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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), 1st Special Forces, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
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5th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)
1ST SPECIAL FORCES

OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD
ENDING 31 JAN 68

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**INCLOSURES**

* 1. Organizational Data (Troop Disposition List, CTZ Maps and Organizational Chart)
* 2. Statistical Data
* 3. Visitor Briefings
* 4. Combat Developments
* 5. Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)
* 6. Civic Action Successes
* 7. Command Progress Report
* 8. After Action Report Assault on Loc Ninh
* 9. After Action Report Operation CIDG Kilie
* 10. After Action Report Battle of Dien Khanh
* 11. Photographs, Dang Ba Thin Training Center

* Withdrawn, Hq’s, DA
** Withdrawn, Hq’s, DA; published separately as CAAA 67X205
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO San Francisco, 96240

15 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U) (UIC #WALXAA)

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO San Francisco 96375

THRU: Commander-in-Chief
United States Army Pacific
APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C., 20310

1. (C) General:

a. During the quarter Special Forces detachments in all four Corps Tactical Zones experienced heavy contact with the enemy; and enemy activity in I and IV Corps Tactical Zones, in particular, showed a marked increase from the previous reporting period. As reflected in the statistical data found at inclosure 2, there was a substantial increase in enemy casualties in all Corps areas except III CTZ. However, Detachment A-331 (Loc Minh) in III CTZ experienced the largest enemy attacks between 29 October and 2 November 1967. (See After Action Reports at Inclosures 8 and 9). In this battle the enemy

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again indicated their willingness to accept severe losses in order to achieve a significant victory. In I CTZ the center of interest lay in northwest Quang Tri Province where Special Forces Detachment A-101 (Lang Vei) and the Khe Sanh combat base were seriously threatened by a large enemy buildup. In II CTZ the heavy fighting that started on 5 November around Dak To developed into the longest engagement of the Vietnamese conflict. Detachments A-502 and A-503, the National Police, Vietnamese RIFs, and a ROK battalion jointly participated in the battle of Dien Khanh between 25 and 28 November 1967. The joint operation resulted in 69 enemy KIA. (See After Action Report at inclosure 10) In III CTZ Special Forces camps at My Da (A-133), My Phuoc Tay (A-111), and My Dien (A-116), which was just established in January, were under threat of attack by three enemy battalions. Camp My Phuoc Tay experienced the heaviest casualties in separate contacts with battalion sized forces in December and January. Large scale enemy attacks on major installations and cities throughout Vietnam were the center of Special Forces attention as the quarter ended.

b. Special operations conducted during the quarter included six search and destroy (Blackjack) operations in I CTZ. Reconnaissance operations Sultan I & II were also conducted in II CTZ by Detachment B-52 (Project Delta). Special operations Rapidfire III, IV, and V were completed in III CTZ by Detachment B-36. Operational control of Detachments B-50 (Project Omega) and B-56 (Project Sigma) transferred to CMUSMACV on 1 November 1967.

c. Four CIDG camps were closed, one camp was converted to RF/PF, and one camp was transferred to VNSF control during the reporting period.

d. Organisational structure and troop disposition are reflected at inclosure 1.

e. The command concept for employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group forces is discussed in inclosure 5.

f. Civic Action Success during the reporting period are described in inclosure 6.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 Jan 68 (U)

2. (S) Intelligence.

a. A major contribution to the intelligence and counterintelligence effort of the Group has been made by the Military Intelligence Augmentation detachments assigned during the period April - June 1967. To date no orders have been received indicating assignment of replacement personnel to fill anticipated rotational losses. If replacement personnel to fill authorized spaces are not received a diminution of the intelligence effort is anticipated.

b. Detachment B-57 will move out of Saigon with the command and control element closing the SPOB by 29 Feb 68 and the Saigon facility closed by 31 Mar 68. The unit designation (B-57) will be dropped effective 1 Apr 68. Reference to B-57 activities subsequent to that date will be Cambodian Border Operations (S), short title COPS (U) with the activity functioning as a branch of the S2 Section.

c. Project OAK activities were terminated 31 Dec 67 after the collection activity was determined unproductive in terms of funds expended. Personnel assets have been reassigned to intelligence activities throughout the Group.

d. Order of Battle Workbooks for each Corps Tactical Zone were updated utilizing material from both Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam, and the Order of Battle branch, this Headquarters.

e. Summary of Enemy Activity by Corps Tactical Zones.

(1) I CTZ: Enemy activity in I CTZ increased from guerrilla type action and sporadic contacts during October and November to attacks by fire along the DMZ, a large enemy buildup in Northwest Quang Tri Province, and all out attacks on large installations and cities during January. Throughout the Corps the enemy suffered from food, logistical, and personnel shortages which initially staved his offensive capabilities. The Revolutionary Development Program initiated by the GVN moved a large majority of the population from VC/NVA controlled areas into relatively safe areas and therefore impeded the enemy's capability to tax the people for food and labor. The enemy recruiting program also suffered. It is probable that during November and December the enemy concentrated on building up his forces to combat effective strength and prepared for future offensives. During the month of January enemy activity increased significantly with evidence of a large enemy buildup consisting of three NVA divisions in NW Quang Tri Province. Large scale attacks against Special Forces Camp Lang Vei, Det A-101 and the Khe Sanh Combat base were expected at anytime. On 30 January enemy forces launched all out attacks on installations and cities throughout I CTZ. Reports indicated that the enemy committed primarily VC units which indicate that a subsequent main enemy thrust will be launched by NVA forces if necessary. The enemy had the ability to initiate coordinated fire and ground attacks at anytime throughout the Corps as of the end of the reporting period.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 Jan 68 (U)

II CTZ: Prior to the November enemy offensive near Special Forces Camp Dak To (Det A-214), the 32nd and 66th NVA Regiments moved into prepared positions to the southwest of the camp and the 21th NVA Regiment moved into the southern portion of the Tou Morong Valley. On the 5th of November heavy fighting erupted to the SW of Dak To and the resulting battle developed into the longest engagement of the Vietnamese conflict. During the first two weeks of December the enemy launched a series of attacks on allied forces and installations that ranged from the Bong Lon Plains to Phu Cat District. The enemy suffered heavy losses but continued to make moderate contact in a vain attempt to extend its control over the rice-rich region of eastern Binh Dinh Province. The enemy offensive activity expected during the Christmas and New Year truce periods never materialized. Enemy activity throughout II CTZ was at a low level during the first part of January and was characterized by small scale attacks on lightly defended outposts. The new Special Forces camp, Ben Het, received mortar and rocket fire almost daily. The enemy stepped up his activity toward the end of January as all units redeployed for the Tet offensive, which began on 30 January, with attacks on major cities and installations.

III CTZ: During this quarter the enemy displayed a desire to score a major victory over allied forces with apparent little regard to the losses he would suffer. He launched his largest and some of his most successful attacks during the final two months of 1967 and first month of 1968. The enemy selected Loc Ninh District Headquarters to attack in an attempt to win a major propaganda victory. The unit tasked with the mission was the 9th VC Division composed of the 271st, 272nd, and 273rd VC Main Force Regiments. Due to heavy losses suffered earlier in southern Binh Long Province by the US 1st Inf Div in Operation Enterprise, a third regiment was formed from elements of the 11th and 165th NVA Regiments to replace the 271st VC MF Regiment. The attacks on Loc Ninh, where Special Forces Detachment A-331 is located, took place on 29 October through 3 November. The enemy failed in their attempt to take the district headquarters and suffered extremely heavy casualties. After this engagement the enemy continued to concentrate his large actions in closer proximity to the Cambodian border when he could easily be resupplied or seek sanctuary. On 29 November, the enemy began harassing Special Forces Camp Bu Dop, A-331, and Bo Duc District Headquarters. On 29 November, the enemy launched a battalion sized ground attack against Bo Duc District Headquarters and Camp Bu Dop received heavy mortar and rocket fire. The enemy harassment continued until 8 December. Prior to December enemy activity had primarily been restricted to Military Region 10; however, during December the enemy attempted to force more action throughout the Corps area. In January installations in Tay Ninh and Gian Dinh Province were constantly harassed. Throughout the month Special Forces Camp Thien Ngon, A-323, continuously received mortar attacks by elements of the 69th VC Artillery Regiment. On 31 January, major US and GVN installations in Military Region 1 were hit by rockets, mortars, and ground attacks that extended into the next reporting period.

IV CTZ: During November and December the enemy confined his activities to indiscriminate shellings of district towns, small scale attacks against lightly defended outposts and the interdiction of lines of communications, primarily along highway #1 between Can Tho and Saigon. Special Forces Camps; My Phuong Tay A-411 located in Binh Tuong Province, and My Da A-433 located in
close proximity to the Dinh Tuong/Kien Phong Province border were continually under threat of attack by the 514th local force battalion and the 261st and 263rd main force battalions during the entire quarter. On 5 December, in Dinh Tuong Province friendly forces engaged in Operation Coronado IX captured a political advisor to Military Region II who infiltrated from North Vietnam. This was the first time that an indigenous North Vietnamese had been captured in IV Corps. During the insertion of SF camp My Dien A-416 in Dinh Tuong Province in January, documents were found indicating that the area had been a base area for the 514th local force battalion. Captured Pds revealed that the 261st and 263rd main force battalions were operating with the 514th. During January the enemy repositioned many of his units in preparation for the large TET offensive campaign. The 267th main force battalion moved from Dinh Tuong Province to III Corps and was identified in the attack against Tan Son Nhut airbase on 31 January. In Kien Phong Province the 502nd local force battalion moved into position and with the assistance of the local force companies in the area conducted a mortar and ground attack against Cao Lanh city and Special Forces Detachment B-43. The 504th local force battalion conducted a mortar and ground attack against Moc Hoa city and Detachment B-41. At the close of the reporting period the enemy was placing emphasis on the overrunning and holding of key installations and heavily populated areas. The harassment of SF camps had apparently become a secondary objective although SF camps My Phuc Tay A-411, My Dien A-416, and My Da A-433 remained threatened by the three enemy battalions.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

3. (S) Operations and Training

a. Plans:

(1) A special study was conducted and submitted regarding the establishment of the 4th Special Tactical Zone in IV CTZ. The final decision to establish the 4th STZ placed it under the command of ARVN with the requirement for the 5th SFSG to provide a USAF Liaison Detachment.

(2) A series of Briefings were held with COMUSMACV pertaining to the planning of Operation York.

(3) Under RVNAF Force Structure Development COMUSMACV disapproved the organisation of a sixth company for the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion.

(4) A study was completed and approved for the organisation of Detachment B-20 in II CTZ to assume OCPON of the II CTZ MSG and Co E, 1/20th Inf (1RRP). It also authorised the expansion of the II CTZ MSG to 12 companies.

(5) The goals for FY 68 for the 5th SFSG's subprogram, title: Transfer of Selected Camps to VNSF Control (U), were submitted to COMUSMACV. The goals are:

(a) Transfer of camp Thuong Thoi by 30 March 1968.
(b) Transfer of camp Kinh Quan II by 30 July 1968.

(6) A special study of the effects of the enemy's increased rocket capability on CIDG camps was written and forwarded to COMUSMACV.

(7) A review and analysis of RVNAF Progress, sub-program title: Transfer of Selected Camps to VNSF Control, was conducted and forwarded.

(8) Plans are being written for 5th SFSG's participation in Operation York.

(9) A review and revision of MTG 31-105E (Airborne Special Forces Group) and of the TDA for Special Operations is being prepared for submission during the 1st quarter of FY 68.

(10) CIDG Camps:

(a) The following CIDG camps were closed on the date indicated: Binh Hung (A-404) on 9 November, Prek Klok (A-322) on 9 December, Trai Bi (A-323) on 18 December, and Hia Hoa (A-351) on 30 December 1967.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

(b) Camp Mai Tinh (A-226) was converted to RF/PF on 2 December and Vinh Thanh (A-228) was redesignated A-120, and transferred to VNSF control on 25 December.

(c) The following CIDG camps were opened on the date indicated:
Duc Hue (A-351A) on 15 November, Thien Ngon (A-323) on 8 December, Tieu Atar (A-231) on 20 December, and My Dien II (A-446) on 20 January. The assets from Trai Bi were redeployed to Thien Ngon and assets from Hiep Hoa were redeployed to Duc Hue, Tra Cu, and Duc Hoa. Assets from Prek Klok are scheduled to be deployed to Katum.

(d) Five camps in I CTZ, seven in II CTZ, and one in IV CTZ are scheduled for either conversion to RF or for close out. Two camps in IV CTZ are scheduled for transfer to VNSF control. Eight new camps in I CTZ, four in II CTZ, five in III CTZ, and two in IV CTZ are scheduled to be opened utilizing the assets as they become available from camps that are closed out.

b. Operations.

(1) Summary of significant operations by Corps Tactical Zones.

(a) I CTZ: On 2 November, a recon operation from Camp Minh Long, A-108, Quang Ngai Province, which consisted of two USASF and 50 Camp Strike Force personnel, made contact with an estimated platoon of VC. There were no friendly casualties. Enemy losses were one VC killed and 26 houses destroyed. On 4 November, a recon operation from Camp Thuong Duc, A-109, Quang Nam Province, which consisted of two USASF, one VNSF, and 30 Camp Strike Force personnel made contact with an estimated battalion size enemy element. One USASF was wounded in the initial contact and died before a medevac could be completed. One USASF was wounded while a passenger in a helicopter which was flying in support of the operation. One CSF soldier, one NVA, and one VC were also killed in the contact. On 7 November, a recon patrol from Camp Ba To, A-106, Quang Ngai Province, which consisted of two USASF, 25 Camp Strike Force personnel and 25 Popular Force troops initiated contact with five VC. After a brief firefight the friendly element assaulted the enemy position wounding two VC and capturing one US carbine, two 30 round magazines, six chicom grenades, one rucksack, one poncho, one harmonica, and a small amount of documents. On 7 November, a recon patrol from Camp Ba Than, A-101, Quang Ngai Province, which consisted of two USASF, one VNSF, and 90 Strike Force personnel was probed by a VC platoon. The VC moved to within 75 meters of the patrol defensive position and opened fire. The patrol reacted by immediately returning a heavy volume of fire which caused the VC to withdraw. During the action two CIDG were wounded. Enemy losses were one VC killed, two wounded; one NIAS 36, a small amount of .45 cal ammo and one pistol bolt captured. On 9 November, Camp Lang Vei, A-101, Quang Tri Province received ten rounds of 120mm mortar fire in a ten minute period. The camp immediately initiated counter mortar fire with unknown results. There were no friendly casualties. On 10 November, a search and destroy
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operation from Camp Tien Phuoc, A-102, Quang Tin Province, which consisted of two USASF, one VNSF, and 70 Camp Strike Force personnel, initiated contact with a VC squad. The VC fled under the intense volume of fire from the friendly element, leaving behind two VC killed, one US shotgun, one M16 mine, and five Chicom grenades. There were no friendly casualties. On 13 November, a local security operation from Camp Thuong Duc, A-109, Quang Nam Province, initiated contact with three VC. After an exchange of fire, the VC withdrew with one VC killed. The patrol also detained two suspects and captured one sniper rifle. There were no friendly losses. On 16 November, a recon operation from Camp Tra Bong, A-107, Quang Ngai Province, which consisted of two USASF and 30 camp strike force personnel made chance contact with two squads of VC. After a brief fire fight the VC broke contact and withdrew. The friendly element suffered no casualties, although they captured three VC and detained four suspects. The three VC were killed on the 17th while trying to escape. On 17 November, a search and destroy operation from Camp Tien Phuoc, A-102, Quang Tin Province, which consisted of two USASF, two VNSF, and 50 camp strike force personnel ambushed one squad of VC, killing one VC and capturing three. The friendly operation suffered no casualties. On 17 November, a search and destroy operation from Camp Gia Vuc, A-103, Quang Ngai Province, which consisted of two USASF, one VNSF, and 100 camp strike force personnel ambushed one VC resulting in one VC killed. There were no friendly casualties. The friendly element then dispatched a squad to recover the enemy weapon and search the body. The squad came under fire and was forced to return to the main body. The operation again came under fire in their night location, but suffered no casualties. On 17 November, a recon operation from Camp Tra Bong, A-107, Quang Ngai Province, which consisted of two USASF, one VNSF and 30 camp strike force personnel made chance contact with seven VC. The patrol delivered a heavy volume of fire and the VC withdrew. The friendly element lost one HT-2 radio and one M1 rifle. This equipment was lost while the patrol was crossing a river. Enemy losses were one political book captured; two houses, four bunkers, one tunnel system (35 feet long), 700 pounds of rice and miscellaneous bunker material destroyed. On 21 November, a search and destroy operation from Camp Tien Phuoc, A-102, Quang Tin Province, consisting of two USASF, two VNSF, and 50 CSF soldiers initiated contact with four VC at a distance of 80 meters. The VC immediately withdrew leaving behind one VC killed; 10,000 piasters; four documents; a passport, school papers; and a tax list. There were no friendly casualties. On 21 November, a search and destroy operation from Camp Gia Vuc, A-103, Quang Ngai Province, which consisted of two USASF, one VNSF, and 100 CSF soldiers fired at 100 NVA and ten montagnards at a distance of 700 meters. After a brief exchange of fire the enemy withdrew leaving behind two of their dead. There were 20 killed by gunships; they were not confirmed by USASF body count. On 26 November, a search and destroy operation from Thuong Duc, A-109, Quang Nam Province, which consisted of two USASF, two VNSF, 100 CSF soldiers and 30 PF troops ambushed a VC squad which resulted in one VC killed and three wounded. At 11:35 hours the patrol observed a VC platoon with a carrying party of 100. Contact was established and maintained. Results of this encounter were 12 VC killed, 12 VC wounded; 800 kilos of rice, salt and corn destroyed; 100 rucksacks with miscellaneous equipment, personal belongings, and one red flag with a yellow hammer and sickle and VC banners attached to it captured. The operation found and destroyed two caches of 3,000 kilos.
of rice, 1,000 kilos of corn, and 500 pounds of salt. At 1530 hours the operation was ambushed by a reinforced VC company. The patrol immediately returned a heavy volume of fire and directed air strikes on the VC position. Results of this encounter were one CSF soldier killed and one wounded. Enemy losses were eight VC killed by air strikes and numerous blood trails found in the area. At 1630 hours the patrol overran a VC outpost, killed the VC guard, and captured one rucksack. The patrol returned to camp at 1000 hours 28 November with the overall following results: Friendly losses were one CSF killed and one wounded. Enemy losses were 22 killed, 15 wounded; one unknown type weapon, 122 rucksacks, one Russian flag captured; 800 kilos of rice, salt, and corn destroyed at one location and 3,000 kilos of rice, 1,000 kilos of corn and 500 pounds of salt destroyed at another location. On 7 December at 1025 hours, a search and destroy operation from Camp Thong Duc, A-109, Quang Nam Province, which consisted of six USASF and 169 MSF ambushed a VC platoon. The VC platoon returned fire and fled south with the friendly forces in pursuit. During the pursuit the friendly forces were ambushed by an estimated NVA battalion. The battalion was armed with machine guns and mortars. On the initial contact with the NVA battalion friendly forces sustained one USASF killed, three MSF killed, three MSF killed and four MSF wounded. Due to bad weather close air support could not be provided. Artillery was fired from Camp Thong Duc with unreported results. A search and destroy operation also from Camp Thong Duc, consisting of three USASF and 220 CSF troops, moved from their planned route to a blocking and reinforcing position to assist the MSF operation. At 1350 hours the MSF broke contact and moved to an LZ to evacuate the 4 MSF wounded. On the 8th at 1050 hours, the bodies of the USASF and MSF troops were recovered and evacuated to Camp Thong Duc. At 1715 hours the MSF attacked an unknown size VC force in well dug in emplacements from a distance of 50 meters. After a brief fire fight the VC broke contact and fled in an unknown direction. Results of this contact were one MSF killed, one USASF and two MSF wounded. Enemy losses are unknown. A breakdown of captured items are one AK-47 assault rifle, 12 packs; one mortar sight in carrying case complete with accessories, including night light device; one medical kit packed inside a rucksack marked with a red cross. The kit contained a wide variety of medicines including antibiotics, chloroquine, quinine, antispasmodics, morphine, atropine, and battle dressing. Items were of varied origin including North Vietnam, Russia, China and Poland. Company C Surgeon judged the medical kit to be quite sophisticated and capable of treating 100 troops for two or three months. Documents included unidentified unit rosters, personal papers, letters, publications and what appeared to be weapon firing tables. Clippings from a Saigon newspaper were less than six months old. On the 8th at 1215 hours, a search and destroy operation from Camp Minh Long, A-108, Quang Ngai Province, which consisted of two USASF, one VNNSF and 50 CSF troops ambushed 10 VC washing in a stream from a distance of 35 meters. The VC returned fire and withdrew in a northeasterly direction. There were no friendly casualties. Enemy losses were three VC killed, one VC wounded and one M2 carbine captured. On the 16th at 1128 hours, one USASF died of wounds received in action on 8 December. On the 10th of December at 0916 hours, a search and destroy operation from camp Tra Bong, A-107, Quang Ngai Province, which consisted of four USASF and 150 CSF troops made contact from a distance of 100 meters with a VC squad.
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armed with small arms and shotguns. After a brief firefight, VC broke contact and withdrew northeast. Friendly forces pursued VC to the east and at 1210 hours the operation reestablished contact, this time with two VC squads from a distance of 100 meters. After a 15 minute firefight the VC broke contact and withdrew in an unknown direction. Friendly losses were one CSF soldier killed. Enemy losses were 13 VC killed, one VC cadre captured, one ML rifle, one shotgun, three grenades and one gasmask captured. There were 20 buildings, 3,000 kilos of rice, 28 cows, 11 pigs destroyed and 55 VC suspects detained. On the 12th of December, the same operation made contact with a reinforced VC platoon from a distance of 75 meters while sweeping a hamlet. After a short engagement the VC broke contact and withdrew west and south-west. Friendly losses were one CSF soldier killed. Enemy losses were 20 VC killed. On 17 December, at 1015 hours a search and destroy operation from Camp Ho Thanh, A-101, Quang Ngai Province, consisting of two USASF, two VNSF, and 150 CSF troops, made contact with one VC company while sweeping a village. The VC were armed with automatic weapons. After a short firefight the VC broke contact and withdrew north. There were no friendly casualties. Enemy losses were seven VC killed; two VC wounded; four AK-47 assault rifles, two NAS 36's, and one 3.5 rocket launcher with one rocket and 25 grenades captured. On 20 December, a search and destroy operation from Camp Tien Phuoc, A-103, Quang Tin Province, which consisted of five USASF and 150 CSF troops made contact with 15 VC armed with automatic weapons. After a brief firefight the VC broke contact and withdrew southeast. There were no friendly casualties. Enemy losses were three VC killed, one VC wounded. On 23 December, the same operation raided a village occupied by 10 VC armed with small arms. After a sporadic firefight the VC broke contact and withdrew southeast. Friendly casualties were one CSF soldier wounded. Enemy losses were five VC killed, two VC wounded, one Chicom carbine, one AK-47 assault rifle, one pair binoculars, two mines of unknown type, four ruck sacks and 100 lbs of rice captured. On 23 December, a search and destroy operation from Camp Thuong Duc, A-109, Quang Nam Province, which consisted of two USASF, one VNSF, and 50 CSF troops, made contact with a well dug in VC platoon. After a sporadic firefight the patrol assaulted to within 100 meters of the VC positions after which the VC broke contact and withdrew southeast. There were no friendly casualties. Enemy losses were 10 VC killed, two VC wounded, one Russian sniper rifle, one US SMG, M60 ammunition and assorted documents captured. On 29 December at 1000 hours, a search and destroy operation from Camp Tra Bong, A-107, Quang Ngai Province, which consisted of two USASF and 50 CSF troops made contact with one VC squad armed with small arms and automatic weapons from a distance of 200 meters. After a brief firefight the VC broke contact and withdrew west. There were no friendly casualties. Enemy losses were two males, six females, three children, five Chicom grenades, one carrying pouch, one directory from Danang Air Base concerning combat equipment and how to order it captured. Destroyed were 15 bunkers, 125 houses, 2,000 kilos of rice and 30 cattle. On the 30th of December at 0730 hours, a recon patrol from Camp Tien Phuoc, A-102, Quang Tin Province, made contact with one VC platoon, armed with small arms, while raiding a village. After a brief firefight the VC broke contact and withdrew north. There were no friendly casualties, enemy losses were three VC killed, five VC captured, and two Chicom 7.62 rifles with ammunition captured. During the period 30 December 1967 and 06 January 1968, CIDG and RF/PF advised by USASF conducted
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133 operations and engaged in 17 contacts. Enemy losses were 43 killed, six captured, nine wounded and 20 weapons captured. Friendly losses were 26 RF/PF killed and 65 wounded. There were 50 weapons lost by friendly forces. On 2 January at 04:23 hours, a PF outpost located five kilometers southwest of Camp Tien Phuoc, A-102 Quang Tin Province, received an estimated seven rounds of mortar fire. There were no casualties. At the same time the NVA made a coordinated attack on the outpost of Hau Duc District headquarters located 10 kilometers southwest of Camp Tien Phuoc. This outpost was overrun and occupied by NVA. A patrol from Camp Tien Phuoc recaptured the outpost with no casualties. NSG Co 16 was airlifted from Danan to Camp Tien Phuoc and closed into the camp at 0130 hours on the 4th of January. The NSG are presently located at the OP and are conducting small scale operations. Total results of the operation were: 26 RF/PF killed, 6 RF/PF wounded, six RF/PF missing and 60 individual weapons lost. Enemy losses were 22 NVA killed by air, 31 NVA killed in action, 60 NVA killed (probable) reported by the Hau Duc Chief, 15 NVA wounded and four NVA captured. Equipment lost by the enemy is as follows: One 60mm mortar with 50 rounds of ammunition, four B-40 rocket launchers with 60 B-40 rockets, 30 individual weapons with 30 cases of ammunition, 12 bangalore torpedos, nine mines, 285 hand grenades, 642 kilos of TNT and 11 rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle ammunition. During the period of 06 January 1968 and 13 January 1968, CIDG and RF/PF advised by USASF conducted 147 operations and engaged in 20 contacts. Enemy losses were 13 killed, one captured, 15 wounded and three weapons captured. Friendly losses were two OSF killed, eight wounded and one missing. There were no weapons lost by friendly forces. On 12 January at 1100 hours, a search and destroy operation from Camp Tien Phuoc, A-102, Quang Tin Province received mortar fire from a VC platoon from a distance of 200 meters. The patrol returned fire and the VC withdrew south. There were no friendly casualties. There were five VC wounded. At 1600 hours the same search and destroy operation received sniper fire from a distance of 600 meters. Upon engagement the VC withdrew northwest. There were no friendly casualties. Enemy losses were five ChiCom grenades, 5,000 rounds of carbine ammunition, 100,000 rounds of M1 ammunition, 2,000 rounds of M79 ammunition and 50 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition. On 12 January at 2030 hours, a night ambush patrol from Camp Lang Vei, A-101, Quang Tri Province, ambushed an estimated VC platoon from a distance of 30 meters. The VC broke contact and withdrew, but remained in the area. At 02:15 hours on 13 January, after the ambush patrol moved to the planned ambush site, the patrol ambushed an estimated VC company plus from an unreported distance. The VC immediately maneuvered on the patrol forcing the patrol to break contact and withdraw back toward base camp. The VC pursued the patrol to within 500 meters of the camp. Results of the encounter were one OSF soldier missing, 12 VC killed, two VC wounded and one AK-47 assault rifle captured. During the period of 13 January 1968 and 20 January 1968, CIDG and RF/PF advised by USASF conducted 150 operations and engaged in 19 contacts. Enemy losses were 26 killed, eight captured, 22 wounded and four weapons captured. Friendly losses were five OSF and one RF/PF killed, 12 CIDG wounded and one CIDG missing. There were two weapons lost by friendly forces. On 13 January at 05 hours, the Detachment Commander of Gia Vuc, A-103, Quang Ngai Province, while flying visual reconnaissance, observed enemy movement. Approximately 200 VC were counted...
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Airstrikes were requested. Aircraft dropped napalm, cluster bomb units, 500 and 750 pound bombs. Results of the airstrikes were 16 VC killed by air; one VC killed by ground forces; four dwellings and five bunkers destroyed. On 17 January at 1100 hours, an operation from Tien Phuoc, A-102, Quang Tin Province, made contact with 5 VC from a distance of 50 meters while conducting a raid on a village. After a brief firefight, the VC broke contact and withdrew southwest. Enemy losses were five killed, two wounded, one captured and one AK-47 assault rifle captured. There were no friendly casualties. On 18 January at 1100 hours, a reconnaissance patrol from Kham Duc, A-105, Quang Tin Province, made contact and withdrew southwest. Result of the encounter was two VC killed and two wounded.

On 18 January at 1330 hours, a company operation from Bo To, A-106, Quang Ngai Province, made contact with an unknown size VC force. Gunships were requested and airstrikes brought in on the enemy force. Ten minutes later the same operation made contact with an estimated VC squad. The VC were armed with automatic weapons. Enemy losses were 13 killed by air, two killed by ground forces, and 20 military structures destroyed. One pack, numerous types of ammunition, leaflets and death certificates were captured. At 1200 hours, elements of the same operation captured two VC and one carbine. Again at 1615 hours the same element made contact with an estimated VC platoon wearing mixed uniforms and armed with automatic weapons. The VC broke contact and fled east with no exchange of fire. Gunships were requested at 1430 hours and credited with eight VC killed. Various types of small arms ammunition and one Chicom grenade was captured. On 19 January at 1320 hours, contact was made with three VC. After a brief firefight the VC broke contact and withdrew east. Result of the engagement was one VC killed, one M1 rifle destroyed and one CSF killed. At 1315 hours a blocking position was established to cut off enemy withdrawal. This blocking force fired 60mm mortars at an estimated enemy squad, resulting in two VC killed, three wounded and two carbines destroyed. On 19 January at 0530 hours, Camp Lang Vei, A-101, Quang Tri Province, received five rounds of mortar fire; there were no casualties. At 1200 hours a search and destroy operation which consisted on one USASF, one ARVN, one WNSF and 40 MSF soldiers made contact with an estimated VC company. The results of the encounter were five VC killed and five wounded. On 23 January at 1338 hours two jet aircraft flying from the direction of Laos made a low level bomb run on an outpost 300 meters from Camp Lang Vei. The number of bombs dropped was undetermined, but estimated size of bombs were 250 pound. The aircraft gained altitude and flew back over Laos. The bombs were not on target and there were no casualties. On 24 January at 1235 hours an airforce FAC observed five tanks (type unknown) traveling east on highway nine. An airstrike was called and fire was placed on the tanks. One tank was destroyed and the others withdrew west into the tree line along the highway. On 25 January at 1553 hours, and again

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At 2255 hours, the camp came under artillery fire which resulted in one MSF soldier wounded. At 2330 hours a five-man CIDG patrol ambushed an estimated VC company armed with AK-47 assault rifles. After a brief firefight the VC withdrew south. Enemy losses were five VC killed (unconfirmed), six VC wounded (unconfirmed) and two AK-47 assault rifles captured. Friendly losses were one CSF soldier killed and two wounded. On 23 January at 0610 hours, a search and destroy operation from Camp Gia Vuc, A-103, Quang Ngai Province, executed a hasty ambush on five VC from a distance of 200 meters. After a brief firefight the VC broke contact and withdrew south. There were no friendly losses. Enemy losses were three VC captured. On 25 January at 1100 hours, a search and destroy operation from Camp Minh Lornh, A-108, Quang Ngai Province, which consisted of two USAF, two VNSF, 25 RP/FP and 100 CSF soldiers from Camp Tien Phuoc, A-102, Quang Tin Province, ambushed an estimated VC squad from a distance of 100 meters. After a brief firefight the VC broke contact and withdrew southeast. One VC was killed and one CSF soldier wounded. On 25 January at 1400 hours, a search and destroy operation from Camp Minh Lornh, A-108, Quang Ngai Province, which consisted of two USAF, one VNSF, 11 RP and 70 CSF soldiers made contact with an estimated VC platoon from an unreported distance. After a brief firefight the VC broke contact and withdrew southwest. There were two VC killed. During the period 27 January 1968 to 03 February 1968, CIDG and RP/FP units advised by USAF conducted 115 operations and engaged in 25 contacts. Enemy losses were 150 killed, 18 captured, 74 wounded and 12 weapons captured. Friendly losses were 17 CSF soldiery wounded, one USAF missing and five weapons lost. On 31 January, a three-platoon reaction patrol from Long Vei, A-101, Quang Tri Province, which consisted of MSF, CSF soldiers, three VNSF and eight USAF made contact with an estimated VC platoon. The patrol killed 75% of the platoon before the enemy was reinforced by an estimated three NVA companies. The patrol adjusted fire of gunships and fixed wing aircraft on the enemy. The engagement resulted in 54 NVA killed by ground forces and an estimated 80 to 100 killed by air. Friendly losses were one MSF soldier killed and three wounded. At 1430 hours MSF soldiers made contact with an estimated three NVA companies from a distance of five to fifty meters. Small arms fire was exchanged which resulted in the enemy maneuvering east and west in an attempt to outflank the friendly forces. Results of the engagement were 20 NVA killed, 10 NVA wounded (estimated), three AK-47 assault rifles, one RPG rocket launcher, one light machine gun and one .45 cal pistol captured. Friendly losses were one MSF soldier killed, four MSF soldiers wounded, one USAF and one CSF soldier missing. On 1 February, continuous mortar fire was received on camp Long Vei. The camp pleaded counter-mortar fire on the enemy's position. Result of the mortar attacks was one CSF slightly wounded. On 2 February, two platoons of MSF soldiers were ambushed by an estimated NVA platoon from a distance of five to ten meters. A brief firefight commenced which resulted in the enemy withdrawing. Results of this engagement were two NVA killed, one wounded, one captured, two SKS carbines, eight grenades and various field equipment captured. Friendly losses were three MSF soldiers killed. At 1930 hours MSF patrol made chance contact with a NVA squad set up ambush from a distance of ten meters. Small arms fire was exchanged which resulted in four NVA killed and one MSF soldier wounded. On 28 January, a search and destroy
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operation from Tien Phuoc, A-102, Quang Tin Province, which consisted of four USASF, two VNSF and 120 CSF soldiers engaged an unknown size enemy force. Small arms fire was exchanged resulting in five VC killed, five VC wounded (blood trails) and two VC captured. There were no friendly losses. On 27 January, an estimated VC squad probed an outpost at Ha Thanh, A-104, Quang Ngai Province, with automatic weapons fire. At the same time, a light probe was made on the camp and adjacent airfield by an unknown size enemy force. Results of this attack were two civilians killed and one civilian wounded. At 1000 hours, a reconnaissance operation consisting of two USASF, one VNSF and 110 CSF soldiers made chance contact with a ten man VC carrying party. Small arms fire was exchanged which resulted in one VC wounded and seven VC captured. There were no friendly losses. On 1 February, the District Headquarters at Ba To, Quang Ngai Province, came under attack by an estimated force of 700 VC armed with automatic weapons, recoilless rifles, 60mm mortars and M-79 grenade launchers. Approximately half of the enemy were armed with spears and knives. The enemy breached the perimeter and used C4 to destroy Province Headquarters and several bunkers. Results of this attack were 12 VC killed, six RF/PF killed, seven RF/PF wounded, four M1 rifles lost and the village chief of Ba Heip killed. At 0600 hours, a RF/PF patrol made contact with an estimated VC company. The VC were armed with spears, knives, and small arms. Mortar fire was adjusted on the enemy forces which caused them to withdraw north. A firefight then commenced which resulted in ten VC killed and several knives and spears captured. There were no friendly losses. At 0650 hours a VC company was seen moving across the air strip from south to north. The VC were pushing Montagnards armed with spears and knives in front of them. A reaction force was sent out to intercept. When the enemy was engaged, they withdrew southwest. Results of the engagement were six VC captured (one male and five female), 20 spears, 35 knives, one helmet and one carbine captured. Friendly losses were two CSF soldiers with weapons missing. On 27 January, a platoon of VC armed with M6 rifles, carbines and shotguns attacked the village of Minh Anh, Quang Ngai Province. Small arms fire was exchanged by CSF soldiers from Minh Long, A-108, which resulted in one VC killed, one CSF soldier, one PF soldier and one villager killed. Two CSF soldiers are still missing.

