mang Buk, A-246, Kontum Province, made six separate contacts resulting in a total of 16 VC killed, one captured, and six weapons captured. These results were achieved with no friendly losses. On 15 May at 0920 hours, four USASF, four VNSF and 230 CIDG from Dak To, A-244, Kontum Province, received 60mm mortar fire. At 0930 hours, the operation made heavy contact with an NVA company. On the 16th at 1500 hours, one company of CIDG from Dak Seang, A-245, Kontum Province, had been helilifted in to reinforce the Dak To operation. On 17 May, one company of Mike Force and

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one company of CIDG from Dak To were helilifted to reinforce the operation. On the 20th they has returned to their respective locations. Results of the operation: two USASF and seven CIDG killed, two USASF and 14 CIDG wounded, eight NVA killed and one weapon captured.

On 24 May at 0200, a combined operation, with one CIDG company from Tan Rai, A-223, and one CIDG company from An Lac, A-234, Darlac Province, was attacked. The multi-company assault came from two directions and was supported by 50 to 60 rounds of 81mm mortar fire. The VC were armed with light machingguns and other assorted small arms. The Tan Rai company was driven from its position, but the An Lac company held. At approximately 0245 hours, two gun ships and an AC-47 arrived, and the VC attack slowed to sporadic fire fights. At first light the firing ceased. At 0700 hours an ARVN Ranger battalion was air landed south of the battle area. The Tan Rai company suffered one USASF and seven CIDG killed, one USASF and nine CIDG wounded. The An Lac company had 10 CIDG killed, two USASF and 19 CIDG wounded. VC losses were nine killed, one RFD LMG and two carbines captured.

On 30 May at 0940 hours, an operation from Cung Son, A-221, Phu Yen Province, made contact with an NVA company plus. Gun ships and fighters were on station at approximately 1000 hours. The initial contact was broken at 1145 hours when the NVA withdrew. The operation was reinforced by another search and destroy operation in the same area and gave pursuit. Sporadic contacts continued until 1340 hours. The results of the contact were one USASF and three CIDG killed, seven CIDG wounded, 16 NVA killed and 11 weapons captured. On 3 June at 0150 hours, Camp Cung Son received 11 rounds of 120mm or 4.2 inch mortar fire. There was no damage since all rounds landed outside the camp's perimeter. This attack -- the first time the camp has ever been mortared -- was probably in retaliation for losses suffered on 29 and 30 May.

A patrol from Dong Tre, A-222, Phu Yen Province, came under heavy automatic fire on 5 June. One CIDG company was dispatched to reinforce, but also came into heavy contact. Numerous airstrikes were called in, and one Mike Force Company from Pleiku was sent to the Dong Tre camp to reinforce the operation. The results of the contact were 28 CIDG killed, seven wounded, nine missing, 14 small arms and one 60mm mortar lost. There were seven VC killed. A villager reported that he had helped bury 28 VC bodies on the night of 5 June. An agent reported 43 VC had been killed in the contact. On the 4th of June a search and destroy operation from Trung Dung, A-502, Khanh Hoa Province, made a series of contacts, resulting in 12 VC killed, nine weapons and various documents captured. On 12 June a patrol from Plateau Gi, A-234, Kontum Province, sighted an NVA company moving along a trail. A hasty ambush was set up, and the ensuing fire fight lasted approximately one hour. Results were one CIDG killed and two wounded, 23 NVA killed, six enemy weapons and documents captured.

On 14 June a CIDG unit from Camp Dak To, A-244, Kontum Province, broke and fled from their night perimeter under attack by an estimated NVA company. Two USASF and eight CIDG were left missing, six CIDG killed and 11 CIDG wounded. One NVA was confirmed killed and ten estimated killed. Later

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that morning a Mike Force company with four USASF was deployed to search for and recover the missing personnel. On 15 June the operation initiated contact with an estimated NVA company. The Mike Force unit was overrun, resulting in two more USASF missing. The Mike Force Company Commander rallied three squads and attempted to move forward but was beaten back by the intense fire. As the enemy fire continued, the company fled leaving the two USASF with ten men. After resorting to E&E tactics, these individuals rejoined the main body and established a perimeter. On 16 June, when all stragglers had been gathered, the unit returned to Dak To. Results of this action were two USASF and eight Mike Force personnel killed, 14 Mike Force personnel wounded. At 0430 hours the following morning, on 17 June, the camp received a mortar attack lasting approximately one hour. Three USASF, three attached US, seven Mike Force, and five CIDG were wounded; two CIDG and one Mike Force killed. Additionally, five CIDG dependents were killed and seven wounded.

A search and destroy operation from Van Canh, A-223, Ihu Yen Province, made contact on 19 June with an NVA company which was well entrenched. Six airstrikes were placed on the enemy positions, after which they withdrew. The CIDG then swept the area. The results were two CIDG killed, one USASF and four CIDG wounded. There were 17 NVA killed and two weapons captured. On 27 June a surveillance operation from Poley Kleng, A-241, Kontum Province, made contact with two NVA companies. Two airstrikes were called in, resulting in nine NVA confirmed killed and another 155 estimated killed.

Elements of a screening operation from Plateau Gi, A-243, in Kontum Province, made contact with a reinforced NVA company at 1500 hours on 11 July. The operation received automatic weapons and 82mm mortar fire until 2030 hours. At this time contact was broken with the aid of artillery fire. Results of the contact were six CIDG wounded, nine NVA killed, and two AK-47's captured. On 8 July an ambush and search and destroy operation from Trang Phuc, A-233, Darlac Province, made contact with an NVA platoon. A ten minute firefight ensued after which the NVA broke contact. On the 9th at 1200 hours, the operation ambushed ten NVA moving along a trail. The NVA immediately broke contact and fled. Results of the two contacts were six NVA killed, four small arms and one crew served weapon captured. One CIDG was wounded. On 18 July a CIDG element from Gung Son, A-221, in Phu Yen Province ambushed one company of NVA carrying large quantities of rice. The NVA were armed with AK-47's and two M-16 rifles. Results of the ambush were one CIDG killed, one CIDG wounded, nine NVA killed and one M-16 rifle captured.

On the 23rd at 1600 hours, a search and destroy operation from Camp Dak Seang, A-245, Kontum Province, consisting of two USASF, two VNSF and 70 CIDG, made contact with an estimated company of NVA preparing night defensive positions. A firefight ensued, after which the friendly element broke contact with the aid of artillery and airstrikes. One CIDG was killed and nine wounded, one VNSF and one CIDG were missing. At 1800 hours on the 23rd a 70 man reaction force was dispatched to sweep the area of contact, and the following morning this element was reinforced by an additional 80 CIDG. At 1100 hours the operation engaged in a brief firefight with an

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estimated company of NVA, resulting in three CIDG wounded. The next day, 25 July, the body of one VNSF that was previously carried as missing was recovered by the operation. Results of the two contacts were one CIDG killed, 14 CIDG wounded, one CIDG missing and one VNSF killed. Equipment losses were two BAR's, seven carbines and two HT-1 radios.

During the reporting period CIDG operations have been conducted in support of the following major operations in II CTZ: Francis Marion (4th Inf Div), Greely (173rd Abn Bde), Stillwell (4th Inf Div), Pershing (1st Cav Div), and ROK operations conducted 9-31 July.

(c) III CTZ: Throughout the reporting period numerous casualties were caused by mines and booby traps, especially in Hau Nghia and Long An Provinces. Camp Prek Klok, A-322, Tay Ninh Province, was constantly harassed by enemy mortar attacks. US counter-mortar radar at Prek Klok plotted enemy positions as close as 1000 meters from the camp during these attacks.

On 9 May, a two company CIDG operation from Hiep Hoa was in an advantageous position to react to a multi-company VC force which had made an attack on two River Assault Group boats which were patrolling the Oriental River. The CIDG operation intercepted and pursued the withdrawing VC units. Close air support and reinforcements deployed by both Hiep Hoa and Tra Cu, A-352, aided in the destruction of the enemy. Forty-nine enemy were killed during this action. Again on 16 May, a company operation from Hiep Hoa made contact with a multi-company VC force. Elements of the 1/27 and 2/27 Infantry, 25th US Infantry Division, were deployed by helicopter as reinforcements, and the operation ended with 34 enemy killed.

On 6 May, Camp Tong Le Chon, A-334, Binh Long Province, came under a heavy mortar attack by an estimated VC battalion minus, resulting in six Mike Force personnel killed, 39 wounded, one CIDG killed and three wounded. On 26 May at Camp Tong Le Chon, a Mike Force operation made contact with a large enemy force including a hospital staff, nurses, and patients, approximately eight kilometers north of the camp. Heavy contact was maintained for approximately three hours. The Mike Force assaulted the enemy's fortified positions, and artillery and airstrikes were called in. The operation received an ammunition resupply as well as reinforcements. The enemy finally withdrew northwest towards Cambodia. Friendly losses in this action were one USASF killed, one wounded, four Mike Force killed and 22 wounded. Two VC were killed, and assorted medical supplies and documents were captured.

On 14 May a CIDG company minus operation from Chi Linh, A-333, Binh Long Province, made contact with an estimated VC company armed with assorted small arms and automatic weapons including M-16 rifles. A 45 minute fire-fight resulted in one USASF killed, five CIDG killed, 13 CIDG wounded and three weapons lost. An AC-47, airstrikes, and artillery were called in, which caused the VC to break contact and flee in all directions. Five VC were confirmed killed with an unknown number killed or wounded by airstrikes. On 28 May, a CIDG operation from Chi Linh made contact with an estimated platoon. The friendly element called in artillery and airstrikes and engaged

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the enemy with small arms fire. The enemy broke contact immediately with the friendly element in close pursuit. Several minutes later, the friendly element was attacked by an estimated VC company. During the ensuing fire-fight, radio contact was lost with the ground force and a radio was dropped in. Friendly casualties from this action were one USASF killed, one wounded, three CIDG killed, eight wounded, ten weapons and one IRC-25 radio lost. Five enemy were killed.

On 4 June a company size operation in the vicinity of Hiep Hoa, A-351, Hau Nghia Province, made several contacts accounting for a total of nine VC killed. Two USASF were wounded, one CIDG killed and four wounded; most of the friendly casualties were caused by booby traps. On 11 June a Mike Force operation in the vicinity of Chi Linh, A-333, Binh Long Province, made contact with an estimated VC company. The enemy was deployed on line and fired assorted small arms, automatic weapons, and 82mm mortars. Friendly forces returned the fire and called in artillery, a FAC, and a light fire team. After 45 minutes, the enemy broke contact and withdrew, leaving seven killed and assorted equipment. No friendly casualties were sustained.

A patrol conducted in the vicinity of Loc Ninh, A-331, Binh Long Province, made contact on 22 June with five VC. After five minutes the VC broke contact with friendly elements in pursuit. This contact resulted in one VC killed. Later that afternoon the element in pursuit made contact with a VC battalion which opened fire from three sides using automatic weapons. The friendly element took a defensive position and called for a light fire team and air strikes which caused the enemy to withdraw. On 23 June contact was made with the point element of a VC company, but was broken with no casualties reported. At 1400 hours the 4th Mike Force Company arrived by helicopter and linked up with the operation. All elements were placed in a defensive position, and H&I fire was directed on suspected VC locations. At 0837 hours on 24 June, the combined force discovered 10 VC killed by airstrikes and two enemy weapons. At 1058 hours a MEDEVAC aircraft was fired on by two VC squads. After an exchange of fire, the VC withdrew, with the combined force in pursuit. Contact was again made with two squads of VC firing automatic weapons, and broken at 1202 hours. Still in pursuit, the combined force made contact with an estimated VC company. The VC broke contact and withdrew after artillery and airstrikes had been called in. This entire operation resulted in 21 VC killed and five enemy weapons captured. Friendly forces sustained one USASF, seven CIDG, two Mike Force personnel, and one interpreter killed; 27 CIDG and four Mike Force personnel wounded; five rifles and two radios lost.

On 28 June an estimated VC platoon initiated contact with another operation from Loc Ninh. Friendly elements moved into defensive positions with 105mm and 175mm artillery in support. A light fire team and tactical aircraft were requested. At 1220 hours the enemy positions were reinforced, bringing the total estimated VC strength to a company or larger. One USASF was killed, two USASF wounded, five CIDG killed and 24 CIDG wounded. Medical evacuation could not be accomplished because of intense enemy fire and adverse weather conditions in the operational area. At 1620 hours two Mike Force companies were helilifted from Loc Ninh to reinforce the friendly elements.

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The two Mike Force companies linked up with friendly elements without incident. The VC withdrew, and by 1900 hours evacuation of the dead and wounded was completed. At dawn on 29 June the contact area was assessed, revealing one VC killed by airstrikes and four additional CIDG killed. At 0955 on 12 July a search and destroy operation consisting of 87 CIDG and two USASF from Tong Le Chon, A-334, Binh Long Province, sighted an estimated VC regiment moving along a trail. Friendly elements opened fire with small arms and withdrew to a defensive perimeter, calling in 105mm and 175mm artillery on the enemy positions. Contact was broken at 1000 hours. No friendly casualties were sustained. At 1535 hours this operation moved back to the contact area to assess the artillery damage and was ambushed by an estimated two companies of VC. Friendly elements returned the fire, called 105mm and 175mm artillery into the VC positions, and, under the protection of an airstrike, withdrew again to defensive positions. Sporadic small arms fire was received until 1800 hours. Results of this operation were three CIDG killed, three wounded and three missing; one USASF wounded, and ten VC killed. At 1140 hours on 19 July a local security element at Camp Irek Klok, A-322, Tay Ninh Province, made contact with a VC platoon. After a short exchange of fire in which one CIDG was wounded, the VC platoon withdrew. At 1627 hours Camp Irek Klok received 12 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Ten rounds landed on the inner perimeter and two rounds on the perimeter wire. Counter-mortar fire was employed and artillery directed into suspected VC firing positions. One CIDG was killed; one USASF, 11 CIDG and two civilian mechanics wounded. On 27 July a waterborne search and destroy operation consisting of two companies of CIDG, four USASF and three VNSF, made contact with an estimated company of VC ten kilometers northwest of Ben Soi, A-321, Tay Ninh Province. After a ten minute firefight the VC broke contact and withdrew; results of this contact were one VC killed and four wounded, two CIDG killed, 11 CIDG and one USASF wounded, nine boats and one .30 cal light machinegun slightly damaged.

(d) IV CTZ: On 2 May, two companies of CIDG from My Phuoc Tay initiated contact with two VC companies. After a two hour firefight, 21 VC were confirmed killed, and three small arms, a large amount of documents, assorted equipment and ammunition were captured. On 14 May one platoon of CIDG on OP security at My An initiated contact with a VC platoon. A ten minute firefight ensued during which the CIDG were supported by 4.2 inch mortars and 105mm howitzers. Results of the contact were 16 VC killed. Camp Ba Xoai, A-421, Chau Doc Province, was attacked by a reinforced VC company on 19 May. The enemy employed 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles, 60mm and 81mm mortars, machine guns and small arms in the attack. The camp was not physically assaulted; all firing was from approximately 600 meters out. The camp was supported by artillery from Chi Lang Training Center and by AC-47 aircraft. After a firefight lasting approximately two hours, the VC broke contact and withdrew west toward Cambodia. Friendly losses were one CIDG killed, three CIDG and four USASF wounded; the team house, vehicles and TR-20 radio were damaged. There were no confirmed VC casualties, but three litters and bloody clothing were found, indicating at least six VC casualties.

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A company of CIDG from Ihu Quoc, A-441, Kien Giang Province, made contact on 4 June with an unknown number of VC approximately ten kilometers southeast of camp. After a short fire fight the VC broke contact and withdrew with the friendly element in pursuit. Friendly losses were one USASF and two CIDG killed, while the enemy suffered 11 killed and 11 weapons seized. Operation Le Dinh Dao 10, 8-11 June, was the first major foot-mobile operation conducted by the CIDG over a sustained period of time in the VC controlled area known as the "Pocket" in southeastern Kien Tuong Province. Eight hundred CIDG troops were employed initially, including troops from Camps My An, Kinh Quan II, Tuyen Nhon, and My Phuoc Tay. On the first day of the operation, 8 June, an additional 150 CIDG from Camp Binh Thanh Thon were airlanded to reinforce units from My Phuoc Tay which had made heavy contact as they moved into the operational area. Contact with the enemy, elements of the 261st Bn of the Dong Thap I Regiment, lasted approximately five hours. Sporadic contact continued for the next two days; however, no major VC units were encountered. Results of the operation included 32 VC killed, 13 captured (wounded also); five CIDG killed; 25 CIDG, one VNSF, two USASF, and one helicopter crewman wounded. In addition, 72 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition, four weapons, and 10 kg of documents were captured, and numerous bunker, structures, and sampans destroyed.

On 28 June at 0955 hours, Operation Le Dinh Dao 9, a search and destroy operation from Moc Hoa, B-41, Kien Tuong Province, consisting of ten committed CIDG companies supported by tactical air and helicopters with three CIDG companies in reserve, made contact with a reinforced VC company approximately 30 kilometers south of Moc Hoa. The VC used rockets, 60mm mortars, .50 cal machine guns, .30 cal machine guns, and assorted small arms in attacking a CIDG company. After five minutes of close combat the VC withdrew southeast and deployed in a defensive position. The CIDG company was reinforced by another CIDG company and air strikes and armed helicopters were directed against the VC. Sporadic contact was made throughout the day with company size elements of the VC 263rd Main Force Battalion. Friendly losses on 28 June were three USASF, one VNSF and 19 CIDG killed; one USASF, one VNSF and 20 CIDG wounded; 40 CIDG missing. VC losses were 50 killed, four wounded and two captured. On 29 June at approximately 0900 hours all the CIDG companies were pulled out, and a reaction force consisting of two Mike Force and six CIDG companies was committed in the contact area to seal off and destroy the VC. The Mike Force companies swept south through the contact area making a total of six contacts which resulted in 24 VC killed and four captured, with no friendly losses. Thirty-one bodies of the 40 CIDG reported as missing were recovered. The CIDG companies made two contacts, resulting in one VC killed and no friendly casualties. The operation terminated on 29 June at 1830 hours with the following overall results: friendly losses were three USASF, one VNSF, and 53 CIDG killed; one USASF, one VNSF and 21 CIDG wounded; nine CIDG missing. VC losses were 75 killed, four wounded and six captured.

