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HEADQUARTERS
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCDH

31 May 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Combat Operation After Action Report for Operation WILDERNESS is forwarded for necessary action and/or information.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. D. ZEILER

2 Incl
1. Incl 1 - COAAR 3rd Sqdrn, 2LT, AGC
17th Cav
2. Incl 2 - COAAR 1st Brigade

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1st Squadron, 18th Air Cavalry (Sep)
2d Battalion, 138th Artillery
IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (10 June 68) FOR OT RD 68X022

13 June 1968

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation WILDERNESS, 25th Infantry Division, 8 March - 8 April 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded as inclosure for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry
APO 96216

15 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

See Distribution

1. NAME OF OPERATION: Operation WILDERNESS

2. DATES OF OPERATION: 8 March 1968 thru 7 April 1968

3. LOCATION: Tay Ninh Province

4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry

5. REPORTING OFFICER: WILLIAM W. BRANNON Jr., LTC, Commanding

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:
   A Troop, Major Robert A. Witcher, Commanding
     (OPCON to 199th Light Infantry Brigade)
   B Troop, Major James T. McManus, Commanding
     8 March 1968 thru 23 March 1968; 24 March 1968 OPCON to 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division
   C Troop, Major Gary E. Luck, Commanding
     OPCON to 9th Infantry Division until 23 March 1968; 24 March 1968 thru 7 April 1968.
   D Troop, Captain Russell W. Mengel, Commanding

7. SUPPORTING FORCES: None

8. INTELLIGENCE:
   A. When the 3d Squadron 17th Cavalry was committed to Operation Wilderness there had been no recent contact with the 271st, 272d and 273d VC Regiments which indicated that elements of these units had possibly moved to supply areas and were deliberately avoiding contact with Free World Forces.

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B. Terrain and Weather:

(1) General: The TAOR was bounded generally by Cambodia on the North and West in War Zone C, the 1st Infantry Division boundary on the East and the XT25 East-West grid line on the South.

(2) Terrain:
   (a) Observation and fields of fire ranged from limited in War Zone C to excellent in the rice paddies near Go Dau Ha.
   (b) Obstacles - Throughout the TAOR there were no natural or artificial obstacles which impeded the reconnaissance or movement of the squadron.
   (c) Concealment - The hours of darkness and early morning fog provided the VC and NVA with natural concealment from air activity.
   (d) Key Terrain - Highway 22 was selected as key terrain since this is the route by which convoys move to resupply the Tay Ninh area.
   (e) Avenues of approach:
      (1) Fish Hook - Saigon River - Michelin Plantation.
      (2) Highway #1 leading from Cambodia to Go Dau Ha.

(3) Weather:
   (a) Visibility - During early morning hours visibility was restricted due to fog and haze.
   (b) Temperature - The temperature averaged in the high eighties throughout the operation.

C. Intelligence During the Operation (Annex B Intelligence Overlay):

   (1) Lines of communication for the VC/NVA extended from the Fish Hook South toward the Michelin Plantation.
   (2) Logistical Bases: Several large bunker complexes were discovered. In the vicinity of XT5271 a possible transfer point was located; several truck tracks (3/4 ton) led into the area from the North but no tracks were discovered leading from the area to the South. There were also two 3/4 ton trucks, type and make unknown, spotted under camouflage. In the area a cache consisting of approximately 4000 lbs of rice was discovered as well as 300 boxes of small arms ammunition.

9. MISSION:

   Conduct armed aerial reconnaissance of 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, TAOR to locate VC/NVA forces, enemy logistical bases, and interdict enemy lines of communications. Provide counter-mortar air weapons team for Dau Tieng Base Camp during the hours of darkness. Conduct route reconnaissance and security between Tay Ninh and Trang Bang.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

   3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry (-) will conduct armed aerial reconnaissance in the 1st Brigade TAOR with one air cavalry troop. B Troop will locate, report,
and destroy, with its capabilities, VC/NVA forces, enemy logistical bases, and enemy lines of communications. Provide a counter-mortar team for Dien Bien each evening. D Troop will conduct a daily route reconnaissance of Highway 1 and 22 from Tay Ninh to XT41232. Local patrols will be conducted along route following the initial reconnaissance mission. Secure engineer work parties as necessary.

II. EXECUTION: 8 March 1968 thru 23 March 1968

On 8 March 1968, 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry (-) was placed ORCON to 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and given the mission of performing reconnaissance in the 1st Brigade TACR (Annex A), searching for signs of enemy movement and all enemy intelligence. During this period, lines of communication between Cambodia and the Michelin Plantation and several base areas were plotted. On 11 March, B Troop spotted four NVA soldiers dressed in khaki uniforms at XT619332. The enemy troops were taken under fire resulting in 4 KIA (BC). Later in the day, D Troop reported a roadblock and possible enemy ambush site at XT530183. One company of 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry was sent to that location as a reaction force. Due to the distance and time involved for the reaction force, the enemy had abandoned the ambush site just prior to the company deploying. No contact was made during the maneuver. On 16 March, two aero weapons teams from B Troop were sent to XT294300 when an ARVN outpost came under heavy attack by an estimated VC battalion. B Troop received anti-aircraft fire from one position which they immediately engaged and silenced. The aero weapons teams then engaged the VC positions. With the combined fires from the weapons aircraft and the ARVN soldiers, the VC attack subsided and was soon broken. B Troop was credited with 25 KIA (BC). On 18 March, an aero scout team from B Troop was on a reconnaissance vicinity XT565503 when the team received heavy automatic weapons fire. The team leader immediately called artillery on the position. Following the fire mission the team made a low level assessm ent of the damage and credited the artillery with one automatic weapons position destroyed and two KIA (BC). Between 18 March to 5 April, D Troop was assigned the additional mission of escorting gravel trucks, from the 65th Engineer Battalion, from Tay Ninh to Trang Bang in support of road repair operations. On 20 March, B Troop discovered an enemy storage area at XT481393 containing bunkers and one large tin building. An artillery mission was called on the site, resulting in one secondary explosion producing a 150 foot high mushroom cloud. On 21 March, the aero rifle platoon of B Troop was inserted at XT1646, on a reconnaissance in force operation of a reported VC rendezvous point. Inspection of this area failed to show any signs of recent activity and the platoon was extracted. D Troop, on a route reconnaissance mission, encountered an ARVN popular forces unit which had just been ambushed along the route at XT385285. D Troop assisted the unit by placing 106mm recoilless rifle fire on targets pointed out by an American advisor to the unit. Contact was then broken with unknown results. The aero rifle platoon of B Troop was inserted on 22 March at XT752022, in coordination with 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (Mechinised). The platoon established a blocking position at that location as the battalion swept toward the platoon from the west. Negative enemy contact was encountered on the operation and the
platoon was extracted at 1600 hours, on 23 March, C Troop was released from the 9th Infantry Division and returned to squadron control.

b. 24 March 1968 thru 7 April 1968

On 24 March 1968 B Troop was placed OPCON to 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division and C Troop assumed B Troop’s missions in operation WILDERNESS. On 25 March D Troop encountered an ARVN Mechanized Company which had been ambushed at XT299361. D Troop approached the rear of the ARVN unit and deployed to the south, west and east of the village of Can An (XT299361). D Troop supported the ARVN advance by placing 106mm recoilless rifle fire on the enemy locations. Twenty (20) VC were spotted at XT299361, attempting to envelop the ARVN from the south and were immediately engaged. The VC then withdrew in the direction they had come. Approximately one hour and thirty minutes later, the VC broke contact with the ARVN unit. D Troop had negative casualties or damage and inflicted three (3) VC KIA (Possible). The recoiless rifle platoon of C Troop was inserted at XT299361 in a coordinated operation with 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry (Mechanized). C Troop set up a blocking position with the battalion sweeping toward the platoon. Negative contact was established and the platoon was extracted at 1300 hours vicinity XT519556. On 26 March, an Air Force Forward Air Controller, assigned to the squadron, spotted 40 VC at XT120947, walking along a road. The FAC contacted one of C Troops aero scout teams and vectored them to the target area. By using forward air controlling procedures, the team was vectored to the enemy location, made the first firing pass, and caught the VC still on the road. The team was credited with ten (10) VC KIA (EC). On 30 March, C Troop was performing an aerial reconnaissance south of Tay Ninh between the Oriental River and the Cambodian border. An estimated VC company was sighted occupying a base camp at XT301301. Three airstrike were put into the target area, however the strikes were relatively ineffective. On 3 April, C Troop spotted an enemy base camp at XT397721 and marked the target for a FAC. Results of the airstrike were 30-40 bunkers destroyed with two KIA (EC). On 5 April, C Troop discovered recent vehicle tracks leading from Cambodia toward Dau Tieng. Similar tracks had been spotted and reported in the past, however, no trucks were ever found. On this occasion, C Troop followed the vehicle tracks to a storage area, XT527713, and found two 3/4 ton trucks, type unknown, and 300 boxes of ammunition. An air strike on the area destroyed 1 truck and more than half the ammunition and damaged the other truck. Artillery fire was placed on the target area throughout that night. On 7 April, D Troop stopped a Vietnamese vehicle along with several suspicious personnel, at XT527334. The vehicle was filled with contraband including whiskey, cigarettes, C-Rations, and beer. The vehicle and personnel were turned over to the Vietnamese National Police. This period confirmed that VC/NVA forces were rebuilding and recouping old base areas in War Zone C and were moving large amounts of supplies from Cambodia, by truck, toward the Dau Tieng area.