(b) II CTZ: On 3 November, a search and destroy operation from Trung Dung, A-502, which consisted of two USASF, one company of CSF and two combat reconnaissance platoons made contact with a company of VC in defensive positions, including machine gun positions, in a school house 11 kilometers north of Nha Trang. A fire fight ensued from a range of 100 meters. The operation directed airstrikes and artillery on the VC positions. The Mobile Strike Force, A-503 Khanh Hoa Province, reinforced the operation with one company of MSF and two combat reconnaissance platoons. Throughout the day, and into the evening, airstrikes, artillery and small arms fire was placed on the VC positions. A sweep of the area was conducted revealing 23 VC killed. One heavy machine gun, 13 small arms and four VC were captured in the sweep. Friendly losses were four CIDG killed, one USASF, and 13 CIDG wounded. On 4 November a search and destroy operation from Camp Cung Son, A-221, Phu Yen Province which consisted of two companies of Camp Strike Force personnel initiated contact with two NVA ten kilometers northeast of Cung Son.
A brief fire fight ensued which resulted in one NVA killed, and one AK-47 assault rifle captured. On 5 November, a search and destroy operation from Camp Luong Son, A-237, Binh Thuan Province, consisting of two USASF, two VNSF, one CRP and one company of CSF fired on four VC, 20 kilometers southwest of Phan Rang. A brief fire fight ensued, which resulted in two VC killed, one caliber .45 pistol and one AK-50 captured. On 6 November a search and destroy operation from Camp Plateau Gi, A-213, Kontum Province, consisting of four USASF, two VNSF, and 150 CSF soldiers conducted a bomb damage assessment of an air strike conducted in support of a previous contact 16 kilometers south of Plateau Gi. Results were three VC killed and six huts destroyed. On 8 November, a bridge security operation from Camp Kak Seang, A-245, Kontum Province, consisting of two USASF, one VNSF, and 30 CSF soldiers made contact with an estimated seven VC ten kilometers north of Camp Dak Seang. A 20 minute fire fight ensued, which resulted in one VC killed and two AK-47 assault rifle captured. On 13 November, a search and destroy operation from Plei Krong, A-213, Pleiku Province, consisting of one VNSF and two companies of CSF personnel initiated contact with an estimated platoon of NVA, 20 kilometers northwest of Pleiku. A brief fire fight ensued which resulted in three NVA killed and one ChiCom automatic rifle captured. On 16 November, a recon patrol from Cung Son, A-221, Phu Yen Province, which consisted of one squad of CSF soldiers initiated contact with one squad of VC, 17 kilometers southwest of Cung Son. A fire fight ensued which resulted in four VC killed, five Mauser and three Springfield rifles captured. On 15 and 16 November, Dak To, A-224, Kontum Province, received an estimated 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. The camp immediately initiated countermortar fire with unknown results. There were three USAF aircraft destroyed and two USASF slightly wounded. On 15 November, Mobile Strike Force Company 22 (-), which consisted of two USASF, one Australian and 39 MSF soldiers on a training mission initiated contact with two VC. A brief fire fight ensued which resulted in two VC killed and two US carbines captured. On 19 November, Mobile Strike Force Company 26, on a search and destroy operation 2K kilometers southwest of Dak To, initiated contact from 20 meters with three NVA. A brief fire fight ensued, which resulted in three NVA killed, two AK-47 assault rifles and one SKS rifle captured. On 20 November, a search and destroy operation from Trang Phuc, A-233, Darlac Province which consisted of four USASF, four VNSF and 160 CSF soldiers made contact with an estimated company of NVA 35 kilometers northwest of Trang Phuc. A fire fight ensued for one hour resulting in two NVA killed; one NVA, two KSO sub-machine guns, two SKS carbines and one RPD captured. On 21 November, a search and destroy operation from Trang Phuc, A-233, Darlac Province, which consisted of four USASF, four VNSF and 160 CSF soldiers initiated contact from 50 meters against an estimated platoon of NVA 35 kilometers northwest of Trang Phuc. A 15 minute fire fight ensued which resulted in four NVA killed; two SKS carbines and one RPD captured. On 21 November, a reconnaissance patrol from Cung Son, A-221, Phu Yen Province which consisted of one squad of CSF soldiers initiated contact from 50 meters on three VC 25 kilometers northwest of Cung Son. A brief fire fight ensued resulting in three VC killed, one Mauser rifle captured and one CSF soldier wounded. On 25 November, a reconnaissance patrol from Cung Son, A-221, Phu Yen Province, which consisted of one CRP squad initiated contact from 25 meters with three VC.
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Ten kilometers northeast of Cung Son. A brief fire fight ensued resulting in three VC killed and one weapon captured. On 27 November, a search and destroy operation from Ha Tay, A-227, Binh Dinh Province which consisted of two USASF, two VNSF, one CRP and one CSF company initiated contact from a distance of 25 meters on an unknown size VC unit, five kilometers west of Ha Tay. A fire fight ensued resulting in four VC killed and one captured. Friendly losses were two CSF soldiers killed and two wounded. On 30 November, a search and destroy operation from Trang Phuoc, A-233, Dalac Province, ambush an estimated platoon of NVA from a distance of 50 meters, 35 kilometers northeast of Ban Don. A fire fight ensued resulting in two NVA killed and one CSF soldier wounded. On 1 December, a search and destroy operation from Phu Tuc, A-221, Phu Bon Province, initiated contact with an estimated 30 NVA guarding a rice field, 18 kilometers southwest of Phu Tuc. A brief fire fight ensued resulting in two NVA killed and five small arms captured. On 4 December, a search and destroy operation from Vinh Thanh, A-228, Binh Dinh Province, which consisted of two USASF, one VNSF, and one CSF company initiated contact from 50 meters with three VC, 26 kilometers northeast of An Khe. A fire fight ensued resulting in two VC killed. On 5 December, a reaction force from Vinh Thanh, A-228, Binh Dinh Province, which consisted of one CRP, was fired on by an estimated platoon of VC, 20 kilometers northeast of An Khe. A fire fight ensued, and artillery was called. The results of this contact were one CSF soldier killed, two wounded, six VC killed and five weapons captured. On 6 December, a saturation patrol from Vinh Thanh, A-228, Binh Dinh Province, which consisted of one VNSF and one CSF platoon made contact with one VC squad 15 kilometers east of Phu Khe. A brief fire fight ensued resulting in two VC killed and one weapon captured. On 8 December, a search and destroy operation from Vinh Thanh, A-228, Binh Dinh Province, which consisted of one CSF platoon fired at one VC squad 23 kilometers northeast of An Khe. A fire fight ensued and artillery from Camp Vinh Thanh fired in support, the results of this contact were two VC killed and two weapons captured. On 12 December, a saturation patrol from Vinh Thanh, A-228, Binh Dinh Province, which consisted of two VNSF and one CSF company initiated contact from 50 meters with an estimated VC platoon 16 kilometers east of An Khe. A ten minute fire fight ensued resulting in one VC killed. On 13 December, a search and destroy operation from An Lac, A-234, Dalac Province which consisted of two USASF and one CSF company initiated contact with an estimated VC company 20 kilometers southeast of Lac Thien. A fire fight ensued, resulting in one VC killed and one weapon captured. On 14 December, a reconnaissance patrol from Phu Tuc, A-221, Phu Bon Province which consisted of one CSF platoon initiated contact with one VC 20 kilometers southeast of Cheo Ruo. This contact resulted in one VC killed and one rucksack captured. On 15 December, a search and destroy operation from Cung Son, A-221, Phu Yen Province, which consisted of 12 CSF soldiers initiated contact with an estimated NVA platoon 18 kilometers northwest of Cung Son. A fire fight ensued which resulted in three NVA killed and four CSF soldiers wounded. On 20 December, a search and destroy operation from Poloi Kleng, A-221, Kontum Province, which consisted of three USASF, one VNSF, and one CSF company initiated contact with an unknown size NVA unit 25 kilometers southwest of Kontum. A fire fight ensued and air strikes were called. The results of
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This contact were four NVA killed and three weapons captured. On 20 December, a search and destroy operation from Bu Prong, A-236, Quang Duc Province, which consisted of three USASF, one VNSF, and one CSF company ambushed the lead element of an unknown size NVA unit 55 kilometers northwest of Nhon Co. A fire fight ensued resulting in four NVA killed. On 21 December, a search and destroy operation from Luong Son, A-237, Binh Thuan Province which consisted of one CSF platoon initiated contact with an estimated platoon of VC 35 kilometers west of Hoa Da. Small arms fire was exchanged which resulted in two VC killed and two small arms captured. On 22 December, a search and destroy operation from Plei Mrong, A-113, Pleiku Province, which consisted of two VNSF and one CSF company initiated contact with an estimated VC platoon 15 kilometers northwest of Pleiku. Small arms fire was exchanged which resulted in three VC captured. On 22 December, a search and destroy operation from Ha Tay, A-227, Binh Dinh Province which consisted of one CSF platoon initiated contact with an estimated VC squad 15 kilometers south of Bong Son. Small arms fire was exchanged resulting in one VC killed and 15 captured. On 22 December, a reconnaissance operation from Dong Tre, A-222, Phu Yen Province, which consisted of one CRP was fired on by an unknown size VC unit 35 kilometers northwest of Tay Hao. Small arms fire was exchanged which resulted in nine VC killed and two small arms captured. On 28 December, a search and destroy operation from Bang Bak, A-246, Kontum Province, ambushed an estimated 50 VC, 45 kilometers northeast of Dak To. A brief fire fight ensued resulting in four VC killed and two small arms captured. On 29 December, Vinh Thanh, A-120, Binh Dinh Province, received a report that an estimated VC company was located 15 kilometers northwest of An Khe. Artillery was fired and an assessment operation was conducted, revealing seven VC killed. On 30 December, a local security operation from Vinh Thanh, A-120, Binh Dinh Province, received small arms fire from an unknown size NVA unit 22 kilometers northwest of An Khe. Small arms fire was exchanged and artillery from camp was called in. The results of this contact were 8 NVA killed and assorted small arms captured. During the period 30 December 1967 and 06 January 1968, CIDG and RF/PF units advised by USASF conducted 1,107 operations and engaged in 21 contacts. Enemy losses were 68 killed; three wounded; 19 VC and four VC suspects captured; 23 small arms and four crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were one USASF and three CIDG killed; ten CIDG wounded. A total of three mortar, one mine and one booby trap incidents were reported during the week. On 1 January, a search and destroy operation from Phu Yen, A-113, Phu Yen Province, consisting of one VNSF and one CSF company ambushed an estimated battalion of NVA 16 kilometers northwest of Pleiku. Small arms fire was exchanged and spooky was on station. The results of this contact were 47 NVA killed and one weapon captured. Enemy equipment losses were two 82mm mortars, one 105mm mortar, two 84mm rocket launchers, five K-50 sub-machine guns, two chirom automatic rifles, one Russian rifle and one Colt pistol captured. Friendly losses were three CSF soldiers killed and four wounded. On 4 January, a search and destroy operation from Phu Yen, A-224, Binh Thuan Province, consisting of two USASF, one CRP and one CSF company ambushed an unknown size NVA unit 15 kilometers southwest of Cung Son. Small arms fire was exchanged which resulted in seven NVA killed and one weapon captured. On 5 January, a search...
and destroy operation from Nhon Co, A-235, Quang Duc Province, consisting of two USASF, one VNSF, and one CSF company, initiated contact with three VC 19 kilometers north of Nhon Co. A brief fire fight ensued which resulted in three VC killed and three small arms seized. During the period 06 January 1968 and 13 January 1968, CIDG and RF/PF units advised by USASF conducted 1,153 operations and engaged in 30 contacts. Enemy losses were 12 killed, five captured, three suspects detained and 11 small arms seized. Friendly losses were 11 CSF soldiers killed; two USASF, one VNSF, and 35 CSF wounded. Two mortar attacks were reported during the week. On 6 January, a search and destroy operation from Cung Son, A-221, Phu Yen Province, consisting of one CRP squad ambushed the lead element of an estimated two VC companies 1/5 kilometers northwest of Minh Hoa. Small arms fire was exchanged resulting in 20 NVA killed and three captured. Friendly losses were one CSF soldier killed. On 9 January, a search and destroy operation from Tieu Atar, A-231, Darlac Province, consisting of five USASF, two VNSF and one MSF company initiated contact with an estimated squad of NVA 1/5 kilometers north of Ban Don. A brief firefight ensued resulting in six NVA killed and two small arms captured. On 9 January, a search and destroy operation from Tieu Atar, A-231, Darlac Province, consisting of five USASF, two VNSF and one MSF company made contact with an unknown size NVA unit 1/5 kilometers north of Ban Don. Small arms fire was exchanged resulting in five NVA killed and two weapons captured. During the period 13 January 1968 and 20 January 1968, CIDG and RF/PF units advised by USASF conducted 1,114 operations and engaged in 31 contacts. Enemy losses were 36 killed, one captured, one wounded, 11 small arms and two crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were two CSF soldiers killed, two USASF and 23 CSF soldiers wounded. A total of 11 mortar attacks and three mining incidents occurred during the week. On 15 January, a search and destroy operation from Tieu Atar, A-231, Darlac Province, consisting of five USASF, two VNSF and one MSF company initiated contact with an unknown size NVA unit, 1/5 kilometers north of Ban Don. Small arms fire was exchanged resulting in three NVA killed and one weapon captured, friendly losses were one USASF wounded. On 16 January, a search and destroy operation from Ha Tay, A-227, Binh Dinh Province, consisting of two USASF, one VNSF and one CSF company initiated contact with three VC occupying an observation post, nine kilometers northeast of Qui Phan. A brief firefight ensued resulting in three VC killed and one automatic rifle captured. On 17 January, a search and destroy operation from Tan Rai, A-232, Lam Dong Province, consisting of two USASF, one GRP and one CSF company initiated contact with two VC, 13 kilometers west of Di Linh. Small arms fire was exchanged resulting in two VC killed and two carbines captured. On 17 January, a search and destroy operation from Trang Phu, A-233, Darlac Province, consisting of two USASF, one VNSF and one CSF company initiated contact with an estimated company of NVA, 30 kilometers northwest of Ban Don. A fire fight ensued and the NVA employed B-40 rocket launchers and mortars causing the CSF to break contact and withdraw. The results of this contact were five NVA killed and eight CSF soldiers wounded. On 20 January, Camp Ben Het, Kontum Province, came under mortar and ground attack. Artillery and air strikes were called on suspected enemy locations. The following morning a search of the area.
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revealed 11 NVA killed, one wounded NVA captured and three enemy weapons recovered. During the period 20 January and 27 January 1968, CIDG and RF/FP units advised by USASF conducted 1,082 operations and engaged in 27 contacts during the week. Enemy losses were 29 killed, four captured, one suspect detained and ten weapons captured. Friendly losses were four CSF soldiers killed, one VNSF and 21 soldiers wounded. Two small arms were lost, a total of ten mortar attacks and two booby trap incidents were reported. On 22 January, a search and destroy operation from Due Lap, A-239, Quang Duc Province, which consisted of four USASF, two VNSF and one CSF company initiated contact with an estimated VC platoon 20 kilometers southeast of Due Lap. A brief fire fight ensued which resulted in two VC captured. On 25 January a search and destroy operation from Buon Hiech, A-238, Phu Bon Province, which consisted of two USASF, one VNSF and one CSF company made contact with four VC 45 kilometers northeast of Ban Me Thuot. Small arms fire was exchanged and resulted in one VC killed and one captured. On 26 January a reconnaissance patrol from Ha Tay, A-227, Binh Dinh Province, which consisted of one CRP initiated contact with an unknown size VC unit 13 kilometers southwest of Bong Son. A fire fight ensued and resulted in two VC killed and one M-16 rifle captured. On 26 January, a search and destroy operation from Nhon Co, A-235, Quang Duc Province, consisting of two USASF, one VNSF and one CSF company initiated contact with two VC 20 kilometers south of Bu Prang. Small arms fire was exchanged which resulted in two weapons captured. Camp Ben Het, Kontum Province came under mixed mortar and recoiless rifle attack ten times during the week; a total of 145 rounds were received. On each occasion Ben Het employed countermortar fire. The results were three NVA killed, three MSF soldiers killed, six MSF and four CSF soldiers wounded. During the period 27 January and 03 February 1968, CIDG and RF/FP units advised by USASF conducted 816 operations and engaged in 35 contacts during the week. Enemy losses were 135 killed, two wounded, ten captured and 22 weapons captured. Friendly losses were three USASF, one VNSF and 19 CSF killed. Wounded during the week were 32 USASF, three VNSF and 66 CSF soldiers. A total of 22 mortar and rocket attacks were conducted against USASF installations during the reporting period. On 30 January, a sweep operation from Pleiku, Company B, Pleiku Province, which consisted of MSF elements encountered heavy resistance while attempting to clear the enemy positioned in the downtown area of Pleiku City. A heavy volume of fire was exchanged; and the MSF withdrew to call in gun ships. Enemy activity was quiet during the night, and MSF elements maintained a cordon around the city. The next morning an assessment of the contact area revealed that 49 enemy had been killed. On 30 January, a reaction force consisting of one CSF company from Cung Son, A-221, Phu Yen Province, and one CSF company from Phu Tuc, A-221, Phu Bon Province, conducted an assault on a fortified position in the Qui Nhon railway yard. Heavy small arms fire was received. The CSF withdrew to a covered position and took the enemy under fire with recoiless rifles. The CSF again assaulted the position and one weapon captured. Friendly losses were; three USASF and three CSF wounded. On 30 January, mortar, rocket and small arms attacks commenced in the city of Ban Me Thuot. Detachment B-23 reported only light small arms fire received in their compound. During the period 30 January thru 2 February, Kontum, Detachment B-24, Kontum Province, reported numerous mortar and rocket attacks accompanied by company size ground probes. In several instances the enemy penetrated the perimeter of B-24's compound, but were quickly repelled by supporting gun ships.
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(c) III CTZ: During the period 29 October thru 2 November, Loc Ninh, A-331, Binh Long Province came under heavy ground and mortar attack. On 29 October at 0125 hours, heavy mortar, small arms and .50 caliber machine gun suppressing fire was placed on the camp in support of an estimated two battalion attack on the RF/PF district compound. At 0645 hours, Camp Loc Ninh launched a Camp Strike Force company operation to relieve the district compound. At 1000 hours, a reinforced infantry battalion of the 1st US Infantry Division was committed to assist in the clearing of the district compound, and the final contact was broken at 1150 hours. On 31 October at 0045 hours, Dot A-331, the district headquarters, and elements of the 1st US Infantry Division at Loc Ninh came under heavy mortar and rocket attack. At 0100 hours, small arms fire increased in a coordinated attack on all three friendly locations. At 0145 hours, the joint employment of fire from all three locations suppressed the attack. Sporadic small arms fire was received until 0515 hours when another coordinated attack commenced on all three friendly unit locations. The friendly elements jointly returned fire and at 0730 hours, the VC broke contact and withdrew. On 2 November at 0045 hours, all three unit locations again began receiving heavy mortar and small arms fire. Between 0130 and 0600 hours, the enemy force, estimated at three battalions, probably of the 273d Regiment, made repeated attempts to mass their troops and assault friendly positions. The effective use of light fire teams, flare ships, tactical air and friendly ground units broke the attack. At 0600 hours the enemy broke contact and withdrew. During the three attacks, Camp Loc Ninh received 24 rounds of 122mm rocket fire, 22 rounds of 100mm mortar, 370 rounds of 82mm mortar, 50 B-40 rockets and 50 RPG-7 rockets. As a result of all three attacks, eight CIDG were killed; four USASF and 68 CIDG were wounded; 18L VC were killed. In addition, 95 VC were killed which were not accredited to USASF, VNSF or CIDG. Four small arms, five crew served weapons, ten RPG-7 rockets, 20 B-40 rockets, 50 hand grenades and assorted munitions were captured. On 5 November, Camp Chien Thang I, A-302, and Camp Chien Thang II, B-36, Phuoc Tuy Province, received a total of nine 60mm mortar rounds. There were no damages or casualties at either camp. On 9 November, Hon Quan, B-33, Tong Le Chon, A-334, Binh Long Province; and Bunard, A-344, Phuoc Long Province came under mortar and rocket attacks. Hon Quan received a total of 200 rounds of 82mm mortar and rocket fire, 20 of which landed in the sector headquarters. Tong Le Chon received a total of 33 rounds of 82mm mortar during two attacks in which two Camp Strike Force personnel were wounded. Bunard received 10 rounds of 60mm and 81mm mortar which landed south of the camp perimeter. All three camps fired defensive concentrations and counter mortar fire. Air support which consisted of light fire teams, AC-47 gunships and TAC Air caused the enemy to break contact and withdraw. On 14 November, Loc Ninh, A-331, Binh Long Province, received several 82mm mortar rounds from an unknown enemy force. The camp responded with 105mm artillery defensive concentrations and 81mm counter-mortar fire, which caused the enemy to break contact and withdraw. On 15 November, Loc Ninh, A-331, Binh Long Province, received an 82mm mortar round and one B-40 rocket. The camp responded with defensive concentrations and countermortar fire, causing the enemy to break contact and withdraw. The camp suffered no casualties during both attacks. On 18 November, Tong Le Chon, A-334, Binh Long Province, received approximately 50 82mm mortar rounds from an unknown size VC force. All enemy rounds landed in the outer defensive wire.
The camp responded with 105mm and 175mm defensive concentrations and called light fire teams in support, causing the enemy to break and withdraw. There were no friendly casualties resulting from the attack. On 18 November, a forward element of a search and destroy operation from Bu Dop, A-341, Phuoc Long Province, consisting of two USASF and one VNSF and 100 camp strike force personnel, sighted an NVA company, wearing khaki uniforms, in bunkers, in the vicinity of Bu Dop. The friendly element deployed, and assaulted the enemy positions, opening fire from a distance of 50 meters. The enemy returned fire and due to their superior firepower, caused the friendly unit to break contact and withdraw. After regrouping, the friendly unit called airstrikes on the enemy position. At the completion of the airdrops, the enemy flanked the friendly unit and opened fire. The friendly unit returned fire but again had to break contact and withdraw. Results of this contact were one camp strike force soldier killed, two wounded, and two weapons lost. Enemy losses were four killed and one wounded. On 25 November a search and destroy operation in Hau Nghia Province which consisted of three USASF and 157 Mobile Strike Force personnel made contact with an estimated 25 VC armed with automatic and semi automatic weapons 10 kilometers west of Duc Hoa. The VC were hiding in houses and directed sniper fire on the Mobile Strike Force at a distance of 300 meters. The Mobile Strike Force assaulted the VC positions. A brief fire fight ensued, which resulted in nine VC killed, 13 captured, three sampans and two houses destroyed. On 26 November, a search and destroy operation from Tra Cu, A-352, Hau Nghia Province, was engaged by a platoon of VC eight kilometers west of Duc Hoa. A two hour fire fight ensued resulting in three CIDG killed, one wounded, 16 VC killed and two weapons captured. On 26 November, a company search and destroy operation from Bu Dop, A-341, Phuoc Long Province, was engaged by an estimated company of VC, 20 kilometers northwest of Song Be. A 90 minute fire fight ensued which resulted in one USASF, four CIDG wounded; two VC killed. During the period 27 to 29 November, a company search and destroy operation from Bu Dop, A-341, reinforced by one company from Dong Xoai, A-311, Phuoc Long Province, operating 10 kilometers northwest of Song Be, was engaged by numerically superior NVA forces. The friendly units were out maneuvered causing them to split. Results were one USASF, nine CIDG killed; three USASF, one VNSF, and 20 CIDG wounded; one USASF, one VNSF and 32 CIDG missing; and 32 weapons lost. On 30 November, friendly elements were sent out to attempt to relocate the missing personnel. On 27 November, a company search and destroy operation from Bunan, A-344, Phuoc Long Province, was ambushed by a company of VC, 23 kilometers southeast of Song Be. A 20 minute fire fight ensued resulting in one USASF, one CIDG killed; one VNSF and one CIDG wounded; 15 VC killed. On 28 November, a company search and destroy operation from Tra Cu, A-352, Hau Nghia Province, was engaged by an estimated platoon of VC, 15 kilometers west of Duc Hoa. A brief fire fight ensued which resulted in four VC killed, one VC and two weapons captured. On 29 November, a Mobile Strike Force company search and destroy operation supporting Duc Hoa, B-35, Hau Nghia Province, was engaged by one squad of VC, 30 miles northwest of Duc Hoa. A 15 minute fire fight ensued, resulting in one CIDG wounded; five VC killed. On 29 November, Bu Dop, A-341, Phuoc Long Province, received an estimated 15-122mm rocket rounds in conjunction with the attack on Bo Duc District Headquarters. Rocket fire was inaccurate and caused no damage or casualties to the camp.
From 2 to 8 December, Camp Bu Dop, A-341, Phuoc Long Province, received approximately 130 mortar rounds and 12 rocket rounds, resulting in 11 USASF and nine camp strike force soldiers wounded; USASF living quarters, communications and ammunition storage facilities destroyed and two 155mm howitzers damaged. From 3 to 7 December, Camps Trai Bi, A-323, Tay Ninh Province; Hon Quan, B-33, Binh Long Province; Tong Le Chon, A-33, Tay Ninh Province; Song Be, B-31, Phuoc Long Province and Rumard, A-334, Phuoc Long Province received light mortar, rocket or small arms fire, resulting in negative damage or casualties. On 5 December, Camp P. Klok, A-322, Tay Ninh Province, received 12 mortar rounds, one rifle grenade and small arms fire which resulted in one VNSF and three camp strike force soldiers wounded. On 6 December, Camp Duc Hue, A-351A, Hau Nghia Province, received 20 mortar rounds resulting in one camp strike force soldier killed; one USASF and one camp strike force soldier wounded. On 6 December, Camp Tong Le Chon, A-344, Tay Ninh Province, came under ground attack by an unknown size VC force. The enemy triggered trip flares while attempting to cut through the defensive wire. The camp strike force immediately opened fire with small arms, mortar and artillery, and called light fire teams in support, causing the enemy force to break contact and withdraw. Results of this attack were negative friendly and unknown enemy casualties. On 8 December, mobile strike force elements from Lonh Hai, A-302, Phuoc Tuy Province, operating 35 kilometers northwest of Tay Ninh, Tay Ninh Province, were ambushed by an estimated platoon of VC from a distance of 25 meters. The friendly elements returned fire and called FAC and light fire teams in support, causing the enemy force to break contact and withdraw. Results of this action were one mobile strike force soldier killed and 13 mobile strike force soldiers wounded. Enemy casualties are unknown. During the week of 9 thru 15 December, elements of Det A-323, with one attached US engineer company and three attached Mobile Strike Force companies establishing a new camp at Thien Ngon, 33 kilometers northwest of Tay Ninh Province, were continuously engaged by squad, platoon and company size VC units, culminating in a 200 round mortar attack, followed by a battalion size ground attack. The new camp site received an estimated 330 rounds of mortar and 30 rockets during the week. Results were one CSF soldier killed; one USASF, nine US engineers and 15 CSF soldiers wounded. Enemy losses were two killed. On 15 December, Camp Duc Hue, Detachment A-351A, Hau Nghia Province, 30 kilometers northwest of Duc Hue, received an estimated 30 to 50 rounds of mixed mortar and recoilless rifle, resulting in one CSF soldier wounded. Also on 15 December, a company size search and destroy operation from Camp Duc Hue, operating west of the camp and approximately three kilometers from the Cambodian border, made contact with an estimated two battalions of VC. Air Force aircraft and Army gunships were immediately on station to support them. Three CSF companies from adjacent USASF camps were helilifted into the area to reinforce the friendly element in contact. After link-up, the friendly elements assaulted the enemy who were in defense positions. The friendly force continued to assault the enemy until dark, at which time they were ordered to break contact due to their inability to maintain continuity of the attack during darkness. The friendly forces began to withdraw east toward camp Duc Hue with the enemy in pursuit. Army gunships supported the withdrawal. Results of this action were one USASF, one VNSF, and 28 CSF soldiers killed; one VNSF and 22 CSF soldiers wounded; 19 CSF soldiers missing; 3 radios, 2 crew served and 64 individual weapons lost. Enemy losses were 14 killed. An estimated 50 VC were killed (US estimate by air). On 17 December, elements from camps Hiep Hoa, Det A-351 and Tra Cu, Det A-352.
Hau Nghia Province, while conducting a company size joint search and destroy operation, made contact with a VC company, 17 kilometers northwest of Duc Hoa, Hau Nghia Province. The friendly elements surrounded the enemy and with the use of well coordinated firepower, maneuver and Tactical Air support, killed 12 of the enemy and captured 1 individual, two crew served weapons, numerous items of supplies, munitions ond web equipment. Friendly losses during this engagement were two camp strike force soldiers killed and 12 wounded. During the week of 16-23 December Camp Thien Ngon, Detachment A-323, Tay Ninh Province, engaged in 19 contacts consisting of camp probes, mortar and ground attacks. During the week, the camp received approximately 600 rounds of mixed mortar and rocket and an undetermined number of rifle grenades. Friendly casualties during the week were one Camp Strike Force soldier killed and 54 wounded. Enemy casualties are unknown. On 18 December, Camp Trai Bi, Detachment A-323, Tay Ninh Province was officially closed. Assets from Camp Trai Bi have been moved to Thien Ngon. On 24 December, 12 CSF soldiers from Camp Duc Hue, A-351 (A), Hau Nghia Province, who were part of L9 personnel missing in action on 15 December, returned to Camp Duc Hue after being released by the VC. Four personnel required medical treatment and were medevaced. The remainder of the personnel were taken to Camp Duc Hoa, Detachment B-35, Hau Nghia Province, to be debriefed. On 28 December, a 12 man team from Camp Long Hai, Detachment B-36, Phuoc Tuy Province, on a training mission, operating from an FOB in Tay Ninh Province, were inserted into an area approximately 23 kilometers northwest of Tay Ninh City, Tay Ninh Province. Immediately after insertion, the team was engaged by an unknown number of VC. A fire fight ensued after which the enemy broke contact and withdrew. The team was extracted from the area of contact shortly thereafter. Results were six USASF personnel slightly wounded; Eleven VC were killed, two individual weapons and miscellaneous equipment were captured. On 30 December, a company size reaction force from Camp Trai Cu, A-352, Hau Nghia Province, was inserted into an area approximately 27 kilometers west of Duc Hoa, in response to an enemy sighting reported by a FAC aircraft. The friendly force was engaged by a platoon of VC, dug in bunkers and foxholes. A 75 minute fire fight ensued, culminating in an assault on enemy positions, causing the enemy to break contact and withdraw west. Results were four VC killed, two individual weapons, one claymore mine, seven hand grenades and miscellaneous webbing, equipment and munitions captured. During the period 30 December 1967 and 6 January 1968, CIDG and RF/PF advised by USASF conducted 176 operations and engaged in 15 contacts. Enemy losses were one killed, one wounded, one captured and four suspects detained; one weapon and 300 pounds of salt captured. Friendly losses were one USASF soldier killed; one USASF and seven CSF soldiers wounded; one weapon lost. On 1 January, an estimated VC squad attacked a security outpost from Camp Tay Ninh, Detachment B-32, Tay Ninh Province. A brief fire fight ensued resulting in one CSF soldier killed and one VC wounded, as evidenced by heavy blood trails found in the area. On 1 January, Camp Thien Ngon, Detachment A-323, Tay Ninh Province, sustained two brief mortar attacks and one rifle grenade attack which resulted in one USASF and four CSF soldiers wounded. The camp received a total of 22 mortar rounds and an undetermined number of rifle grenades. On 2 January, an estimated VC squad opened fire on a company size search and destroy operation from Camp Ben Soi, Detachment A-321, 13 kilometers south of Tay Ninh, Tay Ninh Province.
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A brief fire fight ensued, after which the enemy broke contact. One VC was killed and four suspects were detained. On 6 January, a search and destroy operation from Camp Loc Ninh, A-331, Binh Long Province, made contact with a reinforced VC company 16 kilometers northwest of Hon Quan. A fire fight ensued which resulted in two CSF soldiers wounded. Seventeen VC were killed but were not credited to Camp Loc Ninh. During the period 6 January thru 13 January 1968, CIDG and RF/FF units, advised by USASF conducted 165 operations and engaged in 26 contacts. Enemy losses were two USASF, one CSF and seven MSF soldiers killed, two USASF, six CSF and 36 MSF soldiers wounded; 10 MSF soldiers missing in action.

