**UNCLASSIFIED**

**AD NUMBER**

| AD390719 |

**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

| TO: | unclassified |
| FROM: | confidential |

**LIMITATION CHANGES**

| TO: |
| Approved for public release, distribution unlimited |

| FROM: |
| Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; Mar 1968. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310. |

**AUTHORITY**

31 Mar 1980, DoDD 5200.10; AGO D/A Ltr 29 Apr 1980

**THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED**
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (21 May 68) FOR OT RD 681291
29 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 U. S. C., Section 793 and 794. Its transmission or the publication of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Adjutant General School
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Chemical School
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Chaplain School

Regarded uncategorized when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

Best Available Copy
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
US Army Medical Field Service School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Missile and Munitions School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Security Agency School
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
The Surgeon General
The Provost Marshal General
Research Analysis Corporation (Library)
OSD(SA), Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
Joint Action Control Office
Defense Documentation Center
Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
USAF Air Ground Operations School

Commanding Generals
US Army Weapons Command
US Army Materiel Command
101st Airborne Division
5th Infantry Division (Mech)

Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
4th Brigade, 6th Infantry Division
116th Engineer Battalion (Cbt)
3d Battalion, 197th Artillery
1st Squadron, 18th Air Cavalry (Sep)
336th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo)
2d Battalion, 138th Artillery
972d Signal Battalion

Commander in Chief, US Strike Command
AVDG-GG

31 March 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
       (U\IC WABIFP)

TO: See Distribution

References: AR 1-19, dtd 26 May 1966; USARV Reg 1-19, dtd 8 February 1967

SECTION I

A. (C) OPERATIONS:

1. Combat Operations: A summary of the concept and execution of Division Operations conducted during the reporting period follows:

   a. OPERATION EAGLE THRUST: The pre-movement and movement of the 101st Airborne Division from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to the Republic of Vietnam.

      (1) Dates: 2 August 1967 through 19 December 1967

      (2) Mission: To prepare for and to deploy from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Bien Hoa, RVN; establish base camps, conduct a thirty day in-country training program, and at the conclusion of the training period assume combat commitments as directed by CG, II Field Force, Vietnam.

      (3) Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky, Phuoc Vinh (IT 9648), Bien Hoa (IT 013143) and Cu Chi (IT 6313) base camps, RVN

      (4) Commander: Major General Olinto M. Barsanti, Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division.

      (5) Forces Involved: 101st Airborne Division (-) and United States Air Force Military Airlift Command

      (6) Concept and Execution: See Enclosure 1 (After Action Report - Pre-movement and Movement Phases); and Enclosure 2 (Quarterly Report - Base Camp Development and In-Country Training Program).

   b. OPERATION MANCHESTER:

      (1) Dates: Initiated 12 January 1968 and continues through end of the reporting period.
SUBJECT: Operational Reports for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(2) Mission: To target on the destruction of VC Dong Mai Regiment; disrupt VC infiltration west through AO MANCHESTER from War Zone D into the Di An area; and to prevent the launch of mortar, rocket and/or ground attack from AO MANCHESTER against the Long Binh - Bien Hoa military complex.

(3) Location: Binh Duong and Bien Hoa Provinces, Republic of Vietnam. Map Reference: Southeast Asia, scale 1:50,000, sheets 6331 I, 6331 II, 6331 IV, 6431 I, and 6431 II.

(4) Commander: COL Lawrence L. Havey

(5) Forces Involved:

(a) US:

3d Bde TF
1/506 Inf (Abn)
2/506 Inf (Abn)
3/187 Inf (Abn)
2/319 Arty (Abn)
B/1/84 Arty (155 towed)
A/2/35 Arty (155 SP)
B (-) 326 Engr
C/326 Med
3/101 MP
3d FASC 501 Sig
A/3/17 Cav
F 51st Inf (LRP)
TM-101 MI
3-265 RRC
25 PI
RR TM-324 Sig
86 Engr LCT (Rome Flow)

(b) Other: None

(c) Supporting Forces:

1 2/319 Arty: Employed in a direct support role.

2 162nd Assault Helicopter Company: Provided troop lift and flew combat support and resupply missions.

3 The US Air Force flew 68 tactical fighter missions totaling 138 sorties. Forty-four of these sorties were IMMEDIATE requests which were processed through the Air Force Tactical Request Net with an average reaction time of 24 minutes. In addition, 1 flare ship (CE-47) sortie and 19 Combat Sky Spot sorties were flown in support of the operation. Forward Air Controllers flew 134 sorties while adjusting artillery, conducting visual reconnaissance and directing tactical air strikes.
On 25 January 1968, the 86th Engineer Land Clearing Team was placed OPCO 3d Bde to conduct ROME FLOW operations in the southwestern portion of the AO. Troop I, 3-11 ACR was also placed OPCO 3d Bde to provide security for the ROME Flows. During the period 25-29 January, 490 acres were cleared, vic Tan Uyen (XT 9625), in the southern portion of the MANCHESTER AO. On 29 January, a ROME FLOW detonated an anti-tank mine resulting in minor damage.

(6) Concept and Execution:

(a) Concept of Operation: The 1st Airborne Division employed the 3d Bde TF, beginning 121600H January 1968, in a series of ground and helicopter assaults in AO 101 and AO MANCHESTER to locate and destroy the VC Dong Nai Regiment and to neutralize his Base Area (359), Base Camps, and other facilities in the assigned AO. Emphasis was placed on frequent and aggressive night ambush patrols designed to interdict east-west infiltration through AO MANCHESTER and to prevent VC launch of attacks against the Long Binh - Bien Hoa military complex. To provide continuous support for the reconnaissance in force operations, the Brigade TF occupied two Fire Support Bases (FSB) in the southern portion of AO MANCHESTER. These FSB's, DAVE (XT 977237) and KEENE (XT 043275) had been previously established by the 199th Inf Bde (Sep) (Lt).

(b) Execution: The operation began 17 February with 1/506 Inf conducting an air mobile assault to occupy FSB KEENE with A Battery 2/319th Arty and 2/506 Inf moving to secure FSB DAVE with B Battery 2/319th Arty. Concurrent with the above, 3/187 Inf conducted a road clearing operation along Hwy 1A from Phuoc Vinh to the junction of LTL 16 and Hwy 1A (vic XT 886374). The road was essential to the resupply of the Phuoc Vinh Base Camp and considered an important LOC for VC movement in the area. The Brigade Recon Platoon established a cordon around the villages of Phuoc Hoa I and II (XT 9343) in support of a search by the local RF/PF. Company D/3/187 Inf established a defensive position around the Song Be River Bridge (XT 964642) astride Hwy 1A. Throughout the reporting period the activities of the Brigade in OP MANCHESTER centered around the activities noted above. The battalions rotated responsibility for the FSB's, the highway, the bridge site, and the security of the Phuoc Vinh Base Camp. Tactical operations emanated from the FSB's from where the battalion tactical command posts controlled the reconnaissance in force, Eagle Flight, and extensive night ambush operations conducted during the period. The first enemy contact in the operation occurred at 122215H January, when Company D, 2/506 Inf at FSB DAVE received hand and rifle grenades from an undetermined number of VC. The unit returned SA and M79 fire and the harassment ceased. The Bde continued reconnaissance in force operations with slight contact until 16 January, when at 1IC5, Company B and Recon Platoon of 2/506 Inf received heavy AW and Claymore fire from an estimated reinforced VC platoon dug in, vic XT 98355. The unit returned SA and AW fire; Arty, LFT's, and TAC Air supported the action.
At 1145, Companies A and D maneuvered to reinforce the action and the enemy fled. US losses during the action were 5 KIA and 2C WIA (11 evac). A sweep of the area revealed 3 VC KIA and an extensive VC hospital-supply-base complex. Two days later, at 1819CH an NOSR from A/3/17 Air Cav observed a rice cache, vic XT 998392, that had apparently been exposed by artillery fire during the previous day's activities. Harassing and Interdictory artillery fires were placed in the area to protect it during the night and the following day, B/1/506 Inf was inserted into the area to investigate the sighting. Twenty-eight tons of rice were discovered and evacuated that day, and by 21 January a total of 46 tons of rice and 6 additional tons of food stuffs had been captured. The majority of engagements during the period were with VC forces of platoon size or smaller. There were 61 total engagements and only 2 were with a company sized enemy force. There were no battalion size units moving in the area. The largest number of contacts occurred during the hours of darkness primarily due to the continuous and large number of small night ambush patrols placed near VC base camps and astride LOC's in the area. At 19021CH January the Bde Ron Plat ambushed a VC company, vic XT 998474, utilizing claymores, SA, AW, and Artillery fires; the VC returned AW and grenades then broke contact. At 211C, the VC again returned with heavy AW and mortar fire which was countered with organic weapons, Artillery and TAC Air support. At 2301, the platoon broke the contact which resulted in 3 US WIA (minor) and 9 VC KIA. At 2345, on 19 January, a platoon size ambush patrol from A/2/506 Inf conducted a meeting engagement with a VC company, vic XT 998357; SA/AW and M-79 fires were exchanged, the contact lasted 15 minutes, resulting in 1 US KIA and 3 WIA (2 evac); VC losses were 4 KIA. Recon in force activities continued during the following week without significant results. At 26135H January, B/2/506 Inf discovered another supply complex, vic XT 977335; SA/AW and M-79 fires were exchanged, which, after a two day search, resulted in 46 tons of rice, 3.2 tons of salt, and 21,000 linear feet of steel reinforcing rod captured. As the TET Cease-Fire period drew near, the enemy movement in the area continued. Night defensive positions continued to be established astride LOC in the area. At 27100CH January, a platoon ambush from B/2/506 Inf executed a well planned ambush against 2 VC squads, vic XT 914365; the VC returned light fire as they withdrew, leaving 6 VC KIA behind; there was 1 US WIA (minor). The TET Cease-Fire went into effect 291100H January; the first cease-fire violation in AO MANCHESTER occurred at 292315H when a security platoon from 3/187 Inf received 6 rounds of mortar fire, vic XT 968506. The platoon moved to XT 968501, where they again received hand grenades from an estimated 3 VC. The platoon engaged the VC with SA and M79 fire and the VC fled at 2325H. There were no casualties. The operations conducted by the 3d Bde during the reporting period were designed to interdict LOC's at night when the enemy was most prone to use them; as a result there were very few daylight engagements even though extensive Eagle Flights and recon in force operations were conducted during the daylight hours. The daylight operations were successful in locating enemy supplies and denying him several previously secure hospital/rest area...
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDG-GC

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

c. OPERATIONS SAN ANGELO:

(1) Dates: 16 January through end of reporting period.

(2) Mission: To conduct multiple airborne, helimobile, and ground assaults into the assigned AO to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces, their base areas and supplies; to seize the Bu Gia Map airfield (YU 3437) and to upgrade it to accept C-130 aircraft; to block principle VC/NVA invasion routes from Cambodia during Tet truce period; and to support and secure construction of a base camp at Song Be (YU 1407).

(3) Location: Phuoc Long Province, RVN. Map reference: Southeast Asia, series L-607, scale 1:100,000, sheets 6333, 6332, 6331, 6433, 6432, 6431, 6533, 6532, 6531.

(4) Commander: Brigadier General Salve H. Matheson until 23 Jan 68, when COL John W. Collins III assumed command of the brigade.

(5) Forces Involved:

(a) US: 1st Bde TF
1/327 Inf (Abn)
2/327 Inf (Abn)
2/502 Inf (Abn)
3/506 Inf (Abn)
2/300 Arty (Abn)
B/2/11 Arty
A/326 Engr
101 Sig Co (Prov)
1/101 MP
42d Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
181 MI
406 RRD
20 Chem
9 Cmbt Tracker
45 PI
46 APU

(b) Other: CIDG Company from Song Be Special Forces

Cam #8-34

(6) Concept and Execution: See Inclosure #4, OPORD 1-68

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDG-GC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
(SAN ANGELO) and Inclosure #7, (Combat After Action Report - Operation San
Angelo).

d. OPERATION ATTALA (CASEY)


(2) Mission: To conduct recon in force operations in
assigned AO to destroy the 165th NVA Regiment and, on order, conduct oper-
ations to the north to destroy the 88th NVA Regiment. See paragraph D.

(3) Location: Binh Long Province, RVN. Map reference:
Southeast Asia, series L-607, sheets 6232, 6332, 6231, and 6331.

(4) Commander: COL J. H. Qushman

(5) Forces Involved:

(a) US:

- 2d Bde TF
- 1/501 Inf (Abn)
- 2/51 Inf (Abn)
- 1/502 Inf (Abr.)
- 1/231 Arty (DS)
- A/1/27 Arty
- C/326 Engr (DS)
- B/326 Med (Spt)
- 4 FASC P - 501 Sig (Spt)
- 2/101 Med (DS)
- Tm-101 MT (DS)
- 2/265 RRC (DS)
- 2/4/801 Maint (DS)
- 34 PI (Spt)
- RR Tm A/53 Sig (Spt)
- 11 ACR (-)
- 2/11 ACR
- 1/11 ACR
- Air Cav Trp

(b) Other: None

(6) Concept and Execution:

(a) Concept of Operation: The operation was to be
conducted in two phases. Phase I, consisted of establishing the 3d Sqdn,
11th ACR in blocking positions along Hwy 245 and LTL 13 to seal off the area
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDG-GC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

of operation; while the 2d Bde with the 2d Squadron, 11th ACR conducted recon
in force operations in sectors to locate and destroy the 165th VC Regiment
believed to be in the area. Phase II envisioned the 2d Bde moving into AO
ARAB to conduct operations against the 88th NVA Regiment while the 11th ACR
continued its blocking role. (See Inclosure 5, OPORD 1-68-ATTALA (CASEY)).

(b) Execution: On 21-22 January the Brigade began air
and overland movement into the assigned AO; established base camp facilities,
defensive positions and prepared to initiate a sweep of the area. At 0310,
22 January, GC, II Field Force Vietnam issued a change of mission directing
the Bde to return to Cu Chi Base Camp and prepare for immediate deployment to
I CTZ. At the time of the alert, the 1/501 Inf was enroute into the AO.
They were diverted midway, returned to base camp and subsequently deployed
to Hue Phu/Bai the following day, OPCON to III MAF. At 241800H January,
the responsibility for OP ATTALA was passed to the 11th ACR and the 2d Bde
began phasing back to Cu Chi. During the entire operation there was no
significant contact and negative results.

B. (C) TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES: The missions assigned to the Division
during the reporting period were those of security and regional search and
destroy operations. Ambush and security operations emphasized simplicity and
the requirement for continuous all-round security while maintaining an alert,
aggressive, mental posture. The reconnaissance in force operations followed
the principle of first finding the enemy with scouts, probing his position
and surrounding him in place, then bringing all available fire power to bear
before closing with the enemy and destroying him. The 101st Airborne Division
booklet, "Fundamentals of Infantry Tactics" (Inclosure 6) sets forth those
techniques and principles which have proven very successful.