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On 3 July at 2400 hours installations in the town of Cao Lanh, Kien Phong Province, came under heavy VC mortar, rifle grenade, antitank rocket and small arms fire. The primary attack was against the USASF airboat facility with secondary attacks on the B-43 compound, National Police Station, Kien Phong Sector Headquarters and the CORDS compound. Friendly troops observed the muzzle flashes of the VC weapons and returned fire with 4.2 mortars, 105mm howitzers and small arms. A FAC and an AC-47 were on station at 0035 hours, at which time the VC broke contact. One USASF, one civilian (Filipino) tech rep, five CIDG, six security guards, and seven civilians were wounded; one ARVN soldier and one civilian were killed. Minor damage was sustained by the buildings in the B-43 compound. Extensive damage was done to the airboat site. The following major items of equipment were destroyed; one 2½-ton truck, one air compressor, one airboat (complete), six airboat engines and all spare parts for boat repairs to include special tools. The maintenance shed was totally destroyed, and all buildings on boat site are in need of minor repairs. The VC losses are unknown.

On the 14th of July at 0245 hours Camp My An, A-433, in Kien Phong Province; the town of My An, and two mobile OP's south of the camp, came under attack by an estimated VC battalion. The attack was concentrated on the two OP's with suppressive fires on the camp and town so they could not give sufficient fire support or reinforce the OP's. Counter mortar was fired from the camp and 105mm howitzer from the town. Tactical aircraft and AC-47 were on station at 0330, bringing the VC under fire. The VC broke contact at 0545 hours withdrawing to the southeast taking their dead and wounded in 13 sampans. Results of the attack were 12 CIDG killed; two USASF, two VNSF and 33 CIDG wounded; one .30 cal machine gun and two assault boats with motors lost. VC losses were five confirmed VC killed with an estimated 50 additional VC either killed or wounded. One AK-47 rifle and one claymore mine were seized.

On the 17th at 0900 hours, detachment A-441 on Phu Quoc Island dispatched two USASF, one combat recon platoon and one company of CIDG on a search and destroy operation in response to intelligence. At 1305 hours tactical aircraft conducted 11 airstrikes in the target area. At 1430 hours the airstrikes lifted, and the friendly element, supported by 4.2 inch mortar fire, moved into the area. At 1500 hours the combat recon platoon made contact with four VC, killing one and wounding another. At 1640 hours the company of CIDG initiated contact with eight VC, who broke contact after an eight minute fire fight which resulted in one VC killed and two CIDG wounded. By 2000 hours a complete assessment of the target area had been made, revealing an additional six VC killed. A FAC reported seeing a number of VC bodies being carried away. Total results of the operation were two CIDG wounded, eight VC killed, four VC suspects detained, one VC wounded, three structures destroyed, 600 kilos of rice, two kilos of documents and three kilos of medical supplies captured. On the 25th at 0645, a platoon of Chieu Hois and two USASF from Kinh Quan II, A-412, Kien Phong Province, ambushed a company of VC approximately 15 kilometers southeast of camp. A 15 minute firefight ensued resulting in six VC killed, two weapons and two kilos of documents captured, with no friendly casualties.

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(2) CIDG camps: On 1 May Detachment A-252 was withdrawn from Plei Mrong, Pleiku Province, leaving the VNSF detachment to run the camp without advisors. This was the first test of a new concept designed to conserve USASF assets and thru facilitate the deployment of additional camps in new locations. The second camp to be turned over to the VNSF under this program was Vinh Gia in IV CTZ. Control of the camp was transferred to the VNSF detachment on 27 June, and USASF Detachment A-422 was withdrawn on 30 June. See Inclosure 6 for a progress report on this program. On 15 May, Detachment B-31 terminated its mission at Xuan Loc and Nui Thi, and all personnel and equipment were move to Company A at Bien Hoa. The buildings previously occupied by the detachment were turned over to Sector control. Personnel have been reassigned to other Special Forces detachments throughout the Corps Area. On 26 May three CIDG companies, one CRP, USASF Detachment A-126 were airlifted to Luong Hoa in Long An Province to open a new CIDG camp. The 25th ARVN Division and the 36th ARVN Ranger Battalion conducted Operation Victory Trail in support of the camp opening. In II CTZ the closing of Bong Son and the opening of Ha Tay was completed on 12 June. On 24 June Detachment A-225A at Le Hai officially turned their post at the Dong Xuan District Headquarters over to an element of MACV Team 28. The CIDG camp at Con Thien, just below the DMZ, was turned over to the USMC on 25 July for use as an outpost. Heavy pressure from NVA forces in the vicinity of the DMZ and the presence of large USMC units in the immediate area of the camp precluded accomplishment of the CIDG mission.

(3) The designations for most of the "A" detachments in IV CTZ were changed effective 1 June 1967. The purpose of the change was to more readily identify the "A" detachments with their parent "B" detachments. The first two numbers of each detachment now correspond to the number of its "B" detachment. The five detachments that report directly to Company D have designations starting with the numbers "40". New designations are as follows:

	<u>OLD</u>	<u>NEW</u>
Don Phuc (Mike Force)	A-430	A-401
To Chau (1st MGF)	A-431	A-402
To Chau (2d MGF)	A-432	A-403
Binh Hung	A-411	A-404
Ha Tien	A-421	A-405
My Phuoc Tay	A-424	A-411
Kinh Quan II	A-416	A-412
Ba Xoai	A-429	A-421
Cai Cai	A-412	A-431
Thuong Thoi	A-425	A-432
My An	A-426	A-433
Phu Quoc	A-427	A-441
Phu Quoc	A-428	A-442

(4) Preparation for the coming flood season was emphasized in the IV Corps Area. A training program was implemented with primary emphasis on boat tactics and operations to include the employment of sampans, assault boats, and airboats. Berms, drainage systems, and pumping

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facilities have been rebuilt and improved to withstand the flood waters. Supplies, ammunition and equipment are being pre-stocked in the camps to preclude some of the resupply problems when the floods come. The Company D Flood Plan was coordinated with the Senior Advisor, IV CTZ; Company A, 5th SFGA; US 9th Inf Div; II & I Force V, and representatives from COMAVFORV to insure a unified effort (see inclosure 25, Company D Flood Plan). The airboat site at Cao Lanh, Kien Phuoc Province was completed in May but suffered severe damage during the VC attack on 3-4 July (see paragraph 3b(1)(d) above).

c. Special Operations.

(1) Operation Buckner: Conducted by Detachment B-50 (Project Omega), this operation took place in western Kontum Province, II CTZ, from 15 April to 15 May. There were 13 reconnaissance teams and two company operations in the AO. Nineteen contacts and seven air strikes resulted in 12 VC killed, four wounded, and four captured. One Mike Force soldier was wounded.

(2) Blackjack 41: This mobile guerrilla operation began on 19 January, with Phase I terminating on 23 March. Phase II began on 17 May. The operational area was the Seven Mountains region of IV CTZ. See Inclosure 15 for after action report. In addition, operation Arrowhead, a Mike Force parachute assault, was conducted in support of the mobile guerrilla force. See Inclosure 16.

(3) Blackjack 24: This operation was conducted in north-western Kontum Province by the A-219 Mike Force, the A-217 mobile guerrilla force, and CIDG elements from A-242 as a diversionary force. It began on 16 March and ended on 19 May, with 16 contacts made during the operation. Friendly casualties were one USASF killed and one wounded, one Mike Force soldier killed and nine wounded. Enemy losses were 11 killed, six wounded, one captured, 152 buildings destroyed, 13 tons of food destroyed, and five weapons seized.

(4) Blackjack 25: During the period 15 April - 20 May mobile guerrilla elements made 11 contacts in the area of operation, which was located in central Kontum Province. Friendly casualties were seven USASF wounded, two Mike Force soldiers killed and 20 wounded. Enemy losses were 19 killed, seven wounded, 96 structures and 100 kg of food destroyed, and nine weapons captured.

(5) Blackjack 33: This operation was conducted in central III CTZ from 27 April to 24 May. For the first time mobile guerrilla elements were employed in conjunction with long range reconnaissance teams (B-56, Project Sigma), resulting in an impressive total of 320 enemy killed. See Inclosure 12 for after action report.

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(6) OPORD 5-67: From 10 April to 15 June reconnaissance teams and Ranger companies from Project Delta, Detachment B-52, operated in the Ashau-Aloui Valley in I CTZ. See Inclosure 18 for after action report.

(7) Blackjack 42: This was a mobile guerilla operation conducted in southeastern Vinh Binh Province, IV CTZ, from 3 June to 2 July. It marked the first amphibious infiltration conducted by Special Forces advised elements in Vietnam. See Inclosure 17 for after action report.

(8) Blackjack 26: Running from 15 June to 14 July, this was a mobile guerrilla operation conducted in northeastern Kontum and northwestern Binh Dinh Provinces by the 23rd Mike Force Company (A-219). Only four contacts were made, resulting in three USASF wounded, two Mike Force soldiers killed and three wounded. Although there were no confirmed enemy casualties, 27 structures and four tons of food were destroyed, and one weapon was captured.

(9) Blackjack 34: Conducted during the period 16-21 July, this was a mobile guerrilla operation in northeastern Binh Long and northwestern Phuoc Long Provinces. The operation discovered a VC regiment and killed 126 of the enemy while suffering only three USASF wounded, one Mike Force soldier killed and 33 wounded. See Inclosure 14 for after action report.

d. Training.

(1) Recondo School

(a) General

<u>1.</u>	<u>NR</u>	<u>USASF</u> <u>OFF</u>	<u>ASSD</u> <u>EM</u>	<u>ATCH/D</u> <u>OFF</u>
	May	5	27	1 ROK
	Jun	5	29	1 ROK 1 AUST.
	Jul	5	30	2 ROK 1 AUST.

2. During this reporting period the MACV Recondo School received student classes R-13-67 through R-2-68. The following is a breakdown of students by units and Corps areas for these classes.

<u>I CORPS</u>	<u>IN</u>	<u>DROPPED</u>	<u>GRADUATED</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>	<u>IN TRAINING</u>
1st Mar Div	2	0	1	1	0
3rd MAF	2	1	1	0	0
ROK Marines	2	0	2	0	0

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II CORPS

1st Cav Div (AM)	72	24	39	2	7
4th Inf Div (-)	41	18	18	0	5
3/25th Inf Div	12	1	10	1	0
1/101 Abn Div	10	2	8	0	0
ROK Forces	43	5	26	6	6
Hq Tng Div MACV	1	0	0	0	1

III CORPS

1st Inf Div	48	27	12	0	9
25th Inf Div(-)	17	7	10	0	0
173rd Abn Bde (Sep)	26	2	19	0	5
196th Lt Inf Bde	4	2	2	0	0
199th Lt Inf Bde	21	4	9	0	8
9th Inf Div	45	17	15	2	11
11th Arm Cav Reg	5	1	4	0	0
5th SFG	1	1	0	0	0
1st Phil Cag	9	2	4	0	3

3. The mission of the MACV Recondo School is to train selected personnel from US/FWMAF units in specialized techniques and skills necessary to conduct successful long range reconnaissance operations in the Republic of South Vietnam.

(b) Operations and Training Activities.

1. Plans - N/A

2. Operations

a Number/type operation conducted

	<u>Day</u>	<u>Night</u>	<u>Recondo</u>	<u>CIDG</u>
(1) Attacks	0	0	0	0
(2) Blocking Actions	0	0	0	0
(3) Escort Action	9	0	0	9
(4) Combat Patrols	0	0	0	0
(5) Recon Patrols	40	0	40	0
(6) Ambushes	0	80	80	0

b Number of friendly initiated contacts

<u>Day</u>	<u>Night</u>	<u>Recondo</u>
0	0	0

c VC Losses (Confirmed)

(1) VC Killed: 0

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(2) VC Captured: 0
 (3) VC Wounded: 0
 (4) VC Suspects: 15
 (5) VC Weapon: 0

d Friendly Losses

	<u>USASF</u>	<u>RECONDO STD</u>	<u>CIDG</u>
(1) Killed	0	0	0
(2) Wounded	0	0	0
(3) Missing	0	0	0
(4) Weapons Lost	0	0	0

282 hou: POI. See Inclosure 4. Training: Recondo classes now receive a 9.

(c) Logistics. The MACV Recondo School is supported logistically by USARV and the 1st Logistical Command.

(2) Dong Ba Thin VNSF Training Center.

(a) Courses graduated or in progress during the reporting period:

CIDG #23	10 Apr - 15 May	102
CIDG #24	15 May - 27 Jun	128
CIDG #25	03 Jul - 11 Aug	121
CRP #21	17 Apr - 21 May	248
CRP #22	24 May - 28 Jun	232
CRP #23	03 Jul - 07 Aug	248
CIDG Radio #110	Apr - 28 Aug	37
LLDB RCT #6	31 Jul -	

(b) The Basic Airborne Course was attended by Mike Force units from D & C Company, 5th Special Forces Group, during the months of May, June and July. Also attending were selected US personnel. A total of 215 students graduated from the basic airborne course during the reporting period. The course is taught by USASF personnel assigned to Detachment B-51. While the airborne course is in session, the Detachment's capability to monitor other training and conduct operations is decreased because of personnel shortages.

(c) During the reporting period the following combat operations were conducted:

<u>OPN</u>	<u>SIZE</u>	<u>DURATION</u>	<u>CONTACTS</u>
T-10	2 Platoons	3 Days	Neg
T-11	2 Platoons	3 Days	Neg

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T-12	2 Platoons	3 Days	Neg
T-13	8 Platoons	5 Days	1 VC KIA
T-14	1 Platoons	4 Days	Neg
T-15	8 Platoons	5 Days	Neg
T-16	2 Platoons	2 Days	Neg
T-18	2 Platoons	5 Days	Neg
T-19	3 Platoons	5 Days	Neg
T-20	2 Platoons	5 Days	1 Squad(2 CIDG-WIA)
T-21	2 Platoons	5 Days	Neg
T-22	2 Platoons	4 Days	Neg

(d) The camp nightly deploys four to five squad ambushes or security patrols. The CIDG leaders course, the LLDB course and the CRP course conclude with field training exercises into areas which provide opportunity for enemy contact and thus add a degree of realism and seriousness to field training.

(e) Aviation: The tactical airlift liaison personnel provided by the U.S. Air Force increased to three officers in May 1967. The Group is now supported by the senior tactical airlift liaison officer at Nha Trang and one assistant for C and B Company and a second assistant for A and D Company. A marked improvement in the efficiency of air movement operations at the forward supply points has been noted.

(1) A pocket-size close air support guide for ground commanders was produced. The guide will be distributed down to the "A" detachments and will provide the ground commander with a quick reference for minimum safe distance for each type of air delivered munition and its pattern of effect.

(2) The C-7A caribou assets under the operational control of the 5th Special Forces Group were increased to eleven aircraft daily. The redistribution of assets has enabled the Group to place two caribous at each forward supply point.

(3) Portable airfield lighting sets were distributed to each "A" detachment, increasing the operational capability of all Special Forces airfields in the Republic of Vietnam.

(f) Combat Developments: See Inclosure 8 for a summary of all projects currently under evaluation.

4. (U) LOGISTICS

a. General. From 1 May through 30 June 67 the Logistic Support Center continued to provide the 5th SFGA's far flung detachments and companies with all classes of supplies and up to and including 5th echelon ordnance, signal and engineer maintenance. More than 10,000 tons of supplies were delivered to subordinate units by all methods of transportation. Over 700 tons of food, ammunition and general supplies were parachuted to isolated camps and in support of special operations.

b. Supply.

(1) Construction of facilities for a fifth forward supply point was initiated with an expected completion date of 1st September 1967. This action will complete the decentralization of the 5th SFGA logistics system and will provide a reduced order-ship time and further dispersal of supplies.

(2) Part of the LSC stockage level of critical supplies and equipment, such as weapons and radios, has been dispersed to the Logistical Annex at Detachment B-55 Saigon.

(3) A new ration warehouse has been completed, allowing the LSC to store rice in large quantities under optimum storage space. This allows LSC to purchase rice in large quantities when the market price is low. A recent purchase of 25,000 bags was made at a saving of fifty piasters per bag.

(4) Ammunition stockage levels were reduced from a sixty to a thirty day level. All ammunition in excess of the thirty day level is being turned in to Cam Ranh Bay. A rehabilitation plan to construct new berms within the ammunition dump has been implemented with an expected completion date of 20 August 1967.

(5) The petroleum storage area has been bermed to reduce possible fire hazards.

(6) POL and ammunition are no longer placed on the ready lines within the LSC. These supplies are now moved directly from their respective storage areas to the aircraft loading ramp, thereby further reducing fire and explosion hazards.

(7) A significant movements achievement was accomplished during the month of June when sea shipment tonnage equaled the tonnage shipped by air. This was the first time in 5th SFGA history that sea shipments equalled air shipments, thereby significantly reducing the drain on the in-country airlift systems. Large quantities of bulk, low priority cargo can now be shipped more economically to Danang, Qui Nhon, Can Tho, and Bien Hoa, keeping the high priority cargo for aerial port shipment.

(8) A covered, elevated ramp has been constructed to allow more and larger rigging lines for the preparation of loads for air land and air drop. To decrease aircraft loading time, a direct access gate from the C7A

LOGISTICS (CONTD)

aircraft parking area to the rigging ramp has been made, and the area is now in the process of being covered with PSP to provide an all-weather operating surface for forklifts.

(9) Direct shipment schedules have been made with the Counter Insurgency Support Office to our forward supply points in Danang and Bien Hoa. These schedules are designed to reduce handling, reduce the order-ship time and eliminate re-shipment from Nha Trang. A test delivery schedule is being made on rations, cement, and lumber.

(10) A logistical briefing has been given to Brig Gen Quang, LLDG Commander, his staff, and all LLDB "B" Detachment Commanders.

(11) LSC security has been improved by the addition of American guards and observation towers.

(12) All "A" camp generators in the II CTZ are being standardized to reduce repair parts stockage and to help eliminate repair parts problems.

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USASF advisory responsibilities so that the 5th SFGA could properly align RDSA/PSYOP personnel with their counterparts at all levels. As a result of the ideas submitted, a joint staff study was initiated on 1 Jun 67, recommending a combined RDSA/PSYOPS Section be organized to advise the VNSF in conduct of the GVN POLWAR Program, RVNAF. This study will be completed by 15 Aug 67.

(3). The meeting held on 18 Jul 67 resulted in a mutual exchange of job descriptions and delineation of duties in order to clarify both LLDB/5th SFGA counterpart responsibilities. Each LLDB sub-section chief in the POLWAR Section outlined his specific missions and program objectives. In addition, CPT Ky, Political Indoctrination Chief, presented the LLDB concept of Revolutionary Development supporting accordance with command guidance. The next meeting is scheduled to be conducted on 17 August 67 to finalize the program of instruction for the CIDG CA/PSYOPS squads in all four tactical zones as well as to determine the employment of these squads (i.e. at selected training centers or company level).

b. On 6 June 1967, the first CIDG rice buying association was organized by the S-5, Co C, Da Nang. The rice buying association is a cooperative established by the CIDG under the guidance of Vietnamese and US Special Forces for the purpose of buying large quantities of rice in Da Nang for shipment and sales to CIDG dependents. The purpose is to:

(1) Provide rice at a reasonable price for CIDG dependents living in remote areas, thus discouraging local rice purchases at exorbitant prices.