On 9 January, a joint operation consisting of a CSF company from Camp Tong Le Chon, Detachment A-334, Tay Ninh Province, and elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, were ambushed 32 kilometers northeast of Tay Ninh by an unknown size VC force, with RPOGs from a distance of 50 meters. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment made a mounted assault on the enemy positions while the A-334 elements provided a base of fire. The enemy broke contact and withdrew. Results were one USASF killed and two CSF soldiers wounded. On 10 January, a company size search and destroy operation from Duc Hue, Detachment A-351, Hau Nghia Province, spotted 100 VC suspects, 22 kilometers northwest of Duc Hoa. The suspects split up and fled in all directions. The majority fleeing across the Cambodian border, 47 suspects were detained. Two identified as ARVN deserters. On 11 January, Camp Thien Ngon, Detachment A-323, Tay Ninh Province received 20 82mm mortar rounds. On 12 January, Camp Thien Ngon, received 15, 82mm mortar rounds. Both attacks were initiated from 2,000 meters northwest of the camp. Results were three US engineers and six MSF soldiers wounded. On 11 January, a MSF search and destroy operation, consisting of six USASF and 250 MSF soldiers, operating from Camp Tay Ninh Detachment B-32, Tay Ninh Province, were engaged by an estimated VC company, 10 kilometers north of Tay Ninh. The friendly element called artillery on the enemy, then assaulted their positions, causing the enemy to break contact and withdraw. Five minutes later, the enemy estimated to be at battalion strength, engaged the friendly element from the north, east and west. The friendly element called artillery on the enemy, again causing them to break contact and withdraw. The operation began to move toward an LZ approximately two kilometers west of the area of contact when they were hit again. The friendly elements secured the LZ and at 1830 hours the contact was broken by the enemy, and friendly forces were extracted. Results were one USASF and seven MSF soldiers killed; two USASF and 30 MSF soldiers wounded; 10 MSF soldiers were reported missing in action. Enemy casualties are unknown. On 12 January, a company search and destroy operation from Camp Tra Cu, Detachment A-352, Hau Nghia Province, was engaged by an estimated VC squad, with automatic weapons from a distance of 200 meters, 25 kilometers west of Duc Hoa, Hau Nghia Province. Friendly forces counterattacked, causing the enemy to break contact and withdraw. Results were two VC killed and two AK-47 rifles captured. During the period 13 January 1968 and 20 January 1968, CIDG and RF/FF units, advised by USASF conducted 162 operations and engaged in 23 contacts. Enemy losses were 12 killed and one suspect detained. Enemy equipment losses were seven small arms, two CBU, one radio, one kilogram of documents, assorted munitions and webbing captured; one sampan destroyed. Friendly losses were seven CSF soldiers wounded. No weapons were lost by friendly forces during the week. On 15 January,
a company size search and destroy operation from Camp Tra Cu, Detachment A-352, Hau Nghia Province, assaulted an estimated VC platoon approximately 13 kilometers west of Duc Hoa. The enemy did not return fire and immediately broke contact and withdrew northwest. Results were one VC killed, one small arm and two GPU's captured. On 16 January, a company size search and destroy operation from Camp Tra Cu, Detachment A-352, ambushed an estimated VC squad. The VC were moving across the Song Hu Co Dong River in sampans, approximately 10 kilometers west of Duc Hoa. The enemy broke contact and withdrew in an unknown direction. Results were four VC killed and one sampan destroyed. It was estimated that two small arms and approximately 20 grenades were lost in the river by the enemy. On 19 January, a company size search and destroy operation from Camp Ben Soi, Detachment A-321, Tay Ninh Province, 22 kilometers west of Tay Ninh, opened fire on an estimated VC platoon supplying a base camp which had facilities for a platoon size medical unit. The enemy returned fire then broke contact and withdrew northwest. Results were two CSF soldiers wounded, five VC killed, three small arms, one radio, one kilogram of documents, assorted webbing equipment and ammunition captured. During the period 20 January 1968 thru 27 January 1968, CIDG and RF/PF units advised by USASF conducted 112 operations and engaged in 30 contacts. During this period enemy losses were one VC killed, two wounded and six suspects detained. Two sampans, 3,200 pounds of rice, one bridge and one mine destroyed. Twenty bags of tear gas, 506 pounds of rice, one sampan motor, two aiming stakes, M-16 ammunition and one kilogram of documents captured. Friendly losses were one CSF soldier killed; two USASF, seven MSF soldiers, 11 CSF soldiers and three RF/PF soldiers wounded. No weapons were lost. On 22 January, a search and destroy operation from Camp Dunard, A-344, Phuoc Long Province, which consisted of two USASF, one VNSF and one CSF company was ambushed by an estimated VC platoon 28 kilometers south of Song Be. Friendly forces deployed and assaulted the enemy positions. A ten minute fire fight ensued, then the enemy broke contact and withdrew east with friendly forces in pursuit. Contact with the enemy was not regained. Results were one USASF and three CSF soldiers wounded. On 23 January, a search and destroy operation from Camp Ben Soi, A-321, Tay Ninh Province, which consisted of two USASF, two VNSF and two CSF companies were engaged by two VC squads 23 kilometers southeast of Tay Ninh. A brief fire fight ensued. The enemy broke contact and withdrew west. Results were one CSF soldier killed and two CSF soldiers wounded. On 23 January, a RF/PF outpost 22 kilometers southeast of Song Be, Phuoc Long Province, was attacked by an estimated VC squad. Camp Dunard, A-344, supported the outpost with mortar and artillery fire to keep out a reaction force which reached the area of contact after the enemy had withdrawn. Results were three RF/PF soldiers wounded. On 26 January, a search and destroy operation from Camp Thien Ngon, A-323, Tay Ninh Province, which consisted of three USASF, one VNSF and 11 MSF soldiers were ambushed by an estimated VC squad 38 kilometers north east of Tay Ninh. A 15 minute fire fight ensued, then the enemy broke contact and withdrew west. Results were one VC killed and three MSF soldiers wounded. On 27 January, a search and destroy operation from Camp Trang Sup, A-301, Tay Ninh Province, which consisted of six VNSF, two CSF companies, one MSF company and one platoon of APC's engaged an estimated VC company eight kilometers northeast of Tay Ninh. A two hour fire fight...
ensued, then the enemy broke contact and withdrew into a large cave. Results were four CSF and four NSF soldiers wounded. During the period 27 January 1968 thru 3 February 1968, CIDG and RF/PF units advised by USASF conducted 74 operations and engaged in 39 contacts. Enemy losses were six VC killed, two wounded and two suspects detained. Enemy weapons and equipment captured were five small arms, three crew served weapons, six rockets and one Chicom grenade. Friendly losses were two RF/PF soldiers killed; two USASF, one VNSF, 16 CSF and three RF/PF soldiers wounded. Friendly losses were nine small arms, one PRC-25 radio, three HT-1 radios and nine syrettes of morphine. On 31 January, elements of the 27th MP VC Battalion launched a 122mm rocket and 60mm mortar attack on Co A, Detachment C3, Bien Hoa, Bien Hoa Province. A total of three rockets and 12 mortar rounds impacted in and around the compound which resulted in one USASF wounded and caused minor damage to the company headquarters building. On 31 January, ARVN and CSF elements from camp Duc Hoa, Detachment B35, Hau Nghia Province, trapped an estimated VC platoon in the Duc Hoa market place. All exits from the market place were sealed off by friendly forces and contact was maintained throughout the day. Results were six VC killed and two captured. Five small arms, three crew served weapons and six rockets were captured. On 1 February, Camp Thien Ngon, Detachment A-323, Tay Ninh Province, received an estimated 105 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from an estimated VC company located approximately 1500 meters north of the camp. Results were five US engineers (attached) and two CSF soldiers wounded. On 2 February, Camp Dung Son, Detachment A-345, Phuoc Long Province, received ten rounds of 82mm mortar fire from an unknown size enemy force. One round impacted on a CSF building which resulted in 15 CSF dependents wounded. On 3 February, a search and destroy operation from Camp Tra Cu, Detachment A-352, Hau Nghia Province, which consisted of two USASF, two VNSF and 120 CSF soldiers were engaged by an unknown size VC force 15 kilometers west of Duc Hoa. The enemy opened fire from a distance of 100 meters with automatic weapons. The friendly force returned fire until their position was overrun. Friendly forces broke contact and withdrew from the area. Results were one USASF, one VNSF and eight CSF soldiers wounded. An estimated 15 VC were killed.
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During the period 1 November 1967 thru 30 December 1968, an estimated company size VC unit attacked Ba Chuc FOB, Chau Doc Province. The enemy unit was armed with 57mm and 60mm mortars. Approximately 60 rounds of 60mm mortar and 57mm RR fire landed in the FOB.Gunships and airstrikes were called in support. Ba Zaol, A-421, supported with 4.2 inch mortar fire. The attack lasted one hour. Results of the attack were one USASF killed and one wounded, one CSF killed and one wounded. Enemy casualties were unknown. On the 8th of November at 0130 hours, an estimated reinforced company of VC armed with small arms, 60mm mortars, 82mm mortars, B-40 rockets, and 57mm Recoilless Rifles attacked the Cao Lanh City Prison from a distance of 75 meters. Detachment B-43 supported with 4.2 and 60mm illumination. A reaction force from B-43, 2/16 ARVN Battalion, and four armored cars were dispatched to counter the ground attack. A portion of the reaction force overrun a VC support squad, secured the road and took up positions in the prison perimeter. The firefight lasted until 0500 hours at which time the VC broke contact and withdrew in an unknown direction. Results of the attack were: one RF, one ARVN, and two civilians killed; 29 RF, one FF, 26 ARVN, and 12 civilians wounded. Enemy losses were 22 VC killed (13 of which were USASF confirmed). The friendly element captured the following items: four AK-47 assault rifles, one chicom rifle, one Russian carbine, one US M-1 carbine, one homemade B-40 rocket launcher, hand made grenades, two concussion grenades, an undetermined amount of propaganda leaflets, and assorted web gear. On 11 November at 0800 hours, an operation consisting of one company of CSF, two VNSF, and two USASF departed My Do, A-433, Kien Phong Province on a search and destroy operation. On the 12th at 0700 hours, the friendly element initiated contact with an estimated squad of VC approximately three kilometers east of the camp. After a five minute firefight the VC broke contact and withdrew north. Results of the contact were two VC killed, two sampans, one chicom rifle, and assorted ammunition captured. On 21 November at 1600 hours, an operation from Det A-413, Sinh Thanh Thon, Kien Toang Province, consisting of two companies of CSF, and two USASF initiated contact with four VC from a distance of 50 meters. After a five minute firefight the VC broke contact and withdrew. Results were: no friendly losses, one VC killed, one VC and one weapon captured. At 1700 hours the friendly element made contact with an estimated platoon of VC. After a 15 minute firefight the VC withdrew. Results were: one CSF soldier wounded, 29 VC killed (6 of which were confirmed by USASF), three VC suspects detained, 13 weapons and two kilos of enemy documents captured. At 1940 hours, another contact was made with an estimated VC platoon. After a 30 minute firefight, the VC broke contact and withdrew north. Results were: one CSF soldier wounded, ten VC killed, four VC and 11 enemy weapons captured. Conversion of Ha Tion, A-405, Kien Giang Province, and Tinh Bien, A-423, Chau Doc Province, was completed with camp conversion ceremonies. The ceremonies took place at Ha Tien on 27 October, and Tinh Bien on 31 October. All camp equipment was backloaded from the camps prior to the official conversion with the exception of mission essential equipment which was transferred to MACV. Camp Bien Hung, A-404, An Kyuan Province, closed out at 0900 hours, 9 November. Seventy-two strike force and families were transferred to Company A on 30 October. The remaining personnel were transferred to To Chau where they will be integrated into the B-40 Mobile Strike Force. Mission essential equipment was hand received to the MACV team for a 60 day period. All other equipment was backloaded to Company D. During the period 30 November 1967 and 30 December 1967, an estimated reinforced company of VC armed with 60mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles, and B-40 rockets attacked the Kien Van District Headquarters.

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The friendly element returned the fire and requested air support. An armed AC-130 arrived on station at 0120 hours and placed fire on the VC positions. In total, the District Headquarters received 50 rounds of mortar and recoilless rifle fire. All firing stopped at 0630 hours with the following results: 11 RF/FF killed and seven RF/FF wounded; VC losses are unknown. On 5 December at 0100 hours, two VC platoons attacked an RF patrol supporting Kinh Quan II, A-122, Kien Tuong Province. A firefight ensued resulting in two VC killed and two VC captured. There were no friendly casualties. At 1815 hours on 5 December, an unknown size VC force attacked an RF outpost three kilometers east of Hoc Ha, Kien Tuong Province, and destroyed two bridges in the area. The action resulted in two RF killed, two RF wounded, one RF missing, and ten weapons lost. Enemy casualties were unknown. At 1130 hours on 6 December, an element of the II Corps on an operation in the vicinity of Ba Khoi, Chau Doc Province, initiated contact with a VC platoon armed with small arms and a .50 caliber machine gun. A 30 minute firefight ensued, resulting in three VC killed and one VC wounded. On 11 December, a company size operation uncovered a large ammunition cache west of Ng Phuoc Tay. On the 12th the same operation uncovered a second cache and encountered an estimated VC battalion. A 12 hour firefight ensued resulting in four USASF and nine CIDG killed, one USASF, one VNSF, and ten CIDG wounded. Enemy casualties are unknown, but estimated to be heavy. On the 11th an unknown number of VC ambushed a squad of CIDG on Phu Quoc Island, resulting in two CIDG killed, one CIDG wounded, and the loss of one M2 Carbine. The VC withdrew in sampans. A Naval craft detained one sampan and eight VC suspects believed to have been involved in this action. On the 15th an unknown number of VC ambushed a CIDG squad in a 3/4 ton truck on Phu Quoc Island resulting in four CIDG killed, two CIDG wounded and the loss of three M2 Carbines. On the 15th three companies of RF operating in the vicinity of Da engaged two VC platoons in a three hour sporadic firefight which resulted in four RF killed, two USASF and seven RF wounded. Enemy casualties were unknown, but estimated at ten VC killed. On 16 December at 2100 hours, a VC company initiated an attack on an F-13 of A-133, Binh Thanh, Kien Tuong Province, three kilometers northeast of Long Xuyen. The VC fired 30 rounds of 60mm mortar, automatic weapons and small arms. An AC-130 gunship arrived on station at 0120 hours. At 0135 hours the VC broke contact and withdrew northeast. Friendly loss was one civilian wounded. Enemy losses were three VC killed, one B-40 rocket with launcher, and one AK-47 assault rifle captured. On 20 December at 2300 hours, five to seven VC disguised as ARVN soldiers gained entrance in an ambulance to the Con Tho Airfield through the 1st Avn Br gate. At 0100 hours they moved down the parking ramp, placing grenades in parked aircraft. They were detected and fired on by airfield guards but managed to escape. This attack resulted in three UH-1D helicopters and two Air America aircraft (one Porter and one Twin Bech) totally destroyed. One C7A aircraft was damaged. On 21 December at 2230 hours, the town of Moc Hoa, Kien Tuong Province came under attack. An estimated 50 RF fired 62mm mortar, B-40 rocket, automatic weapons, and small arms fire at RF/FF positions in the town. The attack lasted 30 minutes, resulting in friendly losses of five RF/FF killed; three RF/FF and six National Police wounded; one LCVP 60% destroyed. Enemy losses were one VC killed; one pistol and one hand grenade captured. On 23 December, a canal clearing operation which consisted of one company of CSF from Vinh Gia, A-122 (VNSF), encountered two companies of VC, seven kilometers northwest of Nui Dai mountain, Chau Doc Province. A 30 minute firefight ensued at which time the VC broke contact and withdrew northwest toward Cambodia.
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Two companies of RF and two platoons of PF arrived in the area as a reaction force. 155mm howitzers from Cii Lang fired in support of the operation and air-strikes were directed against the retreating VC. A search of the area revealed 20 VC killed, one LNQ, two K-50 SMG, two L1 Carbines, one 9mm pistol, one BAR, two Chicom carbines, one B-40 rocket launcher, 15 B-40 rockets, 10 entrenching tools, two gas masks, 10 kilos of rice and a packet of assorted documents captured. Friendly units suffered three CSF soldiers and one RF soldier killed, one CSF soldier and one RF soldier wounded, and the loss of one BAR. On 20 December, a search and destroy operation which consisted of two CSF companies and two CRP's from Binh Thanh Thon, A-411, encountered one VC platoon eight kilometers east of Cai Can, Kien Tuong Province. A five minute firefight ensued at a distance of 75 meters, resulting in 15 VC killed, 10 of these confirmed, and the capture of five small arms, seven sampans, two sampan motors, one medical kit, and two kilos of documents. The friendly elements suffered one CSF soldier killed and one CSF soldier wounded. During the period 30 December 1967 and 06 January 1968, CIDG and RF/PF advised by USASF, conducted 1,369 operations and engaged in 13 contacts. Enemy losses were five killed, five captured, 23 suspects detained and 19 weapons seized. Friendly losses were two CIDG and one RF/PF killed, 14 CIDG and two RF/PF wounded. On 3 January, 66 Hoi Chans rallied and turned themselves and 11 small arms over to a platoon of CSF and two USASF from Camp Ba Xoai, A-421, Chau Doc Province. The 66 Hoi Chans are now in the ARVN Chieu Hoi channels. On 4 January, a search and destroy operation consisting of one CSF platoon and three USASF from Khan Quan II, A-412, Kien Tuong Province, initiated contact with two platoons of VC 11 kilometers west of An Baq. A ten minute firefight ensued after which the VC broke contact and fled south. This action resulted in two VC killed; two VC, two US carbines, and assorted mines and documents captured. During the period 06 January through 13 January 1968, CIDG and RF/PF units advised by USASF conducted 1,359 operations and engaged in 39 contacts. Enemy losses were six killed, three captured, three suspects detained, and one weapon seized. Friendly losses were one WSF, 12 CIDG, and nine RF/PF killed; one USASF, one WSF, 12 CIDG, and 21 RF/PF wounded; 14 RF/PF missing; and 25 weapons lost. On 6 January, a search and destroy operation consisting of two companies, two CRP's, six USASF, and three VHSF from My Phuoc Tay, A-411, Kien Tuong Province engaged two VC companies, three kilometer southeast of My Phuoc Tay. A firefight ensued at a distance of 300 meters. The engagement was supported by 155mm Howitzer from the base camp with a VR aircraft adjusting and one section of gunships placing fire on the VC positions. After a five hour firefight the friendly elements broke contact and withdrew to the base camp. The results of this operation were one WSF, 12 CIDG and one interpreter killed; eight CIDG wounded; and the loss of eleven weapons. Enemy casualties are unknown. On 8 January, the compound of Noc Hon, B-41, Kien Tuong Province and a near by ARVN artillery compound came under 82mm mortar attack by an estimated two platoons of VC. A VR aircraft was on station and in support of the camp five minutes after the attack began. Spooky arrived on station one hour and ten minutes later. The attack lasted for one hour and 10 minutes, during which time ten rounds landed inside the compound. The results of this action were one RF soldier killed; one USASF, two LCV advisors, three RF soldiers, five National Allies, and one civilian wounded. Enemy casualties are unknown. During the period 13 January through 20 January 1968, CIDG and RF/PF units advised by USASF, conducted 1,255 operations and engaged in 13 contacts. Enemy losses were nine killed and one weapon captured. Friendly losses were four USASF, one WSF, and 12 CIDG killed;
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On 16 January, a search and destroy operation consisting of two CSF companies, one CRP, four USASF, and three VNSF from My Phuoc Tay, Detachment A-411, Dinh Tuong Province, engaged an estimated 100 to 500 VC, seven kilometers southeast of My Phuoc Tay. A firefight ensued and communications were lost with the friendly elements. The engagement was supported by two platoons of gunships and nine slicks. One gunship was shot down and the crew extracted. Reaction forces were dispatched from My Phuoc Tay, A-411, and Tuyen Nhon, A-415.

On 16 January, a search and destroy operation consisting of two CSF companies, one CRP, four USASF, and three VNSF, encountered two companies of VC two kilometers north of Dan Chau. A four-hour sporic firefight ensued resulting in the VC breaking contact and withdrawing into Cambodia. This action resulted in one VC killed and one weapon captured. The friendly elements suffered two USASF and four CSF soldiers killed, one USASF, and 11 CSF soldiers wounded, and a loss of 11 weapons and three radios. On 19 January, in preparation for the construction of Camp My Dien, A-416, Dinh Tuong Province, artillery and air strikes were employed prior to the insertion of four MSF companies, 16 USASF, and four VNSF. All elements were inserted into the area on 20 January, with the support of 19 slicks and two platoons of gunships by 1055 hours. This insertion was made with no contact, VC were sighted in the area and gunships were employed. MSF personnel activated a vine which killed two MSF soldiers and wounded one MSF soldier. At 1750 hours all elements had secured a perimeter for the night defense. The results to date are: friendly, two MSF soldiers killed, and one MSF soldier wounded; enemy losses were two VC killed, numerous bunkers, houses and staging areas were destroyed; clothing, 200 pounds of medical supplies, two K-50's, 150 rounds of K-50 ammunition, 115 rounds of 60mm mortar, six sampans, 11 small mines, protective masks, and demolitions were captured. During the period 20 January thru 27 January 1968, CIDG and RF/PF units advised by USASF conducted 1,076 operations and engaged in 25 contacts. Enemy losses were 31 killed. Friendly losses were one USASF, nine CSF, and three RF/PF soldiers killed; one USASF, one VNSF, 26 CSF and three RF/PF soldiers wounded; one CIDG missing and 21 weapons lost. During the period 27 January thru 03 February 1968, CIDG and RF/PF units advised by USASF conducted 562 operations and engaged in 25 contacts. Enemy losses were 9 killed, five captured, two suspects detained, and 81 weapons captured. Friendly losses were one VNSF, one CIDG and 15 RF/PF soldiers killed; five USASF, 12 CIDG and 11 RF/PF soldiers wounded; two CIDG and one RF/PF soldier missing; and 13 weapons lost. Four MSF companies continue search and destroy operations in support of My Dien, A-416.
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Anh Tuong Province, 26 kilometers northwest of Ly Tho. The USF companies have uncovered numerous caches containing weapons, ammunition, demolitions equipment, and medical supplies. On 2 February at 0400 hours, Detachment B-41 and the city of Hoc Hoa, Kien Tuong Province, came under attack by an estimated two VC companies. Heavy fighting continued throughout the morning with sporadic firefights reported during the afternoon. Results of this action were 30 VC killed, two captured, 55 small arms and six crew served weapons captured, one RF soldier killed, one USASF and three RF soldiers wounded. On 4 February, friendly forces were encountering light sniper fire within the city. On the morning of 30 January, Detachment B-42 and the city of Chau Doc, Chau Doc Province, came under attack by an estimated 1,000 VC. The VC took the majority of the city under control. After four days of heavy fighting, heavy casualties and extensive damage to the city existed. On 2 February, the VC began to withdraw using civilians as cover. Known results at this time are 25 VC killed, 11 captured, 15 suspects detained, and 37 weapons captured. As of 4 February, sniper fire was still being encountered within the city. On the morning of 1 February, Detachment B-43 and the city of Cao Lanh, Kien Thong Province came under attack within the city. On 4 February, contact with the VC continued within the city. Results of this action are incomplete; however, friendly casualties are reported to be light. On the morning of 31 January, Detachment C-4 and the city of Can Tho, Thong Dinh Province, came under attack. Heavy fighting in the city continued until 3 February. Total results of this action are incomplete; however, known VC casualties were 113 killed, nine captured, 33 suspects detained, and 14 weapons captured. A mortar attack at the C-4 compound on 3 February resulted in three USASF wounded. The attack started a fire in the C-4 warehouse and storage yard. The fire caused extensive damage to ammunition, RCL, and lumber stored in the compound. On 4 February, the city of Can Tho was secured and friendly units were in light contact with the VC on the outer edges of the city.
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c. Special Operations.

(1) Blackjack 22A (Search and destroy Operation Boudinet) was conducted by the 27th MSF Company, Company B, Pleiku in northwest Daklak Province, II CTZ. Size of this force was 154 CIDG, six USASF, two MSF, and the Interpreter, comprising three rifle platoons, one recon platoon and a HQ Section. This operation began 15 Oct 67 and terminated 16 Nov 67. Establishing caches of supplies was one of the stated missions. Supplies were cached twice and on both occasions they remained intact. This operation was successful in capturing large quantities of enemy supplies and destroying numerous amounts of clothing, ten weapons and large amounts of munitions were captured. Friendly losses were: One USASF killed and one USASF and two CIDG wounded. Enemy losses were: 11 NVA killed and two NVA captured.

(2) A MSF Company operation originally programmed for Operation Glendale (BJ 23A) was subsequently changed to a CSF Company search and destroy operation from Detachment A-251 (Plei Djereng). The operation was composed of 132 CIDG, two VNSF, and five USASF, and was conducted in the lower Plei Trap valley of southwest Kontum Province, II CTZ. The operation, which began 9 Nov 67, was extended and the original CSF was replaced by another CSF on 28 Nov 67. The operation terminated on 13 Dec 67. The search for suspected base camps and caches at reported locations proved futile as none were located. The operation did, however, make three contacts with enemy forces which resulted in one USASF and three CIDG wounded. Enemy losses were three NVA killed and three weapons captured. It was learned that second edition maps were inaccurate regarding placement of roads, and that the CIDG Camp Strike Force soldiers were ineffective after approximately ten days. This ineffectiveness was due to lack of training and proper pay incentive for operations of this nature.

(3) Blackjack 24A (Search and Destroy Operation Glendale) was conducted by the 27th MSF Company, Company B, Pleiku in southwest Lam Dong Province. Size of this force was 118 CIDG, one VNSF, one interpreter and five USASF. This operation began 25 Nov and terminated 4 Dec. The S&D operation located a company sized enemy fortified position and found a metal box containing two million pistols. The company had one contact with enemy forces which resulted in one CIDG wounded, enemy losses were unknown. Observation made by the company during the operation; the enemy is traveling in small groups and is fortifying his areas, and the enemy feels safe enough within this area to travel by day and use lights at night. Travel in the area by other than foot traffic is limited due to density of vegetation, lack of roads, and suitable clearings for L2's.

(4) Blackjack 25A (Search and Destroy Operation Brush) was conducted by the 25th MSF Company, Company B, Pleiku. Size of this force was 150 CIDG, two VNSF and four USASF. The operation began 14 Dec and terminated on 3 Jan 68, and was conducted in vicinity of the Junction of Binh Thuan, Lam Dong and Binh Tuy.
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province along the II/III CTZ boundaries. The MSF Company was inserted into
their AO upon departure of conventional forces in a stay behind role designed to
capitalize on the enemy habit of returning to an area upon departure of convention-
al units. The company made ten enemy contacts which resulted in one USASF, one
AATT and four CIDG wounded. Enemy losses were five VC killed and five weapons

captured.

(5) Blackjack 26A (Search and Destroy Operation Hall) was conducted
by the 21st MSF company, Company B, Pleiku. Size of the force was 132 CIDG, two
VNSF, one interpreter and five USASF. The operation commenced 18 Dec and terminat-
ed on 6 Jan, and was conducted in the vicinity of Mao Chu Hi Mountains, Ninh Thuan
Province, II CTZ. Punji stakes and man traps were prevalent throughout the area of
operations and accounted for 90% of the wounds incurred during this operation. The
company made 11 enemy contacts which resulted in six USASF and six CIDG being
wounded. There were no enemy losses reported.

(6) Blackjack 27A (Search and Destroy Operation Brush II) was
conducted by the 27th MSF Company, Company B, Pleiku. Size of this force was 15C
CIDG, two VNSF and four USASF. This operation which commenced on 7 Jan 68 and
terminated on 20 Jan 68, was a follow-up operation of a previously conducted
Blackjack operation (BJ 25A) in the southwest portion of II/III CTZ. The company
made two contacts with enemy forces which resulted in one CIDG being wounded.
Enemy losses were three VC killed and five VC captured.

(7) Reconnaissance Operation Sultan I (B-52 Project Delta) was
conducted in the upper Plei Trap Valley, Kontum Province II CTZ during the period
1 Dec thru 25 Dec 67. The Task Force organization consisted of normal Hq and
communication elements, ten Recon/Roadrunner teams, three companies from the ARVN
91st Ranger Battalion, and one CIDG Nung Platoon. The forward operations base
(FOB) was located at Kontum east airstrip with the forward launch base (FLB) at
Tolei Kleng. (31) Recon/Roadrunner Team operations, and five company operations
were conducted during which numerous trail networks and enemy base camps were
located and large quantities of enemy equipment, clothing, munitions, medicine
and miscellaneous documents and letters captured. These operations made two
enemy contacts which resulted in two USASF wounded, six Rangers killed and 38
wounded and one captured. Also captured during this operations were 11 weapons.
A problem area in regard to the response time for FAC was made evident during the
operation. Although the FAC was always "on the way" the maximum speed of the air-
craft (OIF) limited it's effectiveness. It was therefore recommended that in order
to improve on response time that a faster aircraft (OIF) (OIF) be utilized, thereby
reducing the response time in most cases to half.

