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SECRET
FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM

COMMAND REPORT
QUARTER ENDING 30 SEPTEMBER 1965

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HEADQUARTERS,
FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM
APO US Forces 96307


TO: Commanding General
U. S. Army, Vietnam
ATTN: ASCY-C
APO US Forces 96307

SECTION I: SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (S) GENERAL: On 13 July 1965, DA SECRET message 723643 was received from DOPPER at HQS III Corps, Ft. Hood, Texas, directing that headquarters to prepare for movement of a TOE Corps HQS to the Republic of Vietnam. USARPAC GO 233 dated 20 July 1965 (Incl 1), activated Headquarters United States Army Task Force Alfa (USATFA), effective 1 August 1965, as a TD unit assigned to United States Army Vietnam (USARV). The headquarters was authorized 29 officers and 29 NCO's. No equipment authorization was published.

On 25 July 1965 an initial TDY group of 29 officers and men from Commander U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) and USARV resources were assembled at NHA TRANG, VN, as the Task Force planning group with Brigadier General Paul F. Smith assuming command of USATFA on 1 Aug 65 (Incl 2). The first increment from Fort Hood departed CONUS on 5 Aug 65, arriving in NHA TRANG on 11 Aug 65 and the second increment departed CONUS on 17 Aug 65 arriving in SAIGON on 18 Aug 65. The last element closed in NHA TRANG on 1 Sep 65.

In accordance with GO 2 HQS USATFA, dtd 4 Aug 65, Major General Stanley R. Larsen assumed command of USATFA (Incl 3). On 25 Sep 65, USATFA was designated Field Force, Vietnam (FFORCEV) assuming OPCON of the II Corps Advisory Group in accordance with CONFIDENTIAL message 33682 from MACV J3, DTG 251614Z.

The major activities conducted by this command during this past quarter were activation, movement overseas, organization of the headquarters, preparing for and reception of major US units under operational control (OPCON) of this headquarters, and combat operations.

2. (S) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES:

a. In preparing for the move from Ft. Hood, eligible personnel assigned to III Corps TOE positions were utilized to fill the newly created

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD INR 5200.10
unit. DA SLCRT message 725981 authorized a 13 space augmentation to provide for a Deputy Commander, an Artillery Staff Section and a G5 Section.

The initial TDY group was satellited upon 5th Special Forces Group for logistical and administrative support. Some of these personnel were later integrated into the permanent staff to insure operational continuity and provide the headquarters with in-country experienced personnel.

Prior to the arrival of the main body from CONUS and after the mission stated and implied was ascertained, a TD organization (using Combat Service Support Structure for the Field Army (COSTA) concept) for TFA was developed. Commensurate with mission requirements, command lines, and envisioned modus operandi, TOE 52-1D was considered inadequate to satisfy the existing and anticipated requirements. Therefore the spaces cut from the administrative and technical staff sections were assigned primarily to the G2 and G3 Section. Personnel with skills excess to the needs of TFA were released to USARV prior to arrival of the main body, simultaneously a requirement was placed on HQ, USAV, to provide combat arms officers and Enlisted as replacements to satisfy immediate operational requirements. At the same time a need for indigenous personnel was recognized. Authorization to hire 50 Vietnamese personnel to be used for drivers, laborers, interpreters and clerks was requested and approved. As of 30 Sep, 20 persons had been hired.

In order to obtain personnel familiar with techniques and procedures of the Government and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam a personnel infusion plan was developed when the headquarters was established. This action resulted in the exchange of 18% of USATFA authorized strength for in-country experienced personnel. These personnel contributed greatly to the swift and smooth organization and establishment of a functioning headquarters in a minimum period of time. The need to develop a more comprehensive plan to minimize the impact that would result in loss of personnel in August 1966 was quickly recognized. Basically the plan was predicated upon the promise that no more than 15% of the headquarters personnel would be lost in any one month. The plan envisioned in-country transfer of officers and Enlisted between the 4th and 8th month of their RVN tour. This would provide in-country experience for the gaining units, encourage volunteer extensions, and would result in curtailing the tour of 18 personnel.

Tactical units and control headquarters must have an organic capability to communicate and effect liaison with adjacent and higher headquarters. In order to meet immediate minimum operational requirements, it was determined that an interim requirement existed for 60 interpreters/translators for a division size force, 20 for a separate brigade size force, 4 for HQ FFORCE, and 16 for FFORCE assigned/attached units. These requirements were coordinated with USAV, and at the end of the quarter were being satisfied rapidly and were being programmed for incoming units.
The arrival of non-English speaking 3rd Country Forces (ROK) in RVN further complicated the communications/liaison problems. PFORCEV requested and was granted an eight space augmentation to establish two liaison groups. One team of 3 officers and 2 EAs was to be located at the ROK division headquarters and one team of 2 officers and one EA was to be located with the separate ROK Marine Brigade. These teams joined their respective advance planning groups immediately after arrival in country.

b. In the area of personnel services subordinate assigned/attached units and OPCON units were generally able to follow existing doctrine, policy, and procedures. However, several problem areas developed.

Post Exchange: The Navy system as administered through Headquarters Support Activity (HLSUPACT) was found inadequate in that it was not responsive and required the full-time services of an abnormal number of unauthorized U.S. personnel. When the Army-Air Force Exchange Service assumes the role of PX provider and organizer this situation should be alleviated.

Administration of Pay and Personnel Records: It was expected that a supporting unit would provide personnel administration for PFORCEV assigned personnel. However, no unit capable of assuming these functions was available in-country or programmed during Phase I. The reorganized TD headquarters included an understrength personnel section as a nucleus to provide the essential services.

Memorial Service: Procedures for timely and appropriate recognition and honoring of deceased became difficult to administer. To insure proper services and reduce the drain on resources, this headquarters proposed establishing a representative contingent at Saigon rather than sending unit representatives on an as-needed basis.

c. The AG Section of this headquarters was established on 26 July 1965. By using borrowed personnel it was able to operate a joint classified and unclassified message center. On 19 Aug 65, it became fully functional and on 1 Sep 65 reached authorized strength. Efficient mail service was established on 23 Aug 65 being served by APO 96240. Military personnel and administrative services were satisfactory at the end of the quarter.

d. The Provost Marshal Section became operational on 5 Sep 65. During this period numerous liaison visits were made with counterparts in higher and adjacent headquarters, and in units under OPCON of PFORCEV. Liaison was also maintained with United States Operations Mission (USOM) Public Safety Officers. Initial plans were made, approved and implemented for the employment of two platoons of the 272d MP Co to secure the site of the future headquarters of PFORCEV, as well as certain sleeping quarters within the city of NHA TRANG. The other platoon was utilized as a reserve and to provide security for important convoys on Route 1 between NHA TRANG and DONG BA THIN as necessary.
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a. The SJA Section of this HQS became operational on 2 Sep 65. After defining the special and summary court martial convening authorities in the area and becoming familiar with existing regulations and directives of higher headquarters, this section made its services available to the many units and small detachments of the area.

The major projects were undertaken to insulate the CG FFGCEV from lower echelon responsibilities of military justice (Incl 4) and to clarify General Court Martial convening authority and responsibilities for Judge Advocate Services (Incl 5).

f. The Information office became operational on 5 August 1965. Although it lacked experienced writers it was able to process more than 200 hometown news releases, 31 hard news stories and 8 feature stories. Additionally the office assisted over 40 US and Foreign correspondents. In order to excite press interest and respect for the mission of the command, a "Daily War Story" (Incl 6) was published by this office and circulated by the MACV IO at the daily press briefing in Saigon.

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: The establishment and organization of the intelligence element for the Headquarters was initiated by TDY personnel selected from those assigned to the intelligence system already in country, principally HQ MACV J2. Primary tasks were: setting up of Order of Battle files, situation maps, and basic reference files, conducting limited planning for early operations, and establishing initial intelligence contacts and channels. Permanent party personnel began arriving from COMUS as well as from in-country on 10 August and expanded the essential activities already begun.

The Imagery Interpretation Section of the 181st H&I Det of the 1st Bde 101st Abn Div supported G2 Air until arrival of the Imagery Interpretation Section of the 55th H&I Detachment on 21 Sep 65. Aerial surveillance was inadequate due to the absence of organic aircraft and the fact that requirements had to be transmitted to the Air Force through II Corps DiSC and thence to the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Saigon. A marked improvement in capability was expected from the establishment of the FFGCEV DiSC and from the arrival of the 20th ASTA Platoon in October.

