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| AUTHORITY |
| 31 Aug 1978, per document marking, DoDD 5200.10; 31 Aug 1978, DoDD 5230.24 |

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SECRE rcc GC-TNG

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jul 66
RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

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Section I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (S) General: 18 OACSFOR 19 OT-RD-660289

a. In May, June and July of 1966, Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) with 28 Maneuver battalions, 16 US and 12ROK, supported by 16 artillery battalions, conducted operations throughout the Republic of Vietnam II Corps Tactical Zone (IICTZ) (Incl 1).

The majority of the operations during the period were oriented primarily towards destruction of the enemy by US Forces, with necessary protection for population centers and rice growing areas provided by the 2d Korean Marine Brigade in Operation Fillmore Mr-2 and Capitol ROK Infantry Division in Operations Bun Kae and Su Bok. Operations were concentrated in the areas in which the greatest enemy activity occurred; from the west around Chu Pong Mountain (YV8999), north to Dak Pek (YB6468), east from Sout Ca valley (BR8066) and north along the coast to the I/II Corps boundary. Emphasis has also been concentrated on the infiltration routes along the Vietnamese/Cambodian border.

There has been no significant increase in the willingness of the enemy to stand and fight, even to include defending base areas. The greatest results have been achieved when the enemy was surprised while massing his force to attack a small outlying camp such as the Special Forces Camps at Vinh Thanh (BR6160), Ioumorong (ZV1336) and Dong Tre (BQ9070). Once FWMAF were brought to bear against his position, he fought only long enough to allow his forces to exfiltrate the area.

b. I FFORCERV and GVN tactical operations during the reporting period resulted in the following enemy losses within the II Corp Tactical Zone (IICTZ): 4,670 KIA/BC, 494 Captured, 1,341 individual and 102 crew served weapons captured. The US/FMAF kill ration for this quarter was 7.2 to 1 as compared to 6.6 to 1 for the last reporting period (Incl 3).

c. Nine hundred and twenty-seven men of the Ivy Division, 4th Infantry Division were in-country as of 31 July 1966.

(1) The 4th Inf Div's advance planning group of 25 personnel headed by BG D. O. Byars, Jr. and the 4th Engineer Battalion's advance party of 19 personnel headed by LTC G. Schultz arrived in Nha Trang 11 Jul 1966. The 4th Inf Div's advance planning group established a base operations in HQ, IFFORCEV and the Engr Bn's advance party moved first to Dong Ba Thin and then on to Pleiku on 22 July.

(2) The 2d Brigade, 4th Inf Div's advance party of 273 personnel headed by COL J. W. Miller closed in Pleiku City 21 July and established a base area contiguous to the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, the sponsoring unit. On 26 July, the advance party relocated 12 miles south, to "Dragon Mountain" west AR 805350.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, RCS CPSEC-65 (U)

3. (3) The equipment for the 4th Engr Bn moved through Qui Nhon Port and then on to Pleiku City on 27 July. On 28 July, the main body of 610 personnel also moved through Qui Nhon Port and to their base camp area "Dragon Mountain" via AB605350.

d. The 52d Artillery Group arrived in-country on 17 June with the 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery, the first 105mm self-propelled artillery unit to arrive in the II CTZ. This artillery group has since moved to vicinity Pleiku City and with the 3d Bn, 6th Arty, 6th Bn, 14th Arty and 1st Bn, 30th Arty attached, has assumed the mission of "General Support of US, ARVN, and FMF Forces in the II Corps Tactical Zone".

2. (c) Intelligence:

a. General: There was no major or significant change in intelligence production activities or techniques during this quarter. However, the location and disposition of Communist Main (Mobile) Force elements in the highlands and plateau area of the II CTZ became increasingly difficult to determine during the latter half of the quarter as the enemy forces in the area declined opportunities to engage or to maintain contact with friendly forces committed in the area.

b. Significant Sources, Agencies, and Techniques:

(1) Ground reconnaissance continued to be the most reliable and virtually the only means of confirming the presence and locations of enemy troops in an area of operations. However, the large areas of operations and the reluctance of enemy forces to become engaged during the latter part of the period, made locating the enemy in the highlands and plateau area increasingly difficult. This was noted particularly during Operations Beaufort in Kontum Province, Henry Clay in Phu Bon and Darlac Provinces, and Paul Revere in Pleiku and Darlac Provinces.

(2) Captured documents and enemy personnel continued to be the primary source of useful and reliable order of battle intelligence information. Documents captured by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, during Operation Austin VI provided excellent details on the Viet Cong structure in the VI Military Region (II and III Corps boundary region), the rationales and objectives of VC actions during the first quarter of 1966 in Lam Dong, and Quang Duc Provinces, and the details of intelligence and logistical preparations required by the VC prior to a major operation. Captives taken during Operation Hawthorne, again by the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, confirmed the existence and presence of a new regimental size formation in Kontum Province, the 24th NVA Regiment, constituted from the newly infiltrated 42d NVA Regiment. Captives and documents taken during Operation Nathan Hale by elements of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and the 1st Cav Div (AV) confirmed the movement of the newly organized 18th Regiment, 325th NVA Division (designated the Hung Dao Regt by the VC and as the 16B Regt by US intelligence) into Phu Yen Province. Other documents continue to reveal more details on the activities and structure of the VC local forces and provincial organization and the relationships of this structure to the main or mobile forces under VC regional control. Despite the wealth of useful information provided by these sources,
tinely and accurate exploitation continued to be handicapped by the inadequate numbers of US personnel proficient in the Vietnamese language. Exploitation of these sources at the local level was dependent almost entirely on attached Vietnamese Army personnel.

(5) Aerial surveillance and reconnaissance was further handicapped during the period in the highlands and plateau area by adverse weather. The uncertainties of weather and lack of directly responsive acquisition resources precluded the use of repetitive cover necessary for comparative analysis. However, aerial photography continued to be used extensively for detailed studies of particular areas of interest. Infrared imagery (Red Haze) provided some indications of the possible presence of enemy in areas not known to be occupied by friendly troops or local civilians. However, again the absence of repetitive cover precluded further analysis of infrared imagery read-outs. Side looking airborne radar (SLAR) remained of no value to the I FORCEN intelligence collection effort. Visual aerial reconnaissance was handicapped by weather and insufficient aircraft available to meet all requirements. Some relief in aircraft availability was achieved during the latter part of July with the arrival in-country of an additional Gulf aircraft aviation company, the 183d Avn Co (01) with further improvement expected.

(4) Acquisition of counterintelligence information was accomplished essentially as in the previous quarter. The bulk of counterintelligence information continued to be received from other US and Vietnamese agencies, even though some progress was made in the development and recruitment of original sources. The lack of a clear cut distinction between counterintelligence information and other intelligence information in the broad sense in an insurgency environment became more obvious as efforts were made to categorize various types of VC initiated incidents during the period.

(5) There was no change in the techniques of processing information and in producing finished intelligence in support of current and planned operations.

2. Enemy Order of Battle:

(1) Losses inflicted on the enemy by US, FMAF, and GVN units in the II CTZ during the period 1 May - 31 July 1966 are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>TOTAL KIA</th>
<th>VCC</th>
<th>INJURY WPN</th>
<th>GRIEV SERVED</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMAF</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>GVN</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1292</td>
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<td>486</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966
RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>TOTAL HIA</th>
<th>VC</th>
<th>SUMMARY WITH</th>
<th>G/H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JUL 66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>1369</td>
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<td>352</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMAF</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVN</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>97</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2116</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUL 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>186</td>
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<td>96</td>
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<td>47</td>
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<td>SVN</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHA D TOTAL</td>
<td>4670</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>1341</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Enemy strength within the II C&Z as of 31 July 1966 consisted of:

- 20,000 NVA Troops
- 11,100 VC Regulars (4000 Main Force, 7,100 Local Force)
- 16,900 VC Irregulars
- 48,000 Total

(3) Disposition of NVA, Main Force and Local Force units are shown in Incl 4; of Local Force and Irregular in Incl 5.

d. Weather:

(1) Weather conditions in eastern II C&Z were good except for a few afternoon and evening thunderstorms. The most significant weather occurrence in this region during the reporting period was on 25 July when surface wind gusts to 55 knots limited aircraft operations at Tuy Hoa and An Khe. (This latter was due to the proximity of Typhoon "Ora" off the northeastern coast of the Republic of Vietnam).

(2) In the west, Kontum, Pleiku, extreme northern Dakoc, Quang Duc, and western Lam Dong Provinces, the ceilings and visibilities were often below operational limits due to considerable stratus clouds, light drizzle, and fog. This condition generally occurred between 0200H and 1100H daily, followed by scattered afternoon and evening thunderstorms and rainshowers. The remainder of interior II Corps experienced partly cloudy skies with occasional afternoon and evening thunderstorms and rainshowers.

4 of 57
CONFLICT

AVFA-DC-TNC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966
RCS OSPP-65 (U)

(3) Effects on operations during May and June were mainly in the form of ineffective photo reconnaissance and Red Flag operations. Most of the missions affected were in the Highland area west of the Amsa Mountains. Before the advent of the "Shoewst" system, numerous tactical air support missions were also weathered out in the same area. There were only five reported weather delays of troop movement during May and June, four of them in the western Highland and one in the central mountains near An Khe. In July, the primary effect of weather was on troop movements. In the Paul Severe operational area, in Pleiku and Daklak Provinces, movements were cancelled on three days and delayed on five days due to weather. Troop movements were also delayed or cancelled on three days in operations Henry Clay in the Bo and Daklak Provinces and Hayes in Kontum Province. Almost all of the delays were for movements scheduled during the early morning hours.

e. Significant Enemy Activities

(1) Although there was much concern early in the period that the Communist forces would soon launch a "Conson Offensive" in the western highlands and plateau region, the Communist forces initiated no large scale operation during the period. Major encounters with Communist Main Force elements during Operations Austin VI, Paul Severe, Crazy Horse, Hawthorne, and Nathan Hale were the direct result of friendly efforts initiated to seek out and destroy the enemy. Despite sharp reaction to initial encounters, the enemy chose in each case to break contact and to exfiltrate the area of encounter in small groups under the cover of darkness and/or protective terrain and vegetation when faced with certain destruction provided by overwhelming friendly combat power. There was no indication, however, that the enemy had embarked on a program of total avoidance as units in the field continued to be subjected periodically to harassing small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fires and probing actions by small groups. Additionally, it was indicated strongly that Operations Hawthorne in Kontum Province and Nathan Hale in Chu Yen Province had disrupted enemy plans to employ the newly infiltrated 24th and 18th Regiments in attacks against CIDG camps in Kontum and Chu Yen Provinces, while Operation Austin VI in Quang Duc Province sought the toll of the movement of the 141st NVA Regiment from the II Corps "Border Zone" deeper into the III Corps Zone.

(2) The net balance of enemy order of battle adjustments during the period confirms that the infiltration of North Vietnamese Army units and troops into and through the II CCZ continued during the period, leaving the total enemy troop strength within the zone at the end of the period not changed appreciably from that at the end of the previous quarter. The apparent decrease in troop strength as reflected in paragraph 20(2) results in part from a re-evaluation of previously held figures rather than in any real reduction in enemy strength.

(3) Enemy efforts to maintain, establish, and/or extend control over the local population through intimidation and coercion continued unabated and at a persistent level during the period as local force elements and VC irregulars continued their program of terror, sabotage, harassment, and interdiction. Relatively weak Vietnamese
Regional and Popular Force units and posts continued to be the principle targets of these harassing and limited objective attacks.

f. Enemy Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action: Based on the enemy's order of battle and trends at the end of the period, the enemy's capabilities and probable courses of action were viewed as follows at the end of the period:

(1) Enemy Capabilities:

(a) Attack with one or more regimental-size formations in Binh Dinh, Pleiku, and Kontum Provinces.

(b) Attack with up to two regimental-size formations in Phu Yen Province. 

(c) Attack isolated outposts, installations, and units with up to reinforced battalion strength in any province in conjunction with attempt to ambush relief forces.

(d) Continue harassment, sabotage, assassinations, and probing activities throughout the II CTZ.

(2) Discussion and Analysis:

(a) Throughout the month of July, attention was focused on the Phu Yen area except for the period 5-11 July when the center of attention was focused on the Border area of Phu Yen, Phu Yen, and Darlac Provinces. This shift was initiated by the finding of mortar equipment, ammunition, and documents, which indicated the presence of elements of the 56th Front for the group. These elements, believed to be part of the 66th Artillery, were previously identified in Kontum Province at the end of May 1966. There also appeared to be increased activity around the Chu Bia area base area, southern half of Phu Yen Province; and on 9 July, ARVN forces in northeastern Darlac Province made contact with enemy forces, initially identified as elements of the 51st Front and the 30th Front. Operation Phu Yen Clay, which commenced 2 July and terminated 30 July, moved westward from Phu Yen Province into that general area without significant enemy contact.

(b) Toward the middle of July, attention was once again drawn toward Phu Yen Province and continues to remain there at close of reporting period. Battalion size sightings continue to give indications of the enemy's presence in the area. The approaching rice harvest may be the reason for his presence; however, the enemy continues to avoid contact with US and PAVN. He appears to be seeking an opportunity to resume operations aimed at regaining control of the Phu Yen area. Such action would precede the initiation of new campaigns elsewhere in the II CTZ area.

(3) Relative Probability of Adoption:

(a) Avoid contact with major OODP/PAVN while continuing to harass vulnerable units and installations; overrun isolated EP/EP outposts and district towns where chance of success is greatest. In
SECRET

AVFA-60-71C
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 1 July 1966, CCS CINCPAC-OI (I)

conjunction, continue sabotage, terrorism, and propaganda.

(b) Attack, in strength of up to reinforced regiment, vulnerable forces and installations; possibly employing tactics of laying siege to a unit or installation in conjunction with an attempt to ambush possible relief forces.

(c) Launch multiple attacks in Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, Kontum, Phu Yen, and Daklak Provinces at one or more places simultaneously in up to reinforced regimental strength against vulnerable units and installations in an attempt to cause CVC/PAF to be committed piecemeal.

(d) VC/VC forces are not expected to defend in strength when pressed by CVC/PAF except in those instances where the defensive action is an integral part of a greater tactical scheme. Usually, they will avoid major engagements and allow local forces and guerrillas to maintain contact, thus retaining the option of choosing the time and place for decisive encounters.

3. (5) Operation and Training Activities:

a. Plans:

(1) The 52d Arty Gp and also the 3d Bn, 6th Arty moved into the II CIN, vic Pleiku City and were attached to I FFORCEN.

(2) The 13th RRU Battalion was placed under OPCON I FFORCEN.

(3) The 41st Civil Affairs Company, which had been OPCON to this headquarters, was attached during the reporting period.

(4) Inclosure 6 shows all OPCON, assigned and attached units.

(5) The command relationship of major PAF forces in II CIN is shown in Inc 1.

(6) There were 17 operational plans and 12 operational Frag Orders produced and distributed as shown in Inc 8.

(7) Two new major programs, directed by COMUSMACV, were implemented. These were the Road Runner, a program to proactively restore to CVC the control of main and secondary roads throughout all of RVN and the combating of VC tax extortion, to strengthen the confidence of the Vietnamese in their government.

b. Operational Activities.

(1) O:LAN 17-66 (AUSTIN).

(a) From 1-18 May 66 the 1st Bn, 101st Abn Div (-) conducted Operation Austin 6 (Incl 9) in an area never before contested by I FFORCEN. This search and destroy (S&D) operation was conducted astride the II and III CIN boundary west from Cia Longin. In this operation
the enemy again refused to come to grips with US Forces. Intelligence estimates prior to the operation indicated two NVA Regiments in addition to the main and local force units were in the area of operations. There were numerous squad and platoon size contacts. The majority of the results were achieved in two company size contacts. As pressure was brought to bear, the enemy broke contact and withdrew to the west along a main trail running from RVN into Cambodia. The most significant item in this operation was the 75 tons of rice found far away from any major rice producing area in RVN.

(b) Combat losses for this operation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENEMY LOSSES</th>
<th>FRIENDLY LOSSES</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (30)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOC</td>
<td>WIA 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>WIA 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Serve Wns</td>
<td>MIA 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiv Wns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) OPLAN 25-66 (DAVY CROCKETT).

(a) The 1st Cav Div (AN) completed on 5 May, the reconnaissance in force phase of Mosby II (Incl 10) with the 2d Bde, which was conducted in the northeastern area of Kontum Province. The attention of the division was then immediately turned to the east, in Binh Dinh Province, where it had conducted the highly successful 42 day Operation Master/White Wing ending 6 Mar 66. The 3d Bde after having completed on 29 April, a three day show of force operation, Operation Bee Bee, was returned to the Dong Song area to conduct Operation Dovy Crockett (Incl 11). In addition to the Dong Song area (296613), the operation was conducted primarily in the Eagles Clav (287381) and in the Son Ca Valley (289060).

(b) Dovy Crockett began with the deployment of two infantry battalions and the 1st Sqdn 9th Cav (-) into the area of operation. Between 5 and 6 May, the 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (-) located an estimated enemy battalion. Each time, infantry battalions were heli-lifted into position to attack. In both instances, although significant casualties were inflicted on the enemy, the attacking forces could not maintain contact through the hours of darkness. Additional forces from the 1st Cav Div (AN) deployed into the area on 11 and 14 May meeting only light resistance. On 15 May the units began redeployment to home base (An Khe), closing on the 16th.

(c) As in previous actions the majority of the enemy casualties were assessed the first two or three days after initial contact. As the US build up continued in the area of operation, contact dwindled to light and sporadic by the 6th day of the operation.

(d) The most significant aspect of this operation was the success of the 1st Cav Div (AN) in applying the principle of surprise. This was possible for several reasons including: (1) the fact that area knowledge gained earlier in Operation Master/White Wing reduced the need for extensive reconnaissance, (2) coordination with ARVN and GVN officials was delayed until shortly before D-Day and then

1 For WMDW 5649, HPr 192215 May 66, subj: SITREP 18000H to 18240H.
made with those senior officers and officials concerned. Because of these actions the 1st Cav Div (AD) was able to commit two infantry battalions and the reconnaissance squadron into the area of operations without "telegraphing" the move.

(e) Combat losses for this operation were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA (SC)</th>
<th>WIA (SC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>344</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F.1Y.6 SC .1F.R.6 W.I0.6 478 & 68 (KIA) 66 VCC 60 WIA 300

Jailers 0 WIA 0

Crew Serve WIA 0

Wpns 17 WIA 0

Indiv Wpns 224

(3) OPLAK 19-66 (PAUL RICKER).

(a) On 10 May the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div launched Operation Paul Revere (Incl 15). This was essentially a border surveillance operation in the vicinity of the Chu Long Mountain, Ia Dr, and Plei Me Special Forces Camp. There were three major contacts in this operation during the period. On 29-30 May 2d Bn, 35th Inf and A Co, 1st Bn, 35th Inf were heavily engaged throughout the period with elements of 33d and 66th NVA Regt resulting in 161 NVA KIA (US 90). On 24 June, the 1st Bn, 35th Inf made contact with a battalion size enemy force and became heavily engaged. The 1st battalion was so close to the Cambodian border (approximately 500 meters) that it could not maneuver behind the enemy and was forced to disengage from the action. During 3-4 July a platoon from B Co, 1st Bn, 35th Regt on patrol in dense jungle approximately 3000 meters from the border, gained contact with an unknown size force. The platoon had been divided into two patrols, one with the platoon leader and the other with the platoon sergeant. Early in the afternoon of 3 July the platoon leader's patrol was heavily engaged and surrounded. The platoon sergeant attempted to link up with the patrol and was also surrounded. B Co (-) mounted in APC's attempted to link up with the two units but also became heavily engaged. Link up was made with the platoon sergeant's patrol and a contact parameter was formed. Artillery and air was called to support the unit in contact. The company later linked up with the remnants of the platoon leader's patrol and moved to the north. Next day a search of the area revealed the following results: US 17 KIA, 28 WIA; enemy 23 KIA (SC). Phase I of this operation terminated 2400 hours, 31 July with sporadic contact.

(b) Combat losses for this operation were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA (SC)</th>
<th>WIA (SC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>478</td>
<td>68 (KIA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>300</td>
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F.1Y.6 SC .1F.R.6 W.I0.6 478 & 68 (KIA) 66 VCC 60 WIA 300

Jailers 0 WIA 0

Crew Serve WIA 0

Wpns 17 WIA 0

Indiv Wpns 224

21 FIDCSYV Mag 5583, DDC 170005 May 66, Subj: SITREP 1600011 to 162400G.
22 FIDCSYV Mag 5583, DDC 170005 May 66, Subj: SITREP 1600011 to 162400G.
SECRET

AVP-103-78
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, BS GSPR-69 (b)

(a) Having completed Operation Navy Crockett, the
1st Cav Div (A) began moving with the 1st Bde (-) into the area north
of the Cap ROA Div's TAOR lying between Vinh Thanh and Soul In Valley
and conducted Operation Crazy Horse 16 May - 5 June (Incl 15).

(b) On 15 May a CEC patrol operating out of Vinh
Thanh Special Forces (SF) Camp ambushed an estimated VC platoon. A
search of the site yielded documents containing plans for an attack on
the Vinh Thanh SF Camp or about 18 May. In addition a 120mm Mortar
neutral, eight and quadrant were discovered. At 1045 on 16 May a company
of the 2d Bn, 6th Cav conducted a haliborne assault into the eastern
side of the Vinh Thanh valley. By late afternoon the company was in
heavy contact with an estimated enemy battalion. Two additional
companies of the 1st Bn, 12th Cav were inserted into the area of operation.
The following day the 2d Bn, 5th Cav air assaulted into the area of opera-
tions. The presence of the 2d VC Main Force Regiment was confirmed,
which was taking heavy casualties, approximately 60 per day. On the
fifth day of the operation the 1st Bn, 8th Cav replaced the 2d Bn, 12th
Cav and 58 forces continued to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy.
The seventh day of the operation was characterized by only sporadic contact.

(c) On 24 May (9th day of operation) the 1st Cav Div
(AH) changed tactics and surrounded the main battle area with assistance
from the 2d Bn, Cav Regt, Cap ROA Inf Div and two ARVN Abn
Battalions. Blocking and ambush positions were established along
all escape routes while a B-52 strike was delivered on the enemy posi-
tion. After the strike the units tightened the encirclement and
violent sporadic contact erupted as contact was made with dispersed
enemy units. The operation terminated upon the units closing the center
of the battle area.

(d) Combat losses for the operation were:

| KIA (VC) | 478 |
| VCI | 27 |
| Faleiros | 0 |
| Crew Serve Wms | 15 |
| Indiv Wms | 88 |

| KIA | 78 |
| VCI | 213 |
| IA | 1 |
| Crew Serve Wms | 0 |
| Indiv Wms | 18 |

(5) Frag Order 4125 (060016H).

(a) From Phnom Co, in Quang Duc Province, the 1st Bde,
101st Abn Div (-2/327th) deployed with C-130 aircraft to Chao Tao,
in Phu Bon Province, in preparation for Operation Cooper. Due to
increasing enemy pressure on the Toumoron outpost and at the re-
sult of the 24th Special Tactical Zone Commander, I FTZ-1075
committed the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (-) to Operation Hawthorne, (Incl 14) 2 - 20
June, and cancelled Operation Cooper. The mission of the 1st Bde, 101st
Abn Div was to evacuate Toumoron garrison and to conduct S & S opera-
tions for elements of the 24th NVA Regt and the 200th NVA Weapons
Battalion, threatening the area.

4 I FTZ-1075 04245, DTC 060200S Jun 65, Subj: STRTM 050000H to 052400H.

SECRET
SECRET

AVFA-DC-TH
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RCS OSFOR-65 (U)

(b) Initial moves by helicopter placed forces in the vicinity of Tounorang and only light contact occurred with aircraft receiving automatic weapons fire. 1st Bn, 327th Inf landed north of Tounorang and searched to the south while the 2d Bn, 502d Inf (-) remained in Dak To as a reserve reaction force. The 21st Ranger Bn and one battalion from the 42d Inf Regt (ARVN) in conjunction with 1st Bn, 327th Inf made a three pronged attack to relieve the pressure on Tounorang. Only light contact was made and the garrison was relieved and withdrew to Dak To on 6 June.

(c) On the evening of 6 June the 1st Bn, 327th Inf made light contact north of Tounorang and that night the artillery battery and the defense rifle company came under heavy attack. The 1st Bn, 327th Inf counter-attacked the enemy's southern flank and a bitter battle ensued throughout the day and night. The 2d Bn, 502d Inf was employed on 7 June to develop the enemy's northern flank. Contact was made immediately and hand to hand combat ensued between C Co, 2d Bn, 502d Inf and the enemy.

(d) Encirclement of the enemy was completed by the insertion of 1st Bn, 5th Cav, the I FFORCE Reserve, and an ARVN Bn. As the encirclement tightened, fierce fighting continued with the 24th NVA Regt. After four days, the friendly lines were adjusted to accommodate a massive B-52 strike (Incl 15). As the battalion exploited the strike, resistance crumbled. Sporadic contact continued until the operation was terminated on 20 June. This B-52 strike is considered the most successful of the strikes received during this report period.

(e) For the 1st brigade's conduct of this operation, Premier Nguyen Cao Ky awarded them a citation declaring that "the skill, stamina and courage displayed by the troops of the 1st brigade are a tribute to them and to their leaders". The Premier also presented awards for valor to 41 men of the brigade. Capt William Carpenter, commander of Company C, 2d Bn, 502d Inf was recommended for the Congressional Medal of Honor for his participation in this action.

(f) Combat losses for this operation were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENEMY LOSSES</th>
<th>FRIENDLY LOSSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (BC) 479 &amp; 52 (KBA)</td>
<td>KIA 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCC 22</td>
<td>WIA 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA 45</td>
<td>WIA 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA 1</td>
<td>MIA 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Serve Wpn 21</td>
<td>Crew Serve Wpn 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiv Wpn 85</td>
<td>Indiv Wpn 85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(g) OPLAN 34-66 (HOOKER).