(2) Protect the CIDG and their dependents from unscrupulous merchants.

(3) Discourage the CIDG from pilfering rice from the camps.

The experiment has proven highly successful and future implementation of this concept is scheduled for II, III and IV CTZ. (See Inclosure 21)

c. On 4 Jul 67, a joint memorandum was issued by the LLDB POLWAR and USASF S-5 Section of Co A, Bien Hoa, designed to improve the standards of living for the CIDG and their dependents by providing subsistence and morale commodities via an established commissary system for all CIDG camps. The bi-lingual memorandum outlined the 60 day trail concept as follows:

(1) Camps selected to implement the commissary concept were Tong Le Chon, Prek Klok and Luong Hoa. All three of these camps have experienced a gradual decline in troop morale as a result of remote location and non-availability of such items as beer, cigarettes, and general morale commodities.

(2) Supply of commissary goods as well as the management of all camp exchanges are the food contractor's responsibility. The food

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contractor supplies the requested commodities on a weekly basis at the same time the fresh food deliveries are made to the detachments. Fixed prices are predetermined and agreed upon by the LLDB POLWAR/USASF S-5 section, Co A, Bien Hoa. Established prices are designed to preclude profiteering activities within the CDDG camps. The trial period terminates 4 Sep 67, and a project report will be included in the subsequent ORLL.

d. Field Evaluation: An extensive evaluation of the Group's nationwide RD support and civic action programs was begun during June 67. The collection phase of this evaluation is now complete, and the findings and recommendations are expected to be available early in August. It is expected that this study will, among other things, result in closer integration of civic action and intelligence efforts, much tighter control on piaster spending, and closer alignment of the USASF advisory structure with the VNSF POLWAR functions.

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6. (U) Psychological Operations.

a. There has been a significant increase in coordination and joint effort between the Group PSYOPS Officer and appropriate counterparts in the Vietnamese Special Forces Political Warfare Section. A formal conference and a number of informal staff visits have contributed to a closer working relationship. A number of projects are being jointly considered. They are:

- (1) Equipment for CA/PSYOP teams
- (2) Reorganization of CA/PSYOP teams
- (3) Lessons (POI) for training of CA/PSYOP teams
- (4) Introduction of training classes at Dong Ba Thin Training center
- (5) Better integration of POLWAR activities into the CIDG program.

b. 5th Special Forces Group has received a marked increase in aircraft support of PSYOPS. The Group presently receives five times the number of aircraft missions for the previous reporting period. Although 20% of the total missions requested are still not being flown, there are several reasons. They are:

- (1) Failure of companies in the CTZ to follow through on missions requested to insure all requests have been forwarded to the US Air Force D. A. S. C.
- (2) Failure to USASF personnel to properly request aircraft support.
- (3) Failure to USASF to insure that leaflets and tape recordings are supplied to the US Air Force properly. Corrective action has been taken on problems identified, and higher efficiency will be forthcoming.

c. An increase of junior officers in group has generally improved the manpower situation in SF detachments resulting in an increase in support for PSYOPS. The present manpower status remains far below the recognized needs of the Group for PSYOPS, however.

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7. (U) Personnel & Administration

a. Unit strength:

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period:

OFF	518
WO	11
EM	<u>2197</u>
	2726

(2) At end of the reporting period:

OFF	465
WO	11
EM	<u>2181</u>
	2657

b. Supply of blank forms & publications: Supply publications has been excellent. The supply of blank forms is marginal.

c. Assignment Instructions upon DEROS: The late receipt of assignment instructions for personnel departing this command upon DEROS continues to be a problem. It is felt that the efforts expended at all levels to improve this situation will reduce the administrative burden and improve morale.

d. Awards and Decorations:

(1) The following is the status of awards and decorations approved during the reporting period.

(a) Medal of Honor	0
(b) DSC	4
(c) DSM	0
(d) DFC	4
(e) Silver Star	48
(f) Legion of Merit	14
(g) Soldier's Medal	25
(h) Bronze Star (V)	144
(i) Bronze Star	350

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(j) Air Medal (V)	4
(k) Air Medal	206
(l) ARCOM (V)	33
(m) ARCOM	96
(n) Purple Heart	92
(o) CIB	545
(p) CMB	57

(2) There are two recommendations for the Medal of Honor currently pending at Department of the Army: 1LT Sisler, George K., OF110068 and SFC Hoskins, Gomer D., Jr., RA25351557.

e. A&R and Special Services:

(1) Athletic and Recreation Program: Fourteen additional weight lifting sets were obtained for use at the SFOB and various detachments. Other athletic equipment has been ordered and will be distributed upon receipt.

(2) Special Services: Magazines, paperback books and newspapers are mailed directly to all detachments weekly. A reading room was opened at the SFOB. There are magazines, newspapers and over 1,000 paperback and hard cover books available; facilities for studying and writing letters have been installed. A tape library was opened in May, and personnel are able to dub tapes, record tapes to send home, and play tapes received from home.

f. Post Exchange Facilities: The SFOB PX annex now stocks various items of electronic equipment, television sets, radios and numerous other items.

g. Labor/Civilian Personnel: In keeping with MACV objectives to reduce the amount of piasters expended, additional consolidation of activities is planned. All hiring and firing of civilian personnel for Group units in the Nha Trang area will be centered at the SFOB Civilian Personnel Office. This will permit elimination of most CPO positions at the other four offices in the Nha Trang area.

8. (U) Medical

a. Hospital facilities: The CIDG hospital at Company A, Bien Hoa, has been performing major surgical procedures on CIDG patients since mid-May 67. This not only substantially increases the level of medical care available to III CTZ CIDG, but also decreases dependence upon U.S. military hospital facilities in the area.

b. Advisory mission: An immeasurable improvement in the relationship between the Vietnamese Special Forces Surgeon and the 5th Special Forces Group Surgeon was noted during this quarter. Tangible results include:

(1) Joint MEDCAP operations in the Nha Trang area.

(2) Combining the USASF and VNSF medical facilities at Detachment B-51 and VNSF Training Center at Dong Ba Thin. This combination precludes duplication of effort and of resources and serves as one example of results obtainable from excellent advisor-counterpart relations. It is planned that the combined facilities will form a nucleus for a projected training course in advanced medical procedures to be conducted for VNSF aidmen.

(3) A data file system on all medical and paramedical personnel was made available to the VNSF Chief Surgeon. This system will enable him to understand the personnel resources controlled by him and will assist him in making and rotating assignments and in deciding which personnel require additional training in certain fields.

c. Medical civic action: Medical civic action programs continued. Civilian outpatients treated between 1 Jan 67 through 31 Jun 67 totalled 505,461.

d. Plague prevention: In an attempt to curtail the perennial increases in the incidence of bubonic plague in "A" detachment areas. 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) approved the expenditure of funds for the purchase of sufficient plague vaccine from the Institut Pasteur to immunize 143,000 persons. This number includes all CIDG, their dependents, and civilians living in the immediate vicinity of "A" detachments in I and II CTZ. Immunizations will begin in late September or early October, 1967.

e. Emergency Medical Reaction Team: The EMRT, consisting of one medical officer and two aidmen, with sufficient supplies, deployed from the SFOB to Detachment A-110, Con Thien, in mid-May to provide medical support. This was the first time the team was utilized, and it was successful in its mission.

9. (U) Signal:

a. Airboat communications: The high noise level associated with airboat operations has made use of radios with issue-type handsets impossible. The Electronic Maintenance section of the Signal Company resolved the problem by developing a completely different earphone-microphone-intercom system. Earpluff headsets, such as those used by personnel working near jet engines, reduced outside noise to an acceptable level. These headsets were modified with receiver diaphragms removed from old headsets. The microphone problem was resolved through the use of the Air Force oxygen mask with a built-in microphone. An intercom set between the gunner and driver allows free conversation, and both individuals can operate the AN/PRC-25. This equipment was constructed by using two modules from the AN/PRC-25, powered by the AN/PRC-25 battery and packaged with the necessary switches in a .30 cal ammunition can. The problem of the whip antenna in overhanging vegetation was eliminated by attaching a wire doublet to the boat.

b. Communications from small outboard craft and LCVP's.

(1) The following pertains to communications using AN/PRD-25's from small outboard craft and LCVP's with normal operating ranges 8-12 KM. and frequently up to 25 KM.

(2) Extra precautions must be taken to waterproof radios and handsets. Additional batteries have to be carried and kept waterproofed until put into operation.

(3) To achieve extended ranges, long antennas and RC-292 expedient antennas are frequently required.

(4) Inter-communication within a single boat is not required. Each boat should have a means of communication from boat to boat. All communication equipment should be located either against the bulkhead or in recessed areas so as not to interfere with personnel movement and so that equipment will be protected from the elements as much as possible.

(5) Preferred operating frequency is from 53-75 MHz (high band). Many older helicopters cannot net with the low band (30-52 MHz) on a PRC-25. The frequency selected should fall on a hundred KHz channel since many fixed wing aircraft cannot net with a 50 KHz channel.

(6) Command and Control (C&C) Boats.

(a) The GRC-125 or an AN/VRC-46 or 47 is preferred as the main C&C radio since it has a greater range and the antenna system is preferable to mounting a 292-type antenna in a boat. The LCVP has a 24 volt power source.

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(b) The C&C boat must also have a back-pack radio so that the command group can, if necessary, disembark and control ground operations.

(c) The C&C element should have the ability to monitor two nets simultaneously. This facilitates control of such action as medical evacuations, resupply missions, or administrative traffic with maneuver elements and also allows communication with rear base control station on a frequency other than the tactical command frequency.

(d) Distances and dispersion of maneuver elements may require that a forward control boat and an intermediate control boat be used. In all cases the rear overall control should be either land based in a relatively secure area which affords sophisticated communications, or on a large vessel which affords the same capabilities.

(7) All radio operators must have headsets in order to monitor transmissions while the boat engine is running. Headsets are a necessity.

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10. (C) Engineer.

1. Organization: During this reporting period, two significant activities took place with respect to organization. First, the entire engineering effort of the Group was placed under the supervision of the Staff Engineer. The advantages of this move are:

a. Simplicity and more continuity for funding purposes.

b. A centralized engineer organization within the Group to eliminate duplication of effort

The second organizational change has been the official notification received by this organization that the 31st Engineer Detachment will be assigned to replace the 539th Engineer Detachment o/a 22 Sept 67. The 539th Engr Det, which is now in country on TDY from the 1st Special Forces Group (Abn), will then return to their home station in Okinawa.

2. CONEX Bunker Design: During the last monsoon season in the delta region, many bunkers were flooded resulting in ammunition becoming wet and thus malfunctioning. Design has now been completed for bunkers in this region. Basically the design consists of placing the CONEX on its back, doors up, and waterproofing the interior. A protected entrance is provided at the top of the container. This design will keep the bunker dry at all times when the water in the camp is six feet or less.

3. Airfield Surveys: A continuing problem in the Special Forces camps, especially the new ones, has been timely surveys and classification of the airfields so that the fields can be placed in operation shortly after construction. Due to the shortage of personnel, the USAF has not been able to go to these fields as rapidly as desired. Arrangements were completed with the USAF in May that will allow the Group to classify the airfields located in the vicinity of the Special Forces camps. The survey, which is made in accordance with published USAF standards, is conducted by a team from the Group consisting of the Staff Engineer, the TALO and a representative from the Engineer Section, IFFV.

4. Prestocked CIDG Camps: As reported in the last ORLL, two complete CIDG camps were being stocked in the LSC. During May and June, two camps were shipped, one to Camp Mang Buk and one to Camp Ha Tay. The concept of prestocking the camps in the LSC and then shipment directly to the camp site has proved successful, and plans are being made to continue this method of camp construction.

5. Camp Construction: The following is a progress report for construction program during this quarter:

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<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CONS UNIT</u>	<u>AIRFIELD</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
Con Thien	Subsurface	MCB-4 (Seebees)	C7A	Completed
Lang Vei	Subsurface	MCB-11	C-130	Under Cons
Ha Tay	Surface	Staff Engr	C7A	Under Cons
Mang Buk	Surface	539th Engrs	C7A	Under Cons
Bunard	Surface	539th Engrs	C-130	Completed
Luong Hoa	Surface	539th Engrs	None	Under Cons
Airboat Fac. Gao Lanh	N.A	Contract	None	Completed
Airboat fac. Moc Hoa	N/A	539th Engrs	None	Under Cons

SECRET

11. (S) Comptroller.

a. GENERAL: (U) In view that the CIDG Finance is basically part of the 5th SFGA Comptroller Section, beginning with this reporting period all CIDG Finance activities will be reported under the Comptroller Section to prevent any duplications.

b. CIDG Fundings: (S) During the reporting period the FY 1968 Command Operating Budget was submitted thru proper channels to Department of the Army on 24 May 1967 and the FY 1969 Command Budget Estimate was submitted to USARVAC 22 June 1967 for disposition. Following is the general breakdown and comparison of funds for FY 1967, 1968 and 1969. For 1967 the Annual Funding Program (AFP) and the actual costs incurred are listed.

TITLE	1967 <u>AFI</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>	1968 <u>AFI</u>	1969 <u>AFP</u>
In-Country OMA	45,498	42,000	51,209	56,056
Out-of-Country OMA	21,125	22,600	24,835	25,467
FEMA	<u>31,210</u>	<u>26,000</u>	<u>29,196</u>	<u>28,409</u>
TOTAL	\$97,835	\$90,600 (a)	\$105,240 (b)	\$109,932 (c)

(1) Excess funds of 7.2 million dollars were generated by:

a. Over-budget in FEMA - primarily in ammunition which decreased from \$24.0 to \$11.1 million. Increasing of other budget projects caused a net decrease in FEMA of only \$5.2 million.

b. Short fall in the number of troops recruited was due to slippage in the conversion of OIL troops to the RF/IF program.

(2) The budget for FY 1968 is based upon a gradual increase in company equivalents from 336 at year-end 1967 to 337 at year-end 1968. The FY 68 budget is a \$4.7 million decrease from the approved FY 68 budget estimate of 109.9 million dollars.

(3) Budget for FY 1969 is based upon 337 company equivalents for the entire year.

(4) Approximately 72% of the in-country OMA is used to pay salaries and subsistence of the CIDG troops. A 10% increase has been included in FY 1968 and FY 1969 budget, in anticipation of an expected pay increase.

c. CIDG Fund Audits: (U) Unannounced on-site audits of 26 detachments were completed by CIDG Finance auditors. Findings of these audits indicated improvement in all areas of reporting and that proper accountability of funds is being maintained. Main shortcomings noted:

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in some detachments were the purchase of non-expendable items without the prior approval of the Group S-4.

d. Project Numbers: (U) Effective 1 July 1967, a project number system was established for approved construction projects. The project number will provide a better means of identifying and compiling cost data for the Comptroller Section. Thus far in FY 1968, \$73,883.75 has been approved for 19 construction projects.

e. Non-Appropriated Fund: (U) A comparative Balance Sheet and Comparative Profit and Loss Statements based on monthly input from the units concerned has been established for each "B" and "C" detachment operating a mess association. As monthly financial reports are posted and trends are developed, analysis of these trends can now be made, and units concerned are notified to take corrective action.

f. Civilian Personnel TD: (U) A review of the indigenous civilian personnel at the SFOB was completed 25 June 1967. As a result of this survey, the civilian TD was revised and updated. The new TD of 505 positions eliminated 54 old positions, added 48 new positions with a net reduction of 6 positions. This reduction of 6 positions will save approximately \$7,319 annually. Thirty-one of the new positions were used to expand the carpenter shop, R&U and electrical sections. In addition to the TD strength, a 63-man temporary labor force was organized to support SFOB construction projects. A saving of \$50,000 to \$60,000 will be realized by employing this construction section to reduce the number of construction projects contracted out to local contractors.

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SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDERS' OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I - Observations (Lessons Learned).

1. (U) Personnel: None

2. (C) Operations:

a. ITEM: Attack on Lang Vei, 4 May 1967. (Source Co C)

(1) DISCUSSION: Enemy initiated the attack at 0315. Observation: The enemy is increasingly attacking between the hours of 0200 and 0400. Increased vigilance and alertness are required during this period.

(2) DISCUSSION: The attack was preceded by small arms and rocket fire. Observation: The enemy realizes the advantages of employing direct fire initially due to greater accuracy. The security screen must be in sufficient depth from the camp to keep the enemy out of direct fire range.

(3) DISCUSSION: The assault force consisted of relatively few people. Observation: The assault will not necessarily be executed by a large force. A small, well-rehearsed assault against a camp's weak point can be just as dangerous.

(4) DISCUSSION: The attack was aided from inside the camp by VC who had infiltrated the CIDG units posing as recruits. The attackers had a detailed knowledge of specific targets inside the camp and were oriented toward those targets. Observation: Effective counterintelligence is essential. The loyalties of all personnel in the camp must be determined and frequently reviewed. See also item 4a below.

(5) DISCUSSION: The detachment commander and XO were killed and the team sergeant wounded simultaneously in the same bunker. Observation: Key personnel must be dispersed throughout the camp at all times. Alternate command posts must be established and manned.

(6) DISCUSSION: Radar bombing missions were not called immediately in support of the camp. Observation: Plan with the Air Force to provide support. Establish primary and alternate means for requesting support. Rehearse the plan to insure it will work. The 7th Air Force has tasked specific units to support each camp. Find out who they are, how you can use them and procedures for requesting immediate support. Insure all USASF and VNSF personnel know procedures. Post procedures in TOC.

(7) DISCUSSION: No artillery was employed during the first hour of the enemy attack. A considerable amount of time elapsed before on-call artillery at Camp Khe Sanh was registered accurately enough to provide any supporting fires. Observation: The artillery fire plan is an integral part

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of the camp reaction plan, and it must be exercised occasionally to insure effectiveness. Commanders should take the time to plan and coordinate carefully with their supporting units. In order to be timely and effective the artillery must have a current fire plan for the camp and be afforded an opportunity to conduct registrations periodically in the target area. When alerts are called and there is preplanned artillery within range, the support artillery FDC should be alerted as well as the camp personnel, and where possible the camp should call for some concentration fires or at least illuminating flares.