C. (C) OPPLANS AND OPORDS: The following is a synopsis of the Operations
Orders published and executed during the reporting period:

1. OPORD 1-68-(SAW) "GEOC" (U) dated 111300H January 1968 (See
Inclosure #3).

   a. Mission: 101st Airborne Division conducts multiple airborne,
   heliborne and ground assaults to:

   (1) Destroy VC/NVA forces in assigned AO.

   (2) Locate and destroy enemy bases, and supplies.

   (3) Seize Bu Gia Map Airfield (TU 3437) and upgrade to
   accept C-130 aircraft.

   (4) Block principle VC/NVA invasion routes from Cambodia
during TET truce period.

CONFIDENTIAL

7
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDO-GC

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(5) Support and secure construction of a Brigade Base at Song Be (YU 1407).

b. Execution - Concept of Operation - Maneuver (Four Phases):

(1) Phase I. 101st Airborne Division employs 3d Bde reinforced 100600H January 1968 in AO SUKCHON to open Hwy 1A from Phuoc Vinh (XT 9648) to Dong Xoai (XT 0875), provide security for Engineers upgrading the road and clear the road 200 meters on each side by Rome Plow; on order, provide one Battalion TF as Division Reaction Force from field location.

(2) Phase II. 1st Bde moves, beginning 8 January 1968, by fixed wing aircraft to Song Be with three battalions and Bde Base, and one Bn (3/506) by surface convoy to Phan Rang to stage for parachute assault; establish, on 16 January 1968, one medium fire base northeast of Bu Chirr Phuc (YU 1924) and one light fire base at a location to be determined by CG, 1st Bde; conduct parachute assault by one Bn TF on 17 January 1968 to seize Bu Gia Map Airfield; conduct S&D operations in AO VECHI; block principal VC/NVA invasion routes from Cambodia and interdict VC/NVA LOC in assigned AO; on order, provide one Bn TF as Division Reaction Force from field location.

(3) Phase III. 2d Bde moves by fixed wing aircraft, beginning 17 January 1968, with 2 Bn TF's to Bu Dop (XU 9629), secure Bu Dop; conduct S&D operations in AO BACTOCNE; block principle VC/NVA invasion route from Cambodia; interdict VC/NVA LOC in assigned AO; and one Bn TF to Song Be as Division Reaction Force. 3d Bde employs one Bn TF to establish a fire base, vicinity Bu Nho (TT 0197); conduct S&D operations and interdict VC/NVA LOC in assigned AO.

(4) Phase IV. 101st Airborne Division, following TET stand-down, continues S&D operations in assigned AO, block VC/NVA LOC in AO and support and secure construction of Bde Base at Song Be.

2. OPORD 2-68 (MANCHESTER) (U) dated 131300 January 1968 (See Enclosure #4).

a. Mission: 101st Airborne Division, beginning 12 January 1968, conducts operations in MANCHESTER, NORMANDY and SAN ANGELO AO's to:

(1) MANCHESTER:

(a) Target on destruction of Dong Nai VC Regiment.

(b) Prevent launch of rocket, mortar and ground attack on Bien Hoa and Long Binh areas from AO MANCHESTER.

(c) Disrupt VC/NVA infiltration from War Zone D through AO MANCHESTER toward the Di An area.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVOG-GC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(2) NORMANDY:

(a) Assume responsibility for AO NORMANDY effective 121200H January 1968.

(b) Destroy VC/NVA forces in AO NORMANDY with priority to 2d Bn, MR IV and 1st Bn, MR IV.

(c) In direct coordination with 25th Inf Div, assume responsibility for exterior defense of Camp Cu Chi (XT 6313).

(3) SAN ANGELO: Beginning 16 Jan 68, conduct operation in AO SON, VEHEL, BASTOGUE, MINSON and SICILY to -

(a) Destroy VC/NVA forces in AO.

(b) By airborne assault, seize Thuan Kiem (XU 9914) on 17 January 1968 and destroy VC/NVA forces in that area.

(c) Establish blocking positions along the Cambodian border vicinity Bu Gia Map (YU 3437)/Bu Chirr Phuoc (YU 1924) during TET truce period.

(d) Be prepared to block Cambodian border vicinity Loc Ninh (XU 7309)/Bu Dop (XU 9729) during TET with a two Bn force on, or about 25 Jan 68.


(1) Phase I. 3d Bde, 120730 January 1968, conduct multiple helimobile/ground assaults in AO MANCHESTER and AO 101 to locate and destroy the Dong Hai VC Regiment; interdict VC/NVA eastwest LOC to disrupt VC/NVA infiltration through AO MANCHESTER from War Zone D toward the Di An (XT 9406) area; and prevent enemy launch of rocket, mortar and/or ground attacks of Bien Hoa (XT 0114) and Long Binh (XT 0306) military installations; 3d Bde continues installation coordinator responsibilities for Phuoc Vinh (XT 9649). 2d Bde, on order, reinforces 3d Bde in AO MANCHESTER or AO 101.

(2) Phase II. 2d Bde 121200, by multiple helimobile/ground assaults in AO NORMANDY, locate and destroy 1st and 2nd VC Bn, MR IV, and through direct coordination with 25th Inf Div, provide external defense for Camp Cu Chi (XT 6312).

(3) Phase III. 1st Bde, 16 January 1968, by helimobile/ground assault in AO VEHEL establish light FSPB vicinity Bu Chirr Phuoc (XU 1924) and medium FSPB vicinity Dakir (XU 0514); 17 January 1968, conduct parachute assault to seize Thuan Kiem (XU 9914) and destroy VC/NVA forces in that area; reinforce parachute assault with one Bn by helimobile assault.
if necessary; 21 January 1968 conduct helimobile assault vicinity Bu Gia Map (YU 3437) to seize the Bu Gia Map Airfield; secure and upgrade Bu Gia Map Airfield to accept C-130 traffic; establish blocking positions vicinity Bu Chirr Phuoc and Bu Gia Map during TET truce period; conduct S&D operations and interdicts enemy LOC in AO VEGHEL. On order, move one Bn TF to operate in the Bu Prang (TT 57556) area in AO SICILY. 2d Bde, on order, establish blocking positions along the Cambodian border vicinity Bu Dop (XU 9729) and Loc Ninh (XU 7407) with a two Bn force; 3d Bde prepare to reinforce units operating in AO VEGHEL and AO BASTOGNE with a minimum of two Bns; on order, employs forces to conduct operations along an axis: Dong Loai (TT 0376), Phu Riang (TT 11-89). 2d Bde provides Division reserve of at least one Bn for air mobile employment within four hours after notification with priority of commitment to the Song Be (YU 1507) area. 1st Bde provides defense of Song Be in AO SON.

3. OPORD 3-68 ATTALA (CASEY) (U) dated 2017C0H January 1968 (See Inclosure #5):

a. Mission: 101st Airborne Division continues SAN ANGELO and Operation MANCHESTER and:

(1) Beginning 21 January 1968 moves to and conducts operations in AC ATTALA to destroy the 165th NVA Regiment.

(2) On order, conducts operations in AO ARAB to destroy the 88th NVA Regiment.

(3) On order, block the Cambodian border with Bde size force at Bu Dop (XU 9729) to be in position prior to TET.

b. Execution: Concept of Operation (Annex A Operation Overlay) - Maneuver (Two Phases) - -

(1) Phase I. 101st Airborne Division conducts operations in AO ATTALA employing the 2d Bde TF, following ground and air move from current locations, conduct search and destroy operations in zone to locate and destroy the 165th VC Regiment. 11th ACR establishes blocking positions along Hwy 245 and LTL 13 to seal off the 2d Bde area of operation; on order provide Cav Trp CP CON 2d Bde to assist in destruction of enemy base areas.

(2) Phase II. 101st Airborne Division, on order, conducts operations in AO ARAB to locate and destroy the 88th NVA Regiment employing the 2d Bde TF in S&D operations and the 11th ACR as a blocking force.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

D. (C) ORGANIZATION: Units assigned to 101st Airborne Division.

17th Cavalry, 2nd Squadron
25th Public Information Detachment
34th Public Information Detachment
36th Chemical Detachment
101st Aviation Battalion
101st Administration Company
101st Military Police Company
101st Military Intelligence Detachment
101st Quarter Master Company (AE)
187th Infantry, 3d Battalion (Airborne)
326th Engineer Battalion
319th Artillery, 2nd Battalion
321st Artillery, 1st Battalion
326th Medical Battalion
501st Infantry, 1st Battalion (Airborne)
501st Infantry, 2nd Battalion (Airborne)
501st Signal Battalion
501st Supply Company
502nd Infantry, 1st Battalion (Airborne)
506th Infantry, 1st Battalion (Airborne)
506th Infantry, 2nd Battalion (Airborne)
801st Maintenance Battalion
HHC 101st Airborne Division
HHC 2nd Brigade
HHC 3rd Brigade
HHB Division Artillery
HHC & Band, Support Command

--Unit Attached to 101st Airborne Division--

265th Radio Research Company

E. (U) TRAINING:

1. Upon arrival in the Republic of Vietnam the Division launched a thirty day orientation and training program. The program included reviews of squad and platoon tactics, ambush and patrol techniques, intelligence and USARV Replacement Training required briefings. Selected personnel attended Tunnel Rat Team Training at Cu Chi. The mines and boobytraps confidence courses at Cu Chi was used extensively by the division units during the period.

2. Divisional units began using USARV schools in December and have had personnel in continual attendance at the USAFV Recondo School at Nha Trang since that time.

CONFIDENTIAL
3. Replacements were sent to Phan Rang for replacement training by the Division's 1st Brigade during the period.

Y. (U) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

1. The main problems encountered during POM of this Division, in the G1 area of interest, were those of reorganization. At Fort Campbell the Division did not become involved in Post Staff type functions except to furnish feeder reports, etc. It was realized, before we left Fort Campbell, that the Division would probably be responsible for all the Post Staff functions that we had become used to having done for us. For this reason it was considered essential that the section be augmented, and reorganized. From a TOS authorization of three (3) officers and five (5) enlisted men, it was necessary to add three (3) more officers, and two (2) enlisted men, bringing the section personnel strength to six (6) officers and seven (7) enlisted men. The section itself was broken down into an Administration Section, a Personnel Management Section, and a Personnel Services Section. The Personnel Services Section now handles those services which were taken care of by Post Headquarters and Special Staff at Fort Campbell. Examples of these are: Officer's and NCO Clubs, Field Ration Messes, Non appropriated funds, and civilian personnel management.

2. Some of the problems encountered upon arrival in-country centered around trying to allocate sufficient space to divisional sized units and staffs in an area occupied by a brigade prior to our arrival. This problem was solved in part, by doubling up on billeting space and using the vacated billets for office space.

3. Adjutant General:

a. During the period 2 August 1967 to 31 December 1967 this section was engaged in pre-movement to the Republic of Vietnam. The most significant activities throughout this period occurred in the areas of Personnel Administration and Postal Operations.

b. Immediately upon notification on 3 August 1967 of the Division's deployment to RVN, a meeting was held at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, between representatives of Department of the Army, US Continental Army Command, Third United States Army, and the Division. At this meeting personnel deployment criteria for the Division was discussed. Essentially, it was decided that:

(1) Officer personnel fill would be controlled by GPO, DA.

(2) The bulk of the enlisted fill of deployables for the Division would of necessity be from Third US Army resources. Secondary fill would be programmed from USAEUR and USARSO. Headquarters, Third US
AVDG-GC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

Army, therefore, would control for the most part the fill for the Division of approximately 4,000 enlisted personnel.

(3) All enlisted personnel would be assigned direct to subordinate Division units against a specific OPO control and line number.

(4) Personnel on Station Date (POSD) would be 5 October 1967.

(5) All non-deployable enlisted personnel would be reported to Headquarters, Third US Army for subsequent assignment, namely to the 82d Airborne Division.

c. Immediately after this conference, action was taken to screen and identify approximately 3,500 non-deployable enlisted personnel and some 200 officers. Volunteers from among former RVN returnees were solicited. The Division was quite successful in this campaign as close to 1,000 volunteers were obtained. Concurrently, enlisted personnel shortages were identified and a requisition prepared and submitted to Department of the Army based upon TOE authorizations furnished by Headquarters, Third US Army and after that Headquarters applied Division deployable assets against the authorization. Later, it was found that numerous administrative errors existed in the document. As a result, an adjusted requisition was prepared by the Division, instead of Headquarters, Third US Army. Meanwhile, OPO, DA started to act upon the original requisitions. This resulted at a later date of some "double" enlisted personnel fill when the adjusted requisition was received by OPO, DA.

d. To achieve the 75 percent unit fill required for all units to initiate training by POSD, it was necessary to effect considerable personnel diversion. This was caused by the time and rate of fill. Since all enlisted men were charged against a specific OPO control and line number, personnel accounting problems arose. Many personnel from Europe and USARSO were directly assigned to battalions of the Division and gained on these units morning reports. When it was necessary to divert to units with less than 75 percent strength, frequent double entries upon Morning Reports occurred. This was caused by the volume of personnel fill and the quantity of diversions. To allow the Division Commander more flexibility during the critical fill and training periods, personnel should be assigned to the Division Replacement Detachment for further assignment as required.

e. In the area of Postal Operations it is significant to note that the 101st Airborne Division was the first deploying unit to permit the release of its APO number prior to actual deployment. This proved to be of great value since it enhanced mail-handling and expedited delivery. Mail was on-hand in RVN upon arrival of the advanced party and continued to arrive thereafter.
f. POM processing for all personnel of the Division and Post clearance of Fort Campbell was accomplished simultaneously. A country-fair system was initiated to accomplish these actions. It proved to be quite successful. Stations were established within the Post gymnasium to complete certain POM tasks i.e., remake of DA Form 41 (Records of Emergency Data), immunizations, preparation of identification tags, review of personnel records etc. Personnel were funneled through the processing center according to a time-phased schedule by unit. Previously prepared machine listings of personnel and dispatched to the various Post clearance agencies, e.g., Red Cross, Central Housing etc., greatly enhanced the timeliness of the operation. All personnel of the Division were completely POM processed within a two-week period.

g. During the movement phase to RV., it was decided to send the Data Processing Equipment by air. This proved to be a wise decision in that the machines were available immediately upon arrival of the bulk of the main-body of the Division and minimal down-time was encountered. Also during the movement phase, personnel records accompanied each increment of troops. This proved to be successful since it compensated for last minute problems by allowing ready access to personnel records in such matters as deferments, last minute reassignments, etc. As a task force or echelon deployed the personnel records were normally on the last aircraft.

h. The AG Section closed in-country on 29 December 1967, after arrival of its Rear Detachment from Fort Campbell. The mission of the Rear Detachment was to assist in solving last-minute personnel problems concerning non-deployable and deferred personnel, preparation of personnel deployment statistics and assist in the transfer of station property. In the movement of a division-sized unit, a rear detachment is deemed essential since it can handle many last-minute personnel details which would otherwise result in hardships on the individual or unit if left until the arrival of the main-body in country. The AG Section Rear Detachment was comprised of 14 enlisted men, one warrant officer, and the Deputy AG.

i. Establishment of Special Service programs proved to be of prime importance after initial arrival of the AG Section in RVN. Tasks to be completed include: Establishment of the Special Services Supply Account, which was accomplished on 23 Nov 67; procurement of 16mm projection equipment; schedule a USO show; open a Division swimming pool at the Bien Hoa Base Camp; establish the R&R Program; and accomplish liaison visits with area librarian. Due to the workload of the Division Special Services Section in RVN, the TOE personnel authorization of one officer and two EM is considered grossly inadequate when compared to the mission of the section. A minimum of two officers and 12 EM is recommended.
AVDG-SC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

1. Within the area of Postal Operations, upon arrival in-country, the main task was receipt and dispatch of mail. Dispatch schedules were established and air transportation made available for moving mail to Brigade Base Camps. The Postal Section for the Division (-) is authorized 2 officers and 13 EM. This is totally inadequate to provide postal support for a Division in Vietnam. Requirements for couriers and mail guards necessary for transporting mail on trucks and aircraft was far greater than anticipated. It is believed that a Division Postal Section in RVN should be authorized, as a minimum, two officers and 45 EM.