(a) On 10 June while the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (-) was engaged in the northwest portion of the II CTZ, the 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AH) initiated operation Hooker I (Incl 14) on 10 June. This was a search and destroy operation in the area west of Pleiku-Kontum and in the vicinity of the Cambodian border sharing the north/south area of operation boundary with the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. This operation terminated 21 June when little or no contact was made.

7F I FFORCE Mag 4760, DDT 210120 Jun 66, Subj: SITREP 020001H to 022400H.

11 of 57
SECRET
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, RGS CSFOR-65 (U)

(b) Combat losses for this operation were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENEMY LOSSES</th>
<th>FRIENDLY LOSSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (BC)</td>
<td>KIA 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>WIA 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>MIA 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Serve Wpns</td>
<td>Crew Serve Wpns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiv Wpns</td>
<td>Indiv Wpns 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60MM Mortar</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) OPLAN 28-66 (BEAUMARD).

(a) Having completed operation Hawthorne on 20 June, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (-) remained generally in place in the western highlands in the vicinity of Dak To, Kontum Province to conduct Operation Beausard (Incl 16), 24 June - 15 July. This operation, a surveillance of the Laotian/Cambodian/RVN border was initiated with long range reconnaissance teams deploying to the northwest sector of the area of operation where ambush and blocking positions were established along all suspected VC infiltration routes. Then reacting to intelligence obtained from these teams, from Red Base and three ralliers, several airmobile assaults were made to block the enemy's likely avenues of escape, but only light contact was made. It is believed, however, that the brigade's presence in the area reduced the number of infiltrators into the II CTZ.

(b) Combat losses for this operation were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENEMY LOSSES</th>
<th>FRIENDLY LOSSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (BC)</td>
<td>KIA 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>WIA 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>MIA 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Serve Wpns</td>
<td>Crew Serve Wpns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiv Wpns</td>
<td>Indiv Wpns 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) OPLAN 36-66 (HAYMAN HALE).

(a) During the period 12 June to 1 July the 1st and 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AP) with the 2d Bn, 327th Inf, conducted Operation Hayman Hale (Incl 17). The operation began with the Special Landing Force (SLF) of the 3d Bn, 5th ARVN Force, (Deckhouse I) (Incl 17) conducting a shake down of its units with an amphibious landing north of Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen Province on 18 June.

(b) On 19 June based on intelligence, the 2d Bn, 327th Inf (-3 Co) was inserted to the south of the SLF, west of Tuy An at 1740 hrs. Heavy contact was made immediately and continued until 2008 hrs that night. Based on this, B Co, 2d Bn, 327th Inf, located in Tuy An, and I FORCEN Reserve/Reaction Force, 1st Bn, 5th Cav, were committed to relieve the pressure on A and C Co's, 2d Bn, 327th Inf, and closed in the area of operation by 2200. All contact broke in the area by 2400 hrs. On 20 June at 0200 hrs A Troop, 2d Sqdn, 17th Cav was committed into the area of operation. On the same

6 I FORCEN Mag 4799, DCG 2201314 Jun 66, Subj: STREP 210000H to 220000H.
7 I FORCEN Mag 0092, DCG 1001100 Jul 66, Subj: STREP 150000H to 152400H.

SECRET
day the SLF had sporadic contact in the beachhead area and at 0800 hrs the two Co's of 2d Bn, 327th Inf were again in heavy contact with an unknown size force. At 0815 hrs 20 June the 1st Cav Div (AM) was alerted to "be prepared" to commit the I FFORCE Reserve/Reaction force to reinforce 2d Bn, 327th Inf. Heavy contact continued until 1100 hrs at which time the enemy broke contact. At 1400 hrs, the 1st Cav Div (AM) assumed CP/DN of the 2d Bn, 327th Am Inf. Plans were immediately implemented to commit additional forces in the area of operation to attack and destroy the enemy forces.

(c) On 21 June at 0230 hrs elements of 2d Bn, 327th Inf again came under heavy attack which lasted until 1400 hrs. During this action the 1st Bn, 8th Cav was also engaged by an estimated enemy battalion which lasted until 1930 hrs.

(d) At 0630 hrs on 22 June the enemy attempted to overrun C Co, 2d Bn, 327th Inf without success. Meanwhile the SLF continued to push inland toward the area of engagement. Late in the afternoon the 2d Bn, 7th Cav closed in the area of operation and captured a POW who identified the enemy unit as the 185 NVA Regiment.

(e) On 24 June the 1st Bn, 7th Cav was introduced into the area of operation as the 2d Bn, 7th Cav was in heavy contact with a large NVA force. Contact was broken by the enemy at 1600 hrs.

(f) Between 25 June and the termination of the operation on 1 July still another battalion, the 2d Bn, 8th Cav was introduced into the operation but enemy contact diminished and could not be regained.

(g) Combat losses for this operation were:

**ENEMY LOSSES** | **FRIENDLY LOSSES**
---|---
KIA (BC) | 423 & 36 KIA
WOC | 36 WOC
Killed | 433
Wounded | 333
KIA | 62
WIA | MIA 4
Crew Serve Wns | 29 Crew Serve Wns
Indiv Wns | 131 Indiv Wns

(9) FLAG ORDER msg 5093, D (01235 June (HENRY CLAY).

(a) The day following the termination of Nathan Hale, two brigades of the 1st Cav Div (AM) began Operation Henry Clay (Incl 18), 2-30 July. This operation moved from the eastern edge of the Phu Van Province through Phu Coc and Bui Lac Provinces across to the Cambodian border. It was essentially a search and destroy operation throughout the Chu Die Ya base area and west to the border. There were three B-52 strikes used during the operation with no significant results.

(b) On 5 July the recon elements of the 1st Bn, 7th Cav found 300 packs in one of the strike areas. Six packs were removed on 6 July and on the 7th, elements of 1st Bn, 9th Cav returned to the area and all packs were gone.

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8 I FFORCE Msg 5142, D (021000 Jul 66, Subj: REPORT 0100011 to 012400H.
SECRET

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, RCS CSFOR-65 (II)

(c) During Henry Clay two A.T.H Bns (1/45, 3/45) conducted Operation Thang Long 243 in the area of operation south of East-West Jid line by 30. On 9 July at 0750 contact was made with an estimated VC Bn; 103 enemy were killed before the contact was broken at 1025.

(d) The 1st Cav Div (AN) continued to search to the west and on 16 July a large weapons cache was discovered in the area of the B-52 strike. There were no other significant contacts or actions in Operation Henry Clay which terminated on 30 July 1966 upon the closing of all Cav units into An Khe.

(e) Combat losses for this operation were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENEMY LOSSES</th>
<th>FRIENDLY LOSSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (HC) 33 &amp; 2 (KBA)</td>
<td>KIA 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC 7</td>
<td>KIA 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralliers 0</td>
<td>KIA 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Serve Wms 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiv Wms 82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(10) FWD CIDON msg 5561, D.C 1304,10 July 1966 (MAYBE).

Upon the withdrawal of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (-) from Operation Beauregard, the 1st Bn, 7th Cav, 3d Bde moved into the vacated area on 19 July to conduct Operation Hayes (Incl 16). This was essentially a screening mission along the Cambodian border west of Dak To and Dak Pak. No significant contact has been reported to date in this operation.

(11) OPLAN 39-66 (JOHN PAUL JONES).

On 21 July the 1st Brigade 1Cst Abn Div returned to the Tuy Hoa, Vung Ro Bay area to conduct Operation John Paul Jones (Incl 19) in conjunction with the 2d Korean Marine Bde. On D-Day all units secured assigned objectives and Hwy 1 from Tuy Hoa to within 1 KM of Vung Ro Bay was opened. The following morning the 39th Eng Bn landed by LST on the Vung Ro Bay Beach to begin preparation of LST landing sites, access roads and hardstands.

a. 03 Air Operations

(1) Tactical Air Support: Tactical Air sorties varies daily from 4 to 77 with a mean of 34 per day. The most frequent missions were:

(a) Direct support of friendly forces in contact.

(b) Preparation fires on landing zones and objective areas.

(c) Harassment and interdiction of enemy base areas, assembly areas and infiltration routes.

9) FWD CIDON msg 20386, D.C 30221 Jul 66, Subj: SIGNED 000000H to 002400H.
SECRET

AVF74-GO-119
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, RCS 038022-65 (c)

(2) Use of air cover was drastically reduced from the previous quarter. This was primarily due to a new policy initiated by the 7th Air Force that immediate air strikes, using ground alert aircraft, would be flown on any lucrative target. Previously, ground alert aircraft were "scrabbed" only in support of units receiving enemy fire. Air cover was therefore needed to provide strikes for targets of opportunity.

(3) Although damage assessment of strikes was difficult because of the dense jungle cover, some reports were available from forward air controllers, ground forces and units. Numerous secondary explosions were observed. There were 590 confirmed enemy killed by Air Force (KBAF) within II CTZ during the period; 155 in May, 176 in June and 259 in July.

(4) Prior to June, 99% of the air strikes were conducted during daylight hours. In June, 69% were daylight missions and 31% were night missions. This was made possible by the newly installed MSQ/77 Ground Directed Bombing System (SKYS'OT). All night missions and 12% of the daylight missions were controlled by SKYS'OT.

(a) SKYS'OT permits bombing at night and during all-weather conditions by directing the bomb run and release from a ground based radar/computer system. The II CTZ is supported by systems based at two locations.

(b) The Bien Hoa system (POLAR BEAR) supports the southern quarter of II CTZ. The first SKYS'OT mission used by I FFRICOF was controlled by this system in support of the 1st Bde., 101st Abn Div, in Operation Austin VI.

(c) The Pleiku system (PEN LIGHT) became operational in May and supports the northern two-thirds of II CTZ. It provided control for the majority of I FFRICOF SKYS'OT missions. The coverage capability of this system at various altitudes to maximum altitude (22,700 ft) and range (98.0 nautical miles) is shown in Enc 20.

(d) SKYS'OT was used extensively by the 1st Bde., 101st Abn Div, during Operation Hawthorne. From the night of 11 June through the morning of 13 June, 41 missions were conducted. At night, missions were flown every 30 minutes. During the day, strikes were conducted every 45 minutes until weather permitted forward air controllers to assume control.

(e) Field commanders have commented favorably on the system citing the following advantages:

1. All-weather capability.
2. Surprise (no aircraft are observed prior to the strike).
3. Good accuracy (actual strike data indicates an average miss distance of less than 170 meters).
SECRET

AVFA-GC-798
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

4. Good reaction time (immediately filled in less than one hour; time over targets (100) consistently met within 10 minutes).

(f) The major limitations of the system are:

1. Minimum time between strikes on different targets is about 20 minutes.

2. Each system can control only one strike at a time.

3. Only a limited number of aircraft equipped to operate with the system at all ranges are available for in-country preplanned strikes. Initially, the available sortie rate was 10 strikes per day. In June this was changed to 15. Additional aircraft were on alert for immediate strike requests.

4. The system is adequate for area coverage, but it does not replace the forward air controllers for close air support who can visually acquire the target. The trop safety distance for SKYSPOt is currently 1000 meters.

(5) Tactical air sorties flown in support of major operations during the period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATIONS</th>
<th>TOTAL STRIKES</th>
<th>SORIES/DAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austin VII</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davy Crockett</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Revere</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crazy Horses</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawthorne</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hooker I</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaucaire Garden</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathan Hale</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Clay</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SKYSPOt first used by FFORCEN

45 KBA (BC), 63 KBA (est)

23 KBA (BC), 17 KBA (est),
13 secondary explosions,
5 morts dest.

32 KBA (BC), 62 KBA (est)

8 AV sites dest, 52 KBA
(BC), 209 KBA (est)

5 KBA (est)

Air strikes were held to try to encourage enemy to reveal self by action. 3 KBA (BC)

6 AV pens dest, 36 KBA (BC)

1 secondary fire, 2 KBA (BC)
A comparison of sorties flown in I, II, III CTZ is shown in Incl 21. The graph of each Corps includes support of both ARVN and US/FMMAF forces. Sorties in support of I FFORCE are also shown separately from II CTZ totals.

A flareship was on airborne alert from 1900 to 0600 daily, stationed over Plei Di, in general support of II CTZ. A restriction, to conserve flares, limiting flare support to units in contact, continued throughout the period.

An experimental light ship, a C-123 fitted with a bank of 27 arc type lights cooled by a water type heat exchanger, was tested at An Khe and at Nha Trang. Troops on the ground reported favorably that the cone of light provides adequate lighting over a one-half mile area. Bonus effects of the cone of light are that troops outside the area remain in darkness and that lighting is continuous. Pilots indicated some aerodynamic difficulties with the ship and pointed out the limited station time, about two hours.

Strategic Air Support.

(a) B-52 strikes conducted in support of ground operations and on suspected enemy concentrations are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CODE NAME</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>OPERATION OR EFFECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>131700Z May</td>
<td>Port Rail</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Austin VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251000Z May</td>
<td>Dead Sea 1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Crazy Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251000Z May</td>
<td>Dead Sea 2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Crazy Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300200Z May</td>
<td>Dead Sea 3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Crazy Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>052000Z Jun</td>
<td>Large Mule</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Suspected VC political cadre meeting NE of An Khe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102250Z Jun</td>
<td>Bull Thistle 1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Hawthorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130001Z Jun</td>
<td>Bull Thistle 2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Hawthorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130005Z Jun</td>
<td>Bull Thistle 3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Hawthorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211610Z Jun</td>
<td>Shire Mare 3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>NVA assembly area in Binh Dinh Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231845Z Jun</td>
<td>Shire Mare 1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>NVA assembly area in Binh Dinh Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>242100Z Jun</td>
<td>Blue Lake 1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>NVA infil route fr Cambodia to Kontum Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>242100Z Jun</td>
<td>Blue Lake 2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>NVA infil route fr Cambodia to Kontum Province</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVFA-DI-TNG
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

242100Z Jun Blue Lake 6 6 LWA infil route fr Cambodia to Kontum Province
252345Z Jun Share Mare 2 12 LWA assembly area in Kinh Dinh Province
272200Z Jun Blue Lake 4 6 LWA infil route fr Cambodia to Kontum Province
272200Z Jun Blue Lake 3 6 LWA infil route fr Cambodia to Kontum Province
060310Z Jul Pink Lady 6 Henry Clay
102200Z Jul Slow Mare 1 9 Paul Revere
102200Z Jul Slow Mare 2 6 Paul Revere
112000Z Jul Wild Horse 1 9 Henry Clay
112000Z Jul Wild Horse 2 6 Henry Clay
170125Z Jul Slow Mare 3 9 Paul Revere

(b) Strikes Bull Thistle 2 and 3, on 13 June in Operation Hawthorne were reported by the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, to be particularly effective. The 1st Bde had encountered and successfully contained the enemy north of Dak To for three days. Following the strike, the brigade exploited the area immediately, counting some 37 KIA and estimating many more that could not be recovered due to the dense jungle cover blown down by the strike. Several prisoners were taken without resistance in a state of shock. The commander of the first troops into the area stated, "many were just walking around like zombies still stunned by the enormity of the bombing attack."

(c) Pink Lady, on 6 July, in Operation Henry Clay, was the first strike of the Quick Run, a quick reaction B-52 force. From the time of request by the unit to the strike, only 11 hours elapsed. This is six hours less than the best previous reaction time. This was the first B-52 bomb run controlled by NSC/77 system. The Strategic Air Command keeps aircraft on alert at Guam to provide a 10 hour reaction force (from time of receipt of MACV request to TOT). The Quick Run reaction force is normally used only for operations where troops are in contact.

d. Army Aviation Operations:

(1) During the period, 1 May - 31 July 1966, this headquarters acquired operational control of the 183rd Aviation Company (O1). The 183rd Avn Co (O1) with 32 aircraft became operational at Dong Ha Thin on 16 July 1966 and was assigned to the 10th Avn En. Two airmobile companies (281st and 282d) were organised in II C:2 by the 17th Avn Op from existing separate platoons and two HQ's packets for avn companies which arrived in AVN 7 June 1966. The 281st Avn Co (O1) was assigned to the 10th Avn En and placed under OPCON of the 7th US Special Forces Group (Abn) by MACV direction with home station Nha Trang. The 282d Avn Co (O1) (-), located at Da Nang, was assigned to the 14th Avn En
AVFA-CC-TNC

SUBJECT: Operational report for quarterly Period ending 31 July 1966, HCS CSR-65 (U)

and placed in support of I Corps. One platoon of the 202d Avn Co remains at Pleiku and provides support to NVA II Corps.

(2) An augmentation of seven additional UH-1D helicopters have been assigned to the 117th, the 129th and the 48th Aviation Companies (AH). The troop lift capability of each company has been increased by 70 percent as a result of the augmentations. All 10 air mobile companies of the 17th Avn Gp are scheduled to be augmented by November 1966.

(3) The first company of CH-47 helicopters, the 179th Avn Co (AH) (CH-47), assigned to the 17th Avn Gp, arrived in N. on 26 July 1966. This unit is presently being offloaded at Cam Ranh Bay and is destined to be stationed at Pleiku in the highlands area. The company, with 16 assigned CH-47 helicopters is expected to become operational in August 1966.

(4) The pre-aviation support concept which existed during the quarter is shown in Inc. 22. Primary areas of employment as listed in Ltr, AVFA-7, Mn, 7 FPQNVN, 18 Apr 66, Subject: Letter of Instruction (U) are:

10th Avn Bn GS II Corps Area Coastal South
14th Avn Bn GS II Corps Area Coastal North
52d Avn Bn GS II Corps Area Highlands

(5) Aviation units under OPCON I FPQNVN participated in the following significant US operations in II C.Z. during the reported periods:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>UNITS</th>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>U.F.S. SUPPORTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austin VI</td>
<td>117th Avn Co</td>
<td>1 May - 10 May</td>
<td>1/101st Abn Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>129th Avn Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48th Avn Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fillmore</td>
<td>129th Avn Co</td>
<td>25 Mar - 21 Jul</td>
<td>2d ROK Mar Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>170th Avn Co</td>
<td></td>
<td>2/27th Abn Inf Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>161st Avn Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Revere</td>
<td>155th Avn Co</td>
<td>10 May - 31 May</td>
<td>3/25th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>170th Avn Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>161st Avn Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Revere</td>
<td>119th Avn Co</td>
<td>1 Jun - Continuing</td>
<td>3/25th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155th Avn Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>170th Avn Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawthorne</td>
<td>48th Avn Co</td>
<td>2 Jun - 20 Jun</td>
<td>1/101st Abn Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>117th Avn Co</td>
<td></td>
<td>AFGHS Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>129th Avn Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauregard</td>
<td>48th Avn Co</td>
<td>24 Jun - 15 Jul</td>
<td>1/101st Abn Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>117th Avn Co</td>
<td></td>
<td>AFGHS Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>129th Avn Co</td>
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</table>
(6) While the above ARVN operations were in progress, numerous operations conducted by ARVN divisions and lasting from one to three days were supported with helicopter assets. These operations varied from one aircraft platoon for Eagle Flights up to three aviation companies (AV) for initial lifts on multi-battalion size operations. Detailed coordination was required to release aviation assets previously committed to US operations in order to shift assets to meet ARVN requirements. Early ARVN requests for aviation support in May and June did not allow sufficient time to properly plan for shifting aviation assets. ARVN air mobile operations during July indicated considerably more timely planning, resulting in increased aviation support for ARVN. For example, the following ARVN operations were supported in July:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>UNIT SUPPORTED</th>
<th>AREA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dan Thang 66</td>
<td>2 Jul</td>
<td>24th STZ</td>
<td>Kontum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagle Flight</td>
<td>4 Jul</td>
<td>234 AVN Div</td>
<td>Dan Me Thout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnamed (2 each)</td>
<td>5 Jul</td>
<td>24th STZ</td>
<td>Kontum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Lai</td>
<td>7 Jul</td>
<td>24th STZ</td>
<td>Dak To</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuan Long 243</td>
<td>8-10 Jul</td>
<td>24th STZ</td>
<td>Kontum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hao Ho 54</td>
<td>18 Jul</td>
<td>24th STZ</td>
<td>Kontum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Phu 14</td>
<td>20 Jul</td>
<td>24th STZ</td>
<td>Dak To</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Thang 73</td>
<td>22 Jul</td>
<td>24th STZ</td>
<td>Kontum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loi Hon 65</td>
<td>27 Jul</td>
<td>24th STZ</td>
<td>Tuy Hoa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thang Long 246</td>
<td>16 Jul</td>
<td>24th STZ</td>
<td>Muong Ao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bach Dang 46</td>
<td>29 Jul</td>
<td>24th STZ</td>
<td>Dak To</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minh Thuan 14</td>
<td>31 Jul</td>
<td>24th STZ</td>
<td>Muong Hoa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) On 6 July 1966, an emergency request for two air mobile companies was received from 22nd Corps to lift reinforcements in the vicinity of Phu Cat (SR90490). The 22nd ARVN Div force was committed to a VC force estimated to be battalion size in strength. One air mobile company was immediately available and a second company was diverted from a Cap XoK Inf Div resupply mission and was at the loading zone two hours after notification. The 22nd ARVN Div reinforcements were helilifted into blocking positions around the enemy positions where artillery and air strikes inflicted heavy casualties on the VC force. The operation was completed and aircraft released at 1930 hours.

(8) I FGR1/NV reinforced I Corps and III MRF with a total of 20 aircraft between 15 and 23 July. The aircraft consisted of four GV-2's, eight OI's, six UH-1B gunships and two UH-1D suffixes. All of the aircraft have been released back to control of the 17th Avn Gp except the eight OI's and two UH-1D's which are continuing to support III MRF in Opn Hastings and I Corps.

(9) Major operations of the 1st Cav Div (AV) during the period included Hosiery II, Davy Crockett, Crazy Horse, Hooker I, Nathan Hale, and Henry Clay. In addition to supporting organic units, the
1st Cav Div (A1) supported the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div with two and three flyable CI-47's respectively on a daily basis. The CI-47's were used primarily for movement of supporting artillery ammunition into otherwise inaccessible areas. Numerous times the 1st Cav Div (A1) was tasked to provide CI-47 helicopters to extract downed aircraft for US Marine and US Air Force units. On 11 July, at the request of II Field Force, a 1st Cav CI-54 "Flying Crane" extracted an armed CI-47 helicopter that was downed by enemy action about 40 nautical miles south of Bien Hoa. The 1st Cav Div (A1) has a total of four CI-54's and they are the only helicopters in M.T. capable of extracting a CI-47.

(10) Air traffic control of forward airfields in joint Army/Air Force operations continued to require detailed planning and coordination. The 125th Air Traffic Control (ATC) Company provided ground control approach and air traffic control equipment and personnel on request. Presently there are three forward airfields being operated by the 125th ATC Company. Cat catka Airfield supporting Operation Paul Revere, Dak To Airfield supporting Operation Hayes and "May Soo South Airfield supporting Operation John Paul Jones. It was necessary for this headquarters to prescribe procedures and fire responsibilities for the use of forward airfields in II CTZ. Specific responsibilities were assigned to the supported unit commander, the senior Army aviation commander supporting the operation as outlined in I FFORCEV regulation 95-1, Subject: Joint Airborne/Airmobile Airstrip Operation, 3 July 1966 (Ann 23).

(11) Administrative requirements for helicopters continued to detract from combat helilift capability.

e. Psychological Warfare:

(1) General:

(a) Psychological operations in the II CTZ continued to increase in both scope and coverage.

(b) The scope of the psychological operations, was divided into those efforts used to support the tactical operations and those efforts used in the various pacification programs.

(c) Every tactical unit in II CTZ, both FNNAP and ARVN, had planned psychological operations before, during and following a tactical mission. This support was usually in the form of leaflet and loudspeaker missions. PSYOP personnel were either organic or attached to the tactical unit to exploit any POW's or returnees and the immediate combat situation. The target audiences of these tactical psychological operations were the NVA from the north, the VC, local and hard core, the population which supported them and the various Montagnard tribes.

(d) In addition psychological campaigns are being implemented preceding the arrival of new American troops units. A series of leaflets are currently being printed explaining to the populace why the allies are in Vietnam and the role the American (that specific unit) are playing in the fight against the Viet Cong.
educational programs and psychological operations in the I CHZ to being prepared for the I CHZ area as a sort of their in-country orientation, the end of the individual and the third level, are reached.

(c) In the case of I CHZ which was initiated during the reporting period and the support of the I CHZ and III Corps areas, due to the nature of the area of the III Corps and III Corps area, the procurement of locally available instructional materials to support these efforts was therefore initiated. Utilization of this phase of PSYOP should be given more weight.

(d) The main problem areas in II CHZ are two-fold in nature. First, execution of maintenance, delivery of leaflets to the supporting unit. Second, implementation of psychological operations practices. The first problem consists of readjustment and re-evaluation of requirements of required items of supply. These problems, though numerous at first, are beginning to work themselves out as a better understanding of I CHZ is gained by using units. The second problem area, it is believed, is best handled by educating personnel in the employment of psychological operations as a weapon system and by immediately filling PSYOP positions with school trained personnel.

(2) Support:

(a) From 1 May - 31 July 1966, psychological operations support was provided to I Field Force Vietnam and other 55/64 Military Assistance Forces in the I CHZ and the III by the 21st Psychological Operations Company. The company had elements in the I Corps and Pleiku with an 86 NCC (Current Intelligence) in Qui Nhon.

(b) The Fifth Air Commando Squadron, with detachments in the I Corps and Pleiku, provided support in psychological operations by dropping leaflets and conducting aerial bombardment missions. During the reporting period, a total of 112,348,000 leaflets were dropped and 963 hours of aerial bombardment were provided in support of II CHZ combat and pacification operations.

(c) Progresses are being developed with the US Army to implement a lead-bomber capability for the swifts and junk boats. Plans are being developed to coordinate aerial bombardment and leaflet drops with the arrival of a swift boat at a fighting village.

(d) The main problem areas in providing I CHZ support in II CHZ is the nature of time, equipment breakdown and maintenance. The small number of planes available (four B-10Fs) and the numerous missions resulted in frequent maintenance problems. The operation of the I CHZ Military Printing Press has resulted in frequent breakdown due to increased production requirements. These problems have caused the cancellation of numerous PSYOP missions as well as the curtailment of leaflet supply.