12. RESULTS:

a. Friendly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enlisted Men</td>
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b. Enemy:

(1) VC/NVA KIA (BO) - 82
(2) VC/NVA KIA (Foes) - 109
(3) Military Structures Destroyed - 107
(4) Military Structures Damaged - 23
(5) Sampans Destroyed - 37
(6) Sampans Damaged - 4
(7) Miscellaneous Destroyed:
   1-3/4 Ton Truck
   150-Boxes of Small Arms Ammunition

c. All Bomb Damage Assessments were conducted by aerial reconnaissance.

13. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITY

a. Supply

(1) No difficulties were experienced in either Class I, II, III, IV, V.
(2) Total ammunition expenditures by the squadron during this
   operations:

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<tr>
<td>2.75 Rockets</td>
<td>1,376</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.62mm Linked</td>
<td>164,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.56mm</td>
<td>4,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm (M-79)</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm (M-5)</td>
<td>1,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoke (All Colors)</td>
<td>193</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frag Grenades</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Phosphorous Grenades</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106mm ( Recoiless Rifle)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm ( Mortar)</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>MK-24 (Flare)</td>
<td>192</td>
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b. Maintenance:

Daily road reconnaissance missions are very demanding on equipment
and vehicles in D Troop. Each vehicle averaged 125 miles per day during
this operation. Although numerous parts were replaced, particularly
suspension items and tires, equipment readiness averaged 99% throughout
the period. A concrete preventive maintenance program, actively supervised
before, during, and after operations, forestalled major problems. Aircraft
maintenance was greatly improved enabling all air cavalry troops to increase
their availability approximately 10% over that available during the last
operation.

14. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS

a. ITEMS: Local Intelligence

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DISCUSSION: Many rear area commands bring the unit in constant contact with local civilians, Popular Forces, and ARVN troops. These people live and work in their specific areas and know not only the terrain but also enemy locations and movements.

OBSERVATION: It is highly desirable to cultivate these local intelligence sources. By daily contact, these sources can give an exceptionally clear picture of local VC activity, many times pin-pointing numbers and locations. The time involved in seeking out this type intelligence is well spent.

b. ITEM: Operational Control

DISCUSSION: When a cavalry troop becomes OPCON to a battalion size unit, there has been a tendency to fragment the assets of the troop, using the sections to augment the reconnaissance platoon or rifle companies.

OBSERVATION: Commanders must be briefed on the missions, capabilities, and limitations of the cavalry troop. Particular emphasis must be placed on the necessity for maintaining platoon integrity as all sections are dependent upon each other for the cavalry platoon to operate as it is designed.

c. ITEM: Maintenance

DISCUSSION: When performing daily route reconnaissance and security missions, with wheeled vehicles, the maintenance requirement increases drastically. Parts wear faster, more maintenance is required, and minor assemblies, i.e. ball joints, shock absorbers, universal joints, break with increasing frequency.

OBSERVATION: In order to maintain an acceptable degree of combat readiness, both a strong maintenance program and management of assets are necessary. A good preventative maintenance program stressing operator maintenance, timely requisitioning of parts, and timely replacement of parts is a must. Secondly, the available assets must be managed so each piece of equipment gets necessary maintenance time. This may require standing down individual vehicles if a platoon cannot be released for maintenance. With careful management the former can be an effective program.

d. ITEM: Dust

DISCUSSION: Dust continues to be a major problem in many helicopter parking and landing areas throughout the corps. Dust causes many extra hours of maintenance and presents a major safety hazard for helicopters taking off and landing. At night, dust can cause pilots to lose ground reference with serious consequences.

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OBSERVATION: All commanders must realize the hazards of dusty conditions in areas where rotary wing aircraft operate and take such action as necessary to eliminate these conditions.

WILLIAM W. BRANNON JR.
LTC, Armor Commanding

ANNEXES:  A - Operations Overlay
            B - Intelligence Overlay

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SUBJECT: Combat After action Report (Operation WILDERNESS)
(RCS: MACV J3-32)

TO: Commanding General
25th Inf Division
APO San Francisco
ATTN: AVDCPB

1. (U) NAME OF OPERATION: Operation WILDERNESS


3. (U) LOCATION: Tай Nhie and Binh Duong Provinces; RVN.

4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

5. (O) REPORTING OFFICIAL: Colonel Fremont B. Hodsdon, Jr.

6. (O) TASK ORGANIZATION:
   a. 4-9 Infantry: 11 March - 30 March 1968.
   b. 4-9 Infantry: ( (-) C Co): 31 March - 8 April 1968.
   c. 2-12 Infantry: 22 March - 30 March 1968.
   e. 3-17 Cavalry (-a & B Troops): 25 March - 8 April 1968.
   h. 3-22 Infantry: 30 March - 4 April 1968.
   i. 3-22 Infantry: ( (-) D Co) 5 April - 8 April 1968.
   k. 7-11 Artillery DS (11 March - 8 April 1968).
   m. 2-32 Artillery GSR (11 March - 8 April 1968).
7. (c) SUPPORTING FIRES:

a. Artillery: Artillery support was characterized by frequent movement of the firing batteries to support the airmobile activities. Fire support bases used were:

(1). FSB Wainwright (XT 282509)
(2). FSB Washington (XT 123526)
(3). FSB Wainwright (XT 287507)
(4). FSB Rawline II (XT 302507)
(5). FSB Washington (XT 146568)
(6). FSB Hooker (XT 570850)
(7). FSB Rawlings I (AT 308500)
(8). FSB Wayne (AT 283428)

A total of 8,948 HE, 203 WP at 187 illuminations rounds were expended. Artillery fire accounted for 35 enemy KIA (BC) and 6 enemy KIA (POSS). GS units were used for firing TOFS, preparation of landing zones, large tactical targets and the HDL program.

b. Tactical Air: Tactical Air Support was provided by 7th USift. The mission were controlled by 1st Brigade TACP. The following summarizes USift Tactical Air Support for Operation WILDERNESS.

(1). FAC Missions flown: 121
(2). Fighter Sorties: 247
   a. Preplanned: 23
   b. Preplanned (Diverted): 63
   c. Divert: 153
   d. Immediate: 8

(3). Bomb Damage Assessment: 313 bunkers destroyed, 1 bunker damaged
36 bunkers uncovered or exposed, 33 military structures destroyed, 14 military structures damaged, 114 meters of trench destroyed, 225 meters of trench uncovered, 9 tunnel entrances exposed, 7 bridges destroyed, 150 boxes ammo destroyed 150 crates ammo destroyed, 24 secondary explosions, 8 shrapnel fires
36 bunkers of road cut, 2 trucks destroyed, 1 truck damaged, 2 fighting position destroyed, 10 supply caches destroyed, 4 bicycles damaged, 1 stove destroyed, 10 bags of rice destroyed, 20 explosive crates were destroyed, 20 water buffalo KIA, 40 enemy KIA (BC), 41 enemy KIA (POSS).