(8) DISCUSSION: The communications bunker with all radio equipment except a PRC-25 was destroyed in the initial mortar barrage. With the primary means of communications lost, the detachment members had to relay all radio traffic through CIC elements in Khe Sanh. Observation: An alternate means for notifying support elements of attack should be available. This means should be checked out frequently to insure its reliability. A possible method is frequent, planned communications checks with the artillery unit in support of the Special Forces camp.

(9) DISCUSSION: Both the USASF detachment commander and VNSF camp commander in the CIDG camp exercise a relatively limited span of control. When critical control positions are neutralized, command control is all but eliminated and leaves the CIDG completely without leadership and fire support. Observation: Commanders in the camp should assign certain VNSF and or USASF personnel to man key positions on the defensive wall. Preferably they should be near automatic weapons positions and in such a location as to facilitate assumption of local command in the event certain key defensive positions are knocked out. CIDG forces should know that when a crew served weapon, such as a machine gun in a bunker, is knocked out, other CIDG personnel should automatically man the weapon, if it is still operable.

(10) DISCUSSION: Most of the CIDG personnel killed and wounded were the result of mortar fire during the 4 May attack on Lang Vei. All these casualties were in their fighting positions. Most of the casualties occurred because fighting positions were not capable of providing complete protection for the individual soldier. They were oriented to protect the firer from flat trajectory fire from outside the wire, not indirect fire or direct fire from inside the camp. Observation: CIDG personnel at Lang Vei were in their fighting positions when the mortar attack occurred. Had the positions provided overhead, side and rear protection as well as forward protection, casualties as a result of this mortar attack would have been minimized.

(11) DISCUSSION: A practice alert was conducted each night for the two nights preceding the mortar attack on Camp Lang Vei. The CIDG camp personnel were intimately familiar with their individual responsibilities. This undoubtedly saved a large number of lives and probably saved the camp. Observation: The defensive force must become thoroughly familiar with required action once an attack has begun. This can be accomplished by frequent practice alerts stressing those points of known weaknesses; i.e., suspected attack points, bands of fire

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not interlocking, personnel not cognizant of required actions, DS artillery not having fire support plans, etc. The practice alert should be unannounced and at unusual times throughout the day and night. If the camp has an alert or reaction force their actions should be integrated into the overall scheme of camp reaction and actually rehearsed by creating simulated conditions.

(12) DISCUSSION: The relative inaccessibility of the approaches to the eastern portion of Camp Lang Vei caused camp personnel to generally discount the possibility of attack on this sector. Because of the steepness of the hill camp personnel neglected proper security measures and failed to clear and provide adequate fields of fire for automatic weapons. Observation: Difficult terrain is definitely an advantage in bolstering camp defenses, but the advantages must be positively exploited, not used as a crutch. The camp commander must make pointed efforts at impressing upon his personnel the importance of maintaining vigilance on unlikely as well as likely avenues of approach. He must insure that warning devices, barriers, and firing positions are adequate throughout the camp.

b. ITEM: Attack on Con Thien, 8 May 1967.

(Source Gp S3)

(1) DISCUSSION: Enemy initiated attack at 0230 hours. Observation: Enemy is conducting most major assaults between the hours of 0200 and 0400.

(2) DISCUSSION: The attack was not preceded by enemy preparatory fires. The enemy moved into forward assault positions undetected. No forewarning of the attack occurred until the enemy opened up with automatic and rocket fire against local security elements. Observation: The attacks against Special Forces camps are no longer signalled by mortar/preparatory fires. The enemy may attempt to move large forces undetected into close proximity of friendly installations and overrun the camp through surprise and mass, supported by preplanned rocket and automatic fire. Local security elements must be at a sufficient distance out from camp to provide adequate time for the defenders to come to a full alert status in the event contact is made.

(3) DISCUSSION: The enemy was able to move forces undetected across a 200 meter opening adjacent to the camp. Observation: An effective security screen is essential. Illumination must be employed periodically during the hours of darkness. Every means must be employed to detect enemy movement.

(4) DISCUSSION: Once contact was made a heavy volume of well-aimed direct and indirect fire was placed on the camp. This included small arms, automatic weapons, flame thrower, grenades, 40mm rockets and mortar fire. Observation: The enemy has the capability of close fire coordination and control. He can and does develop a detailed fire support plan.

(5) DISCUSSION: The enemy employed bangalore torpedoes and satchel charges to breach the defensive wire.

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Observation: Defensive wire must be employed in depth with much more emphasis on tanglefoot, and, where possible, coordinated with other barriers which are not as susceptible to explosive breaching, i.e., moats. All barriers must be under continuous observation and covered by automatic weapons. Barriers must be protected.

(6) DISCUSSION: The enemy attack was directed at a point where the Marine defenses were tied into the CIDG defenses. Observation: The enemy recognizes the fact that boundaries are inherently weak. Critical portions of the perimeter should not be split between two units. Defensive boundaries must be reinforced through the increased use of barriers. The importance of close coordination between adjacent units cannot be overstressed.

(7) DISCUSSION: Once the perimeter was breached, the defenders fell back to previously prepared defensive positions within the perimeter. Observation: In view of the fact that any position can be penetrated, all camps must have successive and mutually supporting defensive positions. Barriers and forward positions must be constructed so as to minimize their value if the enemy were to overrun them. The fact that this camp had successive and mutually supporting defense positions contributed directly and in the main to their ability to repulse the attack.

(8) DISCUSSION: Once the perimeter was penetrated, the enemy concentrated the attack on the command bunker, commo bunkers and US team house. Observation: The enemy continues to concentrate on vital targets within the objective area. Counterintelligence is most important in order to deny the enemy target information. Alternate positions for key installations are essential.

(9) DISCUSSION: Communications were lost immediately with higher and supporting headquarters. Observation: Alternate communications facilities are essential. Provision must be made to place FM radios where they are readily available to predesignated individuals. When attack can be anticipated, pre-positioning of FM radios on the perimeter is advisable.

(10) DISCUSSION: During the attack several sandbag hardened CONEX bunkers sustained direct hits from mortar rounds and direct fire rockets. Other than a temporary impairment of hearing to personnel in the bunkers, no damage nor casualties resulted from these hits. Observation: These bunkers when constructed with care are extremely effective defensive positions.

(11) DISCUSSION: Because of the immediate loss of communications, notice of the attack to supporting units was delayed. Observation: A system of continuous communications with higher headquarters must be in effect, and must include a provision for frequent contacts. Any loss of contact must immediately be investigated by the supporting unit, to include sending a FAC or VR aircraft aloft.

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(12) DISCUSSION: The enemy continued the attack well into the late afternoon. Observation: The enemy evidently anticipated a rapid victory. When this was not achieved, they continued the attack scorning the inevitable consequences.

c. ITEM: Small Unit Tactics in The Delta Region. (Source A-111)

DISCUSSION: In the area surrounding My Phuoc Tay many village guerrilla teams, consisting of between 20 to 30 men, were located throughout the area of operations. Upon seeing a company size force of CIDG on a daylight search and destroy operation, the VC element would withdraw. The terrain throughout the operational area consisted of rice paddies and numerous canals, bordered by heavy vegetation. This enabled the enemy to observe the size of the CIDG elements while they were still 2000 to 3000 meters away from the enemy positions, allowing ample time to decide whether to engage or withdraw.

OBSERVATION: To counter this, the following method was used. While conducting daylight search and destroy operations, the lead platoon always moved at least one terrain feature in front of the main body. This meant that it was one tree and a canal line in front of the main force at all times. Because of this, the VC were only able to observe a force of between 20 to 30 men at one time. This would give the appearance of a platoon size operation, and the enemy would choose to engage rather than flee. The special instructions given to the lead platoon were to always stay in contact once it was initiated and to move in as close as possible to the enemy positions. As soon as a firm contact was made, artillery fire from the 155mm howitzers located at My Phuoc Tay would seal off the enemy's escape routes. While this was being done, the main CIDG force was still concealed in the next wood line away from the firefight. The ability to flank a fixed enemy position in this kind of terrain was the key to success on this type of operation. While the lead platoon kept the enemy force in contact, artillery sealed off the escape routes, thus keeping the enemy in their bunkers or killing many of them as they tried to escape. The main CIDG elements were thus able to attack successfully from the enemy's flank and overrun his positions. As basic as this tactic seems, it was successful on many operations. This ability to deceive the enemy as to your true strength and thereby tempting him to hit what he believes to be a small unit has accounted for many VC kills in My Phuoc Tay area.

d. ITEM: NVA Use of Wounded Personnel as Bait. (Source G-11)

DISCUSSION: On the morning of 6 May, during a Black Jack 98 operation, the mobile guerrilla force was in a defensive posture after having been in a series of moderate to heavy contacts with elements of the 11th NVA Division on the afternoon of the previous day. Throughout the day the enemy had unsuccessfully probed and attempted to infiltrate the perimeter. At 0800, troops on one end of the perimeter reported that one NVA, apparently wounded, was crawling ten meters outside of their position. Three USARV moved to the area with the intention of taking a prisoner. Before they could get to the wounded

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soldier, however, the MGF recon platoon leader shot at him. Immediately after the first shot, enemy troops who were deployed approximately twenty meters outside of the perimeter opened fire with seven or eight automatic weapons. Obviously, the wounded NVA had been used as bait for a trap, and the first shot was the signal to open fire. The next day, during the withdrawal of an outpost which was about 100 meters outside of the perimeter, an MGF soldier was wounded and captured. The NVA then held the prisoner approximately twenty meters outside of the friendly positions and bayoneted him periodically during the next six hours in an attempt to lure friendly troops out of their positions.

OBSERVATION: The enemy has no scruples against the use of cruelty and human suffering to accomplish his objectives. US personnel should be constantly aware of this fact and resist the impulse to rush to the aid of wounded without first giving careful consideration to security.

e. ITEM: Escape and Evasion.

(Source Co C)

DISCUSSION: On 25 July 1967, a 150 man force from Camp Tien Phuoc became engaged with an estimated reinforced company of Viet Cong. As a result of this encounter, the Camp's Executive Officer, LT Eckhardt, was reported missing in action. A search force was dispatched to the battle area, but had no success. On 28 July, a civilian discovered LT Eckhardt walking toward camp. He concealed him in his hut and returned to inform the camp of his location. The camp then dispatched a helicopter to return LT Eckhardt to safety.

OBSERVATIONS:

- (1) That the "A" camp fire illumination at regular intervals (15 min) during the night in order to assist missing persons in reorienting themselves, if necessary (it was in LT Eckhardt's case).
- (2) That the small lightweight, red and orange panel be carried by all USASF.
- (3) That at least one radio remain under USASF control at all times.

f. ITEM: Combat Operations.

(Source Co A)

DISCUSSION: During the past quarter, combat operations have been increased by all CIDG camps, with the exception of Prek Klok and Luong Hoa. Prek Klok, beset with internal problems, had virtually no operations employed, and thus was the target of innumerable VC mortar attacks. Luong Hoa, a newly established camp, initially had an ARVN ranger battalion performing operations and security. In many instances, these operations were inadequate, because they were not deployed in great distances throughout the TACR. As a result, the VC were able to penetrate the area and attack the camp with mortars, rockets, and small arms fire. Fortunately, these situations have been corrected to such extent that has resulted in a decrease in enemy sneak mortar attacks.

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OBSERVATION: With rare exception, it has been proved that CIDG camps having excellent rapport between USASF counterparts were camps that had well disciplined troops and conducted vigorous operations continuously. These camps also had the highest degree of successes - and the VC usually gave their TACR's a wide berth. A prime example - though not during this reporting period - was Camp Bu Dop from Jan to Mar 67. Bu Dop had strong leadership, highly trained and disciplined troops, and conducted continuous well planned operations. During this period Bu Dop accounted for more enemy dead than all other camps in III Corps. Aggressive, continuous operation with unlimited strategems will keep the enemy off balance and reduce his capabilities to mass main force echelons for ground attacks; sneak mortar attacks; or to infiltrate assets within camps.

g. ITEM: Night Observation from C-1E Aircraft. (Source B-52)

DISCUSSION: An experiment was conducted with an aerial observer utilizing the Starlight Scope from an C-1E aircraft during late evening flights. Flying at an altitude of 1000 feet to 1500 feet above the ground, objects were very distinguishable. The success of this experiment culminated in the sighting and eventual destruction of one enemy truck by TAC air. The only limitation noted was the inadequacy of light necessary to fly by at low altitudes.

OBSERVATION: The Starlight Scope has great potential for night aerial observation.

h. ITEM: Proper Selection of RON's. (Source B-33)

DISCUSSION: CIDG operations often just stop anywhere along their general route of advance and establish a RON. If VC are trailing the operation, as they frequently do, the friendly position is fixed by the VC. The VC could then elect to attack the friendly operation at a time of their own choosing or formulate plans to ambush the friendly operation along their route of march.

OBSERVATION: Select RON's at least 1000 meters from the operation's general route of march. In addition to the security provided, it will not yield the next day's initial direction of march. The same result could be obtained by circling back to RON on the route of march, moving out in a new direction the next morning.

i. ITEM: Signalling Aircraft at Night. (Source B-52)

DISCUSSION: Colored smoke cannot be seen at night, and the use of flares gives away the unit's position.

OBSERVATION: During a night extraction under the light of aircraft flares it was discovered that a signal mirror could be utilized to signal friendly aircraft. Pilots reported that the emission of reflected light was strong and more than adequate for signalling purposes. An important advantage over other lights is that the signal is directional and light is not cast in all directions.

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j. ITEM: Position Check for Combat Patrols.

(Source B-33)

DISCUSSION: Combat patrols requiring position check from the FAC can greatly assist the pilot with the use of the survival or signal mirror. In almost all instances the person on the ground can see the aircraft after one orbit when it arrives in the general area, however, it may take several orbits before the pilot can sight a panel through the jungle. With a little practice the survival mirror in adequate sunlight can attract the pilot's attention to the position more quickly than any other means. This is not only an expeditious means but also precludes the FAC from having to circle the area continuously and thereby unnecessarily compromising the friendly position.

OBSERVATION: Obtain an adequate number of signal mirrors so that each "A" team has at least one available for their operations.

k. ITEM: Search & Destroy Methods and Ambush Techniques. (Source B-35)

DISCUSSION: On 29 May, a search and destroy operation consisting of one CIDG company, one CRP, one LLDB, and two USASF, was conducted in the area to the south of Tra Cu CIDG camp. Infantry battalions from the US 25th Division were then conducting large scale operations in known VC base areas along the Vam Co Dong River. Familiarity with the VC base areas and resupply routes allowed the CIDG force to accurately predict the resupply routes which would probably be used to support the VC in the areas then being cleared by the US elements. Through a series of aggressive and well disciplined night ambushes, the enemy sustained losses of eight VC KIA, two US carbines, two Chicom carbines, three sets of web gear, miscellaneous knives, spoons, clothing and cooking pots, five hand grenades, 150 pounds of fresh fish, miscellaneous food supplies and documents CIA, and ten sampans, two sampan motors, kerosene and cooking oil, unknown number of 57mm RR or 81mm mortar rounds, miscellaneous small arms rounds, and four structures destroyed. This was accomplished with no friendly casualties.

OBSERVATIONS:

(1) CIDG units can effectively support larger scale US operations by saturation patrolling or ambushing of likely resupply routes into the US area of operations.

(2) A successful night ambush is one of the most effective psychological operations that can be conducted.

(3) In swampy terrain during the dry season, VC resupply routes are extremely limited and by continued through patrolling, these resupply routes can be detected and neutralized.

(4) Night ambush fire discipline is difficult to maintain and must be thoroughly rehearsed and explained prior to operations departing.

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(5) In swampy areas, very seldom does a ground security element accompany VC boat resupply movements. This makes these sampans very susceptible to ambushes at ranges of two or three feet.

(6) Claymore mines could be used for these ambushes and small arms fire should be avoided unless absolutely necessary. The sound of the Claymores detonating will resemble the sound of normal artillery harassment and interdiction fires, thereby allowing multiple ambushes on the same canal during one night.

(7) Tracing of known resupply routes can provide reliable intelligence for probable locations of base areas and cache sites. (NOTE: tracing of this resupply route resulted in capture of a battalion resupply cache by a subsequent operation).

l. ITEM: NVA Tactics.

(Source A-244)

DISCUSSION: In the action near Dak To, 14-17 June, two NVA tactics became apparent. First, the NVA were quite sure that another operation would return to recover the friendly bodies that were left after the initial contact. Consequently they had set up a reinforced company in a U-shaped ambush at the contact site. The ambush was well planned and extremely effective. Second, when a bomb strike was being delivered, the enemy spontaneously rushed the friendly element in order to escape the killing zone.

OBSERVATION: Utmost caution should be exercised when conducting body recovery and similar missions which are dictated by social and moral principles, and thus may be obvious to the enemy. The "hugging" tactic can be spoiled by increasing the volume of fire immediately before the strike, pinning the enemy down and precluding an opportunity for his rush.

m. ITEM: Defense Against Snipers.

(Source B-35)

DISCUSSION: During operations in the vicinity of Hiep Hoa, casualties were inflicted by VC snipers positioned in trees.

OBSERVATION: When moving through heavily wooded areas while in contact with enemy forces, friendly forces must be oriented to cover not only their front, flanks, and rear, but also personnel must be appointed to cover all tree tops and overhead foliage for possible enemy snipers.

n. ITEM: VC Tactics.

(Source B-32)

DISCUSSION: In Tay Ninh Province a pattern of VC initiated squad and platoon size ambushes on trail elements of CIDG company size operations has been noted.

OBSERVATION: Stay-behind, claymore type ambushes should be employed during all halts, breaks, etc., in order to discourage VC from following CIDG operations.

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o. ITEM: VC Early Warning Nets.

(Source A-411)

DISCUSSION: After many surprise attacks by CIDG forces from Camp My Phuoc Tay, the VC elements in the area established various types of early warning nets. All trails, rice paddy dikes, canals, and roads leading out of the camp were mined, booby trapped, and/or under surveillance by one or two man outposts. Upon the approach of CIDG troops the VC would fire a few warning shots which would be relayed to the main forces. Other early warning methods used by VC sympathizers in the area included releasing doves, gathering water buffalo, and signalling with lights.

OBSERVATION: These early warning techniques were countered by the use of deception while moving out of camp on operations. Operations always departed at night, thereby causing visual signalling devices to be ineffective. To avoid mines, booby traps, and outposts the CIDG troops would move at a 90 degree angle from the desired direction of movement for a distance of three to five kilometers. At this point an azimuth would be followed across the rice paddies to the desired objective. Moving cross-country without following the rice paddy dikes or trails was usually quite slow and tiring, but by using this method, all mines, booby traps, and early warning devices were avoided, and continued success was achieved in locating and surprising VC elements.

p. ITEM: Employment of Airstrikes.