(3) Operations:

(a) Operation Winds: This operation is directed
SECURITY

AV24-62-710
SUBJECT: Operational Report for quarterly period ending 31 July 1966,
RCS 05/05-65 (1)

against North Vietnamese army personnel along the border and in an
extension of the border represented the primary objectives along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and North Vietnam. More than 1,500 bombs were dropped in one aerial attack. The target area was located
in North to the Nam Son and Red River areas to destroy the
connection with this operation.

(b) MA Campaign: The program directed against North
Vietnamese army personnel in South Vietnam. Standard 514s and locally produced 514s were dropped in conjunction with all
tactical operations before, during and after combat operations against
known or suspected areas where North Vietnamese units were operating.

(c) The Chien Rei Campaign (Open Area). The program
was continuously utilized in all aspects of psychological operations
in II CTZ. The program was directed toward civil and military
personnel, to persuade them to voluntarily return to OW control after
having actively supported the Viet Cong, militarily or politically.
The program used the theme that the returnee would be treated with respect
and a decision to return to the Republic of Vietnam would be made.

(d) The loudspeaker support for the tactical operations
averaged one loudspeaker aircraft a day for each operation. From one to
two 25 teams (field loudspeakers) were provided to I Field Forces Tactical
OPCEN units on a direct support mission basis. In addition during the
reporting period each US brigade received a public address system
AM-155-4 which can be vehicular or aircraft mounted on organic
transportation; augmenting the existing capability of ground and aerial
loudspeakers.

(e) I Field Forces tactical operations were supported as
follows:

1. One audio visual jester, (25 teams) to each
of the following operations: Double V, Merry Christmas, Paul Revere,
Crissy Horse, Hooper III, Nathan Hale, and John Paul Jones.

2. Two loudspeaker teams (25 teams) to Operations
Beaufort and Harboure.

(f) The following themes were exploited in tactical
operations:

1. Before operations:
   a. Allied superiority.
   b. VC hardships expected to combat in Republic
      of Vietnam.
   c. Reduction of civilian casualties.

25 of 57

SECRET

AVCMA 72-74
SECRET

AVP-66-666
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RCS CSP-05 (U)

1. Chieu Ho program.
2. B-52 raids.
3. During operations.
   a. Allied superiority.
   b. Demoralization.
   c. Chieu Ho.
   d. Specific instructions on how to return (Chieu Ho).

b. Following the operations, themes were: allied superiority, demoralization, Chieu Ho, and in addition themes against specific targets such as the sick and wounded, lack of food and medicines were stressed. Specific examples of leaflets used in tactical operations during the reporting period are attached as enclosures:
   Incl 22, demoralization leaflets; Incl 23, quick reaction leaflets and special leaflets; Incl 24, pacification leaflets. Specific themes creating dissension between the VC and NVA have not been developed due to lack of intelligence and adequate personnel for such a program.

4. VC Propaganda:
   (a) The VC rely extensively on propaganda. Propaganda against civilizations is difficult to evaluate, but propaganda directed against US military forces is considered to be ineffective. The propaganda themes directed at non-military targets are:

   1. Allied artillery and aircraft are killing innocent people and are destroying homes, villages, farm animals and crops.

   2. Requesting the mothers, wives, and daughters who have sons, husbands, and fathers in the armed forces to urge desertion and return to their homes.

   3. The US are Imperialists, same as the French.


   5. Use of noxious chemicals in South Vietnam.

   (b) Propaganda directed at US military targets are:

   1. Racial strife in America.

   2. Being far away from home during the hardships.


   4. Disease, bugs, and heat in Vietnam.
SECRET

AVFA-CC-TNG

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RCS CFPB-65 (U)

2. Not safe from VC terror acts.
6. Rally to the VC, repatriation, and VC Safe Conduct Passes.

5. Returns:
(a) As of 30 July 1966, there were approximately 4,965 returnees in the II CTZ. From a psychological standpoint these people are important because they represent results of the PSYOP effort. However, they also represent one of the weak points; specifically: have these Chieu Lal been utilized to their fullest extent? The intelligence as to why they rallied is general in nature and not specific as to local condition, fulfillment of promised benefits and really becoming a citizen of Vietnam.

(b) One recent example of the above occurred on 4 Jul 66, when 6 returnees came into the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div with weapons. As of this date it is unknown whether or not they were paid, treated humanely or if they had any valuable intelligence.

(c) Although the rate of returnees is proportional to the number of tactical operations in the area, it still remains for the psychological operation to fully utilize this potential source of information.

1. Chemical Operation:

(a) General:

(a) On 7 May 1966 authority to employ RCA, CN, and CS-1, was delegated by CINCPAC to all US/ARVN divisions and separate brigade commanders. Prior to this time all US/ARVN units in II CTZ requested specific approval for the use of these agents for each operation. There was no major effect on RCA employment since OPCON units had, in the past, been given authority to employ RCA prior to each operation. Employment response times seemed not to be affected.

(b) On 18 May 66, a message was received from USARV asking whether this headquarters had a valid requirement for riot control agent DN (Adamsite) and further if we recommended a change in present RCA policy to permit the use of DN. OPCON units were queried as to their thoughts on the matter. 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div stated they had no valid requirement for agent DN and did not recommend changing the RCA policy. The LAV (AR) recognized a valid requirement for agent DN and further recommended changing RCA policy to include all available incapacitating agents. In reply to USARV message, this headquarters indicated that no valid requirements exist at this time for agent DN and the current RCA policy was satisfactory. Factors considered in arriving at this decision were:

1. Use of agent DN would be an escalation of the use of chemical agents in Vietnam.
2. Its use would generate adverse public reaction.

-5 of 57

SECRET
SECRET

A/36-06/475
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RG-03982-65 (U)

3. Agent CS (presently used) gives satisfactory results when employed properly.

4. Although agent XX has a longer duration of effect (15 to 30 minutes), this is of marginal value when weighed against the increased safety precautions required for friendly forces, non-
combatants, and political considerations.

(c) On 2 June 1966, this headquarters received, from
the 9th ACR, a request for consideration of possible use of incapacita-
ting chemical agent XX which offers a more persistent effect (48-72
hours). The rationale and justification put forth by the 9th Cav Div
(AC) were militarily sound. This agent has a long, lasting incapacita-
tion, giving commanders sufficient time to fully infiltrate and search a tar-
get area while the enemy is still under the full effect of the agent.
Past experience indicates that it may take as much as 10 hours to get
crews into an area and another 10-12 hours to search and clear the area.
This request was forwarded to SMSA/CM for consideration emphasizing
the possible military and political ramifications. Action is still pending at that headquarters.

(a) On 27 June 1966, SMSA/CM asks this headquarters
for comments on proposed guidelines for crop destruction to include
comments on desirable or undesirable being authorized to destroy crops in
conjunction with tactical operations. The proposed guidelines are:
"Crops which cannot be controlled and whose harvest cannot be secured by
military forces will be destroyed. Provision for the needs of refugees
plus provision for the legitimate food requirements of the local populace
must be made by local US/CM provincial authorities with monitoring and
assistance by US members of the provincial team. If such provisions
cannot be made, crops will not be destroyed." In reply, this headquarters
states that the proposed guidelines are satisfactory and that authority
for commanders to destroy crops while in tactical operations would be
advantageous.

(2) Crop Destruction Operations: During the reporting
period the following four crop destruction requests were initiated by
3d ACR and forwarded through this headquarters to MACV for approval
and execution:

(a) Project 2/28/02/66 - Project consists of three
target areas containing approximately 6,250 acres of assorted foodstuffs
in Binh Thuan Province. Crops in area are recommended for destruction
during August-September 1966 (Incl 27).

(b) Project 2-31 - Project consists of five target
areas containing approximately 2,000 acres of assorted foodstuffs in
Tuyen Du Province. Recommended destruction during July-August 1966
(Incl 27).

(c) Project 2-22 - Project consists of 6 target areas
in Phu Yen Province. The Province Chief requested recovery of crops in
these target areas in early August. This will be the 3rd consecutive
growing season that crops in these six target areas have been destroyed
(Incl 27).
SECRET

AVFA-Go-TNG

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 Mar - 31 Jul 1966,
HQ USAFOS 65 (O)

(d) Project 2/2/01/66 - Project consists of four
target areas encompassing approximately 6% of Kontum Province. Spray
operations were initiated on 21 July and are expected to run through
31 December 1966 (Incl 27).

(3) Defoliation Operations.

(a) During the reporting period the following de-
foliation requests were submitted by DSA II Corps and forwarded to
N.A.V for approval and execution:

1. Project 2/20/05/66 - Project consists of de-
foliating three areas in the Don Ba Thin - Cam Ranh Bay area of Phan
Hoa Province. Target 1-defoliation of perimeter of Cam Ranh Bay
Air Force Base. Target 2--defoliation of approximately eight miles of the
National Railroad. Target 3--defoliation of 10th Aviation Battalion
complex. Spray operations are to be conducted 15 Aug: - 31 Dec 66 (Incl
27).

2. Project 2/20/04/66 - Project consists of
eleven target areas along LOC's in Phu Bon Province. Recommended for
completion prior to October 1966 (Incl 27).

(b) During the report mg period the following de-
foliation projects were sprayed:

1. Project 2/20/01/66 - Defoliation of perimeter
in the vicinity of Plei Ne and Plei Bjereng; Special Forces Corps (Pleiku
Province) was completed during July 1966 (Incl 27).

2. Project 20-61 - Defoliation of 18 targets along
LOC's in Binh Dinh Province was completed during June 1966. The target
areas are too numerous and spread out to depict on attached map.

3. Project 20-81 - Defoliation of a proximately
nine miles of the National Railroad in Binh Thuan Province was completed
during July 1966 (Incl 27).

4. Project 20-50 - Defoliation of eight target
areas along the National Railroad in Binh Thuan Province was initiated
in June. Project was to last through December 1966. Because of excessive
crop damage and at the Province Chief's request the project has been
delayed until Jan 67 (Incl 27).

(4) Riot Control Agent (RCA) Operations.

(a) Use of E159/158, RCA Munitions--A detailed summary
of E159/158 usage by the 1st Cav Div (AH) is at Incl 26. The summary
covers usage during the last reporting period, but was not submitted in
sufficient time to include in the last report. Photograph (Incl 29)
does E159 munition modification as described in para 2a of summary
(Incl 28). The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div have
also received a limited number of E159/158 munitions. The 1st Bde,
101st Abn Div has employed several E158's (1 cluster of a 2 cluster
E159) in reconnaissance operations and selected targets of resistance.
During Operation Hawthorne, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div employed RCA in
an Arc Light target area 30 minutes prior to TOT in an effort to bring
enemy forces out of bunkers and caves, making them more vulnerable to
the bomb strike. Its effectiveness could not be evaluated. The only other employment of .CA by the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div was also conducted during Operation Hawthrone. Co C 2d 3d (Abn) 502d Inf used CS to suppress weapons' fire and extract its dead and wounded during the course of a hot fire fight with NVA forces. This 3CA strike caused a virtual total suppression of enemy fire for approximately 15 minutes. The 1st Cav Div (A) used RCA, E599 CS cluster and NTAJ rounds, in the following operations: Lewis & Clark, Davy Crockett, Paul Revere, Crazy Horse, Hawthrone, and Stocker I. During operation Nathan Hale and Henry Clay, ECA was not used. The 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, the 2d BNK Inf Div and 2d BNK BN Div have not used any E159/156 munitions during the quarter.

(b) Other ECA uses.

1. Expedition disperser for 17 type CS grenades—Photographs (Incl 29) show a locally fabricated system developed by the 1st Cav Div (A) for aerial dispersing of 17 type CS grenades. This system was described in the ORR for quarterly period ending 30 April 1966, however, photographs were not available at that time. While the above mentioned system is non-standard, it does offer a satisfactory means of delivering a large amount of CS on area type targets.

2. Pity Hite Air blowers—tunnel clearing and denial operations, using Pity Hite Air blowers (E106 riot control dispersers) to force CSa clouds through the tunnel and cave systems, continues mainly along the coastal lowlands of the III CI.

3. During Operation Su-Bok the 2d BNK Inf Div discovered a tunnel of approximately 50 meters in depth via E1595466. The cave was estimated to have a capacity of 200 men. The cave was flushed with one Pity Hite blower and 48 NTAJ CS grenades resulting in the following:

- 21 VC KIA
- 1 VC Captured
- 15 rifles captured
- 92 bars of rice captured
- 5 bags of peanuts captured

(5) Summary/Observations.

(a) Herbicide Operations - Defoliation along LOC's and in vicinity of base camp areas has considerably improved observation. In areas of dense foliage, repeated application is necessary for complete effectiveness. Crop destruction operations, while difficult to evaluate, are believed to have a definite impact on the availability of large area food sources in predominately VC controlled areas. Upcoming operations in Kinh Thuan, Phu Yen, Kien Hoa and Binh Dinh provinces should be highly effective.

(b) Riot Control Operations - Giant strides have been made in ECA employment within the past year. Continued RCA usage, along with requirements for more and better delivery systems and munitions indicate that riot control agents are effective in offensive and psychological operations in Vietnam. Observations noted in after-action reports of operations with respect to chemical employment are as follows:
1. Units must have sufficient protective masks on hand to exploit RCA attack.

2. Communications with ground forces during aerial delivery of RCA is essential.

3. Definite requirements exist for RCA delivery by mortar and artillery.

4. Mort control agents with more persistency and a longer duration of effectiveness are needed.

5. Aircraft crews require special training in aerial employment of RCA munitions.

6. Smoke phosphorous and smoke preparations on objectives just prior to aerial delivery of RCA munitions effectively reduce the vulnerability of the aircraft to ground fire and increases the effectiveness of the RCA employment.

g. Trainings:

(1) DC US NAV published Training Circular Number 2, 7 May 1966, prescribing replacement training programs for all combat organizations. The 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div, and the 1st Cav Div (A) had published training directives prior to the publication of the USNavy directive. The 3rd Bde, 25th Inf Div published a training directive prescribing the brigade training program to implement the USNavy directive.

(2) As a follow on to the study of training conducted by ARW units in the II CTZ and based on reports by the deputy senior advisor, II Corps, the Commanding General, I FORGE, dispatched a letter to the Commanding General, II MZ, Corps recommending remedial actions to improve the training posture of ARW units in the II CTZ.

(3) DJ, I FORGE Staff Memorandum Number 350-1, 24 May 1966, subject: Manditory Training was published providing guidance pertaining to training in mandatory subjects for the personnel of headquaters I FORGE and headquarters forces, I FORGE.

(4) During 16 - 21 May, 25 officers and enlisted men from 155mm and 8 inch howitzer battalions under operational control of I FORGE received refresher training with artillery units of the 8th Army in Korea.

(5) The Fifth Special Forces Group's Project Delta, conducted long range patrol training for 22 officers and men of the 1st Cav Div (A) and the 3rd Bde, 25th Inf Div from 11 to 30 July 1966.

(6) Training on the personnel detector, chemical, unpacked (People Sniffer) was conducted for selected personnel of I FORGE OICN units by a team from the Land use Laboratory during June 1966.

h. Organization:

The report of the evaluation team headed by BG George L Hambry, Jr, was received during the month of May. The report, Evaluation of US Combat Operations in Vietnam (AROW), recommended a major change in each of the type infantry battalions operating in Vietnam, i.e., adding a fourth rifle company. Recommendations for changes in the organization of the battalion reconnaissance platoon, weapons platoon, and the support platoon in the headquarters company were also included. Recommendations for elimination of some recoilless type weapons and the ENTAC anti-tank missile were included in the report.

(2) Recommendations for modification of TOE 52-12 for HQ, 1 FFORCN and MAR 52-2D for Headquarters Company, I FFORCN were received from the staff sections of I FFORCN Headquarters and the commanding officer of headquarters company during the period. MTOE's were prepared and submitted to USARE. MTOE's for the lst Cav Div (AR), lst Bde, IOlst Abn Div, and 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div were submitted to HQ, USARE during the period.

I. Doctrine:

(1) In response to requests from the US Army Armor School, reports of significant operations in which armor, armored cavalry, and reconnaissance elements of the air cavalry division and the infantry battalions participated were provided.

(2) After action reports and critique reports of significant operations were provided to the Combat Arms Schools and the Command and General Staff College.

(3) A compilation of lessons learned submitted by the major FFORCN units was published and distribution was made to in-country units, units scheduled for deployment to the II CTZ, and to the Combat Arms Schools and the Command and General Staff College.

(4) In response to queries from the Command and General Staff College on functional operations of the Field Force Staff, and differences in functions in comparison with a type Army Corps, information was prepared and forwarded for use by the college in its instructional program.

J. Research and Development:

(1) OPOCN and assigned units submitted requirements for many new and improved items of equipment during the reporting period. These included new types of radio equipment to enable a squad leader to communicate with his fire team and weapons team leaders, new shrapnel type fuses for artillery ammunition, a sound ranging system for counter-mortar operations, improved mine detection equipment and battery operated night observation binoculars.

(2) The AN/PRC-74 radio, crew served weapons light scope, medium range starlight scope, commercial type sniper's rifle, and the M79 "snub-nosed" round were received by the OPOCN units during the period.
SECRET

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, RM OSGOR-65 (U)

k. Disruption of VC Activities.

(1) VC extortion has been and continues to be the prime source of revenue, medicine, drugs, foodstuffs and contraband with which they support their warfare within SVN. To counteract this, MACV inaugurated a program in msg 20307 DFG 140910Z June to disrupt the extortion.

(2) I FFORCNV implemented CONSMAGV's plan by msg 5239, Subject: Disruption of VC Extortion (U) DFG 0509582 July, and called for a comprehensive and coordinated program, in coordination with G2 II Corps, (AVN). The plan includes:

(a) An intensified intelligence effort to obtain facts which reveal patterns of VC activity and permits decisive action to disrupt the system.

(b) Employment of quick reaction forces, appropriate helicopter forces, to seize VC extortionists, disrupt collection sites and destroy security forces protecting them.

(c) Increased stress on psychological warfare measures in support of the program. Primary emphasis is to be placed at village and hamlet level and directed toward strengthening local resistance against extortion and encouraging the local populace to report and identify the collectors, patterns of collections and collection sites.

(3) The location of VC tax collection points within II CTZ (Incl 30) were distributed to all OPCON units in msg A-0048 DFG 171235Z July. In order to accelerate the elimination of these points, general areas of operations were also assigned to OPCON units.

4. (G) Logistical activities:

a. General:

(1) During the reporting period the G4 Section placed major emphasis on the planning, coordination and monitoring logistical support of the following I FFORCNV tactical operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caser</td>
<td>21 Apr - 3 May</td>
<td>2 - 20 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austin</td>
<td>1 - 18 May</td>
<td>Hooker 10 - 21 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davy Crockett</td>
<td>4 - 16 May</td>
<td>Beauregard 24 Jun - 15 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Revere</td>
<td>10 May - In Progress</td>
<td>Nathan Hale 19 Jun - 1 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crazy Horse</td>
<td>16 May - 5 Jun</td>
<td>Henry Clay 2 Jun - 30 Jul</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) I FFORCNV conducted logistical support planning conferences for all of the above stated operations. These conferences were conducted as far in advance of D-day as possible to facilitate the development of the plan of support by the unit and all supporting agencies. The conferences were normally attended by representatives of I FFORCNV G3, the unit to be supported, the 1st Logistical Command, 1st Support Command, Movement Agency, and US Air Force when airlift of troops was envisioned. In addition, technical representatives from the Provost Marshal's Signal and Engineers attended as required. During the conference all agencies had a chance to determine and discuss the support requirements, establish
personal contacts with key personnel and refine the concepts proposed by I FORCE and/or 1st Log Comd. The supported unit knew who their contact personnel would be, their location, the manner of support to be expected, and the extent of backup available. The supporting agencies likewise knew what requirement would be placed on them by the supported unit. Changes to the operation subsequent to the meeting were announced by message with additional meetings arranged as required.

(3) The logistical planning conferences are an excellent means of insuring that all supporting activities are informed and that all necessary coordination is achieved between key personnel. The conferences have been a significant factor in the overall improvement of tactical logistical support experienced during the reporting period.

(4) In addition, during the initial conduct of the operations and as required thereafter, a 04 I FORCE liaison representative was sent to the field to insure that the tactical unit was receiving all necessary support and assisted when possible in resolving logistical problems.

b. Supply:

(1) Supply conditions affecting operational capability continues to improve. Existing supply shortages did not affect the success of any tactical operation; however several items are still in short supply. These items are: jungle fatigue, medium and regular underwear, medium and small lightweight airmobile construction equipment; materials handling equipment (MHE), all kinds, especially rough terrain and also repair parts for generators. Class I, III, IIIA and V supplies have been adequate to support all operations. High consumption of illumination ammunition and signalling devices was experienced due to extensive night operations, the need to mark helicopter LZ's, signalling of supporting aircraft and extensive deployment of small units.

(2) During the reporting period, expenditures of the following Class V items was controlled by the available supply rate (ASR) as shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>ASR Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.75HE</td>
<td>0.20 rds/tubes per day (a decrease of 0.10 rds/tube per day fr ASR on 31 April).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.75M/R</td>
<td>0.10 rds/tubes per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 III</td>
<td>0.50 rds/tubes per day (a decrease of 0.25 rds/tube per day fr ASR on 31 April).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 HE</td>
<td>4.00 rds/tubes per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 III</td>
<td>0.64 rds/tubes per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAW</td>
<td>10.00 per/3rd/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar HE</td>
<td>5.00 rds/tubes per day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Service and support: The following combat service support

32 of 37
activities were provided when requested by the tactical units: laundry, shower, graves registration, 3d echelon maintenance and medical hospitalization and evacuation. 1st Logistical Command personnel displayed an increased awareness of the critical importance of providing shower and laundry facilities to the troops in the field at the soonest possible time. Shower and laundry facilities are especially important in the jungles of Vietnam and contribute to the maintenance of high morale and the health and welfare of the field troops.

d. Transportation: Airlift requirements for unit moves and combat service support continued at a high rate to meet tactical situations. Several constructed and recently repaired airfields required extensive and continuous maintenance to keep them operational during large airlifts. Careful programming of assets enable line haul and land LOC requirements to be met. Port and beach clearance of supplies continues to be a problem due to lack of adequate beaching and harbor facilities. The completion of the Vung Ro Bay facility in the southeastern Phu Yen Province will improve the cargo clearing situation in the vicinity of the Ton Hoa and significantly reduce the need for airlifting Class I, III & IV supplies. Railway movements are improving within the II CTZ. Sections are currently open from Ham Rang to Dalat, from Qui Nhon to Phu Cat and from Cam Lai to Nha Trang.

a. Medical: There were no major medical problems encountered during this period. However, two tests were conducted to determine if the drug DDS (diamino-diphenylsulfone) taken in addition to the weekly chloroquine-primaquine tablet would reduce the malaria incidence rate.

(i) The first test was conducted with the 1st Cav Div (A&M) from 25 March - 26 April 1966. The brigade conducted Operation Lincoln 25 March - 8 April and Operation Mosby 11 - 17 April during the test. The results of the test showed that a 50% reduction in malaria incidence could be expected by using the two drugs. Also that there was no evidence of toxicity from the drug.

(ii) The second test was conducted with the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div from 29 May - 10 June 1966 while the brigade was conducting Operation Paul Revere. Two battalions of the 1st Cav Div (A&M) placed under operational control of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div and participated in Operation Paul Revere but did not use the DDS drug. Results of the tests revealed that of approximately 2,500 men of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf only 16 cases (0.6%) of malaria were contracted whereas out of approximately 1,600, 1st Cav Div personnel, 160 cases (10%) contracted the disease.

(iii) As a result of the findings of the test all USAF combat units (A&M) to I 7th ARVN were included in the combined DDS and chloroquine-primaquine prophylactic program effective 20 Jul 66.

5. (b) Civil Affairs:

a. Increasing emphasis on Civil Affairs and Civic Action in II CTZ is evident in the statistics provided by the major tactical units under operational control of this headquarters. For example, the number of patients treated by US/ARVN medical personnel during the period was more than 90,000 as compared to 35,000 for the previous quarters.
In addition, 107,000 kiles of rice were distributed along with clothes, school supplies, foodstuffs, soap, cooking oil, rice, balgur wheat, blankets, and building supplies. Also continuing at a high level was the repair and construction of schools, dispensaries, houses, wells, roads, bridges, etc. Other areas of civic action activity are in education and training, transportation, technical assistance, entertainment and sporting events.

b. As of this quarter, the Community Relations Report became the staff responsibility of the 05 Section. Previously it was a CI function. During the period, there was no significant change in the activities of the community relations committees. There was a continuing interest in extending counter-inflationary measures particularly with respect to billeting rentals, price ceilings and wage scales. In addition, attention was given regularly to countering black market activities, the placing of area off-limits and other recurring problems generated by the increased US/PAF presence.

c. An attitude survey was conducted among the Vietnamese in Tay Ho, An Khe and Phan Rang cities to determine the feelings of the general populace towards the civic action projects going on. Generally, it was found that the civic action programs were known primarily by the people affected or in the immediate vicinity of civic action projects. Little was known of any of the welfare projects. It was also discovered that the Vietnamese did not know the proper procedures for submitting legitimate grievances with reference to losses incurred by American Military action. Wages are being investigated in coordination with USAF personnel to make Vietnamese civilians in urban areas aware of the civic action activities taking place in the rural areas.

d. During the quarter, the 05 section began a daily scrutiny of various Vietnamese and French language newspapers and magazines representing the major religious and political views. This is being done in an attempt to pinpoint possible problem areas and sources of friction as a result of the increasing US presence in Vietnam, before they become major issues. Articles dealing with such topics as the personal behavior of troops, inflation, housing and other matters pertaining to civil-military relationships are translated and circulated on a weekly basis throughout the headquarters.

e. Two Civil Affairs/Public Affairs Bulletins were published this quarter. Their purpose was to assist units in exchanging ideas and information, highlighting deficiencies and offering possible solutions (Incl 31 and 32).

f. During the period a White House Fact Sheet was prepared by this headquarters for the Secretary of Defense. The subject of this Fact Sheet was: The Army Supports a Rice Parent (Incl 33).

g. During this quarter, the 41st Civil Affairs Company (-) and its nine teams in the 11 CIV were attached to I Field Force Vietnam. Although designated as Refugee Control Teams, the fact that refugee control remained a SVN responsibility, kept utilization of the teams for this purpose to a minimum. Instead, much of the teams' efforts continued to be primarily directed toward other civil affairs actions
and various civic action projects in support of military operations. Additionally, the team engaged in civic action projects in their respective base areas. These projects included building sick-call facilities in several locations and providing medical care in the construction of public facilities, such as schools, clinics, dispensaries, spillways, bridges, and irrigation systems, as well as conducting community surveys and conducting in-country training programs. The underlying problem area in the field of civic action has been to conduct it in such a manner as to improve the image of the GVN in the eyes of the Vietnamese people. Continuous effort to channel the benefits of civic action through local GVN officials has helped to meet this problem in part. Command and civic affairs staff sections are becoming aware of the need for individual capabilities of the civic affairs personnel attached to their units. Tones have been more carefully controlled. As a particular skill is needed, the team specialist holding that skill is called upon to perform a specific mission. This has led to more efficient utilization of the team personnel.

b. The Revolutionary Development Program in the II-ESR at the beginning of the quarter was generally behind the programmed schedule, with only 5 of 28 provinces, Binh Dinh, Han Tho, Quang Tri, Huu Nhon and Quang Ngai, meeting satisfactory progress during the quarter. CIA personnel indicated that the period diverted considerable attention from the Revolutionary Development Program. The charts of Table 3 show the status of bases on 1 May and 31 July.