Initial counterintelligence activities were limited to liaison with local agencies already in being. The arrival in country of personnel with proper security clearances permitted rapid development of restricted access areas.

The following intelligence units joined the headquarters on 22 Sep 65 and began to phase into intelligence activities: 55th H&I Det (Corps), 45th H&I Det (AIRS), 407th A&I Intm, 18th C&G Det, 18th Sig Det, 30th TO Det, 528th Ord Det, and 590th CM Det. As of 30 September, none of these detachments were fully operational due to non-arrival of their equipment.
To summarize activities during the reporting period, the Viet Cong (VC) maintained their ability to replace losses and their capability of infiltrating at least 1,000 men per month in the form of cadres from North Vietnam. During the month of August, VC activity was primarily in KONTUM province while in September their main activity was centered in Northern and Central BINH DINH province, where an apparent build-up was taking place, units up to and including battalion size being suspected. This apparent build-up could be attributed to the urgent need of rice and fish by the VC and the harvest season reaching its peak during September in the coastal areas. It is also expected that the VC will take advantage of the rainy North East monsoon along the coast to stage their winter offensive actions. Order of Battle as of 30 September (Incl 7).

4. (S) OPERATIONAL AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES:

a. On 5 Aug 65, the G3 Section of this headquarters became operational. On this same date, OPLAN 1-65 was published based on a TOP SECRET letter of instructions (Control #1010) from COMUSVIET also dated 5 Aug 65 stating the mission and designating units under OPCON of USATFA. The intention of this plan was to inform those designated units that USATFA has assumed OPCON and to provide them with initial guidance for future operations. The mission statement was general in nature encompassing three actions: assumption of control of designated units by USATFA; defense of key United States/Government Vietnam (US/GVN) installations; and maintenance of the capability to conduct country wide offensive operations in support of the Vietnamese Forces. The concept went into detail on the methods of defending the key US/GVN installations and was specifically oriented towards the base areas of the US/Third Country Units. On 14 Aug 65, a TWX was distributed designating OPLAN 1-65 as OPLAN 1-65.

The major units under OPCON of USATFA at the time of execution of OPLAN 1-65 were: 3/73d Abn Bde, 2d Bde 1st Inf Div, 1st Bde 101st Abn Div and 2d Bn 7th Marine (Reinf) (Incl 8). As indicated by inclosure 8, later changes occurred in the operational control of units. At the end of the reporting period the 1st Arty Cus Div, 1st Bde 101st Abn Div, 2d Bn 7th Marine (Reinf) were under the operational control of FFORCEV.

Based on intelligence reports indicating a possible VC attack upon the NHA TRUNG complex, OPLAN 5-65 (OPN CUTLASS) was published in TWX form on 18 Aug 65. The 1st Bde 101st Abn Div was given the mission of conducting operations in a designated zone south of NHA TRUNG to destroy VC/PAVN forces during the period 19-22 Aug in coordination with the 5th Special Force Group (SFGR) and local advisors. A minimum of two patrol bases were to be established. On 191000H Aug, operation CUTFASS was initiated. Two patrol bases were established and numerous patrols were sent out with the mission of searching out and destroying the enemy forces reported operating in the area. The operation terminated at 221800H Aug, with negative contact.
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On 190400H Aug 65 the 1st Bn 16th Inf 2d Bde 1st Inf Div, then attached to the 1st Bde 101st Abn Div, conducted a search and destroy operation (OPN BARRACUDA) in Khanh Hoa Province. The operation terminated successfully on 201730H Aug 65 resulting in VC losses of 25 kIA, 3 WiA and 7 captured with friendly losses of 1 MLA.

On 19 Aug 65, OPLAN 6-65, designated as operation RAMROD (later changed to operation HIGHLAND because of possible compromise) was published. This plan involved the securing of a division base area, a port facility, and the route between these two installations to permit the unopposed deployment and combat configuration of the 1st Air Cav Div. It was felt that this Division would be extremely vulnerable during the unloading, movement to, and occupation of their initial base area. The plan called for securing of the base area (An Khe) by one Bn 1st Bde 101st Abn Div while the Bde (-) secured the route (Hwy 19) (Incl 10). 2d Bn 7th Mar (Reinf) and friendly Vietnamese units were to secure the port facility (QUI NHUI). During the movement of the 1st Air Cav Div to its base area, the convoys would be secured by other elements of the 1st Bde 101st Abn Div. Once the newly arrived unit had closed into the base area, the 1st Bde 101st Abn Div would continue to secure and patrol around the division perimeter until the 1st Air Cav Div was capable of providing its own security. This OPLAN was instituted as OPORD 6-65 on 25 Aug 65. The OPORD was executed as planned with the 1st Bde 101st Abn Div assuming responsibility for securing Hwy 19 and the AN KHE area (Incl 10). 1st Air Cav Div moved to and occupied the base area and then prepared for operational missions. No major incidents occurred and no VC contacts were made by the 1st Air Cav Div prior to its assumption of responsibility for its base on 28 September. On 30 Sep the Div declared itself prepared to assume its T/O.

On 2 Sep 65, USITFA received message (TMX 3120) from COMUSMACV directing the release of OPCON of the 173d Abn Bde and the 2d Bde 1st Inf, to include the latter's subordinate unit, the 1st Bn 18th Inf, then securing the port of CAM RANH BAY (effective 8 Sep 65). In addition, USITFA was relieved of responsibility for the III Corps Tactical Zone.

OPLAN 7-65 (GOODFRIEND I), published on 13 Sep, was similar to OPLAN 6-65. Based on reports and liaison, it was decided that the 1st Air Cav Div would soon be prepared to assume responsibility for a portion of its own division base area. This would permit movement of a battalion from the 1st Bde 101st Abn Div to CAM RANH BAY to relieve the 1st Bn 18th Inf. The port at CAM RANH BAY and a base area in the immediate vicinity would be secured by this battalion for the arrival of the ROK Marine Bde. The 1st Bn 18th Inf would then revert to OPCON of its parent unit. This plan became OPORD 7-65 on 25 Sep 65. On this same date the advanced elements of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Marine Bde arrived in NHA THANG and moved immediately to the CAM RANH BAY area to prepare for the arrival of the ROK Marine Brigade. In conformance with this OPORD the 2d Bn 502d Inf 101st Abn Div moved from the
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vicinity of QUI NHON to CAM RANH BAY on 22 Sep and the 1st BN 18th Inf returned to BUEN HOA and OPCON of its parent unit. As of the end of this reporting period all phases of the plan were being executed. Operational activity of this command has been successful as evidenced by the results contained in inclosure II.

b. In the area of training, a team of in-country personnel (Incl 12) prepared and conducted a pre-combat orientation course (Incl 13) to 800 individuals a day of the 1st Air Cav Div at AN KHE during the period 15-27 September 1965. A Naval Gunfire team of the Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company ANGLICO conducted an orientation on 20 Sep for personnel of the 1st Air Cav on the Capabilities and Limitations of Naval Gunfire.

On 12 Sep, a letter of welcome with a list of DO'S and DON'TS for Combat in Vietnam (Incl 14) were distributed down to Platoon Leader level in the 1st Air Cav Div. Similar distribution to be made to the ROK units.

c. The G3 Air Section was primarily engaged in requesting and establishing a Direct Air Support Center (DASC) with Field Force Headquarters, and in securing adequate Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP'S) for units under the operational control of Field Force, Vietnam.

A coordination meeting was conducted on 30 Sep 65 with representatives from the 1st Cav; 1st BN 101st Abn Div; 2/7 Marines, and interested staff sections from HQ Field Force, Vietnam. The purpose of this conference was to discuss in detail Tactical Air Support request procedures and the employment of tactical air firepower.

Representatives from the G3 Air Section conducted liaison visits during August and September to all units in Vietnam under the OPCON of the headquarters. The main purpose of these visits was to discuss problem areas in tactical air support. Similar visits were planned for the ROK units upon their arrival in Vietnam.

During the initial stage of organization, there was some reluctance on the part of the 2d Air Division to authorize the establishment and retention of a Direct Air Support Center (DASC) at the headquarters. The need for a DASC co-located with HQ Field Force, Vietnam was considered essential to responsive close air support for U.S. and third country units. At the time, all requests for close air support were routed directly into II Corps DASC at PLEIKU for action. However, the requirement for a DASC at HQ Field Force, Vietnam was finally substantiated and approved. Once this DASC becomes fully operational a more responsive tactical air ground system will be in existence for support of FFORCEV units.