(Source A-342)

DISCUSSION: Camp Dong Xoai suggests the following technique be used when putting in airstrikes in fairly open terrain where the enemy can see the fighters coming in. After the fighters have made a few "wet" runs and delivered a sufficient amount of ordnance on target, instruct the FAC to make the next three passes of each fighter "dry", i.e., without delivering ordnance. As soon as the fighters begin their passes and the enemy gets his head down, friendly elements can maneuver in toward the enemy positions.

OBSERVATION: Don't lose track of the "wet" and the "dry" passes.

q. ITEM: Elimination of VC Coast Watchers.

(Source B-44)

DISCUSSION: The VC have an elaborate network of coast watchers and small units operating along the Island coast. These watchers and units have the following missions: observing GVN and U movements along the coast, securing supplies brought in by small sampans from the mainland and conduct harassing attacks on USASF small boats moving along the coast.

OBSERVATION: To combat this situation a new tactic has been devised. A killer team consisting of two or three USASF and a squad of heavily armed CIDG are hidden on a large fishing sampan. The sampan travels the coast drawing little or no attention from the VC, thus allowing the killer team to get very close to the enemy before opening fire. This new tactic has already been tried once resulting in one VC coast watcher killed.

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- r. ITEM: Marking Targets for AC-47 Aircraft. (Source A-421)

DISCUSSION: During the attack on Camp Ba Xoai in the early morning hours of 19 May, it was found that the use of tracer streams from ground positions to mark targets for AC-47 aircraft was somewhat less than satisfactory. Although the left and right boundaries of the desired beaten zone could be clearly marked, there was no way to indicate the range from the weapons firing the tracers.

OBSERVATION: A solution which proved to be quite effective was the use of 57mm recoilless Rifle WP rounds fired at the desired range to mark the left and right boundaries of the desired beaten zone.

3. (C) Training and Organization:

- a. ITEM: Sand Table Critique. (Source B-33)

DISCUSSION: When planning for and issuing orders before operations, a great deal of possible misunderstanding is eliminated by the use of sand tables. While many commanders utilize the above, few commanders use it for debriefing.

OBSERVATION: Improved evaluation, critique, and lessons learned results could be gained by use of a debriefing/critique technique using a sand table.

- b. ITEM: Punitive Measures Taken against CIDG. (Source B-33)

DISCUSSION: One of the most effective means of reaching the heart and mind of the CIDG Striker is the fear of losing a portion of his salary. However, fines must be deducted in the proper manner so that the agent officer may be protected against possible repercussions.

OBSERVATION: The use of a "fine" is a legal way to enact punishment on a CIDG Striker. Once it is determined that the Striker warrants some punishment for an ill deed, the LLDB and the USAF must agree on the amount deducted from his pay. When this is determined, the Striker's name is red-lined, and his name entered on a supplemental payroll bearing the adjusted amount. A remark is also entered on the Striker's pay card, indicating the deduction.

- c. ITEM: Realistic Targets for Field Firing Ranges (Source A-442)

DISCUSSION: Realistic, moving targets add to the effectiveness of marksmanship training.

OBSERVATION: An excellent target for use on field firing ranges can be constructed by using two type "E" silhouettes and a short length of WD-1 wire. The target is prepared by cutting a $\frac{1}{2}$ inch slit down the center of one target for half its length starting at the head. The second target is slit down the center for half its length starting at the bottom. The two targets are then slipped together resulting in a three dimensional target. When hung from an overhead branch, this target will move with the slightest breeze. A black

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ajama or other salvage uniform can be placed over the target for added realism.

4. (C) Intelligence:

- a. ITEM: Viet Cong Emphasis on Infiltration of USASF Installations and Security Elements. (Source Co C)

DISCUSSION:

(1) On 4 May 1967, the USASF at Lang Vei came under VC attack with the result that the USASF team leader and Executive officer were among those killed and the majority of the above-ground structures destroyed. Subsequent investigation and interrogations revealed that CIDG personnel inside the camp assisted in the attack by the outside force. One subject named Nhon was contacted by the VC prior to the attack and was directed to join the CIDG at Lang Vei in order to obtain information on the camp. After joining the CIDG, subject recruited four other CIDG to assist him in reporting information concerning the camp to the VC. One man was to determine the locations of all the guard positions and how well the posts were manned, the third was to make a sketch of the camp, and the fourth was to report on supplies brought into the camp from Khe Sanh. The VC contacted Nhon on four separate occasions prior to the 4 May attack to obtain the information that had been collected. On the fourth occasion, the five VC within the camp were told about the impending attack and were given instructions as to what to do during the attack. They were told to leave their shirts off in order for the VC to recognize them during the attack. On the night of the attack, subject Nhon and another CIDG killed two of the camp guards and led the VC force through the wire and mine field defenses into the camp perimeter.

(2) In addition, a JTAD agent report, dated 18 July 1967, disclosed a VC propaganda meeting held on 17 July, 1967 in Quang Tri Province. At this meeting the district cadre of Ba Long and Huong Districts reportedly praised an individual who worked at the Lang Vei Special Forces camp, for being instrumental in the 4 May attack on the camp and a subsequent mortar attack a few weeks later. At this same meeting, priority of effort was reportedly directed toward infiltration of CIDG units and the security elements of Special Forces and other installations.

OBSERVATION: Infiltration by the VC of CIDG units and indigenous elements providing security for installations is unquestionably an effective method of reducing the defensive capability of friendly units. It is logical to assume that the VC will continue to place great emphasis on this tactic. It is essential that Special Forces detachments enact the necessary counter-intelligence measures, to include the establishment of an effective informant net within the installation, to detect VC infiltration.

- b. ITEM: Screening of CIDG Personnel. (Source Gp S2)

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DISCUSSION: Since the CIDG personnel are recruited from among those indigenous to specific localities with, according to US standards, insufficient background investigation, there is no positive means of insuring that VC are not inadvertently recruited. Clearance performed amounts to local agency checks conducted by the LIDB and MSS, in conjunction with local officials. Sources testifying to the reliability of CIDG are themselves of unknown reliability. It is known that the VC are capable of applying pressure and persuasion in special localities, sufficient to cause concealment of VC association of members of the CIDG. Once recruited into the CIDG, the member has placement and access to further VC intentions concerning espionage, sabotage and subversion.

OBSERVATIONS: To counter this potential, counterintelligence measures being taken are:

- (1) Increased emphasis on making the clearance program more adequate.
- (2) Establishment of CI informant nets within the ranks of the CIDG to identify, neutralize and exploit VC in the ranks.
- (3) Development of usable infrastructure information to identify VC sympathizers, to insure reliability of subjects and sources.
- (4) Development of Blacklists.
- (5) Planned use of the polygraph in a personnel reliability program to check interpreter/translators, sources, and principle agents in nets, as well as to verify information proffered by interrogees.
- (6) Interrogation of prisoners and detainees for information of CI interest as well as OB information. Predetermined questions will be given to RVN interrogators.

c. ITEM: Installations are Vulnerable to Sabotage. Stolen supplies are Channeled to the VC. (Source G, 32)

DISCUSSION: Insufficient physical security allows access or potential access to the VC. Such access increases the possibility of successful sabotage. The VC are known to be targeted against US installations. The ethics of the Vietnamese are such that theft is not considered to be morally or legally wrong. The VN "loses face" not by stealing, but rather by being stupid enough to be caught stealing or not having taken sufficient precautions to secure his own property.

OBSERVATION: The following counterintelligence measures should be taken:

- (1) Surveys and inspections should be conducted with a view toward identifying weaknesses and making recommendations concerning their correction. Particular emphasis is placed on fencing, lighting, guard and reaction force systems, visitor control, pass procedure, security of critical and restricted areas, and proper logistic procedures.

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(2) Investigation of thefts should be conducted to determine identity of culprits and ultimate disposition of stolen material. Emphasis is placed on whether or not theft is for profit or resupply of VC.

d. ITEM: Interrogation of PW's. (Source B-33)

DISCUSSION: Hard core Viet Cong are reluctant to speak when they are first captured. After a period of time, when they have had their wounds cared for and after they have been fed and treated well, they begin to "open up". A Chieu Hoi female admitted voluntarily she had "Chieu Hoi'd" to blow up the Chieu Hoi Center, but only after she had been subject to treatment at the center for a few days. A Main Force officer refused to talk when captured on the battlefield, as did his captured comrades. After being fed and having their wounds tended, they began talking and finally answered all questions presented, as well as offering new information not specifically requested by the interrogator. The captives related that they are all told by their supervisors that they will be maltreated and killed when captured by allies.

OBSERVATION: By treating PW's kindly immediately upon capture and by not resorting to coercion, interrogations will be more successful.

e. ITEM: Interrogation of Montagnards. (Source B-33)

DISCUSSION: In interrogation of Montagnards, it was found that sometimes the detainee appeared to be contradicting himself and not verifying his previous statements, though the detainee appeared to be cooperative and truthful. It was later found that these Montagnards either didn't understand Vietnamese well, or spoke Vietnamese so poorly that the Vietnamese interpreter had to paraphrase, thus losing the exact meaning the detainee was trying to convey.

OBSERVATION: For better interrogations of Montagnards, a Montagnard dialect-speaking interrogator should be used.

f. ITEM: Payment to Montagnard Sources. (Source B-33)

DISCUSSION: Montagnards do not seem to have many mundane possessions, including money. Possessions such as radios would immediately make the Montagnard stand out, and perhaps draw suspicion, as other people in the hamlet would know how much he ordinarily makes and whether he could afford an expensive item. Montagnards are known to smoke and gratefully accept cigarettes.

OBSERVATION: Montagnard sources should be paid in a reasonable quantity of Vietnamese cigarettes when the situation makes the excessive possession of money or expensive goods awkward or unreasonable.

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g. ITEM: Planning H & I Fire.

(Source B-33)

DISCUSSION: The enemy likes to enter hamlets at night to avoid H & I fire. The enemy knows H & I fire will be planned no closer than 600 meters to an inhabited area. They will leave these hamlets between 0500-0600. The enemy will tend to move in rubber lots during the day, if possible, and where friendly troops are absent, because of the fact that H & I fire will not be placed in the rubber without contact. The enemy tends to get careless in the rubber and uses trails.

OBSERVATION: For effective artillery H & I fire on the enemy that are known to use villages at night, the enemy's routes of withdrawal should be noted and H & I's placed there between 0500-0600. Paths leaving rubber plantations should be targets to catch departing Viet Cong.

h. ITEM: Use of Way-Stations.

(Source B-33)

DISCUSSION: Communist way-stations or temporary bases, used by the enemy in transit, have poor overhead cover and other protection from indirect fire weapons. These bases are used as stopovers, usually one night, for the enemy in transit between larger base areas or objectives.

OBSERVATION: Way stations should not be touched in any way to give the impression that anyone other than the enemy was there. The target should be well plotted, and then a unit detected moving toward this way station can be the subject of a fire mission during the night.

5. (U) Logistics

a. ITEM: Resupply of fresh water.

(Source: A-344)

DISCUSSION: Fresh water cannot be found in some areas and must be brought in by resupply aircraft.

OBSERVATION: An excellent way to drop water to operations in remote areas is by the use of the metal containers for 81mm mortar ammunition (new round, charge 8).

b. ITEM: Identification of ammunition.

(Source A-411)

DISCUSSION: The man who is sent to fetch more ammunition often cannot read the English on the boxes.

OBSERVATION: The use of color codes on ammunition boxes can be a significant time saver, especially in critical situations. A simple color code indentifying the caliber and type of ammunition prevents confusion. The key to the color code should be posted in English and Vietnamese in the bunkers. Colors can be easily applied with a few cans of spray paint.

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6. (C) Other

a. ITEM: Handling of Refugees.

(Source: Co C)

DISCUSSION: Having been forced from their homes once, faced with another compulsory move to an unfamiliar area, and subject to Viet Cong propaganda imploring and threatening them to leave Ba To to return to their homes, 2300 refugees were persuaded to scatter, making the planned airlift of refugees to Nghia Hanh impossible. Approximately 350 have already returned to the Son Ve valley, which they were previously forced to leave by the 101st Airborne Division. Late intelligence reports indicate that others are waiting in small groups to infiltrate back into their home territory. The majority, however, are probably still in the Ba To area afraid of showing up to be airlifted to Nghia Hanh and afraid as well of returning to their previous homeland where they are subject to Viet Cong domination as well as artillery fire and bombs from FVMAF units.

OBSERVATIONS: The greatest deficiency in handling the refugees at Ba To was the lack of any intelligence network among the refugees. Intelligence personnel should make an immediate effort to establish nets among new refugees. The distribution of commodities and MEDCAL offer opportunities for collecting intelligence as well as contracting agents. The refugees can give valuable information not only about the area they recently came from, but also about the presence of Viet Cong agents among the refugees, Viet Cong attempts to disrupt GVN and FVMAF civic action programs, and the attitude of the refugees toward various government plans such as the resettlement at Nghia Hanh. Not knowing why the refugees refused to go to Nghia Hanh prevents us from taking any effective counter-measures. The lack of knowledge of population resources control measures is a deficiency which must be corrected. Simply, what are the techniques for controlling large numbers of civilians? In areas where government authority is tentative or contested, the Army must assume the role of policeman as well as soldier, but training for this is inadequate and information on the subject not available. (See Inclosure 24).

b. ITEM: Discharge from CIDG Forces because of physical disability or illness. (Source: B-33)

DISCUSSION: Chronic illness and permanent physical disability often occurs in CIDG Strikers, posing serious problems, both in the present for duty strength of the camp and in the morale and effectiveness of those personnel which perform day to day tasks, including combat operations. Malingering is common among CIDG troops as a means of avoiding both combat operations and camp construction and maintenance activities.

OBSERVATION: When it is suspected that a Striker is chronically ill or permanently disabled, positive steps must be taken to discharge that particular individual. A certificate is in use by all detachments of

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B-33. It is submitted through the "B" Detachment to the LLDB "C" Detachment, which makes the final decision as to discharge.

c. ITEM: Payment of Death Gratuity for CIDG KIA. (Source: Co A)

DISCUSSION: On several occasions next of kin or other relatives of CIDG KIA have collected gratuity payments at A Det sites and later made requests for payment at B Dets, or Company A. By requiring the paycard of an individual bursement voucher, double payment is prevented.

OBSERVATION: This may require one or two days delay in making payment to next of kin, but is necessary to prevent double payment.

d. ITEM: Prevention of fungus infection. (Source: A-413)

DISCUSSION: Personnel returning from operations where their feet have been immersed in water for long periods of time have experienced problems with fungus infections.

OBSERVATION: If these individuals wear shower shoes for two or three days (situation permitting, of course) after the operations so that the feet can dry thoroughly, fungus infections will be greatly reduced.

e. ITEM: Preventive medicine in remote rural areas. (Source: B-33)

DISCUSSION: One problem experienced in conducting public health programs at the Provincial and District level has been in reaching remote rural villages and hamlets. The problem is mainly one of security and encouraging Vietnamese involvement, and, too, the traditional MEDCAP has come into some disfavor. Aside from the initial and favorable (?) psychological impact, medically speaking there is much to be desired. Only local diseases can be treated with any degree of certainty, there is often no recourse to a hospital facility where more extensive diagnostic and treatment can be performed, and too often the MEDCAP is a one-time-only affair. The crucial point is that little of lasting medical value is accomplished.

The MILPHAP Team has devised one solution to this problem. Although admittedly it is not unique, it is a local solution. The Team has provided an organizational umbrella under which it has tried to collect the various Vietnamese social and medical agencies operating at the Provincial and District level. It has provided logistical support; ie, transportation, generator power, and some equipment. It has provided liaison with the essential security force. The Team found that as long as adequate security was provided, the Vietnamese would go out into the villages remote from the safety of the town perimeter. Moreover, they would participate with enthusiasm.

Thus, to date, the MILPHAP Team has been able to mount operations which include Vietnamese Rural Health Workers dispensing medications and performing dental extractions, an immunizing team carrying on the country's immunization program, a malaria control team which sprays houses and takes blood smears for analysis, Vietnamese Information Service to carry on crucial public

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relations work, Chieu Hoi Cadre to perform public relations work as well as their own role, Vietnamese Social Service representatives to supervise the distribution of OCO and USSF commodities, and representatives of the refugee or Montagnard Affairs offices.

Typically, the whole team assembles in a caravan with its security force and proceeds to the village. Once there, various stations are organized with the villagers proceeding to each. Commodities are not distributed until all other work has been done.

The keys to the success of these operations which the MILPHAP Team has chosen to call MAPHORA operations (MILPHAP Assisted Public Health Operations into Rural Areas) are:

- (a) Attention to the details of obtaining an adequate security force, coordination with S3 (Operations) officers, and radio communications.
- (b) Attention to the details of getting all equipment needed in correct working order: It does no good to take an automatic injection gun without a working generator. A myriad of supplies must be assembled.
- (c) Attention to advising the Vietnamese as to the nature of work, assuring that adequate manpower will be present at the right time. For security reasons, often they are not informed of destinations.
- (d) Attention to advising US advisors as to the nature of the activities and the role they should play; ie, Chieu Hoi advisor, JUSPAO Rep, etc.
- (e) Gradually allowing and making the Vietnamese carry the burden of the work and the organization of the actual operation.
- (f) Security arrangements must be scrupulously analyzed, if Vietnamese-planned, by the S3 officer before the team will participate. The team usually insists that a US advisor from this section accompany the operation. US planned operations need no such coordination.
- (g) The policy of the MILPHAP Team has been to disassociate MAPHORA operations with other types of activities; ie, search and seal.
- (h) The creation of as much drama as possible while at the villages adds to the success -- speeches, cultural dramas, posters, and leaflets attract people as well as allow explanations to be given, propaganda to be disseminated, and educational activities to be conducted.
- (i) The role of the health facilities in the Province is emphasized -- the fact that a Provincial Hospital where the people may be treated is available to all citizens, that so much can be done in the hospital, that expectant mothers can have their children in the maternity section of the hospital, etc.

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(j) The frequent programmed return to the village must be assured -- at least on a bi-monthly basis, if not monthly. This not only allows follow-up on patients, but also negates some bad aspects of the MEDCAP. If the unit is not prepared for "continuity" (at least to some degree), then these operations will be of no value.

OBSERVATION: Given thorough US advisory organizational support, an operation providing extensive medical, social and political services, run principally by the Vietnamese, can be mounted into remote, often insecure rural areas, on a programmed basis.

f. ITEM: Malnutrition in children. (Source: B-33)

DISCUSSION: This pathetic sight is often observed at the Provincial Hospital: an emaciated, pot-bellied, mottled skin, light haired, edematous Montagnard child with worms, diarrhea, and dehydration. That these classic malnutrition cases provide 95% of the cases on the pediatric ward can only intimate what is going on in the villages. The principal causes seem to be: poverty, lack of knowledge of simple dietary principles, and social custom to feed children on the breast sometimes to the third year (the mother believes that this will prevent pregnancy).