1. This section is called upon to publish guidance for US forces in II-ESR on their role in the coming GVN elections (11 Sep 1964). In coordination with NURS and NURS information was gathered to provide the basis concerning the election. Specific instructions on the delicate nature of the situation were given to troop units for their conduct during the forthcoming campaigns, and subsequent elections.

c. Personnel and Administrative Actions

1. Maintenance of Unit Strengths

(1) 63. I HICWS lay personnel and FNCW cadre commanders are shown in Table 35.

(2) Authorized and assigned strengths of I HICWS units have been satisfactory throughout the reporting period. Some fluctuations occurred during peak rotation periods in the I Stn Co Bn (51) and the 1st Bn, 252d Inf Bn during short periods of unacceptable ES strength in some battalions. These situations have been corrected. Particular shortages have been noted in the following hard skill areas: linguistics, aircraft maintenance, signal maintenance, and medical personnel. Personnel strengths of assigned, attached and operational control units are shown in Table 35.

(3) Outstanding requirements for replacements are not considered a critical problem at this time. Some slippage of one or two replacements, to include a short overlap, has been noted during peak rotation periods, especially in the case of linguists. However, current replacement plans appear realistic, and 252d United States Army, Vietnam is continuing to monitor closely.
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ANNEX-01-001
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 July 1964, E3 200-45 (2)

4. Problems areas have been noted, in that the assigned strength of units greatly exceeds the Unit's strength due to the large number of personnel carried as assigned, but are actually in an in/ out transit status or hospitalized for extended periods of time in/out of country.

b. Personnel Assignments

1. Assignment instructions for personnel nearing rotation continue to be very erratic. Except of assignment instructions has varied from six months in advance to the day of departure, to non-receipt of instructions in some cases. This has created some difficulties especially where married personnel are concerned. The new policy of allowing enlisted personnel to be assigned to Jocasin, California has at least assisted those personnel in departing country on their scheduled dates.

2. Qualification and motivation of the vast majority of personnel serving within the units assigned, attached, or under operational control of this headquarters are considered excellent. The training bases in COBRA are providing personnel that are in excellent physical condition and well informed on general guerrilla tactics that may be encountered within the combat.

3. The procedures (MIL-PAC 434-5 as 434-36) to eliminate the limited few personnel who have lost the motivation and/or the personal integrity desired in a combat war, continues to be unbalanced, cumbersome and time consuming. Because of these procedures, assigned personnel must be carried on unit reports for extended period of time, creating a strength posture that does not reflect the true combat strength of a unit.

4. Hospitalization procedures within Vietnam provide advance notice disposition (AND) reports to units from in-country hospitals and assignment of personnel to "Detachment of Patients" outside of country when hospitalized for more than 30 days. The out of country hospital is responsible for issuing reassignment orders for the individual concerned. This procedure causes many problems in strength accounting and requisitioning for personnel, due to the fact that there may be a delay of up to 60 days before the leaving unit receives the transfer order. Thus both the hospital and the parent unit are carrying the man as a part of the assigned strength. It has been recommended to USMC that all departure orders for patients evacuated out of country be issued by that headquarters. This would enable the parent unit to drop the man from its strength and requisition replacement.

c. Civilian Personnel: Civilian personnel management procedures continue to improve. Pay procedures were significantly improved by the transfer of a paying officer from St. Louis to the 23d Finance Accounting Section, Bien Hoa. Civilian personnel status of the headquarters is as shown below:

- Total Akt (AK) personnel authorized: 66
- Total AK personnel on hand 1 May 66: 53
- Released during reporting period: 12

5% of 57
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Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1946,

Balanced for some
Balanced for individual request
Transferred
Number of employees on hand 31 Jul 46

4. Billeted position allocations are shown in Table 37. In upper grades above, (110) allocations were received 10 to 19, 30 to 33, and 52
to 57.

5. Development and maintenance of morale

(a) The morale of all assigned, attached, and operational
control units remained excellent throughout the reporting period. Morale
services within the command continued to improve.

(b) Billeted grades for assigned, attached, and operational
control units were received, distributed, and used as shown in
Annexures 30 and 33. It is to be noted that the units were able to obtain and use
405 steady allocations.

(c) Awards and Decorations,

(a) The authority to award certain decorations to US
personnel was delegated by OCMC by 18(2) 1945, 1800000 July. Subjects
Further Delegation of Award Authority on Follows

1. To operating generals of associate brigades
the Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal, Army Commendation Medal and the Purple
Heart.

2. To commanders in the grade of major general
and above and to brigadier generals commanding tactical units authorized
a major general, the awards stated in para (c)(3) and also the Silver
Star, Distinguished Flying Cross and the Soldier's Medal.

(b) This delegation of authority has materially im-
proved the timeliness of awards.

(c) Awards and decorations for the period are shown
at Annexure 40. The highest award for the period was the Silver Star
of which 4 were authorized.

(d) Delivery of personal mail has improved. Notes on
which personal mail was not received are shown at Annexure 41. This
requires a continuing matter of concern.

(f) Chaplain activities.

(a) Religious services during the period all the
religious services in the United area were conducted by this
headquarters. Protestant and Catholic Sunday services and Jewish Sabbath
services (Shabbat evening and Saturday morning) were held each week.
Protestant and Catholic services were performed at regular intervals: from
1910 to 1946 Sunday at 10.30, Monday, 19:15 and the Sixth (29th
July). Also 29th July, 1946 and the Sixth (29th July). Jewish Services took place at the Chapel of the 4th
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AVN-90-295

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,

RE ORGN-05 (U)

Field Hospital on Friday at 1930 hours and Saturday at 0900 hours. In
addition, during the week, daily Catholic services were provided at A3,
I MPKCS at 0700, 8th Field Hospital at 1100 and 17th Avn Op at 1730.
Chaplains of this headquarters assisted units at Phu Bai, 2nd Bn., 25th Inf Div;
1st Bn., 101st Abn Div., 1st Cav Div (MF); at Qui Nhon, Phu Bai, An Nhon,
Cam Ranh Bay, Phu Bai, and Tu Hieu.

(b) Chaplain coverage in II CTZ. 100 chaplains assigned:
65 US (76 Army; 10 USAF); 12 ROK.

1. Coverage for OCPUS units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Chaplains</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Cavalry Div.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn., 25th Inf Div</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn., 101st Abn Div</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK Capital Div.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK Marine Brigade</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK Navy Frame Unit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Summary of chaplain coverage by area and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An Khe</td>
<td>3 USARV</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total Chaplains 3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Bai</td>
<td>2 USARV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total Chaplains 5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>14 USARV</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total Chaplains 16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>9 USARV</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total Chaplains 14)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Bai Bay</td>
<td>2 USARV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total Chaplains 2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Bai</td>
<td>1 USARV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total Chaplains 3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Tre</td>
<td>6 USARV</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1 (Jewish)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total Chaplains 12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Special facet of chaplain activities in II

CTZ:

The I MPKCS Jewish Chaplain coordinates time

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AVFA-CC-TAC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, RGS CGFOR-65 (U)

2. The I FRCEN chaplain section coordinates all religious services in the Nha Trang area. Protestant and Catholic services for the 5th SF Group are usually provided by this headquarters.

3. US Air Force Chaplains assist in providing area denominational coverage in Phan Rang, Cam Ranh Bay, Pleiku, and Nha Trang.

4. Advisory team chaplains, at Kontum and Ben Ho Thuy, assist in covering scattered teams.

5. Three 5th Special Forces Group Chaplains cover all SF camps in-country including all those in II CTZ.

(d) Actions taken to influence chaplain activities in II CTZ.

1. Chaplains of this headquarters supervise the area and denominational coverage of all units in II CTZ.

2. Informed all OPCOM units to request assistance of this office whenever the unit is unable to provide chaplain coverage from its own resources.

3. Informally, brought to the attention of the Chaplain, FO USAV, the concentration of chaplains in the Qui Nan and Cam Ranh Bay area, and the imbalance of denominational coverage.

(e) I FRCEN Chaplains assist civilian organizations in the Nha Trang area by the following contributions: Protestant Bible School offering from services on 1st and 2nd Sundays 3,000 to 5,000 Piasters; Evangelical Medical Clinic offering from services on 3rd Sunday 3,000 to 5,000 Piasters; and Catholic offering from services on 1st and 3rd Sundays to Holy Family Church, Nha Trang, 2nd Sundays St Joseph's School, Nha Trang. The usual Sunday offering is 10,000 to 15,000 VND.

(f) Civic Actions in which this office has been involved:

1. Distribution of food to: The Leprosarium, Old People's Home, Orphanages, and Convents.

2. Assistance by the Jewish Chaplain to the Catholic sisters in Qui Nan in arranging for the transport of 50 tons of cement which was stranded in Saigon for lack of transportation.

f. Maintenance of Discipline, Law, and Order:

1. Discipline, law, and order: No unusual law and order problems developed during the period of this report. Commanded by units (assigned, attached, and OPCOM) generally compared favorably with the USAV rates for offenses and incidents are shown at Inci 42.

2. Traffic safety program.

(a) The high rate of traffic accidents continued to
be a problem throughout II CTZ. Speeding on streets crowded with bicycles, motor scooters, pedestrians and animal drawn vehicles; unique driving conditions present in Vietnam; and the erratic behavior of Vietnamese drivers and pedestrians were contributing factors. In a letter on 31 May 66, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, directed that a positive program of driver selection, supervision and training with emphasis on defensive driving, local hazards and Vietnamese traffic laws be established in order to reduce the traffic accident rate.

(b) ABNH convoys on Highway 19 presented a serious safety hazard due to lack of discipline and control. Some discrepancies noted were excessive speed, passing at dangerous places and driving two or three abreast, dangerous horseplay and failure to obey instructions of military police. This lack of control and discipline was brought to the attention of the ABNH II Corps Commander by the Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, in a letter on 23 June 66. In his reply the Commanding General, ABNH II Corps, stated that intensive and accelerated programs to improve driver training would be conducted and improved traffic regulations would be implemented in order to alleviate the situation.

(3) Quality and quantity of military police personnel. Improvements for military police units have been received in adequate numbers and personnel have been well qualified. Authorized strengths are adequate with the exception of the separate brigades when fragmented on battalion task forces in widely dispersed operations. Efforts for separate brigades have been submitted for approval.

(4) Prisoners of war procedures.

(a) Under existing arrangements all personnel captured by US, regardless of specific category, are transferred to the nearest ABNH civil or military authorities for final disposition. This method of operation as it applies to prisoners of war has evidently been questioned in view of the United States responsibilities to conform to the requirements of the Geneva Convention. Technically the United States remains responsible for the humane treatment and welfare of prisoners of war falling into their hands. To meet these responsibilities, a major change in policy has been planned into effect whereby the United States will retain custody of prisoners until such time as they are delivered to ABNH Combat Captive (IV) Camps which are being established in each Corps Tactical Zone. A II Corps Combat Captive (IV) Camp is now under construction at Phnom. The camp is nearing completion and will have the capacity for 1000 Pcs.

(b) Effective with the opening of the ABNH II Corps Combat Captive (IV) Camp, captives will be processed as follows:

1. Capturing troops will disarm, search, segregate and tag (ABNH Form 340) all captured personnel. After interrogation at the division or separate brigade collecting point, the individuals are categorized and disposed of according to their status, e.g., suspects who are determined to be innocent civilians are released to the US civil affairs personnel for return to the civil community; returning (as enemy the voluntarily surrenders) are released to US civil authorities for transfer to an "open area" (Chien Duc) custody civil defendants, i.e.,
criminals and other wanted persons are released to DH authorities; those
designated as prisoners of war are prepared for evacuation.

2. To ensure accountability for captured personnel,
two copies of Detainee Report (NAV Pub 54) are prepared on all suspects,
returnees, civil defendants, and PIs delivered to the division or separate
brigade collecting point. Useful cases are treated as PIs until final
determination of their status is made by military tribunal. At the time
an individual is released from United States custody the receiving official
signs the Detainee Report to attest for receipt of the persons. One copy
of the Detainee Report is forwarded to NAV Provost Marshal for accounting
purposes.

3. Prisoners of war will be evacuated through
United States military channels to the II Corps Combat Captive (PV)
Command. A NAV Military Police (PV) advisory team is located at the camp
to render advice and assistance in fulfilling responsibilities as
prescribed by the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of priso-
ners of war. All NAV units have been instructed to notify this
headquarters regarding problems encountered relative to processing of
prisoners, transportation or guard personnel.

4. An increase in the number of prisoners of
war may require additional military police for escort parties however,
currently no sizable increase is expected. The Provost Marshal and GHA
will monitor the program to resolve any problem which may develop.

Miscellaneous:

(1) The remainder of the staff sections completed on 20
May 1966 the two and one-half mile move from the 5th Special Forces
Compound into the Headquarters Compound, Grand Hotel. The staff
organization in the main building is shown in Enclosure 43.

(2) Protocols: There were 119 distinguished visitors to
the command during the reporting period (Enc 44).

7. (a) Artillery:

a. 224th & 124th Bty, 2nd Art Bty, 3rd Bty, 14th Art Bty (105mm) and 31st,
6th Bn, 16th Art Bty (155mm) arrived at Man Port on 17 June 1966,
aboard the USS Walker. Immediately following the well-coordinated
embarkation, personnel of the 3rd Art Bty and 31st Bn, 6th Art Bty were flown
to their base camp area in the vicinity of Pleiku City where they were
sponsored by the 6th Bn, 14th Art Bty. 31st Bn, 6th Bn, 16th Art Bty moved by
road to its base camp area in the vicinity of An Khe where they were
sponsored by the 1st Cav Div (4th) Art Bty.

b. All three units, 224th & 124th Bty, 2nd Art Bty Gp with 100 personnel,
31st Bn, 6th Art Bty Gp with 110 personnel and 31st Bn, 6th Bn, 16th Art Bty Gp
with 111 personnel were attached to I FORGEW by 02 Number 4301, HQ NAVAF,
dated 27 June 1966. Personnel assigned to these new units by letters,
124th Bty, I FORGEW, 20 July 1966. Subject: Letter of Instructions (102) (v)
(Enc 45) area

3rd Art Bty Gp - general support, 224, 124 and 2nd Art Bty in the

43 of 57

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RGCS CSFOR-65 (U)

II CTZ, OPCON to I PFORCEV Arty.

3d Bn, 6th Arty - attached to the 52d Arty Gp.
Btry C, 6th Bn, 16th Arty - attached to the 1st CAv Div (A).  

c. TOE equipment of the 52d Arty Gp and the 3d Bn, 6th Arty (minus howitzers) arrived in-country aboard the SS Cornel Victory and SS Copper on schedule. The authorized 19 105mm self propelled howitzers for 3d Bn, 6th Arty arrived in-country 24 July.

d. The WARTOC and TOE equipment of HQ, 52d Arty Gp and the 3d Bn, 6th Arty loaded on the SS East Hill is in a "Hold Status" in Manila port with no known estimated time of arrival in-country.

e. The time lapse between receipt of TOE and WARTOC equipment will cause undue hardship to the incoming and sponsoring units in the establishment of base camps and in becoming completely operational.

8. (c) Engineer:

a. The 45th Engineer Group arrived in II CTZ during the quarter and was placed under the OPCON of the 18th Eng Bns. The group consists currently of the 20th and 39th Eng Bns. With the arrival of this group, tactical operations within the II CTZ are now supported by the 35th, 45th and 937th Eng Gps generally in the areas as shown in Incl 46.

b. The major engineer activities of I PFORCEV during the reported period consisted of:

(1) Updating land and air LOC studies within the II CTZ from information received from field units and from reconnaissance by Engineer Section personnel. This information was submitted to G2, G3 and G4 upon their request.

(2) Disseminating additional minefield information to friendly units within the II CTZ as received from SDA II Corps.

(3) Determining engineer support requirements to maintain air and land LOC's for concepts developed for Exercise Flashback.

(4) Developing a study of the tentative engineer work required to support tactical operations in the plateau area.

(5) Coordinating engineer support for Operations Longfellow, Millmore, Becurregard, Hooker, Nathan Hale, Henry Clay, Hayes and John Paul Jones.

(6) Determining locations for incoming units to include required engineer surveys, requests for real estate, and proposed base camp layouts.

(7) Developing plans in coordination with G3 and G4 on the construction of new airfields and the upgrading of existing airfield in the II CTZ.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-90-WO
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RCS CSOR-66 (II)

(a) Construction of three airfields 3,200 feet long
and surfaced with T-17 membrane was completed in June:

- Ban Don Airfield vic AQ 438610 (Incl 18)
- Phu Nhon Airfield vic N 870990 (Incl 18)
- Camp Radcliff vic BR 40468 (Incl 11)

(b) The three airfields upgraded are:

- Ban Don, dry weather airfield, vic 2Y 038665, to C-130 capable in May (Incl 18).
- Dong Tre, dry weather airfield, vic BQ 909706, to C-123 capable in June (Incl 17).
- An Khe, all weather airfield, vic BR 480447, to C-130 capable in June (Incl 15).

(c) Finalizing the Tuy Hoa tactical road net plan with interested agencies.

(d) Establishing required highway standards on MSR's as
    class 35 two-way, class 50 one-way with class 62 risk traffic permissible.

(e) After receipt of authority, assisted G4 and OPCON
    units in requisitioning the airborne engineering equipment for 5d Bde, 25th
    Inf Div and 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div.

(f) Initiating action to obtain 21 additional sets of
    Bailey bridge for use in II CTZ.

(g) Requesting eleven additional sets of M4T6 Float Bridging
    from HQ MACV. This quantity is the minimum reserve felt necessary to
    support operations and maintain LOC's during the monsoon season within
    II CTZ.

(h) Maintaining close liaison with the Engr Adv of II
    CTZ and monitoring progress of ARVN and ROK engineers.

9. (c) Signal Operations.
   a. Maintenance and upgrading of all I FCORCEV communications,
      and development of mid and long range communications plans have comprised
      the majority of signal section activities.
   b. Considerable effort was expanded to improve the maintenance
      posture of the 54th Signal Battalion. Electronic equipment of the battalion
      has been in continuous operation for almost a year and has begun to
      deteriorate at an above normal rate, primarily due to environmental
      conditions in Vietnam. With the cooperation of USA RV and 1st Logistical
      Command, significant improvements have been made in the maintenance pro-
      gram during the reported quarter.
   c. On 1 July 1966, the 21st Signal Group became operational in
      Nha Trang as a major subordinate element of the 1st Signal Brigade. The
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-TM
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, ROCS CPOR-65 (U)

GROUP has operational control of all signals in I and II CINVN except those assigned to I FORCEN and OPCON units of II FORCEN. The group has responsibility for managing long haul communications within II CINVN. It is anticipated that this centralized control will materially contribute to improvement of communications available to support I FORCEN.

d. A semi-fixed communications facility was installed during May at the new headquarters compound of I FORCEN. A communications building was constructed and currently houses the telephone central, communication center, and technical control facilities. Fixed plant communication equipment to replace the tactical equipment now in use at this facility is being programmed.

e. A secure voice communications system was installed in May in the I FORCEN Tactical Operations Center. This system provides secure voice telephone communications with HQ HACV and USARV. The system will be extended to US divisional units in the near future.

10. (U) Informational Activities:

a. Increased press interest and coverage of the combat operations of I Field Force Vietnam during the period resulted mainly from four widely separated and successful spoilage attacks and press speculation as to the outcome of the much talked about Communist Summer Offensive.

b. The four operations which gathered the most press interest and coverage from in-country and stateside media were Operation Davy Crockett, a raid into the Bong Son area by the 3d Bde of the 1st Cav Div (AAM); Operation Crazy Horse by the 1st Cav Div (AT) (-) which started as a one company air assault and quickly built up to five battalion strength in the Vam Thanh Valley; Operation Hawthorne by the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (-) with the resulting publicity from the plight of Captain Bill Carpenter's surrounded rifle company near Dak To and Nathan Hale by the 1st Cav Div (AM) (-) in the vicinity of the Bien Hoa Special Forces Camp in Phu Yen Province.

c. In each of these combat operations the press quickly grasped the magnitude of the story potential and nearly all major news media were represented. The operations were not without cost to the press corps. In Operation Crazy Horse, Stan Castan from Look magazine was killed by Communist mortar fire and Ward Just of The Washington Post was wounded by Red grenade fragments during Operation Hawthorne.

d. During the period, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div received major play in two Newsweek articles. The first, titled, "Bloody Checkersboard," done on Operation Austin UX in the Quang Duc and Thuoc Long Province areas, was done by Merton Perry of Newsweek with assistance from the I FORCEN information officer. The second was the inclusion of two stories of men from the 101st in Newsweek's July 20th cover story on "Tan At War."

e. Paul Hemphill, columnist from the Atlanta Journal arrived in Nha Trang in May and spent eight weeks with I FORCEN covering operations of OPCON units and doing six columns a week almost exclusively on
these units and their men. His columns received wide acclaim from readers of one of the South's largest newspapers.

f. Also during May, this headquarters was visited by Mike Deines, a senior editor of the National Section of Time Magazine and Frank McCulloch, Time's Far East Bureau Chief.

g. Operation Hawthorne, which kicked off on the 24 of June, brought about the largest press attendance that the 101st Airborne has had since their arrival in-country. As many as 30 members of the press corps were on hand for the operation, which hit its peak with the dramatic rescue and bitter fighting revolving around the company commanded by Captain Carpenter. The story was front page and in the top news spot in papers and television stations across the United States.

h. Also during June, two companies of the 24th BN of the 327th Inf opened up toward Khe Sanh and were reinforced by the 1st Cav Div (AVN). A special CTV Caribou was requested and loaded on from MACV to transport news media representatives to the action.

i. Also in the realm of public information, Bob Boose, II Corps correspondent for the Associated Press interviewed the Commanding General, I FFORCNW and wrote an interpretive feature on the war in II CTZ based on the interview and his own observations after 10 months of covering the war in the Central Highlands. The article was selected by AP New York as the story of the week and received wide play in the US and AP's foreign wire.

j. On the 9th of June, the information officer, I FFORCNW attended an important information planning conference in Saigon with the USAVE 10 and the MACV 10 to consider this headquarters recommendation that the incoming Public Information Detachment be stationed in the Khe Sanh area and operate a press camp here for correspondents covering the war in II CTZ. Although USAVE and MACV originally leaned toward establishment of this facility in Pleiku, a decision was made to follow I FFORCNW's recommendation.

k. The I FFORCNW 10 covered the raising of the flags of the Republic of Vietnam, Republic of Korea and the United States over the Grand Hotel on the 25th of June. (Incl 47 and 48). The news account of the event was sent to Stars and Stripes by teletype and published on the 26th (Incl 49). In addition, a radio tape was made of the ceremony and dispatched to USAVE for editing and distributed to the Army Hour, APUS Saigon, and the Department of the Army Command Information Unit by USAVE 10.

l. To coincide with the flag raising, heralding I FFORCNW's accomplishments since their arrival, an in-depth feature "I FFORCNW War Roundup" was written and cleared for release (Incl 50). The feature was intended for background use by in-country correspondents and was personally addressed to more than 65 correspondents representing all news media. At present, the Associated Press is using the feature to brief all incoming AP staffers. From the response of a number of the press corps, the feature was well received.

m. An investigation into the problems confronting the distribution
of Stars and Stripes to OPCON units was undertaken in June in coordination with Major H. L. Mathews, GTO of Stars and Stripes in Vietnam. The outcome was to change the distribution pattern for the 1st Bde., 101st Abn Div from their organic aircraft to the AV system and to cut delays which occurred while unloading the papers in Sapa.

July was highlighted by the arrival of the 1st Public Information Detachment to establish a press center. Efforts by the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command to lease a suitable facility to house the press camp were held up shortly by the recently issued MACV directive prohibiting leasing of additional Vietnamese facilities. A request for exception to the MACV directive was originated and subsequently approved. The real estate officer, office of the area engineer, was still in the process of attempting to lease a building for the press camp at the end of the reporting period.

Information Officer, I FORCEN, requested the Associated Press and Reu Press in doing stories on the anniversary of the arrival of the 1st Bde., 101st Abn Div. Also in the month, Bob Press of the AP wrote a similar story on the Ist Cav Div (AM).

During the period, 334 hometown News Releases were dispatched to the U. S. Army News Release Center, Kansas City, Mo. In addition, 71 stories were distributed to in-country media along with 23 photos.

Communications between the I FORCEN Information Office and HQ MACV were improved by the installation of a point-to-point teletype.