4. Provost Marshal:

a. The deployment of the PMD was done in an orderly manner. Major Elder, Ast PM, deployed with the Advance Party on 17 Nov 1967. In order to provide adequate personnel for in-processing of Divisional Units, personnel who would have helped set up the PMD were used in other capacities. The PMD was not actually set up until 7 Dec 1967. The PMD building required minor repairs to include additional flooring and wiring. The flooring and wiring was accomplished prior to 20 Dec 1967. No operational problems were encountered. On 10 Dec 67 the PM Operation Sergeant and clerks arrived, followed by the PM, LTC Carr on 13 Dec 67. The PMD processed its first blotter and was fully operational on 11 Dec 67.

b. The existence of separate brigade base camps created a police administrative problem for the PMD. In order to insure proper format, maintenance of sequential report numbers and proper distribution, the MP Platoons, supporting brigades, forward draft MP Reports to this office. This required the two clerks in PMD to type and process these reports in addition to normal PMD correspondence. The Platoons do not have a clerical capability.

c. The CID Section has received a modification to TOE authorizing two additional clerks to handle the administrative burden encountered. This in turn necessitated the request and approval for a larger building. Upon acquisition of these clerks, the CID Section and ARVN Liaison Section will switch buildings. This switch will give the CID Section additional office space and allow space to conduct interrogations in private.

d. The PMD has begun a gradual phasing of the 1st MP Platoon, 1st Brigade into the 101st MP Company and PMD Operations. The platoon is now handling its police administration as other MP Platoons of the Division. When the 1st Brigade officially rejoins the Division, little is left to complete the phasing of the platoon into the company and PMD Operation structure. This phasing has proceeded in an orderly manner to date and no major problems are expected in the future.

e. In summary, the PMD has encountered no major obstacles in completing its mission. The PMD is successfully carrying out its function of discipline, law and order and tactical support.
5. Chaplains:

a. The 101st Airborne Division Chaplain Section conducted religious services before, during, and after deployment. The Chaplains were moved by echelon, providing continuous courage for deployment of the Division. The intensive training program in-country included unit Chaplains accompanying the troops during operations.

b. There were 275 services conducted with 5,139 personnel in attendance. These services were conducted in-country. A comparative chart will be submitted each quarter for review and evaluation of the Chaplain program.

6. Intelligence:

1. (c) Narrative account of activities.

a. (U) G2 Section and MID.

(1) During the period from 31 October 1967 until deployment of the Division main-body to Vietnam, the G2 Section and MID activities consisted of training, research, POM activities, liaison, and providing services to elements of the Division. The more significant accomplishments are as follows:

(a) The Division Personnel Security Section, which was established on 18 August 1967, continued to validate and initiate security clearances for Division personnel, many of whom had been recently assigned.

(b) During this period the G2 Section continued to maintain a two-man liaison team with II FFORC En Hq at Long Binh, Republic of Vietnam. The team fed timely information to the Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, became conversant with available collection agencies in III CTZ, and oriented other members of the G2 Section and MID as they arrived in RVN.

(c) Instructions for disposition of classified documents which were not required in RVN were published and distributed on 1 November 1967. This enabled subordinate units to properly dispose of the bulk of their classified material well before deployment, and avoid the problems associated with attempting such a project with insufficient time.

(d) During this period the second phase of a Division sponsored Ground Surveillance Radar School was conducted. The instruction was conducted during the period 6 thru 9 November 1967 and was presented by the Division.
AVDG-GC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

A team from the Combat Surveillance School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The instruction consisted of the use and maintenance of GSR equipment and a night practical exercise.

(e) The G2 Section established a library with a reading room on 15 October. The library contained pertinent intelligence publications covering VC/NVA doctrine, tactics, strategy, weapons, equipment, dispositions, and activity; as well as information on terrain, weather, population, customs and other facets of the Republic of Vietnam. During the reporting period until deployment, unit commanders, intelligence personnel, and other key personnel were able to keep abreast of the situation in Vietnam and learn a considerable amount about the VC and the country in general.

(f) During the pre-deployment period, weekly briefings were conducted on current enemy activities in Vietnam. In addition, special briefings were conducted when warranted by significant enemy activity. Much of the information presented in these briefings was obtained from reports submitted by the G2 liaison team and from operational reports prepared by units already in Vietnam.

(g) During the pre-deployment period, the Intelligence Annex of the Division TAC SOP was revised to better conform with format and procedures used in Vietnam by MACV and II FFORCEV.

(h) On 20 November 1967, 4 officers, 4 NCO's and 3 enlisted men from the G2 Section deployed to RVN with the Advance Party. These eleven personnel set up, along with members of the MID, the various sub-sections of the G2 Section; issued basic load maps; commenced procurement of initial record photo coverage; established procedures for requesting support, receiving information, requesting information, and processing information; and visited other units in II FFORCEV to benefit by their experience. Considerable effort was expended during this time on base camp development, particularly by members of the MID Advance Party.

(2) During the base camp development and training phase, the G2 Section and MID activities consisted of training of MI personnel, improvement of base areas, development of intelligence for future operations, further development of procedures, activation of G2 Plans, and developing Order of Battle files. Although a large part of the Division was involved in training and base camp development during this period, the G2 Section, especially Plans, OB, and Air (including the II Section), became increasingly involved in preparation for future operations.

(a) During the base camp development and training
AVDG-GG
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

phase, the G2 Plans subsection was established. G2 Plans initiated a program of liaison visits to CICW, II FFCRCEV, other US Divisions, III CTZ Hq, and subordinate elements of the Division. From 22 December 1967 until 4 January 1968, G2 Plans made a liaison visit in the Song Be area to collect information and coordinate future collection in support of Operation SAN ANGELO. During this visit, information was exchanged and coordination was effected with numerous US and Vietnamese agencies in the area. From 16 January 1968 through 18 January 1968, a representative from G2 Plans made a liaison visit to III MAF Hq at Da Nang, to gain information for the 2d Brigade of this Division when it was alerted for its move to I CTZ.

(b) During this period the M1D devoted its time to base camp improvement, liaison visits, establishment of accounts, and training (some of which was conducted with other M1D's). The M1D was fortunate to have been assigned a group of existing structures in the Bien Hoa Base Camp, but considerable improvements were necessary to provide an efficient facility in which to conduct detachment business. A significant accomplishment during this time was the establishment of the Intelligence Contingency Fund. Liaison visits were made with other intelligence agencies for exchange of information, and to learn methods which are successful here in Vietnam. Some of the personnel of the 101st M1D worked in other M1D's to learn Vietnamese peculiar procedures and to improve overall proficiency through QI. An important activity during this period was the molding of interrogators and interpreters into effective IPW teams.

(c) During this period, the G2 Air element continued to acquire record photo coverage. Procedures were established for the receipt and further dissemination of SLAR, RED HAZE, and photo reports. Photo master traces were acquired during this period, and development progressed to a considerable degree on an installations data base. In December 1967, 5 personnel were sent to the in-country II Course (5 days) conducted by 1st M1B (ARS). This course has proved to be very valuable. The training of personnel for aerial observation was conducted during this period. The goal of this program, which is still underway, is to have all imagery interpreters train aerial observers in order to improve their ability to interpret photos and to make each man proficient in the use of hand-held cameras. A II officer was trained for targeting for attacks by TAC Air and Artillery during this period.

(d) During the base camp development and training period, the OB Section spent most of its time developing its various files. During this period the section also supported G2 with the OB files, intelligence estimates, studies on enemy organizations and tactics, periodic analysis of the enemy situation, frequent input to the Division INTSUM, and preparation of briefing maps. The section also conducted liaison with adjacent units and intelligence agencies, analysed the results of PW interrogations and captured enemy documents, and recommended EEI to the G2.
AVDG-GC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

b. (U) Long Range Patrol:

(1) General: It is the belief of the G2 Section that the most difficult task confronting combat commanders in RVN is finding the enemy and immediately exploiting pinpoint targets with a reaction force. It was, therefore, felt that a LRP capability under operational control of the G2 was a capability that the Division had to start developing before deployment. This objective was accomplished by using the Division RECONDO School as a cadre to train LRP personnel.

(2) Pre-deployment training: During the period prior to deployment, training included orientation of personnel, testing and training in basic skills on map reading, communications, weapons, first aid, and patrolling. Training was also conducted under the US Army Florida Ranger Camp, Eglin AFB, Florida. This field training took place under simulated combat conditions and included:

(a) Use of FAC's.
(b) Live-Fire jungle reaction courses.
(c) Methods of infiltrating and exfiltrating areas of operations.
(d) Finesse patrolling.
(e) Saturation patrolling.
(f) Debriefing recording and report writing.

(3) In-country activities: The LRP company deployed to RVN with a strength of 3 officers and 47 enlisted men. The following training and operations were conducted:

(a) Training.

1. During the period 3 December 1967 thru 31 December 1967, one officer and 5 NCO's of the LRP participated in training with 1 SAS Sqdn of the 1st ATP at Nui Dat. A total of 7 missions were conducted with 1 SAS Sqdn. During the period 10 VC were KIA (BC).

2. During the period 10 December 1967 thru 20 December 1967, 1 officer and 18 men (3 LRP Teams) participated in LRP training and combat operations with the 9th Inf Div LRP Company. One VC was KIA (BC) by one of the 101st patrols.

3. During the period 17 December 1967, thru the end of the reporting period, a number of EM attended MACV RECONDO School.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDG-CC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1968

(b) Combat Operations.

1 During the period 26 December 1967 thru 3 January 1968, one officer and 14 enlisted men participated in combat operations with the 3d Brigade Short Range Patrol.

2 From 5 January 1968 thru the end of the reporting period, the entire IRF Company was attached to 3d Bde, 17th Cavalry for combat operations in the Song Be area. The company has conducted numerous reconnaissance, security, and ambush patrols in the area. The most successful operation was conducted on the night of 9 January 1968 when a IRF patrol ambushed 12 VC who were withdrawing from positions after having mortared Song Be Air Strip. The patrol killed 4 VC by body count, possible killed 8 more, and captured an 81mm mortar.

c. (c) 265th Radio Research Company.

(1) Pre-deployment period: The pre-deployment training program started on 9 October 1967 and extended into the reporting period, ending on 4 November 1967. From 6-8 November, the company went through modified ATT. The ability of the company to provide maximum support was reduced by a shortage of personnel and equipment. However, a rating of EXCELLENT was given for the support rendered and the capabilities of personnel assigned to the company. Twelve personnel had previous experience in RVN which, with the fine performance of the other personnel in the company, materially contributed to the above result. The final readiness report was submitted to the Commanding General, USAS, with information copy to the Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division, on 10 November 1967. At the close of the 4 week training cycle, a period of operational training began which extended until the date of departure. Inspections were undergone by the company during the period 6 thru 24 November 1967, with inspections conducted by:

(a) 101st Airborne Division.
(b) USASA Headquarters.
(c) 3d Army

(2) Base Camp development and training period.

(a) Base camp development. Numerous projects were completed or in progress during this period. Major projects included:

1 Expansion of the company area by bulldozing berms behind the company area.

CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

2. Oil the motor park.

3. Construction of personnel bunkers, defensive bunkers, and supplementary perimeter bunkers.

4. Sandbagging structures in the company area.

5. Fencing the entire company area with triple concertina.

6. Various building renovation projects.

7. Numerous grounds improvement projects.

(b) Training. Training during the period was operational in nature. It consisted primarily of sending personnel to work with other Radio Research Units in III CTZ. The 2d and 3d Brigades Support Platoons began to support the respective at the same time the company was undergoing its training phase. Support was rendered in the same manner as it would be during normal operations. The company became fully operational on a 24 hour per day basis on 1 January 1968, seven days before the end to the training period.

2. (C) Order of Battle during the period.

a. Upon the arrival of the 2d and 3d Brigades, 101st Abn Div, training AO's were created in the immediate vicinity of their base camps. The enemy is capable of appearing at any time, anywhere in III CTZ. Therefore, no area is considered secure as was the case with both assigned training AO's. The enemy was contacted by elements of the 2d and 3d Brigades on numerous occasions during the training missions. It is believed that the 2d Brigade contacted elements of the 7th Inf Bn of 1st IV. The 3d Brigade was harassed by local force enemy units operating in the Phuoc Vinh area.

b. AO NORMANDY. Generally there were indications of a growing enemy offensive during the period the 2d Brigade operated in the AO. This offensive was targeted against lightly defended OP's and District Headquarters. All the battalions of MR IV, particularly the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 7th were fully capable of conducting multi-battalion attacks against friendly base areas. AO NORMANDY encompassed an area that is extremely important to the enemy and one that he has operated for years.

c. AO MANCHESTER. Contact with the enemy in the 3d Brigade AO has been generally light. Presently the Dong Nai Regiment appears to be avoiding contact, though reports persist that they are fully capable of attacking or defending any position within AO MANCHESTER or any other location.
CONFIDENTIAL

AWC/GC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

Elements of the Dong Nai Regiment will probably defend their base areas. They appear to be more interested in scoring a victory in the Tar Ben area than against elements of the 3d Brigade, 101st Abn Div. They will attack a lucrative target (company size) should it present itself.

d. AO SAN ANSELO. During the period that the 1st Brigade has operated in Northern Phuoc Long Province, enemy main force units were present, however, they appeared to be avoiding contact with US Forces. Present indications are that the 273d VC Regiment, the 275th VC Regiment, and the 88th NVA Regiment have moved south out of Phuoc Long Province. Small offensive probes throughout the night and sporadic mortar attacks have probably been conducted by local force units. (See inclosure 1 to inclosure 3 sketch map of AO). Contacts initiated by elements of the 1st Bde have probably been against local force units or unidentified main force units.