The MILPHAP Team has long sought some way to deal with this on a local basis. A solution is opening up in the use of a Fish Protein Concentrate. This product, recently approved by a federal agency for use in the US is made from fish, processed to the point that only a white powder is left; 75 to 90% pure, concentrated, animal protein. It has no taste and only a very slight fish odor.

The team feels that this product will be the answer to the malnutrition problem since by and large it is principally due to protein deficiency. By adding 15 grams of this product to supplement the food of the child, the daily protein requirement will be achieved. The product costs approximately 25¢ per pound when ordered in bulk amounts. This is the cheapest source of protein concentrate of this quality known to the team. The team has started the MILDIP program (MILPHAP Dietary Improvement Program) to deal with malnutrition. With a donation from an interested physician, 400 pounds of FPC have been purchased. At first, it will be given to children on the pediatric wards. It can be directly added to their regular diet, or tube fed with milk. The team is also increasing the use of milk products at the hospital.

The team hopes that it can promote FPC use throughout Vietnam, at least as a way for treating protein deficient malnutrition and at the very most as a generally accepted dietary supplement for adults and children.

OBSERVATION: The MILPHAP Team is exploring the use of FPC (Fish Protein Concentrate) in the treatment of protein deficient malnutrition common in Vietnam in the hospital at first, but with an eye toward introducing it as an acceptable source of high grade protein for the general population.

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PART II - Recommendations.

1. (C) Language study for interrogators.

a. In April 1967 the 633rd MI Interrogation Field Team was assigned as part of the 5th SFG Intelligence Augmentation. This unit is composed of eight interrogation personnel, none of whom are Vietnamese linguists. Consequently, interrogation must be conducted through interpreters. In using interpreters for this purpose, the following problems have arisen:

- (1) General shortage of interpreters.
- (2) Limited ability of many interpreters.
- (3) Difficulty of establishing personal communication between the subject and the interrogator when working through an interpreter.
- (4) Inaccuracy incurred when the interpreter rephrases or imparts additional meaning to the interrogator's query.

b. At present the Group's ability to produce timely and accurate intelligence from interrogation is wholly contingent on the availability and ability of the interpreter. In-country language training is being conducted to develop some elementary linguistic ability, but this program, because of operational exigencies, is of limited effectiveness. The logical solution is intensive language study for interrogators prior to deployment to Vietnam.

c. It is recommended that interrogation personnel be programmed for intensive Vietnamese language study prior to deployment to Vietnam.

2. (C) Training of Collection Personnel.

a. Because of the unique nature of its operations, the 5th SFG has great potential for an extensive and highly productive collection effort. In April 1967 the 613th MI Detachment, a designated collection unit, was assigned as intelligence augmentation to the 5th SFG for exploitation of this potential. This detachment underwent POM/POR training at Fort Bragg, N. C., during the period 27 March to 25 April 1967. Although a designated collection unit, the 613th MI Detachment is, in fact, almost exclusively manned by personnel with a counterintelligence MOS. During the training period no attempt was made to conduct any sort of cross training, nor was any training presented which was specifically oriented toward enabling the 613th to better perform its mission in Vietnam. There was no language training or area familiarization; the 613th had no assigned personnel with a Vietnamese language capability. The entire training program was conducted more to "meet requirements" than to actually prepare the 613th for its assigned mission in Vietnam.

b. It is recommended that collection units not be assigned counter-intelligence personnel unless extensive cross training has first been accomplished.

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POW/POR training for intelligence personnel should be given by intelligence personnel who have recently returned from Vietnam and who are able to instruct in the various problems, capabilities, limitations, and particular situations concerning the intelligence effort in Vietnam. Trained area specialists with Vietnamese language capability should be provided for collection elements presently deployed or scheduled for deployment in Vietnam.

3. (C) Inadequacy of VNAF aeromedical evacuation for CIDG casualties.

a. Refusal to fly air evacuation missions and delays in flying such missions on the part of VNAF has led to loss of life and limb of CIDG casualties.

b. It is recommended that CIDG casualties be permitted evacuation by US aircraft without having to go through Vietnamese channels.

4. (C) Hospitalization of CIDG.

a. A literal interpretation of USARV Regulation 40-11 would prevent or delay the admission of CIDG personnel to US Army hospitals. Although CIDG hospitals do exist, they can not fully support all CIDG forces. Care of CIDG personnel through Vietnamese channels is inadequate. Insufficient medical support is detrimental to the mission of Special Forces in Vietnam.

b. It is recommended that USARV Regulation 40-11 be interpreted throughout the theater of operations as excluding CIDG personnel from its provisions.

5. (U) Extraction of captured rice.

a. On numerous occasions CIDG units in the field have discovered large enemy rice caches. Stated 5th SFG policy is that whenever possible rice caches will be safeguarded until a means of extraction is available, and then the rice will be brought back for friendly consumption. More often than not, however, a means of extraction is not readily available, and CIDG units can seldom remain in a static position without seriously jeopardizing their security. Consequently, the rice is too often destroyed. During the last week in July, for example, CIDG units in III CTZ destroyed over 50 tons of rice. Ironically, the 5th SFG is purchasing increasing quantities of US grown rice to support the CIDG program. Furthermore, the general shortage of rice throughout the country is forcing the costs higher and higher, which is detrimental to civic action programs in general and especially to refugee projects. In view of the growing scarcity of rice, it would seem appropriate to place a higher priority on the allocation of helicopters, the only feasible means of transportation in nearly all cases, to rice extraction missions

b. Recommendations:

(1) A national policy should be formulated with regard to the priority of extracting captured rice.

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(2) A more operationally responsive system should be developed to extract rice in those situations where a unit cannot safely remain in position to secure the cache.

(3) All aviation assets (Air America, US Army, etc) should be coordinated so that in areas where operations are being conducted at least one helicopter can be on stand-by for rice extraction missions.

6. (U) Support for research and development.

a. Reference: paragraph 9 (page 29).

b. In late 1966 QRP action was requested for the development of an airboat communications system. Several months ago a follow-up on this request revealed that a system is in the developmental stage but will not be operational in time for the 1967 flood season. As a result, the 5th SFG Signal Maintenance Facility went ahead and developed its own system. Although most of the airboat communications problems have now been resolved, placing the extra burden of research and development on the Group Maintenance Facility was not a satisfactory situation. Key personnel had to be taken from other duties to accomplish the job. Moreover, standard repair parts for organic radios were used to construct the intercom system. Use of the parts for this purpose had not been planned in the stockage level, resulting in an unforecasted decrease in the authorized stockage level. This has not affected operations so far; however, serious shortages may exist during the next 90 days pending the arrival of supplementary repair parts.

c. It is recommended that whenever a new item such as the airboat is introduced, a team should be provided by AMC or CDC which has assets to fully support and develop all aspects of the project including communications and maintenance.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
D. E. BROCK
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

25 INCLOSURES

See Table of Contents

SECRET

AVHGC-DST (15 Aug 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 14 SEP 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Force Development, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces (WA4X).

2. (S) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning language trained interrogators, section 2, part II, paragraph 1, page 54: Concur with recommendations of 5th SFG (A). The shortage of linguists within this command is fully realized by all headquarters concerned with this problem and is a matter under continuous analysis. The 5th SFG (A) had an established requirement of 97 linguists for FY 69. DA validated only 2 of the 97 linguists. The 5th SFG (A) will requisition the two validated linguists at the proper time for FY 69 requisitions. The latest OPO 22 has been received from the 5th SFG (A), with a requirement for 339 linguists, and was forwarded to DA for validation on 28 August 1967. After requirements are validated a requisition must be submitted by the unit.

b. Reference item concerning training of collection personnel, part II, paragraph 2, page 54: Concur with recommendation. Recommend CONUS training be reevaluated in this area to insure that requirements of the command are met.

c. Reference item concerning evacuation of CIDG casualties, paragraph 3b, page 55: Nonconcur. RVNAF has the primary mission of providing medical evacuation for Vietnamese casualties and should retain the prerogative of performing it. However, present policy allows for US aircraft participation upon saturation of RVNAF capability. No action by higher headquarters is recommended.

d. Reference item concerning hospitalization of CIDG, paragraph 4b, page 55: Concur with recommendation. This action has been accomplished through coordination with the 44th Medical Brigade.

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10


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AVHGC-DST (15 Aug 67)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)


e. Reference item concerning extraction of captured rice, paragraph 5b (3), page 56: Nonconcur. The extraction of rice is not considered of sufficient criticality in relation to the performance of other combat support missions to accept the non-productivity associated with missioning aircraft to standby for that specific purpose.

f. Reference item concerning development of airboat communication system, paragraph 6b and c, page 56: Concur with recommendation contained in paragraph 6c, page 56. The original ENSURE request did not provide for communication support. It did, however, include spare parts, special tools and new equipment training teams (NETT) to train operators and maintenance personnel. In the future, if communication support is desired, the request should be included in the original ENSURE request as a part of the overall requirement.

3. (U) Unit will be notified of actions and comments by routine indorsement which returns this report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

25 Incl
nc


E. L. KENNEDY
CPT AGC
Asst AG

SECRET

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GPOP-DT (15 Aug 67) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
from HQ, 5th Special Forces Group (UIC: WA4X)(RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 19 OCT 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

25 Incl
nc

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
CORRESPONDENCE

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HQ USARFAC

S-67- 5122

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TROOP DISPOSITION LIST - I CORPS
TROOPS

DET	LOCATION	COORD	DATE OPENED	NR CIDG	NR RF	NR PF	MF	MISSION	ETHNIC GROUPS
Co C	Danang	BT775719	Sep 62	123				CAC	Mixing
A-101	Lang Vei	ZD794362	Dec 66	328				CIDG/ES	VN, Brn
A-102	Tien Phuoc	BT105142	Nov 65	587	185	554		CIDG/SS	VN
A-103	Gia Vuc	BS376271	Feb 63	487	180	269		CIDG	VN, Hre
A-104	Ha Thanh	BS387701	Apr 65	502				CIDG/SS	VN, Hre
A-105	Kham Duc	ZT004079	Sep 63	256	108	211		CIDG/SS/TC	VN
A-106	Ba To	BS556327	Mar 65	308				CIDG/SS	VN, Hre
A-107	Tra Bong	BS346884	Mar 65	358		420		CIDG/SS	VN, Cohre
108	Minh Long	BS536511	Mar 66	430	120	228		CIDG/SS	VN, Hre
A-109	Thuong Duc	ZT145334	Mar 66	519			125	CIDG	VN
A-111	Danang	BT075719	Mar 67				445	MF	Hre, Khade
A-113	Danang	BT075719	Aug 65				570	MF	Kung, Cohe, Rhade
		TOTAL		3898	592	1613			

II CORPS

Co B	Fleiku	AR765475	Oct 62	132			912	MF	Jarai, Khade
A-217	Fleiku	AR765475	Jan 67				282	MF	Jarai, Rhade
A-218	Fleiku	AR765475	Oct 62					MF	Jarai
A-219	Fleiku	AR765475	Oct 62					MF	VN
B-22	Qui Nhon	CR099228	Jan 65	17				CAC	VN, Rhade
A-221	Gung Son	BQ801135	Jan 66	604	235	350		CIDG/SS	VN, Rhade
A-222	Dong Tre	BQ912703	Jun 63	542				CIDG	VN, Cham
A-223	Ven Canh	BR834063	Aug 65	433				CIDG	VN, Jarai
-224	Phu Tuc	BQ504598	May 65	468				CIDG	Jarai
-226	Mai Linh	BQ245925	Sep 65	614	199	234		CIDG	Jarai
A-227	Ha Tay	BR799829	Jun 67	519				CIDG	VN
A-228	Vinh Thanh	BR615606	Oct 65	515			138	CIDG/SE	VN, Jarai
B-23	Fan Me Thuot	AQ780040	Nov 64	106				C&C	Coho
A-232	Tan Rai	ZTC98879	Jan 66	383				CIDG	Coho
A-233	Treng Phuoc	ZU039268	Sep 66	766				CIDG/ES	Rhade
A-234	An Lac	AP865484	May 65	592				CIDG	Mnong, Ma
A-235	Nhon Co	YU804249	Mar 66	506				CIDG	Mnong, Coho
A-236	Lac Thien	AP971756	May 65	525				CIDG/SS	Mnong, Jarai
A-237	Luong Son	SN125386	Jan 66	570				CIDG	VN, Cham
A-238	Buon Blech	BQ008594	Jul 66	643				CIDG	Rhade
A-239	Duc Lap	YU913751	Nov 66	588				CIDG/ES	Rhade, Mnong

Final 1 to 3rd BRG, ORLT 1 MAY-31 JUL 67 1-1

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DEI	LOCATION	COORD	DATE OPENED	NR CIDG	NR RF	NR PF	MF	MISSION	ETHNIC GROUPS
B-2A	Kontum	YU913751	Jan 66	111				C&C	Jarai, Behnar
A-2A1	Polei Kleng	ZAO32933	Mar 66	390				CIDG/BS	Sedang, Jarai
A-2A2	Dak Pek	YB948684	Nov 62	689				CIDG/BS	Jeh, Sedang
A-2A3	Plateau GI	BS085155	Jan 55	444				CIDG	Bahnar, Sedang
A-2A4	Dak To	ZB011215	Aug 65	549				CIDG/BS	Sedang, Rangao
A-2A5	Dak Seang	YB895405	Jul 66	480				CIDG/BS	Sedang, Bahnar
A-2A6	Mang Buk	AS984418	Jul 64	457				CIDG	Sedang
A-251	Plei Djerang	YAB75457	Jun 64	548				CIDG/BS	Rae
A-252	Plei Mrong	ZAL12678	Nov 62	474				CIDG	Jarai
A-253	Duc Co	YAB42248	Jun 62	577				CIDG/BS	Jarai
A-255	Plei Me	ZAL62059	Oct 63	373				CIDG	Jarai
B-50	Nha Trang	CF031518	Jul 66	402			580	OMEGA	Sedang, Jeh
B-51	Dong Ba Thinh	CP040290	Apr 64	740				Tng Gen	VN
A-502	Trung Dung	BP937557	Mar 64				793	CIDG	VN, Cham
A-503	Nha Trang	CF031518	Jun 64					MF	Rhade
Redondo	Nha Trang	CF031518	Jun 64	107				PCOJN	VN
				<u>14,903</u>	<u>438</u>	<u>722</u>	<u>2,567</u>		
				III CORPS					
Co A	Bien Hoa	XT007123	Nov 64	68				C&C	VN
A-301	Trang Sup	XT167555	Feb 63	285			1049	CIDG Tng	VN, Camb, Nung
A-302	Bien Hoa	XT007124	Nov 64					MF	VN, Camb, Nung
A-303	Trang Sup	XT167555	Feb 67					MF	
A-304	Trang Sup	XT167555	Jan 67				228	MF	Camb
311	Tanh Linh	XT962962	Apr 65	319				CIDG	VN, Thuong, Cham,
B-32	Tay Ninh	XT201508	Dec 64	143				C&C	Nung, Mien
A-321	Ben Soi	XT094475	Mar 65	511				CIDG/BS/SS	VN, Camb, Chinese
A-322	Prek Klok	XT276785	Mar 67	557			469	CIDG/BS	VN, Camb
A-323	Trai Bi	XT116697	Jun 67	728				CIDG/BS	VN, Camb
A-324	Nui Ba Den	XT282582	Aug 64	104				Rad Relay	VN, Camb, Montagnard
B-33	Hen Quan	XT750878	May 65	68			243	C&S/SS	VN, Camb
A-331	Loc Ninh	XU731082	Nov 66	456			146	CIDG/SS/BS	VN, Camb, Chin, Mont
A-332	Minh Thanh	XT644668	Dec 63	562				CIDG	VN, Camb, Montagnard
A-333	Chi Linh	XT916735	Jan 67	290				CIDG	VN, Camb, Montagnard
A-334	TongLoChon	XT622E 2	Mar 67	55				CIDG/BS	VN, Camb

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DEV	LOCATION	COORD	DATE OPENED	NR CIDG	NR RF	NR PF	MF	MISSION	ETHNIC GROUPS
B-34	Song Be	YU17E113	May 65	98	951	1025		C&C/S/SS	VN, Camb, Montagnard
A-341	Bu Dop	XU973292	Nov 63	337	77	305		CIDG/SS/BS	VN, Camb, Nung, Mont
A-342	Dong Xoai	YT077761	May 65	444	22	220		CIDG/SS	VN, Camb, Montagnard
A-343	Duc Phong	YU438048	Apr 66	436	103	174		CIDG/SS	VN, Camb, Montagnard
A-344	Bunard	YT276887	Apr 67	286				CIDG	VN, Camb, Montagnard
B-35	Duc Hoa	XS593968	Dec 66	104	255			C&C	Cambodian
A-351	Hiep Hoa	XT429071	Apr 66	477				CIDG/SS/BS	VN, Cham, Camb
A-352	Tra Cu	XT477933	Jan 67	276				CIDG/BS	VN, Cambodian
A-353	Luong Hoa	XS581856	May 67	343				CIDG/BS	VN, Cambodian
-55	Saigon			187				LANO	VN
B-56	Ho Ngoc Tao	XT958301	Aug 66	187				SIGMA	VN, Chinese
TOTAL:				734	4517	2582	578		

IV CORPS

C9 D	Can Tho	WS843116	Jan 63	185				C&C	VN
A-401	Don Phuc	WT513010	Jan 66				422	MF	KKK, Nung
A-402	To Chau	VS456453	Feb 67				78	MF	VN, Cambodian
A-403	To Chau	VS456453	Mar 67				110	MF	VN, Cambodian
A-404	Binh Hung	VQ845815	Jan 65				131	(IDG	VN
A-405	Ha Tien	VS438468	Apr 65					(IDG/BS/SS	VN, Hoa Hao
B-41	Moc Hoa	XS030709	Feb 65		123	107		3C/S	
A-411	My Phouc Tay	XS202600	Feb 67					(IDG	VN, Hoa Hao
A-412	Kinh Quan	ITWS974757	Oct 65		325	202		(IDG/BS/SS	VN
-413	BinhThanh	WT863032	May 65		126	406		(IDG/BS/SS	VN, Cambodian
-414	Moc Hoa	XS028399	Mar 63		276	316		(IDG/BS/SS	VN
A-415	Tuyen Nhon	XS273773	Apr 65		101	100		CIDG/BS/SS	VN
B-42	Chan Doc	WS131842	Mar 65		615	1347		C&C/S/SS	VN
A-421	Ba Xoai	VS956528	May 66					CIDG	KKK, VN
A-429	Vinh Gaf	VS762509	Aug 64					CIDG/BS	KKK, VN
A-423	Tinh Bien	VS953712	Apr 64		421	624		CIDG/BS/SS	KKK, VN
B-43	Cao Lanh	WS695562	Feb 67					C&C/S	KKK, VN
A-431	Cai Cai	WT562076	Apr 65		487	735		CIDG/BS	VN
A-432	Thuong Thoi	WS313955	May 66		467	467		CIDG/BS/SS	VN
A-433	My An	WS999520	Mar 67					CIDG/SS	VN

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<u>DET</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>DATE OPENED</u>	<u>NR CIDG</u>	<u>NR RF</u>	<u>NR PF</u>	<u>MF</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ETHNIC GROUPS</u>
B-44	Phu Quoc	US864289	Feb 67					C&C/SS	VN
A-441	Phu Quoc	US864289	Feb 65	521	453	85		CIDG	VN
A-442	Phu Quoc	US864304	Sep 66	320				CIDG Tng	VN, Hoa Hac, Camb
TOTAL:				<u>841</u>	<u>3394</u>	<u>4389</u>	<u>741</u>		


LEGEND:

- C&C - Command and Control
- CIDG - Civilian Irregular Defense Group
- V - Mike Force
- BS - Border Surveillance
- S/SS - Sector - Subsector
- VN-Vietnamese
- Camb - Cambodian
- RP - Regional Force (Province level)
- PF - Popular Force (District level)
- Corps - Corps Tactical Zone

NOTE: Mike Force includes the Mobile Guerrilla units.