A letter from CG, Field Force, Vietnam to CH USMACV requesting augmentation of Ground Liaison Officer (GLO) Teams was submitted 2 Aug 65 with follow
up action in the form of letters or messages on 29 Aug, 2 Sep, 7 Sep, and 29 Sep. As a result, all officer requirements were met, but vacancies still existed for four NCO's (E-6) and four Teams, RB Mobile Radio with equipment. At the end of the quarter, action was being taken to acquire the NCO's through existing sources in Vietnam, while the expected date of arrival for the Radio Teams was still pending.

Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP's) were requested for all units under OPCON of FFORCEV. The 1st Bde 101st Abn Div arrived in-country without TACP's; as of 30 Sep only one of the four authorized Parties had been assigned, the remaining ones being scheduled to arrive during the month of Oct. The 1st Air Cav Div arrived with its authorized complement. TACP's for the Republic of Korea Division were scheduled to join the division in Vietnam.

d. The Aviation Section of HQS FFORCEV became operational on 20 Aug 65. Liaison visits were made to higher and subordinate headquarters by the Aviation Officer. Temporary OPCON of 5 fixed wing and ten rotary wing aircraft was obtained to provide administrative support to HQ USAFRA. FFORCEV was assigned OPCON of aviation assets allocated to SA II Corps on 25 Sep 65. 52d Aviation Battalion with then current assets minus 145th Airmobile Platoon was then reallocated to OPCON SA II Corps. HQ FFORCEV retained OPCON 117th Abn Co and 145th Abn Plt. Avn Section 30th Hq Co, FFORCEV, became operational 1 Oct 65.

Other activities accomplished during the period were plans for improvement/ construction of C130-capable airfields and plans for positioning of incoming airmobile companies.

e. The Psychological Warfare (PsyWar) Section of G3 became operational on 12 Aug 65. Initially the section formulated plans and performed research on the PsyWar situation in Vietnam in relation to the mission of FFORCEV. Liaison was made with the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) and the United States Operations Mission (USOM) as well as with other military PsyWar personnel in country. Recommendations were made for deployment of the 24th Psy Ops Det in NHA TRANG and the 25th Psy Ops Det in PLEIKU. As of the end of the reporting period the 24th Psy Ops Det had received all its personnel and equipment. Equipment for the 25th Psy Ops Det has not yet arrived. A significant problem precluding both units from becoming fully effective in the near future resulted from their movement to Vietnam without a full issue of expendables, many of which were not locally procurable.

f. The Signal Section of the HQS became operational on 19 Aug 65. During the period communication support for the headquarters was furnished by Det 1, Co C, 41st Sig Bn. Aside from meeting the normal administrative problems of settling in a new area, the major activities of this section involved: attempting to obtain adequate Command Control, and administrative
and logistics communications (Incl 15), establishing Command SOI and SSI, obtaining and improving internal headquarters communications, and sponsoring the arrival of the 54th Signal Battalion, Corps.

g. The Chemical Section became operational on 9 Sep 65, with the primary mission of coordinating defoliation and crop destruction operations (Incl 16) for units under OPCON of the headquarters. Crop destruction operations (Incl 17) began in BINH DINH province on 23 Sep and were expected to be completed on 15 Oct 65. Concurrently, defoliation operations were carried out along Highway 19 between AN KHE and QUI NHON. Approval granted by higher authority to conduct crop destruction in PHY YEN and PLEIKU provinces commencing with PHY YEN on 4 Oct 65.

5. (U) LOGISTICAL ACTIVITIES: Upon becoming operational, the G4 assisted in planning operations by units under the OPCON of FFORCEV. Advance elements were sent to QUI NHON, AN KHE, PLEIKU and CAM RANH BAY, among other locations, during this period. These personnel assisted unit movements and helped define logistical problem areas arising within OPCON units. Reporting and command control were greatly facilitated through the efforts of those advance sections, one of which continued to function in the QUI NHON area to assist in the arrival and deployment of the ROK Tiger Division.

Major movements of OPCON units during the period included the 1st Air Cav Div which closed in country at AN KHE, the 1st Bde 10lst Abn Div which moved from CAM RANH BAY - DONG BAI THIN area to AN KHE to provide security for the 1st Air Cav Div, the 173d Abn Bde (subsequently removed from OPCON this Hqs) which moved from BIEN HOA to PLEIKU and back, and the reception of the advance party, ROK Tiger Division. These movements and associated logistical matters such as supply buildup and prestocking were all expedited by advance elements from this section as mentioned above. During the course of these movements, coordination was effected with HQ USARV, 1st Log Cmd and the NHA TRANG and QUI NHON Support Areas permitting rapid reaction to logistical problem areas. For example, extreme transportation limitations in the QUI NHON area were alleviated by the shifting of 40 trucks from NHA TRANG to QUI NHON, an action requested by HQ FFORCEV.

Specific studies were conducted during the period such as: sewage disposal problems at AN KHE for the 1st Air Cav Div; water supply problems at AN KHE; beach, rail and highway study - CAM RANH BAY - QUI NHON - PLEIKU; bridge requirements, highways 1 and 19; base development and troop list development.

Unit arrivals in country lacked coordination in that troops arrived prior to equipment and occasionally vice versa. In addition, troops arrived with essential equipment (individual shelter halves, weapons, mess gear) packed as Red Disc TAT and had to be deployed without it. By assistance from units
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in country and from the NHA TRANG Support Area all units were accommodated until their equipment arrived. However, the solution was only arrived at after exhausting the equipment resources in the entire NHA TRANG area and by expediting shipment of tentage from SAIGON. Additionally, overcrowding of existing troop mess facilities was occasioned by lack of unit or individual mess equipment.

Project PUSH, (Automatic resupply), although partially alleviating supply problems in newly arrived major units, was found to be no substitute for individual requisitions. Units arrived less PLL/ASL repair parts and did not understand the supply system and particularly the reason for PUSH. A serious shortage of jungle boots and fatigues developed in-country. This headquarters attempted to alleviate the most immediate short by specifying priorities of issue to OCON units. However the extent of the shortage was such that in-country stocks and incoming shipments were not sufficient to cover urgent requirements for combat units. Although some clothing arrived piecemeal in PUSH shipments, the majority arrived separately, directly from the manufacturer as it was ready in time for PUSH shipment. Recommendations were made regarding requisitioning of substitute items (standard boots and fatigues). However, lead time did not allow for delivery of even substitute items in sufficient time.

During one coastal sea-lift operation, it was apparent that inadequate preparation had been made for lift. By personal contact, the problem was solved and the units moved successfully. It was discovered from this incident that no theater SOP for sea lift existed. This incident led to the completion of a suitable SOP.

It became apparent that in-country stockage of modules for new series radios was negligible, this predicting high deadline rates in the near future and a corresponding decrease in communications capabilities within units. The problem was temporarily alleviated through use of spares from the 1st Air Cav which brought ample stocks with it. However, the 1/101st requested 500 modules of various types prior to departure from CONUS, but received only 30 by the end of the quarter. Lack of a complete programmed issue of equipment magnified the problem. Issue of the new series of radios just prior to departure of the unit was the primary cause of the shortage; additionally, supply slippage delayed delivery of requisitioned repair parts.

6. (U) CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES: The G5 Section became fully operational on 25 August 1965. Its major effort during the period was to determine what guidance on US Civil Affairs activities exist and what resources were available to US units for civic action purposes. This was resolved by liaison visits to the many Provincial and National agencies concerned and resulted in the publication of Regulation 10-1 H&TS TPA, dtd 8 Sep 65 (Incl 18). During these visits it was noted that there was a lack of any type of publication stating just what the different agencies within Vietnam were responsible for or what
could be obtained from them. This section completed, by the end of this reporting period, a consolidation of such required information and planned to distribute the document in early October.

It was determined that material needed to support a military civic action program could not be made readily available by USARV because items became the property of the GVN when they arrived in-country. This problem has not been satisfactorily resolved.

Civil Affairs responsibilities in a counterinsurgency situation far exceeded the capabilities of the two officers and one clerk-typist assigned.

7. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES: The Inspector General Section of the headquarters arrived in Saigon on 19 Aug 65. The personnel were then reassigned leaving only one IG and one clerk. This required the IG to perform as an Administrative Supervisor along with his normal duties. Prior to becoming operational on 8 Sep 65, the section worked with G3 USARV. On 31 August, CG USARV directed the IG to conduct a special investigation concerning the reporting activities of III Corps Advisory Team (Incl 19). From 9-17 Sep 65, the IG conducted an investigation concerning the facts surrounding the reported use of Chemical Agents by the 2d Battalion 7th Marine Regiment on 5 Sep 65, in the vicinity of QUI NHON, Vietnam (Incl 20).