3. (c) Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques.

a. One of the enemy’s most successful types of offensive actions has been attacking outposts or fixed installations. Because of overall Allied superiority in manpower and firepower, the VC/NVA commander plans his attack carefully and at great length. His reconnaissance and intelligence effort is extensive. The attack is rehearsed repeatedly, using mock-ups and sand tables. Execution of the attack plan is marked by good security, silence, and speed. Attacking units made maximum use of terrain and move aggressively into the perimeter to isolate and destroy the opposing force periphery. Withdrawals are quick, orderly, and well executed. Once the attack starts, great emphasis is placed on the individual initiative of subordinate commanders, especially the platoon leaders and squad leaders. Sappers are used extensively to overcome the installations obstacles and establish a bridgehead within the defensive perimeter. VC/NVA tactics and techniques used in attacking fixed installations are well conceived and have proved to be effective in numerous cases.

b. The hours from dusk to dawn are considered prime hours for the VC to assault, sabotage, terrorize, harass, and ambush. The VC consider not only the hours of darkness, but also fog, heavy rain, and strong wind to their advantage. Under these conditions, the VC can approach enemy positions undetected, giving them a better chance of achieving surprise in their attack.

c. The VC rely heavily on the ambush as a means of initiating contact with opposing forces. The ambush makes maximum use of their knowledge of terrain, good intelligence, careful planning, and camouflage techniques. The ambush takes advantage on the dependence of the opposing forces use of roads. It also provided the VC with a means of partially coping with the opposing forces greater fire power and mobility which have made attacking a fixed installation increasingly hazardous.

d. The chief mission of the VC/NVA heavy weapons is to provide fire support to the infantry unit. VC doctrine, at present, does not envision
positional defense; therefore, the role of the support weapon in a defensive situation has probably not been fully developed. VC/NVA attacks call for a violent shock effect followed by a swift assault. In order to produce this result, the heavy weapon is employed to its maximum capability. After the attack, they revert to silence and secrecy of movement. The VC are very adept at employing direct fire weapons in an indirect fire role.

e. The VC/NVA have been concerned with electronic warfare throughout the Vietnam conflict, but during the past few months they have intensified their efforts. By taking advantage of breaches in Allied communications security, they have been able to intercept our transmissions and gain valuable intelligence data. The VC/NVA have also effectively jammed friendly broadcasts and have developed the ability to enter friendly nets and transmit false information.

4. Recapitulation of enemy losses. During the reporting period enemy losses were as follows:

a. KIA (K) 586
b. KIA (POSS) 173
c. Detainees 192
d. PW 13
e. Chieu Hoi 2
f. Crew Served Weapons 52
g. Individual Weapons 91
h. Crew Served Weapon Ammo (rds) 15
i. Small Arms Amm (rds) 11,753
j. Booby Traps 60
k. Demolitions (lbs) 48
l. Grain (tons) 153 3/4
m. Documents (lbs) 11 3/4
n. Sampans 22
do. Bunkers 518
p. Structures 164

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDC-OC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

q. Tunnels

5. (C) Significant Intelligence Sources.

a. The following is a listing of significant intelligence sources and comment on each.

(1) SLAR Adequate coverage.
(2) RED HAZE Adequate coverage.
(3) Photo coverage (USA & USAF) Too slow - normally it requires 4-8 days from request to delivery.
(4) VR's from higher hqs Marginal.
(5) Det A, 1st MI Bn (ARS) Excellent.
(6) CICV Excellent studies and cooperation, but due to their work load, it required up to two weeks to get a new area study.
(7) ARVN Hqs In area of interest. This source gave a helpful local Vietnamese evaluation to the intelligence picture.
(8) US Units In area of interest. Good source of a quick intelligence picture but, because they move continually it is not an in-depth evaluation below Bde level.
(9) MACV and SF Camps In area of interest. Best source of local information and evaluation of agent reports. Establishing proper rapport is the main concern with this source.
(10) Prisoners of War. Good

b. Intelligence collection is based upon Division initially developing a list of all sources in any area and establishing initial contact with the sources. Information gained in this manner is used for initial planning. Upon movement of the operational unit into an area, that unit continues contact with all sources in that vicinity. Basically, Division determines sources in an area, establishes contact with the source and then passes this responsibility to the unit moving into the area.

6. (C) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Possible Courses of
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDG-C2
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

Action at the End of the Period.

a. The enemy is capable of:

(1) Continuing stubborn resistance in Saigon and maintaining a high level of harassment in the circle of territory surrounding the metropolitan Saigon area. Coordinated action around Saigon can be conducted with four Local Force Battalions against such targets as Hoc Mon, Binh Chanh, Thu Duc, and Nha Be.

(2) Intensifying his actions beyond the outer edge of the current, concentrated offensive by conducting attacks against such Province capitals as Tay Ninh, An Loc and Song Be. Purposes of these actions would be to attempt to relieve Allied Pressure on forces in the Saigon - Bien Hoa - Long Binh areas and to strengthen his influence and control. In the current time frame, attacks against outlying Province capitals will probably be no larger than reinforced regiment size.

(3) If the enemy decides that the Saigon - Bien Hoa - Long Binh complex must be secured, he can reinforce his battalions currently in contact with all or parts of four Divisional Main Force Regiments. These regiments are believed to be within reinforcing distance of Saigon to the north and northwest.

(4) With the exception of battalions involved at Saigon and main force regiments involved in the Bien Hoa/Long Binh area, the Provincial and Local Force units conducting the current offensive are capable of disengaging from action and resuming their cover as bonafide citizens of the community.

(5) The enemy is not considered to be capable of sustaining the high level of current offensive operations without the further commitment of Divisional Main Force Regiments.

b. The enemy's probable course of action:

(1) Continue holding and harassing actions in the Saigon - Bien Hoa - Long Binh area until forced to withdraw.

(2) Reinforce provincial and local elements in contact at key locations which would afford the enemy an opportunity to achieve military and political victory.

(3) Increase harassing fire attacks to include the substantial use of 122mm and possibly larger rockets against key Allied installations and bases.

(4) Increase harassing fire and ground attacks against outlying Province Capitals and District towns.

CONFIDENTIAL
AVDG-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

c. Enemy Vulnerabilities:

(1) Enemy LOC's are extended and insecure, with the exception of those traversing neutral countries or international waters where some degree of security exists.

(2) The enemy is generally short of medicine and foodstuffs.

(3) Low enemy morale is vulnerable to exploitation by friendly psychological warfare operations.

7. Deviation From Current Intelligence Doctrine: None

8. Recommended New Techniques and Changes in Doctrine and Organization:

a. Basic to an effective intelligence operation is an understanding and acceptance of the characteristics of the Vietnam war. It is oriented on Brigade and smaller unit operations in primarily an unconventional environment that can move anywhere on short notice. Currently, the 101st Airborne Division is in the process of refining its techniques and modes of operation under this concept. With a month and one half in-country during this period, no recommended new techniques will be made this quarter in order to adequately experiment and evaluate suggested changes.

H. Logistics:

1. Concept of Operation:

a. Base Camp:

(1) Division Supply Point at Bien Hoa supporting all classes of supply for the Bien Hoa Army Base and selected Class II & IV items to all Division elements in their areas of operations.

(2) Forward Supply activity at Phuoc Vinh operated by Saigon Support Command providing Class I, III and minimum Class II & IV items to the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division Ammunition Supply Point.

(3) 25th Infantry Division Supply Point at Cu Chi providing Class II & III supply support to the 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. All Class II & IV and Class V support for the 2nd Brigade was provided by the 101st Airborne Division Supply Point, Bien Hoa.

b. Operations:

(1) Operation San Angelo was supported by Saigon Support Command, forward supply activity, Song Be, Vietnam for Class I, III and selected Class II & IV items, barrier material and batteries. The 101st Airborne Division established a forward support element and an ammunition supply point to operate in
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

conjunction with the forward supply activity to provide other Class II & IV, plus all Class V items.

(2) Operation Jeb Stuart: Support received from FSA's from Da Nang Area Sub Command and III MAF. All classes of supplies are being provided by the units. The 426th S&T Battalion has a 38 man FSE in support of the 2d Brigade.

2. Maintenance - Summary of jobs received and completed by commodity category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMODITY CATEGORY</th>
<th>RECEIVED JANUARY</th>
<th>COMPLETED JANUARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>801 Backup</td>
<td>801 Backup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calibration</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>1286</td>
<td>1293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Medical - Health conditions of the command:

a. Malaria: The 101st Airborne Division (minus 1st Brigade) experienced 2 cases of malaria between 1-31 January 1968. During the same period, 138 cases of malaria were reported from the 1st Brigade.

Discussion - Effective malaria prevention requires constant command emphasis on personal protective measures. The use of mosquito bed nets is of great importance and is often neglected by forward troops.

b. Hepatitis: Between 1-31 January 1968 there were two cases of hepatitis reported from Division (-) and 24 cases from 1st Brigade. The high rate in the 1st Brigade was attributed to drinking undisinfected stream water.

Discussion - Some troops had not used iodine water purification tablets and others had used deteriorated tablets. Iodine water purification tablets that have changed from normal metallic gray color to reddish brown have deteriorated and should not be used. Purification of a canteen full of water requires one tablet in clear water, two (2) in cloudy water and three (3) in muddy water. After tablets have dissolved a 30 minute contact time is required before drinking.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDG-GE

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

4. Transportation:

a. Convoy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DESTINATION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF VEHICLES</th>
<th>TOTAL CARGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 January 1968</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>170 (3&amp;4's &amp; 2½ ton)</td>
<td>1680 ST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 January 1968</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>277 (2½ tons)</td>
<td>1351 ST</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Airlift Recap:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE REQUEST</th>
<th>NUMBER OF REQUESTS</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT TYPE</th>
<th>TONNAGE</th>
<th>PAX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TE</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>3,954</td>
<td>6,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>C-123</td>
<td>3,954</td>
<td>6,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>C-124</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>C-124</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIORITY 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>C-7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>C-123</td>
<td></td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>1,566.7</td>
<td>5,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1 (Courier)</td>
<td>C-7</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTALS: 45 (SHORT 5,735.2 TONS)

I. Civil Affairs:

1. Civic actions implemented to assist the GVN Revolutionary Development effort.

SCHOOLS:

Repaired 2
Supplied (5) 1900 school kits
5 athletic kits

DISPENSARIES:

Repaired 1

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

MEDCAP II:

Visits: 52
Patients: 2,783

COMMODITIES DISTRIBUTED:

- Food: 23,000 lbs
- Damage: 300 board feet
- Soap: 20 lbs
- Health Supplies: 200 toothbrushes

ROADS REPAIRED: 5 KM

2. Actions implemented or monitored to ensure Vietnamese acceptance of US and FWHP troops presence.

3. Prior to deployment of the 101st Airborne Division, special classes in Vietnamese - American relationships concerning customs and culture were presented which better prepared the troops of the 101st Airborne Division for Vietnam. In addition, a series of articles on the subject was published on a periodic basis in the daily bulletin. This further helped to focus attention on the proper American - Vietnamese relationships.

4. The status of GVN Revolutionary Development Program.

MEDCAP II by which the doctors and medical corpsmen give aid and assistance to relieve misery and suffering is highly effective in winning the minds and hearts of the people. This is especially true following VC destruction where refugees are in dire need of medical assistance. Prior to starting any EDCAP program, a visit to a MEDCAP site observing procedures, in effect, will preclude loss of wasted motion when commencing a new MEDCAP.

5. Minutes of the Monthly Community Relations Meeting for December are attached as inclosure 8.

6. A summary of psychological operations support to include samples of propaganda leaflets used during the reported period is attached as inclosure 9.

J. Psychological Operations:

1. The Psychological Operations (PsyOp) campaign for this period was oriented primarily toward the TET holiday season and the Chieu Hoi program. Additional leaflets and tapes were utilized to provide information and instructions to the VC, the NVA and South Vietnamese Civilians. These additional leaflets provided information to the enemy and the Vietnamese civilians on such subjects as rewards for weapons, ways to surrender, and the discrediting of VC leaders.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDG-CC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

2. PsyOp data for the month of January:
   a. Hours of Loudspeaker Broadcasts------------------18
   b. Number of Leaflets Disseminated------------------1,131,000
   c. Films shown on MEDCAP missions------------------12
   d. Aircraft used to disseminate above--(U-10) 4 (HUID) 5

3. The above listed propaganda material was developed by 101st Airborne Division PsyOp personnel, the 6th PSYOP Bn, Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), and local Vietnamese Political Warfare organizations.

4. Examples of PsyOp leaflets utilized during this period are at enclosure #9.

K. Artillery:

1. Using C-141 aircraft of the USAF's Military Airlift Command, as part of Operation Eagle Thrust, the 101st Airborne Division Artillery began arriving in RVN on 3 December 1967. The first round fired was by C Battery, 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery on 5 December. By 18 December the main body of Division Artillery and all subordinate units had closed into base camp areas. No significant problems were encountered during the move. To a great extent, this can be attributed to the high degree of experience in air movement possessed by the Div Arty units.

2. Immediately upon their arrival in RVN the Division Artillery units were integrated into the program of artillery fires existing at their assigned base camps. This operational fire support was accomplished concurrently with the required thirty day in-country training schedule and base camp development program.

3. Documents containing "lessons learned" by units in RVN have proved invaluable to elements of this command. In many cases the observations contained in the "lessons learned" served as a nucleus for the establishment of unit SOP's for providing safe and responsive fire support to the maneuver elements of the Division. Techniques and procedures for double-checks of firing data and firing clearances were developed. Emphasis is continuing on the control of close-in fires and double-check procedures.

4. Liaison visits to artillery units within the same Corps Tactical Zone by advance party personnel were found to be very beneficial in the development of unit SOP's.

5. Development of base camp facilities competed with scheduled training. This was anticipated and prior planning prevented base camp development from significantly interfering with unit training objectives.
6. Survey section operations have been highly successful. Upon initial occupation of position both Battalion Survey Sections established position area control and, in one battalion, established a series of triangulation bases within a compound to facilitate the survey of possible position areas outside the compound.

7. In Operation San Angelo the Division Artillery Survey Section established an observation point on a commanding terrain feature in order to extend control to fire support bases. They accomplished this mission by use of Distant Measuring Equipment (DME) HC-8 and T-16 Theodolites. With this equipment, survey control was extended to fire support base located as far as 17,000 meters from the observation point.

8. The Division Artillery's use of organic radar sections had been very successful (See Sec. 2, Part I Lessons Learned). The Ground Surveillance Radar AN/TPS-25 has been especially successful in detecting moving targets, reporting their location accurately, and, in some cases, vectoring helicopter light fire teams to the target.