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I CORPS

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INCLOSURE 1 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1967


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NAME BOX (A248)




INCLOSURE 1 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1967

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CONFIDENTIAL III CORPS



LEGEND

- + - + - INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
- ===== CORPS BOUNDARY
- PROVINCE BOUNDARY
- DISTRICT BOUNDARY
- COASTLINE

1-3-1

INCLOSURE 1 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1967

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STATISTICAL DATA

1. Operations:		I	II	III	IV	
		<u>GTZ</u>	<u>GTZ</u>	<u>GTZ</u>	<u>GTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
a. Squad		5278	11058	8730	13770	41836
b. Platoon		817	10990	1176	5736	19019
c. Company or Larger		118	3053	1060	628	4889
2. Contacts:						
a. Contacts resulting from friendly offensive action:		69	289	189	217	764
b. VC attacks on installations and convoys:		165	133	188	97	633
c. Incidents (booby traps, mines, assassinations, etc):		18	111	81	191	331
3. Confirmed VC Losses:						
a. KIA		339	473	741	378	1931
b. WIA		67	119	43	19	278
c. OPTR		72	62	76	151	361
d. Quarterly comparison of confirmed VC losses country-wide:						
		KIA	OPTR			
4th Quarter 66		1515	411			
1st Quarter 67		1632	501			
2nd Quarter 67		1931	361			
4. USASF Losses:						
a. KIA		4	6	7	7	24
b. WIA		35	41	36	29	141
c. MIA		0	2	0	0	2
d. Quarterly comparison of USASF casualties country-wide:						
		KIA	WIA	MIA	TOTAL	
4th Quarter 66		9	51	1	61	
1st Quarter 67		19	80	3	102	
2nd Quarter 67		21	25	2	51	

Incl 2 to 5th SFGA ORLL, 1 May - 31 Jul 67

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STATISTICAL DATA (CONTD)

	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>CTZ</u>	<u>CTZ</u>	<u>CTZ</u>	<u>CTZ</u>	
5. VNSF Losses:					
a. KIA	1	4	0	1	6
b. WIA	2	14	3	6	25
c. MIA	1	0	0	1	2
6. CIDG Losses:					
a. KIA	86	104	103	143	436
b. WIA	273	365	472	309	1419
c. MIA	60	13	31	27	131
d. Quarterly comparison of CIDG casualties country-wide:					
	KIA	WIA	MIA	TOTAL	
4th quarter 66	59	202	6	267	
1st quarter 67	322	920	80	1322	
2nd quarter 67	436	1419	131	1986	
7. RF/PF Losses:					
a. KIA	7	20	68	6	101
b. WIA	10	37	111	24	178
c. MIA	0	18	7	1	26
d. Quarterly comparison of RF/PF casualties country-wide:					
	KIA	WIA	MIA	TOTAL	
4th quarter 66	81	136	18	235	
1st quarter 67	94	164	29	287	
2nd quarter 67	101	178	26	305	
8. Weapons:					
a. Friendly weapons lost:	50	114	145	109	418
b. Enemy weapons lost:	100	191	95	128	514

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HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO 96240

AVGB-C

8 August 1967

SUBJECT: Quarterly Combat Development Report

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Inclosed is a summary of the highlights of the 5th SFGA Combat Developments Program for the period 1 May 67 - 31 July 67.

2. All personnel are encouraged to submit ideas or requirements for development on weapons, equipment, or ammunition, they feel would be of value to personnel of the 5th SFGA in accomplishing their combat mission. Recommendations should be forwarded to CO 5th SFGA ATTN. S-3CD (CPT PETERS)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
List of CD Projects

D. E. Brock
D. E. BROCK
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

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"A"

Incl 8 to 5th SFGA ORLL, 1 May - 31 Jul 67

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COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS

A. Combat Development Projects, currently under evaluation:

1. (C) Manpack Personnel Detector (MPD). The MPD is a device intended to alert the operator to the presence of concealed humans by detecting certain human chemical effluvia. The results of the tests indicated that in the manpack role the MPD would be of very limited use. However the MPD's are currently undergoing modification to permit installation on helicopters. This method was tested by the 1st Air Cav Division with excellent results. The modified MPD's will be reevaluated in this new mode.

2. (C) Parabundle Marker, AN/GRT-13. The parabundle marker is a site marking radio transmitter set which is used in conjunction with organic FM radio equipment to form an electronic homing system. The marker is attached to air dropped supply bundles prior to delivery, thereby providing a means to recover lost bundles air dropped into thickly vegetated terrain. Eight systems were evaluated, and due to the non-expendability of the item and high weight (25 lbs), were determined to be unacceptable for Special Forces operations.

3. (U) Lightweight Load Carrying System (M-56). The lightweight load carrying system weighs approximately 3.3 lbs, and consists of the following items made of nylon material:

Individual Equipment Belt, suspenders, small arms .
Ammunition case (2 each), first aid packet or compass
Case, intrenching tool carrier, combat field pack
Canteen cover, sleeping gear carrier.

Forty sets of the new equipment are presently in the field with a high degree of enthusiasm for the system being expressed by the evaluating individuals.

4. (C) Lightweight Protective Mask (XM-28). Evaluation of a new type lightweight protective mask which is made of silicone rubber and packaged in a waterproof carrier was completed in July. The total weight is 14 ounces and fits in a pocket of the standard field uniform, however it protects against riot control type agents only. It was determined that the mask fills a definite need in the CIDG program and a basis of issue is recommended as one per CIDG striker.

5. (C) Hand Held Position Marker (PM-1). The marker is an expendable smoke signal for use in areas having a dense jungle canopy. When the signal is fired the signal assembly penetrates the canopy and travels to an altitude of 300 feet. A parachute stabilizes its fall back into the canopy where two grapnels effected during flight snag, suspending the signal so the smoke is visible to aircraft. 72 systems were tested and the smoke yield of the signal was found to be insufficient. However a new signal (PM-3) has been designed to produce more smoke. The system, if so improved, will be a great improvement over existing signal devices.

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COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS (CONTD)

6. (C) Linear Power Amplifier for AN/PRC-74 Radio. The power amplifier is designed to increase the wattage output of the AN/PRC-74 radio from 30 to 100 watts, thereby providing a much greater range. 13 sets were distributed to the field in late July and no results have been received to date.

7. (C) Evaluation of Sniper Activities and Operations. ACTIV continues to conduct an evaluation of the sniper program presently existing in RVN. The evaluation period has been extended one month and will now end on 31 Aug 67. The purpose of this evaluation is to:

- a. Determine if a need exists to re-institute an Army-wide program of sniper training.
- b. Evaluate new sniper equipment and effectiveness of existing equipment.
- c. Evaluate the effectiveness of present sniper activities in RVN.

To date the 5th SFGA has scored its sniper kills utilizing the starlight scope and M-16 rifle. This has been in contrast to what had been expected through use of M-14 rifle with M-84 scope and M-16 rifle with the Realist scope.

8. (C) Airboat Communications Systems. Due to the extremely high noise level on an airboat, standard radio transmitters and receivers were impossible to use. An ENSURE request was submitted for a suitable airboat communications system which USAIWL is presently developing. However, the 5th SFGA Signal Maintenance Facility has developed an interim system utilizing available components. The AN/ PRC-25 radio will be used for FM communications and the inboat intercom between the driver and the gunner will consist of two additional PRC-25 modules mounted in a waterproof ammunition box with a BA-386 for its power supply. The headsets are modified sound suppressing earmuffs with built in receiver diaphragm. The microphone is an oxygen mask type with built in microphone. This system is presently being installed in the airboats with the evaluation to take place during Sept through Oct.

B. Items Due In For Test And Evaluation By 5th SFGA.

1. (C) Position Marker FM-3

This Marker is a modification of the FM-1, with all the same characteristics and functioning, however the smoke payload is supposed to have been greatly increased. Item is due in for testing during Sept.

2. (C) Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector.

The detector is a sensor system small and light enough (each detector weighs 8 ounces and is the size of a paper back book) to be carried by a patrol. Each system contains 4 detectors and one monitor. Detector is

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COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS (CONTD)

sensitive enough to detect footsteps at 30 meters and capable of giving alert to monitor unit over distance of one mile. 5th SFGA is due to receive 10-15 systems for evaluation between Aug and Oct.

3. (C) Trace Metal Detection Kit.

The Detection Kit contains two battery powered ultra-violet light sources, a battery charger, and 10 plastic spray cans containing a chemical solution. The Detection Kit works on the principle of making traces of metals visible by means of ultra-violet light in conjunction with a chemical solution. Metal leaves a characteristic residue on skin and clothing in patterns and intensities due to weight, friction, and duration of exposure to the metal. By using the kit it can be determined if a suspect has been in contact with a weapon, each of which leaves a characteristic pattern. 5th SFGA was due to receive this item for evaluation in June, however as of yet none have arrived.

4. (C) Mine Firing Switch, MFS-XI.

Seven Mine Firing Switches were due in mid-July for evaluation, based on a request put in by 5th SFGA to the limited warfare laboratories Liaison Officer. The switch provides a light weight battery powered (BA-30) device that will detonate M18A1 Claymore, or similar anti-personnel mines, or any explosive devices that employ the M-6 or similar electric blasting cap. The switch consists of a waterproof case with connectors to accommodate the firing leads to 10 explosive devices, which may be fired individually or in salvo.

5. (C) MCM Rapid fire Grenade Launcher Systems.

Evaluation of three systems of rapid fire grenade launchers is due to begin in Aug-Oct 67. The systems to be evaluated are: (a) Hand cranked, low velocity grenade launcher; (b) Automatic, low velocity grenade launcher; and (c) Automatic, high velocity grenade launcher. The 5th SFGA is scheduled to receive two of each systems for evaluation.

C. Recently evaluated items that were of interest to 5th SFGA

1. (U) Battery Operated Fluorescent Lamp (Safari Light)

This 9 pound lamp has an 11 inch miniature fluorescent tube powered by a 110 volt external AC source or by two 69 volt batteries. It is designed to be hand carried or suspended by eyelets. Battery life is between 40 and 80 hours depending on high or low intensity use. The lamp is ideal for emergency lighting of TOC's, medical and commo bunkers, helipod marking, etc. Since the light is an off-the-shelf item, procurement should not take long. The recommended basis for issue is: A-Det-4, B-Det-4, C-Det-3.

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COMBAT DEVELOPEMENTS (CONTD)

2. (C) Battle Field Illumination System.

The Battle Field Illumination System is a support weapon which will provide illumination over a target area 600 meters in diameter at a distance of 410 to 670 meters from the launch site. The system is a lightweight, portable, one use launcher containing 12 projectiles. Each projectile burns for 30 seconds, with the entire system, once fired, programmed to discharge the projectiles at predetermined intervals thereby providing a total of 6 minutes of illumination. An interrupter built into the launcher allows firing of only one minute or of three minutes of illumination as desired. No operator is necessary after the fuse is ignited. The battle illumination system will not only provide for an additional in-camp illumination capability, but also free the mortars from firing illumination missions, permitting mortar HE missions to be fired. These systems are being requested on an ENSURE basis for distribution to all A and B Detachments in country.

3. (C) Linear Anti-Personnel Mine (Fragmacord)

The mine consists of a 25 foot length of waterproof flexible, explosive, 1/2 inch diameter cord, beaded with coiled fragmentation rings crimped to the cord. The cord is capable of being cut into smaller lengths or several mines may be connected by small metal couplings for longer lengths. This new munition can be used to mine ditches, mine outer perimeter wire around camps, mine trails, or as the main charge in booby traps. Fragmacord is not a standard item, however 5th SFGA has urged its rapid development and procurement as a standard item. There is no indication as to when it might become available.

4. (U) Lightweight Jungle Hammocks.

The hammock is constructed from water repellant treated nylon fabric, 3 feet by 8 feet in size, with two 15 foot, 1/4 inch thick, polyester drawcords. The evaluation of the hammocks has been completed and the 5th SFGA has requested a basis of issue of one per USASF.

5. (U) Lightweight Nylon Rucksack.

Thirty-one lightweight rucksacks were tested by 5th SFGA. A high degree of enthusiasm was expressed by individuals conducting the testing. The noteworthy features of the rucksacks are: Lightweight nylon construction, quick-release buckles on shoulder straps, plastic holding device on the drawstrings for the large compartment, five sections of webbing with eyelets for mounting additional equipment, and a pocket with velcro fastener in the cover of the large compartment. The requested basis of issue is one per USASF. No information is presently available as to when the item will be available for issue.

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SPECIAL REPORT ON THE ACTION AT CAMP TRUNG DUNG, 8 April 1967.

The following special report was prepared by the 21st Military History Detachment. It describes the small unit actions that took place on 8 April 1967 within the TAOR of CIDG Camp Trung Dung (coord BP 932551), which is advised by US Special Forces Detachment A-502, 5th SFG (Abn), and commanded by Captain Ngoc, Vietnamese Special Forces, Army Republic of Vietnam.

Prior to 8 April 1967, CIDG operations from Camp Trung Dung had made numerous contacts with local Viet Cong throughout the camp's Tactical Area of Responsibility, (TAOR) but at no time since the camp's inception (1 Jan 66) had any NVA contact been made until 22-23 Mar 1967. On these dates, one CIDG company (555) was out on a search and destroy operation about three kilometers west of My Loc (locale for 8 April 67 action) at coord BP 857513, when contact was made with an NVA company (+). The NVA unit attempted to surround the CIDG company, but was unsuccessful.

This contact was the first NVA contact made within this TAOR. An unusual aspect of this action was the fact that this contact and subsequent attempt at encirclement occurred in daylight hours, which indicated a very aggressive and confident enemy force was now confronting the CIDG of Camp Trung Dung.

The CO of Det A-502, Captain Deason, was aware of the 7th, 8th and 9th Battalions of the 18B NVA Regiment being in the Province, but not until 22-23 March did he know that at least one Battalion was in his TAOR.

This appearance of an NVA unit within the TAOR created no real surprise to Captain Deason and Captain Ngoc because many intelligence reports had been coming in indicating that the VC were critically short of food and would soon come looking for rice.

Within the TAOR are four rice storage areas or warehouses. By controlling the rice from planting to harvesting to storage, CPT Deason found he could control the VC activities to the point that large massing of forces was practically impossible due to the lack of available foodstuffs to sustain that force.

One of the four rice storage areas indicated above is located in a hamlet called Hoi Phuoc, about four kilometers southwest of Camp Trung Dung at coordinates BP903537. It was against this storage area that the NVA launched an early morning attack hoping to capture the much needed rice stores. At 0135 hours 8 April 1967, CPT Ngoc was informed by the Dien Khanh District Chief that one of his Popular Force (PF) units at Hoi Phuoc had just come under an attack by an estimated company of VC. (See sketch #1).

CPT Ngoc immediately conferred with his SF advisor, CPT Deason. The plan of action that evolved is described below and is portrayed on the attached sketches:

When the enemy attacked the PF outpost at Hoi Phuoc, they apparently were unaware of three separate platoon size night ambush sites that had been set up as routine night security for the area.

These three platoons were out of CIDG Company 556 from Camp Trung Dung. (See sketch #2).

Using a TR-20 radio, CPT Ngoc called these three platoon leaders (each had HT-1 radios) and gave them quick and complete instructions to move

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ACTION AT CAMP TRUNG DUNG, 8 April 1967 (COMED)

two units to blocking positions to their east along the My Loc road, and to move one platoon to the south, blocking the VC route of withdrawal. (See sketch #2 and #3). These three platoons were in their assigned areas within 30 minutes.

Meanwhile, CPT Deason had hoped to reinforce the platoon in the southern blocking position with a CIDG company from Camp Trung Dung. His plan was to move this company south from camp on Highway #1 (See sketch #1) to the intersection of the My Loc road, move east and north until reaching the hamlet of Dai Huu, then move over into the rice fields just east of Dai Huu where the southern blocking platoon was located. (See sketch #1 and #3).

Unfortunately, the execution of this plan required coordination and approval from the District Chief of Cam Lam (see sketch #1), since almost all movement would be through his district. Since time was of the essence in order to trap the enemy force, this plan was discarded when word was received around 0200 that all three platoons of Company 556 had arrived in position, were now in contact with the enemy force, and were receiving heavy fire. CIDG Company 558 was immediately loaded onto three 2½ ton trucks (40 men to a truck) and sent west on Highway 420/421 (known locally as HT-2) to the intersection of Highway 420/421 and the northern end of My Loc road. (See sketch #1 and #4).

It was beginning to appear to CPT Deason and CPT Ngoc that either two companies of local VC were being engaged or an NVA or "hard core" unit had arrived in the area. This thesis was further strengthened when the CO of Company 558 called at 0230 hours to announce that as soon as his unit de-trucked (south of the bridge), they too came under heavy fire. (See sketch #4). An enemy automatic weapon position was just southwest of the bridge, on the eastern side of the My Loc road and was preventing Company 558 plus the platoons from Company 556 from advancing. (See sketch #4). The strength, identification, and composition of the enemy force had not become known as yet, and CPT Deason recommended all remaining reserve forces within the camp be mobilized and moved to the area of contact. CPT Deason felt that if the CO of Company 558, who had the best unit in the camp, was having difficulty with the enemy force, then he'd better get all the troops he could muster in to the area as well as himself. He also felt that they were up against a well trained and organized NVA force.