C. Army Aviation: Army aviation statistics for Operation WILDERNESS are as follow:
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(1). Sorties (UH-ID, UH-ID Aircraft): 121
   (a) Combat Assaults (Gunships): 66
   (b) Tactical Troop Lifts: 60
   (c) Resupply: 45
   (d) Air Evac, C & C Recon, & Miscellaneous: 50

(2). Sorties CH-47 Aircraft: 93
   (a) Resupply: 8
   (b) Evacuation: 65
   (c) Other: 20

(3). Sorties CH-54 Aircraft: 0

(4). Sorties CH-23B Aircraft: 216
   (a) Tactical: 162
   (b) Administrative: 54

8. (C) Intelligence: Experience from past operations and intelligence gathered prior to the start of Operation WILDERNESS indicated that enemy activity was concentrated on the fringes of the Brigade AO and consisted mainly of support and resupply of enemy units to the South.

   a. Strength: The 1st Brigade was opposed by elements of COSVN Hq's 1st Guard Battalion, 680th Training Regiment, 82d Rear Services Group, D-14 local Force Companies. Total enemy strength was 2500-3000 men, of which approximately 1200 were combat soldiers.

   b. Disposition: During the operation support and guard units remained in their base camps. 680th Regiment occupied an area along the CAMBODIAN Border Northwest of TAY NINH: the 1st Guard Battalion secured base camps, caches and resupply routes in War Zone C. Elements of COSVN remained in traditional areas north of KATUM, along the CAMBODIAN Border. Local force units were dispersed in base areas east of TAY NINH. Toward the end of March, D-14 moved South of the AO to support operations near TRANG BANG. Other local force units were dispersed throughout TAY NINH Province.

   c. Summary of Enemy Activity: During Operation WILDERNESS the majority of enemy forces were committed to defending base camps, caches and resupply routes. Local force elements launched round attacks against Regional Force, and Popular Force out-posts in TAY NINH Province, harassed DAU TIENG Base Camps with mortars, rockets, and ground probes, and harassed TAY NINH - DAU TIENG convoy with antitank mines. Through VR, SLAR, and Red Haze Missions 1st Bde was able to identify several well-used communications routes. The main LOC ran South from the FISHHOOK vicinity XT4385, along Rte 233 and the Michelain Plantation to the East. VR's spotted tire tracks on road and trails and several huge base camps consisting of more than 100 bunkers.

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c. (Cont'd) Air strikes in response to these VR's uncovered and damaged 2 3/4 trucks and destroyed large ammo caches. The only ground action conducted against this LOC met with immediate heavy resistance, and rather than commit a large force to the operation, the unit was withdrawn.

d. Weather: During Operation WILDERNESS, the weather had little effect on operations. On several occasions, morning haze delayed airmobile operations, but there were no air missions aborted due to inclement weather. The weather in no way hindered operations or convoys.

e. Terrain: The terrain was generally flat and provided no obstacle to movement. Vegetation varied from triple canopy jungle to large open fields and rice paddies. The ground was firm enough to support mechanized operations.

f. Intelligence: Agent Reports and information received during Operation WILDERNESS were evaluated at C-3 (fairly reliable, possibly true). Operations accompanied by agents or recent Chieu Hoi's were very successful. The most comprehensive and reliable intelligence was received from VR sightings by the 3-17 Cavalry.

g. Security: Operational security during Operation WILDERNESS was good; elements at all levels showed a greater awareness of reasons for good security.

9. (C) Mission:

a. Conduct offensive operations in vicinity of TAY NINH to DAU TIENG; destroy enemy forces.

b. Open MSR to BAU CO from TAY NINH, TAY NINH to DAU TIENG, and secure engineer efforts and convoys operating on these routes.

c. React to enemy initiatives and intelligence throughout TAOI.

d. Defend BAU CO, TAY NINH Base Camp, and DAU TIENG Base Camp.

e. Conduct recon of and interdiction of enemy LOC leading into 1st Bde's TAOI from CAMBODIA. Armed aerial recon. Emphasis to be replaced on the Crescent area, and the Ben Cui and Michellen Plantations.

f. Be prepared to react to convoy incidents.

g. Provide light fire team support for counter mortars at DAU TIENG during hours of darkness.

h. Provide light fire team support to Division units on order.

i. Conduct Battalion refresher training.

j. Sweep and secure MSR from TAY NINH to GO DAU HA (effective 20 Mar 68).

10. Concept of the Operation (C): Brigade would employ one Mech Infantry Platoon to secure BAU CO and sweep, secure and escort convoys along the TAY NINH-DAU TIENG MSR. D troop 3-17 Cav would sweep and outpost MSR between TAY NINH and GO DAU HA. Air troop, 3-17 Cav would conduct recon and interdiction of enemy LOC within the Brigade TAOR and provide light fire teams.
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10. (Cont'd) Infantry battalions would conduct refresher training and react to intelligence to destroy enemy forces and installations. At least one Company of Infantry would be in TAY NINH to DÀU TIENG base camp during hours of darkness. Infantry battalion would provide engineer security along MSR.

11 March 1968

11. Execution (C):

4–9 Inf: Completed move from HOC MON, XT752938 to TAY NINH at 1516. Companies stood down for maintenance for remainder of the day. Recon platoons secured rock crusher at NUI BA ĐEN.

2–22 Inf: (M): Battalion conducted RIF with Co C from XT500490 to XT530490 to XT530520 to XT517514. B Co conducted RIF from XT517514
B Co conducted RIF from XT5175 to XT519350 to XT519350 to XT530550 to XT530520
Recon platoon RIF from XT530490 to XT498490 to XT512520 to XT532530. The operation resulted in negative US' casualties, and 1 VC KIA (BC) vicinity XT5320549 with 7.62 pistol.

S-5 Activities: 2–14 Inf delivered material to NIELP LONG, XT233480 and supervised bunker construction.

12 March 1968

4–9 Inf: Stood down at TAY NINH for refitting in preparation for further operations. C Co conducted training in vic center of mass XT 1448. At XT 140496
C Co apprehended two detainees and returned to TAY NINH negative contact. Recon secured rock crusher at NUI BA ĐEN.

2–22 Inf (M) (-): C Co swept and outposted MSR from XT41544 to XT4738458
B Co swept and outposted MSR from XT471468 to XT455493 and conducted RIF in Area of Operation bounded by grids XT473413 XT453413 XT430437 and XT460437.
Recon platoon secured convoy from DÀU TIENG to TAY NINH and back. B Co found 5,230 pounds of unpolished rice at XT463425 extracted 1,450 pounds, destroyed the rest.

A 2–22 Conducted road sweep and cleared MSR from TAY NINH to XT371424.
One platoon cleared road from BAU CO to TAY NINH and escorted convoy back to BAU CO, securing BAU CO, at night.

S-5 Activities: S-5 personnel dropped 46,000 leaflets vicinity XT3853, and 21,000 leaflets vicinity XT3946.

13 March 1968

4–9 Inf: Continued to stand down in preparation for future operations with C Co conducting training vic center of mass XT1447, negative contact. Prepared to send two companies to support 2–22 contact. Recon platoon secured rock crusher at NUI BA ĐEN.

2–22 Inf (M) (-): C Co swept and outposted MSR from XT41544 to XT338458
B Co sweep and outposted MSR from XT471468 to XT455493. Recon secured convoy from DÀU TIENG to TAY NINH to DÀU TIENG. C Co conducted RIF from XT415443
to XT356455 to XT354475 to XT367473. At 1435 C, Co at XT373476 received small arms fire from an estimated 50 VC. B Co established a blocking position from XT380475 to XT381483 and support with mortars. A light fire team supported.
At 1555 B & C linked up at XT374476, C remained in position and B swept area of of contact. At 1620, B received fire at XT373477.
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11. (Cont'd) by JLY 4 US KIA, 9 US WIA, VC losses unknown.

2-22 Inf (M): Swept MSR from TAY NHINH to XT 371424 and participated with
2-22 as described above. One platoon swept and outposted MSR between TAY NHINH
and BAU CO, securing BAU Co at night.

GRIP: Participated in RIF with 2-22.

S-5 Activities: D-25 hed conducted MEDCAP at DUN TIEENG, treating 85 patients;
7-11 Artillery held MEDCAP at LONG BIEN, XT 240435, treating 60 patients; 2-14
Infantry supervised construction of a dispensary at RIF LONG, XT =33460;
588th Engineers delivered 500 boxes of cereal to C.O D'U Orphanage, XT 237497
Fla & E sprayed TAY NHINH with DDT for insect and plague control; 4-9 Infantry
delivered 100 cans of food stuffs to BAU SOI XT0847.