9. If safe, accurate, close-in fires are to be delivered by field artillery units, the conduct of precision registrations is vital. The nature of the terrain in RVN often times precludes the effective use of air or ground observers in the conduct of registrations. The AN/FQ-4A radar has been profitably employed by Division Artillery to observe high-burst and center-of-impact registrations. The accuracy of the registration corrections obtained with this radar have been comparable to those obtained using a target area base.

10. The AN/FQ-4A radar has also been used to adjust indirect fires on targets of opportunity and to verify the accuracy of unobserved fires.

11. This command intends to probe the possibilities of combining both the TPS-25A radar's ability to detect and track targets, and the AN/FQ-4A counter-mortar radar's capability of determining the point-of-impact of indirect fire weapons with the Gun Direction Computer (FADAC) to provide a highly accurate and quickly responsive means of attacking targets.

12. Due to combat emergencies USAF transport aircraft have not always been able to adhere to scheduled aircraft loading times. Airfield delays of 4 to 36 hours have been experienced by some Division Artillery units. It is wasteful of artillery firepower to place an entire unit in a loading posture awaiting delayed aircraft. When the situation permits, this unit has adopted the practice of positioning at the airfield only the necessary personnel and equipment to load two or three chalks. The loads for the remaining chalks are left on tactical position until a firm word is received on aircraft arrival times, minimizing the loss of artillery firepower during the waiting period.

13. Both battalions which accompanied the Division to RVN fired missions in support of maneuver elements during training and tactical operations throughout the entire in-country training period. The 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery,
AVDG-GC

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

in RVN with the 1st Brigade, rejoined Division Artillery in mid-January 1968.
From mid-December 1967 through 31 January 1968 units fired the following
number of rounds:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/319th</td>
<td>15,713</td>
<td>13,807</td>
<td>29,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320th</td>
<td>6,299 (as of 25 Jan)</td>
<td>6,299</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/321st</td>
<td>11,601</td>
<td>7,549</td>
<td>19,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS:</td>
<td>33,613</td>
<td>21,256</td>
<td>54,869</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. On 10 January 1968, the 1st BN, 321st Artillery was called upon
to furnish defensive fires in support of a 25th Infantry Division fire sup-
port base which was under heavy enemy attack. During the course of the night
the battalion fired 1935 rounds, Enemy KIA (BC) totaled 103. The accurate fire
of the 321st Artillery was accredited with a large number of the enemy killed.

15. During the reporting period, Division Artillery units engaged in
a total of 59 days of training, 10 days of troop movement, and 23 days of
combat operations.

L. Chemical:

1. The 101st Abn Div Chemical Section (TOE 57G) consists of two
officers and three enlisted men. It is augmented by a CBRC Detachment (TOE
3-56E) of one officer and four enlisted men. When alerted for duty in RVN,
the 101st Abn Div Chemical Section and the 36th Chemical Detachment immediately
reviewed the status of CBR training and equipment within the Division. The
great influx of deployable personnel required a revision of CBR school courses
in order to present material specifically applicable to RVN Operations in
the very short time available. A series of one week CBR Officer courses and
two week CBR NCO courses were presented to satisfy the training requirements
for unit CBR personnel. Special maintenance assistance was provided by Third
US Army Mobile Maintenance Teams to insure the Division's protective masks
and portable flame throwers and dispersers were in operational condition prior
to packing for deployment. At the same time, reports from the 101st Abn Div
were studied in order to identify specific missions for the Chemical Section
and 36th Chemical Detachment. Those missions identified were:

a. Personnel Detector Missions (Airborne NPD)
b. Bulk CS Drum Drops
c. Tactical CS Drops
d. Smoke
e. Flame
f. Defoliation
AVDL-6C-T
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

2. The first problem that became evident was the lack of specialized equipment required to perform the above listed missions. The Division had no personnel detectors and none were available in CONUS. The Division had no XM3 delivery systems for tactical employment of CS and smoke. The Division TOE included no large scale flame fuel mixing capability, and there was no capability for either aerial or ground-based defoliation other than the M26 "Mitey Mite" Disperser. Training was difficult not only due to the lack of equipment and ENSURE type munitions but also because of CONUS safety regulations dealing with the transport of explosives by aircraft. In addition, limited training areas available would not contain the downwind hazard expected from large scale ACA operations. In view of the unusual training problems, training other than familiarization with doctrine and lessons learned was postponed until the division was in-country.

3. It was determined that the only source of personnel detectors was in-country, so that item was left to be handled by advance party personnel. For the Bulk CS mission drum racks of the type used by the 1st Inf Div were fabricated. The racks were modified so that they could be broken down into CONEX size loads. The drum racks were shipped with the Division sea tail. Since XM3 systems were determined to be unavailable in CONUS and in RVN, it was decided that a rocket pod grenade drop system would be fabricated. This project was scheduled for in-country completion due to the greater availability of rocket pods in RVN. The pods would also provide a limited smoke screening capability, if required. An M135 request was submitted for the 36th Chemical Detachment in an effort to provide fuel mixing, PFT servicing and minimal ground base defoliation capability within the section.

4. Training of section and detachment personnel was accomplished for the most part in-country. The 1st Inf Div, which was the host unit for the 101st Abn Div, agreed to provide on-the-job training (OJT) for Division chemical personnel over a period of approximately two weeks. The 1st Inf Div chemical section was extremely helpful in providing technical data based on their experience and practical work for 101st personnel in conjunction with 1st Div operations. The OJT program was effectively completed by 28 Dec 67.

5. Concurrently with the training program, the grenade drop system was fabricated and a rigging yard for drum operations was constructed at base camp. Four Manpack Personnel Detectors were obtained from USARV, and the Division's first MPD mission was flown on 26 Dec 67. The severe maintenance problems with MPD's experienced by other divisions have also been encountered by the 101st Abn Div. The small number of available instruments coupled with the maintenance problems and the wide dispersion of the brigades resulted in considerable difficulty in providing the amount of MPD support requested by the brigades. It is felt that under the present conditions, sixteen MPD's are required to adequately support the Division.

6. ACA CS has been effectively used in conjunction with personnel detector operations and supporting fires during follow-up operations on suspected base camps when other tactical resources could not be diverted. An example of the sequence of events follows:

33
SUBJECT: Operational Report for quarter ending 31 January 1968

a. Information received by G2 indicated the possibility of an active training/logistical site in the 3d Bde AO.

b. A personnel detector mission was planned for the area and unusually strong readings were obtained in the suspected area.

c. The 3d Bde Chemical Officer followed the personnel detector mission with a CS drop utilizing two E155R2 CS Cannister Clusters. The agent was immediately followed by fire from light fire teams, and a FAC was on station to direct artillery or an immediate airstrike in the event enemy personnel or equipment were exposed.

d. On this mission, the suspected enemy personnel did not expose themselves and enemy results were unknown. The hunter-killer concept employing (1) Intelligence date (2) Personnel Detector (3) RCA CS and (4) artillery, LFT or airstrike follow-up is considered to be a satisfactory method of reconnaissance and subsequent engagement of a target of immediate Intelligence value when other tactical resources cannot be employed rapidly enough to exploit the intelligence gained.

7. Since 26 December, the Chemical Section and 36th Chemical Detachment have conducted twenty-three (23) personnel detector missions in support of Division units. Follow-up action on strong personnel detector readings have produced eight secondary explosions representing three separate targets; three ground contacts by 3d Bde elements and 6 VC KIA by escorting LFT. The personnel detector has proven a valuable intelligence gathering device and continues to be in demand by all division units. The device has been particularly useful in areas of dense vegetation in which other reconnaissance methods, such as visual recon and SLAR, are less effective.

8. The Division Chemical Section was alerted for a RCA mission in the vicinity of the US Embassy in Saigon on 31 Jan 68, following a VC attack on that installation. RCA CS was to be used around the Embassy to suppress small arms fire directed at the embassy helipad while reinforcing US troops were being inserted by helicopter. A locally fabricated system for dropping M79 CS grenades was selected as the delivery system. The grenade drop system, installed on a UHILH aircraft, was on station above the Embassy but was not used during the insertion as ground fire was suppressed sufficiently by conventional means.

9. Flame operations within the Division have been limited to flame field expedient work on base camp perimeters. In preparation of 55 gallon fougasse, an air pressure fuel mixing technique had proven useful. The system utilizes the ANM4 compressor as an air source. Air is forced through a metal tube into the gasoline as thickener is added. The resulting agitation is sufficient to mix the fuel. This system is particularly useful when very few personnel are available and no M4 mixer is available.

10. Units of the Division have successfully used Smoky (the smoke generator system integral to UH-1 aircraft) on both LZ extractions and insertions. The equipment is not organic to the Division, but it is often available from supporting assault helicopter companies.

11. The 101st Airborne Division had done no work with defoliants. On arrival in RVN probable areas of operations were examined to determine the
AVDG-BC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

extent of approved areas and the need for additional defoliation. Much of the area was found to be already defoliated or scheduled for Ranch Hand operations. The 3d Bde perimeter at Phuoc Vinh was requested for ground based defoliation. In general, the mobile character of the Airborne Division complicates defoliation operations due to the fact that the Division usually will have moved before approval can be obtained if the area is not already approved, or before the defoliant takes effect even if the area is not already approved. With this in mind the major defoliation effort will be directed toward clearance of base camp perimeters.

12. The 101st Airborne Division is prepared to conduct bulk CS Operations. To date, an insufficient quantity of CS-1 has been available to support such operations.

M. Inspector General:

1. Significant activities conducted by the Inspector General during the period 1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68 are as follows:

   a. Period 1 Nov - 12 Dec 67

      (1) Assistance Inspections. To assist the units in the preparation for deployment, assistance inspections were made. That portion of these inspections directly controlled by the IG covered unit administration, fire prevention and safety procedures, security of weapons, medical records and equipment, and non-appropriated funds. In addition, information was given to commanders on procedures for obtaining assistance inspections covering security, supply records, and maintenance. The results of the IG assistance inspections were given directly to the battalion commanders for their corrective action.

      (2) POM Inspections of Unit Funds. Based on instructions to units prepared by G1, (Div Cir 20-4) the POM Inspection of unit funds were scheduled and conducted by the IG. Arrangements were made for the pick-up of final bank statements and the conversion of fund assets into US Treasurer's checks. A significant problem was caused by the absence of unit fund custodians on POM leave at the time these funds were being processed. Special efforts are required to avoid closing funds so early that troops lost benefits from these welfare funds, while at the same time assuring sufficient time to close and inspect funds prior to departure. In general, funds were closed out and inspected within 30 days of the actual departure date of the unit.

      (3) Readiness Inspection by Third US Army. During the period 14-22 Nov 67, a readiness inspection was conducted by teams from

Third US Army (Div Cir 20-3). This inspection covered all aspects of deployment preparation and was directed towards the adequacy of the deployment program being conducted by Fort Campbell and the 101st Airborne Division. (The actual POM inspections were the responsibility of and were conducted by the post command at Fort Campbell). These readiness inspections were performed by four teams headed by the TUSA IG. One team checked personnel records while the remaining three teams (each made up of one TUSA IG and one TUSA DCLOG representative) visited units of the division. Draft copies of the reports of inspection were given units immediately after each unit was inspected, but the final reports were not received until after deployment of the division main body had begun. In general, units of the division were found to be ready for deployment, provided 30 days of in-country training was conducted. Some problems, mainly personnel status and shortages of equipment, were identified but these were already known to the Division and actions were taken to resolve these problems.

(4) Acting Inspectors General. To insure that personnel had an opportunity to present complaints and requests for assistance to an IG while divisional units were separated both during and after deployment, a program for designation of acting inspectors general in each of the brigades, Division Artillery and Support Command was developed (Div Reg 20-1).

(5) Annual General Inspections. At the time the Division was alerted for deployment, only Support Command had received an AGI in FY 68. Because of personnel turbulence and the intensified training program, the conduct of AGI's of Divisional units was suspended during the period from September 1967 to January 1968. A schedule for AGI's beginning in mid-February 1968 following arrival in-country, was developed, (Div Cir 20-2). The AGI program was revised to accommodate conditions in RVN and information on this program was distributed to the command prior to departure from Ft Campbell (Div Reg 20-2).

(6) Request for Assistance. A substantial number of requests for assistance were processed by the IG just prior to deployment of the Division. For the most part these requests involved personnel actions requesting deferment from movement or transfer to another unit. Because of the large personnel turnover in the division and the accelerated movement schedule, assistance was required in acting on the personnel action request before individuals were scheduled to depart. These requests were referred to Div AG who had the personnel involved held at Ft Campbell until action was completed in those cases where there appeared to be a reasonable basis for favorable action.

b. Period 13 Dec 67 - 31 Jan 68

(1) Complaints and requests for assistance processed during the period were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justified Complaints</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unjustified Complaints</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVDG-GC-T

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

Request for Assistance

(2) Inquiries and Investigations -

(a) Status of Special Service Radios and televisions sets. The Report of Inquiry recommended that the special services officer establish a property book for special services equipment and insure that equitable distributions are made throughout the division.

(b) Alleged Improper Conditions in AG Section. SP5 Lagasse, 101st Admin Co, wrote the President alleging that he was allowed insufficient free time, that personnel were punished for leaving their offices when there was no work to be done and that he was called to attention when the CG entered the Div Chapel. The allegations were found to be without foundation, but AG was directed to take action to improve communications within the AG Section.

(c) Alleged Improper Personnel Action. In a letter to Sen. Lister Hill, PFC Ronie F. Small, 1/502 Inf, alleged that, when he was in 3/187 Inf, (Mar 66 - Mar 67) he attempted 17 times to submit a request for compassionate transfer. There was no evidence to support PFC Small's allegation. Arrangements were made for 1/502 Inf to assist PFC Small in processing his request as soon as he receives supporting documentation.

(d) Use of Electric Power. An inquiry was made into the use of electric power in the Division HQ area. Based on this inquiry, it was recommended that the use of large electrical appliances be controlled and that a Division directive on this subject be published. G1, G4, ADE were directed to take necessary action.

(e) Post Exchange Concessionaires. An inquiry into the status of PX concessions, particularly barber shops, determined that controls by the area and sub-area exchange offices were inadequate, that some concessionaires did not have valid contracts for operation in the Div base camp, that barber shops were not being properly supplied by the concessionaires and that sanitary conditions did not meet established standards. G1, Div PX Off and Div Surg were instructed to take corrective action.

(f) Use of Construction Materials. An inquiry into the use of construction materials by Support Command indicated that better control of these materials was needed, that Division planning guidance on materials to be stocked should be prepared and that a Division Regulation establishing procedures for obtaining and using these materials should be published. G4 and DISCOM have been instructed to take action.

(3) Other IG Activities
AVDG-GC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(a) Equipment for Base Security. During a visit to the 3d Bde a potential problem concerning the non-availability of supplementary equipment (weapons and communications items) to replace TOE equipment in base defense was noted. G3, G4 and CofS was informed.