After CPT Ngoc agreed, the reserve forces (one platoon each from Companies 556, 557, and 558) were quickly loaded into trucks and moved out. At 0245-0250, they arrived to the rear of Company 558, which had just overcome the enemy blocking element. (See sketch #5). The enemy blocking force was composed of at least six NVA soldiers. Five NVA were dead at their positions, along with the LMG and four AK-47's which were immediately secured. One heavy blood trail indicated that a 6th man was dragged or had crawled away from the position.

CPT Deason immediately realized that if troops could be moved further south along the My Loc road, they could then box the NVA force into a pocket formed by Company 558 and one platoon to the north and northwest, two platoons to the west and southwest, and one platoon to the south. Additionally, a call went out to the District Chief requesting that a PF unit be moved south of Hoi Phuc to seal off the east. (See sketch #6).

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ACTION AT CAMP TRUNG DUNG, 8 April 1967 (CONTD)

Action and contacts were sporadic throughout the remaining hours of darkness as the CIDG continued to advance and encircle the NVA forces.

The 4.2 inch mortar at Camp Trung Dung had continuously illuminated the area and fired approximately 350 illuminating rounds before daylight. In addition, a "Moonshine" aircraft (C-47 armed with flares only) arrived in answer to CPT Deason's request, but departed the area after dropping three flares. (The pilot said he was receiving 37mm AA fire, but no one else saw or heard any AA fire). The "Moonshine" aircraft pilot was asked to send a "Spooky" flare ship (AC-47 armed with 7.62mm "Gatling guns" plus flares) as a replacement. Spooky was on site from 0515 until daylight.

As morning approached, the CIDG forces had continued their sweep of the area to the south and southeast until their disposition was as depicted in sketch #8.

Since a FAC and fighter aircraft were overhead at first light, CPT Deason requested a napalm strike on a small hill to the front. Automatic weapons fire was being received from the hill, and CPT Deason had personally observed two NVA soldiers running onto the hill. (See sketch #7).

While the CIDG forces held their positions, the hill was entirely burned off with napalm. After the strike, the sweep continued and three charred weapons were found on the hill.

All contact had ceased by 0700, and the CIDG forces reorganized and swept back through the area, finding 22 NVA bodies and taking one PW. (See sketch #8).

At 0800, one additional airstrike was placed on the suspected NVA assembly area (coord BP 852511).

During this period, the CIDG forces had suffered only one killed and six wounded. (One of the wounded CIDG died later in the 8th Field Hospital).

All forces cleared the area by 0830 and returned triumphantly to Camp Trung Dung. The 22 NVA bodies and the 21 captured weapons were displayed for all to see and photographed for psychological purposes.

The CIDG forces had come up against the best of one NVA Battalion (see note 1 below) and had come out the victor due to the following:

1. Excellent communications.
2. Quick and aggressive response to orders.
3. Familiarity of terrain and area of operations.
4. Continuous illumination which afforded good maneuver and precluded NVA from mass exodus from the area undetected.
5. Well trained leader in advisor role.
6. Mutual respect between advised and the advisor.
7. Timeliness in receiving report of initial contact.
8. Preselected and occupied security positions throughout the area of responsibility as opposed to "close in" positions.
9. Flat, open terrain which afforded excellent maneuverability.

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ACTION AT CAMP TRUNG DUNG, 8 April 1967 (COMTD)

NOTE: 1 - The NVA PW later explained that the personnel of his battalion were sick and hungry. 105 personnel were selected, based on their good health condition, to attack the rice warehouse for the much needed foodstuffs.

NOTE: 2 - On 15 April 1967 (one week later) another search and destroy operation from Camp Trung Dung found fresh graves containing 20 additional bodies vicinity of coord BP852511, where the last airstrike had been conducted on 8 April. Since no other action had occurred since 8 April 1967 in this TAOR, the bodies can safely be credited to the 8 April contact. (Either wounded NVA who later died and/or casualties suffered during the airstrike which was placed against the suspected assembly area).

TOTAL ENEMY LOSSES - 42 NVA KIA
21 Weapons captured.

TOTAL FRIENDLY LOSSES - 2 CIDG KIA
5 CIDG WIA
No equipment losses

Information contained in this report is based upon a taped interview with CO, Detachment A-502, Captain Deason. Interview conducted at Camp Trung Dung by LTC M. H. Jenkins, CO, 21st Military History Detachment (Airborne), 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces.

ACTION AT CAMP THUNG DUNG (CONTD)

Sketches 1 thru 8 Omitted
From Copies 9 - 35

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AFTER ACTION REPORT: ATTACK ON CON THIEP. THE FOLLOWING CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF THE ACTION OF 8 MAY 1967 WAS EXTRACTED FROM THE MONTHLY OPERATIONAL SUMMARY OF DETACHMENT A-110.

- 0210 hrs. - Six to eight round burst of small arms fire was heard east of camp. No other sounds were heard. No particular significance was given to this fact at the time because the enemy had fired weapons around the position on previous occasions apparently to draw fire in order to better determine the AW positions.
- 0230 hrs. - Attack commenced: I, CPT Chamberlain was sitting in the entrance to the command bunker when mortar and recoilless rifle fire of great intensity started landing throughout the USSF position and along the perimeter. Although some minutes must have past, it seemed that small arms fire broke out along the perimeter almost immediately.
- 0245 hrs. - SSG Gibson, radio supv, and Kiet, camp interpreter, joined me at the CP bunker. Throughout this time a constant monitor was made of the USMC Bn Tac net. Situation at this time was still not clear and scope of enemy attack not fully appreciated.
- 0255 hrs. - SSG Brillante and SGT Zicaro joined the group at the CP bunker. Enemy by this time had penetrated Co 146 position and sappers were moving into USSF/LLDB area. Some confusion existed at this time because of the difficulty of determining if the moving personnel were NVA or CIDG, who, having been pushed off the perimeter, were looking for a place to regroup. Within a few moments we were able to determine who the enemy were and the NCO's at my position took them under fire with small arms and grenades.
- 0300-0320 Fighting continued around the bunker with exchange of grenades and small arms fire. At least 6 homemade grenades exploded outside the CP bunker but did no damage. One AT round from a B-40 hit the north side of the bunker and penetrated through the sandbags into the connex box that formed the base for the bunker. Throughout this period we were able to hold the CP bunker and had suffered only minor wounds to USSF personnel.
- 0320 hrs. - Enemy moved a flame thrower to a position on the right front of the CP bunker, firing from about 10 to 15 meters range. They put the first shot right in the front of the CP bunker, but for some reason ignition of the fuel was not complete. There was a flash and roar and it was immediately decided to abandon the position.
- 0330 hrs. - Relocated CP group into the Sea Bee's area. Until our arrival the Sea Bees had not realized the situation and were still deep in their bunkers. They were immediately informed of the situation and moved into the trenches, and a secondary strong point was created. At this time coordination and communication was reestablished with Camp Commander and the LLDB Det. By using one of their radios, communication was reestablished on the Bn Tac Net.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT: ATTACK ON CON THIEP (CONT.)

0135 hrs. - Remainder of the USSF Det (CPT King, SFC Loff, SFC Lansberry, SFC Gomez) joined us at the Sea Bees position. They had been located on top of hill 158 in positions within the area of construction for the new camp. They too had been confused as to the situation and it was not until they observed the flame thrower being used that they realized the seriousness of the situation. NOTE: (Illumination throughout the action was very sporadic. The supply of hand held flares was rapidly exhausted, and the USSF 81mm mortar position was untenable for all practical purposes during this phase of the action. A flare ship was on station a good portion of the time but was having difficulty in getting oriented over the position. This, coupled with low ceiling and smoke, made its effectiveness very limited. The importance of illuminations were obvious. When there was sufficient light definite lulls in the fighting, particularly along the perimeter, would occur, only to be followed by intense action as soon as the flares burned out).

0400-0500 hrs USSF and Sea Bees remained in position, and we satisfied ourselves with keeping the enemy out of our position. Fighting continued to be very heavy along the Marine perimeter. Some difficulty was encountered in keeping abreast of the USMC situation. During this period ammo was resupplied to them by using amtracks. The Bn Commander utilized the Marine Engineers to reinforce and strengthen their position. Some confusion and shooting took place as the amtracks passed in front of the CIDG positions. No confusion existed regarding whose tracks they were, but rather in regards to the ground element moving with them. The camp commander was able to get things under control very rapidly once he was made aware of the situation. NOTE: (During the period there were undoubtedly times when we could have brought enemy force under fire from our position but due to the confusion I directed all USSF and Sea Bee personnel to hold their fire until I was absolutely sure of the target. This occurred mainly in the Marine position in the east just north of where the airstrip bisected the perimeter).

0500-0630 hrs The situation at this time had clarified itself enough so that we were able to take steps to push the enemy elements out of our immediate area. During this time the .50 cal MG position was reoccupied and effective fire placed on the enemy troops occupying part of the Marine perimeter as well as a portion of the CIDG perimeter. This weapon was kept going until mechanical failure coupled with personnel being wounded forced us to leave the gun and return to a secure position where we were able to place fire on the enemy.

0630 hrs.-- At this time it became obvious that: (1) the enemy was trying to effect a withdrawal, and (2) he had waited too long and had a large number of men trapped inside the perimeter. As the light conditions improved the action took on the characteristics of a turkey shoot. I believe without a doubt the enemy took his greatest casualties during this period. He simply waited to long.

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SUCCESS STORY: RELOCATION OF REFUGEES IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS.

The following article, which was released for publication by the 5th SFG Public Information Office, describes refugee resettlement operations that took place during the period 25 March - 7 April 1967.

FLEIKU (U.S. Army) - A recent operation conducted by Vietnamese and American Special Forces (Green Berets) succeeded in freeing 750 villagers and 36,000 pounds of rice from Viet Cong control. The villagers were moved at their own request to a secure, government-controlled area, where they can live in peace, free from VC terrorism. Their household goods, rice stocks, and animals were moved with them, so that they will be able to make a good start in their new homes.

The story began when a combat patrol from the Special Forces camp at Plei Me, in the central highlands, made contact with approximately 450 Jarai villagers living a few kilometers northeast of the camp (the Jarai are members of the ethnic and cultural minority known as "Montagnards", who inhabit the remote mountain areas of central Vietnam). The people told the patrol members that the Viet Cong had forced them to build a bunker system in the area, had taken away many young men for conscripts, and had "taxed" much rice from them. They asked if the Special Forces could move them to the district headquarters at Phu Nhon, where they could live without further VC harassment. Captain Lowell M. Scott, the senior American advisor with the patrol, said that he would try to arrange the move. Captain Scott then secured the area with his three companies of Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CODG) soldiers, and requested assistance in moving the people and their belongings.

When the request for help was received at the Special Forces Company Headquarters in Pleiku, the staff immediately coordinated with the 4th Infantry Division to obtain helicopters, and with the Office of Civil Operations and the Pleiku Province Headquarters to arrange the resettlement. The government of Vietnam agreed to provide vacant land in the Phu Nhon area for the people to settle on.

Within 36 hours after the people asked to be moved, the first helicopter load was moving from the old village site to Phu Nhon. The move was supervised by Captain Scott and by Mr. Frank Pavich, the Assistant Province Representative of the Office of Civil Operations in Pleiku. Arrangements at Phu Nhon were handled by the District Chief, assisted by the Revolutionary Development Team working in the area, and by the MACV sub-sector advisory team.

By the afternoon of the second day, all the people, with their household goods, animals, and rice, had been moved from the old area. The VC bunker system was destroyed, and the deserted villages were burned so that the VC could make no use of them.

At the same time the move in Plei Me's area was taking place, a patrol from Camp Duc Co, another Special Forces camp thirty kilometers northwest of Plei Me, had contacted another 300 Jarai who were similarly anxious to be removed from VC control. These people showed the patrol where a large rice cache, part of

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the VC supply system, was located. They asked that they be moved as soon as possible, in order to avoid VC reprisals. Captain Lawrence R. Amon, commander of the A detachment at Duc Co and senior advisor to the patrol, requested assistance in moving the people and the captured rice. Again helicopters were provided by the 1st Infantry Division, and shortly thereafter the people were relocated to a Vietnamese Government settlement area near Thanh An District headquarters. Land and housing materials were provided for them, and the building of new homes commenced.

All in all, the operation resulted in the liberation of 750 Jarai, who had previously been subjected to taxation, conscription, and forced labor by the Viet Cong; and in depriving the VC of a great amount of rice--enough, in fact, to feed two VC combat battalions for a month! It was a major setback for Charlie, and an accomplishment of which the Green Berets are justly proud.

MISSING REFUGEES AT BA TO

1. Having been forced from their homes once, faced with another compulsory move to an unfamiliar area, and subject to Viet Cong propaganda imploring and threatening them to leave Ba To to return to their homes, 2,300 refugees were persuaded to scatter, making the planned airlift of refugees to Nghia Hanh impossible. Approximately 300 have already returned to the Song Ve Valley which they were previously forced to leave by the 101st Airborne Division. Late intelligence reports indicate that others are waiting in small groups to infiltrate back into their home territory. The majority, however, are probably still in the Ba To safe area, afraid of showing up to be airlifted to Nghia Hanh and also afraid of returning to their previous homeland where they are subject to Viet Cong domination as well as artillery fire and bombs from from F/MAF units. The basic problem is to:

- a. Prevent the return of the refugees to the Viet Cong controlled area.
- b. Assemble them in Ba To.
- c. Move them to the new refugee camp being built at Nghia Hanh, or
- d. Find an alternate location where they would be secure and willing to accept as their home.

2. The refugees were originally brought to Ba To by the 101st Airborne Division in an attempt to clear the Song Ve Valley northeast of Ba To. Within one month, 2,884 refugees were assembled in the Ba To safe area. Commodity support was adequate, but housing was not nor was there sufficient land to consider resettling all of the refugees in Ba To. To eliminate the housing problem, the Special Forces camp at Ba To initiated a housing project. One hundred dwellings were completed by mid-July. The original plan was to continue construction in hundred-house lots until all of the refugees had homes. Medical attention for the refugees was provided by the Special Forces medics as well as the doctor from Company C who spent several days at Ba To. Additional medical attention was provided by a four-man team from the Malteser Aid Service, but the team did not arrive in Ba To until after the refugees had dispersed. Thus, commodity support and medical attention were adequate, visible progress was being made to construct new homes, land for farming was not available.

3. Province's plan was to airlift the refugees that had been collected at various locations including Ba To to a new refugee complex being built at Nghia Hanh, Nghia Hanh, which is in the lowlands of Quang Ngai Province would be easier to supply especially during the monsoon when aircraft are prevented from making regular runs in the highlands. Ba To had two local supply problems. One was a lack of storage facilities and the other was that the refugee camp is across the river from the airstrip where the commodities would normally be unloaded. During the monsoon, the river is unfordable.

4. The only detracting feature of the new location at Nghia Hanh was the fact that it is in lowlands which may have been odious to the Mon-

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tagmards who made up the majority of the refugees. To overcome any preconceived prejudices against the new location, Lieutenant Walter Beardslee, the CA/PSY OPS officer at Ba To, escorted six Montagnard chiefs of the refugees for a two-day tour of the new camp. The chiefs appeared to be impressed and when asked what they thought, replied favorably, however, it is not known if they were merely being polite as is often the custom or if they were really in agreement with the move.

5. The airlift to Nghia Hanh was set to begin two days after Lieutenant Beardslee and the six chiefs returned to Ba To. On the morning of the 24th, some refugees did indeed begin assembling on the airfield and the first helicopter loads were taken as planned. By the fourth trip, however, there were no more refugees standing by and the airlift was suspended. A total of 359 people had been moved. Lieutenant Beardslee and the LLDB camp commander immediately went to the district chief who commented that "yesterday and last night, they all disappeared." Later that day, the LLDB were requested to send their agents out to discover the whereabouts of the missing refugees. They reported that approximately 350 had returned to the Song Ve Valley, but that the rest remained in the safe area. A subsequent agent report stated that eighty-five refugees were waiting to infiltrate back into their homeland. On 26 July, another 150 were rounded up and sent to Nghia Hanh.

6. The attitudes of the Ba To District Chief throughout the period prior to the airlift was outwardly one of disinterest. Some reports indicated that the District Chief was making no effort to prevent the return of the refugees to the Viet Cong territory. He issued passes ostensibly for them to go to recover their livestock, but actually knowing it was unlikely that once they were out of Ba To, they would try or be able to return. The USSF commander, as subsector advisor, discouraged him from continuing the practice, and it was halted. Another opinion held by the LLDB is that the District Chief does not want the refugees to leave Ba To since this will mean loss of potential recruiting for Popular Forces, and the flow of commodities will be cut off. If the refugees are in the safe area, then the district chief must be able to round them up or at least communicate with them.

7. Lessons Learned: The following lessons were learned from the experience at Ba To and should be heeded in any similar situations in the future:

a. The greatest deficiency in handling the refugees at Ba To was the lack of any intelligence network among the refugees. Intelligence personnel should make an immediate effort to establish nets among new refugees. The distribution of commodities and MEDCAP offer opportunities for collecting intelligence as well as contracting agents. The refugees can give valuable information not only about the area they recently came from, but also about the presence of Viet Cong agents among the refugees, Viet Cong attempts to disrupt GVN and FVMAF civic action programs, and the attitude of the refugees toward various GVN plans such as the resettlement at Nghia Hanh. Not knowing why the refugees refused to go to Nghia Hanh prevents us from taking any effective countermeasures.

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b. Following a large influx of refugees, the Viet Cong can be expected to attempt to persuade and threaten the people to return to the Viet Cong area. The Viet Cong can also be expected to infiltrate among the refugees if not already there and ridicule any efforts to assist them. Ultimately, the Viet Cong may be expected to carry out their threats even to the point of deliberately motaring refugee camps with the objective of terrorizing the people into returning or at least prove that GVN is incapable of providing them with security.

c. The ultimate value of large clearing operations should be examined carefully and thought be given to what will happen to large numbers of refugees after the tactical phase of the operation ends and the problems of resettlement begins. It is easier to burn a house than build one.

d. The lack of knowledge of population resources control measures is a deficiency which must be corrected. Simply, what are the techniques for controlling large numbers of civilians? In areas where government is tentative or contested, the army must assume the role of policeman as well as soldier, but training for this is inadequate and information on the subject is not available.