14 March 1968

4-9 Inf: Continued to support 2-22 Inf (M) in contact. B Co provided
security for FSB WAINRIGHT, XT 282509. D Co moved to DUN TIEENG to act as
RIF at night. A, B, & D Companies conducted as assault into LZ at XT365497 and
RIF to vic XT352601. During RIF B Co discovered and destroyed a small enemy
base camp vic XT 353493, conducted sweep to XT100440 and returned, receiving
light sniper fire at 1115, vic XT03503 and returned fire with organic weapons
and artillery; negative casualties, negative results. One platoon of C Co
secured rock crusher at NUI BA DEN.

2-22 Inf: (M) (-): Battalion conducted RIF from its larger position at
XT373476 into area of previous days contact at 0630, after an air strike and
artillery preparation. Continued RIF and discovered and destroyed two medium
size base camps at XT374475 and XT376478; all elements closed DUN TIEENG for
night. Platoonsize MP's were established vic DUN TIEENG Base Camp.

A-2-22: Participated in RIF of Battalion as described above. One platoon
conducted sweep and clear of Rte 4 between TAY NHINH and BAU CO, and secured BAU
Co at night.

S-5 Activities: 7-11 Artillery conducted MEDCAP at LONG KHOIANG, XT 245435
treating 50 patients; 4-9 Inf held MEDCAP at DUN NHINH, XT 2352 treating 93
patients; B-25 hed conducted MEDCAP at DUN TIEENG, treating 50 patients; leaflets
drop was conducted vic XT36690, cropping 46,000 leaflets and broadcasting PSYOP's
tapes for two hours.

15 March 1968

4-9 Inf: A, B, & C Companies conducted airborne assaults vic XT067543
and RIF to PZ vic XT074566, with negative contact. C Co secured FSB WASHINGTON
II vic XT123526 and conducted legal sweeps to XT126542 and XT 114534. 11 units
closed TAY NHINH Base camp at 1743 Recon platoon secured rock cruiser at Nui Ba
Don.

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2-22 Inf (-) Battalion conducted normal sweep and clear mission along T.A. Minh - D.U. TIENG NSR. Co B conducted RIF north-east of D.U. TIENG base camp, establishing AP's at AT546487 and AT522468 and a blocking force at AT540468 negative contact. Battalion established 4 platoon sized AP's via D.U. TIENG at night.

A 2-22 Inf (M): Secured G40 XAI laterite pit and swept and outposted route 4 from TAY MINH to Bau Co. One platoon secured Bau Co at night. At 1615 via XT284618 an APC of Co A hit a pressure plate type antitank mine resulting in 4 WIA and total warping of the hull of the APC.

S-5 Activities: Conducted leaflet drop via XT4975 dropping 23,000 leaflets.

16 March 1968

4-9 Inf: A, B, C & D Companies conducted airborne assaults vic XT329539, XT385827 and XT304513 conducting company sized RIF to PZ vic XT365528, XT365532, XT291531, and AT579513. A Co discovered and destroyed several bunker complexes vic XT378538, XT375530 and XT373531. B Co located 500 meters of trench vic XT370527. C Co apprehended one female defector vic XT297511; she had no ID papers and was carrying 6,000 piasters. At XT375418 D Co located 8, 60mm Chicom mortar rounds and freshly dug mortar positions. All Companies PZ to Tay Ninh except D Co which PZ to FSB WAINWRIGHT II, XT287507 and convoyed to Tay Ninh. Recon platoon cleared the rock crusher at NUI BA DEN.

2-22 Inf (M) (-) Co departed D.U. TIENG base camp, established temporary lager position at AT453433 and had 1 platoon conduct RIF to west, and one platoon RIF to the east. At 1348 vic XT45418 an APC hit a mine resulting in heavy damage to the APC and 3 WIA. Co C recon platoon swept and secured NSR between TAY MINH, BAY DU TIENG, etc along route.

A 2-22 Inf (M): Escortec artillery convoy from TAY MINH to FSB WAINWRIGHT II and conducted RIF along axis XT335337, XT332535 and returned to TAY MINH.

CRIP: Conducted air mobile recon mission vic XT205590, negative contact.

17 March 1968

4-9 Inf: Four companies departed TAY MINH by convoy closing FSB HULL, vic XT260380. From FSB company sized airborne assaults were conducted to LZ's vic XT293393, XT293398, and XT303477. Co C secured the FSB. Companies conducting RIF to PZ's at XT301412, XT301480, and XT290539. At XT304419 B Co found 750 pounds of polished rice, and at XT302408, A Co discovered and destroyed a small base camp. At XT298398 B Co found 150 meters of tunnel. All Companies PZ to FSB HULL, and convoyed to TAY MINH. Recon platoon secured rock crusher at NUI BA DE.

2-22 Inf (M) (-) B Co with C Co swept and outposted MSR between TAY MINH and D.U. TIENG and escorted convoy. C Co (-) sealed village at XT501485 and conducted cordon and search with CRIP. Remainder of C Co conducted RIF from D.U. TIENG along axis XT515468 to XT529497 to XT517518 and returned to D.U. TIENG. Four platoon sized AP's were established at night via D.U. TIENG Base Camp.

CRIP: Conducted cordon and search of village vic XT501485 with C 2-22 Inf (M).
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S-5 Activities: 7-11 Inf conducted MEDCAP at GAM GIANG, XT259380, treating 163 patients. 4-9 Inf conducted MEDCAP at TIN HAF, XT13505, treating 130 patients. 2-77 Artillery held MEDCAP at MINH THANH, XT501471, treating 74 patients.

18 March 1968

4-9 Inf: Co C (-) convoyed from TAY NINH with artillery, and secured FSB RAWLINGS II, XT302518. One platoon of C Co secured CIA XA laterite vit. A, B, & I Companies conducted airmobile assaults to LZ vic XT378552, conducting RIF to XT373561 and XT373559 for extraction. A Co was extracted to FSB RAWLINGS II night ambush positions vic of the FSB.

2-22 Inf (M) (-): At 0645 DAU TIENG Base Camp received 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from CIA XA. An artillery and light fire team. Resulting of engagement 9 US KIA, 4 VC KIA (by artillery & LFT) B & C Co conducted RIF from DAU TIENG to vic XT565515. At XT56515B by 1325 hours B Co engaged two VC with small arms fire and automatic weapons, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and no US casualties. Recon and CRIP participated in RIF with B & C companies.

A 2-22 Inf (M) Swept and outposted at 4about TAY NINH and BAU D/C. Secured BAU CO with one platoon at night.

CRIP: Participated in RIF with 2-22 Inf (M).

S-5 Activities: 7-11 artillery held MEDCAP at IONG KIM, XT243460, treating 100 patients.

19 March 1968

4-9 Inf: Stood down at TAY NINH. established 6 platoon sized night ambush patrols vic TAY NINH. established 6 platoon sized night ambush patrols vic TAY NINH Base Camp. Recon platoon secured rock crusher at NUI BA DEN.

2-22 Inf (M): Swept and outposted MSR between TAY NINH and DAU TIENG. B Co and recon element conducted RIF Northwest of DAU TIENG along axis XT 468475 to XT483483 and return to DAU TIENG; negative contact. All elements closed DAU TIENG. At 1705 DAU TIENG received 7 rockets rounds, destroying one building damaging another. At 1231 10 rounds of 82mm mortar were received, negative damage. 2-22 established 2 night platoon sized AIFs vic DAU TIENG Base Camp.

A 2-22 Inf (L): F ... conducted cordon and search of village vic XT340548 with National Police and CRIP. One platoon secured the 4 between TAY NINH and BAU D/C, securing BAU CO, at night.

CRIP: Participated in cordon and search of village vic XT340548 with National Police and A 2-22.

S-5 Activities: 2-22 Inf conducted MEDCAP at LONG YEN, vic XT225435, treating 105 patients. 4-9 Conducted MEDCAP at LONG YEN, treating 68 patients. S-5 personnel conducted a leaflet drop vic XT7806, dropping 40,000 leaflets, and broadcasted a PSYOP tape for 30 minutes.
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20 March 1968

4-9 Inf: All units stood down for maintenance and preparation for future operations. 1 platoon secured the CAO XA laterite pit. Recon platoon secured rock crusher at NUI BA DEN, D Co departed TAY NINH by CH-47 for DJU TIENG to be OPCON to 2-22 (-) for base camp defense.