SECTION II COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

(U) The following recommendations are submitted:

a. That cellular type support units be deployed simultaneously with Corps Headquarters to provide minimum essential service support pending arrival of normal support units, i.e. car company, admin detachment, maintenance elements etc.

b. That the current Corps Headquarters TOE be augmented to provide sufficient additional intelligence and operational personnel to permit sustained operations at peak efficiency.

c. That General Court Martial and JA Services be allocated on a geographical basis in Vietnam.

d. That Logistical and Communication support units should be programmed to be operational in-country prior to the arrival of the unit or headquarters to be supported.

e. That in-country signal frequencies be reviewed on a continuing basis and that assignments be made according to priority of requirement.
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Reports Control CSGFO-28 (R!) (U)

f. That in-country signal frequencies be assigned by block, to appropriate headquarters, to permit rapid response to tactical communications requirements.

g. That all units arriving in Vietnam be accompanied by complete field equipment, individual weapons, ammunition and unit equipment as to be fully prepared to live in the field on arrival.

h. That the issue of new types of equipment be limited unless the following criteria are met:

(1) Units are fully trained in the operation and maintenance of new equipment before issue.

(2) Units are in possession of complete PLL/ASL repair parts before deployment.

i. That authority be granted USCM to provide U.S. forces with material to support a U.S. military civic action program.

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STANLEY R. LARSEN
Major General, USA
Commanding
AVG (15 Oct 65) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 September 1965
Reports Control GSCPO-28 (RL) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96307 Nov 4 1965

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GHQ-4-H, APO US Forces 96558

1. (S) Reference Section I, paragraph 2b: USARV non-concurred in recent proposal by MACV (revision to MACV Directive 600-e) to modify memorial services held on Tan Son Nhut and recommended that memorial services at Tan Son Nhut be discontinued with services to be conducted at unit areas.

2. (U) Reference Section II:
   a. Paragraph a and b: Concur with recommendations of CG, FFORCEV.
   b. Paragraph c: Concur. This recommendation is in general accord with proposed concept for Judge Advocate activities within the command.
   c. Paragraph d: Concur, with reservation, in that this should not be construed as a recommendation for Army-wide doctrine, other than in specific case of Vietnam.
   d. Paragraph e: Concur. Signal frequencies are reviewed on a continuous basis. Distances are already demanding that frequencies be reassigned to higher priority requirements. Frequency study groups from COMUS are currently in country reviewing the frequency allocations in RVN.
   e. Paragraph f: Concur. Recommendations to this effect have been submitted to MACV, both verbally and in writing.
   f. Reference paragraphs g and h: Concur with the recommendations of Commanding General, FFORCEV.
   g. Reference paragraph I: Non-concur. Public Law 480, which governs the US Aid Program, provides that AID materials arriving in an assisted country, become the property of that country. USOM, as the US-AID agency in RVN, cannot issue material to US Forces to support a
SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 September 1965
Reports Control CSGPO-28 (R1) (U)

US military civic action program. USO representatives in each province can, however, request materials for use in GVN approved civic action projects. Implementation of recommendation would require Congressional action.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

HENRY L. DENNY
CWO, W3, USA
Asst Adjutant General
GPOP-MH (15 Oct 65)  
SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 September 1965  
Reports Control GSGPO-28 (RL) (U)  

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 7 FEB 1966

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) The Command Report of Field Force, Vietnam, for the quarterly period ending 30 Sep 65 is forwarded herewith.

2. (C) The following comments are keyed to paragraphs of Section II, Commander's Recommendations, of the basic Command Report:

a. (C) Paragraph g. CONUS and USARPAC supply agencies are, as far as assets permit, supplying units deploying to the RVN with complete field and unit equipment, weapons and ammunition, and MIL/LSL's.

b. (C) Paragraph h. Units are being trained in the maintenance of equipment as well as possible, time permitting.

c. (U) Paragraph i, and paragraph 2g, USARV 1st Indorsement:

(1) USARV is correct in statement in regard to PL 480 Aid. However, civic action programs of tactical units while in operations must conform, by MACV directives, to the approved civic action program as well as to other programs of the Province Chief in whose area the operations are being conducted. In such situations the U.S. tactical units are implementing and supplementing a GVN-approved program.

(2) Other programs exist to provide a source of materials and supplies to U.S. Army commanders for implementing purely U.S. military civic action programs. These include volunteer agencies operating in the RVN, voluntary contributions of individuals and organizations, both military and civilian, and collateral activities programs.

(3) As of the date of the Command Report (15 Oct 65), CG FFV may not have been aware of the existence and scope of these additional programs, some of which have been placed in a formal status since that date.

d. (U) With few exceptions, most of the problems indicated in the Command Report have been eliminated since the date of the report and of the USARV 1st Ind.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D. A. HARRISON
Capt. AGO
Anst AG

Confidential

IN 

7/3/66

DC. 33/3

USARV
2-66
FOR OT RD

SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned

Administrator
Defense Documentation Center
ATTN: DDC-TC
Cameron Station, Alexandria, Virginia 22314

The attached documents are forwarded for entry into your system as discussed with the Chief of Accessions, DDC, Ext. 4-6824.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT:

6 Incl
1. (S) Report 650016 (1 cy)
   Control No. 2605626 (RBl)
   T. J. Camp, JR.
   Brigadier General, GS
   Director of Organisation,
   Unit Training & Readiness, OAGSFOR

2. (S) Report 650017 (1 cy)
   Control No. 2601930 (RBl 2)
   ROBERT E. HAMMERQUIST
   Colonel, GS
   Chief, Readiness Division

3. (S) Report 660123 (1 cy)
   Control No. 2611723 (RB 1)

4. (S) Report 660289 (1 cy)
   Control No. 2700496 (RB 1)

5. (S) Report 660502 (l cy)
   Control No. 2704922 (RB 7)

6. (S) Report 670227 (1 cy)
   Control No. 2707510 (R11)

SECRET
FOR OT RD

SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned

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Defense Documentation Center
ATTN: DDC-TC
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FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT:

S. J. CAMP, JR.

1. (S) Report 650016 (1 cy)
   Control No. 2605626 (RB1)
2. (S) Report 650017 (1 cy)
   Control No. 2601930 (RB 7)
3. (S) Report 660123 (1 cy)
   Control No. 2611723 (RB 1)
4. (S) Report 660289 (1 cy)
   Control No. 2700496 (RB 1)
5. (S) Report 660502 (1 cy)
   Control No. 2704922 (RB 7)
6. (S) Report 670227 (1 cy)
   Control No. 2707610 (R11)

SECRET
GENERAL ORDERS

NUMBR 233

20 Juy 1965

ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT

1. TC 002, Following Organization/Unit ORGANIZED.

HQ U. S. ARMY TASK FORCE ALFA, APO San Francisco 96240, P5-2501-00.
Assigned to: U. S. Army, Vietnam
Effective date: 1 August 1965
Authorized strength: OFF WL ENL CIV AGG
    29  0  29  0  38
Equipment: Required will be requisitioned in accordance with normal supply procedures.
Personnel: Will be provided in accordance with DA Msg 723643, 13 July 1965. Enlisted personnel authorizations will be reflected immediately in the CP0-45 report.
Files/records: Will be established and maintained in accordance with AR 345-210 or AR 345-215 as applicable.
Morning report: Initial and subsequent morning reports will be submitted in accordance with AR 335-60.
Mission: To command all assigned or attached troops.
Fund obligation: Obligate to the extent necessary the appropriate allotments in accordance with current fiscal procedures.
Special instructions: Short title for U. S. Army Task Force Alfa will be: USATFA.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

OFFICIAL: A. J. ADAMS
Major General, GS
Acting Chief of Staff

s/ John S. Tyler
t/JOHN S. TYLER
Colonel, AGC
Acting Adjutant General

A TRUE COPY
R. C. BLOOMIN
Captain, AGC
A/F AG

incl. 1
GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 1

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND

1. TO 355. The undersigned assumes command.

Organization: United States Army Task Force ALFA, APO San Francisco, 96240

Authority: Paragraph 12, AR 600-20.

[Signature]

PAUL F. SMITH
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
A

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION:
20 - TACO
5 - CG, USARV
5 - COMUSNAVY

incl. 2
ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND

1. TC 355. The undersigned assumes command.


Authority: Paragraph 12, AR600-20.