(8) Reconnaissance Operation Sultan II (B-52 Project Delta) was
conducted in the southwest Kontum Province of II CTZ during the period 5 Jan to
26 Jan 68. The Task Force organization was the same as the preceding operation.
The FOB was located at Plei Djereng. The Detachment conducted 33 Recon/Roadrunner
operations and four company operations locating and identifying local force VC and
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NVA units, infiltration routes and fortifications throughout the area. Quantities of enemy equipment, ammunition, miscellaneous documents, letters and a diary were captured. This operation made 15 contacts resulting in four Rangers killed, 11 wounded, and one CIDG wounded. Enemy losses were: 10 killed and two captured. Five enemy weapons were also captured.

(9) Operation RAPIDFIRE III (b-36) was conducted in Binh Tuy Province, III CTZ, near Ham Tan during the period 3-13 Nov. The operation was assigned the mission of gathering combat intelligence and developing EEI for the US 9th Infantry Division. The force, which consisted of 21 USASF, 22 LRRP personnel, and 236 MSF soldiers, conducted 11 ambush missions and employed 11 Recon teams. Three enemy contacts were made which resulted in five VC killed and two VC wounded. Two USASF were wounded and enemy weapons and various equipment and documents were captured.

(10) Operation RAPIDFIRE IV, 14 Nov - 26 Nov, with an assigned mission of interdicting enemy lines of communications and destroying enemy bases and cache sites, was conducted by B-36 in Binh Duong and Long Khanh Province, III CTZ. 35 USASF, 20 LRRP personnel, and 236 MSF soldiers operating from the FOB located at the Phuoc Vinh airfield conducted 26 Recon/Ambush missions. 16 contacts with the enemy resulted in four USASF killed, one CIDG killed, seven USASF and 18 CIDG wounded. Enemy losses were 16 VC killed and four weapons, and numerous documents and equipment captured which resulted in the identification of two major enemy units. 30,000 lbs of rice and 390 pairs of sandals were destroyed. One battalion sized enemy base camp was destroyed.

(11) Operation RAPIDFIRE V was conducted from 8 Dec through 25 Jan 68 in northern and western war zone "C" in conjunction with the 25th US Infantry Division Operation "YELLOWSTONE". On 12 December, RFV was forced to stand down due to elements of the 25th Infantry Division conducting operations within the AO. The operation resumed on 29 December. Forty Recon/Ambush missions and four company operations were conducted. Enemy losses were 53 killed and five VC captured. Seven weapons and numerous documents and equipment were captured. Friendly losses were two USASF, one US LRRP, and four CIDG killed, 10 USASF and 27 CIDG wounded.
d. Training.

(1) MACV Recondo School

(a) General:

1. Average assigned and attached strengths were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>ATCH OFF</th>
<th>ATCH EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1 Aust 1 ROK</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1 Aust 2 ROK</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1 Aust 2 ROK</td>
<td>1 ROK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. During this reporting period, the MACV Recondo School received students for the two-week LRP classes: LRP 2-68 thru LRP 4-68. The three week Recondo School course was resumed on 4 Dec 67 with Class R-7-68. Classes R-7-68 thru R-7-68 have graduated and Class R-10-68 will graduate on 3 Feb 68. Following is a breakdown of students for the LRP classes and Recondo Classes by unit and Corps area:

**LRP Classes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Entr</th>
<th>Drpd</th>
<th>Comp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>I FFV LRP Co</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II FFV LRP Co</td>
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<td>126</td>
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**Recondo Classes**

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<th>Comp</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americal Div</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd MAF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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**II Corps**

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<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Cav Div</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK Forces V</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
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**III Corps**

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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Div</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Abn Div</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199th Lt Inf Bde</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th ACR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I PHIL CAGV</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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IV Corps

9th Inf Div 27 2 10 0
Royal Thai Army 32 13 19 0

NOTE: Class R-11-68 commenced training 29 Jan 68.

2. The normal mission of the MACV Recondo School is to train selected personnel from US/Thai units in specialized techniques and skills necessary to conduct successful long range reconnaissance operations in the Republic of South Vietnam.

(b) Intelligence: None

(c) Operations and Training Activities:

1. Plans: N/A

2. Operations:

   a. Number/type operation conducted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># Day</th>
<th># Night</th>
<th>Recondo</th>
<th>CIDG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Attacks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Blocking Actions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Escort Action</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Combat Patrols</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Recon Patrols</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Ambushes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

b. Number of friendly initiated contacts: None

c. VC Losses (Confirmed):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Captured</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Suspects</th>
<th>Weapons</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>(4)</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USASF</th>
<th>RECONDO STD</th>
<th>CIDG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2. Training: Recondo classes receive a 286.5 hour POI. LRP special classes received a 331.5 hour POI.

4. Logistics: The MACV Recondo School is supported administratively and logistically by the 1st Logistical Command.

(2) VNSF Training Center, Dong Ba Thin

(a) General: During the reporting period this detachment has successfully accomplished its mission of providing advice and support to the VNSF Training Center in training VNSF and CIDO personnel, and also its mission of providing advice and support to the assigned Camp Strike Force in combat operations, training, and local security. Considerable gains were made in the areas of training support rendered, increased combat operations, and CA/PO activities, and noticeable improvement was achieved in camp facilities, both for USASF and CIDO personnel.

(b) Personnel Strengths:

1. Detachment B-51 - Authorized: 9 Off 19 EM
   Assigned: 11 Off 23 EM

2. VNSF Training Center - Authorized: 49 OFF 231 EM
   Assigned: 34 OFF 168 EM

3. Camp Strike Force - Authorized: 446
   Assigned: 440

(c) Intelligence: In coordination with VNSF counterparts a new intelligence net was initiated, and intelligence gathering was increased as a result of closer coordination activities with all RVN and Allied Forces in the vicinity of this camp.

(d) Operations and Training:

1. Operations: Combat operations during the reporting period were increased in frequency and size within the assigned TAOR. Field Training Exercises inherent in the varied courses trained at the Training Center were conducted in conjunction with Camp Strike Force operations, giving them a more realistic setting and contributing to a more effective overall operational program.

2. Training:

   (a) This quarter has seen a great many improvements in the performance of the mission of advising the VNSF Training Center at Dong Ba Thin.
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With the augmentation of the detachment with select personnel we have been able to directly counteract the center's instructional committees. Being able to have direct contact at this low a level has enabled us to gain a spirit of daily contact and cooperation. Problems are immediately obvious, allowing for prompt solution by the USASF at this level or the prompt notification of the Training Center Advisor for further advice, guidance, or assistance. A great deal of work has been done to improve the Center's training facilities. Improvement of facilities has shown our counterparts that we are sincere in our desires to help. Utilization of other units in the area to lend assistance has proven to be a great source of help both in material and equipment. One example is the use of the USAECV (P) equipment school to level, enlarge and clear our drop zone area. The use of bulldozers, road graders, and 290 belly dumps even by engineer students has really provided us with a Class "A" drop zone and given the engineer school a much needed practice area. (See photographs, enclosure #11).

b. Courses graduated or in progress during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VNSF Recruit #7</td>
<td>25 Oct</td>
<td>13 Jan</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNSF Basic Off &amp; NCO #11</td>
<td>25 Sep</td>
<td>18 Dec</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG Leaders #28</td>
<td>3 Nov</td>
<td>9 Dec</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG Leaders #29</td>
<td>15 Dec</td>
<td>22 Jan</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRP #26</td>
<td>6 Nov</td>
<td>11 Dec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRP #27</td>
<td>26 Dec</td>
<td>25 Jan</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNSF BAC #2</td>
<td>6 Nov</td>
<td>4 Dec</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US/Mobile Reaction Force #8</td>
<td>4 Dec</td>
<td>17 Dec</td>
<td>11/35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karate #2</td>
<td>17 Jul</td>
<td>16 Dec</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNSF RTO</td>
<td>20 Nov</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Logistics: Normal activity continued throughout quarter.

(f) Civil Affairs: One officer and one NCO were permanently assigned with sole responsibility of CA/PO activities. Main highlight in reporting period was the completion and opening of a Catholic Church within the camp confines. Also a school building was completed at Hoc Gia hamlet which will soon open.

(3) USASF Replacement Training.

(a) During the reporting period classes were conducted for all USASF replacement personnel to familiarize them with staff support in the SFOB, USASF advisor relationships, mines and booby traps and firing of assigned weapons.

(b) Breakdown of classes are as follows: Inprocessing (S1), Finance, Dispensary, Motor Pool, CIDG Funds, S1 briefing, S1 briefing, S5 briefing, S3 briefing, Mess Association, Lessons Learned, Mines and Booby traps, Surgeons briefing, Communications, RDGA, JAG, Chaplain, Weapons, S2 briefing, USASF advisor relationships and air support.
During the reporting period 151 officers and 857 enlisted personnel were processed through replacement detachment.

(a) During the reporting period 151 officers and 857 enlisted personnel were processed through replacement detachment.

(b) CIDO Recruit Training.

(a) The III CTZ Training Center at Trang Sup Det A-301 continues the CIDG recruit training (basic) mission. CIDG trainees are transported to their assigned camps after receiving comprehensive training in small arms, crew served weapons, small unit tactics, live firing, care and cleaning of individual weapons. Emphasis is placed on QT type training involving VC ambush techniques, the use of claymore mines, combat patrolling and Airmobile operations. Before graduation, recruits participate in at least one three-day combat operation.

(b) A CIDG company-size refresher training program has been established at each A Detachment camp in III CTZ. This refresher training program consists of a 6 day 24 hour block of instruction presented to each CIDG company once per month. The training involves the following blocks of instruction:

1. Live firing of individual and crew served weapons.
2. Compass and map reading
3. Immediate action drill and counter ambush techniques.
4. Grenade throwing and employment of claymore mines.
5. Patrolling, raids and ambushes.
6. Small unit tactics.
7. Establishing an patrol base.

The Refresher Training Program has met with varying degrees of success depending on how receptive, enthusiastic, and aggressive the VNSF camp commander and VNSF detachment has executed and carried out the training program and how closely the USASF Det has monitored and supervised the training in their respective camps.

(c) The Phu Quoc Island Training center, IV CTZ, has completed training of four companies (473 recruits) which have been deployed to camp My Dinh II (A-416).

(d) Training was completed for crews of four 75mm pack howitzers by the 7th ARVN Div in IV Corps. The howitzers were deployed to Detachments A-413 and A-415 during the last week in December. Training courses for airboat drivers, crews and maintenance personnel were conducted at Moc Hoa and Cao Lanh airboat facilities.
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e. Aviation: During the period of October through December of 1967, aviation operations included several emergency resupplies, throughout the Republic of Vietnam and several combat assault operations flown in support of the Installation Defense Command. The aviation office has three separate functions. These functions are handled by three separate officers and the activities conducted by each, during this period of time, will be discussed individually.

(1) The Air Force Liaison officer (ALO) has done all of the planning and coordination for forward air controller (FAC) and tactical air support for detachments B-52, detachment B-50, and Company "E" of the 20th Infantry. This entails setting up tactical air control points at each of the unit FOB's. The FAC pilots, communications personnel, and aircraft are assigned to the unit concerned and live at the FOB with the Special Forces personnel.

(2) The Tactic Airlift Liaison officer (TALO) has done all of the coordinating and scheduling of lift aircraft for normal operations. He has also coordinated and made all arrangements for emergency resupplies, combat essential airlifts, and tactical emergency airlifts. During this reporting period (normal airlift) there was a total of 5,861,000 pounds moved by airlift from the 5th SFDA LSC to various parts of the RVN. Of this total 4,300,400 pounds were air-landed and 5,818,000 pounds were air-dropped.

(3) The 5th SFDA Aviation officer coordinated and scheduled all U.S. Army Aviation in support of 5th SFDA. During this period of time it was realized that additional U.S. Army Aviation support would have to be made available to the Installation Defense Command (IDC). As of this date no aircraft have been allocated to the IDC; however, on a tactical emergency request, aircraft are usually on station within thirty (30) minutes after the request is received.

f. Combat Developments: See inclosure number four (4) for a summary of all projects currently under evaluation.
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4. (c) Logistics:

a. General: From 1 November 1967 through 31 January 1968, the Logistical Support Center continued to provide the 5th Special Forces Group's widely dispersed companies and detachments with all classes of supply and up to limited depot maintenance. Over 10,000 tons of supplies were delivered by the LSC to supported units. Over 2,000 tons of food, clothing, ammunition and general supplies were air dropped by the Logistical Supported Center to isolated camps and special operations.

b. Supply (LSC):

(1) The mid-year budget review was conducted with representatives from the Counter Insurgency Support Office, S-3, Signal Office, S-4, Staff Engineer, and Comptroller sections.

(2) A complete inventory of all warehouses was conducted.

c. Maintenance: A satisfactory program of preventive maintenance and a procedure for requesting and storing repair parts was found to be lacking in some units. A mobile maintenance team was organized at Group Level for the purpose of assisting units with all aspects of their maintenance program. Although this team is programmed by schedule, the actual time spent in a unit is determined by the unit's needs for assistance.

d. Movements and Storage (LSC):

(1) An additional lumber storage facility was renovated.

(2) Construction of a new berm and ammunition storage ready line has been started.

e. Company A:

(1) General: The forward Supply Point of Company A shipped an all time high in cargo and material with the tonnage increasing monthly. During November, December, and January 5,385,476 lbs, 6,398,126 lbs, and 7,306,740 lbs were shipped respectively. Camp construction in III CTZ accounted for the increased tonnage.

(2) On 20 November 1967 a special release was obtained from USARV for 5,000 sheets of M8A1 airfield matting to be used in the opening of Duc Hue, Detachment A-351. This item was essential to the engineers in order for them to start construction on the new A-site. All materials for A-351 were stockpiled at Duc Hoa Detachment B-35, further broken down and airlifted to the new site by CH-47 helicopters. All materials were stockpiled prior to 1 December. Buildings were prepared at Long Binh Post, transported to Duc Hue. Riggers and forklifts with operators were attached to B-35 to assist them in the movement of materials to the new camp.

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Supplies and equipment were moved to Duc Hue utilizing Company A's organic transportation.

(3) Movement of materials to Tay Ninh, Detachment B-32, for use in construction of the camp at Thien Ngon began on 24 November. The total pre-stocked was moved by the 8th of December by convoy and CH-47. Riggers and forklifts were furnished to detachment B-32.

(4) On 15 December the forward supply point began sending convoys to Hon Quan with materials for a new B Detachment site. This marked the first convoy from Company A to Detachment B-33 in Hon Quan. Convoys over the last two months saved the government considerably by reducing the number of sorties flown and releasing aircraft for higher priority missions.

(5) In January material was moved to Tay Ninh Detachment B-32 for the construction of a new camp at Katum and stockpiled at the 588th Engineer Battalion storage area.

(1) General: During the quarter the Company D forward supply point handled over seven million pounds of supplies. Over three and one half million pounds were shipped to subordinate detachments. Breakdown of supplies handled follows:

| Total supplies handled: | 7,190,434 |
| Total supplies received: | 3,501,902 |
| Total supplies shipped to detachments: | 3,688,532 |
| Total shipped by air: | 3,592,010 |
| Total air landed: | 2,662,173 |
| Total air dropped: | 876,545 |
| Total Lolex: | 52,942 |

(2) Supply handling totals for the past quarter show that 186,630 pounds more supplies were shipped from the forward supply point than were received. These figures do not reflect the quantities of due outs that were on hand. Many detachments at the end of the quarter were down to basic loads in ammunition and have minimal stocks of rations. Also barrier materials were non-existent. All of these are bulk items which cannot be economically hauled in quantity by aircraft. There is a requirement for at least one LST or similar beach landing vessel to deliver supplies to Can Tho each month.
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5. (U) Revolutionary Development Support Activities

a. I CTZ

(1) During November the resettlement of Tra Trung Hamlet in Tra Bong District continued with USASF supporting the construction of the new hamlet. Refugees have started to move into the safe area around Camp Gia Vuc stating they are leaving the contested area because of heavy VC taxation. The people are bringing their rice harvest with them to put in the rice storage areas that have proven very successful in Gia Vuc. A total of 10,480 pounds of CIVAC supplies were airlifted to support the move of the villagers from Mong-Gia to Gia Vuc. Two CA/PO conferences were held this month. The first was at Company C for all "A" detachment CA/PO officers, at this meeting the S5 staff presented a program designated to update old information and answer questions from newly assigned CA/PO officers. The second meeting was held at Quang-Ngai with all the CA/PO personnel in the province receiving a briefing at Sector Headquarters. The meeting was attended by personnel from CONUS and MACV as well as CA/PO personnel. It was designed so that sector personnel and USASF personnel could obtain a better understanding of the relationship that exists between district and province and their respective advisors. Following the briefing USASF CA/PO officers discussed problems peculiar to each district and possible solutions that could work if help from province was provided. The meeting has resulted in a better working relationship between sector and sub-sector advisors.

(2) The Civic Action effort in I CTZ during December was highlighted by immediate reaction to disasters and refugee influxes. The hamlet of Ba Lang, located east of Camp Ba To, lost its entire rice harvest. Within twenty-four hours of the disaster enough foodstuffs were airlifted to Ba To to insure the people would have enough food to eat until the next crop was harvested. Food and clothing were also provided within twenty-four hours of the arrival of 175 refugees at Camp Tien Phuoc. The refugees were a result of an operation conducted by this camp. At Camp Gia Vuc the Vietnamese Special Forces have begun a program of instruction in the Vietnamese language. This is indicative of the increase in participation the VSF are giving Civic Action programs at this location. Also at Gia Vuc a new school was completed in Hamlet C. The people of the village provided the labor for construction of the building. Shortly after completion of the structure a ceremony was held. Dinner was provided followed by entertainment. Education Officials from provincial and national level were present. This school will enable sixty children to begin their education. Greater airlift capability has been achieved through the cooperation of the 1st Marine Air Wing. This unit is supporting the Special Forces movement of CA commodities with its CH-53 helicopters. The total amount of Civic Action supplies shipped during this month was 78,829 pounds.
(3) In January highway #4 from Danang to the Special Forces Camp at Thuong Duc was opened. While a convoy was being organized, the enemy again blow out one of the bridges. On 6 January, the bridge was repaired and local security set up. On 9 January, an integrated venture between the VNSF and USASF was started and resulted in the first convoy into Thuong Duc in eight years. Approximately 10,000 Tet gifts of clothing, candy, and toys were distributed to the population in or near our "A" camps throughout II CTZ. Each camp also had a dragon costume to do the traditional Tet dragon dance during the ceremonies. Prior to Tet, a survey was conducted at each "A" camp to ascertain what food items the population desired for the Tet celebration. The people desired special jams, jellies, and various fruits which could not be obtained in the various villages. Approximately 4,300 lbs of these commodities were also distributed. Construction was started on a new CA warehouse for use at the "C" team. The building will have a loading dock at each end and it is expected to be completed by the end of February. On 23 January, the enemy situation at the Special Forces Camp at Lang Vei was critical. The enemy was burning down villages and others were being abandoned due to fear of the enemy. On 25 January, a flow of refugees was pouring into the area around the camp. Due to the lack of aircraft and the enemy situation, evacuation was impossible. By the morning of the 26th over 7,000 people had moved into the area just northeast of the camp. The S5 section was working with CORPS and III MAF to bring all available aid to the people but very little supplies were on hand. 95% of the supplies came from Company C. By 1300 hours on the 26th, the start of a massive air drop was in progress. In 36 hours 25,500 lbs of rice, 2,200 lbs of salt, 54,000 PIR rations, 250 lbs of milk, and EDCP supplies were air dropped into the area. On 27 January, a VC element moved to the edge of the Ha Thanh's safe area and burned down a village creating 1500 more refugees. Food and supplies were moved by C7A on the 28th and 29th of January for these people.
b. II CTZ

(1) In November the newly constructed civic action supply warehouse at Company B, Pleiku was stocked. In the past request for civic action supplies have had to be forwarded to Detachment B-55 in Saigon. This procedure has caused unavoidable delays before the commodities arrived at the requesting detachment. Under the new system, the supplies will be shipped directly from the company warehouse to the detachments. Restocking of the company warehouse will be accomplished through Detachment B-55 supply channels. It is anticipated that this new system will cut delivery time to a minimum.

Detachments B-22, B-23, and B-51 each received a new SS officer this month. The addition of these three officers should greatly improve the effectiveness of the civic action progress at their assigned detachments; however, primary duty CA personnel are still required throughout the CTZ. An increase of 500 refugees this month has accounted for a step-up in construction, and distribution of clothing, commodities, and other materials, as well as additional MEDCAPs to meet the health and sanitation needs of the refugees. The greatest increase of refugees was at Detachment B-24, Kontum. Continuing projects accounted for much of the effort throughout the CTZ this month. Camps that are to be closed or converted are placing emphasis on the completion of current projects. Planning also has begun at most of the detachments for the Christmas/Tet holidays.

(2) In December the Civic Action effort in II CTZ was highlighted by the cooperation exhibited between VNSF and US:SF at all levels for the Christmas program. Approximately 20,000 Christmas packages were distributed among all "B" and "A" detachments. The main groups that received the gifts were the dependents of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) and VNSF. In the Iha Tang area approximately 5,500 gifts were distributed. This was highlighted by a party attended by about 1,000 children. At the party, ice cream, liquid refreshments, cookies, and rum were distributed. A mock-up of a locomotive with train cars was made. This provided rides for the children. At Kontum, B-24, gifts were also distributed to two orphanages, one hospital, and the Leprosarium. At Trung Dung, A-502, a total of 7,500 gifts were distributed at two Christmas parties. The gift packages that were distributed in II CTZ were composed of children's clothes, toys, and candy. All programs were well received and a great psychological impact was made.

At Dak Pek, A-242, a camp rifle competition was sponsored by the VNSF. Teams from the five CIDG companies, two special platoons, and a team each from the VNSF and US:SF entered the competition. The 205th CIDG company won both team and high individual honors. The winning team hosted a party for the runners-up. This has contributed significantly to an increase of morale for the CIDG. Bonds of friendship, respect, and cooperation were forged among all personnel. The CA Logistical Center at Saigon, B-55, has filled approximately 80% of the initial supply requests for Company B's warehouse. The strike at Air America seriously hampered further shipments. The low
priority afforded Civic Action supplies on military aircraft continues to be a serious problem, especially when Air America aircraft are not available.

(3) As a result of the joint POLWAR conference held in Nha Trang in January, the VNSF S-5 counterpart at Company B began plans for a corps level POLWAR training program. On 28 January 19 Camp Strike Force (POLWAR) students from all of the major tribal groups in II CTZ began three months of training at the Da Nang Agriculture Center. Upon completion these men will return to their home camp and instruct others in agriculture and animal husbandry. As a result of the increased enemy activity during the Tet holidays, much of the civic action activity in the latter part of January centered on refugee aid and resettlement, HE/DE/CAPs and distribution of commodities at all levels.

c. III CTZ

(1) At Hiep Hoa, A-351, the CA effort that took place in November was centered primarily on HE/DE/CAPs. Detachment A-351 in coordination with the 2/27 Infantry, 25th Infantry Division treated 450 patients during four (4) joint HE/DE/CAPs. The HE/DE/CAPs were conducted to allow the doctors and medics to examine the patients on a weekly basis. Trang Sup, A-301, is presently in the planning stage for construction of three classrooms, a hamlet chief's office, and wells for the village and market place. Their Civic Action program is gaining tremendous local support, especially after the completion of the Trang Sup market-place. The local villagers are enthusiastic about the CA team and are offering a variety of ideas for social and economic improvement. At Loc Ninh, A-331, CIDG dependents were evacuated by C-130 aircraft to Bien Hoa to protect them from exploitation by enemy forces in the Loc Ninh area. As a result of the attack on Loc Ninh, many refugees went to Hon Quan, 3-33. They were welcomed by Hon Quan district representatives and their basic needs were provided for through all agencies concerned. At Chi Lang, A-32, the recently trained CIDG POLWAR Squads are being used to conduct POLWAR and Civic Action activities at all the "A" camps.

(2) In December, the 16 man POLWAR teams in all "A" camps continued to receive training from the three members of each team that attended the POLWAR course at Co A, Bien Hoa. At Chi Linh, A-333, refugee families came into the safe area. Support was provided in helping the refugees to resettle and build homes in the new village. In Hiep Hoa, A-351, assistance was given to the District Education system by the distribution of over 500 school kits in the hamlets of Hiep Hoa, La Coe, and Tan Ky. Domestic assistance was also provided by the distribution of 50 kitchen utensil sets. At Minh Thanh, A-332, emphasis was placed on the agricultural and personal hygiene programs. Maximum cooperation was received from the village chief and his people. At Tran Sup, A-301, construction was completed this month on three classrooms and a Cao Dai Temple. This has created a favorable psychological impact on the refugees and population in the area. At Chi Lang, A-32, during December, civic action centered around an
orphanage and the Christmas program. Gift distribution was made to CIDG dependents, children at the orphanage, personnel of the Province Chieu Hai Center, and patients in the local US and RVN hospitals. The total distribution was in excess of 4,000 gifts. At Tra Cu, A-352, Civic Action activities during this reporting period consisted of planning for the CIDG Strike Force dayroom, providing medical treatment for the dependents of the camp's troops, distribution of health kits, sewing kits, and fishing kits. School kits were also given to the children attending the CIDG dependent school. A Christmas party was held at all detachments. Priority for the distribution of gifts was given to the dependents of the CIDG.

(3) On 6 Jan 68, Company A's FOLWAR Team was divided into two 8-man sections, one going to Det A-344, Bunard, and the other going to Det A-331, Loc Ninh. The sections were sent to these locations for the purpose of training and aiding the FOLWAR Teams presently at each location. The two sections stayed at Bunard and Loc Ninh for a period of ten days. During that time they instructed the CIDG dependents in personal hygiene and sanitation and discussed the present war situation with the CIDG soldiers. The CIDG soldiers and their dependents were taught patriotic songs. At Bunard, the FOLWAR Team band provided daily entertainment for the benefit of the local villagers, the CIDG soldiers and their dependents. They also helped the Bunard villagers rebuild their dam and several bunkers. On 27 Jan 68, a MEDCAP from Company A was sent to Det B-36's location at Long Hai, Phuoc Tuy Province, at the request of the CIDG Officer for Det B-36. The MEDCAP was conducted jointly by VNSF and USSF medics with the purpose of giving the Long Hai villagers a more favorable impression of the GVN and showing them what the GVN can do for them. During the MEDCAP, over 300 civilians were given medical and dental attention. Also on 27 Jan 68, a Tet party was held in the C-3 Compound for the dependents of the CIDG and VNSF personnel. Each child received a small gift of candy, soap, chewing gum, and clothing and each family received one can of cooking oil. As a result of a meeting between Det B-34/3-14's and the schoolmaster of Tu Hien Primary School it was found that the students lacked school kits and the necessary primary school books. These items were obtained and on 5 January 450 school kits and 100 sats of primary school books were presented to the school children. The schoolmaster was also interested in having a sick call program for the children. A weekly sick call was initiated on 6 January. Once weekly the US and VNSF medics conduct sick call at the school and administer malaria prophylaxis to each child. An immunization day was set for 5 February. The MEDCAP program has been expanded to include weekly sick call at Tu Hien II and Son Truong I hamlets. Eleven MEDCAP patrols were conducted in these hamlets during the reporting period and intelligence information given to the medics during the conduct of these patrols. The arrival and performances of the Civic Action Drama Team during January highlighted the Civic Action Program at Det A-343, Due Phong.
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d. IV CTZ

(1) On 19 November, a ceremony was held to commemorate the opening of the new school at Ba Xoai. For this ceremony a special recorded broadcast was made by a Cambodian Buddhist monk. The tape thanked the GVN and VNSF for aiding in the building effort. After the ceremony, a C-130 aircraft flew over broadcasting the same message in order to reach a greater portion of the population. The mission of the exploitation was to cement the relationship between the VNSF, GVN and the local ethnic Cambodian population.

(2) In November, Det A-413 (BTT) captured members of the VC 263rd RF Bn. The PV's were brought into Company D where they were interviewed for intelligence and PSYOPS purposes. One PV wrote a leaflet and made two tapes directed at other members of the 263rd Bn.

(3) In January, 99 NEDCAP patrols were conducted and 15,791 handouts, 74,155 newspapers, 6,250 pamphlets and 8,080 posters were distributed. A total of 311 movies were shown at 61 locations to approximately 40,520 people. Approximately 7,925,000 leaflets were distributed of which 6,563,000 were delivered from aircraft. Fifteen rallies and lectures were held and attended by 1,590 people. Psychological operations and face-to-face discussions with the leaders by Detachment A-421 resulted in the return of 150 KKK Cambodian soldiers through the Chieu Hoi program.

6. (U) PSYOPS

a. I CTZ

(1) The most significant incident resulting from the use of Psychological Operations in I CTZ during the month of November was the increase of Hoi Chanh. In three cases the information gained from the Hoi Chanh was considered reliable enough to exploit fully. The primary media used for exploitation were leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts. Interrogation has revealed that the best time to make loudspeaker appeals is between 1800-2000 hours, which is the time that the Viet Cong hold their propaganda meetings.

(2) An operation conducted on 21 December at Tien Phuoc was a combined military and PSYOPS operation. With the ground forces were a loudspeaker team and an armed propaganda team from the 211th PSYOPS Company. In conjunction with ground operations, aerial loudspeaker and leaflet flights were conducted. The people were urged to move to the safe area and Chieu Hoi appeals were made. As a result, three Hoi Chanh and 203 refugees moved into the safe area. On 25 December, three NVA rallied at Tho Duc. Within 45
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Minutes after the camp notified the A team, an O2B aircraft was over the target making an appeal to the enemy in the area to rally. On 27 December, this same camp spotted small groups of NVA moving in the same area. Within two hours a tape was cut at the C team and was broadcast over the area.

(3) During the month of January, 109 MEDCAPs were conducted. Approximately 21,800 people were treated during these MEDCAPs. Face-to-face propaganda was conducted with the themes of supporting GVN and of reporting to authorities all VC and NVA activities. PSYOP publication material distributed during the month of January was as follows: 2,000 magazines, 2,350 newspapers, 13,700 pamphlets, and 2,510 posters. Approximately 24,105,600 leaflets were disseminated of which 55,600 were distributed by hand. Twenty-one and one half hours of loudspeaker operations were conducted. All themes followed the JUSPAO guidelines distributed for the Tet period.

b. II CTZ

(1) Psychological operations have been very effective during November as indicated by the increase in the number of Hoi Chanh who returned to the GVN. One of the contributing factors of this increase was the immediate use of Hoi Chanh as a propaganda vehicle. Planning was begun to exploit the Christmas and Tet Holidays. Construction of a joint war monument to all soldiers killed from Detachment A-237 was begun in the town of Luong Son. This monument will serve as an example of the sacrifices made by all Vietnamese during the war.

(2) During December, 49 hours of aircraft and loudspeaker missions were flown and 4,062,450 leaflets were dropped throughout the Corps area. A total of 338 hours of ground loudspeaker operations were also conducted and 52,600 leaflets were disseminated by hand during these operations. These PSYOP missions resulted in a total of 21 Hoi Chanh for the month of December.

(3) PSYOPS activities during January were again highlighted by the effective dissemination of leaflets and timely broadcasts of taped appeals to Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units. Airborne missions accounted for the dissemination of 3,106,800 leaflets and 30,5 hours of loudspeaker operations. On the ground 30,660 leaflets and 334,2 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts were made in conjunction with combat operations. Returnees during this reporting period totaled 20. Eleven of these Hoi Chanh reported that leaflets had caused them to return to the GVN, while eight attributed their return to loudspeaker operations. The continuing success of the psyops program in II CTZ may be attributed to the rapid filling of requests for airborne missions. During January, eight missions were requested and seven missions were flown.
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c. III CTZ

(1) On 15 November, four local Montagnard Viet Cong, which included one squad leader, rallied to district headquarters. The Hoi Chanh brought their rifles with them. The squad leader made a tape asking the rest of his squad to rally and the tape was played from a U-10 aircraft.

(2) At Chi Lang, B-32, the number of personnel to Chieu Hoi increased by 30% from November and was a result of the extensive loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops. At Bu Dop, Detachment A-341, Christmas gifts and clothing were distributed to the CIDG dependents and the inhabitants of Bu Dop hamlet. This was a timely morale booster since it followed numerous attacks on the camp earlier in the month. The result was a favorable psychological impact on the CIDG troops and population in the area.

(3) During January, 33 EDCAP's were conducted with approximately 6,600 persons receiving its benefits. Throughout III CTZ approximately 61 medical aids were trained and is expected to contribute greatly to medical and health and sanitation programs presently being conducted in this Corps.