2-22 Inf (M) (d): Continued to secure TAY NINH base camp. B Co and Recon opened TAY NINH CAO XA laterite pit, C Co conducted RIF to XT130482. Battalion established 3 night platoon sized AP's outside TAY NINH Base Camp.

A 2-22 Inf (M): One platoon opened and secured Rte 4 between TAY NINH and BAU CO, and secured BUI CO at night. A (-) departed TAY NINH at 1830 to go OPCON to 2-22 at DJU TIENG at 2000.

2-22 Inf (-): D Troop opened and secured Rte 22 South of TAY NINH to CO BAU HA. B troop conducted recon and interdiction of enemy LOC in the Northeast portion of the Brigade T.O.R.

3-17 Cav (-): D Troop opened and secured Rte 22 South of TAY NINH to CO DAU HA. B troop conducted recon and interdiction of enemy LOC in the Northeast portion of T.O.R. A Troop conducted a leaflet drop vic XT7808, dropping 40,000 leaflets and broadcasting a 30 minute PSYOP tape.

21 March 1968

4-9 Inf: D Co returned to TAY NINH by CH-47 from DAU TIENG at 0900. One platoon of D Co secured artillery and 4.2 mortar section at FSB WASHINGTON II, XT123527. A, B, C, & D (-) conducted combat assault from TAY NINH to LZ at XT049544. A Co RIF to XT055562; B Co RIF to XT063556; C Co RIF to XT059547; and D Co RIF to XT059547. Companies returned to LZ and PZ to TAY NINH. Elements at FSB WASHINGTON II returned to TAY NINH Base Camp by night. Recon platoon opened and secured rock crusher at NUI BA DEN. A Co flew to DJU TIENG at night to assist 2-22 in Base Camp defense.

2-22 Inf: A Co (-) returned OPCON to Battalion, leaving one platoon at BUI CO to secure at night and to sweep and secure MSR between BUI CO and TAY NINH. Recon and C B opened and secured TAY NINH - DAU TIENG, MSR. Co G stood down for maintenance. Battalion established 2 night AP's vic DJU TIENG, with 4.2 mortar squad at District HQ.

3-17 Cav (-): Opened and secured Rte 22 South to CO DAU HA with D troop. B troop conducted recon and interdiction of enemy LOC in Northern portion of T.O.R. Reacted to intelligence by insertion of Aero Rifles at 1520 at XT163462, negative contact. Aero - Rifles were extracted at 1655 from XT163462 returned to TAY NINH.

S-5 Activities: 588th Engineer conducted MEDCAP at BIEN PHUONG, treating 37 patients; 4-9 Inf conducted a MEDCAP at NINH THUAN, XT2550 treating 98 patients; 82-25 had conducted MEDCAP at DJU TIENG, treating 170 patients. S-5 personnel conducted a leaflet drop vic XT3063 dropping 23,000 leaflets and broadcasting a 30 Minute PSYOP tape. 4-9 Inf delivered 190 lbs of clothing to the CAO XA Orphanage, XT16503.

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.22 March 1968

4-9 Inf: Battalion conducted combat assault with four companies to LZ vic XT086518 and RIF to XT096618, XT083612, XT083616, companies returned to LZ to PZ to TAY NINH. Recon platoon secured rock crusher at NUI BA DENT.

2-22 Inf (K) (-): Battalion and secured D&U TIIENG-TAY NINH MSR. Battalion (-) conducted RIF with B Co RIF to XT586510, C Co RIF to XT5496588, Recon platoon followed and supported B Co. APC of B Co hit a 50 lb pressure detonated anti-tank mine at XT5446486, resulting in 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA, heavy damage to APC.

A 2-22: One platoon swept and secured TAY NINH-BAU CO MSR and secured BAU CO at night. A (-) escorted 4.2 mortars and a battery of artillery to FSB WASHINGTON, XT146568, then RIF to XT588606, returned to FSB and escorted FSB element back to TAY NINH.

2-12 Inf: Closed D&U TIIENG 1345, became OPCON 1st Bde, that time, Battalion stood down for maintenance.

3-17 Cav (-): Conducted road security mission with D troop opening Rte 22 from TAY NINH to GO D&U HA. B Troop inserted Aero - Rifles LZ XT573502 at 1317, took under fire 3 persons in assorted khaki uniforms, negative result by extracted from LZ at 1532. B Troop conducted recon and interdiction operation in Bde TAOR.

S-5 Activities: 2-11 Army conducted MEDCAP at LONG BINH, XT225500 treated 127 patients; 2-14 Inf held a MEDCAP at HIEP LE, XT2350, treating 225 patients. 2-22 Inf conducted a MEDCAP at AP 13, XT564496, treating 150 patients.

23 March 1968

4-9 Inf: Battalion conducted cordon and search of village vic XT 188492. Battalion motor marched to dismount point at XT170490 and then proceeded to release point at AT 182193, surrounding the village with four companies. Companies were in place at 0406. Search team of 1st Bde CRIP and 50 National Police were in position at 0730. 7 Vietnamese were detained and turned over to Vietnamese custody. Battalion closed TAY NINH at 1217, and stood down for maintenance. 1 platoon of HHC secured the CAO XI: interite pit. Recon secured rock crusher at NUI BA DENT.

2-22 Inf (K) (-): Continued defense of D&U TIIENG with two platoon sized night MP's at XT509493 and XT529460. 1 rifle squad at D&U TIIENG Bridge, and 1 mortar squad from C Co supporting D&U TIIENG District Headquarters. D Co and Recon swept and outposted TAY NINH-D&U TIIENG MSR. C Co stood down for maintenance. Occupied larger position with B Co Recon platoon and C Co (-) vic XT52052.

A 2-22 (H): Opened and secured Rte 22 South to GO D&U HA, one platoon opened and secured Route 4 between BAU CO and TAY NINH.

3-17 Cav (-): B Troop conducted recon an interdiction of enemy LOC in Bde TAOR with B Troop. D Troop stood down for maintenance.

7-14 Inf: Stopped down for maintenance and preparation for future operation. Established Bushmaster location vic XT508488.

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2. 3-5 Activities: 4-9 Inf. Conducted MEDCAP at VIA BIEN, treating 60 patients; B -25 had conduct MEDCAP at DAU TIENG, treating 25 patients.

24 March 1968

4-9 Inf: Conducted refresher training, vicinity TAY NINH Base Camp. Recon secured Rock Crusher at NUI BI DEN.

2-22 Inf (N): Recon and B Co swept and outposted DAU TIENG - TAY NINH MSR and escorting convoy from TAY NINH to D'U TIENG. C Co conducted RIF to lager position XT494506, from DAU TIENG remained in position overnight, and established two AP's. One platoon of C Co convoyed to BAI CO.

A 2-22 Inf (N): Swept and secured BAI CO - TAY NINH MSR with one platoon and secured at night, assisted sweep and outposting TAY NINH - GO DAO HA MSR.

2-12 Inf: Conducted refresher training vic DAU TIENG Base Camp.

3-17 Cav (-): D troop stood down. B troop conducted recon and interdiction of enemy loc in Western portion of TAOR.

5-5 Activities: 7-11 Artillery conducted MEDCAP at C'I JIANG, XT2837 treating 60 patients; 2-77 Artillery conducted MEDCAP at TAY TIN, XT501471 treating 63 patients.

25 March 1968

4-9 Inf: Conducted refresher training vicinity TAY NINH Base Camp. Recon secured rock crusher, NUI BI DEN.

2-22 Inf (N) (-): B Co Recon platoon and C Co (-) conducted RIF from night lager vic XT520520 to XT522538/ APC from recon unit hit at XT525518, at 0926 resulting in L US, KIA, and 1 APC destroyed recon platoon closed DAU. TINH.

A-2922 Inf, Opened and secured Rte 4 between TAY LINH and BAI CO.

2-12 Inf: Conducted refresher training and local patrolling vic DAU TIE- NG Base Camp.