(b) Aerial resupply. Based on the observation of, and participation in, three aerial resupply sorties to the forward area of 1/27 Inf (25th Inf Div) it appeared that action to develop procedures and obtain necessary equipment (slings and rigging) was required prior to operations commitment of the Division. This was discussed with G3 and G4 and CofS was informed.

(c) Unit Fund Activities. During IG visits, a number of questions were received concerning unit fund activities. G1 and CofS were informed of the problem. Daily bulletin notices concerning actions requiring immediate attention by fund custodians have been published.

(d) Club Activities. Unit commanders pointed out that, for the morale and welfare of troops, they were operating unit clubs. However, they were concerned that this was being done informally, since formal instructions from Division were not available. G1 and CofS were informed of the problem. G1 has prepared a Division regulation covering these activities.

(e) Distribution of Publications. It was discovered that a significant number of USARV publications are not available for issue to the Division because USARV publications supply does not have copies in stock. Since Division units cannot comply with directives they do not have, AG and G1 were informed of the problem. It was recommended to CofS that a command letter on this subject be sent to USARV.

(f) Security of Weapons. In a five day period, 101st Admin Co lost two weapons (one was later located). A major contributing factor is the fact that personnel in 101st Admin Co (who have administrative duties) are issued weapons after normal duty hours. Since weapons cannot be taken to PM clubs, individuals were leaving them in billets. This problem was discussed with the Div HQ Co and 101st Admin Co Commanders, and with G4 and PM. G4 and PM are to prepare a Division regulation on this subject; however, this regulation has not yet been published. CofS was informed of the problem (23 Dec 67) and, as an interim measure, it was recommended that PM prepare a Daily Bulletin notice informing commanders that they could authorize weapons to be secured in a location where they can be distributed promptly, if the operational situation made this desirable.

2. Planning. The in-country annual general inspection schedule and inspection procedures have been finalized. Inspections will commence on 9 Feb 68 and the remainder (Brigades, Div troops, and Div Arty) of the FY 68 AGI schedule will be completed prior to 30 Jun 68.

N. Staff Judge Advocate

38
AVDC-GC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

1. During the reporting period there were numerous incidents of careless discharge of weapons or accidental shootings involving personnel of this division.

2. A requirement was imposed by AR 350-216 to insure that every member of this command within the preceding 12 month period received instructions on the provisions of the Geneva Convention Number IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDC: 50
SUBJ: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

SECTION II

COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

A. (C) Operations

1. Item: Air to ground radio nets

   a. Discussion: Air Force forward air controller radios mounted in the O1-E aircraft do not have the capability to transmit and receive on the half megacycle. The result is insufficient air to ground frequency to supply all maneuver units.

   b. Observation: Priority of frequencies with whole megacycles must be allocated to maneuver units to insure adequate air to ground communications.

2. Item: Coordination between ground unit and supporting helicopter gunships.

   a. Discussion: One of the most effective weapons used in support of I01st Airborne Division troops in contact has been helicopter gunships. Lack of experience at user level has not enabled them to be used to the maximum extent. Pilots are not familiar with ground force terminology, SCI utilization, coordination procedures, and vice versa. Ground forces are not adept at clearly describing troop dispositions, desires direction of attack and pyrotechnic signals.

   b. Observation: Necessary training required for ground forces and gunships to work as a team must be developed to a greater degree prior to commitment into a combat zone.

3. Item: Personnel Detector Missions located areas of likely enemy activity but troops were not readily available to follow-up on the sighting.

   a. Discussion: On several occasions, personnel detector (people sniffer) missions indicated areas of considerable activity which could not be quickly exploited by troops. When one or more other G2 sources coincided with the personnel detector indication, airstrikes were called on the suspect area. This procedure has been used on four target areas and has netted eight secondary explosions.

   b. Observation: Strong personnel detector sightings reinforced one or more other intelligence sources are lucrative targets for airstrikes.

4. Item: A fast method of mixing large quantities of thickened fuel with minimal personnel expenditure was required for rapid emplacement of flame field expedients.
AVOG-GE
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

a. Discussion: The requirement for large quantities of thickened fuel for use in flame field expedients presents a substantial problem to divisions which have no M4 mixer or equivalent fuel mixing equipment. In addition, very few personnel can be made available for the mixing operation. In order to meet this requirement, a method of mixing the fuel in the drum in which it is supplied has been developed. This procedure requires no large scale transfer of fuel from container to mixer etc. Using the ANH4 compressor as a source of air pressure, air is forced through the gasoline while thickener is added. The air is inserted through a length of pipe and the agitation produced by the air is sufficient to mix the fuel. Using this procedure, a drum of thickened fuel can be prepared in approximately ten minutes. This system is particularly valuable for construction of 55 gal fougasse, as the freshly mixed drum of fuel needs only to have the bung re-installed to be ready for emplacement. One man can turn out 55 gallons of thickened fuel every 10 minutes using this system.

b. Observations: Air pressure agitation utilizing the ANH4 compressor provides a quick method of mixing thickened fuel with minimal personnel requirements.

B. Personnel:

1. In future instances where division size organizations are being rapidly deployed, all replacements should be assigned to the division replacement detachment for further assignment to subordinate units based upon current requirements.

2. Personnel records should accompany each increment during movement to insure complete and adequate support.

3. A county-fair type personnel out-processing and PQR processing center should be established for ease of control and saving time.

4. Scope of CONUS military postal units should be expanded to include those postal activities which are essential in an overseas area. Among these activities are: money order service, parcel post, and receiving/dispach of mail.

5. A minimum of two officers and 45 EM should be authorized a division postal section destined for service in Vietnam in order to provide adequate service to outlying base camps.

6. Additional Special Services personnel should be authorized, since present TOE authorization is grossly inadequate in this vital area, to do a proper job in combat.

7. A minimum of 10 adding and subtracting machines and 13 field safes are required to adequately operate necessary postal financial teams.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

8. No equipment for the additional reenlistment personnel authorized by HQAE. Consequently, the section requires a 1/2 ton truck, three typewriters, and three field tables.

9. Religious coverage was considered best given when the Chaplains assigned to Brigades deployed with their normal coverage unit. This does provide a problem with the Catholic coverage utilizing only one Catholic Chaplain. This problem has been partially solved by rotating the Catholic Chaplains among the units and the Brigade Chaplain assisting in the coverage of the unit normally covered by the Catholic Chaplain.

C. Logistics:

1. Excellent construction materials available for overhead cover are 4X4 timbers PSP, 5 foot and 8 foot pickets, all of which are in extremely short supply.

2. Five (5) - eight (8) days supply of "C" rations should be considered the minimum basic load for small detachments which are deployed away from the parent unit.

3. The receiving point at arrival airfields must be manned by guides from each unit. The guides must proceed their units with sufficient time to enable them to learn the situation and know where the unit is to be located. Vandalism is heavy when supplies are left unattended at arrival airfields.

4. Forklifts must be sent forward with advance elements on every move involving bulk shipments of cargo or equipment via CONEX's or pallets. Fork extensions should be used when handling pallets. 6,000 lb RTPL cannot handle speed pallets adequately due to the short length of their forks. Transportation must be arranged for the transfer of cargo from airfield to unit storage.

5. All shipments of cargo or equipment must be marked with the name of the unit to which it belongs. Valuable or important cargo should be accompanied by at least two guards equipped to sustain themselves for three to eight days. Cargo was often left unmarked with no guards. Valuable time and equipment was used to sort, identify, and relocate this cargo and equipment.

6. FSE's must be moved into forward areas with the first portion of the main body. This enables support to begin as soon as possible.

7. A complete survey must be made of the operational areas to be utilized. Certain items must be clarified prior to the arrival of initial elements. These items are to include:

   a. Definite pre-assignment of real estate to adequately support the unit arriving.

   b. Marshalling areas to be used.

   c. Definite delegation of responsibilities for the organization and manning of AACG or receiving point control group. This should be the responsibility of the unit moving.
d. FSE's must have the capability of splitting into two or three teams. Many times battalion and brigade elements will locate separately from the main brigade area. Small liaison detachments should be sent with these special units.

8. Communications are vital. All elements deploying must have the capability of splitting up to 10 - 25 miles and still be in communication with each other.

9. Any element deploying with/or attached to separate major units should include at least one administrative clerk with typewriter. This clerk would be used to complete rosters, type messages, prepare correspondence and assist in setting up a CP.

10. Every section or element must make sure the following is included in the equipment taken.

   a. Medical items (pills, foot powder, insect repellent, aspirin, etc).

   b. Adequate protective clothing is necessary for climatic conditions (sweaters, field jackets, overshoes, etc).

   c. Repair parts in quantities to repair equipment under "FIELD CONDITIONS".

   d. Blank forms of all types necessary to accomplish all administrative and mission oriented tasks (rations request, 2765's, DA 31's, request for travel orders, etc) should accompany all separate elements such as FSE's.

11. Group travel orders should be published on all personnel deployed away from base area. These orders should authorize transportation to and from base areas. If these orders are not published, each time government transportation is utilized separate orders must be cut. The detachment commander must control the use of these orders.

12. Command and control vehicles are essential. All advance party elements and key personnel should have a 1/2 ton truck, w/radio.

13. When operating on an air-loc, FSE's must be pre-stocked with a minimum five day level of supplies. In addition, allotted daily resupply outfits cannot be reduced for an extended period of time, as it necessitates the use of CE's and higher priorities to effect resupply.
AVG-CC
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

D. Chemical:

1. Item: Vectoring friendly gunships to engage ground targets using the AN/TPS-25A radar.
   
a. Discussion: The method developed consists of using the radar to acquire the target, pinpointed to an accuracy of ten (10) meters in grid, then employing the 75 meter X 2 mil range gate of the radar to vector a helicopter gunship into the gate through a combination of communication with the pilot and the radar acquisition of the electronic signature created by the rotation of the helicopter rotor blades. Once the gunship is over the gate, a positive fix is obtained to an accuracy of 75 meters in length and a subtended horizontal width of 2 mils X range in thousands, e.g., a helicopter located at 2000 meters from the radar would be fixed within an area 75 meters long X 4 meters wide (2 mils X 2 (range in thousands)). By talking the pilot into position his gunship could be placed and maintained over the target. When the target moved, the radar followed this movement and directed the gunship to follow accordingly. When in a favorable position the pilot fixed the target with his lights and engaged it with machinegun and rocket fire.
   
b. Observation: This method of attacking targets during darkness or periods of poor visibility when the enemy is known to move freely seems to offer great possibilities. Adaptability of equipment to missions other than called for by the original design characteristics of the equipment should be exploited.

2. Item: Adjustment of fire close to friendly troops.
   
a. Discussion: Firing defensive concentration is a critical and exacting undertaking by the FO. Caution must be exercised by FO's and FDC personnel when utilizing close-in defensive fires. To minimize the danger to friendly elements when defensive concentrations are being fired, certain procedures and measures have been adopted. These are:

   (1) A requirement that the first round when adjusting fire close to friendly troops be either HC smoke or White Phosphorous. If deemed necessary, the fuse may be set for a 200 meter height of burst.

   (2) Mandatory use of a gunner's quadrant when firing within 1000 meters of friendly troops.

   (3) A requirement that artillery fires will not be placed closer than 300 meters to friendly positions unless requested by the maneuver element commander. Initial volleys in adjustment will be adjusted into position in 100 meter shifts until a 600 meter distance is obtained. From a distance of 600 meters down to 350 meters, 50 meter shifts only will be made.
The forward observer will use all available means to insure the safety of friendly US personnel. The use of an aerial observer in coordinating and adjusting the accurate placing of close-in fires is the desired method. This is accomplished by marking the friendly position then having the aerial observer tell the forward observer where the round is in relation to his position. Alternatives to this method are having the forward observer climb a tree, platform, or roof so he can observe the actual impact of the rounds, using the flash-to-bang method to determine the distance. The least desirable, but usable, method is the adjustment by sound method using flash-to-bang-time to determine the distance.

4. Whenever possible the observer should select close-in defensive targets which place the gun target line to the side of friendly perimeters.

5. Announcing the range probable error to the FO when adjusting fire closer than 350 meters to friendly position (fires can only be requested closer than 300 meters by the maneuver element commander). Special attention must be given to range probable errors when adjusting artillery close to friendly troops and the observer must be continually aware of the accuracy limitation of the battery.

b. Observation: Forward observers, generally speaking do not possess the desired degree of experience in planning and adjusting close-in artillery fires. Therefore definite and strict rules are necessary in the conduct of such missions.

PART II RECOMMENDATIONS

A. (U) That emphasis be placed on providing adequate helicopter and pilot assets to units in CONUS scheduled for deployment to combat zones. These assets must be available in sufficient time and quantity to enable ground units and their organic aviation support to fully develop effective techniques and team work prior to deployment.

B. Current personnel and equipment authorizations within the 101st Airborne Division are not sufficient to support the type of chemical operations currently being conducted in RVN.

1. Additional personnel are required to support large scale, bulk CS operations and to provide greater flexibility with respect to the number and types of missions which can be flown concurrently. A minimum of five additional personnel, 1 Officer and 4 EM are required.

2. In order to support current missions, the following additional equipment is required.

a. At least 16 MPD, modified for aerial employment are required to give each brigade and the division headquarters an adequate capability.
AVDG-GQ
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

The Division is now authorized 8 MPD.

b. A capability for both ground based power and aerial defoliation capability other than locally fabricated expedients.

c. For use on personnel detector missions CS drops and aerial defoliation, a communications system is required. For this purpose, flight helmets are preferred over regular head phones and boom mikes. Basis of issue for helmets should be one per officer in the chemical section.

d. The 101st Airborne Division has no CS or smoke grenade drop capability other than locally fabricated rocket pod racks. An EM3 or similar system is required.

e. The Division requires an Airborne Integral Smoke Generator to provide a smoke screening for use on landing zone insertions and extractions.

C. Chemical direct support maintenance within the Airborne Division is essentially non-exist. Seven EM (MOS 54D2F) are assigned in the Ground Maintenance Company of the organic Maintenance Battalion. The senior Chemical Equipment Repairman authorized is an E4. The personnel are quickly absorbed by the Automotive Maintenance Section. Since they are authorized no chemical maintenance equipment they are limited to inspection and classification operations even when used in their MOS. The major maintenance requirements are personnel detector testing and repair, protective mask repair and hydrostatic testing of flamethrower hoses. At present, no unit within the division has the capability to accomplish any of these three major maintenance requirements.

D. Recommend that an authorized MTOE packet be formed to add to deploying divisional sized organizations when it is expected that they will assume the responsibilities of a Post Staff in addition to what their TOE mission requires.
SECTION III

A. Reference letter, HQ, DA, Medical Problems with Long Distance Air Movements, dated 24 January 1968 (Incl 1). The following additional information is submitted in response to this communication.