STANLEY R. LARSEN
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
A

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION:
20 - TAGO
5 - CG, USARV
5 - COMUSMACV

incl. 3
SUBJECT: Memo for Record

TO: Commanding General
    Field Force, Vietnam
    APO US Forces 96240

1. Problem: Enlisted personnel assigned to Headquarters FFORCEV have as their Commanding Officer the CG FFORCEV. Enlisted personnel of company and smaller sized units assigned to FFORCEV have as their "next higher authority" for purposes of military justice, the CG, FFORCEV.

2. Solution: Interject a Special Court-Martial convening authority between the above described EM and the CG FFORCEV to insulate the CG from the lower echelon responsibilities of military justice. These responsibilities include Article 15 authority over HQ FFORCEV EM, reduction authority above EM E-5 and above assigned company size and smaller units, and Article 15 appellate authority over the above EM in reference to which CG FFORCEV was the "next higher Authority" for purposes of military justice. One of FFORCEV assigned units - the 54th Signal Battalion - was the natural choice as the Special Court-Martial convening authority to insulate the CG as described because of the authority inherent in a TO&E Battalion commander. An alternative, considered but rejected was the creation of a "Commander of Special Troops". Such a position would have been ineffective because, not being a TO&E organization, the commander would have lacked general promotion authority and, therefore, reduction authority. Consequently, all units concerned, less officers and warrant officers, were attached to the 54th Signal Battalion for Special and/or Summary Court-Martial Jurisdiction. Additionally, HQ FForce V EM were attached to HQ company.

VIVIANO GOMEZ, JR.
Maj, JAGC
Staff Judge Advocate

incl. 4
AVF-SJA

SUBJECT: Memo for Record

TO: Commanding General
Field Force, Vietnam
APO US Forces, 96240

1. Problem: Located in the Nha Trang area are many minor units of major commands, minor non-divisional units, and detached Platoons. The General Court-Martial convening authority and JA facility for most of these units is USARV located in Saigon, some 200 miles to the South. Transportation and communication facilities being critical at best, the administration of military justice was cumbersome to say the least, and legal assistance was nearly unheard of.

2. Solution: The SJA F Force V has undertaken to provide as complete a legal service as possible for all units in the Nha Trang area regardless of unit designation or parent organization.

3. Recommendation: Traditionally, JA services and court-martial jurisdiction have been allocated on a command basis. This allocation is logical and effective when commands maintain their geographical integrity and the communications and supervisory capability that geographic proximity facilitates. However, as in Vietnam where units are often fractionalized, geographic barriers break down communications and require a reallocation of immediate supervisory responsibility. So also, should the allocation of JA services and court-martial jurisdiction be adjusted. In Nha Trang, court-martial jurisdiction and JA Services would be most effectively allocated on a geographical basis. That is, a general court-martial convening authority and a sufficient JA facility located in Nha Trang to offer all commanders and personnel in the area effective and complete legal service.

VIVIANO GOMEZ, JR.
Maj, JAGC
Staff Judge Advocate

incl. 5
Daily War Story
Task Force Alfa
19 September 1965

NHA TRNG—Vietnamese and American ground forces continued to apply pressure to a strong and bitterly resisting Viet Cong force in the Song Con valley area near An Khe at mid-afternoon today, after heavy fighting cooled with nightfall last night when the enemy withdrew under cover of darkness.

Thirty Communist soldiers have been killed, by body count, and friendly casualties were described as light.

The battle was the heaviest conducted in the Task Force Alfa central sector of South Vietnam since the command was established August 1.

At 7 a.m., today Vietnamese and American reinforcements arrived to beef up a small heli-lifted task force from the U.S. Army's 101st Airborne (Screaming Eagles) Division which had held the hotly contested area through a rain of small arms and mortar fire all day yesterday. Expansion of the airhead was immediately begun.

Although contact with the enemy was lighter today, artillery and air blows hammered Viet Cong positions in the rugged hill country in these central highlands.

In the relief task force were other elements of the 101st Division, plus two Ranger companies from the Vietnamese 23d Ranger Battalion and a CIDG unit.

The artillery involved in the assault was drawn from the 101st Airborne and the 1st Cavalry Division, the first time any element of the newly-arrived "flying horsemen" have been committed to ground combat.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>GAIN</th>
<th>LOSS</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>5 Aug</td>
<td>10 Sep</td>
<td>Bien Hoa, Pleiku</td>
<td>5 Aug, 10 Aug</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>7 Sep, 10 Sep</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 18th Inf Opcon</td>
<td>5 Aug</td>
<td>26 Sep</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>5 Aug, 26 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn (Reinf), 7th Mar</td>
<td>5 Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td>Qui Nhon Area</td>
<td>5 Aug, 30 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Air Cav Division</td>
<td>25 Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td>An Khê</td>
<td>25 Aug, 30 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK Marine Bde Advance Element</td>
<td>25 Sep</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>25 Sep, 30 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Corps Advisory Op</td>
<td>25 Sep</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>25 Sep, 30 Sep</td>
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COMPARISON OF COMBAT LOSSES  
FCC, II CORPS AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1965  
(AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR FORCERV)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>VC</th>
<th>KIA</th>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>579</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>28</td>
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TOTAL LOSSES: 761
TOTAL LOSSES: 4278

SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Rank &amp; Ser #</th>
<th>Home Station</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keck, Richard L</td>
<td>Capt 05303817</td>
<td>Adv Team 99 96311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webb, Gerald E</td>
<td>Capt 090589</td>
<td>Adv Team 51 96402</td>
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<td>Dixon, Richard A</td>
<td>Capt 094684</td>
<td>HHC, 2/503, 173d 96250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conley, Willard C</td>
<td>Capt 093627</td>
<td>Adv Team 87 96311</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oglesby, Virgil W</td>
<td>Capt 05500604</td>
<td>Adv Tm 33 96297</td>
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<td>Weaver, James K (OIC)</td>
<td>Capt 04074866</td>
<td>Adv Tm 75 96311</td>
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<tr>
<td>Casaway, James W</td>
<td>Capt 05105815</td>
<td>3/319 Arty 173d 96250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sarran, Geo C</td>
<td>1/Lt 096170</td>
<td>Adv Tm 22 96238</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belcher, Thomas H</td>
<td>SSG RA 18566455</td>
<td>Adv Tm 33 96297</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parker, Otis</td>
<td>SSG RA 11666461</td>
<td>Adv Tm 89 96291</td>
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<tr>
<td>Herr, Claude E</td>
<td>M/Sgt RA 13278850</td>
<td>Adv Tm 60 96357</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walker, Darol D</td>
<td>SFC RA 15595979</td>
<td>Adv Tm 99 96311</td>
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<td>Flanders, Sherman C</td>
<td>MSG RA 19213895</td>
<td>Adv Tm 22 96238</td>
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<td>Gentry, James T</td>
<td>SFC #7 RA 25723228</td>
<td>HHC 2/503 173d 96250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unkes, August J</td>
<td>SSG RA 26783528</td>
<td>Adv Tm 75 96304</td>
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<td>McGuire, Bernaro</td>
<td>SFC RA 12298653</td>
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# COURSE OF INSTRUCTION

## PRE-COMBAT ORIENTATION

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Duration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization of the Armed Forces of Viet Nam</td>
<td>1 Hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of Viet Cong Forces</td>
<td>1 Hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Tactics and Techniques in Viet Nam</td>
<td>1 Hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Fire Support availability in Viet Nam</td>
<td>1 Hour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 4 Hour
TFGC 6 September 1965

SUBJECT: Combat Lessons Learned

TO: All Personnel
1st Air Cavalry Division
APO, US Forces 962h0

1. Welcome to Vietnam and to Task Force Alfa.

2. The selection of you and your unit to join other U.S., Viet-
namese, and Third Country men and Forces in the defense of Vietnam is
 testimony of your fighting ability.

3. The war being conducted here is different from any fought by
U.S. Forces in recent history. It is not a war where units fight units
at a comfortable distance apart. It is a war in which man is pitted
against man, usually at close quarters. Your professional skill, in-
genuity, alertness and aggressiveness are pitted against an enemy who
has been in this game a long time and who is well adjusted to the rigors
of this type of warfare.

4. In order better to prepare you for such combat, we have assembled,
from combat lessons learned by other units, a set of "Do" and "Don't"
tips which are attached. You should study these tips and learn them
well, for proper application will hasten the defeat of the Viet Cong
and may well save your life or your buddy's, or both.