3-17 Cav (-): D Troop opened and secured Rte 22 South from TAY NINH to CO DAO HA. B Co contact with unknown size VC force at XT288360 at 1006, sporadic sniper fire, contact broken by VC 1015 negative casualties negative results. B Troop inserted Aero rifles vic XT520520 in support of 2-22 RIF, extracted 1000 negative contact.

26 March 1968

4-9 Inf: Conducted refresher training vic T Y NINH Base Camp. One platoon provided engineer security at the 6916 laterite pit. Recon platoon secured rock crushes at NUI BI DEN.

2-22 Inf (N): A Co conducted a RIF from MSR at XT53450 North to a lager position vic XT34505 establishing platoon sized and night lager position. C Co (-) closed T Y NINH and BAI CO. Recon platoon swept and outposted Rte 239 from DAU TIENG to XT72424. Established 2 platoon sized AP's vic DAU TIENG.

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2-22 Inf (M)(-)(Cont'd) D/JU TIENG Base Camp received 12 rounds of 82mm mortar, resulting in 2 KIA, 3 WIA, and damage to two 5 ton trucks, 1/2 ton trailer, AF B/22 at XT422454, spotted 13 VC, resulting in 1 US KIA (POSS).

A 2-22 Inf (a): Swept and outposted MSR between T.Y NINH and XT372404, Secured D/JU CO at night, with one platoon.

2-12 Inf: Conducted local patrolling and refresher training via D/JU TIENG. A 2-12 established a night lager via XT512448.

3-17 Cav (-): Conducted recon and interdiction of enemy LOC in Western portion of Bde Tq.o with C Troop. Swept MSR from T.Y NINH South to GO D/U HA with D Troops.

S-5 Activities: 7-11 1stry held MJCPC at LONG KHONG, XT245435, treating 45 patients; 2-14 Inf held a MJCPC at HIEF NGHIA, XT235500, 297 patients were treated; 4-9 Inf held a MJCPC at TuU05 PHUOC, XT266455, treating 103 patients.

27 March 1968

4-9 Inf: Conducted refresher training during morning hours. In afternoon-battalion (-) conducted c mbt assault to LZ AT570850 to secure FSB HOOKER and to be prepared to go to support of CIDG, B-56 element in heavy contact at XT532902. C Co remained at T.Y NINH as RRF. Recon secured rock crusher at N.I B./ DEN.

2-22 Inf (M): B Co conducted sweep and outpost of TAY NINH, D/JU TIENG MSR, assisted by elements of C Co. One platoon of A Co escorted the convoy between T.Y NINH and D/JU TIENG. One platoon of C Co outposted and swept Rte 4 between T.Y NINH and B/JU CO. A Co conducted RIF from D/JU TIENG to XT468946 and established night lager.

2-12 Inf: B Co conducted RIF from D/JU TIENG to XT508446 where it joined A Co which had moved from its night lager postion at XT512448; RIF continued to XT510450 where night lager was established. C Co secured D/JU TIENG Base Camp.

B-56 CIDG: In heavy contact with 1-2 companies, vic XT532902 at 0830. Bad weather prevented reinforcing with additional troops during morning. Aerial resupply was also hampered by weather. Portion of perimeter had been breached and VC had reinforced. Became OCON to 1st Bde at 1325. Aerial resupply was affected at 1500. Another CIDG element R/ID FIRE was airlifted to vic of contact, but ambushed as it approached B-56 at 1812. R/ID FIRE withdrew to FSB HOOKER, AT570850. B-56 contact continued throughout day and into the night.

26 March 1963

4-9 Inf (-): Battalion (-) conducted local sweeps of FSB HOOKER. C Co was airlifted to FSB HOOKER from TAY NINH, closed 1805. Battalion established 5 night platoon-sized AP's via FSB HOOKER, and continued to improve defensive positions. Recon secured rock cruiser at N.I B./ DEN.

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2-22 Inf: One platoon of C Co swept and outposted B Co 4 between TAY NINH and Binh Co. O-66 (75 and 155 mm) swept and outposted TAY NINH - D'AU TIENG MSR. Recon platoon escorted convoys along TAY NINH - D'AU TIENG MSR. B Co departed D'AU TIENG and conducted RIF to larger position via XT51952A, night larger position received 4 rounds of 60mm mortar outside perimeter, with negative results.

2-12 Inf: One platoon C Co air lifted from D'AU TIENG to secure downed helicopter, XT242335, returned to D'AU TIENG after helicopter secured. A & B companies returned to D'AU TIENG from night larger, and stood down for maintenance. D Co conducted refresher training via D'AU TIENG Base Camp.

Special Forces: B-56 via XT532902 received a heavy ground attack at 1200 hours, perimeter was broken, but US and CIDG were able to establish another perimeter and repulse VC attack with support of LFT's artillery and air strikes provided by units OFCON to 1st Bde, 1st Brigade conducted aerial resupply and MEdDAC of US and CIDG elements. Results of action: 120 VC KIA (BC) 17 CIDG KIA 50 CIDG WIA, 1 US WIA, CIDG H team was air lifted to FSB HOOKER, from TON LO CHON closing at 1643. Departed FFL at 1700 and proceeded toward point of B-56 contact.

S-5 Activities: 7-11 Arty held MEdDAC at LONG Binh, XT250435, treating 102 patients; 4-9 Inf 3 MEdDAC at THUONG THIEN XT270455, treating 73 patients. 2-22 Inf conducted a MEdDAC at BEN CUI, XT4746, treating 147 patients. S-5 personnel conducted a leaflet drop via XT37500, dropping 23,000 leaflets and broadcasting a 30 minute tape.

29 March 1968

4-9 Inf: Continued to improve positions and conduct local patrolling via FSB HOOKER, XT570850. One platoon secured Cu'A XA laterite pit. All elements departed FSB HOOKER, closed TAY NINH Base Camp, 1945, Recon secured rock crusher at NUI BA, D'AU.

2-12 Inf: Conducted refresher training via D'AU TIENG Base Camp. D Co assumed role as Ready Reaction Force for T.Y NINH Base Camp. Battalion (-) helilifted back to T.Y NINH.

2-22 Inf (b) (-): A Co conducted MIF from D'AU TIENG to XT555520, B Co swept and outposted a portion of the TAY NINH - D'AU TIENG MSR. Recon platoon escorted convoys between TAY NINH and D'AU TIENG.

C 2-22 Inf: Swept and outposted that portion of D'AU TIENG - TAY NINH MSR not secured by B Co. 1 platoon swept and secured at 4 between TAY NINH and Binh Co, and secured Binh Co at night.

3-17 Cav (-): D Troop swept and outposted A52 from TAY NINH South to CO D'AU H, C troop conducted Recon and Interdiction of enemy LOC in Western portion of Bde TAOI. and supported CIDG efforts in AO SMALLBROOK, East of KITUM.

Special Forces: 2nd CIDG element at OCP4 linked up with B-56. All Special Forces and CIDG elements air lifted from field location to TON LO CHON.
S-5 Activities: 2-14 Inf conducted MEDCAP at HIEF TRUONG, XT212475, treating 269 patients.

30 March 1968

4-9 Inf: Battalion conducted stand down until 1200, then conducted refresher training vic TAY NINH Base Camp. One platoon secured laterite pit at Cao Xa. Recon platoon secured rock crusher at Nui Ba Den.

2-22 Inf (M) (-): Swept and outposted portion of DAU TIENG - TAY NINH MSR with B Co. Recon platoon escorted convoys between TAY NINH and DAU TIENG. A Co stood down for maintenance.

C 2-22 Inf (M): C Co (-) swept and outposted that portion of DAU TIENG TAY NINH MSR not secured by B Co. One platoon of C Co swept and outposted MSR between TAY NINH and BAU CO, and secured BAU CO at night.

2-12 Inf: Conducted airmobile movement to FSB HAMILTON, XT400245 from DAU TIENG, closed 1229 conducted local sweep in vic FSB, and secured FSB during hours of darkness.

3-22: Closed DAU TIENG at 1325, became OPCON 1st Bde conducted stand down for remainder of day.

3-17 Cav (-): Conducted recon and interdiction operation in Bde TOR with C Troop. D Troop conducted route security mission from TAY NINH to GO DAU HAl.

S-5 Activities: 7-11 Arty conducted MEDCAP at LONG YEN, XT225435, treating 75 patients; 2-14 Inf conducted MEDCAP at NIEP BINH, XT225500, treating 194 patients; 4-9 Inf held MEDCAP at TAY NINH HUNG, XT293500, treating 103 patients.