(4) The following numbers of PSYOP periodicals were distributed: 4,400 magazines, 5,640 newspapers, and 71 posters. There were 7,165,500 distributed by air. Sixty-eight hours of loudspeaker operations were conducted of which 37 hours were conducted on the ground. Company A focused the majority of its PSYOPS support in January on Det B-36's Operation YELLOWSTONE which ended on 25 Jan 68. During this operation 14 PSYOP missions were flown against the NVA and VC units in Det B-36's TCFO for a total of 6,442,000 leaflets air-dropped and 45 minutes of aerial broadcast time. Themes employed were Chieu Hoi, Ask the People, What does Chieu Hoi mean to the NVA soldier, Weapons, Reward, Scare, and Chieu Hoi Tet themes. Tet themes were employed after 1 Jan 68 to exploit the enemy's desire to return home for the Tet season.

d. IV CTZ

(1) In November, Detachment A-421, Ba Xoai, with support from the Company D Engineer detachment, repaired the road from Ba Xoai to Doc Hoac in Chau Doc Province, making it negotiable to all pedestrian and vehicle traffic. On 19 November 1967, the Ba Xoai school was officially opened by religious, military, and GVN district officials. Two days prior to the official opening, clothing, school kits, and classroom charts were distributed to the school children. On opening day District distributed candy and health kits to the children. Detachment B-43, Cao Lanh, provincial refugee cadre made a preliminary visit to My An District to register refugees.
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This enabled the refugees to receive support under the GVN refugee program. Previously they had been supported largely through US channels. Sixty-five claims were processed under the HILCAP program in November. The significant factor about this is that the claims were for damages that occurred approximately one month prior. Up to 18 months were previously required for the processing of these claims. At Detachment A-431, Cai Cai, desk tops for the camp administrative office were constructed from discarded ammunition boxes by the Camp Strike Force POLWAR Squad. On 24 November the US/SF Executive Officer of the detachment and his VNSF counterpart visited Ap Choi Ho and discussed with the people their needs. It was decided a school for the 200 plus village children was needed. A site was selected and plans were made for construction.

(2) In December at Binh Thanh Then, over 400 people turned out to work on repairing the road from District Headquarters to Binh Thanh Then which was damaged by the annual floods. Through this display of community spirit, the road is once again fully operational. A trash removal project was also completed at Binh Thanh Then. A sanitation cart now goes around the village three times a week collecting garbage and has increased the health and sanitation of the village considerably. A public theater was constructed at Long Khot. The theater is opened to all civilian and military personnel in the area. At Chau Doc, A-42, an animal husbandry program was instituted. A ten month old Duroc boar was purchased along with three younger boars and eleven young sows. A large swine herd is expected in the future with a goal of establishing a source of meat for the populace. At Thooc Thoi, A-432, progress was made in developing a functioning civil government. Responsibilities for maintenance of various public facilities were previously never fixed. As a result, when the village water pump broke down, no one fixed it because no agency was given the responsibility for its maintenance. The CA/PO Officer at this location explained to the District Chief the necessity of assigning responsibilities to the various civil elements. The Government has now learned the importance of assigning responsibilities to its offices.

(3) During January, the people of Kien Phong Province displayed their appreciation for the support rendered by Detachment A-43A in the operation of the public theater at Long Khot. They donated 96000VN to purchase musical instruments and to support needy families. On 23 January in Cao Lanh (B-43), 539 war victims were given cooking oil, bulgur wheat, clothing and school kits during the "Spring of Trous annual ceremony."
7. **Personnel and Administration**

   a. **Command Strength** - The following figures represent the assigned and attached strength of the Group for the reporting period:

   (1) At the beginning of the reporting period:

   | OFF  | 594 |
   | WO   | 27  |
   | EM   | 2629 |
   |
   |       |     |
   |       |     |
   |       | SUM | 3250 |

   (2) At the end of the reporting period:

   | OFF  | 577 |
   | WO   | 23  |
   | EM   | 2800 |
   |
   |       |     |
   |       |     |
   |       | SUM | 3400 |

   b. Accounts with St. Louis, Baltimore, and Japan for pinpoint distribution have been established for the Group Headquarters. Noticeable improvement in the ability of the command to maintain regulation reference sets and provide sufficient supplies of forms will not occur until all companies have established their own accounts.

   c. Recent acquisition of two multilith machines and five 3M photocopiers will greatly improve the quality of the Group's reproduction capabilities as soon as the Group obtains necessary supplies to operate the machines on a continuous basis.

   d. **Awards and Decorations**: The following awards and decorations were approved during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier's Medal</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (V)</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (V)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal (V)</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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AWARD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart *</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Medical Badge</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Infantry Badge</td>
<td>604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese Awards</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other US Awards (for non-Special Forces personnel)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NOTE: Does not include Purple Hearts awarded by hospitals.


e. Judge Advocate Section:

(1) The function of the SJA has been expanded to include a Foreign Claims Commission. This means that along with authorization for approving personal claims against the Government by U.S. personnel up to $500.00, the SJA can also approve claims against the Government by Vietnamese or other foreign nationals up to $1000.00. This Foreign Claims Commission includes not only 5th Special Forces Group's Foreign Claims but Foreign Claims for all units of I Field Force Vietnam as well.

(2) Reference Summary Court Jurisdiction down to commanders at the C Detachment level: Since 5th Group Regulation 27-1 delegated jurisdiction down to the C Detachment level, two C Detachments have used it. Increased coordination between SJA and Admin Supervisors for C Detachments will be necessary to insure proper preparation of records of trial and publishing of appointing and promulgating orders.

f. A&R and Special Services:

(1) The Special Services program has expanded its facilities with the addition of a regulation tennis court, adding a roof to the handball court and construction of horseshoe pits. Current plans center around initiating a photo-lab dark room and a sun bathing area.

(2) The supply of athletic equipment has been replenished by obtaining more softballs, bats, basketballs, handball gloves, hardballs, tennis rackets and tennis balls.

g. The Civilian Personnel Office has initiated a study of the Group's Civilian Personnel. The main areas to be covered are the justification of positions requiring civilians and possible areas of reduction of civilian personnel.
S. (U) Medical:

a. CIDG Medical Care:

(1) In November 1967, the CIDG hospital at Ban Me Thuot completed its expansion from 15 to 30 beds. In addition, a major surgical capability was installed to provide more extensive care of CIDG troops in southern II Corps.

(2) The CIDG hospital at Da Nang began construction in January 1968 in order to expand from 40 to 80 beds. This expansion will provide more adequate facilities for the treatment of ill and wounded I CTZ CIDG.

b. CIDG Medical Training: An eight-week basic aidman course was conducted during December and January for 34 CIDG at Co B headquarters in Pleiku. The course was conducted in various Montagnard dialects in an effort to provide more formal training for CIDG platoon aidmen.

c. Preventive Medicine: Approximately 1,05,000 CIDG and Vietnamese civilians in I and II CTZ were immunized against bubonic plague with indigenous vaccine. The program was completed on 10 December 1967.

d. Narcotics control: On 8 Dec 67, a new narcotics control regulation was published by 5th Special Forces Group (Abn). This regulation provides for adequate accountability of narcotics and sensitive drugs and yet takes into account the country-wide deployment of 5th SFCA, the fact that Special Forces medical aidmen perform the services of battalion surgeons, and the unique problems encountered in supporting indigenous irregular forces.
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9. (C) Signal

a. The Group Signal Officer has developed and is presently evaluating a simple, continuous signal Agent Radio for use by friendly agents in villages near CIDG camps. (See paragraph 5, enclosure number 4). Paragraph 4 of the same enclosure discusses the airboat communications system developed by the 5th SFGA Signal maintenance facility.

b. Signal Company has placed the AN/TSC-26 in operation as the MCS in the Group Emergency Net. This $150,000 radio set also acts as an emergency back-up to the Communications Center and has the capability of CW, voice, and Radio Teletype Transmissions. The radio also possesses the capability to receive burst transmissions and can handle up to 19 teams operating in a UW or clandestine role.

c. Company A.

(1) On two occasions during the quarter the Company A communications section reinforced "A" detachments with personnel and equipment when the camps came under heavy attack. Loc Ninh (A-331) was provided antenna equipment and personnel to assist in radio installation and operation, thus allowing camp radio operators to recuperate from the strain of the attack. The communications bunker at Bu Dop (A-341) was destroyed by fire and within three hours after the incident had occurred, Company A communications personnel had arrived by helicopter with a complete replacement issue of communications equipment. These personnel remained at Bu Dop until the communications equipment was installed and the camp radio operators were ready to assume normal duties several days later.

(2) To counter the VC threat to camp communications, all camps in III CTZ have been equipped with radios to provide 100 percent back up to single side band, CW, and FM radios in an emergency communications bunker. If a camp communications bunker is destroyed in the future, the camp has spare equipment available to operate until replacement items arrive.

(3) During the pre-deployment phase of Detachment A-351, Duc Hue, a communications facility was constructed in an empty AN/GRC-26 communication shelter. This system provided for all needed communication nets and simultaneously provided an easily transportable unit. Within hours after arriving at the new site, appropriate systems were constructed and the communications facility was in full operation.

d. Company D.

(1) Antenna Tower Construction: Erection of the AB-105 antenna tower was planned and commenced during December 67. Plans call for eventual construction of some 20 to 25 towers throughout Co D detachments. To date, three towers have been completed with construction on five additional towers underway. Depending on camp defense requirements, height of towers varies from 40 to 73 feet, the lower height being used to prevent masking camp defensive fire.
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(2) Liaison communications team consisting of two radio operators was provided to 7th ARVN Division during January 1968 in connection with the activation of Detachment A-416. Communications provided included both FM and SSB facilities working out of 7th ARVN Div TOC.

(3) Preparations for communications support for newly activated Detachment A-416 included planning for communications bunker, signal plans and TOE equipment issues.

(4) HT-1 Radio Policies: A survey conducted during November indicated a large proportion of HT-1 radios at the detachment level were not directly controlled by VNSF. Policy letter, dated 2 Dec 67, was published to all commanders to effect the hand receipt of all HT-1 radios to the VNSF. At the same time, additional issues of HT-1's were received to permit the fulfillment of TOE authorizations for all CSF units.

(5) Planning was initiated for use of VHF circuits between Company D and Detachments B-42 and B-43. Circuit requests, initially submitted to 52nd Signal Bn, are being resubmitted through DCA. On approval and establishment of VHF systems, existing in company RTT systems will revert to back-up systems.

(6) During November/December, IV Corps Senior Advisor announced the formation of the 44th Special Zone to coordinate the general area of operations designated for Special Forces elements in the IV CTZ. Initial plans contemplated the use of Special Forces communications systems to support the new zone. In addition, Special Forces communications personnel would provide advisory support to RF and PF units and the ARVN communications platoon serving the new Zone. Subsequent changes reduced the original mission to one basically of signal support through the use of Special Forces communications systems within the 44th Special Zone. The advisory role of communications personnel in Company D was dropped with the activation of a separate advisory team in support of the 44th Special Zone.
10. (C) Engineer:

a. Most of the period covered by this report was spent in new camp construction and in obtaining personnel to man the engineer staff required at "C" detachment level. Operational control of the "C" detachment being decentralized to the corresponding corps area commander or senior US advisor continued to work to advantage from the engineering standpoint in that engineer support could be coordinated directly between the SF engineer at the "C" detachment and the senior engineer staff officer in each corps area. The major problem encountered in all areas continued to be movement of construction materials to our job sites, the majority of which are accessible only by air. Another problem area was the support of established camps in need of major or minor rehabilitation. It was evident that few "A" detachments, however willing and able, possessed the necessary time or technical knowledge to undertake extensive rehabilitation projects. Their time necessarily was as advisors to VNSF elements. Regular engineer units are reluctant to fragment their commands to the extent dictated by the kind of projects that need doing at "A" detachment level, usually a squad or less being required. A study is underway to determine what type of engineer support would serve the SF requirements most efficiently in Vietnam.

b. New camp construction and rehabilitation construction was conducted at the following detachments by the units indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DETACHMENT</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-236 (Bu Prang)</td>
<td>KB team 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-231 (Tieu Atar)</td>
<td>KB team 1 &amp; 20th Engr Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undesignated (Ban Het)</td>
<td>KB team 4 &amp; 299th Engr Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-50 (Ban Me Thuot)</td>
<td>KB team 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-416 (My Dien II)</td>
<td>KB team 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-351A (Duc Hue)</td>
<td>ARVN 30th Engr Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-323 (Thien Ngon)</td>
<td>US 588th Engr Bn</td>
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<td>Undesignated (Katum)</td>
<td>US 588th Engr Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>A-341 (Bu Dop)</td>
<td>KB team 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-245 (Dak Seang)</td>
<td>KB team 3 &amp; KB team 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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11. (S) Comptroller:

a. CIDG PAY RAISE: Effective 1 Jan 68 CIDG soldiers were given a net increase on pay of 200VN. This raise was implemented commensurate with an ARVNAP raise and was necessary to offset the rising cost of living within Vietnam.

b. BURIAL EXPENSES: Effective 1 Jan 68 the authorized burial expense for CIDG was raised from 200VN to 400VN.

c. FIELD AUDIT PROGRAM: An intensified field audit program has been initiated and forty-two field detachments were visited in November and December. The purpose of these audits is to review fund handling procedures, verify accountability and assist the funds officers when required.

d. MID YEAR BUDGET REVIEW: The Parasol Switchback budget review was conducted at the SFOB from 29 Jan through 1 Feb 68. The purpose of the review was to update the FY 68 Command Operating Budget. An additional 10.1 million dollars will be required to fund the anticipated ammunition program for the remainder of FY 68. The original and revised COB are as follows (figures in millions).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1968 ORIGINAL COB</th>
<th>1968 INCREASES AND DECREASES</th>
<th>1968 REVISED COB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PEM:</td>
<td>$29.2</td>
<td>+$10.1</td>
<td>$39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN-COUNTRY OMA</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUT-OF-COUNTRY OMA</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>+5.0</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$105.2</td>
<td>+$10.1</td>
<td>$115.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The net increase in funding requirements is attributed to the following factors:

(1) The shift of Special Forces camps from relatively pacified areas in the interior to hotly contested VC main infiltration routes located on the Lao- and Cambodian borders. These new camps are in daily contact with the enemy.

(2) New mission requirements directly related to U.S. operations in "York" and "San Angelo". Special Forces participation was not programmed in the original combined campaign plan CY 68, AB-143.

e. COMMAND MANAGEMENT: This staff section implemented the Command Progress Report during the month of Nov 67. This report reflects the progress of the staff and special staff, in their area of interest, i.e., S1; Personnel Status; Civilian Personnel; R&R Program; Accidents; S3 Personnel Status - CSF 901 and MSP 904; S5 Ra liers induced by Psychological Operations; Comptroller - Status of Funds In-Country OMA, Field Audits of Agent Officers; Signal - Traffic Volume at SFOB Communications Center, Incoming and Outgoing. The Command Progress Report is a command management tool for decision making by the Group Commander. (See inclosure number 7, Command Progress Report).
SECTION 2, PART I

Observations (Lessons Learned)
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 Jan 68 (c)

1. (C) Personnel
   a. ITEM: Processing of Camp Strike Force Personnel. (Det B-33)

DISCUSSION: It has been noticed on arrival of troops from the Training Center at Trang Sup that they have not had proper processing prior to their arrival at the camps. Specifically they have been without pictures for their pay cards and without the proper issue of clothing and equipment. This practice causes an unnecessary administrative and logistical burden on the gaining unit.

OBSERVATION: A solution to this problem is to have all personnel completely processed at the CIDG Training Center prior to being shipped to their new duty station with completed pay cards with photo and a complete issue of weapons and equipment.

b. ITEM: Briefing of Incoming Officers (Det B-32)

DISCUSSION: Upon an officer's arrival in country, he is given very many orientation briefings. However, at SF03 and company level, these briefings are broad in scope and general in nature. When the officer arrives at the B detachment he requires more intensive and detailed briefings and orientations in order to properly accomplish his mission.

OBSERVATION: This detachment has initiated an extensive briefing/orientation program for newly assigned officers. Now A detachment commanders receive a thorough operations and intelligence briefing which completely familiarizes them with enemy and friendly situation in their assigned TaOR's. This orientation includes activities for the past 3 months, the present, and projected plans for the next 30 days. They receive a comprehensive, but not as detailed briefing on administrative procedures. Because the experience level of most officers assigned an A detachment XOs is relatively low, and because of a myriad of administrative requirements, these officers undergo an informal training session in preparation of an operational fund report, personnel procedures, processing of awards and decorations, and logistical procedures. All officers receive an intensive briefing on CA/PSYOPS activities and communications. This allows all officers to be thoroughly oriented on all existing requirements and procedures and become effective much more quickly when they get on site.

c. ITEM: Relaxation of "A" detachment members off site (Det B-32)

DISCUSSION: Working on an A site can be physically and mentally exhausting, and a detachment members can use a periodic break. This is especially true when a new A camp is being constructed.

OBSERVATION: By keeping two members of the A detachment off site at all times for two or three days, each man can be given a periodic break every two or three
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weeks. This keeps 10 men on site, which is enough to accomplish the mission, and the periodic break gives the men a chance to rest up and go full steam when he gets back. The time and number of men off site can be varied as the situation and mission dictate, but the principle remains valid.

d. ITEM: Showing of 16mm Motion Pictures

DISCUSSION: Previously remote "A" detachment locations have not been able to see five 16mm motion pictures per week. Since this is the only real form of entertainment a detachment can afford or obtain it was of major concern to the commander. "A" detachments had only one film account and the lack of helicopter transportation did not allow the limited number of films to be circulated daily.

OBSERVATION: A solution was provided by obtaining two film accounts for each "A" detachment. One account is for the "A" teams on a daily circuit basis. The other account for the "A" teams provides five films per week that circulate to all "A" teams which are turned in after being seen by all "A" teams. A helicopter shifts the films from camp to camp once a week.

e. ITEM: Processing Remains of Personnel KIA.

DISCUSSION: It was found that old procedures for handling the remains of personnel KIA were not satisfactory. Bodies in some cases took several days to arrive at a shipping mortuary. Coordination for identification, certificate of death, movement of the body and personal effects, and care of the remains was not as good and efficient as it could have been. Past examples have taken several days before the body has arrived at a mortuary in RVN.

OBSERVATION: All handling of remains and administration is taken care of by the Company Adjutant. Bodies are immediately evacuated by USSF to Company A headquarters where identification is effected by two people, and the death certificate is prepared by the Company Surgeon. Personal effects are removed from the body (except ID card and dog tags) for later turn-in. The remains are then immediately delivered directly to a US Quartermaster Graves Registration unit without going through any agency or hospital. This usually takes only several hours as compared to days before and is entirely US SF controlled and operated. It is much faster, more efficient, and gives better care to the body. Immediate follow up action is taken to obtain identification cards or dog tags if they are not on the body, and also the health and dental records are obtained for the mortuary so that final confirmation of the identification can be made. This saves the body from being delayed in CONUS for an FBI check prior to release to the JOK.
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f. ITEM: Handling of Personal Effects.

DISCUSSION: The system for processing personal effects for USASF, KIA, MIA and WIA medically evacuated was not timely, involved undue transportation and administration, and had other undesirable aspects. Distribution of hospital evacuation orders takes in some cases 4 to 6 weeks before the personal effects officer can turn effects into a transportation office. For KIA's and MIA's a summary court officer for each case had to be appointed on orders. When orders were received the summary officer had to ship effects, write letters, and complete paperwork to higher headquarters, and conduct any claims action that might arise at a later date. These actions in many cases took three months or more to complete.

OBSERVATION: The present system calls for all personal effects in KIA's and MIA's to be turned into a Quartermaster Graves registration point immediately after death or determination of MIA. All processing, administration, and shipping is handled by the servicing mortuary. In the case of MIA personnel who are medically evacuated this headquarters monitors the medical condition of each man and collects his personal effects prior to departure from RVN if he is scheduled for evacuation. The only restriction to this practice is that the individual can only carry 80 lbs of effects with him. In most cases however the USASF soldier does not exceed this weight limit. This system allows the effects to accompany the individual through his MEDEVAC channels rather than having them follow him some 30 days later.

g. ITEM: Implementation of Service Award Program

DISCUSSION: Previously a high percentage of the members of this command rotated without their achievements and service in Vietnam being recognized by suitable awards.

OBSERVATION: This headquarters now maintains 90, 60 and 30 day loss rosters. Commanders are informed of upcoming personnel losses and are required to submit appropriate recommendations for award. Suspense dates are set and maintained by appropriate messengers and command emphasis. This headquarters is informed when personnel do not merit award. This system insures just recognition of service and achievement.

h. ITEM: Appointment of A&D Officers and Board.

DISCUSSION: Previously many recommendations for awards received at this headquarters evidenced poor composition, preparation and editing.

OBSERVATION: The appointment of an A&D officer or MCO apart from the B detachment SI and company level A&D board to monitor recommendations at the lowest practical level has significantly improved the quality of recommendations leaving this headquarters.
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1. ITEM: Security of CIDG Funds. (Co A)

DISCUSSION: Many new field commanders fail to have the combination changed on the safe containing CIDG funds and place little or no importance on changing the combination when a new XO comes into the team. This situation results from a lack of knowledge concerning the mechanics of changing the combinations and leaves both the commander and the XO in a precarious position should there be some discrepancy in the monthly fund report or a loss of funds.

OBSERVATION: An excellent method to remedy this situation is to institute a program whereby the C detachment Funds Officer has the means to train the B detachment's Funds Officer who in turn train the executive officers in the A detachments. This program is especially rewarding if followed up by frequent trips to the subordinate detachments by the C detachment Funds Officer.

2. ITEM: Working Hours of Civilian Employees. (CO A)

DISCUSSION: Problems have arisen in the past when certain workers arrived for work late and left early. It was noticed that the same people tend to pose this problem time and time again; this is costly and has an adverse effect on the morale of the other workers.

OBSERVATION: The formation of a motor pool has resulted in greater work output and a lower attrition rate. An old bus was purchased to provide free transportation to and from work on a regular schedule. The bus driver is also a laborer employed with the other workers. This system is particularly effective because the CPO can strictly enforce the bus driver's working hours. The other workers realize the bus driver cannot leave before a specific time and must be on schedule the next morning. Their interest in free transportation has yielded more man hours for this HQ.

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2. (C) Operations

a. ITEM: Effectiveness of Camp Strike Force Soldiers in (Co C) Combined Operations with FWMAF Units.

DISCUSSION: Camp Strike Force (CSF) units are more effective when employed with Free World Military Armed Forces (FWMAF) units.

OBSERVATION: CSF are more responsive and their leaders more cooperative on operations conducted in conjunction with FWMAF units for the following reasons:

(1) They are more aware of their fire support, resupply, airlift, and medevac capabilities immediately available to them.

(2) Their discipline is improved because of their respect for the strength of the unit to which they are attached, as opposed to independent CIDC operations.

(3) They are inspired to greater heights with more daring in tactical operations with FWMAF units with the knowledge of superiority in numbers, fire power, and a professional knowledge in the conduct of such operations.

b. ITEM: Capabilities and Limitations of Camp Strike Force (Co C) Units in Combined Operations.

DISCUSSION: The FWMAF commander must be aware of the capabilities and limitations of the CSF troops.

OBSERVATION: (1) Capabilities:

a. CIDG troops can travel lighter and faster than FWMAF troops on the ground. For this reason, they can best be employed in the most difficult terrain or slowest avenue of ground approach.

b. Because of their small stature and light equipment, aircraft requirements for troop lifts are substantially reduced. More CSF troops can be lifted within a single helicopter than can FWMAF soldiers, therefore requiring less helicopter lift support aircraft.

c. CSF in the field require considerably less logistical support than for a comparable number of FWMAF troops.

d. CSF elements perform exceptionally well as the point or lead element by virtue of their knowledge of the terrain, trail nets, and enemy characteristics in the area. CSF may be attached to FWMAF units in a
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A variety of compositions. One (1) platoon of CSF directly attached to one
(1) platoon of FWMAF has advantages of simplified control and coordination.
Platoons or squad-sized CSF elements, maintaining tactical integrity
integrated and scattered throughout a battalion have demonstrated an
increase in CSF fighting ability; however, problems have resulted from an
inadequate number of Special Forces advisors to accompany these separate CSF elements.

Conversely, company or larger CSF units operating as an independent element of
a battalion lose some of the advantages gained through close association with
FWMAF troops.

a. In the past, SF camps have demonstrated an ability to react
quickly to requests for CSF augmentations to FWMAF units. The individual CSF
soldier requires a minimum amount of time to ready himself for an operation.

b. Both the SF camp intelligence nets, and the individual soldier
on operations can provide timely intelligence to FWMAF units that otherwise
would not be available.

c. SF camps and the area immediately around the camp provide
ready-made, relatively secure, locations for fire support bases, staging areas,
and forward command posts.

(2). Limitations:

a. CSF elements on operations have limited fire power consisting
mainly of small arms, M-79's, and 60mm mortars.

b. The personality of commanders within the CSF elements may be
complex and produce a wide range of performance from one element to another, and
occasionally from one day to the next.

c. The US Special Forces advisor functions as an "advisor" and
his ability to influence CSF elements in the field will vary from virtual
direct command to negligible influence.

d. The missions assigned to the CSF should be kept uncomplicated.
CSF units lack the flexibility to cope with hurried alternate plans of action,
involved schemes of maneuver, or drastic changes enroute.

e. CSF troops will not remain effective in the field for any
extended period of time. The specific number of days that a given element of
CSF can remain effectively attached to FWMAF units in the field is dependent
on a multitude of factors. Experience indicates that rotation of CSF elements
is necessary during any sustained operations lasting over a period of ten (10)
to fifteen (15) days.

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f. The general state of training of CSF is limited to small unit patrolling and tactics, and individual weaponry; therefore, a large coordinated assault or an attack on a fortified position, may exceed their capability. Specialized techniques such as river crossing, bridging, or demolition destruction are not within the capability of the individual CSF soldier, and could possibly create difficulties for the FMHAF supporting units.

g. CSF units may require the augmentation of FMHAF personnel to meet tactical radio communication requirements; ie, the Special Forces advisor will need an RTO to aid him in maintaining a twenty-four (24) hour net, and other nets, as required, with coordinating FMHAF units.

h. The CSF emphasize the evacuation of wounded, and the recovery and evacuation of dead. To this extent, operations may be suspended or temporarily terminated until this requirement is met.

c. ITEM: Camp Strike Force Heliborne Operations (Co C)

DISCUSSION: Independent airmobile CSF operations greatly increase the effectiveness of CSF assets.

OBSERVATIONS: Helilifting CSF troops into an operational area has the following advantages:

(1) Areas of the TAOR can be penetrated that otherwise would require a major effort to reconnoiter and/or conduct tactical operations, either because of terrain or enemy activity, or both.

(2) Heliborne operations result in the better physical and mental condition of the CSF troops on their arrival into the area of operations. The troops are fresh and are much more able to remain within the specific area of operations for a longer period of time.

(3) Heliborne operations normally have an inherent surprise feature that catches enemy forces off guard. From past experience it has been proven that heliborne operations with CSF troops have resulted in higher casualties to the enemy forces, and the capture of larger amounts of equipment and supplies.

(4) To re-emphasize a previous statement that less aircraft are required to move a CSF unit than a comparable sized FMHAF unit.

d. ITEM: Combined Operations Problem Areas (Co C)

DISCUSSION: There are major re-occurring problem areas concerning joint FMHAF and CSF elements.
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OBSERVATION: The major recurring problem areas involving joint operations between FWMAF and CSF units fall into the following basic categories:

(1) In the past, there has been occasional failure of FWMAF troops to physically recognize CSF troops as "friendlies" and because of this, tragic results have occurred. The single most effective deterrent to mistaken identification is for low-level FWMAF commanders to emphasize the presence of CSF elements in the units being jointly associated with the tactical operation. The incidence of mistaken identity is markedly reduced.

(2) Uncoordination encroachment into existing CSF TAOR's is not uncommon. The attachment of any number of CSF units to all FWMAF operations inside a CSF camp TAOR would serve to emphasize the need for continuing coordination between the two forces. When both forces have knowledge of each other's presence within the TAOR, it acts as a stimulus and allows for additional support as required from the CSF camp. More specifically: Camp fire support, guides, intelligence, blocking or maneuver forces, operational bases, and camp reaction forces.

(3) Lack of helicopters to conduct complete coverage of the TAOR, and surprise raids and assaults. The major difficulty encountered in conducting independently in advance to preclude the necessity of organizing and planning alternate operations in the event the airlift does not materialize. Further, the low priority assigned to routine CSF airlift requests by III MAF and I Corps air movement personnel results in far fewer airborne CSF operations than their potential warrants.

(4) Fire support during joint FWMAF and CSF operations within CSF TAOR's have been hampered or needlessly delayed while seeking political clearance. Political clearance has already been approved for fire support within the area bounded by CSF TAOR's, and it is unnecessary for re-approval to be given prior to firing heavy weapons. FWMAF units should be made aware of this fact prior to operations.

e. ITEM: Helicopter Assaults.

DISCUSSION: In III CTZ it was found that lengthy Tactical Air and Artillery LZ preparations accomplished little except to notify the enemy that a helicopter assault was imminent and indicate the general location and direction of the inserted elements.

OBSERVATION: The technique of lengthy LZ preparations by either Tactical Air and/or heavy artillery prior to heliborne assaults has been virtually eliminated in the III CTZ CIDG program unless intelligence indicates a heavy enemy concentration on primary LZ. It was found that utilizing a 3 minute Light Fire Team LZ Prep immediately prior to insertion maximizes the element
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of surprise and does not afford the enemy ample time to flee the area as does an extensive artillery/TAC Air Prep.

f. ITEM: Landing Zones for Helicopter Assaults.

DISCUSSION: Coordination parties for helicopter assaults can physically record landing zones; however, pilots for the remainder of the helicopter support unit receive only a verbal description of the landing zone.

OBSERVATION: A Polaroid camera will take an excellent immediate photograph of a prospective landing zone. The photograph can then be given to the coordination party to take to home base for briefing other pilots.

g. ITEM: Deception in Helicopter Infiltrations.

DISCUSSION: When infiltrating a team by helicopter the following method was used to deceive the enemy. The ships made two or three fake landings on LZ's selected in the air and in each case the team stayed on board. Gunships did suppress the fake landing LZ's but did not suppress the actual infiltration LZ.

OBSERVATION: The risk involved in dry landings has always proven successful to this task force since most conventional units place arty preps on LZ's thereby telling the enemy of the intended landing.

h. ITEM: Insertion of Reaction Forces by Helicopter.

DISCUSSION: It has been observed that several helicopter lift companies, when inserting a reaction company into contact, will make a pass over the secure LZ's and then land on the second run. This allows the enemy to move their weapons to a position to bring maximum fire on the helicopters.

OBSERVATION: Coordination must be made with helicopter flight commanders to impress upon them the importance of landing immediately on a LZ once the word has been received that the LZ is secure. Any trial passes merely increases the probability of the enemy placing accurate fire into the incoming helicopters.

i. ITEM: Random Firing by Helicopters.

DISCUSSION: Both light fire teams and lone helicopters have continued to fire on CSP operations and civilians within the TAOR's without clearing with the ground commander or trying to contact the operation on the ground.

OBSERVATION: Pilots must be briefed on TACG's, call signs and frequencies of all units in the area prior to operating in the area. Lack of clearance from the responsible ground commander must automatically preclude aircraft firing in an area unless they are fired upon first.

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j. ITEM: Use of False LZ Marker for Tactical Air Strikes (Cc A)

DISCUSSION: When intelligence indicates a heavy enemy troop concentration on or near the primary LZ and an artillery/TAC Air Prep is required, a false smoke marker is dropped on the wrong end of the insertion LZ to confuse the enemy.

OBSERVATION: The smoke marker usually indicates the end of LZ preparatory fires to the enemy and the false marker is used to confuse the enemy as to the actual "touch down" point of the troop helicopters. After a one minute pause, a double CBU run by TAC Air along treelines adjacent to the LZ is made followed immediately by helicopter insertion. The short pause (approximately one minute) followed by the final TAC Air CBU run comes as a complete surprise since the enemy believes the LZ prep fires have terminated. If VC/PA are in the immediate vicinity of the LZ, the final CBU run will confuse and pin him down until the initial insertion is completed.

k. ITEM: TAC Air and Artillery as a Blocking Force. (Det B-36)

DISCUSSION: The use of tactical air strikes and artillery as a blocking force is most effective on a search and destroy mission. TAC air and artillery can also be plotted to proceed the friendly search and destroy operation which will open up the jungle canopy making travel easier and revealing enemy installations to a greater degree than only a ground search.