STANLEY R. LARSEN
Major General, USA
Commanding

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incl 14
The following Do's and Don'ts have been compiled from the experiences of ARVN units, their advisors and, more recently, from U.S. Tactical Units that have actively engaged and defeated the Viet Cong. These lessons learned should be studied and practiced in your operations in Vietnam.

DO'S

Be prepared for the unexpected. The one fact you can depend upon is that conditions and circumstances will change when you least expect them.

Keep your weapon immediately available and ready for use.

Practice security at all times and report any violations or suspected violations.

Treat any stranger as a possible enemy.

Avoid developing patterns in any and all operations. The enemy quickly takes advantage of any predictable pattern of operation.

Vary smoke signal meanings to deny the VC the ability to interpret.

Use every available intelligence source in planning every operation.

Effect positive coordination with ARVN, Province, District and Special Forces units in your area.

Provide adequate Air-Ground and Forward Observer communications for all operations.

Maintain enemy contact once it is gained.

Before placing reliance in native interpreters have them checked by a Vietnamese-speaking U.S. man.

During extended movement stop before dark to insure establishing a good, all-around, coordinated defense.

Test fire weapons before each operation.

Bayonet should be carried on all operations - it makes a good mine probe.

Always use discipline in small arms fire - a well aimed round that hits its target is worth 100 random shots.

Use hand and arm signals to conceal your presence whenever possible.

Consider combat efficiency over troop comfort.

Be alert to dead foliage, it may be old camouflage over booby traps, tunnel entrances or other wound producing positions.

DON'TS

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Be sure grenade igniters are screwed in tight and safety pins are properly crimped.

Be sure to tape grenade handles when not actively engaged, to prevent accidental firing.

Carry an adequate supply of illumination ammunition when operating at night.

Carry extra demolitions on all operations, or have plans to bring them in, on call, by helicopter.

Develop supply brevity codes - situations often require the use of the command net for admin and supply purposes.

Carry files or sharpening stones for machettes and axes when operating in jungle.

Police the battle area and destroy everything left behind (A rundown battery can still fire a booby trap!)

Protect your personal property.

When using vehicles be sure they are equipped with tow cables and chains.

Land navigation must be constantly practiced (Compass use, pacing, dead reckoning and etc). 

Plan for civic action whenever possible.

Write home as often as practical.

DO NOT

Do not discuss anything classified over radios or telephones.

Do not overclassify or use an unnecessarily high precedence on electrically transmitted messages.

Do not become stereotyped in your actions.

Do not leave mines and flares in abandoned positions - the VC will salvage them for use against you.

Do not break seals on ammunition or other supplies until you are ready to use them.

Do not use captured weapons or ammunition because they are often booby trapped or rigged to malfunction.

Do not leave vehicles or equipment unattended at anytime.

Do not abuse equipment - your life may depend on it.
Do not call for helicopter medical evacuation until the casualty is near the landing zone.

Do not travel alone at anytime - use the buddy system.

Do not trust children at any time. They may be VC agents.

Do not panic - wait until the VC closes on your position to insure killing him.

Do not consider any route or area inaccessible to the enemy.

Do not listen to, or pass on, rumors.
Prepare protective shelters adjacent to sleeping areas which can be occupied regardless of visibility.

Know your defense sector and that of the man on your left and right.

Plan protective wire, mines (primarily Claymore) and flares on the perimeter.

Plan for illumination in event of a night attack.

Plan for a reaction force to counter any enemy success.

Provide for alternate communications means.

Bury electrical wires to mines to prevent detection and/or sabotage.

Use dismounted vehicle guides when operating under blackout.

Develop a good civic program in areas adjacent to or near the base camp.

**DON'TS**

Do not allow civilians in the area.

Do not chamber a round until you are in your defensive position.

Do not change guards and outposts at regular intervals.
DEFENSE

DO'S

Develop all around security.

Always place ambush patrols on likely avenues of approach outside the perimeter and increase their number during hours of darkness.

Provide combat patrols and listening posts beyond the perimeter.

Plan the use of all available support fires.

Use wire entanglements around the entire position when wire is available and time permits.

Integrate mines, flares and booby traps into defenses. Record mine fields and remove upon displacement.

Disperse key personnel and facilities to lessen the chance of loss from single enemy rounds.

Maintain a reserve to repel and destroy penetrations.

Plan overhead cover on all positions whenever and wherever possible.

Dig trenches and positions in a staggered manner to reduce the chance of the enemy using enfilade fire.

Be sure that there is always someone alert in each position.

Establish multiple communications means.

Use trip flares throughout the position.

Bury electrical wiring to mines to restrict detection and check daily for operational readiness.

Plan to use illumination rounds.

Use mines and similar devices to prevent tampering.

Deny the VC any opportunity to remove casualties from the battlefield.

Vary times of relief for patrols and posts so as not to set a pattern.

Use simple related challenges and passwords in the operational areas. For example: Car-Buick, Fruit-Apple, Animal-Horse.

Try to set up defense before dark.

Pass the plan to all interested parties.
Do not get complacent because of the lack of enemy action.
Do not allow civilians in or near the perimeter or positions.
Do not fire interdictory illumination rounds at regular intervals.
Have a single commander.

Provide sufficient firepower to cover the killing zone and escape routes.

Insure every man knows his job.

Control noise, lights and smoking at all times to prevent detection.

Select a site where enemy chances of escape are minimal.

Mine and/or booby trap escape routes.

Rehearse the ambush whenever possible (Sand tables can be used effectively).

Exploit surprise when engaging the VC.

Use simple, easily understood signals.

Prepare to react immediately to VC counter ambush action.

Exploit and search immediately after springing the trap.

Fire low; a ricochet is better than a miss.

Plan night ambushes to cover normal VC movement periods.

Provide illumination for night ambushes.

Use stay behind ambushes to trap and destroy the VC when leaving an operational area.

Keep civilians (including children) from observing movement to, or emplacement of, the ambush.

Develop a simple pocket card check list for all to use to insure the ambush is complete.

**DO'S**

Do not spring the trap too early.

Do not use the same site repeatedly.
DO'S

Make a detailed reconnaissance by all available means before beginning any operation.

Plan fires on all suspect areas.

Provide front, flank, and rear security at all times.

Provide a suspension of command in case the commander is trapped in the killing zone.

Provide a reaction force to flank or cut off the ambushing force.

Practice immediate action drills to make reaction instinctive.

Use obstructions to conceal time and routes of movements.

Control noise so as not to telegraph your approach.

Have security forces perform detailed check outs of all possible ambush sites.

Maintain continuous communication with all elements at all times.

Vary forced runs to thwart VC plans.

Rotate units on local security missions to increase alertness.

Report suspect areas as they are approached.

Immediately return fire and attack the ambush forces.

Use white porousness grenades and offensive grenades against the killing party to inflict VC casualties and screen your assault.

Continue to fire, even after the VC stops, to prevent his recovering weapons, bodies and escaping.

Clear the entire ambush site once the ambush is overcome.

DON'TS:

Do not move out to assist another unit under attack without first making a complete reconnaissance (the VC often conduct an attack so as to be able to ambush relief forces).

Do not consider any area to be free of ambush - the VC use the unorthodox as normal.

Do not consider normal civilian activity in an area to be an indicator that it is clear - VC use use civilians in cover and deception.

8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Do not announce any movement or operation until the last possible moment.

Do not be baited into careless pursuit of the VC.

Do not bunch up at anytime.

Do not try to take cover in the killing zone.
Coordinate with ARVN, Popular, Regional Forces and Special Forces, as appropriate, prior to executing any operation.

Plan for automatic weapons to be in the lead element.

Plan and react to cut off enemy escape routes.

Preplan all available supporting fires.

Provide for a reaction force.

Make minimum reconnaissance before moving out.

Have a planned succession of command.

Develop all possible intelligence on the area of operations.

Plan in advance for medical evacuation.

Check all personnel for physical condition and proper equipment before moving out.

Make initial moves from camps under cover of darkness or by concealed routes.

When possible move on multiple and mutually supporting routes.

Be alert for ambushes.

Be prepared for sudden meeting engagements.

Move with stealth.

Maintain strict field and rear security.

Be alert for primitive traps, mines and booby traps.

Report enemy contact by the fastest available means.

Maintain contact with the enemy, once you have it.

Use your own combat support means before calling for outside assistance.

Develop and use silent signals.

Carry only essential supplies and equipment.

Occupy clandestine patrol assembly areas after dark to avoid detection.