31 March 1968

4-9 Inf (-): C Co OPCON to 3d Bde. Battalion (-) continued refresher training vic TAY NINH Base Camp. Recon platoon secured rock crusher, NUI BA DEN. One platoon secured Engineer effort at Cao Xa laterite pit.

2-22 Inf (M): One platoon outposted and swept Route 4 between TAY NINH and BAU CO, and secured BAU CO at night. C Co (-) swept and outposted MSR from TAY NINH to Bde Eastern boundary and escorting convoys from DAU TIENG to TAY NINH.

2-12 Inf: OPCON 3rd Brigade.

3-22: Stood down at DAU TIENG for maintenance, and prepared for future operations.

3-17 Cav (-) D Troop sweep and outposted Rte 22 from TAY NINH to GO DAU Ha. C Troop conducted recon and interdiction of enemy LOC in Western area of Bde TAO.

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5 Activities: 4-9 Inf conducted MEDCAP at LONG VAN, XT238480, treating 15 patients.

1 April 1968

4-9 Inf (-): B Co OPCON 3rd Brigade. One platoon secured engineer effort at Cao Xa laterite pit. Recon platoon secured rock crusher at NUI BA DEN. Remainder of battalion conducted refresher training vic TAY NINH Base Camp.

C-2-22 Inf (-): One platoon outposted and swept MSR between TAY NINH and BAU CO. C Co (-) swept and outposted MSR between TAY NINH and Bde's Eastern boundary. C Co escorted convoy from TAY NINH to DAU TIENG.

3-22 Inf: C Co conducted RIF to village XT506445 with 3rd Bde GRI, 2 popular forces platoons occupied blocking position vic XT505445. C Co cordoned village, GRI searched. B Co secured engineer effort on Rte 239 West of DAU TIENG. C & D Companies stood down at DAU TIENG.

3-17 Cav (-): D Troop swept and outposted MSR from TAY NINH to CO BAU HA. C Troop conducted Recon and interdiction of enemy LOC vic central War Zone C and upper Michelle plantation.

S-5 Activities: 2-14 Inf conducted MEDCAP at HIEP HOA, XT235485, treating 109 patients; 2-22 Inf conducted leaflet drop vic XT5459, dropping 46,000 leaflets, and broadcasting a PSYOP tape for 45 minutes.

2 April 1968

4-9 Inf (-): A & B Companies conducted refresher training vic TAY NINH Base Camp. One platoon of D Co secured engineer effort at Cao Xa laterite pit. Recon element secured rock crusher at NUI BA DEN.

C-2-22 Inf (-): One platoon swept and outposted MSR between TAY NINH and BAU CO. C Co (-) swept and outposted MSR between TAY NINH and DAU TIENG, and escorting convoy from DAU TIENG to TAY NINH.

3-22 Inf: Conducted refresher training vic DAU TIENG Base Camp. One company secured engineer effort on Rte 239, West of DAU TIENG.

3-17 Cav (-): D Troop swept and outposted MSR between TAY NINH and CO BAU HA. C Troop continued mission of recon and interdiction of enemy LOC in Bde TAOR, in Western portion of TAOR.

S-5 Activities: 2-14 Inf conducted MEDCAP at HIEP HOA, XT235485, treating 189 patients; 4-9 Inf conducted MEDCAP at LONG VAN, XT238480, treating 58 patients.

3 April 1968

4-9 Inf (-): A (-), B & D Companies convoyed from TAY NINH to FSB WAYNE XT238488. FSB WAYNE secured by 1st Spec Regional Force Co, and 1 Troop of 3-10 Cav (AAVN). Battalion (-) conducted combat assault vic LZ's XT304388, XT-350388 and XT350358. Companies conducted close leaf operation vic LZ return ed to LZ's PZ to FSB WAYNE, and return to TAY NINH. One platoon of A Co secured Cao Xa laterite pit. Recon platoon secured rock crusher at NUI BA DEN.

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C-22 Inf (-): One platoon swept and secured MSR between BUI CO and TAY NINH, and secured BUI CO at night. C Co (-) swept and secured MSR from TAY NINH to Brigade Eastern boundary. Escort convoy from TAY NINH to DAU TIENG.

3-22 Inf (-): Conducted refresher training vicinity DAU TIENG Base Camp with A, B and Companies. C Co secured engineer effort of RT 239 West of DAU TIENG.

3-17 Cav (-): C Troop conducted recon and interdiction of enemy LOC via upper Michelien Plantation, Crescent, Ben Cui Plantation, Boi Loi Woods, KATUM and East of KATUM. D Troop swept and outposted MSR from TAY NINH south of CO DAU HA.

S-5 Activities: 7-11 Arty conducted MEDCAP at LONG BINH, XT2640435, treating 75 patients; 2-14 Inf conducted MEDCAP at HIEP LE, XT23350 treating 185 patients; 4-9 Inf conducted MEDCAP at TRUONG LOU, XT279436, treating 63 patients; S-5 conducted leaflet drop at XT555575 dropping 46,000 leaflets and broadcasting a PSYOP tape for 45 minutes.

4 April 1968

4-9 Inf (-): A (-), B, & D Companies departed TAY NINH by convoy arrived PT-1: RAWLINGS I, XT308500 conducted company RIF to XT355524, XT355514 and XT355520 negative contact. PTB was secured by 161st Regional Force Company, and 1 troop of 3-10 Cav (-) (JVN), Battalion (-) returned to TAY NINH Base Camp. One platoon of A Co secure CAO XAI laterite pit. Recon platoon secured rock crusher at NUI BI DEN.

C-22 Inf (M): One platoon swept and outposted MSR between TAY NINH and BUI CO, and secured BUI CO, and secured BUI CO at night. C Co swept and outposted MSR between TAY NINH and Brigade Eastern boundary. Escort convoy for TAY NINH to DAU TIENG.

3-22 Inf: Conducted refresher training vicinity DAU TIENG, D Co secured engineer effort of RT 239 West of DAU TIENG.

3-17 Cav (-): D Troop swept and secured MSR South from TAY NINH to CO DAU HA. C troop conducted recon and interdiction of enemy LOC via Upper Michelien, Crescent, Ben Cui, KATUM, and East of KATUM.

GnIP: Conducted night ambush XT190515.

S-5 Activities: 4-9 Inf conducted MEDCAP at NINH HUNG, XT239500, treating 63 patients; 2-14 Inf conducted MEDCAP at HIEP LE, XT225483, treating 104 patients.

5 April 1968

4-9 Inf (-): A, B (-), & D Companies departed TAY NINH Base Camp at 1245 by convoy and proceeded to dismount points at XT149455, XT163506, and XT160415. Companies conducted RIF to temporary lager position at XT156475 XT163451 and XT163460. Companies dispatched night ambush patrols from lager positions after darkness. Recon platoon secured rock crusher at NUI BI DEN. B Co secured CAO XAI laterite pit and other platoons.
6 April 1968

4-9 Inf (-): Companies returned to T.Y. LH base camp from ambush position closing at 1045. Battalion stood down remainder of the day. Recon platoon secured rock crusher NUI BI Dinh.


3-22 Inf (-): A Co secured engineer effort on ksr west of D.A. Tilng. B Co departed D.A. Tilng base camp at 0430, and moved to clandestine assembly area via XT506518. Co conducted security operations via assembly area and moved after darkness to ambush positions, vic village K.315515. D Co was air lifted from D.A. Tilng to go OPCON to the 199th Inf brigade.

3-17 Cav (-): D troop opened and secured ksr south from T.Y. Ninh to CO D.U. HA. C troop conducted recon and interdiction of enemy LOC in Upper Michaelen, ConSchau, Bien GUI station, K.Tuh. and west of K.Tuh.

S-5 Activities: 7-11 Artillery conducted hLDCF at LONG Kinh, XT243460, treating 139 patients; 2-14 Inf held a HCaP at HAF Truong, XT212475, treating 184 patients; 4-9 Inf conducted hLDCF at CO D.A. Orphanage AT263901 treating 53 patients; 2-34 Armor conducted hLDCF at CO Xa, XT116503 treating 125 patients.