The four Command Information Topics produced and distributed during the period, Nine Rules, Star Spangled Security, Inflation, and Truth — An American Weapon, are attached as Incl 51, 52, 53, and 54.

11. (U) Inspector General Activities:

a. There were 15 complaints and 15 requests for assistance, advice, or information received during this period. The eight justified complaints pertained primarily to living and working conditions, guard duty, excessive duty, ass, and actions of superiors. There was no evidence of any trends, widespread irregularities, or problems detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of this command.

b. The annual general inspections of the units assigned to this headquarters were conducted as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVALUATION RATING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>272d Military Police Company</td>
<td>2 May 66</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55th Military Intelligence Detachment</td>
<td>18 May 66</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Signal Battalion</td>
<td>13-16 May 66</td>
<td>Superior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>287th Signal Detachment</td>
<td>15 Jun 66</td>
<td>Superior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Company, I FORCEN</td>
<td>27 Jun 66</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64th Engineer Detachment</td>
<td>27 Jun 66</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46 of 57
In addition, training and education of all of the instructors, except for the pilot and flight instructors, was given emphasis.全镇 of the instructor were trained to the extent of five hours of the number of training of instructors and the training of instructors, pilots, and controllers, were all listed above.

The major accomplishments and tasks needed were for the maintenance performance of the instructors and the instructors, the new administration of the personnel, procedures, the security of areas and equipment, the maintenance of the physical fitness program, the food service program, the field sanitation, the supply records and procedures, and the maintenance of supplies and equipment.
SECRET

[Page number]

Section II - Commanders Observations and Recommendations

Part II: Observations Learned

1. Observations

   a. Items Calls for Flakart's support

      Discussion: A Flakart request by the 1st Bde, 113th Arty Div, had difficulty locating the requesting unit north of Hr. Dv. Normally, Air Force Flakart surveills the Flakart to the coordinates furnished by the ground units, but this particular combination of scenario and weather prevented use of Flakart. Instructions from several radio sites in the ground further confused the situation. Though lack of use, the crew had lost proficiency in use of an on-board heating system.

   b. Items: The increase in use of targets by tactical air and artillery.

      Discussion: The 1st Bde, 113th Arty Div, reported that too much time was elapsing between calling off of artillery fire on a target and commander of fire stops. The lack of simultaneous engagement was examined. Due to the possibility of loss of forward aircraft from exploding artillery shells, simultaneous engagement can only be used in extreme emergency. Best simultaneous engagement can be achieved by close coordination between the forward air controller and the ground force commander.

   c. Items: Timing of TTA of 30-2 planes.

      Discussion: Both the 1st Air Cav Div and the 1st Bde, 113th Arty Div, report that the optimum time for a 30-2 strike, which is to be exploited by ground forces, is early in the morning. This allows the ground forces a maximum of daylight hours to set into the area. The ground force requests the desired TTA and specifies a NLT time in their strike request.

   d. Items: Air support for road convoy security missions.
Discussion: The use of fighter aircraft to provide continuous air cover over front areas requires a great number of aircraft and flying hours. This mission is not considered practical except where aircraft in higher altitude maintenance are being covered by a forward air controller. The time in all operations reports indicates that the unit recognizes these VAB's and appreciate their ability to call in air strikes so that a degree of security is thus achieved. fighter aircraft are on 15 minute alert at FEGOY, THA YPM, and WAG RANG Airfields in IT Corps Area.

Observation: Additional security is obtained by requesting fighter aircraft to fly in and returning from strikes to limit the enemy's observation. Aircraft on the ground are a better target than aircraft in the air. The fighter aircraft can be placed in these sites as a "show of force".

f. Items: Late proclaimed air strike requests.

Discussion: The deadline for proclaimed requests to reach FEGOY is 1300 hours the day before the strike. Units have difficulty meeting this time limit because work can be done in the afternoon to modify their planes. Late requests are processed; but difficulties are encountered if all available aircraft have already received their strike orders for the next day. Late requests may either not be filled or may divert aircraft from other strikes already planned.

Observation: If a unit anticipates that some late requests will be required, they should notify 12th Air Force, 28th FW, and ecivate the number of missions so that the required aircraft can be held back at the daily planning conference at FEGOY. If this cannot be done, the unit should request the strike as immediate. The disadvantage here is that they must accept the alert load ordnance.

g. Items: Rotation of 3-10 pilots.

Discussion: When assigned during the tactical operations the pilots were rotated every four days and there was a loss of continuity. Reports. This loss sometimes lasted four hours or more. The new pilots often had to orient themselves to the terrain. If the tactical unit was in contact and had second FTGAB missions to fly, this loss of aircraft was harmful to the FTGAB program.

Observation: Pilot rotation must be in phase with aircraft maintenance schedules and/or the new pilot must have sufficient orientation in order to orient himself to the terrain and the combat situation.

h. Item: Lack of supporting aircraft for psychological warfare.

Discussion: Seven 3-10 aircraft and four C-47 aircraft support all psychological operations in RMW. As of the 31 July three 3-10's were in 22 II CTG and one C-47 in 33 II CTG. It is obvious that even with the minimum time being utilized for maintenance, there are insufficient planes for psychological operations.

Observation: Additional planes are necessary for proper psychological activities. In 33 CTG alone, twelve 3-10's and two C-47's are needed to provide support for anticipated psychological operations.
SECRET

I. Item: Site reaction time to quick reaction PSYOP leaflets.

Discussion: Quick reaction PSYOP leaflets must be based upon sound intelligence and speed of delivery to and from the printing plant. There have been examples when a leaflet has been printed within 10-14 hours and took three days to deliver it to the using unit.

Observation: If the field team with the unit doesn't bring the captive in, the intelligence (IN) team must contact the PSYOP team as soon as possible, so that a leaflet design and types may be made on the spot. The request for quick reaction leaflets should be kept down to 20,000 to 30,000 initially so as to speed printing time. Most important of all, the responding unit should try to help the delivery and pick-up of the quick reaction leaflet with its own organic aircraft. Since the 261st PSYOP Company has no aircraft, it can only coordinate transportation through regular air supply channels. As the priority of leaflets is low, there is often a delay in delivery.

II. Item: Current mine sweeping facilities and procedures are unsatisfactory for extensive mine clearing required on routes in II CTZ.

Discussion: Mine clearing operations on roads and highways must be conducted on a daily basis or made prior to enemy movement. This requires engineer troops to sweep lengths of road which cannot be covered in 24 hours due to space and time to open the road in time for enemy traffic. As a result we have, at necessity, used the concept of driving along the road and looking for suspicious areas and then checking those out. Additionally the expedient plastic explosive mines used in many cases by the VC are impossible to locate with our current mine detector.

Observation:

1. A requirement exists for a walkable non-metallic mine detector.

2. The jeep mounted mine detector will be a valuable addition and should aid in reducing the time of the road when they arrive in 2d quarter FY 67.

III. (U) Training and Organizations:

a. Item: Shortage of PSYOP-train personnel assigned to tactical units.

Discussion: There is a critical shortage of PSYOP trained personnel in both the PSYOP companies and in the tactical units. As a result of this shortage, effective planning and supervision at the implementation level is often unavailable.

Observation: On an immediate basis, the assignment of PSYOP trained personnel to PSYOP positions is necessary. A long term solution would be to include PSYOP training as a basic course in all branch schools. Untrained personnel slated as PSYOP replacements should be programmed to have at least a one month overlap for OJT training.

IV. (U) Intelligence:

a. Item: Interrogation of captives and other personnel.

50 of 57
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 July 1966, 485 FSCAP-3 (C)

Discussion:

1. The shortage of trained personnel proficient in the Vietnamese language necessitates the use of native Vietnamese military or civilian interpreters to assist 25 interrogators.

2. Blindness to interpreters in exploiting captives and other individuals for intelligence information frequently causes interrogations to degenerate into an interview or "question and answer" period. The actual interrogator loses control of the process; he has no "feel" for whether or not the source is telling the truth or all that he knows, or whether the interpreter is interpreting correctly. This results in interrogations replete of dubious reliability.

3. The foregoing shortcomings in the use of interpreters during interrogations can be alleviated to some degree by training the interrogators themselves as interrogators.

Observation: Vietnamese interpreters assigned to interrogation duties should be trained in interrogation techniques.

b. Item: Lack of psychological operational intelligence.

Discussion: The basis of any psychological warfare campaign is timely, local intelligence. While this problem has been recognized for some time, it still exists. The bombardier (SB) team leader with the combat unit is often not aware of the latest RS or rearmament of their information. It is important that the PSYOP personnel interview all prisoners as soon as possible, preferably before they enter the ABN channels. The 245th PSYOP Company has submitted a list of questions designed to provide psychological intelligence. This list is currently being staffed at NS, 1 PSYOP.

Observation: Command interest should be directed toward

CONFIDENTIAL

a. (C) Logistics:

a. Item: Requirement to react rapidly to the tactical situation dictates extensive use of available airfields.

Discussion: Airfields capable of handling C-130 aircraft within 11 CTR totaled 32 on 31 July 1966. During airlifts for large operations, many of the airfields deteriorated to a point where constant and extensive repairs were required to keep the fields open. This was particularly true at those airfields where 717 membrane was utilized. In several instances, fields were closed for almost a full day necessitating adoption of emergency measures to complete the movement on time.

Observation: Continued emphasis should be given to construction of additional C-130 airfields. Adequate emergency repair capability must be available at C-130 airfields. The availability of airborne engineer construction equipment is essential when unpaved or 717 membrane covered airfields are utilized.

b. Item: Sufficient vehicles have not been available for support of brigade size operations.
DISCUSSION: This problem was noted during the previous reporting period. The units have insufficient vehicles to provide for movement completely by highway. The only source for additional transport to lift tactical elements is through 4th Logistic Command, which in turn reduces their capability of keeping adequate supplies at the Forward Support Areas.

Observation: The advantage of utilizing truck transport for tactical moves must be weighed against the effect it will have on logistical support. When trucks are used, adequate planning and supervision must be exercised to ensure maximum utilization. A recommendation has been made to have a light truck company attached to the 4th Cav Div (A/M).

c. Camp: Insufficient quantities of adhesive are supplied with the accessory kits for T-17 Membrane repair.

Discussion: Heavy usage of T-17 membrane fields at Oasis (ZLP28) and Camp Hedcliff (up to 30 sorties per day of C-130 aircraft) has resulted in considerably more rips and tears than was anticipated when the accessory kits were designed. In the case of Oasis, the existence of the base required taking on the membrane and relaying it after repair of the base. This used up large quantities of adhesive during resurfacing. At Camp Hedcliff, heavy C-130 traffic, utilizing maximum performance takeoffs and landings, caused a critical shortage of the adhesive.

Observation: Additional quantities of adhesive must be made available. This could be accomplished by adding the adhesive as a class IV item of supply and then including additional adhesive in the accessory kit. At the present time only 2-5 gallon cases of adhesive are supplied per accessory kit. This is just enough to lay the strip. Initially, the amount of non-skid compound included in the accessory kit is excessive. Two of the eight cases of non-skid compound could be eliminated and replaced by adhesive. Non-skid compound may be used as adhesive, but it requires considerable drying period making it unsuitable in the midst of high density traffic.

5. (C) Other:

a. Reporting and feedback on psychological operations.

Discussion: The very nature of psychological operations makes a detailed and up-to-date feedback difficult to obtain. Trying to evaluate the program on the information currently available is at best, weak. The intelligence summaries received are good but often they are weeks, sometimes months old and contain order of battle, not psychological operations intelligence.

To further improve the program a PSTOP interrogation questionnaire is being developed. This questionnaire will be a great aid in determining the susceptibility of the enemy and also the effectiveness of the PSTOP program. Also to enhance research and analysis of the program, a PSTOP SITREP is being developed.

Observation: Introduction of the above mentioned reports should contribute to the effectiveness of the PSTOP program.

b. Camp: Identification of stations or signals which interfere with radio operations in the II CTZ is becoming an increasing problem.

Discussion: Extensive use is made of HF, FM and VHF radio
CONFIDENTIAL

in the 50-70 MHz frequency range, interference from deliberate and unintentional sources has been repeatedly encountered. When a jamming signal is recognized, or suspected as such, a report has been submitted by the detecting unit. However, in many cases lack of knowledge as to a precise description of the signals or failure of the operators to recognize language heard, results in a report not being submitted.

(1) Among the cases of FM interference (30-75 MHz), there have been deliberate attempts by the enemy to enter tactical nets. But, most interference problems are from use of the higher powered new family radios by SS forces which create primary channel or adjacent channel interference. It can be concluded that a large number of FM radios in a small tactical area of responsibility, with close proximity (approximately 50 miles) to another tactical or base camp area (with airfields), is the primary cause of interference problems in the FM spectrum. Highly mobile units often use a large number of aircraft radios, which add greatly to the interference problem, due to their capability of a greater range from higher altitudes. In addition to this frequency congestion, the problem is compounded by frequent interference during the winter periods of the day from Japanese stations operating in the 50-70 megacycles range. It is believed that these cases of interference by Japanese voices (the words "Main, Main" heard frequently) are instances of sporadic J or temperature inversion, which cause variations in radio wave propagation. This is indicated by the short term (2-4 hour) periods of interference occurring in the hot afternoon and the characteristic of frequent fading. This has been experienced in the Plains-Moona area.

(2) In the VHF range, an increasing number of cases of interference in the 50-100 megacycles range are occurring when new family radios (30-75 MHz), older VHF-1 equipment (70-100 mc) and AN/TEX-2a (50-100 mc) radio equipment are used simultaneously in the same area (2 mile radius). While the apparent fundamental frequency overlap is not too great, harmonic interference is widespread. Overflight coordination is often difficult or impossible, due to language barriers at joint site areas (AM, FM & SS).

(3) Also, in the 200-400 megacycles range, an increased amount of interference has been experienced between multi-channel VHF radios, invariably located near airfields, and the aircraft AM VHF radios. Since the aircraft radios are AM and the VHF is FM, often the signals are unintelligible and operators cannot obtain call signs which are needed to solve the interference problem. Frequency policy in this frequency range is needed.

Observations:

(1) Excellent cooperation has been experienced in solving frequency interference problems even where language incompatibility exists with allied nations.

(2) The concentrated use of FM radios in tactical and base camp areas promises to be a severe problem unless some means of FM direction-finding for station location and frequency police is effectively employed. This should be employed in base or tactical areas (60 miles radius or less), with immediate reaction by cooperation of the local commander.

53 of 57

* Site radius is often small for security reasons.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, HSS GSRX-45 (8)

c. Item: Radio voice call signs, as derived from ACP 110, continue to be a burden in tactical communications. Failure of many units to utilize these call signs and substitution of similar words complicates the frequency police problem.

Discussion: Units continue to employ short call words locally derived. In some cases these have been approved at a higher level. Basically there is no objection to shorter two-syllable call words except that ACP 110 does not provide them. Shorter call words effectively assist communications from aircraft and are easier for user to hear and understand. The tongue-twister-like word call signs have been more of a problem in radio than a practical tool. As a means of security, all signs are probably successful, but unfortunately the US units have difficulty in pronouncing the words as the enemy perhaps would. The primary advantage of the ACP 110 is hidden in the difficulty of the word to user.

Observation: Story should be given to a more practical selection of words for radio calls to be used by the tactical units especially for air and ground mobile stations or air support communications. A more acceptable selection of call words would also assist in the police of the frequency problem.

d. Item: Stable power input for transistorized electronic equipment.

Discussion: The latest communications equipment which employs solid state components have been experiencing frequently "buzz" transistors, due to fluctuating power sources. Even with supposedly stable generators, the power often surges or drops sufficiently to cause malfunction of solid state equipment.

Observation: A type of AC auto transformer should be developed as an integral component for future manufactured equipment and a modification made to those already in operation.

e. Item: Authority is needed in II CTZ to adjudicate claims under Foreign Claims Act.

Discussion: Authority to adjudicate and pay claims to Vietnamese nationals and other foreign personnel for injuries received should be delegated to an SSA in this geographical area. Prompt payment for damages and injuries is vital to our pacification program. Current case of Ho Thi Thoa illustrates the problem of centralizing payment out of Saigon. A Vietnamese soldier was killed in Binh Trang by US Army truck on 3 November 1965. An accident report was submitted by this HQ to MACV on 2 November 1965. Widow of this soldier submitted a petition through General Directorate of Finance and Audit that reached MACV on 25 April 1966. Because of their inability to locate the claimant, MACV had to request I FROCHEZ JA’s help. After locating claimant, who was living in a hovel with three children, a proper claim was submitted to MACV on 5 May 1966. Not until 28 July 1966 was a check for 115,000 VND received by this office as compensation to this widow.

Observation: A foreign claims commission consisting of one Judge Advocate General officer, should be established in II CTZ to insure prompt payment for damage caused by US forces operating in this geographical area.

54 of 57

CONFIDENTIAL
f. Items: Units must have sufficient masks available at all
times to exploit an RCA strike.

Discussion: On several occasions lucrative targets for an
RCA strike have been passed up because ground units in contact did not
have masks available.

Observation: Commanders should insure that sufficient
protective masks are carried to exploit RCA strikes if lucrative targets
develop.

g. Item: Delivery device for dispersing M7A5 (CS) grenades
from UH1 aircraft.

Discussion: Presently there is no standard device for de-

civering a large volume of M7A5 type grenades from helicopters. Units
have developed expedient devices but a standard disperser needs to be
developed.

Observation: Requirements have been forwarded to USAF
for development of a standard disperser for M7A5 type grenades.

h. Item: Development of RCA rounds for M79, 81mm and 4.2
inch mortars, and 105mm and 155mm artillery.

Discussion: Inclement weather can restrict RCA employment
by aircraft and artillery would be an ideal method of dissemination in
these instances. Point targets or small areas could be fired upon with
greater accuracy than aerial delivery. This would also give a more rapid
response to RCA requests.

Observation: Requirements for development of above rounds
have been submitted to USAF.

i. Item: Aerial delivery of H159/H158 RCA munitions.

Discussion: H159/H158 munitions cannot be employed at
altitudes below 500 feet due to the time element necessary to insure
that all eight modules are activated and area coverage is achieved.
Because of this limitation, the use of these munitions is highly restricted
when operating in inclement weather or highland areas during monsoon
seasons when ceilings are continually below 500 feet.

Observation: A standard disperser for M7 type CS grenades
would be of value in situations mentioned above. This system could be
employed with satisfactory results at altitudes less than 500 feet.
Requirements have been forwarded to USAF for development of a standard
disperser for M7 type grenades.

j. Item: The tendency of commanders to use the "numbers" or
"overkill" theory of leaflet use.

Discussion: It was a tendency in World War II and Korea
to overemphasize the number of leaflets dropped. The higher the number
of leaflets dropped the more successful the psychological operation.
It appears as though the commanders in the II CTZ are developing the
same unground tendency. Investigation of leaflet dissemination practices
used by USAF units shows fundamental violations of psychological condi-
tions which no amount of leaflets can rectify.

55 of 57
Specific examples of these violations are:

1. A number of leaflets were dropped on the ridge lines rather than the usual VC/NVA routes, i.e., valley floors, along streams to halfway up ridge lines.

2. Often the themes were not applicable to the situation. Example: Strengthening hunger when a VC unit had just taken all the rice from the nearby villagers.

3. Appeals were made to Montagnards in Vietnamese or with standard Chieu Hoi leaflets.

4. Not understanding leaflet dissemination led to a request for a million leaflets to be dropped in a 35 knot wind. The result would have been that an area of over 200 sq miles of the South China Sea would have been covered with leaflets. The results of this type activity are now being felt. The backlog on the American press in II CTZ, Saigon, Japan and Okinawa has reached millions.

Observation: Base drops on accurate timely intelligence and guidance from a trained PSTOP staff officer.

k. Item: Utilization of medical officers (doctors) on civil affairs teams.

Discussion: Based on experiences gained during the past months, it was determined that the assigned medical specialist could adequately perform the field sick-call and treatment of Vietnamese that previously was performed by the team's assigned doctor.

Observation: Medical officers have been reassigned from the CA teams to tactical units.

Part II: Recommendations

Reference paragraph 7d and e: Recommend that maximum effort be made to transport MACVOC and TOT equipment of each unit deploying to Vietnam on the same ship.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

LAWRENCE F. BOLTON
Colonel, GS
Acting Chief of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL
AVFA-DC-TG
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RCS CSRP - 65 (b)

DISTRIBUTION:
3-AGSFOR, DA
1-CINCUSA: PAC
3-USARV
1-OG II FFOREAY
1-OG 1st Cav Div (AM)
1-OG 4th Inf Div (Adv)
1-OG 1st Bde, 101st Air Div
1-OG 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
1-OG I FFOREAY Art'y
1-USA, II Corps
1-AC, S.S., 01
1-ACSS, 02
9-ACSS, 03
1-ACSS, 04
1-ACSS, 05
1-COMDT, USA CGSC, Ft Leavenworth
1-13th MI Hist Det

CONFIDENTIAL

57 of 57
AVHGC-DH (25 August 1966)  

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 July 1966

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT APO 96558

1. (U) The Operational Report—Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1966 is forwarded herewith.

2. (U) Concur with the comments contained in the basic report and with the preceding indorsements as amplified below.

3. (U) Reference Paragraph 6b(3), Page 36, Elimination of Personnel Unfit for RVN Service: Cited regulations provide for the removal of personnel to other locations within USARPAC, whose presence is embarrassing to the command. Frequently, such action is accompanied by disciplinary and/or elimination actions. Proceedings are generally protracted and are impeded by communications difficulties, and frequently, by return to CONUS of eyewitnesses prior to satisfactory disposition of the case. Additionally, the removal of the offender frequently lessens the aggressive pursuit of follow-up proceedings. This headquarters will take action to alleviate the problem within the framework of existing regulations.

4. (U) Reference Paragraph 6b(4), Page 36, Late Receipt of Orders Transferring Personnel to Hospitals: Since the end of the reporting period, this headquarters has taken steps to prepare orders transferring patients expeditiously. The establishment of a Transient, Trainee, Patient and Student (TTPS) Account within USARV is expected to further improve this situation.

5. (U) Reference Paragraph 7d and e, Page 42 and Recommendations, Part II, Page 56, WABTOC and TOE Equipment: Maximum effort is being made by CONUS loading terminals to load all unit equipment on the same ship or ships. Operational circumstances, however, frequently preclude loading all of one unit's equipment on a single ship. Generally, ships loaded with unit equipment, including WABTOC items, are given priority of discharge over other ships in RVN ports. Pitfalls in the complete effectiveness of present policies are caused by uncontrolled factors such as a
shortage of ships at CONUS loading ports and congestion at some RVN ports. No further action is considered necessary by this headquarters as present policies will suffice once port facilities become more developed and port congestion and ship backlog is eliminated.

6. (C) Reference Paragraph 1g, Page 49, Lack of Supporting Aircraft for Psychological Warfare: COMUSMACV initiated action in August, 1966 (See MACV Message MACP D 293636) to increase the number of aircraft supporting PSYOP. To date six C-47's and 15 U-10's are operational in RVN with six more C-47's and 16 additional U-10's programmed for June, 1967.

7. (U) Reference Paragraph 2a, Page 50, Shortage of PSYOP-trained Personnel Assigned to Tactical Units: There is a critical shortage of PSYOP-trained personnel in USARV. Distribution of incoming PSYOP-trained personnel is controlled by this headquarters.

8. (C) Reference Paragraph 3a, Page 51, Interrogation of Captives and Other Personnel: COMUSMACV is cognizant of the lack of Vietnamese qualified interpreters. Action initiated to mitigate this shortage is the assignment of ARVN MI Detachments to US units at division and separate brigade levels.

9. (C) Reference Paragraph 3b, Page 51, Lack of Psychological Operational Intelligence: In Letter, Headquarters MACV, Subject: USMACV Psychological Operations Posture, 29 July 1966, COMUSMACV reiterated to senior commanders their responsibilities in the conduct of PSYOP.

10. (C) Reference Paragraph 4a, Page 51, Requirement to React Rapidly to the Tactical Situation Dictates Extensive Use of Available Airfields: Programmed airfield mat and membrane shipments due in-country over the next year will permit expanded C-130 airfield repair, maintenance, and new construction. Both items remain in critical supply at present and are allocated by MACV. This headquarters has also taken action to obtain MX-19 aluminum airfield matting for a total of 37 airfields and has requested deployment of two airborne engineer light equipment companies. Although this requirement was verified by JCS, deployment of these units is not expected before late 1967. On 10 September 1966, this headquarters also requested DA to provide airmobile engineer construction equipment for certain USARV engineer units. CINCUSARPAC on 16 September 1966 concurred with the USARV request although no reply from DA has been received.
11. (S) Reference Paragraph 4b, Pages 51-52, Sufficient Vehicles Have Not Been Available for Support of Brigade Size Operations: Within the II ARVN Corps tactical area, there are 15 truck companies presently in-country. 22 truck companies have been requested for location within II Corps area including the 669th Transportation Company which is scheduled to support the 1st Cavalry Division. Based on the programmed deployment, the capability for motor movement is expected to equal the requirement by the end of CY 67. As for depot replacement stocks, no 2½ ton trucks are due in RVN until the 3d Qtr, FY 67. The only other sources of 2½ ton trucks is the return of repairables from Okinawa which is sporadic.

12. (C) Reference Paragraph 4c, Page 52, Insufficient Quantities of Adhesive are Supplied with the Accessory Kits for T-17 Membrane Repair:

   a. The selection of C-130 airfield sites with too low a bearing ratio, a volume of traffic exceeding design specifications, and the shortage of landing mat (See 10 above) over which the T-17 membrane should be laid for extended operations, have resulted in a large consumption of adhesive cement for repair purposes. Moreover, operational necessity has required the use of T-17 taxiway sets as runway sets, thus requiring additional adhesive for the increased number of joint panels. Another factor, contributing to the shortage, is the issue of adhesive to III MAF units which was not programmed.

   b. This headquarters has taken action to increase the adhesive contained in each T-17 runway set from 10 gallons to 15 gallons. In addition, 246 T-17 rehabilitation kits, each containing 20 gallons of adhesive, have been ordered. Adhesive is also available in depot stocks (approximately 1000 gallons as of this date and another 1500 gallons on requisition) and is issued to units throughout RVN upon request.