OBSERVATION: Control by ground commander in FAC aircraft and S3 in C&C ship is mandatory.

l. ITEM: Directing Close Air Support. (Det B-36)

DISCUSSION: When directing close air support using either UTT's or TAC always include the following:

(1) Azimuth from your position to the target.

(2) Distance from your position to the target.

(3) Direction you desire firing passes to be made (your position must be known by supporting aircraft).

OBSERVATION: If the direction of fire passes is not given, all too often the aircraft will come in on the azimuth given from your position to the enemy. This results in the aircraft firing over or into the friendly positions and could cause friendly casualties.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 3 Jan 68 (U)

m. ITEM: Assaulting Enemy Bunkers and Trench Lines for Rapid Seizure.

DISCUSSION: When assaulting enemy bunkers and trench lines it is necessary to overrun enemy positions as quickly as possible in order to capture WIA's and documents. If stubborn resistance is met, napalm has been found best in quickly neutralizing the enemy.

OBSERVATION: It is necessary to mark to front and rear of the friendly line so that the napalm can be delivered by TAC Air without endangering friendly positions.

n. ITEM: Use of FAC by Ground Commander for C&C

DISCUSSION: Often it is practical for a commander to control ground units from a FAC aircraft. This leaves the C&C helicopter free for the Arty Coordinating commander, aircraft commander, and ground unit S3. In the C&C ship one of the two FM radios is tuned to the command net, the other to the artillery frequency. The aircraft commander controls his assets by use of UHF/VHF. The commander controls the ground elements from the FAC aircraft by FM on command frequency. This allows the commander to ensure TAC Air is placed exactly where he wants it. It allows him to stay on target during the strike.

OBSERVATION: This method not only allows the ground commander to control the strike, but also allows him to stay on target during the insertion of the ordnance. Normally the C&C must clear the target area for high performance aircraft. The S3 monitors the command net and can easily relay information to the FOB without the command net by changing his FM set from low band (vice-versa). The FOB monitors and on both high/low band frequencies.

o. ITEM: Use of Mohawk SLAR Aircraft.

DISCUSSION: This detachment has gained valuable intelligence from the increased use of Mohawk SLAR aircraft in this TAOR. These aircraft have spotted targets within the heavy weapons fan of our camp and these targets have been immediately engaged by our mortars and 75mm pack howitzers. However, most targets reported are not within our range fan and we can only react with a grease pencil on a map.

OBSERVATION: An armed aircraft accompanying the Mohawk would provide the needed immediate reaction capability. Many targets which now cannot be fired on could be engaged and destroyed by the accompanying aircraft. The possibility of teaming the Mohawk and "Spooky" should also be given consideration. This combination could be particularly useful when our camps or outposts come under attack. The reconnaissance aircraft could pinpoint enemy positions and movements which Spooky could engage and destroy.

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p. 10th: Control of Armed AC-47 Aircraft.  (Det B-H1)

DISCUSSION:  It has been found that the successful employment of armed AC-47 "Spooky" aircraft in support of fixed installations under enemy attack has been much less than desirable. Especially when only Vietnamese elements are on the ground and, on occasion, when communication with the installation under attack is lost.

OBSERVATION:  To more effectively utilize the firepower of armed AC-47 "Spooky" aircraft in support of ground elements, US F.C. or V.R. aircraft with a Vietnamese observer is used to maintain contact and more accurately identify enemy elements on the ground.

q. 18th: Mines and Boobytraps Emplacements in old Mobile Guerrilla Force (MSF) Areas, VC Bases, DZ's Sumps, MSS's and Left Available to the Enemy.

DISCUSSION:  It was found that the enemy habitually used the same fire pits within their base camp. Grenades were placed under the coals of the fire pits. The pins were pulled and a thin string tied around the grenade body to secure the snoop. Fire would then cause the string to break, then the grenade would explode. Enemy equipment was boobytrapped or sabotaged. Projectiles were removed from shell casings, the powder filler was replaced with PENT obtained from detonating cord. The projectiles were replaced and the munitions placed where it could be found. Use of this ammunition would result in the chamber of the weapon exploding, causing injury to the firer. Enemy and US grenades were disassembled and the firing device (fuse) removed. Detonating cord was replaced without the timing device. This causes instant detonation of the grenade once the firing lever is released, killing or injuring the thrower. Claymore mines were left in base areas and likely enemy avenues of approach, The mine would be dual primed with a time device and a pull type firing device. In the event the device isn't trimmed within a specified period of time, the time device will set off the mine. This also serves to deceive the enemy as to the actual location of the friendly force and clears the area so that friendly forces reentering the area will not be injured by our mines in the vicinity. Sumps in the base areas were boobytrapped by placement of M-11 mines, burying grenades with pull wires inside the sump and attached to something the enemy would likely to pull out. M-11 mines were employed along likely avenues of approach. The best position (location) was found to be near legs or other obstacles that a person would normally step over. It was found that by wrapping the mine with several turns of deton cord the casualty often died instead of just being demobilized. Enemy bodies were boobytrapped with pull type devices often connected to claymore mines, M-5 pressure release devices connected to grenades and just plain hand grenades with the pin pulled and positioned under the body. The arm pits, small of the back, and knee joints were found to be the best places for locating grenades, Enemy equipment would be boobytrapped and left after a contact with the enemy.
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OBSESSION: It should be mentioned that every effort should be made to coordinate, both within the operating unit and adjacent organizations, a system whereby friendly troops entering one of those areas is fully apprised of the fact that the above anti-guerrilla methods have been implemented.

1. ITEM: Booby Trapping of VC Structures. (Det B-32)

DISCUSSION: The VC will frequently remove the pin from a hand grenade, put a string or elastic band around it, and place it in a structure in such a manner that if the structure is destroyed, the hand grenade will go off.

OBSESSION: When destroying VC structures, a search should first be made for possible booby traps. Even after this is done, destruction should be accomplished from as far a distance as possible.

2. ITEM: Use of the Small Starlight Scope on Night Ambushes. (Det B-41)

DISCUSSION: It has been found that utilization of the small starlight scope to detect and mark enemy elements approaching an ambush site is quite satisfactory; however, once the ambush is sprung the ambush elements tend to fire into the marked area rather than cover the entire ambush with fire.

OBSESSION: The use of two small starlight scopes, placing one at each end of the ambush, to simultaneously mark the extremes of the enemy column has proven to be quite effective.

3. ITEM: Use of White Phosphorous Grenades and Rockets to Burn out and Expose Enemy Positions. (Det B-41)

DISCUSSION: During combat operations in the "Plain of Reeds" it has been found that the enemy forces utilize the dry grasses and brush to hide their individual positions and cache sites.

OBSESSION: Prior to launching an operation and during the conduct of normal VC missions in the province, WP grenades and rockets are used to start fires to burn out and expose prepared enemy positions. This technique is also used by the FAC's prior to directing immediate T.C air strikes in the area. Many areas previously used as rest and resupply points have been destroyed by fire and use of these areas completely denied the enemy.

4. ITEM: Combat in Cities. (Det B-42)

DISCUSSION: The VC infiltrated men, weapons and ammunition into the city before the general attack and had established a series of strong points within the heart of the city when the attack began. It appeared that the strong points were to be reinforced, tied together and thus control the city.

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OBSERVATION: A solution which proved effective was the introduction of a small, heavily armed unit (Provincial Reconnaissance Unit Reinforced) into the streets, attacking strong points and denying the enemy reinforcement and communication; thus disrupting control.

v. ITEM: Presence of USAF Personnel at the Point of Decision (Det B-36)

DISCUSSION: It is essential that USAF personnel personally accompany all operations of any tactical importance. In almost every instance where a CIDG leader was left with command and a stressful situation developed, he blew it. EXAMPLE: Two recon teams were dispatched to establish an MSS. Two USAF were on the mission. Both USAF decided to accompany the MSS finding team, leaving the trail surveillance team under the command of a CIDG. A VC squad approached the position of the trail squad and the CIDG leader elected to fire on the enemy unit. When the enemy withdrew, the trail team was not sure as to what their next move should be. They decided to hold their present position. The enemy maneuvered against the Trail team and one CIDG was critically injured.

OBSERVATION: Good judgement and the presence of an American may have saved the situation. An American must be used for navigation.

w. ITEM: Movement in Thick Primary and Secondary Jungle Areas. (Det B-36)

DISCUSSION: It was found that movement from one point to another is best made by following zig zag animal (elephant) trails and trying to maintain a general heading. Movement was found best along ridge lines (more animal tracks) and through bamboo as compared to secondary growth areas. In areas consisting of a series of vertical small hills, travel was best along the floor or swamp areas.

OBSERVATION: Above methods must naturally be adapted to the tactical situation that exists in the area at the time.

x. ITEM: Use of Immediate Sky Spot Request. (Det B-36)

DISCUSSION: Use of immediate Sky Spot request is an effective weapon against detected enemy activity outside the range of friendly weapons during the hours of darkness. Sky Spot can arrive in 20 to 30 minutes and deliver any type of requested ordnance on target with a very small CEP. Sky Spots were called in on targets as close as 600 meters away from friendly positions with excellent results. The Sky Spots should be requested for two runs the last being near BMT, this allows rapid follow up by the friendly forces and it also does not allow the enemy to evacuate their wounded or killed. The Sky Spot would also make an effective immediate weapon in the event of attack on the friendly forces at night.
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OBSERVATION: Even if the enemy position cannot be pin pointed within eight

CKrsit a rough estimate can be made and ordnance delivered on the area within

a minimum amount of time. This could be followed by a request for flare ship

and gunfire - followed by a request for FAC and TAC support.

y. ITEM: Pursuit of Enemy Forces.

DISCUSSION: Many times when a unit makes contact in the field, the enemy force

will withdraw and the friendly force will directly pursue. Frequently the VC

use this to their advantage by establishing contact, retreating rapidly and

sucking the friendly force into an ambush position, thereby inflicting heavy

casualties.

OBSERVATION: Better results can be attained, while at the same time sustaining

less friendly casualties by blocking the enemy's retreat with indirect fire and

making a flanking move to overrun him rather than pursuing him into an ambush

position.

z. ITEM: Neutralizing Enemy Defenses.

DISCUSSION: Many times when contact is made in the field, VC/NVA are

occupying prepared positions and the friendly troops are too close to them to

permit the effective employment of air or artillery.

OBSERVATION: The M-72 LAW can easily be carried on operations and offers an

excellent means of neutralizing enemy positions.

aa. ITEM: Planning of Operations.

DISCUSSION: There is sometimes a tendency on the part of B detachments to

plan operations for the A teams. This leads to misunderstandings and sometimes

lack of coordination.

OBSERVATION: Operations conducted by the A detachments should be planned by

the USASF and VNSF A detachment commanders. If the USASF and VNSF B detach-

ment commanders wish to have a particular type operation conducted, they

should issue the A detachment commander a mission type order only. The only

exception to this rule is operations involving 2 separate A detachments. These

operations generally must be planned by the USASF and VNSF B detachment's S-3.

bb. ITEM: Initial Phases of A Detachment Deployment.

DISCUSSION: The initial phases of deploying an A detachment to a new location

in order to establish a new CIDG camp can become quite involved, particularly if

coordination has to be made with supporting units such as MSF, artillery, and

civilians. It is extremely difficult to move an entire construction unit into a previously unsecured area within 48 hours of initial deployment.
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OBSERVATION: Units planning to deploy A detachments to new locations should fully consider possible adverse effects of the enemy situation, terrain and weather. Once these factors have been fully considered, a time phasing of supporting engineer elements into the new camp location should be planned, rather than attempting to move the entire element at one time.

cc. ITEM: Employment of CBU's. (Det B-32)

DISCUSSION: In soft terrain or marshy areas CBU's frequently do not detonate. These undetonated CBU's are then used by the VC as mines and booby traps with excellent results.

OBSERVATION: Units operating in soft or marshy areas should not call for CBU's when tactical air support is requested except in extreme emergency.

dd. ITEM: Actions Upon Initial Contact. (Det B-35)

DISCUSSION: During recent operations where enemy contact was made, the friendly elements would make initial contact but would not pursue the initiative to force the Viet Cong into more vulnerable fighting positions. Instead, they would wait for requested air support to arrive on station. This resulted in friendly elements losing the advantage and offering the enemy an excellent opportunity to escape.

OBSERVATION: Coordination must be made with the VNSF and CIDG commanders by USASF advisors to impress upon them the fact that the best tactics to utilize at the first moment of contact is to move the CIDG into solid contact with the Viet Cong and maintain this contact while air power is brought to bear on the entrenched enemy positions. Immediately upon completion of the air strikes the friendly elements should move forward to insure complete and total Viet Cong kill.

ee. ITEM: "Hammer and Anvil" Operations. (Co A)

DISCUSSION: CIDG/US blocking position "Hammer and Anvil" type operations, utilizing up to date intelligence and combined artillery/TAC air and helicopter gunship support have met with increasing success in III CTZ. Converging operations conducted concurrently between A detachment sites such as Operation Tra 7/12, 17 Dec 67 with elements from Det A-352, Tra Cu and Det A-351, Hiep Hoc participating, resulted in 12 VC KIA (US body count) as well as numerous weapons and large quantities of equipment captured. In this operation converging sweep operations, heliborne reinforcements and Tactical Air channelized VC elements into an inescapable "Kill Zone".

OBSERVATION: During the next reporting period greater effort will be directed towards converging operations conducted across province boundaries and developing more diversified combat operations.
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ff. ITEM: "Scorched Earth" Policy. (Cc A)

DISCUSSION: More emphasis on "Scorched Earth" Policies should be promoted on search and destroy operations. Adequate time must be allotted on combat operations to sufficiently destroy VC base camp, rice caches, way stations and bunker complexes.

OBSERVATION: Destruction of VC foodstuffs and supplies is a direct means of psychological exploitation of VC sanctuary, demonstrating to the Viet Cong that CIDG/ARVN elements have passed through the area. Food denial and base camp destruction must be thoroughly exploited. During the Monsoon season, if large VC rice caches are discovered which cannot be extracted, a simple method of destruction is to scatter the rice on the wet jungle floor, since exposure to Monsoon rains will rot the rice in one day. Another method is to hold lift in several 55 gal drums of diesel fuel, scattering and saturating the rice thus ruining it for human consumption.

ff. ITEM: Destruction of Large Caches of Rice. (Det B-75)

DISCUSSION: One of the most significant lessons learned was the means by which a large cache of rice could be destroyed in the swiftest manner. In the past, this has proven to be a difficult task. The problem was solved by airlifting an 8 inch arty shell and a drum of JP4 fuel to the cache site. By placing the shell underneath the rice and fusing the shell in the fuze well housing with Cs and attaching detonating cord and applying an 8 minute time pencil to detonate the shell, and then placing the punctured drum of JP4 on top of the rice to allow the fuel to leak from holes made in the drum, the ensuing detonation and fire totally destroys the rice.

OBSERVATION: Although the destruction items are bulky and heavy it is felt that sure fire results more than compensate for their inherent clumsy configuration.

ff. ITEM: Proper Selection of RON's. (Cc A)

DISCUSSION: When CIDG operations stop anywhere along their general route of advance and establish a RON, they become extremely vulnerable to VC attack. If the VC are trailing the operation, as they frequently do, the CIDG position is fixed by the VC. The VC can elect to attack at a time of their choosing or formulate plans to ambush the CIDG patrol along its route of march.

OBSERVATION: A detachments are instructed to select RON's at least 1000 meters from the patrol's general route of march. Another technique is to eat the evening meal 12 hours before dusk. After giving the enemy every indication while eating that this position will be the patrol's RON, boldly and rapidly move the main body until darkness falls to a different position, leaving a "stay behind" claymore mine ambush at the previous location.
ii. ITEM: Enemy Evasion of H&I Fires. (Co A)

DISCUSSION: The enemy likes to enter or "he en" hamlets at night to avoid H&I fires. The enemy knows H&I fires will be placed no closer than 1000 meters of an inhabited area. The VC will normally depart these hamlets between 0500 - 0600 in the morning.

OBSERVATION: In certain areas the VC will move in rubber plantations during the night if possible, because they realize H&I fires will not be placed in the rubber without contact. The enemy will on occasion get careless in the rubber and often use trails. VC routes of withdrawal from sheltering villages should be noted and H&I plotted and fired between 0500 to 0600. Trails leading to and from rubber should be plotted and covered with intensive H&I fires during the hours of darkness. VC way stations should not be disturbed in any way to give the impression that anyone other than the enemy was there. The target should be plotted and when enemy movement is reported or detected in the area artillery fires can be massed.

jj. ITEM: Night Ambush Operations. (Co A)

DISCUSSION: Special Forces has found that a successful night ambush is one of the most effective psychological operations that can be conducted. In swampy terrain even during the dry season, VC resupply routes are extremely limited.

OBSERVATION: By continuous saturation patrolling these resupply routes can be detected and neutralized by night ambushes. Night ambush fire discipline is difficult to control with CIDG forces and must be thoroughly rehearsed and explained prior to the departure of the ambush element. It was found that in swampy areas the VC seldom use a ground security element to accompany any sampan resupply movements. This makes the sampans susceptible to ambushes at ranges of only two or three feet. Claymore mines should be used for these ambushes and small arms fire should be avoided unless absolutely necessary. The sound of the claymores detonating will resemble the sound of normal artillery H&I fires, thereby allowing multiple ambushes on the same canal during the night.

kk. ITEM: Orientation of Reaction Forces. (Det B-36)

DISCUSSION: Great care must be taken to insure that reaction forces from other units, (i.e. divisional units, ready reaction unit), are fully apprised of their responsibility to this detachment in that the size of the force which is internally available to the Special Task Force is not of sufficient size to engage in a major enemy contact.

OBSERVATION: Considerable difficulty has been encountered in obtaining additional helicopter support when this unit was engaged in a major contact and needed to reinforce its ground troops in order to evacuate wounded and dead personnel. Every effort must be made to insure an adequate force is tabbed for this support before the tactical developments prescribe them.
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11. Item: CIDG Operations. (A-221)

Discussion: When CIDG sweep in the direction of base camp during the latter part of operations, they think that they are going home early and have a tendency to move too quickly and conduct a haphazard search.

Observation: In planning CIDG operations, it is better to have the CIDG sweep in directions away from base camp during the last few days of the operation.

12. Item: Operating Two Airboat Sections Together. (A-401)

Discussion: It has been found that employing two (2) airboat sections together creates a problem of control. Due to the speed and communications, control is difficult between the sections and more so between the sections and the C and C aircraft.

Observation: A solution that proved to be quite effective was to divide the operational area in half and employ a section in each area with a separate C and C aircraft.

13. Item: Effectiveness of Small Arms Fire from the Airboats. (A-401)

Discussion: It was found that strafing runs made by the airboats from a distance of 100 to 150 meters were not satisfactory. The majority of the rounds were going over, under, and behind the target area.

Observation: By making the strafing runs 50 to 75 meters from the target, there was an increase of 40 to 50 percent hits in the target area. The amount of fire received by the airboats was decreased due to the increased effectiveness of the airboats arms.


Discussion: During many of the operations conducted by the airboats, VC sampans were found, but no VC could be located in the area.

Observation: The VC would be submerged under the water in the vicinity of their sampans. A successful tactic was found to be the dropping of concussion grenades from airboats circling the area. The VC would emerge from the water to avoid the concussion grenades and thus be vulnerable to small arms fire or capture.

15. Item: Stay Behind Ambush by Tail Gunner Recon Section. (A-401)

Discussion: This technique employs the use of one recon section which habitually follows the main force. The mission of this unit is to provide
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rear security for the main force and to guard against trackers. Basically two techniques can be used; (1) if the main force was traveling along a course of known direction and distance the "tail gunner" section would periodically establish ambush positions behind the main force along the route of march. These positions would be manned generally for fifteen to thirty minutes. If no contact has been made the tail gunner section could either move rapidly to rejoin the main body; booby trap and/or mine along the back trail (must be approved by OPN CO) and move to RV or continue to ambush the trail until the main force has been established at a Mission Support Site. (2) If the direction and rate of movement is unsure, then the tail gunner section is better employed by staying with the main force and upon direction of the OPN CO,emplace mines and booby traps along the back trail.

OBSERVATION: Continuous radio communication must be maintained by the tail gunner section and the OPN CO. This sophisticated technique requires intense training and tight command and control to be effective. An American must be with all elements involved for immediate reaction to the specific situation.

qq. ITEM: 175mm Artillery Support. (Det B-34)

DISCUSSION: A test was conducted in conjunction with 6/27 Artillery to compare effects of HE Fuze Quick and Fuze Delay when impacting in triple canopy jungle.

OBSERVATION: 25 rounds of HE Fuze Delay were fired in a grid saturation mission with the following results:

(1) 50% of rounds exploded 3 to 4 feet underground.
(2) 20% of rounds exploded in 2d canopy cutting trees at approximately 8 feet height.
(3) 30% of rounds exploded in 3d canopy placing shrapnell in the area from ground level to 18 inches height.
(4) The rounds were dispersed 50 to 75 meters apart in the center of the impact zone.
(5) A previous test with 25 rounds of HE Fuze Quick was less effective with majority of rounds exploding in 1st canopy and very little shrapnell reaching ground level.

rr. Obtaining Artillery Support. (A-227)

DISCUSSION: Operations are often conducted in areas covered by PAVN FAN.
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OBSERVATION: Supporting fire can be obtained with minimum delay by following these simple procedures:

(1) Prior to going into an area where artillery was previously utilized a check with the supporting artillery unit should be made for available concentration numbers and coordinates.

(2) If your unit stops for any length of time, stop as near to one of the previous concentrations as possible and call for clearance.

(3) If this is impossible, plot your own concentrations and have one or more fired immediately. (Don't forget to record the concentration number).

(4) Once fired, request a gun be laid on the concentration with the appropriate round ready for an on call mission.

(5) Record all concentration numbers and coordinates given for future use by your operations conducted in the same area.

DISCUSSION: Use of the "People Sniffer" has been introduced into the Installation Defense Command's operations. The equipment is being used by the IDC, based on S-2 intelligence reports and visual reconnaissance sightings.

OBSERVATION: Success has been achieved by the use of this equipment. There have been several heavy indications, which were reacted to by both armed helicopter and artillery fire. The operation is not complete in that we do not have a ready capability for moving reaction and/or assessment troops into the indicated areas.

ITEM: Improvised Obstacles (Det 3-34)

DISCUSSION: A WP grenade had been wrapped with Det Cord to act as an improvised fougasse. The pin had been pulled and the grenade handle had been tied down with cotton string. When one such fougasse had to be dismantled, the WP grenade ignited because the string had deteriorated. Similar fougasses which were made utilizing plastic tape to hold down the handle were not such a problem.

OBSERVATION: A nondeteriorating substance such as tape should be used on such devices. Additionally, such devices should be fully explained and their location identified in Camp Defense Folders.

ITEM: Work Details Outside Defensive Perimeters. (Det B-31)

DISCUSSION: A CIDG woodcutting party was attacked and 2 CIDG WIA and 1 CIDG captured. The CIDG did not have weapons.

OBSERVATION: Parties going outside defensive parameters regardless of mission must be armed and properly supported.
3. (U) Training Organization.

a. ITEM: Training results. (Det B-35)

DISCUSSION: It has been noticed in the past that the overall interest shown by CIDG attending training of any sort is based on the knowledge of what awards, payment or honors will be bestowed on them at the completion of the particular course.

OBSERVATION: Generate a sense of tremendous accomplishment, future distinction to come and some type of award or diploma for each CIDG class taught. The interest shown will be of a higher quality.

b. ITEM: 4.2 inch Mortar Training for CIDG. (Co A)

DISCUSSION: 4.2 inch mortars are often not employed to best advantage in many A Detachments due to lack of qualified personnel and inability to properly train CIDG because of technical language limitations.

OBSERVATION: ARVN artillery battalions were formerly equipped with 4.2 mortars and have personnel experienced in all aspects of 4.2 inch mortar employment. Due to their language capability and experience a program was undertaken by the 25th ARVN Division to train personnel at various A Camps in the employment of the 4.2 inch mortar including instruction in fire direction control procedures. The CIDG at Hiep Hoa Det A-351 responded enthusiastically to this program. After 3 weeks training CIDG at Hiep Hoa were capable of assuming missions in support of ground operations. This program is to be implemented in newly established A Camps in III CTZ especially those that do not have close artillery fire support.

c. ITEM: Training of Intelligence Sergeants. (Co D)

DISCUSSION: Intelligence Sergeants in A Detachments use low level agent nets to obtain information of Viet Cong units in their areas. In many cases these nets are the primary means available to maintain basic OB information on these units. Most of the intelligence sergeants have little training or experience in methods of control of their sources or methods which can be used to check the reliability of information received or the source himself. As a result, information received is often accepted without any established basis for accurately evaluating the information. A partial solution to this problem is the use of MI specialists to assist and advise the detachment Intelligence Sergeants as is currently done.

OBSERVATION: The formal training of Special Forces Intelligence Sergeants should include instruction in the establishment, testing, and handling of low level agent nets as they exist in Vietnam. Assignment of untrained personnel to this duty should be avoided as OJT must be given by qualified personnel, and these are not sufficiently available.
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d. ITEM: Marksmanship Training. (Det B-33)

DISCUSSION: In order to gain the maximum effectiveness of available firepower all CSF were given an intensified program of marksmanship training. Competition between squad, platoon and company size units was developed which helped to create interest in the program.

OBSERVATION: CSF Troops are particularly responsive to training when there is a reward of some type for training excellence. An effective method to create and maintain interest was to keep an accurate score of the individual's performance during marksmanship training and to award appropriate badges at the completion of the training program.

e. ITEM: CIDG Marksmanship Training. (Det B-32)

DISCUSSION: It is frequently quite difficult to construct a regulation rifle range at an A detachment. The need still exists, however, to provide marksmanship training to the CIDG.

OBSERVATION: By placing targets at various distances from the berm and using these targets for practice, an informal but effective marksmanship program can be initiated.

f. ITEM: Forward Observer Training for CIDG. (Det 3-32)

DISCUSSION: Situations frequently arise in the field when a separate CIDG element such as a security group for an overnight position needs artillery support, and no SF can be with them to adjust the fire. In cases such as this, the CIDG must send the correction to the VNSF (frequently using an HT-1) the VNSF gives the correction to the USASF who relays it to the artillery FDC.

OBSERVATION: A simple, but effective means of teaching the CIDG FO procedures is to divide them into two groups, then after basic FO procedures are explained, one group sits on the berm of the camp and the other goes to an 81mm mortar position. Targets are selected around the camp, and the CIDG are required to bring the mortar fire onto the target. After one group becomes proficient, it is rotated to the mortar. It has been found that the only means of adjustment that the CIDG can understand is the gun-target line method.

g. ITEM: Procurement of Interpreters (Det A-413)

DISCUSSION: Good interpreters are hard to find. When one is found, personality problems arise and the interpreter usually ends up working for the USASF team and being distrusted by the VN, or vice-versa. Recently, one of the CRP leaders in this camp, upon reaching the age of 35, was discharged from the CSF. He was sent to Interpreter School, and arrangements have been made to re-hire him as an interpreter upon graduation. Thus, this camp will gain an interpreter who:
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(1) Has the unquestioned respect of the CSF.

(2) Has an already established authority, is capable of understanding tactical requirements and, if necessary, is capable of making and enforcing spot decisions of his own.

(3) Has long ago earned the respect and, in many cases, has become a personal friend of both USASF and VNSF personnel in camp.

OBSERVATION: Suitable ranking CSF approaching retirement age may be sent to Interpreter School prior to discharge, to be re-hired as interpreters in their own camps upon discharge. Where the advantages outlined above outweigh the fact that their knowledge of English might fall below the desired level, re-hiring on the spot, even without the benefit of Interpreter School, should be given consideration.

h. ITEM: Interpreters.

DISCUSSION: The Dong Ba Thin training center has the mission of training CIDC soldiers, who, for the most part, are of Montagnard origin and do not speak the Vietnamese language. Interpreters that often accompany such students are only of a bi-lingual capability (English - Montagnard), and are not able to translate the classes, which are given in Vietnamese, into the particular dialect of Montagnard spoken by the students. Thus, numerous students gain little by attending certain classes.

OBSERVATION: Interpreters with a tri-lingual capability (English-Vietnamese-Montagnard) are necessary for successful training of CIDC personnel at a Vietnamese training center.

i. ITEM: Training aids.

DISCUSSION: There is a critical shortage of training aids for use at the Dong Ba Thin Training Center. This detachment has attempted to construct them, but the numbers fall far short of what is needed. The Training Center Aids Section also lacks the manpower and facilities needed to fulfill the requirement. Most critical need is for wood mock-ups of all types of weapons and other equipment, which would somewhat alleviate the language problem mentioned above.

OBSERVATION: Training aids are absolutely necessary for the effective training of indigenous personnel, especially when a language barrier exists.
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4. (C) Intelligence.

a. ITEM: Optimum Use of Polygraph on Indigenous Subjects. (Op S-2)

DISCUSSION: Adequate polygraph equipment and trained examiners are in short supply in RVN. The polygraph has been determined to be a useful aid in investigations involving Vietnamese suspects or subjects. In order to conserve manpower and equipment it is essential that certain preparations be made by the unit requiring polygraph services prior to arrival of the examiner. A detailed personal history statement concerning the subject should be prepared. Subject should be thoroughly interrogated using normal passive interrogation techniques when subject is a suspect. A suspect must be segregated from other Vietnamese personnel and suspects. The complete result of the interrogation should be reduced to written format in both Vietnamese and English. Items of information to be verified should be selected. A suitable and separate examining area, cooled or air conditioned and as sound-proofed as possible, must be made available. Subject should be monitored to preclude his use of drugs, narcotics, or alcohol.

OBSERVATIONS: Units requiring use of polygraph investigative techniques should make preparations as indicated above to insure optimum utilization of equipment and examiners.

b. ITEM: USASF/VNSF Collection Operations. (Op S-2)

DISCUSSION: Difficulties have arisen on occasion because regulations and directives were not available in both English and Vietnamese languages.

OBSERVATION: All Operational documents must be bilingual to facilitate understanding and a cooperative effort for mission accomplishment.

c. ITEM: Source Control Procedures. (Op S-2)

DISCUSSION: Source control procedures for processing a name trace action through the MACV Source Register and for obtaining operational interest in a prospective source was accomplished simultaneously by the submission of a name trace request by the interested detachment. MACV has now changed the procedure, requiring consecutive submission of a name trace request and registering for operational interest.

OBSERVATION: The Source Control Section of the Collection Branch, S-2, 5th SFGB, devised 5th SFGB Form 71R (Informant/Source Biographical Information Worksheet) which contains all of the information necessary for both name trace action and registration action. The originator submits the form to the Source Control Section which then extracts the necessary information to submit a name trace request. Upon return of the name Trace Request the necessary information is extracted from the form to submit a request for Operational Interest. The fact that both of these actions are initiated by the Source Control Section saves that time that would be required by separate submission of the actions by the originating detachment and insures the forms are complete and correct.

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d. ITEM: Establishment of a Counter-Intelligence Net (Det B-33)

DISCUSSION: It is extremely difficult to recruit a counter-intelligence agent from within a well-established Camp Strike Force Company since loyalties have been firmly established, and because it is difficult to establish who is trustworthy. Attempting to insert an agent into a camp strike force company as a replacement is also difficult since all newcomers are naturally suspects.

OBSERVATION: One solution to this problem is to have an agent trained at USASF Company level and then inserted into the Camp Strike Force when it commences training. Control of the agent can then be passed to the operational detachment intelligence sergeant.

e. ITEM: Agents (Det B-34)

DISCUSSION: An SF agent was detained by a conventional US unit operating in SF TAOR.

OBSERVATION: Operations of agents must be fully coordinated with combat operations within TAOR to prevent detainment and/or possible injury from friendly patrols, ambushes or H&I fires.

f. ITEM: Agents (Det B-34)

DISCUSSION: An SF agent was detained by an SF combat operation.

OBSERVATION: An agent must have means of identifying himself even when units are aware of agent's operations.

g. ITEM: Establishing Viet Cong patterns of movement and base areas (Det B-35)

DISCUSSION: In order to plan and conduct operations to interdict Viet Cong lines of communication and locate base areas, some system must be established to record data on the Viet Cong's movements, contacts, and intelligence reports received by friendly forces.

OBSERVATION: By utilizing acetate overlays to record the reported movements of Viet Cong units, friendly and enemy initiated contacts and agent reports on a monthly basis, a pattern of the Viet Cong lines of communication can be established. By recording these overlays over a period of ninety days and denoting heavily used areas, it is also possible to determine the Viet Cong base areas.