Begin movement before daylight and continue well after dark to intercept the VC when he is moving.
Do not wear armored vests on prolonged ground operations.
Do not bunch up—present as small a target as possible.
Do not talk, laugh, smoke or use lights.
Do not travel exclusively on roads and trails.
Do not out-maneuver your security forces.
Reconnoiter landing zones for obstacles before using.

Plan fires to cover the entire area of operations.

Have air reconnaissance over the objective and routes thereto, to limit the enemy surprising you. However, care must be used not to reveal your intentions.

Have a rapid reaction force available to block enemy withdrawal, cover routes of withdrawal, provide a covering force or to mop up.

Use concealed routes or darkness to conceal your approach.

Withhold scheduled fires to the last moment so as not to reveal your intentions.

Be alert for snipers in unorthodox locations such as dung piles, gardens, haystacks, wells, etc.

Use some form of encirclement when villages are encountered.

When possible use villagers to precede you into villages—they will avoid mines, booby traps and obstacles.

Avoid being channeled by fences, hedges, punji traps etc.

Be alert for cleverly camouflaged tunnels, caves and bunkers.

Destroy all tunnels, caves and bunkers.

Provide for demolitions to accomplish necessary destruction.

Question individuals out of sight and hearing of groups so they will talk without fear of reprisal.

Search every possible nook and cranny for booby traps, weapons and possible intelligence information.

Leave no trail behind ambush patrols or ambush returning VC and those hidden underground and undetected.

Be alert for fleeing VC after isolated explosions. The VC often eject a grenade thru a hole in a tunnel to cover their escape by another passage.

When it becomes necessary to deliberately destroy a Vietnamese village attempt to secure written permission of the Provincial, District or Sector C.I.A. to burn the village. If after receiving this commitment, have either the person giving permission or his representative (i.e., a Vietnamese national) actually set fire to the village.
DO NOTS

Do not relax at any time, especially on return form an operation.

Do not allow captured civilians and VC to mix.

Do not separate small children from their mothers.

Do not throw grenades into mud or wooden buildings without having adequate cover.
Make detailed reconnaissance of all landing zones and objective areas in coordination with the airlift element.

Plan to use Army Air - Air Force and Artillery to seal off the objective area.

Provide for a reaction force.

Consider weather in all planning.

Provide back-up spare aircraft to cover aborts.

Plan suppression fires on the landing zone to be executed at the last possible moment.

When multiple lifts to the same LZs are used, shift suppressive fires farther out or on avenues of approach for the landing of succeeding lifts.

Plan for medical evacuation to include providing medical crews pilots with unit frequencies to expedite their action.

Provide for armed helicopter escort. Consider aircraft refueling time when planning an operation.

When possible stage operations from an air facility to expedite refueling, loading and rearming of aircraft.

Provide different routes for multiple lifts to the same LZ.

Select multiple landing zones when possible and use a deception plan to deny the enemy knowing the primary one.

Select landing zones which facilitate rapid decisive maneuver and prevent the VC from reacting.

DO NOTS

Do not dispatch helicopters in less than pairs.
Have a single overall commander for each operation.

Provide a succession of command to cover possible battle losses.

Whenever possible have air cover.

Plan supporting fires along the entire route.

Provide an alert force to extricate any portion of the convoy attacked.

Provide for escorts in addition to reaction forces.

Keep movement times and dates secretive until the last possible moment.

Rehearse immediate action to be taken in case of attack.

Check equipment readiness before moving out.

Coordinate with all agencies, area forces and commands thru which the convoy will move.

Have effective communications with a back up at all times.

Avoid identifying command and control vehicles.

Lead out with the heaviest vehicles.

Face riding personnel outward to permit immediate return of fire if attacked and leave the vehicle tail gate open to permit easy exit.

Have all personnel carry weapons at the ready at all times.

Sand bag vehicles.

Provide and maintain vehicle intervals at all times (minimum 100 meters).

Consider any portion of the route as a potential ambush site.

Avoid routine and repetition.

Treat all strangers as possible enemy.

If fired on: Immediately return fire, attempt to drive out of the killing zone, attack the ambush force as soon as possible.

**DO NOT**

Do not emplace supporting weapons in the same location each day on succeeding convoys.

Do not relax at anytime - the V can allow portions or whole convoys to pass in order to gain complete surprise.
Do not allow civilians (including children) to approach or get on any vehicle.

Do not leave vehicles or equipment unguarded at anytime.

Do not allow a broken down vehicle to be left unprotected.
Remember the VC make wide use of booby traps at every opportunity.

Learn to recognize the signs of booby trap emplacement. Favorite locations of the VC are: on gates, on foxholes sites, along trails, near stepping stones at stream crossings, in gaps in thicket fences, in rafters, on doors and on Chinese .45mm machine gun mounts.

Destroy booby traps in place using demolition charges or by remotely activating the trip wire.

Use local natives to precede you thru suspected areas whenever possible. They will avoid known traps.

Do not cross rivers and streams at prepared shallow crossing sites without carefully searching out the crossings.

Do not establish a pattern of movement along trails at anytime.

Do not enter a fenced yard through a gate without searching out the immediate area.

Do not move troops in a close formation through suspected danger areas. Maintain a minimum of 15 meters between individuals to avoid multiple casualties.
Try to learn and use Vietnamese language.

Speak slowly and distinctly and avoid the use of slang. (Think of the difficulty of trying to explain the meaning of "I got a bang out of that").

Be sincerely courteous. Even if your gesture is not understood, the courtesy will be appreciated.

Use a title of rank or the word "Mr. or "Miss" rather than call an individual by his first or last name.

Pay respects to all clergy by a slight nod of the head when you meet, including Buddhist Monks and Catholic Priests.

Accept refreshments when visiting a Vietnamese.

DON'TS

Do not enter anyone's home socially unless invited in.
Do not make jokes about not being able to eat with chopsticks.
Do not prop your feet on a desk or table, put a leg over the arm of a chair, or sit cross legged when talking with Vietnamese.
Do not summon a Vietnamese by gestures.

Do not worry about time—be patient.
SUBJECT: Memo for Record

TO: Commanding General
    Field Force, Vietnam
    APO US Forces 96240

1. One serious problem which has been encountered during this period is that of securing adequate, even minimal, communications for command control and for administrative and logistics traffic. Recognizing that the overtaxed in-country system (Inclosure 15a) could not support the normal demands of a headquarters such as Field Force, Vietnam, the following austere communications were requested:

   1. Sole User voice to higher headquarters
   2. Common User voice to higher headquarters
   3. Sole User teletype to higher headquarters
   4. Common User teletype to Saigon
   5. Sole User voice to advance CP
   6. Sole User to each major subordinate Command
   7. Common User voice to each major subordinate Command
   8. Common User teletype to each major subordinate Command location

Since this in-country long lines system was developed to serve a small number of subscribers, and inasmuch as it now serves six times the original number, it is taxed beyond operational limits. All communications out of or into any point in the country and all joint, combined requirements within the country must use this system. It is obviously inadequate. As a result of no backup and the marginal nature of some of the systems such as the AN/FRC-24, "A" Band obstacle gain system from Qui Nhon to Pleiku, there have been continuing long outages and poor quality circuits from the outset.

The Solution

The 54th Signal Battalion has not closed this area at the time of this report and control of the in-country system is not vested in this headquarters; therefore no means of solving the problem are within our jurisdiction. Continuous follow up and requests for restoration at all hours have been effected without lasting results. If the 54th Signal Battalion were operational some of the command and control circuit problems could be alleviated. It is recommended that the following steps be taken:

incl 15
SUBJECT: Memo for Record

(1) Urgently upgrade the system with equipment from CONUS

(2) Immediately survey all requirements and allocate circuits based on most urgent need, with top priority given to command and control.

The Lesson Learned

A sharp increase in tactical organization must be accompanied or preceded by an adequate increase or reallocation of communications.

Recommendations

It is recommended that priorities be given to shipment of means of support for tactical forces to allow their concurrent or earlier arrival in order that adequate command and control of these forces can be effected and maintained.

2. The second important problem encountered has been securing sufficient radio frequencies for operations. It has been necessary to request any radio frequency required on an individual basis, allowing sixty days lead time, to Headquarters MACV. The imposition of such restrictions obviously could not respond to the changing demands of tactical communications. Because of this situation, the units that had been in-country for some time had obtained a large share of available frequencies. The urgency of tactical requirements dictated selection and operation on unassigned frequencies.

The Solution

Radio nets were held to an essential minimum and request was submitted for blocks of frequencies for control at this tactical level.