13. (U) Reference Paragraph 5b, Pages 52-53, Identification of Stations on Signals Which Interfere With Radio Operations:

   a. Language barrier difficulties will continue to hamper efforts to resolve frequency interference problems. Progress has been made in the definition of frequency usage for both tactical FM and AN/TRC-24 frequencies, however. On 1 July 1966 a system of block frequency allocation for tactical FM frequencies was initiated which gave the Free World Forces frequencies distinct from those used by RVN Forces. A similar system for AN/TRC-24
(12-channel radio relay) frequencies was effected during October and early November 1966. As the management of these systems becomes more proficient, resolution of accidental interference incidents will be possible through assignment records in most cases.

b. This headquarters agrees with the report that FM broadcasts from out of country stations are being received in Vietnam. The onset of the heavy monsoon rains has resulted in an atmospheric condition which results in an effect upon radio signals known as "ducting". Investigation has also revealed that using units have been reporting interference from friendly forces due to their ability to monitor transmissions of distant stations. This has indicated a lack of awareness on the part of numerous operators that the capture effect characteristic of FM equipment will permit them to over ride these transmissions and maintain communications with local stations. Action is being taken to promote more awareness of this characteristic of FM equipment on the part of commanders, staff officers, and radio operators in the subordinate commands.

c. At a recent conference called by J6/JGS RVNAF and attended by representatives from MACV J6, USARV and II FFORCEV, the problem of close coordination at the Corps level, pertaining to the use of frequencies in the 50-100 megacycles range was discussed. It was agreed that CG I FFORCEV, CG II FFORCEV and CG III MAF would act as the coordinating activity for all US Forces desiring to employ "A" band frequencies (50-100 mcs) on AN/TRC-24 equipment in their respective Corps areas. Recognizing that the AN/TRC-1 equipment employed by ARVN operate in the 70-100 mcs range, coordination with the appropriate ARVN Corps Signal Officer will be accomplished prior to activation of "A" band systems by US Forces.

d. During the above mentioned conference it was also agreed that representatives of the J6/JGS RVNAF and MACV J6 would conduct a joint study to better allocate "B" and "C" band AN/TRC-24 frequencies. This should result in a reduction of interference between friendly radio relay systems and airborne UHF equipment.

e. An Air Force, Electromagnetic Compatibility Team has recently arrived in-country. It was placed under the operational control of the MACV Frequency Coordinator and provides an in-country frequency policing capability.

14. (U) Reference Paragraph 5c, Page 54, Radio Voice Call Signs

a. This headquarters has previously recognized the effect that
unauthorized call signs has had on efforts to effectively police FM frequencies in the 27.0 - 75.95 mc range.

b. Current call sign employment procedures permit the dropping of one of the two words derived from ACP-110, once initial contact is established. The use of one word thereafter should not prove a significant burden to personnel operating tactical nets.

c. Voice call signs derived from the ACP 110 and 119 series frequently are groupings of unfamiliar words and probably do prove difficult to some radio operators. The advantage of having secure call signs already prepared in tabulated form is considered to be of such value as to outweigh this objection. Also, the use of these call signs makes rapid identification of a unit through call sign assignment records possible. This provides for more immediate response to radio frequency interference problems. Accordingly, USAF SSI Item 50-4 is being published which requires all subordinate commands to derive their voice call signs from the ACP sources.

15. (U) Reference Paragraph 5d, Page 24, Staple Power Input for Transistorized Electric Equipment: It has been recognized that a requirement exists for stable AC power sources for use with transistorized communications equipment. As an example, the AC power supply being procured for use with Radio Set AM/PRC-25 has as a component variac to compensate for voltage and frequency changes of the AC power source.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. J. THORNTON
1st Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General
SECRET

GPOP-OT(25 Aug 66) 2d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 18 JAN1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

2. (U) Reference paragraph 10, 1st Indorsement: DA message 789558,
DTG 0721550 November 1966, from ACSFOR informed this headquarters and
USARV that DA proposed to purchase 10 company sets of airmobile
engineer equipment for issue to non-airmobile combat engineer units.

3. (C) Reference paragraph 11, 1st Indorsement: USARV LOGSUM
dated 16 December 1966 (USARV AVHGD-PO 41000) cites dues out of 473
each 2 1/2 ton trucks and states that 312 each were shipped from
Baltimore. USAMC indicates that total requirements will be met from
February production with anticipated arrival in RVN about 60 days after
release from production.

4. (C) Reference paragraph 5d, page 54, basic report: USARV has
been requested to elaborate on specific stable AC power source require-
ments in order for this headquarters to assist in this problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.McMULLIN
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

54 Inc1
nc
IFFORCEV
OPERATIONAL REPORT

ON LESSONS LEARNED

AVCS 7974
## CONFIDENTIAL

### COMPARISON OF COMBAT LOSSES 1 MAY - 31 JULY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>ENEMY KIA</th>
<th>CAPTURED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>588</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>220</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4,670</td>
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**KILL RATIO:**
- FMAF: 7.2 to 1
- US: 6.8 to 1
- ROK: 9.8 to 1
- ARVN: 7.3 to 1

### COMPARISON OF COMBAT LOSSES 1 JAN - 30 APRIL

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>MIA</th>
<th>ENEMY KIA</th>
<th>CAPTURED</th>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>648</td>
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</table>

**KILL RATIO:**
- FMAF: 6.6 to 1
- US: 5.5 to 1
- ROK: 9.0 to 1
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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>GAIN</th>
<th>LOSS</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>Assigned</td>
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<tr>
<td>64th Engr Det</td>
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<td>90 I FFORCEV Arty</td>
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<td>1st Bn 30th Arty</td>
<td></td>
<td>20 July</td>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th Bn 14th Arty</td>
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<td>20 July</td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>54th Sig Bn</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td></td>
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<td>52d Arty Gp</td>
<td>27 June</td>
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<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>Attached</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d Bn 6th Arty</td>
<td>20 July</td>
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<td>Pleiku</td>
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<td>13th RRU</td>
<td>8 June</td>
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<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>OPCON **</td>
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<td>7th Avn Op</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
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<td>13th Mil Hist Det</td>
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<td>61st Civil Affairs Co</td>
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<td>77th FA Det (RADAR)</td>
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<td>Assigned *</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>Assigned</td>
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</table>

* Attached to 52d Arty Gp effective 20 Jul 66.

** Det 4, 3d RRU was incorporated in the organisation of 13th RRU.

*** 237th FA Det (RADAR) was attached to 54th Sig Bn, OPCON to CO, USA ASC, CRB for employment in the defense of Nha Trang.
SECRET

I FYCOM CPLAN'S - 1 MAY 66 TO 31 JUL 66

CPLAN 22-66 (CHIANG LIAIH) - I FYCOMV search and destroy operation in Phu CAT Mountain area of Binh Dinh Province.

CPLAN 24-66 (DEPTSY) - I FYCOMV contingency plan to relieve or reinforce Dak Pak CIDC camp.

CPLAN 25-66 (DAV CHVRST) - I FYCOMV search and destroy operation in the Bong SON area north of Qui Nhon.

CPLAN 26-66 (GOOPER) - I FYCOMV operation to interdict suspected lateral VC infiltration corridors leading from the Cambodian border to Phu Yen Province. (Cancelled because forces were committed to operation HAWTHORNS)

CPLAN 27-66 (SAM HOUFLON) - I FYCOMV search and destroy operation in the Chu Doc 74. (Cancelled because forces were committed to operation HAWTHORNS)

CPLAN 3-66 (BEAUSPREST) - I FYCOMV operation to conduct surveillance of the LAOTIAN - CAMBODIAN - RVN border and to conduct blocking and ambush operations along known and suspected VC infiltration routes in Kien Hung Province.

CPLAN 28-66 (MARK THAL) - I FYCOMV search and destroy operation in the area east of NHA TRANG and DONG BA THAN to enhance security of the NHA TRANG - CAN RAI complex. (Cancelled due to commitment in operation HAWTHORNS)

CPLAN 30-66 (HAUPTMANN) - COMUSMACV directed operation in I CTZ conducted in coordination with III Corps (I FYCOMV participation cancelled due to commitments in II CTZ)

CPLAN 31-66 (BUSHMASTER) - COMUSMACV directed contingency plan to conduct night ambushes astride VC infiltration routes throughout II CTZ.

CPLAN 32-66 (LUNDSTLIT II) - Operation requested by 937th Engineer Group to provide security for reconnaissance of Highway I from Tuy Hoa to Qui Nhon.

CPLAN 33-66 (HAUPFLIT II) - USAV directed operation to select and secure, in coordination with Capital Box Infantry Division, a staging area and initial deployment area for the 26th Box Regiment deployment from the Republic of Korea to the Republic of Vietnam.

CPLAN 34-66 (BOOKER) - I FYCOMV operation to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance along the Cambodian - RVN border in Pleiku Province.

CPLAN 35-66 (FUTCH) - I FYCOMV search and destroy operation in TO HAP suspected VC base area SW of NHA TRANG. (Cancelled due to commitment in operation HAWTHORNS)

CPLAN 36-66 (NATH N HALE) - I FYCOMV search and destroy operation. Operation was conducted in conjunction with Special Landing Force operation, DESERT X.

CPLAN 37-66 (WOR JULLIS) - 18th Engineer Brigade requested security of Vung Ho bay and Engineer port construction parties and security of Highway 1 from Vung Ho Bay to Tuy Hoa.

CPLAN 38-66 (DIE STRUCK) - COMUSMACV directed contingency plan to deploy 173rd Abn Bn (Sep) to II CTZ.

CPLAN 39-66 (OLIVIA J HOLLAN) - I FYCOMV search and destroy operation in northern Phu Buoc Province.
SECRET

FFORCEN FRAG ORDERS - MAY 66 TO 31 JULY 66

FRAG ORDER HAVREDORE - I FFORCEN operation to evacuate TONGKHUND garrison and to destroy elements of the 24th NVA Regiment.

FRAG ORDER HAYAN HAIU - I FFORCEN search and destroy operation against the 159th and 95th NVA regiments. Operation was conducted in conjunction with Special Landing Force Operation DECK HOUSE I.

FRAG ORDER HENRY CLAY - I FFORCEN search and destroy operation in the HANOI VC base area.

FRAG ORDER 1-66 (JOHN PAUL JONES) - 18th Engineer Brigade requested security of LOC from YUNG HO MOUNT to TUY HOA.

FRAG ORDER 2-66 (FIRE TIDE) - I FFORCEN operation to secure 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division staging area at VIH-HONG, route of march from staging area to base area and security of base area vicinity PLKIMU. (Frag Order 2-66 was rescinded by Frag Order 8-66.)

FRAG ORDER 3-66 (HAYSE) - I FFORCEN operation to conduct surveillance of known and suspected VC infiltration and supply routes in NORTH Province.

FRAG ORDER 4-66 (LIGHTHOUSE) - I FFORCEN operation to secure 196th Infantry Brigade (SEP) to include security of staging area at TUY HOA, security of route of march from staging area to base area and security of base area vicinity TUY HOA. (Operation cancelled because 196th Infantry Brigade (SEP) was diverted to I CTZ.)

FRAG ORDER 5-66 (BOUNDOUT III) - I FFORCEN and Capitol ROY Infantry Division coordinated operation to secure the Headquarters, ROY Force Vietnam Field Command, 9th ROY Infantry Division and the Operations Company, 5th Signal Battalion in Vietnam.

FRAG ORDER 8-66 (IVY LEAF) - I FFORCEN operation to secure 4th Infantry Division (-) to include the staging area at VIH-HONG, the route of march from staging area to the base area and security of the base area vicinity PLKIMU. (Frag Order 8-66 was rescinded by FRAG ORDER 11-66.)

FRAG ORDER 9-66 (SOUTH CAROLINA) - CONUSMACV directed contingency operation to deploy a three battalion brigade to I CTZ.

FRAG ORDER 10-66 (ROAD RUNGER) - I FFORCEN order to execute ROAD RUNGER operations.

FRAG ORDER 12-66 (EMERSON) - I FFORCEN operation to conduct search and destroy operations in the VAR CANE - DOING THE area.
OPEN DAY: CROCKETT
4-10 MAY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO 96240

REGULATION
NUMBER 93-1

3 July 1966

AVIATION

Joint Airborne/Airmobile Airstrip Operation

1. PURPOSE: a. To prescribe procedures and fix responsibilities for the joint use of forward airstrips during airborne/airmobile operations.

b. To establish safe operations criteria for forward airstrips used in airborne/airmobile operations.

2. GENERAL: Airmobile operations in II CTZ require intensive use of forward airstrips by fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Joint Army and Air Force use of forward supply bases is often mandatory. Efficient operations and safety considerations require that minimum landing zone safety criteria, air traffic control, control of vehicular traffic and loading and unloading areas be established.

3. MISSION PLANNING: A joint planning conference, whenever tactical situation permits, will be held at this headquarters approximately seven days prior to a major operation to discuss logistical support. The senior Army aviation commander supporting the ground tactical unit or his representative will attend this planning conference to coordinate details of air traffic control with DASC, other appropriate Air Force personnel and representatives of 125th Air Traffic Control Company. The plan will include the air traffic control frequencies, traffic patterns to be used by both fixed and rotary wing aircraft, approach and departure corridors, control of vehicles and pedestrian traffic in the vicinity of the airstrip, and other procedures or restrictions peculiar to the operations.

4. CONTROL: a. Airfield Control Officer. The senior Army aviation commander supporting the tactical unit will be the Airfield Control Officer. He or his designated representative, will have the following responsibilities:

   (1) Insure compliance with the minimum landing zone safety criteria as specified in Annex A.

   (2) Supervise overall operation of the airstrip including traffic control and associated ground support activities.

   (3) Supervise Combat Control (USAF) or Air Traffic Control (USAF) tower activities, and movement of aircraft, aircraft parking, aircrew safety practices, all vehicular traffic on the airfield and aircraft unloading.

   (4) Insure that all aircraft and helicopters operating within
Regulation Number 95-1, HQ 1 FFORCEN, dated 3 Jul 66

a radius of 1 mile of the airfield maintain radio contact with the control tower.

b. The senior US commander of the supported unit in the area of operation will be responsible for:

(1) Control of vehicle and pedestrian traffic in vicinity of airstrip.

(2) Removal of cargo from cargo ramp.

(3) Insuring sound safety practices are followed.

(4) Security of the airfield.

(5) Establish and monitor an artillery firing advisory service to the airfield control tower.

c. Limited airlift supply or resupply activities that do not warrant assigning an Airfield Control Officer to the airstrip will be supervised by the senior US commander or advisor at the location. Direct coordination between all aircraft commanders and the senior US commander or advisor is authorized to insure safe, efficient airlift operations.

5. To assist the Airfield Control Officer, a US Air Force Combat Control Team or ATC Team from the 125th ATC Company will be deployed to provide air traffic control at the primary airfield in the area of operation. Normally, a brigade size or larger operation will require ATC facilities.

6. REFERENCES:

a. MACV Directive 95-5.


FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN R. DEANS, JR
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

NEIL M. MATHEWS
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

A 2
MINIMUM LANDING ZONE CLEAR AREA AND LATERAL SAFETY ZONE CRITERIA FOR C-123 AND C-130 AIRCRAFT

1. Runway Shoulder:
   a. Width: 10 feet from runway edge.
   b. Length: Equal to runway length.
   c. Obstructions: None.

2. Runway Clear Area:
   a. Width: 35 feet from edge of shoulder.
   b. Length: Equal to runway length.
   c. Obstructions: None.

3. Runway Lateral Safety Zone.
   a. Width: 75 feet from edge of clear area.
   b. Length: Equal to runway length.
   c. Obstructions: No fixed or movable obstacles protruding above.

4. Taxiway Shoulder: Same as runway.

5. Taxiway Clear Area:
   a. Width: 65 feet from shoulder.
   b. Length: Equal to taxiway length.
   c. Obstructions: None.

Annex A to HQ, I FORGEV, Regulation Number 95-1, 3 July 1966
WARNING TO THE VIET CONG:

If you come to take rice from the people of Dai Dien area of Dien Khanh, DEATH will be there to greet you!
GIRL 76-6-245N

A. Do you remember: RALLY TO GVN
B. It's been so long- RALLY TO GVN
C. Please remember me RALLY TO GVN
D. If you really care, RALLY TO GVN NOW

Ngo Ban Muon Doi Vu That Tu-Tro
Hai Ong Chinh 76-6-245N
WARNING TO THE VIET CONG:

If you come to take rice from the people of Dai Dien area of Dien Khanh DEATH will be there to greet you!

Hãy Cõi Chứng!

Này các bạn đến cuộp thập lên chăng bảo vàng Dai-Dien, Dien-Khan Chế sẽ tiếp đến các bạn ở đây!
If your family is living in a VC controlled area, surely it isn't in peace.

As you have seen, everytime the GVN initiates operations to destroy VC secret bases. The VC have used your homes and villages as a battlefield, thus causing danger to the people who live in that area.

Surely you know that innocent villagers are warned so that they may avoid damage to their homes. However, danger cannot be avoided for everyone, especially old people and children.

There is only one way to guarantee safety for your loved ones: that is to bring them to the free areas that are controlled by the GVN.

You also have a guarantee for yourself: use the National Safe Conduct Pass and go to the Chieu hoi center. You will be united with your family and reestablished in a new life of happiness and freedom.
Is your Family Living in Peace?

If your family is living in a VC controlled area, surely it isn't in peace.

As you have seen, everytime the GVN initiates operations to destroy VC secret bases. The VC have used your homes and villages as a battlefield, thus causing danger to the people who live in that area.

Surely you know that innocent villagers are warned so that they may avoid damage to their homes. However, danger cannot be avoided for everyone, especially old people and children.

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SP 1114
RALLY INSTRUCTION LEAFLET

1. Make a big "X" visible from the air. Logs, stones, bundles of straw.
2. If possible, build a smoking fire on two sides of the "X".
3. When an aircraft sees the marker, he will signal by turning on landing light. If area is big enough, the helicopter will land and meet you.
4. If allied forces are close, follow the direction the aircraft flies. Weapon muzzle down.
5. Allied forces or National Army soldiers will meet you. You will be treated kindly and given food and medicine.

REVERSE:

Comrades in the ranks of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army Troops, you have suffered much for your communist masters in a futile war. You have this chance to avoid a useless, inglorious, and lonely death.

Each rallier will receive a reward for his weapon and ammunition. Read carefully the instructions on the other side of this leaflet and follow the road to a new and happy life.
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Each rallier will receive a reward for his weapon and ammunition. Read carefully the instructions on the other side of this leaflet and follow the road to a new and happy life.

Các Bạn Trong Hàng ngũ Việt Cộng
Các bạn đã chịu đau khổ dưới ách thù trong cuộc chiến tranh vô nghĩa, quan thầy cộng sản trong một chiến tranh vẻ nghiêm, các bạn được cơ hội này để tranh cái chết cay đắng.
Các bạn được về nơi an lành, về danh vinh và vẻ ấm.
Mỗi quan chức viên sẽ được trong thương vong sở và bị và đơn độc mà các bạn đã mang về.
Hãy đọc kỹ những điều chế dẫn phía bên kia truyền đồn để đi vào một cuộc sống tự do và hạnh phúc.
76-1-245N
DUNG CÁC BẠN NGO PHỦ.

Chính phủ Việt Nam công bố và quân đội đồng minh lấy làm tiêu phải chấn ghe truyền cắm các ban để kiến tạo. Nhưng số chúng tôi, chúng tôi rất tiếc phải chấn dùng công việc của các ban, trong lúc ban làm việc. Chúng tôi cùng liều y các ban lặ lúc nào cũng phải mang theo sỏ ghe và the cần cước. Chúng tôi cốc gờ không cho Việt cong xử dụng nôi đánh các oai và ban để lôm chỗ ăn nắp. Chúng tôi xin cáo ban dùng giúp đỡ Việt cong. Hãy nói chúng tôi biết những gì ban biết về Việt cong. Chúng nào chúng tôi đánh được họ bùm bàng ngòi đồ, số ấy khi đất đại và hại phán cua ban thì các ban sẽ được sống trong thanh bình. Như đánh được Việt cong, chúng tôi cần sự giúp đỡ cua các ban. Các ban có thể cùng đơn tran lội những cần hỏi sau đây còn tôi không?

Các ban có thấy Việt cong ở trong vùng này không?
Các ban có biết trực Việt cong được đâu không?

Việt cong dùng những loại ghe nào?
Các ban có thể nói hoàn chi cho chúng tôi tân cua Việt cong không?

Các ban có biết Việt cong cho de tiep te tai đau không?

Có bao Việt cong đến nhà ban nhưng ban trang trang sao?

VỊT CỌC ĐÃ BIẾT ĐƯỢC KHÔNG?

Họa này có Việt cong trong long vẫn ban không? Đạo nhài?

Việt cong có lấy cua vẫn ban không?

Các ban có cần dũng Việt cong không? Chúng tôi sẽ giúp đỡ các ban nau các ban cần chúng tôi. Chúng tôi đang có gang giúp bạn tìm bạn ngoại đó có cậy?

Xin thêm Hża bạ Long Vượng ở với ban và giúp các ban đánh đuổi nhiều ca.

76-11-24/5V
TO THE FISHERMEN, OUR FRIENDS

The government of the Republic of Vietnam and the Free World Military Forces regret stopping and searching your boat. Do not be afraid of us; we are here to help you. We are sorry to stop you at your work. We must ask that you carry at all times your boat registration papers and your identification card. We are trying to keep the wild Viet Cong from using your fishing grounds as a hiding place. We must ask that you do not help the Viet Cong. Tell us anything you know about the Viet Cong. Soon the evil ones will be driven from your land and your waters and you will be at peace. To drive the Viet Cong we need your help. Can you be brave and answer any of my questions?

Have you seen any Viet Cong in this area?
Do you know of any Viet Cong camps?
What type of boats do the Viet Cong use?
Can you show me or tell me of any Viet Cong boats?
Do you know where the Viet Cong load supplies?
How many Viet Cong came by your house this week?
Where did the Viet Cong go?
Are there any Viet Cong in your village now?
How many?
Do the Viet Cong take fish from you?
Do you need help to fight the Viet Cong?
We will help you if you need our help. We are trying to protect you by seeking out the evil ones.

May the Queen of Water, Ha Ba Long Vuong be with you and fill your nets with many fine fish.

76-11-245N
TO THE VC SOLDIERS

This is an important message which the Government of the Republic of Vietnam sends you.

Do you know that now the GVN has a policy which is to receive Vietnamese and Montagnard Communist Soldiers who were tricked into believing the VC propaganda. Now these men desire and volunteer to return to the GVN; and they are striving to bring back brotherhood between the Vietnamese and Montagnard people, peace for the country, and a solid, prosperous economy for our fatherland.

This policy is called the Chieu Hoi program, which was activated by the GVN.

At every province and district, there has been set up a Chieu Hoi office.

The responsibility of Chieu Hoi personnel is to help those who leave the VC ranks to return to the GVN.

SP 1221 (P)
TO THE VC SOLDIERS

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Do you know that now the GVN has a policy which is to receive Vietnamese and Montagnard Communist Soldiers who were tricked into believing the VC propaganda. Now these men desire and volunteer to return to the GVN; and they are striving to bring back brotherhood between the Vietnamese and Montagnard people, peace for the country, and a solid, prosperous economy for our fatherland.

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SP 1221 (P)
Letter to Y Ka, Y Soon, Y Hong, Y Kinh of A-37 1st Bn Darlac Province.

I am Y Bah, Mie, 2nd Lt., political corner of A37, 1st Bn, Darlac Province. I would like to let you know that I have returned to the GVN on 2 June 66. Don't be unhappy and think that I am a traitor, because before returning to the GVN I had pondered over my decision carefully. I realized that we have followed communist VC over ten years, bearing hardship and sufferings, many friends of ours had died in the jungle, in result we have never received any rewards from VC. Those Montagnard villages which have not been liberated are prosperous while those liberated ones people live in fear and hardship. People are tired of us, they want to stay away from us. We have no objective for our struggle. Is it not right that we have been exploited by VC to realize their aggression?

I am welcomed and treated well, I am provided many things, this is contrary to the false propaganda of the VC.

This is a brief short letter, I hope you understand and make up your mind to return as I did.

76-6-245(P)
TO ALL VIETNAMESE AND MONTAGNARD PEOPLE

Do you recognize the two young men on this leaflet? Look closely, please. The two young men are Y-Tuc and Y-Tuk, formerly of the hamlet of Buon Dham in Daklak Province.

Recently they quit the Viet Cong to come back to the side of the Government of Vietnam. They did not join the Viet Cong from choice but by force. After many sad days with the Viet Cong, they are learning to smile and laugh again in the land of the red and yellow flag of Vietnamese and Montagnard brothers.

How did these two fellows escape from the Viet Cong? They only pretended to follow the Viet Cong. Then they requested their leader to give them one free day of leave — and on this occasion they cleverly escaped to return to the GVN.

Did you know that thousands of young men like Y-Tuc and Y-Tuk have done the same thing? Yes, they were more clever than their Viet Cong leaders. No wonder that Viet Cong morale is zero. The Viet Cong leaders know that almost everyone is trying to return to the GVN, even some of themselves.

76-7-245(F)
TO ALL VIETNAMESE AND MONTAGUARD PEOPLE

Do you recognize the two young men on this leaflet? Look closely, please. The two young men are Y-Tuc and Y-Tuh, formerly of the hamlet of Buon Dham in Gia Lai Province.

Recently they quit the Viet Cong to come back to the side of the Government of Vietnam. They did not join the Viet Cong from choice but by force. After many sad days with the Viet Cong, they are learning to smile and laugh again in the land of the red and yellow flag of Vietnamese and Montaguard brothers.

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76-7-245(P)

THÀN ÔI ĐÔI TỔ XÂM ĐỒNG BÀO KINH THƯNG:


Làm thế nào mà hai thanh niên này thoát khỏi vòng Việt Cộng đặc biệt? Thể lệ họ tự vệ với Cộng sản, rồi họ xin phép cấp chuẩn bị một nỗi ngày như một dịp nghỉ cho họ trở về với Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hoà.