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h. ITEM: Capture of VC Suspects. (Co A)

DISCUSSION: Recent discoveries of VC suspects have led several camps to hold these individuals until proper interrogation (and if possible, polygraphing) can take place. Due to lack of adequate U.S. interment facilities and the advisory nature of the USASF role to the VNSF the suspects are placed under the control of the VNSF with the U.S. disclaiming further responsibilities. While it is true that we are in the advisory role, it should be of prime importance to the intelligence sergeant to insure that personnel who may have valuable information are guarded closely until evacuation to a higher command has been completed. Prisoners should be kept under surveillance and close security at all times. There is no excuse for the escape of prisoners, VC or VC suspects, from any camp.

OBSERVATION: Many suspected VC have escaped while awaiting interrogation. Proper handling of prisoners must be emphasized to the VNSF to insure that no further incidents of this nature occur.

i. ITEM: VC Sabotage. (Co A)

DISCUSSION: Camps have reported incidents of possible mechanical sabotage. A favorite target of sabotage for penetration low-level agents has been the camp defense positions. Many incidents have involved the discovering of claymore wires being cut or being misused in the camp. CIDG troops also have found the C-130 in the mines useful for cooking purposes. Bolts have been found missing from automatic weapons, vital gears from machinery, loader straps cut or frayed. It may prove impossible to check all possible likely sabotage points at a Special Forces camp, however key positions and equipment, the loss of which would be detrimental to the camp's effort, such as AW positions and explosive barriers, should be checked as a matter of daily routine.

OBSERVATION: Simple daily checking of the defensive positions and key points can prevent loss of valuable weapons and equipment. All incidents of suspected sabotage should be immediately investigated to determine cause and responsibility.

j. ITEM: Personnel Reliability Program. (Co A)

DISCUSSION: Although most B Detachments have a personnel security system in operation for permanent indigenous workers, in most cases procedures governing clearances and access for daily workers have been, at best, barely adequate. Permanent employees are normally checked through the MSS. However, due to the rapid change-over of daily labor, proper security screening is not possible. These temporary labor personnel should have some reliable means of identification in order to govern their access to certain areas and to make military personnel aware that these people need more supervision and control than is normally required. Usually simple, bright colored badges of some sort will be sufficient for identification.
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OBSERVATION: Access of temporary indigenous workers must be checked in all detachments and the workers should have some visible means of identification in order to govern their access to certain areas and make military personnel aware that these people need more supervision and control than is normally required. A simple, brightly colored badge of some sort would be sufficient for identification.

k. ITEM: Coordination with USAF FAC's. (Det B-32)

DISCUSSION: Province FAC's make many flights over Special Forces TAOR's and are trained to observe trail activity, base camp locations, and bunker complexes where untrained personnel cannot detect them.

OBSERVATION: By conducting daily coordination meetings with Province FAC's and by getting the A detachment intelligence sergeants to fly "back seat" when they go up, a great amount of intelligence can be gathered for the A detachment.

1. ITEM: Recording of Information. (Det B-32)

DISCUSSION: Frequently at A detachment level a large amount of information is recorded on maps. After several months the maps become extremely cluttered.

OBSERVATION: By making a large number of acetate symbols information can be temporarily recorded on the map in an easy to read manner. These acetate symbols can be marked with unit identification and time of report. When the information is no longer of immediate interest, the symbol is removed. The acetate symbol is then retained with the written report and is available for future use if needed.

m. ITEM: Guard Systems. (Co A)

DISCUSSION: When either organizing a security force or reorganizing an already existing one it will be advantageous to assign a US NCO for full time duty, if possible, to supervise the indigenous personnel. Company A has such an NCOIC who performs full time duties in this capacity. He performs such routine measures as checking the guards several times during the day and conducting formations and inspections. The many details and supervisions which would normally fall among many staff sections have been centralized as the responsibility of this one NCO. The security force is organized along American lines with rank divisions with one member of the force acting as platoon leader and directly responsible to the U.S. NCOIC. Working closely in many aspects of the security forces needs, the U.S. NCOIC has adequate time to observe leadership potential with the force, determine needs as they arise, and enforce local duty regulations.

OBSERVATION: Unless indigenous guards are closely supervised there is a tendency on their part to slack off and do just enough to get by.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 January 1968

5. (U) LOGISTICS:

a. ITEM: Damage to multifuel Engines

DISCUSSION: In nearly all cases where the multifuel engines have failed, the cause of the failure was due to water entering into the engine through the fuel system. Since water cannot be compressed, just a little water on top of a piston will break the piston or the connecting rod, bend the crankshaft, or damage the engine block.

OBSERVATION: The solution is quite simple but difficult to accomplish where there is no daily motor stables. The operator must be taught to drain the fuel filters daily as part of his before operation service. He must be cautioned not to ford these vehicles beyond 30 inches depth of water for the 2½ and 5 ton trucks without special fording equipment, and should not exceed 4 miles per hour speed while fording.

b. ITEM: Reporting Deadlined Equipment

DISCUSSION: A simple and direct method of reporting routine deadlined equipment in the units was needed.

OBSERVATION: A monthly equipment status report was established using DA Form 2R06. This report is sent directly from the units to the Group Maintenance Officer at the SFOB in two copies. The report is received by the stock record section and any parts on hand needed to repair deadlined equipment are immediately issued to the unit. One copy of the report is returned to the unit indicating the action taken by the Group Maintenance Facility.

c. ITEM: 30 Caliber Carbine M2

DISCUSSION: In the normal use of the 30 caliber carbine M2 the disconnector spring and lunger are sometimes either lost or broken. If there are no replacement parts, no adequate temporary replacements can be utilized.

OBSERVATION: The M1 rifle clip release spring will serve as a temporary replacement for the disconnector spring.
d. **ITEM:** Mobile Maintenance Team (Gp S-4)

**DISCUSSION:** A satisfactory program of Preventive Maintenance and a procedure for requesting and storing repair parts was found to be lacking in some units. A mobile maintenance team was organized at Group Level for the purpose of assisting supporting units with all aspects of their maintenance program.

**OBSERVATION:** Commanders should investigate the possibility of using an improvised maintenance contact team if none is authorized. Experience indicates that their assistance in records management alone justifies their use.

e. **ITEM:** Salvage of storage batteries with broken terminals. (Det B-35)

**DISCUSSION:** It has been observed that otherwise serviceable storage batteries have been discarded due to one or more of the lead terminals being broken.

**OBSERVATION:** An effective solution is to place a nut of sufficient inner diameter over the terminal stub and connect twelve gauge wire attached to a carbon core from BA-30 to the other terminal. Short the core on the defective terminal. Once the core becomes red hot, melt down the defective terminal and add the necessary amount of lead solder to restore the terminal to its former size. After the lead cools, unscrew the nut and the battery is then restored to full serviceability. This expedient has resulted in reducing vehicle deadlines within the detachment and would, if applied on a wider scale, result in great savings to the United States Army.

f. **ITEM:** Storage of large amounts of ammunition. (Det B-3b)

**DISCUSSION:** Special Forces camps are frequently reinforced by artillery units which necessitate storage of large amounts of heavy ammunition inside the camps.

**OBSERVATION:** Primary concern should be given to storing such ammunition in small dispersed lots with overhead cover to prevent damage and injury from exploding ammunition should a portion of the camp catch fire during enemy attacks.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

**g. ITEM: Bill of Materials for New Construction** (Co A)

**DISCUSSION:** It has been found through experience that having civilian contractors start on building projects prior to having all construction material available has been unsatisfactory. Although they can start work, there are many delays and possibilities of contracts being broken because materials cannot be supplied on a timely basis due to the unavailability of supplies and materials.

**OBSERVATION:** At least 80 percent of all supplies and materials should be on hand before initiating a civilian contract.

**h. ITEM: Loading of Timber on Semi-Trailer Trucks.** (Co A)

**DISCUSSION:** There have been difficulties experienced in tying down lumber and materials on vehicles due to the shortage of log chains and boomers (used for tightening). When chains are available, boomers usually are not available.

**OBSERVATION:** A substitute method which proved effective was to use a 1½ inch banding machine and banding to tie the loads of timber down. Then use stakes on the side of the vehicle as a back-up if the banding breaks.

**i. ITEM: Air Movement of Heavy Engineer Equipment.** (Staff Engineer)

**DISCUSSION:** On initial entry into a new CIDG camp in the delta (IV CTZ) it was found that a dragline would be required to construct a berm that would protect the camp against high water and from direct fire weapons. The berm was necessary because the high water table precluded digging underground structures. A 20 ton crane with dragline attachment was disassembled into six pieces light enough to be lifted 11.4 kilometers by CH 54. The disassembly took three men 16 hours (51 man hours) using another crane and a rough terrain fork lift. The reassembly on site took the same crew 24 hours (72 man hours) using jacks and blocks. The CH 54 lifted the crane structure onto the undercarriage. The 20 ton crane was disassembled into the following CH 54 lifts that were carried into the site in the order indicated below:

1. Dragline bucket, track assemblies and boom.
2. Undercarriage.
OBSERVATION: The CH 54 can carry large items of construction equipment into areas heretofore considered inaccessible, providing appropriate disassembly is accomplished. The type of equipment that can be carried is limited only by extent that it can be disassembled practically and the local lifting capacity of the CH 54.

j. ITEM: Air Lifting "Pre-Fab" Buildings. (Co A)

DISCUSSION: It has been found that pre-fabricating buildings prior to moving them a great distance by truck and by air is totally uneconomical. A semi-truck has to be used to haul these pre-fabs and due to the bulk of the item, only about five tons can be placed on a vehicle capable of carrying twenty-five tons. When sling loading pre-fabs from CH47 helicopters, enough weight cannot be put into a sling to keep it from swinging under the aircraft. When pre-fabs reach their destination many are extensively damaged and have to be re-enforced or nailed together again.

OBSERVATION: A solution is to pre cut the timber, bundle it, and transport it to the site. Put the buildings together on site. This saves an enormous amount of time in transportation of these items both by CH47 and truck. All materials can be transported in about one-third the amount of time.

k. ITEM: Hauling of Palletized Cargo on 2½ Ton Cargo Trucks. (CO A)

DISCUSSION: It was found that by utilizing 2½ ton cargo trucks this unit could not meet the requirements of getting equipment to and from the Air Force loading ramps. One reason was the unavailability of trucks and drivers. Also, only three pallets of cargo or equipment could be hauled by each truck.

OBSERVATION: A solution to this type of problem is to cut one side of the vehicle bed, therefore allowing double pallets to be loaded on the vehicle. The truck then has a total carrying capacity of six pallets and reduces in half the number of trips that would normally be required. It is also much easier to load the vehicle using forklifts.

l. ITEM: POL Containers. (Co A)

DISCUSSION: It has been found that POL containers, such as the 600 gallon petrol containers, are at a critical shortage in Vietnam. Much time has been spent trying to keep these containers refilled.
AVGC-C

15 February 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 January 1966 (S)

OBSERVATION: A solution is to weld together two shipping containers used for 2½ ton or larger truck engine and make a spout on it. This container will hold an additional 300 gallons of POL.

m. **ITEM:** Equipment Lost on Shipping Line. (Co A)

DISCUSSION: It was noticed that a lot of supplies were being lost or stolen from our shipping lines. After a small box of supplies were packaged, it was put on the respective unit's shipping line. However, many of these small items were being misplaced or stolen enroute.

OBSERVATION: A better method is to put all small boxes together in one large pallet covered on the tops and sides with cardboard. Band the supplies to the pallet with a banding machine and then mark the issue voucher number on the box instead of the item description.

n. **ITEM:** Breakage of Rice Bags During Air Drops. (Co A)

DISCUSSION: In the past the breakage of rice bags upon impact with the ground during air drops has caused loss of rice and time on the drop zone.

OBSERVATION: Put the 100 kilo bags of rice inside a 200 kilo bag when air dropping. If the 100 kilo bag breaks, the other bag will hold all the rice and it will not be spread over the drop zone.
CONFLICTED

15 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

6. (C) Other

a. ITEM: Distribution of CA Projects and CA Commodities. (Co A)

DISCUSSION: Many Americans, believing that they understand the Vietnamese, have attempted to begin CA projects and distribute CA commodities without considering the overall effect of the project and without coordinating these activities through their Vietnamese counterparts.

OBSERVATION: Americans involved in CA activities must bear in mind that American values and customs do not necessarily correspond with Vietnamese values and customs, especially in remote areas where the majority of the populace is uneducated. CA projects should not be started unless there is a definite need for them. The people that will be aided by the projects must be willing to work for them and understand the purpose of the projects. All CA activities must be very carefully planned and coordinated through Vietnamese counterparts and officials who have a much better understanding of the Vietnamese people.

b. ITEM: Distribution of Gifts as a Civic Action Project. (Det B-3l)

DISCUSSION: During the Christmas holidays, gifts donated by charitable organizations were distributed to CIDG dependents and other civilian populace. Although there were numerous gifts, there was not a sufficient amount to make a meaningful distribution, i.e. one family received only one gift package which contained a dress or a doll. The family consisted of two girls and three boys. As a result, some rapport was lost.

OBSERVATION: Insure that sufficient items are on hand for such distributions even if small items have to be locally purchased with funds available.

c. ITEM: CA/PSYOPS Interest at "A" Detachments. (Det B-32)

DISCUSSION: The heavy operational and administrative requirements placed on an "A" detachment frequently hinder their taking an active interest in CA/PSYOPS activities.

OBSERVATION: The "B" Detachment S5 can solve this problem by getting out to the "A" detachments to assist in CA/PSYOPS activities and provide materials. Once several projects have been completed, members of the "A" detachment generally become enthusiastic about CA/PSYOPS.

d. ITEM: PSYOP Films (Co A)

DISCUSSION: JUSPACO has a limited stock of Vietnamese speaking propaganda films. It is felt that more and a greater variety are needed.

OBSERVATION: The Vietnamese Information Service, VIS, has a stock of propaganda and educational films. These films, if used, would greatly enhance the overall CA and PSYOPS programs.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 February 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

c. ITEM: Propaganda Distribution (Co D)

DISCUSSION: It often occurs that the VC distribute leaflets and other types of propaganda after dark while allied forces are not in the area.

OBSERVATION: The VIS Chief in the area should counteract this activity as soon as possible by conducting his own propaganda activities.

d. ITEM: Aerial Broadcast Exploitation (Co C)

DISCUSSION: After aerial broadcasts and leaflet drops, favorable situations are not being exploited because SYOPS personnel do not know how to report the effectiveness of such actions. On occasion such personnel also are unaware of the correct method for requesting the needed assistance.

OBSERVATION: During orientation briefings, all incoming personnel should be given specific instruction to eliminate this problem.

e. ITEM: Standardization of SYOPS Equipment (Group S-5)

DISCUSSION: Due to a lack of standardized SYOPS equipment, some units are using make-shift or commercial amplifiers that cannot be repaired in Army Signal units.

OBSERVATION: Unless units not directly supported by a SYOPS company are furnished standardized equipment, these units will continue to ignore use of SYOPS or continue to have minimal effectiveness.

f. ITEM: Support of Hoi Chanh Centers (B-32)

DISCUSSION: Tay Minh, B-32, has provided the local Hoi Chanh Center with basic materials from which the returnees are making bricks, culverts, furniture, etc.

OBSERVATION: This program has noticeably improved Hoi Chanh morale and provided small financial support and professional skills for them. It should be implemented elsewhere.

g. ITEM: Maximum Utilization of SYOP Aircraft (Co A)

DISCUSSION: In the past it has been found that we were not utilizing our available SYOP aircraft to the maximum because we were selecting only one target area per flight.

OBSERVATION: After a study of current policies, it was found that we could utilize one aircraft for three or four different target areas during one flight. Care must be taken to properly space and mix leaflets while they are being loaded on the aircraft and close coordination must be maintained with the flight crew to insure that the proper tapes and leaflets are employed over the proper target areas.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

j. ITEM: Hand Dissemination of leaflets, (Co A)

DISCUSSION: The majority of the leaflets disseminated in Vietnam are air dropped. Although this is an effective, fast method of disseminating propaganda, many times leaflets are wasted due to weather conditions, pilot errors, etc.

OBSERVATION: It has been found that when leaflets are hand disseminated it arouses the curiosity of the receivers and allows for discussion. Leaflets can be effectively hand disseminated by Political Warfare Teams, Armed Propaganda Teams, and soldiers, but care must be taken to assure that the personnel distributing the leaflets understand what the leaflets say and are able to further explain the leaflets if questions should arise.

k. ITEM: Utilization of VNSF Aircraft for PSYOP Missions, (Co A)

DISCUSSION: In the past, we had been using only USAF aircraft for our PSYOP missions. Due to the limited number of aircraft available for PSYOP use, aircraft were not always available for immediate exploitation of PSYOP intelligence.

OBSERVATION: Through VNSF counterparts, aircraft for PSYOP missions can be obtained from the VNAF. This has been accomplished in Co A, and we now have an average of two VNAF PSYOP aircraft per week. VNSF personnel should accompany the aircraft on all missions to become familiar with conducting PSYOP missions and to insure that the proper target areas are covered.

l. ITEM: AN/PRC-74 (Sig Off)

DISCUSSION: This radio is designed for 12 volt operation on a vehicular mount. However, if used it must be completely insulated from touching the vehicle due to the 24 volt system on Army vehicles.

OBSERVATION: If not completely insulated, the radio will overheat and burn out.

m. ITEM: Waterproofing of HT-1 Radios (Sig Off)

DISCUSSION: Tests are being conducted to waterproof the HT-1. A thin neoprene membrane is placed over the speaker assembly sealing it with silicon grease. A neoprene gasket with silicon grease is sealing the screw.

OBSERVATION: The set is still far from waterproof but the modification has limited moisture penetration considerably.

n. ITEM: Emergency Communication Packets (Sig Off)

DISCUSSION: Emergency installation and/or restoration of existing communications require the availability of complete emergency communications packets.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

OBSERVATION: Experience has proven that a team going into an area to set up emergency or restore existing communications, must arrive with everything required for a basic Special Forces Communications System to include a 110 volt generator.

o. ITEM: Emergency Communications (Sig Off)

DISCUSSION: Recent attacks on Special Forces Camps have proven that the first items destroyed will be all antennas above ground. Experience has proven the AN/GRC-109 is the least of all available radios on which to load unconventional antennas.

OBSERVATION: The use of the AN/GRC-109 emergency communication should be stressed. Emergency antennas either underground or under the roof of command bunkers are much easier to load with the AN/GRC-109.

p. ITEM: Receiving and Efficiently Copying Incoming Messages from "A" Detachments. (Det B-35)

DISCUSSION: During the time of enemy contact or periods of heavy administrative traffic there is to a certain degree, some confusion and repeating of radio traffic.

OBSERVATION: The use of a tape recorder to tape contacts and all messages for later play back and copying will lessen the possibility of mistakes. Tapes are easily destroyed by crossing, and after use a number of times burned.

q. ITEM: Antenna Lead-ins (Det B-35)

DISCUSSION: During numerous mortar attacks, antenna lead-ins have been cut by mortar fragments.

OBSERVATION: It has been learned that if antenna lead-ins are over 20 feet high in the air and terminate at the communications bunker in several different places, chances of antenna lead-ins being cut by shell fragments are lessened.

r. ITEM: Radio Repairman (Det B-35)

DISCUSSION: During the last 90 day period it has been noted that this detachment and its subordinate "A" detachments have had numerous radios that needed repair.

OBSERVATION: "B" Detachments and subordinate "A" Detachments have numerous radios. When one radio needs repairing the detachment is short this item of equipment. If Special Forces "B" Detachments were authorized a radio repairman and spare parts, most of the radios could be repaired at the "B" Detachment's location. Under this system radios could be ready for use much faster than under the present system. Also this would decentralize the repair system in the same way Special Forces units are decentralized.
Communications School (Det B-35)

DISCUSSION: It is a slow and tedious task to give communication instruction to a group of CIDG troops by the use of an interpreter.

OBSERVATION: During the past 90 days ten CIDG troops attended a two week communication school on the operation and maintenance of the RC 6, RC 10, RC 25, HT-1 and CH 20 radios. This was accomplished by giving the instruction to the VNSF communications supervisor and having the VNSF give the instruction to the CIDG troops. Instruction will be more thorough and VNSF will now know more about the equipment. The USASF advises the VNSF and he in turn instructs the CIDG troops.

Improved Teletype Commo to "B" Detachments (Co A)

DISCUSSION: Radio-teletype equipment at B Detachments is difficult to maintain and operate due to limited repair facilities, sensitive equipment and limited transportation for repairmen.

OBSERVATION: Ten B Detachments were given circuits over VHF systems to the Co A comm center. These point to point circuits eliminated the need for radios for teletype commo and thus reduced the maintenance requirement considerably.

Full Duplex Radio-Teletype Operation (Co A)

DISCUSSION: Due to close proximity of transmitters to receivers, Co A could not send and receive radio-teletype messages at the same time.

OBSERVATION: One T-368 transmitter was installed approximately 200 meters from the comm center, eliminating interference and allowing full duplex radio-teletype operation.

Signal Equipment (HC-106 Amplifier) (Co D)

DISCUSSION: The HC-106 amplifier designed to boost power output of AN/RC-74 from 15 watts to 100 watts is battery powered (Ba-30) or adaptable to AC power source. (Ba 386 battery is suitable for the amplifier)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

OBSERVATION: Use of the amplifier was best suited to sites where AC power source could be made available. The amplifier was tested under combat conditions on two separate occasions for periods ranging from one to three weeks and its performance was excellent. The use of one amplifier per two AN/RC-74 radios makes an effective substitute for the KWM-2A.

x. ITEM: Signal Equipment (AB-105 Antenna Tower) (Co D)

DISCUSSION: The AB-105 antenna tower is metal and is 73 feet high. The ground area required is 67 foot radius for three supporting guys. Both the antenna base and guy base require concrete support. The tower is adaptable for a detachment use at lesser heights, 40 feet, to meet camp defensive requirements.

OBSERVATION: The antenna tower is not the most practical item for Special Forces use because of complications in erection. However, it is suitable in lieu of lighter type towers. Erection is most efficiently accomplished with use of heavy duty cranes. Field construction can be affected by use of gin pole device.

y. ITEM: Availability of whole blood at CIDG hospitals. (Op Surgeon)

DISCUSSION: Whole blood is not available to CIDG patients through Vietnamese or US. SF sources. Fresh whole blood available from US military medical facilities must often remain available for US personnel until its expiration period of 21 days elapses. For these reasons, CIDG hospitals have been obtaining whole blood from US military hospitals which is just 21 days old and utilizing it on CIDG patients until the blood is 28 days old, after which unused blood is discarded. The outdated blood appears to provide as much benefit as fresh whole blood and no detrimental effects have been noted.

OBSERVATION: Outdated blood can be utilized for at least a week after its expiration date without untoward effects.

z. ITEM: Preventive Medicine (Op Surgeon)

DISCUSSION: Twelve cases of plague were reported among indigenous personnel in a village near the CIDG camp at Ha Thanh in I CTZ on 7 Jan 68. Of these, two cases were fatal. Investigation revealed that personnel contracting the disease entered the area after the Special Forces plague immunization program was completed and therefore had not been immunized.

OBSERVATION: Adequate preventive medicine cannot be implemented until thorough control of the population and its movements is maintained.

aa. ITEM: Dental Treatments on Med Caps (Co D)

DISCUSSION: It has been found that attendance at Med Caps is far greater, and that Med Caps are more successful when dental treatments are included.

OBSERVATION: Every effort should be made to include dental treatments on Med Caps.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 Jan 68 (U)

bb. ITEM: Kitchen Help (Co D)

DISCUSSION: It has been found that kitchen help previously treated for intestinal parasites have since become reinfected.

OBSERVATION: Kitchen help must be examined and treated periodically for intestinal parasites.

c. ITEM: Water Purification (Co D)

DISCUSSION: During the dry season the water level throughout the Delts is considerably lower and the runoff appreciably lessened or completely halted. The contamination of the remaining water is thus increased.

OBSERVATION: At the beginning of the dry season more emphasis must be placed on water purification due to increased levels of contamination.

dd. ITEM: Payment of Subsistence to Hospitalized CIDG Personnel (Det B-35)

DISCUSSION: Hospitalized CIDG personnel in this detachment's dispensary often complained that they were receiving inadequate food even though they were receiving a subsistence allowance.

OBSERVATION: These complaints were curtailed by contracting with the wife of a local CIDG to receive the subsistence and, in return, provide three hot meals a day for all hospitalized personnel. Complaints have virtually ceased and personnel are now receiving an adequate diet.

ee. ITEM: Construction Fill (Co D)

DISCUSSION:

(1) During the planning and construction of Special Forces camps in the delta region of Vietnam, one is faced with the problem of finding or making available large quantities of fill for berm construction, revetments and general cover for personnel positions and ammunition storage when the dry land available is about the size of the desired camp and its highest point is only one to two feet above the water line.

(2) In the past a small dozer had been used to work outside the camp in an attempt to police up sufficient fill to complete all camp projects. This method ended in the dozer getting stuck and having to go inside the camp and dig down in an attempt to get sufficient fill. This caused the camp to be lower and wetter than was desired and left a berm around the camp that was not adequate during flooding.

(3) A crawler mounted crane with a dragline attachment was visualized as the best piece of equipment to obtain fill from above, at, or below the water's surface and in sufficient quantity to construct the desired size berms and fortification. With this piece of equipment a small piece of dry ground about the size of the camp is all that is required and the dragline could dredge sufficient soils to complete construction projects.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 Jan 68 (U)

OBSERVATION: A 10 ton crawler mounted crane weighing 39,000 lbs and positioned at a staging area within flying range of a CH-54 helicopter from the construction site can be dismantled by skilled mechanics, lifted to the site by CH-54 aircraft and reassembled with hand tools. It can be operated from dry land or on wooden pads in swampy areas and efficiently dredge up enough materials to construct an efficient Special Forces camp.

SECTION 2, PART II - RECOMMENDATIONS

NONE.

JONATHAN F. IADD
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

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1 - CINCUSARPAC (ATTN: J3 Special Operations) APO 96610
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1 - CG, 8th SFGA, 1st SF, APO 96837
1 - CG, 10th SFGA, 1st SF, APO 09108
1 - Co A, 5th SFGA, 1st SF, APO 96227
1 - Co B, 5th SFGA, 1st SF, APO 96318
1 - Co C, 5th SFGA, 1st SF, APO 96337
1 - Co D, 5th SFGA, 1st SF, APO 96915
1 - Det E-55, 5th SFGA, 1st SF, APO 96243
ATDSC-DST (15 Feb 68) 1 st Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1968 (RCS CSFDR-65) (U) (UIC #M4X6AA)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 5 MAR 68

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT,
AFO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters,
1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces (AAG). 

2. Correct UIC Number M4X6AA.

3. Concur with report. Report is considered adequate.

4. A copy of this endorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit
through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, VFC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
HQ 5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF
GPOP-DT (15 Feb 68) (U) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Special Forces Gp (Abn) for
Period Ending 31 January 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 29 APR 1968
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Assl AG
1. (C) Operations:
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2. (C) Contacts:
   a. Contacts resulting from Friendly Offensive Action:
      |     |     |     |     |
      |     | 166 | 350 | 164 | 224 | 904  |
   b. VC attacks on installations and convoys:
      |     | 87  | 208 | 191 | 219 | 705  |
   c. Incidents (booby traps, mines, assassinations, etc.):
      |     | 19  | 40  | 15  | 121 | 225  |

3. (C) Confirmed VC Losses:
   a. KIA | 339 | 752 | 553 | 397 | 2041 |
   b. WIA | 64  | 50  | 91  | 60  | 208  |
   c. CPT  | 32  | 127 | 9   | 60  | 228  |

d. Quarterly comparison of confirmed VC losses country-wide:
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4. (C) USASF Losses:
   a. KIA | 7  | 6  | 14 | 10 | 37 |
   b. WIA | 6  | 71 | 51 | 15 | 146 |
   c. MIA | 1  | 0  | 2  | 2  | 5  |

d. Quarterly comparison of USASF casualties country-wide:
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<td>3</td>
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<td>4th Quarter 67</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>188</td>
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5. (C) VNSF Losses:
   a. KIA | 0  | 2  | 2  | 3  | 7  |
   b. WIA | 0  | 8  | 12 | 6  | 26 |
   c. MIA | 0  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 2  |

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

Incl 2 to 5th SFPA QRL for Quarter Ending 31 January 1968
STATISTICAL DATA (CONTD)

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</table>

6. (C) CIDG Losses:
   a. KIA
      | 32 | 128 | 120 | 141 | 421   |
   b. WIA
      | 63 | 401 | 547 | 243 | 1254  |
   c. MIA
      | 2  | 0   | 87  | 15  | 104   |
   d. Quarterly comparison of CIDG casualties country-wide:

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<td>121</td>
<td>1254</td>
<td>104</td>
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</table>

7. (C) RF/PF Losses:
   a. KIA
      | 11 | 8  | 16  | 101 | 136   |
   b. WIA
      | 72 | 5  | 45  | 219 | 374   |
   c. MIA
      | 0  | 0  | 0   | 28  | 28    |
   d. Quarterly comparison of RF/PF casualties country-wide:

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
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<tr>
<td>4th Quarter 67</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. (C) Weapons:
   a. Friendly weapons lost:
      | 11 | 43 | 173 | 218 | 475   |
   b. Enemy Weapons lost:
      | 158| 430| 74  | 139 | 801   |
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96240

AVGB-CT

7 February 1968

SUBJECT: Quarterly Combat Development Report

TO: See Distribution

Inclosed is a summary of the highlights of the 5th SPGA Combat Developments Program for the period 1 November 1967 - 31 January 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

D.E. BROCK
MAJ INF
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION

A

Incl. 1 to 5th SPGA ORR, 1 Nov 67 to 31 Jan 68

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1. (C) Seven mine firing switches, NFS-XL, were received by the 5th SFGA on 24 October for test and evaluation. This switch, developed due to a request put in by 5th SFGA to the Limited Warfare Laboratories, provides a lightweight, battery powered device that will detonate any explosive devices that employ the M-6 or similar electric blasting cap. The switch consists of a waterproof case with connectors to accomodate the firing leads to 10 explosive devices, which may be fired individually, in selected combinations, or all in salvo. The switches have been sent to all the CTZ's for evaluation which has been extended through January. This item appears to be excellent in both camp defense and ambush operations.

2. (C) Minigrenade System. USALWL has developed a series of miniaturized chemical grenades. These are small lightweight items designed to supplement the standard chemical munitions and to enable the soldier to carry a greater variety of munitions without having to increase the weight he must carry. These grenades are built into a small aluminum container similar to the can 35mm film is packaged in; measuring 1.2" by 1.8". The XM-166 white smoke is being received on a monthly allocation and is being distributed to selected units for evaluation. The XM-167 green smoke, XM-168 red smoke, XM-169 yellow smoke have not been received yet, but will be available in the future for evaluation. Other items of this system under development are a white phosphorous and a thermite-incendiary grenade.

3. (U) Portable HF Antenna AN-3 for PRC-64. 5th SFGA received five AN-3 antennas which is a lightweight, compact highly efficient loop antenna. The external tuning and matching network provided will cover the frequency range from 2.0 mhz to 8.5 mhz thus making it compatible with the AN/PRC-64 radio, and the corresponding range of other HF radios. A lightweight mast and guides are provided for use when trees are not available for installation. This antenna during CONUS tests in mountainous terrain has proven to work at ranges in excess of 200 miles with the AN/PRC-64 radio. The antennas were distributed for testing in early November 1967. 5th SFGA tests results so far have been disappointing as no positive two way contact has yet been completed. Specific problems have not yet been identified.

4. (C) Airboat Communications System. The interim system developed by the 5th SFGA Signal Maintenance Facility using the AN/PRC-25 radio and additional modules mounted in a waterproof ammunition box has proven relatively satisfactory. An ESURE request that had been submitted to USALWL is being worked on, with two sets of the systems becoming available after 15 January 1968. This system will use the VRC-12 radio transmitters and will feature CVC helmets with the built in head-set and microphone for the operators. In addition an inquiry from NASA through MACSA may result in efforts to further refine a solution to this problem.
5. In answer to numerous requests from the field the Group Signal Officer has developed and is presently evaluating a simple, continuous signal Agent Radio. This radio is intended for use by friendly agents in villages near CIDG camps. When connected, the radio emits a continuous audible signal at the receiver which is located in the CIDG camp. The receiver is equipped with a directional antenna to determine which agent radio is calling. The CIDG Camp Commander, by establishing a simple code system (e.g., continuous signal means VC in village), can extend his influence further and react more effectively to VC threats to outlying villages. The same field requests have been forwarded through ACTIV for formal development.

6. Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector (PSID). This detector is a sensor system small and light enough (each detector weighs 8 ounces and is the size of a paperback book) to be carried by a patrol. Each system contains four detectors and one monitor. The detector is sensitive enough to detect footsteps at 30 meters and capable of giving alert to monitor units over a distance of one mile. Three PSID's have been received so far and are being evaluated by selected units. Seven more PSID's are due in. In addition two Seismic Intrusion Detectors (SID), a larger detector with greater range and more sensors are being evaluated in the camp defense role.

RECENTLY COMPLETED EVALUATIONS

1. Gunship II Project (Super Spooky). The 5th SFGA assisted the US Air Force in an evaluation program of the Super Spooky aircraft. This aircraft is a modified C-130 which has four 20mm gatling gun cannons, four 7.62mm mini-gun systems, an improved searchlight for both infra-red and visible ground illumination and electronic target acquisition equipment, which gives the aircraft an all weather capability. The Super Spooky not only carries more ammunition but also has the ability to remain over the target for several hours longer than the present C-47 type Spooky. The 5th SFGA portion of the evaluation consisted of emplacing ground radar beacon equipment in five "A" camps in II CTZ. This equipment gave the aircraft an accurate position location on the ground, thereby permitting accurate fire support in any weather, day or night. The evaluation was successfully completed in mid-December and the Super Spooky should become operational in the near future.

2. Manpack Personnel Detector (MPD). The MPD is a device intended to alert the operator to the presence of concealed humans by detecting certain human chemical effluvia. The results of the tests conducted on the ground determined that in the manpacked role the MPD would be of very limited use due to weight, battery life, and changing wind direction. However the devices have given good results when modified and installed on helicopters. 5th SFGA has requested eight modified sets for heliborne use which will be available on request through the Group S-2.

3. Number 4 Special Buckshot, XM-257 rounds for 12 gauge shotgun were received in August 1967 for evaluation and sent out to all companies. This round
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was developed when a requirement was generated for a special shotgen round capable of engaging area targets. A flechette type round was developed and extensively tested; however it was found that a Number 4 buckshot round proved to be superior to the flechette round. This round looks like any standard commercial 12 guage shell, however inwardly it differs by containing hardened buckshot instead of soft commercial lead shot; by having voids between shot filled with granulated plastic and by having the shot column inclosed by a polyethylene sleeve. Shot is hardened and cushioned to obtain pattern uniformity and decreased dispersion over standard shotgun shells. Shot liner reduces barrel wear and maintains shot package configuration during bore travel. When the XM-257 is fired in the hand cocked, 20 inch barrel, riot type shotgun, all of the shot pellets will be in a 40 inch circle at 40 meters. Evaluation was completed in December. The round was found to be superior to the standard shotgun round but not a substitute for the 40mm cannister round.

4. (C) Panel Illumination Marker, XM172 is a 14 X 20 inch plastic panel which contains a chemiluminescent compound sealed between a clear plastic top and an aluminum foil reflecting surface. When the compound inside is exposed to air it emits a blue-green light. It has been tested extensively by Project Delta and found to be useful in extending all types of air-ground operations into the hours of darkness. One drawback is the strong chemical odor emitted by the compound inside. Evaluation reports reflected this deficiency. LSC has a limited supply of these panels for operational use by interested units.

ITEMS DUE IN FOR TEST AND EVALUATION BY 5TH SFGA

1. (C) Position Marker, PM-3. The PM-3 is a modification of the PM-1 previously tested by the 5th SFGA, which has had the smoke payload greatly increased. This marker system is an expendable smoke signal for use in areas having a dense jungle canopy. When the signal is fired the signal assembly penetrates the canopy and travels to an altitude of 300 feet. A parachute stabilizes its fall back into the canopy where two grapnels ejected during flight snag, suspending the signal so the smoke is visible to aircraft. This item was due for testing in September 1967 however it has not yet been received.

2. (C) 40mm Rapid Fire Grenade Launcher Systems. The 5th SFGA was originally scheduled to receive three systems of the rapid fire grenade launcher:

   a. Hand cranked, low velocity.
   b. Automatic, low velocity.
   c. Automatic, high velocity.

These systems all fire the standard high explosive 40mm grenade as used with the
3. (C) Anti-disturbance Firing Switch. This self contained firing switch, about the size of a pack of cigarettes, has a built-in power supply and trembler device. It will detonate an electric cap hooked up to its terminals when, 80 seconds after the activation switch is turned on, the device is disturbed by moving or turning in any manner. Once the switch is turned on, the battery is good for 90 days. The 5th SFGA is attempting to procure these firing devices through CISO from the Navy laboratories where they were developed for the SPMG. Fifty of these have been ordered, delivery date is unknown at this time.

4. (C) Also developed by the Navy Laboratory is a lightweight (mostly aluminum) 40mm pump, four-round shotgun which fires the standard 40mm high explosive grenade. A few of these will be available to 5th SFGA for evaluation in late February.

OTHER ITEMS OF INTEREST

1. (U) A six pound, eight foot pneumatic boat was shown to personnel of the SFOD in December by a representative of MACSA. This lightweight boat folds into an eight by twelve inch roll when deflated. One man can inflate the boat in six minutes and a squad could inflate it in perhaps one minute. The boat appears capable of supporting a full squad of CIDG in river crossing with their weapons and packs inside and the troops holding on outside. A request for development and evaluation has been submitted but there is no present indication when these boats will be available. Four similar pneumatic boats developed by the USAWL will be available for evaluation by the 5th SFGA in early spring.

2. (U) As indicated in the paragraph on the Airboat Intercom System, requests for development requirements have been received from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Of particular interest to them is the adaptation of ultra lightweight electronics for use in RVN. A field requirement has been forwarded to the NASA Liaison Officer for an ultra lightweight version of the AN/GRC-109 Radio. The requirement stated that all of the reliability and operational flexibility of the AN/GRC-109 must be retained but the system should be reduced in weight to the maximum extent possible.
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HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO San Francisco, 96240

AVOB-C

15 November 1967

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) General: This letter presents this command's concept for the employment of CIDG Forces and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects in support of FMF deployed in Vietnam, the command relationship which should be established to effect optimum employment of assets, and the methods of effecting coordination and liaison between conventional units and supporting assets of this command. While procedures outlined herein may appear complex and time consuming, they are considered to be the only means of effectively coordinating operations between FMF, CIDG Forces and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects.

2. (C) Civilian Irregular Defense Group:
   a. Background:
      (1) The CIDG program was developed to provide a means of filling the vacuum existing in many remote and underpopulated areas where ARVN units cannot effectively be employed and which are not under government control. Basically the camps deployed under this program have the mission of border surveillance and/or interdiction of enemy infiltration routes and conducting operations against enemy base areas. Ancillary missions of these camps are the gathering of intelligence, the execution of Civic Action programs and the conduct of Psychological Operations.
      (2) Within the CIDG program there are basically two types of forces available to accomplish the mission. These forces are camp strike forces (CSF) and mobile strike forces (MSF). The capabilities, limitations, suitable missions and most effective concept of employment of each force will be analyzed in the following paragraphs.
      (3) It is important to note at this time that the CIDG camps are under the command of the Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF). The USASF personnel are present as advisors only and do not command the camps or assigned personnel.

DECLASSIFIED AT 30 YEARS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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This letter supersedes ltr, No. 5th SFPA, subject: "Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Mike Force, Mobile Guerrilla Force, and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects" (U), dtd 19 Apr 67
Incl 5 to 5th SFPA ORL, for Quarter Ending 31 January 1968
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AVGR-C

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

b. Capabilities and Limitations:

(1) Capabilities: Due to their organization and indigenous background the Camp Strike Force troops have certain advantages. These are:

(a) Familiarity with the area: Being locally recruited they are generally very familiar with the local terrain.

(b) Survivability: Their accustomed standard of living permits survival on local resources with less supplemental support than that required by conventional units. To a large extent they can live off the land.

(c) Mobility: Reflecting para b. (1) (b) above, they are capable of travelling with lighter loads. With their entire TOE they are foot mobile. They require fewer helicopters proportionally. At sea level one UH-1D aircraft can transport 11 fully armed and equipped Camp Strike Force troops with a two-hour fuel load.

(d) Language and ethnic origin: The Camp Strike Force has the capability to gain the support of the local populace to a greater degree than ethnic foreigners.

(e) Rapid reaction: Not being restricted by specific defensive missions as ARVN units are, they are free to react rapidly to changing situations. This is enhanced by the training of the VNSF commanders and the presence of U.S. advisors at a low level, not found in ARVN units.

(2) Limitations: As with any military force the Camp Strike Force has certain limitations which, of necessity, will dictate their method of employment. These limitations will vary in extent from Corps area to Corps area due to the difference in culture, language, education and motivation. They are:

(a) Training and discipline: The Camp Strike Force personnel are paramilitary employees recruited from the area in which the camp is located. The relative freedom with which they can terminate employment, their loss of motivation in proportion to the distance employed away from their "home" area, and corollary training and discipline factors limit their reliability or use in complex, highly sophisticated, long range, or long term operations.

(b) Fire discipline: The Camp Strike Force can provide a heavy volume of fire but because of communication and training limitations, this fire is often difficult to lift or shift. Further, they tend to react to enemy fire or suspected presence by uncontrolled, premature, and undesired fire; disclosing, often completely, their own positions. This characteristic coincidentally poses special hazards in chance meetings of friendly units.
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15 November 1967

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SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

(c) Physical limitations: The Camp Strike Force soldier is not generally as strong as the US soldier. As a result his endurance is limited. The period in which he can operate effectively on long term operations varies from approximately five days in IV CTZ to 15 days in II CTZ.

(d) Leadership: The leadership capabilities of the Camp Strike Force leaders varies from mediocre to good. In no case does it approach the standard of the US units.

(e) Absence of supporting weapons: The Camp Strike Force company does not possess the heavy fire power capability of the normal US rifle company. Seldom are more than one 60mm mortar and two .30 caliber machine guns deployed. There are three M-79 grenade launchers or 57mm recoiless rifles organic to their TOE.

(f) Force structure: The maximum size of a Camp Strike Force company is 132 personnel. Normal deployed strength is 100 to 115 troops.

(g) Transportation: The Camp Strike Force companies have no organic transportation.

c. Missions and capabilities: In view of the limitations and strengths of the Camp Strike Force companies there are very definite missions which they can be assigned and expected to execute in a highly effective manner. They are:

(1) Blocking missions: In view of their ground maneuverability they are capable of moving into relatively inaccessible areas to block the withdrawal of enemy elements.

(2) Screening force: For the same consideration as in (1) above they are able to screen the flanks of friendly units to prevent surprise attacks, and slow the withdrawal of enemy units to the flank.

(3) Light reconnaissance in force: The Camp Strike Forces are ideally suited to locate enemy forces for destruction by a conventional force. Their familiarity with the area and their ability to associate with the local populace enhances this capability. They have only a limited capability to fix the enemy for destruction by a conventional force, but if assured of a reaction force, they will usually attempt to accomplish this mission.

(4) Search and destroys: The Camp Strike Force has the capability of searching out and destroying small enemy units of company and smaller size. Larger forces they can not normally destroy without assistance from conventional forces, to include air and artillery support.

(5) Reconnoiter and secure LZ/DZ for larger more heavily armed units.

3

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SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

(6) Combat operations against local VC and VC infrastructure to include control over indigenous personnel when such action is necessary.

d. Camp Strike Force Concept of Employment:

(1) The Camp Strike Force should be employed in a manner consistent with their capabilities, and assigned missions which they can normally be expected to perform satisfactorily. These missions should consider their fighting abilities, best exploit their knowledge of the area and exploit their maneuverability. Missions which they are not considered suited for include, but are not limited to, the following:

(a) Perimeter security: Due to their lack of supporting weapons and poor fire discipline they are not considered suitable for defensive missions.

(b) Guides to individual units: Fragmentation of the Camp Strike Force into small groups for use as guides, isolates them from their normal leadership and requires them to exercise a degree of initiative which they do not possess. They are not currently motivated to exercise this mission. A Camp Strike Force company with USASF advisors is the smallest unit which can perform this mission satisfactorily.

(c) Use as a reserve/reaction force: Their limitations preclude their employment in this manner with any reasonable assurance of success.

(2) The Camp Strike Force units should never be fragmented. This separates them from their VNSF commanders and USASF advisors and negates their entire training which has been centered around their employment as a cohesive unit.

(3) Communications from the Camp Strike Force to the supported unit will have to be through the USASF advisor. Accordingly, two advisors will of necessity, have to accompany each maneuver element.

(4) Transportation and fire support will have to be provided by the supported unit through the USASF advisor.

e. Liaison between Special Forces and conventional units:

(1) The Senior Advisor in each Corps is advised by the Special Forces company commander on the employment of Special Forces assets within the Corps Tactical Zone.

(2) When the area of interest of a major tactical commander (Division or Separate Brigade) encompasses all, or a portion of a CIDG Camp's TAOR the "E" detachment or USASF company exercising advisory control over that...
CONFIDENTIAL 15 November 1967

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

CIDG camp will provide a Liaison Officer to the Division/Separate Brigade. This individual will be a Major or senior Captain with considerable Special Forces experience. His duties will be as follows:

(a) Advise the Division/Separate Brigade commander and staff on the capabilities, limitations and techniques of employment of the Camp Strike Force.

(b) Assist the Division/Separate Brigade commander and staff in the preparation of plans and orders for the employment of Camp Strike Forces and other Special Forces assets in support of conventional units.

(c) During the conduct of operations be physically located with the command and control element to advise the commander and his staff in changes in employment, exploitation of contacts, and to provide close and continuous liaison and coordination between the conventional forces and the Special Forces elements operating in support.

(d) Provide fire support coordination between the deployed Camp Strike Force elements and the conventional fire support elements.

(e) Insure that the operations of the pertinent CIDG camps are providing the support envisioned by the Division/Separate Brigade commander.

(f) Keep the "A" detachment, "B" detachment and company commanders abreast of the overall tactical situation, operational requirements and future plans of the US forces.

(g) Coordinate closely with the USASF company commander to gain information required by the Division/Separate brigade commander on mobile guerrilla force operations conducted within their area of interest and methods of employing these assets when available.

f. Command relations:

(1) As stated above, when the area of interest of a conventional commander encompasses all or a portion of the TAOR of a CIDG camp, liaison will be provided to that command. At this stage there will be no command relationship between the forces, but rather a flow of information to the commander and his staff on friendly and enemy activity, area analysis and other specific items deemed necessary.

(2) At such time as the AO of the conventional force encompasses all or a portion of the TAOR of the CIDG camp, the specific role that the Camp Strike Force is to play in the future operations in that area will have to be determined. Their specific method of employment will have to be coordinated with, and agreed upon by the Vietnamese Corps commander. If at this time it
is determined that the Camp Strike Forces from that camp will actively participate in coordinated operations with the Division/Separate Brigade then they will be placed under the OPCON of the conventional force. However, if it is determined that the Camp Strike Forces will only conduct separate supporting operations disassociated from the conventional force then the two forces will be considered to be in a mutual support role. In any case it is essential that the Corps commander agree to and direct the overall concept of employment.

(3) It is then necessary that the Corps commander task the Vietnamese Special Forces "C" detachment commander with the responsibility of making the specific camp available to execute missions within the overall concept of operations.

(4) Responsibility for coordinating the employment of the Camp Strike Forces with the conventional unit commander will be delegated to the Vietnamese and USASF "B" detachment commanders. Specific missions will be transmitted by the US major unit commander through the Liaison Officer and the US "B" detachment commander. He will then effect liaison with, and gain concurrence of his counterpart.

(5) The Vietnamese and USASF "B" detachment commanders will then inform their respective subordinates in the CIDG camp of the mission requirement and implementing instructions.

(6) It is essential that maximum coordination and planning consistent with the situation be effected prior to the execution of all missions. The Vietnamese at all levels must concur in the concept of operations and tasks to be assigned to the camps. The Camp Strike Forces will operate only under the command of the Vietnamese Special Forces chain-of-command. The USASF advisors will accompany the force and coordinate operations with the US forces, however, they are unable to exercise command.

3. (c) Mobile Strike Force:

a. Background: The Mobile Strike Force is organized as a multi-purpose reaction force to be located in each Corps area and the SFOB which is responsive to the needs of US Special Forces company commander and his VNSF counterpart. The mission of this force is to constitute a Corps reserve; conduct raids, ambushes and combat patrols; reinforce CIDG camps under construction or attack; search and seizure operations; and the conduct of small scale conventional combat operations to include airborne operations. An additional mission which this force is capable of is the conduct of mobile guerrilla operations into certain areas of South Vietnam in which the VC enjoy sanctuaries and freedom of movement. The execution of this mission denies the VC the use of those favored routes and base areas. While the number of Mobile Strike Force companies may vary from Corps area to Corps area the number of mobile guerrilla missions which can be adequately supported concurrently within a Corps area, should not exceed two.
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JOINT PUB

15 November 1967

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

b. Capabilities and Limitations:

(1) Because of their organization, background, and mission the Mobile Strike Force troops have certain advantages that differ from those of the Camp Strike Force troops. These are:

(a) Rapid reaction: The Mobile Strike Force rapid reaction capability is even greater than that of the Camp Strike Force in that they are not restricted by having to provide main force elements in camp defense.

(b) The turn-over rate for personnel is lower due to the higher wages and esprit-de-corps generally found in the Mobile Strike Force.

(c) The Mobile Strike Force is an airborne unit which enhances the means for employment under adverse and short reaction time conditions.

(d) Because of the size and general operational commitments of the Mobile Strike Force a better and more comprehensive training program is conducted which increases the professionalism of the Mobile Strike Force.

(e) A higher quality of leadership exists among the indigenous personnel due to the higher wages and other incentives.

(f) When conducting a mobile guerrilla mission the Mobile Strike Force is expected to operate as an independent unit with no mutual support for a period up to thirty days.

(2) Limitations: Due to the fact that the Mobile Strike Force represents the entire Corps area some shortcomings must be realized. These are:

(a) The Mobile Strike Force will not have an intimate knowledge of the area of operations and the people within the specific area of operation.

(b) In some cases, language and ethnic origin will be entirely different and will create local frictions, particularly between Mobile Strike Force and Camp Strike Force personnel.

(c) The logistical supply lines must of necessity be much longer in order to provide adequate resupply. This requires the use of aviation to a much greater extent. For example, all resupply during a mobile guerrilla mission must be made by air.

(d) The Mobile Strike Force is not organized as a battalion, but as separate companies.
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AVOB-C

15 November 1967

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

(1) The Mobile Strike Force is the Special Forces company commanders reserve. By being located centrally in respect to the Corps, the Mobile Strike Force can be deployed by air rapidly enough to influence the outcome or further develop the situation of a major engagement by the Camp Strike Force.

(2) The Mobile Strike Force is ideally suited to conduct raids, ambushes and combat patrols because of its airborne capability and greater degree of training.

(3) By utilizing Mobile Strike Force troops to conduct combat operations in the vicinity of new camp construction sites more Camp Strike Force personnel can be diverted from security to construction tasks.

(4) Because of the higher state of training and professionalism the Mobile Strike Force is able to perform more conventional combat missions on a limited scale to include coordinated joint US/Mobile Strike Force operations.

(5) VC/NVA base camps located during mobile guerrilla missions are carefully observed and either raided or harassed as warranted by the situation. Lines of communications are cut by raids and ambushes and interdicted by mines and booby traps. Enemy supply caches are located and eliminated. Air strikes are directed and assessed.

d. Concept of Employment:

(1) To facilitate rapid reaction and minimum delay, each of the USA SF company commanders and the VNSF "C" detachment commanders can deploy the Mobile Strike Forces in their Corps area without the prior approval of CO, 5th SFGA, and CO, VNSF.

(2) CO, 5th SFGA and CO, VNSF or their designated representatives reserve the right to deploy the Mobile Strike Force from one Corps area to another on any type of mission.

(3) The SFCE Mobile Strike Force companies will be under control of Detachment A-503 as well as a VNSF "A" detachment (minus). The decision to deploy the Mobile Strike Force at Nha Trang is at the discretion of CO, 5th SFGA, and CO, VNSF or their designated representatives.

(4) Normally each Special Forces company will utilize its Mobile Strike Force as its Corps reserve.

(5) The employment of the Mobile Strike Force on a mobile guerrilla mission is designed as an economy of force effort, intended to be projected into remote, isolated areas not under ARVN or PAVN/F control or surveillance. The force is infiltrated into its assigned tactical area of operations by the most
unobtrusive means available. Upon arrival into its area the Mobile Strike Force becomes a true guerrilla force in every respect except that of living solely off the land. Any action that would disclose the location or presence of the Mobile Strike Force to include medical evacuation of personnel must be carefully executed with proper deceptive measures taken.

e. Liaison: The liaison necessary for coordination and control of the Mobile Strike Force in relation to US and Vietnamese Forces is essentially the same as exists for the Camp Strike Force except that the responsible coordination headquarters is always the company which is located in the Corps area of operation. For a mobile guerrilla mission, the Mobile Strike Force requires complete freedom of action within a specified area of operations in order to achieve success. For this reason, once an area of operations is designated for the conduct of a mobile guerrilla mission, the Mobile Strike Force must be assigned complete control of that area to include control of air support.

f. Command Relations: Command and control of the Mobile Strike Force is executed through a joint command between the VNSF/USASF. Either the VNSF "C" detachment commander or the USASF company commander for each Corps Mobile Strike Force and either the G3, VNSF or G3, 5th SFAD for SFUB Mobile Strike Force can employ the Mobile Strike Forces at their disposal. Upon assignment, training and evaluation, the VNSF will eventually take full command of the Mobile Strike Force companies with the USASF reverting to an advisory role.

4. (C) Long Range Reconnaissance Projects:

a. Long range reconnaissance projects were developed to consolidate assets within VNSF, ARVN, and USASF to form a highly mobile reconnaissance force with an organic reaction force.

b. Capabilities and Limitations:

(1) Capabilities:

(a) Confirm VC units, installations and activity for subsequent exploitation.

(b) Teams can remain in the area for long periods with minimum outside support.

(c) Teams can destroy small targets.

(2) Limitations:

(a) Authorization for employment must be approved by multiple channels and therefore requires considerable lead time. When approved, employment is rapid.
AVGEC

SUBJECT: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group and Long Range Reconnaissance Projects (U)

(b) Teams have extremely limited fire power.

c. Liaison: Long range reconnaissance projects receive missions from one of three sources:

(1) From JGS and MACV through 5th SFQA and VNSF.

(2) Directly from MACV or CG, Field Forces, Vietnam in the case of a unilateral type operation.

(3) From the CG, VNSF and CO, 5th SFQA with concurrence of MACV and JGS.

d. Command and control relationships are identical with those found in the CIDG program.

e. The sensitive nature of missions and organization preclude further discussion in this document. Persons having "a need to know", may upon request, receive a complete briefing on this subject by contacting S3, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION: "A"

D. E. BROCK
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

Copies furnished:
MACV J322
CG, VNSF High Command
CIVIC ACTION SUCCESSES

1. (U) A-342, Reading Room

During November 1967, Detachment A-342 initiated a project that would keep the population in Don Luan District up-to-date on the current agricultural methods and policies and programs that the government presently has set up. This project was the creation of a reading room in the District VIS office. Requests for newspapers, magazines and other periodicals were sent through the "B" Detachment to the Province JUSFAO Representative. Magazines and newspapers were then sent directly to the detachment. Due to interest in US magazines shown by the VIS Chief at the district, the detachment has also been supplying the reading room with American periodicals and new papers. Although the greatest majority of people of Dong Xoai do not read or understand English, their interest in American magazines indicates that they are longing for news of the world. Efforts are currently being made to ensure that the Province VIS Office continues to send periodicals and magazines to the District so as to keep this worthwhile project going.

2. (U) A-301, Market Place Construction

The most significant project conducted by the 12 man CA/PU school trained team at Detachment A-301 has been the construction of a market place to improve the economy of the adjacent villages. Construction began on 3 September after the CA/PU officer and his VISF S5 counterpart had conferred with the local hamlet chieftains and decided on the type of structure which would best accommodate the various vendors. It was decided that an open-type market was most suitable, providing it had a cement floor and roofing. With the help of CIDG recruits, local townspeople, and the locally hired carpenters, work progressed rapidly, and by 10 October the framework was in place. The roof was then laid, utilizing tin sheets provided by Company A, and the cement floor was begun. By 4 November, the market place was 95% complete, with the exception of a brick entrance way which was finished on 6 November. Dedication ceremonies were held on 8 Nov, with the CO DST B-32, and the Province Chief as honored guests. Total cost for the market was 18,500$VN, most of which was used to buy brick and pay the carpenter's salaries. Lumber and cement were furnished by Det A-301, and tin roofing by Company A.

3. (U) A-109, A Road is Opened

A very successful project has been completed with the efforts of the VISF and the USISF. This project was not a military victory but an economic victory for the people. The small district town of Thuong Duc has been cut off, except by air, from the rest of the country for over eight years. To aid the people of this area, a major road opening project was started. Highway 14 extends west from Danang to Thuong Duc and had been cut in many places plus three bridges were destroyed. As the project was started, the road was filled in and repaired. Then security was provided and the bridges.
rebuilt. But the enemy was also active. Just as it looked like the road would be opened, the enemy struck back. One of the bridges that was rebuilt was again destroyed. To react to this, the men of Co C, 5th SFG started to gather supplies to rebuild the bridge. Plans were made with the VNSF to put security on two of the bridges by using our camp strike force soldiers. A Marine outpost took over the security of the third bridge. On 9 January 1968, a convoy was organized for the opening of the road. The mission of the convoy was to show the people that the road and a link to the rest of the country was open. The convoy was an integrated venture between the VNSF and Co C, 5th SFG. The commanders and civic action officers of both commands were part of the convoy. The trucks were decorated with flags and signs saying that the road was open. A load of rice was carried to the district for a government rice sale. A loudspeaker team from the 7th Psy Ops Bn. was also part of the convoy. They played music, passed out leaflets, asked the people to help in keeping the road open and work together with the government. In the hamlets and villages along the way, the people crowded the road to see the convoy. As the convoy entered the district town, CBS news was on hand to capture the event for the rest of the world. A VNSF Drama Team provided entertainment for the people. A VNSF and USAF MDCH was set up in the town to help the sick people of the area. The road was open; the government was overcoming its problem and was working for the future.

4. (U) A-343 School Construction

Under the supervision of the CA/PO Officer of Detachment A-343, a school for the Montagnard Hamlet of Bù Ngoi in Đức Phong District was completed on 14 December 1967. The school will accommodate approximately sixty students of the elementary age. This is the second school that has been built in Đức Phong for the Montagnards within the past three months. The school consists of two classrooms and office for the schoolmaster. Each classroom is equipped with twelve long desks, blackboard, teacher’s kit and student school kits. The school was expected to be operational by 1 January 1968. Although skilled carpenters and masons were hired to construct the building, the people of Bù Ngoi did whatever they could to expedite the construction. This interest in the school indicates that the Montagnards desires to have his children educated. The children are eagerly awaiting the opening of their new school.

5. (U) A-332 Construction of a Dispensary

In the village of Minh Hào, Det A-332 has enjoyed a tremendous success in the CA/PO program initiated there in November. As in any other area of Vietnam, the program has not been completely successful according to current guidelines and directives because of certain difficulties encountered. Our major problem has been the nonavailability of male population support in the projects, as all able bodied men and many women are employed by the rubber plantation adjoining the village. This problem has been offset by a training program for the younger generation, CIDG labor, and the hiring
of civilian carpenters. The village has a population of 2,200 including all ages. Prior to the establishment of the SF camp here, the only dispensary in the village was French sponsored, inadequately staffed and supplied and gave the people poor medical attention. The population was hesitant to visit the facility; therefore, an almost epidemic stage of various diseases were inherent throughout the village when the SF program was initiated. An adequate medical facility was built in December and was initially staffed by an SF medic holding sick call daily. At first, the people were reluctant to participate in the program, primarily because of previous experience with the other dispensary and local medical beliefs. The program slowly developed as the villagers grew accustomed to proper medical treatment and learned from their families, friends, and neighbors of the excellent service. During the initial phase of the operation, the Detachment Medical personnel began a training program for two young girls from the village. Upon completion of the training program, the girls were hired by the camp as local health workers; one in the dispensary of the detachment and the other in the village dispensary. It was soon determined that the girls were capable of working on their own except in complicated diseases and minor surgery. The camp nurse now holds sick call with minimum assistance from USAF personnel. The dispensary treats an average of 1,200 patients per month. The village nurse has assumed complete responsibility for outpatient care and is treating an average of 2,000 patients per month. This number is continuing to rise, not because there is more illness but because the population trusts the treatment and can see the benefits derived. Professional advice and medical supplies are furnished by the detachment (GVN offers no assistance in this program nor any other medical progress in the village). Soon after the employment of the first two trained nurses, other young men and women became interested in medicine and requested to be trained on a voluntary basis so they could do their part to help the village. One father came and offered to pay for the training of his daughter. Two hours a day were allocated for one of the detachment medics and the camp nurse to conduct formal training for the students. After three months of training they were given a comprehensive examination prepared and administered by our senior medic. The results were outstanding. Three of the latter students requested to go to Bien Hoa to work in the CIDG Hospital for further training and more technical knowledge. This detachment currently has a backlog of applicants for the medical course and plans to start a new class in the near future with as many students as the operational commitments permit. The program has gained the comradeship of many of the villagers, and they will participate freely in preventive medicine programs as they see the young people of the village enthusiastically engaged in this program.

6. (U) Lang Vei Refugee Story: 25-27 January 68

On 23 Jan, the District town of Khe Sanh was evacuated due to enemy pressure. The tactical situation was such that it looked like a major battle was soon to start. Around the Marine base of Khe Sanh and the Special
Forces camp at Lang Vei, the enemy was reportedly building up. The enemy was burning down villages and others were being abandoned for fear of the enemy. On 25 Jan, from every direction, a stream of refugees were pouring into the area around Lang Vei. The men at Lang Vei reacted by sending situation reports to the S-5 of Company C, 5th SFG at Da Nang. They asked for immediate aid for and evacuation of the refugees. Due to the lack of aircraft and the enemy situation, evacuation was impossible. All day the people continued to move to the only safe area they knew of. Surely the men of Lang Vei would help. For if they didn't, all would be lost.

There was no place to go. The people had carried all of their possessions that they could. Many had walked for miles through the jungle covered hillsides to seek safety. By the morning of the 26th, over 7000 people had moved into the area just northeast of the camp. Two villages with a normal population of 1039 had grown to over 8,800 people. The situation looked very bad. The S-5 section at Da Nang was working with CORDS and IIAF to bring all available aid to the refugees. By 1300 hours on the 26th, the start of a massive airdrop was in progress. On the LZ, the people saw with their own eyes the results of our forces coming to their aid.

When the day ended 18,000 pounds of rice, 54,000 PRI rations, 2200 pounds of salt, 250 pounds of powdered milk, and 4,000 paper blankets had been dropped to the refugees. When the enemy turns his viciousness on the people, he again proves to those he seeks to control that he has no plans for their welfare.

7. (U) Group S-5 Airborne Elephants

One of the major Civic Action programs undertaken was the movement of four full-grown elephants from Ban Me Thuot to the "A" detachment at Tra Bong and Kham Duc. When the idea was first conceived, the entire operation appeared extremely easy. All we had to do was; buy the animals, load them on trucks, haul them overland to Nha Trang, load them on barges, move them to Da Nang, and truck them to the detachment sites. The problem encountered when planning to execute this plan was one of logistics. We discovered that an elephant consumes approximately 150 lbs of hay and about 1 bushel of vegetables per day. He also drinks about 50 gallons of water each day. Since we were dealing with four elephants for a ten day period, we would have had to procure approximately 6000 lbs of hay, 40 bushels of vegetables and roughly 2000 gallons of fresh water and transport all of this food with the animals. In view of the above requirements, a decision was made to attempt to airlift the elephants. USAF personnel assured us that a C-130 was capable of hauling the elephants one at a time if they were immobilized on a pallet during the flight. The veterinarian was contacted and he advised us that normal tranquilizers used on large animals would not guarantee immobilization for more than 15 to 20 minutes. To find an adequate tranquilizer, telephone calls were placed to several large zoos in the United States. Several prominent Vets recommended that we utilize a drug called M-99, (Entrophone), manufactured by Ricketts and Sons, Hull, England. A telephone call was placed to this company and we were assured that the
drug would be sent to us if we procured a narcotics import license for Vietnam. We requested that a research team from Walter Reed, (WRAIR), utilize their import license and procure the drug for us. At this time we are waiting for the drug to complete the operation. A detailed report will be made in the next quarterly ORLL.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, 5th Special Forces Gp (Abn), 1st SF (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 67-31 Jan 1968

CO, 5th SFCA, 1st SF

15 February 1968

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