1. Medical Problems Connected with Long Distance Air Movements:
The Division troops moved from the winter season of a temperate climate to the dry season of a tropical climate aboard C-141 aircraft with a flight time between 20 and 30 hours. Division medical personnel were alert for the following problems during movement: Motion sickness, thrombophlebitis, emotional or psychiatric problems associated with close confinement aboard the aircraft and deployment to a combat zone. In the immediate post-movement phase medical problems associated with acclimatization and gastrointestinal disturbances from a change in diet were considered possibilities. There were no significant medical problems with these or any other conditions. A 30 day period of progressive acclimatization was given all troops.

2. Observation: This favorable medical experience is attributed to the high standard of health, morale and training in the Division prior to deployment and to proper emphasis arrival in RVN.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Inclosures -

1 - After Action Report, Pre-movement and

* 2 - Quarterly Report
** 2 - CPORD 1-68 (San Angelo)
** 4 - CPORD 2-68
** 5 - CPORD 3-68 (Cassy)
* 6 - Fundamentals of Infantry
** 7 - Combat After Action Report (San Angelo)
* 8 - Community Relations Committee Meeting
* 9 - Payrolls Leaflets
* 10 - Artillery (TOE's)
* 11 - Operational Report (HQ's, 2d Sqdn, 17th Cav)
* 12 - Operational Report (HQ's, 326th Engr BN)

DISTRIBUTION:

* Withdrawn, Hqs, DA
** Withdrawn; available at Hqs, DA
2 - Asst CofS for Force Development, DA, Washington D.C. 20310 (thru channels)
2 - G-1/GUSARPG, ATTN: CPOP-MH APO 96558
6 - DCG, USARV, ATTN: AVHCG-DH APO 96375
AVFBC-RE-H (31 Mar 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Period Ending
31 January 1968. (RCS CSFOR-65) (VWBIT)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 8 APR 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This command has reviewed the attached OMLL of the 101st Air-
borne Division and concurs with it.

FOR THE COMMANDER

E. M. McGrath
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning personnel, pages 41 and 42, paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8. Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) may be modified by submission of Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTTOE) to meet specific combat operational requirements IAW AR 310-44 as changed by DA Cir 310-44.

b. Reference item concerning MFD, page 45, paragraph B2a. The division currently is authorized eight converted manpack detectors IAW the BOI established by this headquarters. Records reflect that the 101st Airborne Division now has 11 detectors. The number includes three which were issued to the HQ, USA&V GBRE when it was attached to the division for a special operation. Three airborne detectors have been allocated to Provisional Corps Vietnam (PCV). Two of these detectors have been issued to the 1st Cavalry Division. When the third set becomes available, it will be issued to the 101st Airborne Division subject to PCV approval.

c. Reference item concerning ground based power and aerial defoliation, page 46, paragraph B2b. This headquarters has added two Agavenco sprayers to the MTTOE of the 30th Chemical Detachment (TOE 3-500E, para 01). This action was initiated in response to a II FFORCEV request. Requests for power driven decontaminating apparatus to support herbicide operations should be submitted as MTTOE action.

d. Reference item concerning a communications system, page 46, paragraph B2c. Requests for flight helmets to support chemical operations should be submitted as MTTOE action.

e. Reference item concerning smoke grenade drop capability, page 46, paragraph B2d. The 101st Airborne Division has been allocated two XM27 helicopter mounted dispensers (LNSUHB 230) with 30 reload kits for evaluation. The dispensers will be loaded with XM54 CS grenades and will be available to the division in June 1968.
f. Reference item concerning integral smoke generators, page 46, paragraph E2e. A smoke generator integral to UH-1 aircraft has been type classified and assigned FSN 1040-878-8132. Some generators are currently being received. Production schedules indicate delivery will be completed in August 1968. Smoke generators will be issued to the division as they become available.

g. Reference item concerning chemical direct support, page 46, paragraph C. Seven chemical maintenance personnel should be adequate to perform required maintenance providing they are utilized in accordance with their MOS. MTOE action should be initiated for the equipment required to perform the necessary maintenance functions.

h. Reference item concerning authorized MTOE packet be formed, page 46, paragraph D: Concur. It is recognized by USARV, MACV, and DA that the division TOE is not adequate to support base camp operations in RVN. In February 1968, MTOE was proposed under the current standardization program. Additionally, in February 1968 DA approved in concept TDA augmentation for base camps. ACSFOR has developed MTOE/TDA reflecting personnel and equipment requirements for these functions. Actual reorganization dates depend upon asset availability as established by the current DA capability study and formal trade-off for space increases.

3. (U) The correct unit identification code is WABIAA.

4. (U) A copy of this endorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER

G. S. NARATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQs 101st Abn Div
HQs II FORGEV

50
GPOP-DT (31 Jan 68) (U) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 101st Abn Div for Period Ending
31 January 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 2 MAY 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

CL SHORT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG


AVDG-GC

SUBJECT: After Action Report—Preshift and Movement Phases—101st Airborne Division

THRU: Commanding General

TO: Commanding General

1. The 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, was alerted on 2 August 1967 for deployment to Southeast Asia. Initial instructions required a FOSD of 5 October and a scheduled in-country arrival during February 1968. An ERD for 9 and 29 January was submitted and approved. Plans at the time were for surface transportation of the main body in late January and early February. A nine week training schedule was planned within the frame work of the time allotted.

2. The Division was notified on 1 September 1967 that consideration was being given to airlifting the Division to the Republic of Vietnam in two increments. One increment, to consist of a brigade task force and a division control element, would have an ERD of 1 December, a PBD of 10 December, and would close in RVN by 15 December. The remainder of the Division would close in RVN by 31 January. The advanced movement directive was received on 15 September 1967.

3. Department of the Army, on 4 October 1967, asked for an evaluation of the impact of further accelerating movement and deploying the entire Division by air between 1 and 20 December 1967. It was decided that the Division could conduct a four-week intensified training program (five weeks for the 2d Bde) commencing on 9 October. This new accelerated schedule was directed on 23 October and an ERD/PBD of 1 December was established.

4. Deployability criteria for personnel was determined by Department of the Army. Using the established criteria, approximately 15% non-deployable personnel were identified. A concerted effort was made to induce experienced non-deployable personnel to volunteer for deployment with the Division. This effort resulted in
SUBJECT: After Action Report—Premovement and Movement Phases—101st Airborne Division

800 volunteers, most of whom had combat experience in Vietnam. Requisitions for shortages were submitted. A levy for 500 personnel as replacements for the 173d Airborne Brigade further complicated the personnel problem. TOE modifications and changes created still additional administrative problems which were overcome.

5. The problems of the G4 in movement of this magnitude were formidable. Added to the normal problems was the redistribution of assets necessitated by several TOE changes and modifications and the last minute exchange of such items as Mk41 Rifles. Again, the required tasks were accomplished.

6. The enclosed volume is the first of two after action reports to be prepared on the deployment of the 101st Airborne Division. This report covers Phase 1: Premovement, and Phase 2: Movement of the Division. Phase 3: Base Camp Development and Phase 4: In-Country Training, will follow. These two reports are an effort to present in narrative form the actions, techniques, problems, and recommendations of each staff section and units of the Division.

7. The report, although voluminous, is intended to give commanders and staffs of future deploying units the benefit of the planning, execution, and techniques that the personnel of this Division developed through study, trial and sometimes error.

8. The G2 Section of this report, classified CONFIDENTIAL, is forwarded under separate cover.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GERALD L. GOUCH
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
INDEX: 101st Airborne Division Pre-movement and Movement After Action Report

PAGE:

1
7
10
14
16
18
20
21
23
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
56
58
60
62
64
66
68
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
98
100
102
104
106
108
110
112
114
116
118
120
122
124
126
128
130
132
134
136
138
140
142
144
146
148
150
152
154
156
158
160
162
164
166
168
170
172
174
176
178
180
182
184
186
188
190
192
194
196
198
200
202
204
206
208
210
212
214
216
218
220
222
224
226
228
230
232
234
236
238
240
242
244
246
248
250
252
254
256
258
260
262
264
266
268
270
272
274
276
278
280
282
284
286
288
290
292
294
296
298
300
302
304
306
308
310
312
314
316
318
320
322
324
326
328
330
332
334
336
338
340
342
344
346
348
350
352
354
356
358
360
362
364
366
368
370
372
374
376
378
380
382
384
386
388
390
392
394
396
398
400
402
404
406
408
410
412
414
416
418
420
422
424
426
428
430
432
434
436
438
440
442
444
446
448
450
452
454
456
458
460
462
464
466
468
470
472
474
476
478
480
482
484
486
488
490
492
494
496
498
500
502
504
506
508
510
512
514
516
518
520
522
524
526
528
530
532
534
536
538
540
542
544
546
548
550
552
554
556
558
560
562
564
566
568
570
572
574
576
578
580
582
584
586
588
590
592
594
596
598
600
602
604
606
608
610
612
614
616
618
620
622
624
626
628
630
632
634
636
638
640
642
644
646
648
650
652
654
656
658
660

Withdrawn, Hqs, DA
ACofS, G1

1. 20 August 1967 to 1 December 1967.
2. Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
3. DA, TUSA, and XVIII Airborne Corps.
4. None.
5. None.
6. The mission of the ACofS, G1, during the predeployment phase of the Division was staff planning and supervision of all aspects of preparation for deployment.

7. The preparation for deployment was conceived of in five phases:
   a. Phase I: Initial planning and liaison was done with DA, TUSA, XVIII Airborne Corps, and the 82d Airborne Division. Policy on nondeployability criteria was formulated in coordination with DA and a program developed to encourage nondeployables to volunteer.
   b. Phase II: Nondeployables were identified and personnel shortages requisitioned.
   c. Phase III: Approximately 4500 nondeployable personnel were outprocessed. Plans were made for the reception of fillers and preparation for overseas movement (POM) processing of deployable personnel.
   d. Phase IV: In processing of approximately 5000 personnel was accomplished and unit training begun during this phase.
   e. Phase V: Training was terminated and POM of individuals and units accomplished.

8. Execution:
   a. As soon as the warning order was received on 2 August 1967, the ACofS, G1 briefed the special staff sections under his supervision asking them to formulate plans in their areas of responsibility. Plans were then based on a modified G-series TOE and personnel readiness date (PRD) in February.
   b. Deployability criteria was determined by DA and applied to all personnel in the Division. When the AC identified experienced nondeployables, the ACofS, G1 directed that concerted effort be made to induce these men, many of them RVN returnees, to volunteer for deployment with Division. The program successfully gained over 800 RVN returnee volunteers, thus providing a hard nucleus of combat experience for the Division.

55
c. Personnel were requisitioned on the basis of identified nondeployables and a G-series TOE. At DAS's insistence, personnel shortages were designated by OPO line and control numbers for specific units instead of requisitioning for Division's overall needs. This effectively prohibited filling Division units at an equal rate and contributed to the confusion inherent in such large personnel movements.

d. Coordination was effected with VITTI Airborne Corps and the 82d Airborne Division to arrange a smooth exchange of personnel with Fort Bragg, where the majority of fillers were obtained. Upon request, permission was granted by Third U.S. Army and XVIII Airborne Corps to retain those nondeployable personnel required to staff Division schools during the training period before PBD. Division leave policy was formulated.

e. Nondeployable personnel of the Division were outprocessed in the last half of September and incoming personnel received in late September and early October. As POSD, 5 October 1967, approached, the fill rate of units, particularly for the maneuver battalions, was quite uneven. Personnel were of necessity diverted from the unit of assignment designated by their OPO line and control numbers. Although this diversion of personnel enabled all units to reach 75% strength and begin training on schedule, it generated serious confusion in reporting personnel shortages from then on. Personnel information was submitted in initial operation readiness report but proved to be of little value because of the OPO line and control numbers.

f. Shortly after POSD the decision was made to accelerate deployment of the Division to December 1967. An already tight schedule was compressed. Personnel had to be recalled from schools and PGM processing of units advanced.

g. During the training period personnel continued to arrive from other commands behind schedule. It became obvious that shortfall in filler personnel would jeopardize one hundred percent fill of the Division. Fort Bragg and USAREUR, the two major losing commands, were queried, but provided no satisfactory answers nor revocations of orders on shortshipped personnel.

h. When the 3d Brigade concluded training in early November, PCM leave and processing began. The ACofS, G1, inspected each battalion and separate company for personnel deficiencies. A number of problem areas were identified in these inspections. Among the serious problem areas discovered were morning report entries occasioned by receipt of orders without EDCSA's from 7th U.S. Army. Several TOE changes were received during this period and additional personnel requisitioned.

i. On 23 November 1967, 450 men were levied for the 173d Airborne Brigade. Filling this requirement proved difficult because the Division was still far understrength and had not yet received the promised DA fillers.

9. Negative
10. Negative

11. Preparation of the 101st Airborne Division involved movement of more than 10,000 troops between installations in Europe, CONUS, and the Canal Zone. Many difficulties were encountered because of this massive exodus of troops. The following are observations on difficulties found during the predeployment phase:

a. TOE Changes:

   (1) Item: Frequent TOE Changes.

   (2) Discussion: The three major and many minor TOE changes during the predeployment period created confusion about personnel authorizations and made requisitioning difficult. Hand written, erroneous MTOE’s added to the confusion.

   (3) Observation: TOE changes were hastily done and incompletely planned and studied out. They can not be effectively implemented by units so close to deployment.

b. Assignment of Fillers:

   (1) Items: Assignment of fillers to specific units.

   (2) Discussion: Assignment of fillers to specific units within the Division proved undesirable. Fill of units became extremely uneven and control of accountability deteriorated when individuals programmed for one unit were assigned to other units as a corrective measure. Some individuals bypassed inprocessing by reporting directly to the unit of assignment on their orders. The volume of paperwork generated by transfers and reassignment inhibited accuracy and control and enhanced duplication and multiplicity of errors.

   (3) Observation: Replacement personnel for large deploying units should be requisitioned by number and criteria of vacancies or shortages and assigned thru the organization replacement system.

c. Cooperation:

   (1) Item: Lack of ready cooperation by losing commands caused personnel difficulties.