76-7-245(P)
This man has made the right choice. He has returned to the GVN, and will begin a new life. When will you return. The GVN is waiting to welcome you.

76-9-245(?)

---

PVT Truong Danh Tho
5th Bn
52nd Regt.

This man has made the right choice. He has returned to the GVN, and will begin a new life. When will you return. The GVN is waiting to welcome you.

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---
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5th Bn
52nd Regt.

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76-9-245(P)
HEADQUARTERS 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION
APO US Forces 96490

AVON

2 May 1966

SUBJECT: Summary of M59 Canister, Riot Control CS Munition Activities

TO: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
ATTN: Chemical Officer
APO US Forces 96240

1. The division received 21 M59's and to date has expended 4 for training and 10 on combat support missions. All munitions were delivered as M59 double clusters from the bomb rack of a UH-1B helicopter equipped with an XM16 armament sub-system. All clusters were released at an altitude above the target of 1500 feet using a manual release system, where the crew chief initiated the drop upon the pilot's command. All munitions functioned except one. All munitions were activated by using 2 M63 timers. Modification as described below was made to all of the munitions since the munitions as delivered were designed for release at a height of 500 feet, an unacceptable altitude for helicopter operations in the area of operations. Preferred operational altitudes for helicopters are either "on the deck" or above 1500 feet.

2. The employment of each cluster follows:

   a. On 19 and 21 March 1966, three munitions were test fired to adjust the timer settings for proper height of functioning and to develop a method of mounting the clusters. On the initial drop the instruction manual setting of 7.9 seconds was used. The munition impacted upon the ground and then activated. A second munition was dropped using settings of 5 and 6 seconds. One of the M59's functioned before the munition hit the ground and the second M59 functioned after impact. Because of the height of the M63 timers above the strongback the bomb rack suspension lugs were modified by welding a rod extension loop to them so that sufficient clearance was available between the bomb rack and the cluster tip for the M63 timers. On the third test firing the M59's were detached from the strongback, rotated 90° and reattached to the strongback using

   CMI-97-66-C

   CC: 2

   Jerry 28
SUBJECT: Summary of E159 Canister, Ric' Control CS Munition Activities

four 5/8 inch metal bands, two on each E159. This modification permitted the strapback to be hooked directly to the bomb rack since the timers did not interfere. This modification was used on all subsequent E159's fired. After the cluster was locked in the bomb rack, two static lines were attached from the arming wire of the two 36 timer initiators, to the aircraft. When the E159 was released from the bomb rack the arming wires were extracted. The mechanical time initiators were set for a 3 second delay. On 30 April a 4th test was conducted using a higher drop height, 2000 feet, with a 4 second setting on the timers. The results of these trial firings were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test No.</th>
<th>Time Setting</th>
<th>HOB</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.9 sec</td>
<td>Ground impact</td>
<td>150x150m</td>
<td>Munitions functioned after impact-noticeable billowing. Excellent coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.0/6.0 sec</td>
<td>Partial Ground impact</td>
<td>150x150m</td>
<td>Excellent coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.0 sec</td>
<td>300 feet</td>
<td>200x300m</td>
<td>All modules exploded prior to impact cloud rose thru trees - 4 grass fires were started. Excellent coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.0 sec</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>300x300m</td>
<td>Average duration 5 minutes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. On 071400 April, the 1/9 Cav employed two E159's in a fire support mission. The target was suspected VC in foxholes along a wooded creek line at TV 815690. The CS was employed to drive the VC into the open, to reduce ground fire at helicopters and friendly positions. The cluster was dropped at an altitude of 1500 feet with a timer setting of 4 seconds. The CS mission was followed by a 2.75" rocket fire mission and an Air Force air strike. The first cluster was off target due to a mistaken signal to release the cluster. The second cluster was on target. Both clusters detonated about 100 feet above the ground with an initial area coverage of about 150 x 100 meters before the cloud moved along the creek. No friendly
troops moved into the area but the small arms firing did subside.

d. Again on 11 April the 1/9 Cav dropped two bombs on enemy targets. This time the targets were bunkers and foxholes along a creek at YB 845311 and YB 843312. Once again the bombs were mechanically released from the bomb racks of a UH-1B at 1500 feet and with a 4 second timer setting. Both targets received direct hits and coverage was reported as excellent. No enemy activity was observed, leading to the suspicion that no enemy were present. This was confirmed on the following day when a ground patrol inspected the area and discovered no signs of enemy presence.

- Another two E159's were dropped in support of the 1/12 Cav north of LZ eagle to suppress small arms fire along a creek bed at coordinates YV 855897. The target was marked by smoke and the drop was preceded and followed by intense ARA and TAC Air. The E159 was dropped 150 meters north along a wood line. Even though the bomb was dropped a little too far north the coverage was excellent and the small arms fire was suppressed but the enemy did not leave their holes. The lesson learned from this attack was that when employing CS, some plausible chance must exist for the enemy to survive if you desire to get him from his foxholes. This was the first time the enemy did not attempt to leave a CS mission area. Presumably because of the intense ARA and TAC Air both before and after, he elected to stay in his holes regardless of the CS, although his firing was suppressed.

1. On 27 April at coordinates A 815385 two more E159's were used in support of a feint mission on an LZ for the 2/5 Cav. The objective was to drive the enemy into ambush sites. On this occasion one E159 malfunctioned due to the powder being wet (the munition had been exposed to heavy rain). The second munition gave excellent coverage (100 x 150 meters) although no movement was noted.

3. Recommendations:

- When CS is used on dug in troops it should be employed in the initial strikes on the target.

- Two E159's be employed on each target.

- E159 clusters could be attached to a more inexpensive hard back for use on helicopters.

- For delivery from the XM6 system timers should not be mounted in such a fashion that they interfere with the suspension lug system.
AVGCM
SUBJECT: Summary of M59 Canister Riot Control CS Munition Activities

1. A more accurate timer is also desirable.

4. Generally, the system proved effective and it is the only quick responding combat munition available for CS. Expedient action should be taken to procure more devices as soon as possible. This headquarters will, by separate action, request operational quantities of this munition.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/MALCOLM R. BAER
t/MALCOLM R. BAER
Lt Col, ADC
Adjutant General

A TRUE COPY
JOHN P. CRISPPELL
LEV, Calc
Chemical Officer

CONFIDENTIAL
1. PURPOSE: This bulletin is published in an attempt to assist units by exchanging ideas and information, highlighting deficiencies and offering possible solutions.

2. CIVIC ACTION PUBLIC RELATIONS: It has been found that the Vietnamese in urban areas know little or nothing about the major civic action and social efforts being made in the rural areas. Each unit commander who is involved in such activities should attempt to make this information available to inhabitants of urban in his vicinity. Civic action activities need to be fully publicized in the public information media to insure that as many people as possible are aware of the support being given to the GVN Revolutionary Development Program. The publicity should emphasize combined ARVN/US/PAVN efforts. US/PAVN units will not attempt to publicize these efforts directly with the Vietnamese public. Make the information available to the local JUSPAO representative who may be able to provide word-of-mouth dissemination through the Vietnamese Information Service, the Vietnamese-American Association or the Vietnamese Friendship Committee.

3. US MILITARY PERSONNEL AND VIETNAMESE CUSTOMS:

a. The Vietnamese people look upon a public display of affection between male and female as undesirable. This includes the simple act of holding hands. US military personnel should be made aware of this and the ill effect it has on US-Vietnamese relations.

b. The Vietnamese also find distasteful the free handouts of money on the street to Vietnamese children. The adults feel that it is corrupting the children's morals (money-grows-on-tree attitude) and creates the impression that US troops do not need or care about their possessions, thus encouraging thievery. Pay for value received and make charitable contributions through official channels.

c. MACV CIVIC ACTION FUND:


b. A special civic action account has been established in the MACV Chaplain's Fund. Projects to be financed from this account should be high impact projects for which funds are not otherwise available.

c. Request for funds from this special account must include:

(1) Location (Province, district, village, and coordinates).
Civil Affairs/Public Affairs Bulletin Number 3 dated 22 May 1966 Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, APO US Forces 96240

(2) Sector or sub-sector advisor with whom project was coordinated.

(3) Name and position of US or GVN official who approved the project.

(4) Description of proposed construction, e.g., size of building or extent of repairs, materials to be used, and source of materials. A sketch or drawing is desirable.

(5) A firm estimate of cost.

(6) Identification of military units (RVNAF and FMAF) and civilian groups participating.

(7) Impact on community, e.g., number of civilians to benefit, impact if project is not approved, and indications of civilian interest and need for the project.

(8) Other concrete, specific statements in support of the project.

d. Submit requests to G-5, this headquarters.


6. ITEMS OF INTEREST FROM WEEKLY CIVIC ACTION REPORTS:

a. Garden seeds were issued and villagers were assisted in planting gardens of corn, tobacco, blackeye peas, and radishes.

b. A resettlement area was sprayed for insect control.

c. A volleyball court was constructed at a school.

d. Captured VC weapons and equipment were presented to a Province Chief to be distributed to RF/PF units.

e. Fertilizer was donated to a hamlet to be used in an experiment with vegetable gardens.

f. Arrangements were made with the International Voluntary Service representative to stock a fish pond in a village area.

g. A merry-go-round was installed in a refugee camp.
h. 120 yo-yos were distributed at a resettlement area.
Civil Affairs/Pacific Affairs Bulletin Number 3 dated 25 May 1946
Headquarters I Field Force Victoria, APO 13 Forces 94340

I. The key scouts from An Nan had a weekend course with the QM
when theyScouts at the school grounds. Bus transportation was provided.

J. Villagers were assisted in repairing their village mill.

K. Four refugees are being taught the barbering trade.

L. Action was initiated to equip a village with water and road
barrels for fire fighting.

M. Medical personnel are assisting the village chief in conducting
a personnel census of the village and preparing medical records for
each resident.

N. A dental care class was held for the children in a hamlet.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIALS:

JOHN R. BISHOP, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

WILLIAM B. MATTHEW
Colonel, ASC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

A

G
HEADQUARTERS
I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APU 96210

CIVIL AFFAIRS/PUBLIC AFFAIRS
BULLETIN NUMBER 4

1. PURPOSE: This bulletin is published to assist units by exchanging
ideas and information, highlighting deficiencies and offering possible
solutions.

2. COORDINATING CIVIC ACTION: Units should insure that medical civic
action does not interfere with the Vietnamese local health worker's program
or cause Vietnamese health workers to lose face. It has been reported that
some Vietnamese health workers resent efforts which they believe undermine
their work and their status.

3. PAYING OF WAGES TO VIETNAMESE WORKERS: Some instances have been
reported of individual US soldiers, temporarily in an area, hiring Vietnamese
laborers for 200$VN per day. This has made it difficult to hire laborers at
a fair wage.

action funds to divisions, separate brigades and similar-sized units upon
the request of the unit commander. Divisions are authorized a monthly re-
volving fund of 200,000 $VN while separate brigades and similar-sized units
are furnished 100,000 $VN monthly. For further details see the MACV Directive.

5. MACV CIVIC ACTION FUND:
   a. Reference: Letter MACFPO, 25 Apr 66; Subject: MACV Civic Action
      Fund, and paragraph 4, Civil Affairs/Public Affairs Bulletin No. 3, Headquarters
      I Field Force Vietnam, 28 May 66.
   b. Fund requests are being received for projects which involve
      only Vietnamese participation or for the purpose of purchasing scarce items
      such as refrigerators. Requests for MACV Civic Action Funds for projects
      must reflect US participation in the projects beyond that of donating the
      money.
   c. Fund requests are also being received to purchase equipment
      and materials which are normally supplied by other agencies such as USAID.
      These requests will not be honored unless the items will not be available
      through normal channels within a reasonable period of time.

6. AMERICAN CHRISTMAS TRUCKS AND TRAINS:
   a. The final shipment of ACTY has arrived. The following units
      in II Corps were allocated a portion of the shipment:
VVi 4 Affairo/Public Affairb Bulletin Number 4, 13 July 1966, Headquarters
I Field Force Vietnam

(1) 1st Air Cav Div
(2) 3rd Bde, 25th Inf Div
(3) 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div

b. The above units have been notified. Other US units desiring an allocation should call Sgt Thompson at the Catholic Relief Services office: USAID 467 or Tiger 472.

c. Transportation to move these supplies is an individual unit responsibility.

d. Photographic coverage and related news stories must emphasize the source of supplies, American Christmas Trucks and Trains. The organizations which sponsored this program are the Young Republicans, Young Democrats, and the JAYCEES.

7. CARE (COOPERATION FOR AMERICAN RELIEF EVERYWHERE):

a. CARE has an increased capability to undertake support of special civic action activities, such as furnishing a pump and rotor for irrigation projects. CARE will consider support of special civic action projects when presented a reasonably detailed plan or description of what is desired. Direct contact with CARE is authorized for representatives from brigade or higher headquarters. Telephone of CARE is Post Telephone Telegraphic 25156. Requests from smaller units should be made to the local USAID representative.

b. Coordination with local GVN officials and MACV advisors prior to initiation of these projects is required.

8. ITEMS OF INTEREST FROM WEEKLY CIVIC ACTION REPORTS:

a. Ten thousand vitamin tablets were distributed to three orphanages.

b. A few Montagnards were picked up as VC suspects and were later released after an interrogation. They were transported back to their village and given food, clothing, and blankets to soothe any hard feelings.

c. Rabbits were purchased and will be given to the villagers for breeding purposes.

d. An ice machine is being transported from Saigon for the purpose of reducing the current high price of ice.

e. Baby chickens are being raised for further distribution to local farmers. Distribution will also be made to refugee camps for the establishment of a poultry cooperative.
f. The tops of 55-gallon drums were cut off and the remainder of the drum painted and placed around the city as trash barrels. These barrels were chained to concrete blocks.

g. Windmills were installed resulting in better irrigation for rice paddies.

h. Two thousand fish were stocked in a village pond. The fish were procured from a government fish hatchery.

i. Food and clothing, captured during an operation, were distributed to the residents of a hamlet.

j. Clothing and food packages were dropped into fifteen remote villages. A PSY WAR aircraft explained the meaning of the activity.

k. Experiencing difficulty in controlling the populace during sick calls? Place two vehicles parallel to each other with a space between them large enough for a single column to be formed. This will have the effect of funneling the people to the medical personnel.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:  

J. R. Deane, Jr.  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief of Staff

Neil M. Metzger  
Colonel, Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:  
A
1. The Army has committed its manpower and equipment to assist the Vietnamese farmer harvest rice.

2. In the rice-rich Tuy Hoa Valley of South Vietnam's Phu Yen Province there is enough rice to feed more than 220,000 people for a year. Through the end of 1965 the Viet Cong controlled the area and seized large amounts of rice to sustain local VC units as well as VC units in other parts of South Vietnam. Because of this VC activity, the province government had had to import rice in large quantities to feed the local populace.

3. Beginning in February 1966, United States/Free World Military Assistance Forces were committed to securing the rice in the Tuy Hoa Valley. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and the 2d Republic of Korea Marine Brigade began providing physical security and transportation to enable the local Vietnamese farmers to harvest their rice and bring it into government-controlled areas. During these operations in February and March more than 30,000 metric tons of rice were harvested and secured.

4. While this is only the first phase of what must, of necessity, be a long term operation, some advantages can already be discerned. Deprived of rice, the Viet Cong is forced to either curtail operations by large units in this area or to transport rice from greater distances. It has also eliminated the Tuy Hoa rice bowl as a source of supply for more distant VC units. The people of the Tuy Hoa area have been relieved for the first time in many years of the fear of rice shortages and hunger and have been made aware of VC vulnerabilities. The VC have lost their former omnipotent image.

5. The potential advantages to be gained from the uninterrupted continuation of this operation justify further determined effort. A second rice harvest is due in August. This harvest should produce another 30,000 tons of rice. Minor harvests conducted throughout the year should add approximately 7,000 tons more thus bringing the total...
harvest for the year to between 60,000 and 70,000 tons. This is the total amount required to provide for the needs of the population now under government control in Phu Yen Province, the second most populated province in the II Corps Tactical Zone.

6. There is every reason to believe that the above goals will be met and that with the accomplishment of these goals the people of the area will develop a sense of psychological security possibly never before attained in their life-time. This sense of security should result in even greater gains in production, stabilisation of the economy and increased support for the government. The effort thus far, however, while worthy of note as an outstanding example of the Army's role in counterinsurgency, must be viewed in its proper context: the very first step in a very long term operation.
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(2) Includes 7/30th Arty; 6/14th Arty, and 3/54th Arty.
(3) Includes 7th Avn Br, 14th Avn Br, and 52d Avn Br.

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<tr>
<td>1ST CAV DIV (AM)</td>
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<td>3D BDE 25TH INF DIV</td>
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<td>17TH AVM CP</td>
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FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ASSIGNED, ATTACHED AND OPGUM UNITS OF HQ 1 FIELD FORCE VIETNAM AND THE DATES, BY MONTHS, THAT PERSONAL LETTER MAIL WAS NOT RECEIVED DURING THE PERIOD 1 MAY TO 27 JULY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATES AND COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Air Cav Div (incl 54th Inf Det)</td>
<td>No personal mail received on 22 May, 6, 26 Jun and 6, 16 Jul 66.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde 101st Abn Div</td>
<td>No personal mail received on 1, 9, 12, 13, 15 May, 12, 14, 20 Jun and 9, 11, 26 Jul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 Bde 25th Inf</td>
<td>No personal mail received on 21 Jul 66.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th Inf CP</td>
<td>No personal mail received on 10, 21, and 22 Jul 66. No mail also on 4 days out of first 12 days of May 66. No dates available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93d Div Art Div</td>
<td>No personal mail received on 2, 13, 18, 29 May, 4, 14, 19, 17, 22, 25, 26 Jun and 22, 24 Jul. Figures based on APO files.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Arm Div (incl 69th Inf Det) (incl 850th Hq Recon Det)</td>
<td>No personal mail received by same units assigned to 10th Arm Div on 17, 20, 26, 29 May, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 21, 24, 28, 30 Jun, and 4, 8, 11, 15, 17, Jul 66.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82d Army Gp (includes Army units located at Field)</td>
<td>APO records reflect no personal mail on 18, 21, 22 and 23 Jul 66.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Arm Div</td>
<td>No personal mail received on 2, 3, 8, 10, 12, 20, 29 May, 2, 5, 10, 21, 23, 27 Jun and 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 29 Jul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53d Arm Div</td>
<td>No personal mail received May 5, 14, 25; July 18 and 21.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJOR COMMAND</td>
<td>CLASS I</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JUNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Air Cav Div</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/23rd Inf</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/101st Abn</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I FTOECH (Ang &amp; Atch) Units</td>
<td>1.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>USNAV</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Excess rate attributed entirely to larcenies and auto thefts.
2. Excess rate attributed mainly to aggravated assaults.
3. Excess rate attributed mainly to disorderly conduct, cursing and oft limited violations.
4. Excess rate attributed mainly to speeding violations.

Information for month of July has not been tabulated at this time.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>PERIOD OF VISIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G-3 USARPAC</td>
<td>MG George I. Forsythe</td>
<td>3 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG, 1st Cav Div (Airmobile)</td>
<td>MG John Norton</td>
<td>4 - 5 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications Center</td>
<td>MG Richard J. Meyer</td>
<td>9 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst Sec of Defense for Manpower</td>
<td>Mr. Thomas D. Morris</td>
<td>13 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir of Management and Support of Intel, Ministry of Def. United Kingdom</td>
<td>MG Miles F. Fitzalanhoward</td>
<td>24 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Asst for Counter-insurgency and Spec activities, JCS</td>
<td>MG William R. Peers</td>
<td>25 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Embassy, Sgn</td>
<td>Mr. Robert Rodgers</td>
<td>26 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOMUSKOREA</td>
<td>Gen Dwight E. Beach</td>
<td>26 - 27 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir of Research &amp; Engr, DOD</td>
<td>Dr. John S. Foster Jr.</td>
<td>29 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM General</td>
<td>MG Carl C. Turner</td>
<td>30 - 31 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG, USARV</td>
<td>MG Bruce R. Kendall</td>
<td>31 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV</td>
<td>Gen William C. Westmoreland</td>
<td>3 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV Commanders Conference</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC, USARV</td>
<td>LSG Jean E. Engler</td>
<td>7 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACoS Force Development, DA</td>
<td>LFO James Polk</td>
<td>10 - 11 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG, USA Aviation Ctn</td>
<td>MG John J. Tolson III</td>
<td>12 - 13 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC, Royal Australian Forces Vietnam</td>
<td>MG K. McKay</td>
<td>17 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CofS USMACV</td>
<td>MG William B. Rossen</td>
<td>18 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister in the Foreign Office in Great Britain</td>
<td>Lord Henry D. L. G. Walsten</td>
<td>19 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG, 4th Inf Div</td>
<td>MG Arthur S. Collins Jr.</td>
<td>21 - 22 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir, Far East Region, Office of Amt Sec of Def for Int Sec Affairs</td>
<td>Rear Admiral William E. Lemos</td>
<td>30 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG, Command and General Staff College</td>
<td>MG Michael S. Davison</td>
<td>2 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander TF Seven-Six</td>
<td>Rear Admiral D. W. Wulsen</td>
<td>4 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Honorable James C. Corman (D-Calif)</td>
<td>8 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV</td>
<td>Gen William C. Westmoreland</td>
<td>10 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG, 9th EOK Inf Div</td>
<td>MG Lee So Dong</td>
<td>11 - 12 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG, USA Weapons Command</td>
<td>MG Roland D. Anderson</td>
<td>17 - 18 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-3 MACV</td>
<td>MG John C. F. Tillson III</td>
<td>18 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acting Belgian Ambassador to South Vietnam</td>
<td>Ambassador A. Sellies</td>
<td>21 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUSARPAC</td>
<td>Gen John E. Waters</td>
<td>25 - 26 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir of Def Communications Agency</td>
<td>LTC Alfred D. Starbird</td>
<td>30 - 31 July</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO U.S. FORCES 96295

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (LOI-1) (U) 20 JUL 1966

TO: Commanding Officer
52d Artillery Group
APO 96295

1. (U) General: By General Orders 41B1, HQ, US ARMY, dated 27 June 1966, your group is attached to this command. Operational control will be exercised by I FFORCEN ARMY.

2. (C) Organization and Mission:
   a. Attached:
      (1) 3d Bn, 6th Arty, Pleiku, RVN.
      (2) 6th Bn, 14th Arty, Pleiku, RVN.
      (3) 1st Bn, 30th Arty, Qui Nhon, RVN.
      (4) 77th Radar Detachment, Pleiku, RVN.
      (5) 255th Radar Detachment, Qui Nhon, RVN.
   c. Base Area: Vicinity of Pleiku City, RVN 236535.

3. (S) Execution:
   a. Rules of engagement for artillery fire, naval gunfire and air strikes:
      (1) In other than built up areas, artillery fire, naval gunfire and air strikes may be directed against VC/PAWN forces in contact in accordance with normal procedures. When not in contact, unobserved fire will be directed only at targets or target areas declared hostile by SVN, VN liaison personnel, observers or forward air controllers (FAC).

4936-66
CONSIDERED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECODABLE AFTER 12 YEARS
600 DIR 505.10
SECRET CY 3 or 9 of 40Y5

ARMY 7874
Further, unobserved naval gunfire will be employed only under exceptional circumstances and in cases where:

(a) The requested naval gunfire support missions cannot be observed due to geography, weather, or other factors; or

(b) No US-AOs, FACs or artillery airborne observers trained in naval gunfire spotting are available (conduit of naval gunfire support missions under this proviso must be undertaken as an acknowledged deviation from standard procedures).

(2) Artillery fire, naval gunfire, and air strikes in SVN against known or suspected VC/NVA targets in hamlets and villages occupied by non-combatants are governed by the following criteria:

(a) All attacks will be controlled by an airborne or ground FAC, forward observer, or RVNAF observer and will be executed only after US-GVN-RVNAF approval, as appropriate.

(b) Hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations will not be attacked without prior warning (by leaflets, speaker vans or other appropriate means) even though light fire is received from them.

(e) Hamlets and villages may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area, and if, in the judgment of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning.

(3) Specific rules of engagement governing operations conducted in the vicinity of RVN/Cambodian border are contained in TOP SECRET Inclusion 2, I FORCENV 101, distributed to selected units under separate cover.

b. Civil Disturbances: In the event of civil disturbances, the nearest Vietnamese National Police establishment will be notified. I FORCENV units will take no action other than to defend themselves and property of the US.

4. (U) Administration: Administration channels for your organization will be to this headquarters. Operational matters will be referred to the CC, I FORCENV Artillery.

5. (C) Communications:

a. Internal: Group SOP.

(2) Wire: Establish wire line from Group switchboard to the Pleiku tropospheric scatter site for access to sole-user circuit to this headquarters. Establish separate wire lines to the CP, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div and Pleiku tropospheric scatter site for access to the common-user system.

(3) Teletype: Establish wire line to Pleiku tropospheric scatter site for termination of sole-user teletype circuit to this headquarters.


6. (U) Logistical Support:

a. All classes of supply and maintenance support will be provided by the Pleiku Sub-Area Command.

b. Requisitions and work orders will be submitted directly to the appropriate representative of the Pleiku Sub-Area Command.

c. For those ammunition items not having an ASR, class V supply rates are established by a monthly RSR report. This report is submitted by each battalion or larger unit and is due at HQ I FFORCEN by the 15th of each month, listing the RSR for the following month. RSR reports from battalions under your command will be addressed to CO, I FFORCEN, ATTN: G3 Plans, through CO, 52d Artillery Group with info copy to CO, I FFORCEN Artillery, and in the following format:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PSN</th>
<th>DODAC</th>
<th>Nomenclature</th>
<th>WEAPONS DENSITY</th>
<th>RSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

d. Logistical problems that cannot be resolved by normal support agencies will be referred to AGOS-04, this headquarters through the CO, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

e. Annex H, I FFORCEN Field SUP.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

John R. Drake, Jr.
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

Copies furnished:

1. G1, G3, G4, CO Artillery (I FFORCEN), Brigadier General, USA
2. G1, 77th Radar Detachment
3. 233d Radar Detachment
4. Pleiku Sub-Area Command
5. Copy to G1, 77th Radar Detachment
6. Copy to G1, 233d Radar Detachment
I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM NEWS

4-9-66

I FIELD FORCE HOLDS FLAG RAISING CEREMONY

WITH I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, Dai Ang, RVN—Amid the strains of the Vietnamese, Korean and American national anthems, the flags of these three allied nations, fighting Communist aggression in the Vietnamese central highlands, were raised over Force One’s headquarters for the first time today.