Lesson Learned

An increase in tactical units requires an early review of available frequencies in the light of operational requirements to establish an equitable distribution.

Recommendations

(1) That frequencies be reviewed on a continuing basis and assigned according to priority of requirements.
(2) That blocks of frequencies be assigned to this headquarters in order to allow for rapid response to tactical communications requirements.

RICHARD C. HORNE III
Colonel, Sig C
Signal Officer

PURPOSE: (U) To present the present status of defoliation and crop destruction operations in Vietnam.

BACKGROUND:

1. (S) The United States is providing support to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in defoliation and crop destruction programs intended to achieve specific military objectives as listed in discussion below. The defoliation program has been carried on since July 1961 while the crop destruction program was initiated in November 1962.

2. (C) Materials used are standard type herbicides available from any major chemical firm. They are commonly known as 2, 4-D, 2, 4, 5-T and Cacodylic acid. These compounds have been widely used in the US and the USSR.

DISCUSSION:

1. (S) Defoliation operations have reduced the ARVN ground security force requirements, improved aerial surveillance, improved fields of fire, reduced VC ambushes, and allowed greater use of LOC's. Authority for defoliation operations has been delegated to COMUSMACV/Ambassador.

2. (S) Crop destruction operations have destroyed several million pounds of critical VC food supplies. Authority for approval of crop destruction operations lies with COMUSMACV/Ambassador.
1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this regulation is to provide guidance for the planning and implementation of military civic action projects by units assigned, attached or under the operational control of this headquarters.

2. DEFINITION: Military civic action is the use of military forces on projects useful to the local population. Through these efforts, the military contributes to improved military-civilian relationships, strengthens the socio-economic posture of the country, reduces civilian discontent and adds materially to political stability.

3. CONSIDERATIONS IN PROJECT SELECTION: In selecting military civic action projects, units should consider the following:

   a. The project should satisfy the needs and desires of the population and obtain the willing participation of local nationals.

   b. The project should be capable of being completed or continued by the local population if units must depart the area.

   c. The project should be in an area where government control is expected to continue.

   d. The project should benefit a large segment of the population rather than a selected few.

   e. The project should utilize skills to be found among the local population.

   f. The project should be in harmony with objectives of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. Improving the image of the United States is a secondary objective.

4. TYPES OF PROJECTS: The following are some types of military civic action projects which have produced excellent results:

   a. Highway construction and repair—construction of feeder or access roads connecting remote hamlets/villages to main roads or highways.
b. Construction or renovation of community buildings - schools, playgrounds, dispensaries, aid stations, information centers, market places and pagodas.

c. Land clearance for new hamlets.

d. Construction and improvement of hamlet defenses.

e. Medical treatment of civilians.

f. Distribution of food, clothing and gifts.

g. Emergency care for relocated persons and refugees.

h. English language instruction.

i. Support or establishment of orphanages.

j. Digging of wells.

5. COORDINATION: a. Prior to the commencement of military civic action projects in a province, units will coordinate with the local United States Operations Mission (USOM) representative. Ultimate US agency responsibility for civic action-type projects in RVN rests with USCM. Representatives of USOM are prepared to provide technical advice and material assistance to units planning to undertake military civic action projects and to assist in the integration of the military effort with the overall economic and social program. However, since delays in receipt of USCM technical and material assistance may range from hours to weeks depending on the site of the project, early coordination with the USCM representative is desirable. These unavoidable delays make it desirable that units place initial emphasis on those projects which can be completed with resources available through US military channels. The logistical feasibility of such projects, however, must be ascertained prior to initiation of the project.

b. Normally civic action projects are not undertaken without the approval of the Provincial Committee which consists of the Province Chief, the MACV Sector Advisor and the USOM Provincial Representative. While this is desirable, unit commanders may deviate from this procedure in those instances where loss of time would detract from the favorable effects of the project and it is obvious that the project is of a type generally acceptable under the circumstances (e.g., Medical assistance to civilians during a search and destroy operation). Fixed installations (e.g., roads and bridges) will not be constructed under the civic action program without the approval of the Provincial Committee.

c. Psychological exploitation of such projects is highly desirable. Coordination with the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO)
representatives and other military and Vietnamese civilian Payops personnel in the area will assist in obtaining maximum "mileage" from the payops effort.

6. REPORTS: A weekly civic action status report will be submitted to this headquarters (ATTN: ACofS 65) to arrive not later than 1700 hours on Thursday covering the period 0001 hours Tuesday to 2400 hours Monday. Reports will be submitted as soon as possible by the most expeditious means. Negative reports, if applicable, are required. Reports Control Symbol TPA GE 101. The report will include
but need not be limited to:

a. Unit reporting
b. Location

c. Reporting period
d. New civic action projects begun during reporting period.
   (1) Type of project
   (2) Location
   (3) Number of unit personnel involved.
   (4) Number of other personnel involved.
   (5) Expected time of completion.

e. Civic action projects completed during reporting period.
f. Status of civic action projects in progress other than
d and e above.
g. General comments (Problems encountered, suggestions which
may assist other units).

7. REFERENCES: a. MACV Dir 10-1
   b. Ltr MACVT-116-SA, MACV, Subj: Military Civic Action in
      Vietnam, dtd 21 Jul 65.
FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:  

PAUL F. SMITH  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief of Staff

NEIL M. MATZGER  
Colonel, AGC  
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:  
D
HEADQUARTERS
FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM
APO US Forces 96240

30 September 1965

SUBJECT: Summary to Investigation

TO: Commanding General
Field Force, Vietnam
APO US Forces 96240

1. A special investigation was conducted during the period 2 - 4 September 1965 concerning the reporting system, associated procedures, and coordination involved in the reporting activities of the Army Advisor Group - III Corps, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam relative to the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) in the Binh Hoa Sector during July 1965. The investigation concluded that:

a. The reporting system associated procedures, and coordination involved in the reporting activities of the Army Advisory Group - III Corps, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam were in accordance with the requirements established by the United States Operations Mission and Headquarters United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

b. The nature of the MACV/USOM Provincial Team Report did not lend itself to extensive coordination or involvement with the US Armed Forces.

2. The Commanding General, 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), was informed of the conclusions of the investigation, and the Senior Advisor, Army Advisor Group - III Corps, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam was requested to coordinate with the local US commanders prior to reporting incidents reflecting adversely on the conduct of US Armed Forces.

Warren G. Reed
Lt Colonel, IG
Inspector General
SUBJECT: Summary to Investigation

TO: Commanding General
   Field Force, Vietnam
   APO US Forces 96240

1. A special investigation was conducted during the period 2 - 14 September 1965 concerning the reporting system, associated procedures, and coordination involved in the reporting activities of the Army Advisor Group - III Corps, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam relative to the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) in the Bien Hoa Sector during July 1965. The investigation concluded that:

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   b. The nature of the MACV/USOM Provincial Team Report did not lend itself to extensive coordination or involvement with the US Armed Forces.

2. The Commanding General, 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), was informed of the conclusions of the investigation, and the Senior Advisor, Army Advisor Group - III Corps, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam was requested to coordinate with the local US commanders prior to reporting incidents reflecting adversely on the conduct of US Armed Forces.

Warren G. Reed

WARREN G. REED
Lt Colonel, IG
Inspector General
SUBJECT: Summary to Investigation

TO: Commanding General
Field Force, Vietnam
APO US Forces 96240

1. An investigation was conducted during the period 9-17 September 1965 concerning the facts surrounding the reported use of CN grenades by the 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment during combat operations, 5 September 1965, in the vicinity of Qui Nhon, Vietnam. The investigation concluded that:

a. The existing MACV policy prohibited the operational use of riot control agents except in the defense of compounds.

b. The MACV policy was promulgated to III Marine Amphibious Force and to no other US combat force in Vietnam.

c. The published specific restrictions on the use of riot control agents by US forces in Vietnam were:

   (1) CONFIDENTIAL Message 27431, MACJ3, 051035Z Aug 65, subject: Use of Riot Control Munitions.

   (2) CONSMACV Message, 090230Z Aug 65.

   (3) CONFIDENTIAL Message 31439, MACV J311, 071300Z Sep 65, subject: Employment of Riot Control Agents.

   (4) CONFIDENTIAL Message 31439, COMUSMACV, 071300Z Sep 65, subject: Employment of Riot Control Agents (retransmitted message 1634F USATFA, 071300A Sep 65).


d. Headquarters U.S. Army Task Force Alfa and Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment received no instructions prior to 7 September 1965 prohibiting the operational use of riot control agents.
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