7 April 1968

4-9 Inf (-): B & D Companies departed T.Y. Ninh Base Camp at 0607, closing FSB KWLING II, XT301502 at 0700. A Co conducted airborne assault from T.Y. Ninh to LZ vic XT374486. B & D made contact with snipers vic XT375479. At 1540 A Co had reinforced B Co. Enemy force was estimated as reinforced VC platoon. CS was used in an attempt to dialodge enemy from bunker positions. Artillery and air strikes were not used because two men were wounded close to enemy positions, and could not be withdrawn. A provisional company of the rear elements of A, B, D, and HQ's company secured FSB KWLING II after Ninh and HF/FF forces were withdrawn to secure T.Y. Ninh during hours of darkness.
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4-9 Inf (Cont'd) A & B remained in position during hours of darkness with D Co in reserve, and continued effort to reach 2 wounded men. Recon platoon secured rock crusher at NUI BA DEN.

C 2-22 Inf (M): One platoon swept and outposted Rt 5 between TAY NINH and BIVU CO, and secured BIVU CO. C Co (-) swept and outposted MSR between TAY NINH and Brigades Eastern boundary. Escorted convoy from TAY NINH to DAU TIENG.

3-22 Inf (-): A Co conducted RIF from ambush position at 0830 closing DAU TIENG at 0925. C Co (-) served as DAU TIENG RRF, one squad secured DAU TIENG laterite pit. Remainder of Battalion (-) conducted refresher training vic DAU TIENG Base Camp.

3-17 Cav (-): Opened and secured Rt 22 from TAY NINH to GO DAU HA. C Troop conducted recon and interdiction of enemy LOC vic UPPER MICHELIEN, GESCENT, BEN GUJ, TATUM, and WEST of XU TUM.

S-5 Activities: 7-11 Artillery held MEDCAP at LONG YEN, XT25435 treating 83 patients.

8 April 1968

4-9 Inf (-): Received 2 missing personnel at 0045, and employed artillery and tactical air against suspected enemy position A & D advanced through objective area at 1025 with B Co held in reserve. Over 25 command bunkers and 50 smaller bunkers were found, and destruction was began. Elements were extracted from LZ vic XT369450, beginning at 1509, and closed T'Y NINH. Provisional company at FTD R/LINES closed T'Y NINH. Result of Action: 3 US KIA, 21 US, WIA 4 VC KIA (BC) 15 VC KIA (FOSS). Recon platoon secured rock crusher at NUI BA DEN.

C 2-22 Inf (M): One platoon outposted and swept MSR between TAY NINH and BIVU CO and securing BIVU CO at night. C Co (-) swept and outposted MSR between TAY NINH and Brigades Eastern boundary. Escorted convoy from DAU TIENG to TAY NINH.

3-22 (-): One company secured engineer effort West of DAU TIENG on MSR. Battalion conducted refresher training vicinity DAU TIENG. Battalion dispatched 2 platoon-size night ambush patrols from DAU TIENG to vic XT503513 and XT 476680 at 1930.

S-5 Activities: 2-14 Inf conducted MEDCAP at NIET TRUONG, XT212447 treating 163 patients.

3-17 Cav (-) D Troop swept and outposted MSR from TAY NINH to GO DAU HA. C Troop conducted recon and interdiction of enemy LOC in western portion of TAQR.
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12. (c) Results:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Personnel</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>NBC</th>
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<tr>
<td>(1) US</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-9 Infantry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>3-22 Infantry</td>
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<td>Others</td>
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| (2) CIDG      |     |     |     |       |
| KIA (BC)     | 198 |     |     |       |
| KIA (POSS)   | 131 |     |     |       |
| Detainees    | 56  |     |     |       |
| FW's         | 3   |     |     |       |

| (3) NVA       |     |     |     |       |
| KIA (BC)     | 198 |     |     |       |
| KIA (POSS)   | 131 |     |     |       |
| Detainees    | 56  |     |     |       |
| FW's         | 3   |     |     |       |

b. Equipment losses.

1. Friendly: Bincular, M-13, 20 each; Binocular, 6 X 30, 2 each; Bayonet W/S M-7, 40 each; Pistol, .45 Caliber, 30 each; Rifle, 5.56mm, 60 each; Launcher, Grenade, M-79, 17 each; Shotgun, 2 each; Armored vest, 36 each; Radio Set, AM/PRC-25, 1 each; Rifle, Recoilless, 90mm, 2 each; Machine gun, M-60, 2 each.

2. Enemy: Heavy Weapons, 1; Small Arms Ammo, 1,300 rounds; HE Ammo, 95 rounds; Mine and booby traps, 38; Rice (Ton), 4.25; Structures, 11; bunkers, 725; Documents (lb), 3,625; Tunnel (meters), 7; Sampans, 11; foxholes, 107; Fortifications, 859; Trench (meters), 315; Bicycles, 10; Clothing, (lb) 50; Trucks, 3/4 ton, 2; Workbenches, 3; Ammo Cache, 1; Crates of Ammo, 150; Crates of Explosive, 120; Entrenching tool, 6; tables, 3; Chairs, 3; Spears, fishing, 54; Buffalo, water, 20; Bridge, log, 1; Bridge, underwater, 1; Bridge foot, 1; Bike motor, 1; Cart Ox, 8; Ponchos, 16; Boxes supply, 10; Crates, 2; Stoves, 3; Wells, 2; Sugar (lb) 5; Hatchet, 1; Web Gear, 1; Boxes, Cray, 20.

3. Bomb Damage Assessment: BDA for most airstrikes were conducted by aerial observers.
13. (E) Administrative Matters (C)

a. Since operation were conducted from the TAY NINH and DAI TIEU's
base camps adequate PX facilities were available to all personnel, and it
was not necessary to operate mobile PX's.

b. No difficulty was encountered in rapid distribution of mail.

c. Replacement of non Commission officer in the grades E-6 through
E-9 was extremely difficult. There are very few experienced personnel in these
grades being assigned to the brigade.

d. Unexpected arrival of units at base camps required an immense
and unnecessary amount of attention by the brigade S-1. This loss of valuable
time could be prevented if at least 24 hours prior notice were
given. Minimum
information provided should be the size of the unit, messing facilities require;
and special considerations, i.e. aviation units need billeting near the air
field.

c. e. Supply:

(1) Class I: Three "A" rations per day were fed in all units
On a few occasions "C" rations were consumed after drawing "A" rations due to
operational limitations.

(2) Class II & IV: A large quantity of barbed wire, concertine
pickets, lumber and sandbags were used. Sandbags could not always be produced
in the quantities desired.

(3) Class III: A total of 8,500 gallons of NOS, 10,200
gallons of diesel, 30 quarts of hydraulic fluid, 220 gallons of OE-30, 310
21 quarts of OE-10, and 20 cans of 642-90 grease were used.

f. Maintenance: Maintenance teams from battalions were with their
respective units. They were able to perform all 2nd echelon vehicular maintence.
The 725th Maintenance Battalion provided all directed support maintenance.

g. Treatment of casualties and evacuation. "DUSTOFF" support for
evacuation of casualties was provided by MEDEVAC units of CU CHI, DAI TIEU,
and TAY NINH Base Camps.

h. Transportation: Transportation was provided by use of organic
vehicles, UH1D, H23, C-130 and CH-47 aircraft.

i. Communications: Communications was provided by organic FM and RTT
VHF for telephone service was provided by the 125th Signal Battalion.

j. Medical Evaluation. Personnel health was good throughout the
operation.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques: (C): NO I5
15. Commanders Analysis (U)

   a. The NSIs in the Brigade TaiOR were kept open, and secure for daily
      convoys.

   b. B&W CO, TAY MINH, and D&W TIENG were defended against significant
      enemy initiatives.

   c. Infantry battalions conducted necessary refresher training to
      provide replacements with the know-how required to make the effective members
      of the fighting team.

   d. By timely and effective reaction to intelligence, infantry battalions
      and the air troop of the 3-17 Cav were able to effectively interdict enemy
      LOC, and prevent any significant attacks on defended portions of the brigade
      TaiOR.

16. Recommendations: (U): None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

THOMAS A. STOY
Maj, Infantry
Adjutant
**Combat After Action Report - Operation WILDERNESS, 25th Infantry Division (U)**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 8 March - 8 April 1968

CG, 25th Infantry Division

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**PROJECT NO.**

N/A

**Sponsor's Military Activity**

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**Abstract**