Symbolically the day chosen for the ceremony marked the 16th anniversary of the Communist invasion of South Korea and the corresponding Free World response of military assistance.

Major General Stanley R. (Seeds) Larsen, commanding general of Force One, Major General Tinh-Loo, Vietnamese commander of the II Corps Tactical Zone, and Major General Chae Myung Shin, commander of all Korean forces in Vietnam, presided over the ceremony.

Honor guards from all three nations, under the command of Captain Clinton G. High, of Durham, N. C., were assembled in front of the newly erected flag poles and the assembled crowd of dignitaries which included Mr. Philip G. Habib, political counselor of the U. S. Embassy representing Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Mr. Toek-Koon Lee, charge d' affaires of the Korean Embassy to Vietnam and Lieutenant General John A. Rinzler, deputy commander of the
II United States Military Assistance Command (COMUSMACV) representing General William C. Westmoreland, commanding general, COMUSMACV.

General Larsen, General Vin-loo, Mr. Lee and Mr. Habib all addressed the throng of military spectators and troops which gathered for the event held at Force Victor One's new headquarters in the scenic Nha Trang beachside hotel called Le Grande Hotel.

In his address to the multi-nation troops, General Larsen cited the "close, warm and mutually respected associations" the three nations experienced in their fight against the Viet Cong. He added, "May these flags symbolize that unified strength yet ahead of us which will see this war through to a just peace and freedom for our friends in Vietnam."

Mr. Lee recalled that the 25th of June 1950 lived vividly in the memory of all Koreans as the day the Communists tried to yield their will upon an unwilling people. He cited the example of Free World response to Communist aggression as a principle which his government continues to follow in assisting the people of Vietnam.

General Loch and Mr. Habib both praised the combat accomplishments and fighting spirit of the allied forces in II Corps and both leaders expressed confidence in their ability to carry the fight into the future.

Force One came to Vietnam from Fort Hood, Texas in the crucial days of August 1965 when the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units were making an attempt to cut the war weary country in half by launching a massive monsoon offensive from Pleiku to Qui Nhon. First targeted Task Force Alpha, the combat units of Force One blunted the offensive and have since seized the initiative away from the Communists.
Initially the fighting forces consisted of the 173d Airborne Brigade, the Screaming Eagles of the 101st, a battalion from the 1st Infantry Division and the 2d Battalion of the 7th U. S. Marine Regiment.

The 173d and the Big Red One battalion has since moved to III Corps and are now under the control of II Field Force Vietnam and the Marines have moved to I Corps area.

Since the original organization, the combat capability of Forces One has greatly enhanced the arrival of the 1st Air Cavalry in September, the 3d Brigade of the 25th in December and the 2d Korean Marine Brigade and ROK Tiger Division in October. The Tiger Division was strengthened by the arrival of the 26th ROK Regiment in May to fill out the Division.

Honor guards from the Army of Vietnam, the Republic of Korea Tiger Division and representing the combat units of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division and the 3d Brigade of the 25th Division participated in the ceremony. Music for the occasion was provided by the 1st Air Cavalry Division Band.

-30-
I FIELD FORCE WAR BOUNDUP

By Captain Larry E. Lukens

WITH I FIELD FORCE, PHUC NAM, BHA TRANG, RVN—The combat capability and
achievements of I Field Force are now one of the prime events since they arrived
in Vietnam in August 1965 as Task Force Alpha. The herculean task of blunt-
ing the Communist attempt to cut the worn torn country in half and bring ultimate victory our of North Vietnamese aggression.

Twenty-two American and Korean operations or campaigns undertaken since
Force One's arrival have not only brunted and destroyed the Viet Cong strategy
but have seized the initiative from the once near victorious enemy.

Today, as the battles of Operation Nathan Hale and Paul Revere rage, and
the smoke and dust cleared from the very successful Operation Bartha in
rugged Kontum province, the combat forces of Force One stand poised and ready
for the much talked about North Vietnamese Army Monsoon Offensive of 1966.
Although it has failed to materialize, the American and Korean strikes at Com-
munist main line battalions and regiments could well have been the salve.
Force One's area of responsibility, the Vietnamese II Corps Tactical Zone which stretches from just south of Quang Ngai province on the eastern seacoast to Bien Thuan and Quang Duc on the south contains just about 40 percent of the nation's land mass. In its populous coastal provinces of Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Minh Thuan and Binh Thuan live 1,886,000 people. This area is also the rice bowl of the central section of Vietnam and a valuable prize for he who controls and harvests it. Cutting across the region from northwest to southeast is the rugged Annamite Cordelia and almost hidden behind them you find the Central Highlands with grass lands reminiscent of western United States.

This is the battleground. And a valuable one it is to he who will govern the Republic and achieve military victory.

On this battleground, under control of Force One and exclusive of the Republic of Vietnam forces, we find one American division, the highly mobile and successful—1st Air Cavalry Division with a home station at An Khe halfway between the port city of Qui Nhon and the highland capital of Pleiku; one Korean division—the respected Republic of Korea Capital or "Tiger" Division ---plus two U. S. and one Korean brigade—the battle tested 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, the "vagabonds" of the Vietnam war who have found themselves in almost constant combat since their arrival last July; the 3d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division who made Pleiku their home and have been patrolling in the shadow of the Cambodian border almost in a police beat status and the Korean Marine Brigade which although they are home based at Cam Ranh Bay have been protecting the Tuy Hoa area since January.

(MORE)
The record of these combat troops under the direction of Major General Stanley R. (Swede) Larsen has been distinctive in terms of not only body count—the unofficial yardstick of success the Saigon press corps has adopted, but also in slowly bringing peace to a troubled country side.

Valuable land lines of communication such as Highway 19 from Qui Nhon, a major logistical installation, to An Khe have been secured and a minimum force is needed to provide security the rest of the way to Pleiku. No Allied forces or convoys have suffered the fate of the French's ill-fated Groupment 100 which was destroyed by the Viet Minh in the treacherous Yang Yang Pass just east of the Air Cav's home at An Khe. The guerrilla has still the capability of isolating sniping and an occasional mining but for all practical purposes he hasn't had the capability of halting Allied use of the road.

A valuable side effect of the arrival and success of Force One has been its affect on the morale and combat capability of the Army of Vietnam. At the time of the mass American arrival in II Corps they were a battered but still valiant fighting force. Today they maneuver in areas they never entered before. Their confidence and aggressiveness stands as a mark of progress.

The success of the opening of Highway 19 west of Qui Nhon goes to the tough 29.5 Tiger Division. Although their operations have not been spectacular as far as thousands of enemy dead are concerned, the Tigers have systematically worked to clear the area of VC and helped push the Republic Revolutionary Development program, one of the national objectives, ahead on a daily basis. Commanded by Major General One, Hyung Shin the Tigers have earned the right to their nickname.

(MORE)
A number of names among the twenty-two operations stand out and will long be remembered by the American public and her military community. Names such as Gilmarter, Chu Phong-In Drang, Van Buren, Mash-'E White Wing, Lincoln, Austin 6, Davy Crockett, Paul Revere, Hawthorn, and very recently Nathan Hale. The majority of the monikers bring back the memory of fine American history and rightfully so as the young men who fought them have performed in the finest American tradition. Offering their lives for a cause they knew and felt to be right and just. For if there is one person who has blunted the Communist dream of a quick take over in Vietnam it is the American Fighting Man.

Probably the most significant of the operations were Chu-Phong-In Drang; Van Buren; Mash-'E White Wing; Lincoln; Austin 6, Davy Crockett, Paul Revere, and Hawthorne. Each of these added something to the message of success for the Government of Vietnam cause and a bit more bitter medicine for those in Hanoi.

Chu Phong and In Drang in October began as the 1st Air Cavalry Division came to the assistance of the beleaguered Special Forces Camp of Plei Me south of Pleiku. That the Cavalryman didn’t pack up and go back to An Khe once the job was accomplished could well have been the key. Instead they stayed and shadowed the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces in the area until on the 24th of October they landed at historical Landing Zone "X Ray." From then until 28 November when the NVA broke contact and fled, American soldiers fought their most historic and fierce battle since the Korean War. Air lifting 105 mm Howitzers into positions to pound the hard pressed Communist, the Cav was magnificent. The box there was 1,511 NVA killed by body count and another 2,187 estimated killed. In addition 893 individual and 166 crew served weapons were captured and would never fire at a charging US infantryman again.

(More)
In Van Buren, Vietnamese, Korean, and American soldiers fought for a different objective: rice. Although they managed to kill 672 Communists mainly from the 95th RA Regiment, their important contribution was the protection of 30,000 tons of rice which the hard pressed Communist in Phu Yen valley badly needed. The 101st, the Korean Marines, and the 47th ARVN Regiment severed, hurt the Communist attempt to isolate Ty Hoa and to gain the confidence of the 56,182 farmers and refugees who had crowded into the coastal town. Since the operation which terminated in late February, the villagers have moved back to their farm knowing they will have the protection of the allied forces.

Mariner-White Wing marked the first entrance of U.S. military force into populated "inh Linh, long considered a Communist stronghold. Held by many as Force One and the 1st Air Cavalry: Division's most successful victory it produced 1,800 Viet Cong and NVA dead and sent the highly vaunted Communist force who had been propagandizing themselves as invincible, high-tailing it into the mountains. Entire enemy units decimated and one Viet Cong heavy weapons company lost not only their company commander captured but all of two of their 12.7 machine guns destroyed or captured. Commanded by Col. Hal Moore's III Cav Brigade, once again the enemy proved no match for massed U.S. coordinated air power and fire power.

Operation Lincoln, late March and early April, was dubbed by many as "Oh My Phong Revisited" and that's exactly what it was. Once again the Cav visited LZ "X-Ray" and again found a tough fight on their hands. But again when the VC broke and headed for the border, they left 453 of their fellow Communist lying dead on the mountain redout. And if the NVA were surprised by the Cav coming back to Oh My Phong they were just as surprised when they found Hal Moore's Sky Troopers raiding back into Bong Son in Binh Cha. For twelve days the battle raged and again the Communist came out on the short end of the stick. Three hundred and forty-four were killed, along with the capture of 40 individual and 12 crew served weapons. Nearly one million piasters of North Vietnamese money was confiscated by the Cav.
A regular NVA regiment was caught flat-footed trying to infiltrate into Phu Loc Province by the paratroopers of the 101st in Operation Austin G.

Ironically, 101 of them will never fight again after tangling with the Screaming Eagles.

In their first big fight, the Bronco Brigade of the 5th of the 25th Division did battle with three well-known NVA Regiments — the 32d, 33rd, and 66th in Operation Paul Revere which kicked off west of Pleiku in the border area in early May. In the heavy combat that followed the lightning division infantrymen killed 424 while suffering only light losses themselves.

Knots and Nathan Hale aren't history—they are still news. Capt. Bill Carpenter's dramatic decision to call cascals on his own position to save his hard pressed and encircled troops captured the imagination of the American Press and the American people. In rugged mountain terrain that was so rough that med-evac choppers could not even find a place to settle down, the 101st under the direction of Brigadier General Willard Pearson struck hard at the NVA 24th Regiment and sent them reeling away, without 842 killed by the Diplomat and Warrior soldiers.

Nathan Hale marked the first time the Cav and the 101st had teamed up to give the Communist the one-two punch. The fight began when elements of the 2d of the 327th Airborne looked onto two companies of well equipped Communist troops. Again, it was Hal Moore and his 3rd Brigade which came in to reinforce with two of his battalions and hit back hard at a stubborn enemy. Again the results were strongly in the victory column.

Yes, it's been a long time since Task Force Alpha formed up at Fort Hood and made a move to Vietnam. But, with the Communist monsoon offensive destroyed last year and brunted strongly by the end of June of 66, the enemy force in II Corps certainly must dread the day they ever heard of Swede Larsen and his Force L.

-30-
Subject: Fact Sheet—"The Mine Rules"

The attached fact sheet, "The Mine Rules," is intended for the use of unit commanders and section leaders in order to properly brief their personnel on the importance of conducting themselves in accordance with the Mine Rules. This topic should be presented to all personnel during the month of June.

For the Commander:

R. C. Brown
Captain, AAC
Asst Adjutant General

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as

Distribution:

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Plus
2 = COMBMACY ATTN: MACVIO
3 = USAVC: INFO OFF
1 = 13TH Mil His Det: G
20 = AVP-10
A small card called the Nine Rules, is issued to every serviceman who comes to Vietnam. Though the card is little, its meaning is BIG. These rules apply to every serviceman in Vietnam. If properly applied they will assist in making your tour here more rewarding in the knowledge that you have done your part in upholding the proper image of an American in the eyes of the Vietnamese people.

Let's have a brief look at the "Nine Rules," and what they really mean.

1. Remember we are guests here. We make no demands and seek no special treatment. When coming to a foreign country many things are very different; people, clothes, living conditions, and customs to name a few. Because their way of life is different from what you are accustomed to, you should not take the attitude that they are backward or ignorant. You should act as an American; do the things you have been taught and respect their ways. You are here to assist a country that needs help. To accomplish this you must have the support and respect of every Vietnamese.

2. Join with the people - Understand their life, use phrases from their language and honor their customs and laws. To mingle with the Vietnamese is both important and interesting. The ability to be able to communicate with them can be very helpful to you and your host. By teaching him a few phrases of English, and you learning Vietnamese you will be able to understand each other better. Their customs will appear unusual to you until you take time to understand them.

3. Treat women with politeness and respect. A woman is a woman whether she be Vietnamese or American. She deserves politeness and respect at all times. The color of her skin, the difference of her features does not alter the fact that she is a woman.
make personal friends among the soldiers and common people. The
Vietnamese are our allies, their soldiers stand beside us. Making friends
with the soldiers and the people can make your work easier and your tour more
enjoyable. More important you may form an enduring and meaningful friendship.

5. Always give the Vietnamese the right of way. It's doubtful if you've
ever had to share the road with bicycles, cyclos, motor scooters, and
pedestrians as you do in Vietnam. Here it's very common. The driving and
walking customs here are different from what you are accustomed to back home.
So, for safety's sake, be alert; don't rush, be observant so that you can avoid
accidents. Practice defensive driving, it's a must.

6. Be alert to security and ready to react with your military skill. Be
alert for acts of terrorism. The VC often place claymore mines near bus stops
or other places where people gather. A favorite trick is to set another mine to
go off minutes after the first in order to hit the crowd that has gathered.
Exercise extreme caution if you are near or at a place where one of the bombs
go off.

Always use the buddy system. It's the best practice while on the
streets after dark. Don't wander off by yourself down dark deserted streets.

The Army has taught you how to react. Remain calm and remember what
you've been told.

7. Don't attract attention by loud, rude, or unusual behavior. As a
representative of the United States in a foreign country you are a symbol of
America. If you conduct yourself in a rowdy, adolescent manner, and are
slovenly in appearance, you will ruin the good image the Vietnamese people
have of Americans. Be a gentleman at all times.
SUBJECT: Troop Topic--- Star Spangled Security

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The enclosed troop topic will be presented to all personnel during the month of May.

2. Commanders at all echelons will insure that their personnel are fully informed of the importance of the Savings Bond Program.

3. Staff sections will insure that all officers and noncommissioned officers read the Troop Topic.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. G. Myszka
Captain, AG
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

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2 - COMUSMACV ATTN: MACVIO
3 - USARV INFO OFF
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Uncle 52
Are you getting the most out of your tour in Vietnam? Are you making any plans for the future? For instance, are you putting money away for your return to the States.

Many of us have a hard time saving money. We make all kinds of plans on how much we will save but when it comes down to it, we usually find some place to spend it. Usually on something we think necessary and important.

The smart way to save some money and also make money is pretty obvious. It's the Payroll Savings Plan where a portion of your pay is deducted each month and goes for the purchase of U.S. Savings Bonds.

Last February, President Johnson increased the interest rate on Savings Bonds from 3-3/4 percent to 4.15 percent. This means much more money to you when the bonds reach maturity. By saving as little as $1.70 a week, you could be on the start in a program that will maybe make the down payment on that house you plan on buying when you retire or maybe get started in that business you have always wanted to own.

Another important factor about the Savings Bond Program is the distinct tax advantage you get. Interest earned each year need not be reported as income until bonds reach maturity.

There is no problem in getting enrolled in the Payroll Savings Plan. All it takes is a brief visit to your finance clerk. Just tell him you want to buy a bond every month, or ever three months if you prefer, whichever is convenient to you, and you won't be bothered with putting out the money. You will have to fill out an allotment and from then on, you will be on the way to making money.
As a closing thought we might add something President Johnson said about the Savings Bond.

"The Savings Bond Program is both prudent and patriotic. It is prudent because it strengthens the security of our own family. It is patriotic because it strengthens the economy of our country, it supports our fighting men in Vietnam who need to be supported at this very hour, and it supports the cause of our freedom everywhere in the world. It helps to preserve the buying power of the American dollar."

By participating in the Savings Bond Program, you will also help curb inflation which is spreading throughout the Republic of Vietnam. By saving money through bonds you will be helping withdraw money from the Vietnamese economy and thereby lessen the inflationary effect of our spenders. In the end result you profit, your country benefits and inflation, an enemy of our mission here, is given a setback. Remember, U.S. Savings Bonds give you Star Spangled Security- use them and profit!
INFLATION

Sam cycle drivers and bar-girls lose the war on the home-front that allied military forces apparently winning against the Viet Cong?

She is the average 21 hunting when she drives a cute Vietnamese street with a 20 piaster note in when he overpays a cycle driver 5- piasters.

She wants to drink warm beer in a tent when he can sip cool American beer in a bar while holding hands with a cute bar-girl?

Yes, cycle drivers and bar-girls can do a lot to undermine the war effort of American forces. No one wants to drink warm PX beer when he can have female companionship and cool beer at the same time. But consider the consequences involved—who in the 21 hunting? He is acting himself, not boldly and most importantly he is serving to undermine the Vietnamese economy.

Inflation is the problem that lies at the base of all these questions.

Just what is inflation? Inflation is a state of affairs when you never had so much or partly with it as fast. Instead of having more money than you ever have, inflation means you’ve not twice as much. But it’s only worth half of what you would have if you had what you haven’t got.

Doesn’t take much sense does it? Neither does the fact that the cost of living in the States has risen 25% in the past year. This skyrocketing increase in the cost of living is caused in no small part by the fact that the majority of American servicemen overstay and thereby cause this inflation.

There are now more than 10,000 Vietnamese in the employ of the United States Government.

The average salary of the common laborer, 3,200 VND per week, surpasses that of the professional Vietnamese because the common laborer is allowed to put in a larger amount of overtime thereby pushing his salary up so that it far outstrips that of a school teacher, or other professional person.

The average American corporal makes more than a Vietnamese Lieutenant Colonel. This fact is indicative of the large amount of currency that American servicemen have to pump into the Vietnamese economy.

There are two general causes of inflation in South Vietnam. The shortage of goods in many areas resulting from inadequate distribution or unavailability of supplies is one cause. A large part of this results from the lack of road security, some from the remoteness of the areas and some from the fact that certain types of products are generally scarce in Vietnam.

Inflationary pressures of this type can be reduced by opening roads and obtaining goods through foreign aid but this type of inflation will probably exist even after security is assured because of the nature of the Vietnamese economy. The second class of inflation results from the excessive amount of piasters flowing into the hands of Vietnamese from U.S. sources without a compensating increase in consumer goods.

The people who are hurt most by inflation are those such as teachers, civilian government employees, military personnel and students. They make, perhaps, 2,000 VND a month, whereas high spending Allied Forces may push a bar-girl’s salary to that much in a week.

These “fixed-income” people are the influential class in South Vietnam and will be the people that determine the future of the government here. Therefore, control of the inflation becomes critical to the well-being and to the political stability of the government of South Vietnam.
Much has to be said about the "black market" here in South Vietnam. One can easily see that the purchase of cigarettes and beer from the PX and the subsequent resale of these items to "black market" merchants is hurting not only yourself in the long run in that it may endanger your military career and scar you for life. It also deprives your fellow soldiers of the items that they could normally purchase in the PX.

Therefore, the only person who benefits from the "black market" is the merchant who has little or no interest in the governmental stability of South Vietnam.

This particular individual is simply out for a "fast buck" and as long as there are unscrupulous individuals who will purchase commodities from the PX and then resell these items, this individual will certainly operate.

In a free economy it is natural for a merchant to attempt to get as much as he can for his product. In a seller's market sometimes the prices can become exorbitantly ridiculous. Prices can be held down. Determination on the part of U.S. servicemen not to pay the exorbitant prices of the merchants will serve to bring these prices back into line.

If the average serviceman would remember to send home all excess funds and keep the bare minimum on hand to suffice each month, he would be in much better shape. Buy in the PX. If you feel the compulsion to buy downtown, offer the merchant 25% of what he wants and don't pay more than 50%.

It is the natural American tendency, to tip profusely. Watch this! Some of the tips Vietnamese receive are in excess of what they sometimes make for an hour's work.

Be cognizant of the fact that cyclo-drivers, bar-girls and maids are often making more than you. Security has improved immeasurably over the past few months, but instances of individuals losing possessions from rooms or on the beach are still prevalent. Watch all the possession you value!

Cyclo fares have been established as follows:
a. One trip within one kilometer (0.62 miles) 10VNS
b. Over one kilometer (0.62 miles) 5VNS for each additional 100m
c. From 2200 hours to 0600 hours the next morning rates will increase 50%
d. One hour of riding with intermittent stops 35VNS
e. One hour of continuous riding - 45VNS
f. Rates will increase 50% if heavy cumbersome baggage is to accompany passenger. (Baggage should in no way impair the visual range of the driver.)

If a place charges excessive prices—stay out of it. Again this can only force that establishment to bring prices into line. If this place doesn't do this it will soon be forced to close its doors.

Why not make your tour here in Vietnam one in which you can save money. Keep only the portion of your pay that is essential to live on. Send the rest home and at the end of your tour you will find that you have accrued a nice little nest egg.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
AFU 96240

9 June 1966

SUBJECT: Troop Topic—Truth: an American Weapon

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The enclosed troop topic will be presented to all personnel during the month of June.

2. Staff sections will insure that all officers and noncommissioned officers read the topic and commanders at all echelons will insure that their personnel are fully informed of its importance.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

R. C. WARD
Captain, 80
assistant Adjutant General

1 Incl

DISTRIBUTION:

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2 - COMUSMACV ATTN: MACV/4
3 - USAREUR INFO OFF
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[Incl. 54]
Throughout the years the American armed Forces have found justifiable pride in their record of keeping their servicemen informed.

There was no "grand decision" on the part of anyone, it is a simple fact of the American way of life. The military leaders of the United States throughout the history of our country have believed that "an informed soldier is a better soldier." In reality, truth is an American weapon.

In Vietnam today, the Communist are making an increasing effort to try to destroy the morale of the American fighting man through the use of propaganda. It is easy to see why the rulers of Hanoi and Peking have increased their efforts through such outlets as Radio Hanoi and Radio Peking.

Unlike the conditions which exist in a totalitarian communist state, American authorities in Vietnam make no effort to hide or shield their soldiers from Red propaganda. Any soldier who has the money can buy a radio with a short wave band in the PX Exchange and if he is so inclined he can tune into Hanoi Hana or Peking Polly without any repercussions from his commander.

How is this possible? The reason is simple: We firmly believe that the American fighting man, with the truth as his best weapon, can easily sift Communist half-truths and lies out of the Red message. This trust has been renewed by American fighting men throughout history. Such vehicles like Troop Topics like this one; Stars and Stripes, Armed Forces Radio and free access to news from home are used by our government to present all sides of an issue to the soldier.

But it isn't enough to just shrug off Communist propaganda. Each of us must be able to recognize Communist propaganda for what it is. Simply stated, any propaganda is only the use of words, pictures or sound to convince someone to act or believe in a manner favorable to the propagandist. Not all Communist propaganda is lies. The Reds have long since realized that a little truth intermingled with half-truths and outright falsehoods go a long way. They'll try to interest you with the truth, keep your interest with the half-truths, and then sock you: the hard Communist propaganda line hits you in the face. They'll try to use your fears, frustrations, or the sometimes uncertainty of a situation to make you doubt your own cause and the cause of your country. Rumors are a favorite vehicle for the Red message.
One of their favorite targets are minority groups. The Communist con-
tinually try to split a unit or a group apart by playing friend against
friend. In this way he hopes to destroy the trust, respect and friendship
that built up between members of a squad, a platoon, a company or higher
units. They have played highly the demonstrations at home and will con-
tinue to give stress to events that they can perlay into solid evidence of
non-support of the home front. He cares not if this line of reasoning be
totally untrue.

Unfortunately the actions and behavior of some of us serving in Viet-
nam provide fuel for the Communist propaganda fire. A drunken soldier who
engages in a verbal or physical assault on a Vietnamese citizen is surely
making the Communist image of the American Imperialist soldier more believ-
able to some. Remember the Nine Rules. No matter how simple they sound,
they are the basic document for your conduct here in Vietnam.

In summary, we can say that keeping ourselves informed is the best
weapon we have available to refute Communist propaganda. Keep your eye
and ears open for wild ridiculous rumors which might have been started by
someone less than friendly to your country. Remember your nation from the
days of the Minute Men to today has always fostered the ideal that "an in-
formed soldier is a better soldier." Our democratic way of life is based
on this ideal. With truth as your best weapon we have faith that you will
continue to serve your country in the admirable fashion you have done al-
ready.