   (2) Discussion: During the preparation of the Division for deployment lack of cooperation made the Division's personnel situation very poor. Losing commands failed to ship all the directed personnel, resulting in a shortfall of enlisted strength upon deployment. Losing commands failed to send revocations of orders on short-shipped individuals to this command thereby prohibiting early identification of shortfalls and timely corrective action. This lack of efficient administration effectively concealed the actual situation from DA, Third U.S. Army, and the 101st Airborne Division.
(3) Observation: When commands are levied, they should be held strictly accountable for any shortfalls. Complete justification should be required and command pressure applied when shortfalls are not fully justified.
102

ACofS, G-1

1. 17 November 1967 to 18 December 1967.
4. None
5. None
6. The mission of the ACofS, G1 Advance Party was as follows:
   a. Assist in receiving the Division.
   b. Plan for interior headquarters arrangement.
   c. Arrange for hiring of local indigenous laborers.
   d. Supervise the ARVN Interpreter program.
   e. Coordinate with higher and adjacent headquarters on G1 areas of interest.
   f. Establish G1 section in-country.
7. For the movement phase the G1 section was divided into Advance Party element and Main Body. Advance Party members would establish G1 section in-country while Main Body personnel conducted business back at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
8. Execution:
   a. Interior Headquarters Arrangement: Generally no problems were encountered. Each staff section was represented on Advance Party and provided an accurate picture of their individual space requirements. Total working and billeting space was at a premium since Division Headquarters were forced to occupy an area large enough for a brigade headquarters.
   b. Local hires:
      (1) G1 representatives were least experienced in this area. Initially some assistance was provided by two civilian secretaries, formerly with 173rd Airborne Brigade civilian personnel office. Since the program required full time services on one officer, G5 representative was tasked for the initial hiring, allocation and control of daily hire laborers. The daily hire personnel were primarily used for sandbag filling and general clean-up.
(2) A total of VNS 750,000 were allocated to the Division in the form of assistance-in-kind (AIK) fund, however due to the accelerated deployment and the need for additional AIK funds, an additional VNS 250,000 were requested. ASAD approved VNS 220,000. The total sum was prorated among all division elements and the three base camps. At the same time, planning was initiated for AIK fund requirement for the next quarter, beginning in January 1968.

(3) A total of thirty (30) permanent hire spaces had been allocated to the Division. This too proved to be totally inadequate due to the accelerated deployment. Twenty-seven (27) of the spaces were occupied by KP's. Immediately, requests for additional permanent hire spaces were submitted for base camps at Bien Hoa and Phouc Vinh respectively. KP situation was further complicated by the requirement to operate messhalls around the clock in the staging and processing area. At the same time, advance party did not have sufficient personnel on hand to detail as KP's and carry out numerous other necessary tasks.

c. ARVN Interpreter Program: A total of ten (10) interpreters were diverted from 25th Infantry Division and assigned on loan to the 101st Airborne Division. On 16 December, the Division received fifty (50) additional interpreters graduating from 15 December class.

d. In addition to the above tasks, GI Advance Party assisted in receiving the Main Body by coordinating personnel details assisting with personnel and performing other tasks as directed by the Commanding General, Advance Party. To the maximum extent possible, liaison and courtesy trips were made to GI's at U.S. Army Vietnam, II Field Force, 1st Infantry Division, 45th Infantry Division and 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

e. The GI advance party, consisting of Deputy GI, arrived in-country on 17 November. The second increment, consisting of one Assistant GI and three (3) EM, arrived on 20 November. The main body consisting of three officers and four (4) EM arrived during the week of 6 December. ACofS, GI arrived in-country on 13 December 1967.

9. Administrative: Greatest problem area encountered by the Advance Party was in dealing with incomplete or error filled manifests. Manifests did improve as the airlift progressed.

10. None

11. Commanders Analysis:

a. In areas such as civilian hire, where tactical units have little or no experience, the assistance in the form of liaison teams or detailed SOP's must be provided to the incoming tactical units.

b. Recommendations: None

c. Lessons Learned: None
PART I

Administrative Services Division, Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division; Pre-deployment After Action Report

1. Date of Operation: 20 August 1967 thru 16 November 1967

2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky

3. Control of Corps/Headquarters: 101st Airborne Division, Support Command

4. Subordinate units: DA

5. Supporting units: 101st Infantry Company

6. Mission: To support equipment and personnel for overseas deployment

7. Concept of Operations: The concept of operations was to prepare the unit and personnel for deployment in phase.

8. Execution: Flexowriter machines Model 2301 were justified and requisitioned. Personnel from the 82d Airborne who were deployable were identified with personnel of the 101st who were non-deployable and the personnel were identified for exchange. In all cases in the AS, this was not done because several personnel had an BTS and one was extended in order to deploy. Airborne personnel worldwide were curtailed where necessary and assigned by name to jobs in the AS. Extensive maintenance on vehicles and equipment was begun. Flexowriter machines model 2301 for the Orders Section were received. Extensive justification for 2 Davidson 500S Dualith machines, one Xylograph machine and 1 Itelk Model 101SR Latmaster (has enlarging and reduction capability) was put in. Personnel began classroom instruction in the evenings in preparation for overseas deployment. Personnel began weapon qualification; personnel began to get medical and dental checks in preparation for overseas deployment. Initial justification for reproduction equipment turned down by DA. Immediately resubmitted with further justification. ASD personnel divided into three groups for deployment: (1) Move with Advance Control Group. (2) Move with 3rd Bde Task Force. (3) Move with Division (-). Equipment not required in RVN turned in and junior issue equipment issued. A few personnel from the 82d showed up for duty in ASD. The remainder were routed down to subordinate units because a higher priority of work exists there. Final ICM processing accomplished. Reproduction equipment turned down by DA again. Justification resubmitted. Personnel that were assigned to the section never did show up, this causing deployment with fewer personnel than had been anticipated. Personnel in the ASD were untrained in their specific areas because of the close relationship with Post and the general reliance on the Post Personnel to do the job that the Division Personnel would have primary responsibility on. Upon deployment, important training was given Division personnel by the Post Personnel when each was made aware of the responsibilities that they had in training and learning. Expendable supply support was outstanding.
9. Administrative: NA

10. Special equipment, techniques, and procedures: The overall preparations for the move were speedy because of the priority for movement given the Division. This caused a certain amount of confusion and also a certain amount of lacking in attention to detail for the sake of getting the job done. The preparations for the move were very good considering the circumstances that the Division was in.

11. Commander's analysis, recommendations, and lessons learned: NA
PART II

Administrative Services Division, Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division; Pre-Movement and Movement After Action Report

1. Date of Operation: 17 November to 29 December 1967
2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Bien Hoa, RVN
3. Control or Command Headquarters: 101st Airborne Division, Support Command
4. Subordinate units: NA
5. Supporting units: 101 Admin Company
6. Mission: To move the personnel and equipment to RVN
7. Concept of Operations: The concept of operations was to move the ASD to RVN in three groups while maintaining each capability in the section in both Fort Campbell and Bien Hoa.
8. Execution: The Advanced Command and Control Group consisting of 1 Officer and 4 enlisted men, departed Fort Campbell 17 November 1967 and arrived at Bien Hoa Air Force Base on 19 November 1967. Five pallets of equipment traveled with the party and these pallets were picked up immediately upon arrival. The bulk of the Section departed Fort Campbell on 5 December 1967 and arrived at Bien Hoa Air Force Base on 7 December 1967. Pallets of equipment also accompanied the people. These pallets were picked up immediately upon delivery to RVN. Three CONEX containers which came by ship arrived. Five individuals plus a 5 ton trailer and an expandable van left Fort Campbell on 9 December 1967. Two of the five individuals arrived on 9 December 1967. The five ton trailer and van plus three individuals arrived on 15 December 1967 by a C-133. The final group departed Fort Campbell on 28 December 1967 and arrived at Bien Hoa Air Force Base on 30 December 1967.
9. Administrative: The trip was not too hard on the personnel. The planes were comfortable and the food served was very good. All personnel were processed in a professional and timely manner from the time of departure at Fort Campbell Army Air Field until arrival at Bien Hoa. The advance Planning Group was not prepared to receive the Advance Party Group. The unit that sponsored the 101st was very helpful in getting the personnel from the air field to the Division area. From here, however, preparations and plans broke down.
10. Special equipment, techniques, and procedures: NA
11. Commander's analysis, recommendations, and lessons learned: The entire trip from beginning to end was very well organized. Each station in the long line of processing the Division toward RVN was well set-up and well run. The main problem was the lack of guidance given immediately after arrival in country.
Postal Division, Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division
Pre-Movement and Movement After Action Report

PART I POSTAL PRE-MOVEMENT

1. 2 August 1967 through 31 December 1967.

2. Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

3. 101st Airborne Division, Support Command.

4. No subordinate units.

5. 101st Admin Co.

6. To prepare equipment and personnel for overseas movement.

7. The concept of operation was to prepare the equipment and personnel for deployment in bulk.

8. A survey of personnel and equipment requirements was conducted and requisitions were submitted for additional postal personnel with augmentation requirements. Military Post Office pre-packs were surveyed to determine supplies on hand and requisitions were submitted for additional equipment. Coordination between Army Postal Service and Postal Officer 101st Airborne Division was established to insure a release of APO number and priorities on shipment of equipment and adequate guidance was provided to the 101st Abn Div. Non-deployable personnel were utilized to facilitate the section's movement. At the time of notification, the postal was submitted to increase strength to 2 officers and 43 EM. Coordination was made with Admin Machine Branch to produce machine run rosters and two complete decks of locator cards to be furnished the Division Locator and USARV Area Postal Directory. Unit Postal Officers and Unit Mail Clerks were provided instructions on in-country postal procedures. All unit mailrooms were given a final inspection. Locators cards were submitted by all units to the postal section. Change of address cards for dependents and correspondents were submitted by the individuals concerned. Seventy-nine cartons of postal supplies and equipment were received from the Post Office Department. Stamp and Money Order Stock was requisitioned from Postmaster, San Francisco to be shipped in care of Area Postal Directory, APO SF 96381. OJT was continued for all postal personnel. Additional Postal Personnel were assigned. Coordination was made with local postmaster on mail routing procedures after deployment. Equipment was packed prior to departmure of pers personnel. Three conexes and fourteen pallet type inserts were shipped. On 17 November 1967, 1 officer and 10 EM deployed with the Advanced Command and Control Group.

9. Division Circular 65-1 was published informing all personnel of overseas mailing address. A Division Postal Bulletin provided each individual with pertinent information concerning postal activities in-country.

64
10. None.

11. a. Item - Pre-Packed Equipment.
   b. Discussion - Pre-Packed equipment on hand was insufficient.
   c. Observations - Pre-Packed equipment must be inventoried, and kept updated to insure obsolete forms and equipment are replaced.
   d. Item - Personnel.
   e. Discussion - Staffing of the Postal Section was found to be inadequate to provide complete postal service in an overseas area.
   f. Observations - TO&E authorizations should be re-evaluated to insure adequate personnel are available.
   g. Item - Training of Personnel.
   h. Discussion - The majority of personnel comprising the Postal Section were not school trained or had not received adequate OJT.
   i. Observations - Scope of CONUS Military Postal Units should be expanded to include those postal activities which are essential in an overseas area. Among these areas are: Money Order Service, Parcel Post Service and Receiving and Dispatch.
Postal Division, Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division

Movement After Action Report

PART II POSTAL MOVEMENT

2. Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Bien Hoa, RVN.
3. 101st Airborne Division, Support Command.
4. No subordinate units.
5. 101st Adm Co.
6. To move personnel and equipment to RVN.
7. The concept of operation was to move the postal section to RVN in 3 increments while maintaining a capability to conduct postal activities at both Fort Campbell and Bien Hoa.

8. The Advanced Command and Control element consisting of 1 officer and 10 EH from the postal section arrived on 19 November 1967, at Bien Hoa, RVN. Fourteen pallets of supplies and equipment were shipped with this group. Upon arrival, a post office building was located and moving in operation began. Coordination was established with Staff Postal USARV, Saigon Air Mail Terminal and the 35th Base Post Office. APO 96383 received and dispatched mail for the first time on 21 November 1967. Fifteen additional personnel arrived with the 3d Bde Increment on 5 and 7 Dec 67. Total personnel assigned when the postal section closed included 2 officers and 35 EH. The three conexos arrived during the Division (-) movement.

9. None.

10. a. Item - Vehicle Transportation.
   b. Discussion - No vehicle transportation was available upon arrival in-country.
   c. Observations - A minimum of two 2½ ton H-109 Vans should be made available, upon arrival in-country.
   d. Item - Air Transportation.
   e. Discussion - Very limited air support was available upon arrival in-country.
   f. Observations - Host unit should be prepared to supply air transportation for movement of mail to outlying units until organic air transportation is available.
   g. Item - Buildings.
   h. Discussion - Adequate space was not provided for a division postal operation.
J. Observations - Advance Planning Group should make thorough evaluation of space available and should apportion prior to arrival to Advanced Command and Control.

J. Item - Equipment.

J. Discussion - Sufficient equipment was not available upon establishment of APO operations.

J. Observations - Postal sections should deploy with a minimum of 4 cancelling machines, 10 metal racks, 8 breakdown cases, 8 adding and subtracting machines, 10 field safes, 8 money order machines and 1-2 door, 4 drawer safes.
Special Services Division, Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division: Pre-Movement After Action Report

1. Date of Operation - 2 Aug - 17 Nov 67
2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky
3. Control or Command Headquarters: Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division.
4. Subordinate units: N/A
5. Supporting units: N/A
6. Mission: To prepare the Special Services Division for deployment to the Republic of Vietnam and to provide the maximum services possible during the deployment of the Division.
7. Concept of Operation: The Special Services Section was to support the Division during its preparation for overseas deployment with primary consideration given to the arrival of the Division Main Body in country. Actual development of the Special Services program was to be accomplished by the advanced party during the time frame of 17 Nov 67 to 17 Dec 67.
8. Execution: a. The Special Services Office formed as a Division Special Services Section on 1 October 1967. The section consisted of one Captain, one E-7, and 2 E-4's.
   b. Individual Company training occupied most of the EM's time during this period. On the Job Training was implemented for the entire section and close coordination was maintained with Post Special Services for basic fundamental operations.
   c. The return of the first Liaison Team from the Republic of Vietnam revealed several problem areas. First, a critical shortage of 16mm movie projectors existed in the Republic of Vietnam. Colonel Miller, TAG Special Services Officer visited Fort Campbell and was informed that the Division was not authorized to have 16mm projectors and requested that projectors be issued to the Division prior to its deployment. DA then dispatched a message to USARV to place a hold on 25 projectors for the 101st Airborne Division upon its arrival in country.
   d. The Special Services Section received connex containers to ship TOE equipment and a limited amount of expendable supplies to the Republic of Vietnam.
   e. Some of the items issued to the units prior to deployment are as follows:
      (1) Pocket Books
      (2) Magazines
      (3) Small Games
   f. Free 16mm movies were shown to the troops during the training phase and the "lock-in" period prior to deployment.
   g. A complete review of USARV and 1st Logistical Regulations was conducted prior to deployment. Some Division regulations were drafted based on the information available. Continual emphasis on individual training prevailed until date of departure, 17 November 1967.
9. Administrative: N/A
10. Special Equipment, techniques, and procedures: a. The following is
a list of special equipment requested prior to deployment:
   (1) 16mm projectors
   (2) Recreation Kits
   (3) Book Kits

b. A portion of the above listed items were received, however the quantity was not sufficient and additional supplies and equipment was obtained immediately upon arrival in country.

11. Commanders analysis, Recommendations, and Lessons Learned: Development of Division Regulations and SOP's should have been accomplished prior to arrival in country as much as possible. Actual operation and support in specific areas within the Special Services program are being held up pending publication of the corresponding regulations.

Carl R. Lupardus
CPT, AGC
Special Services Officer
Headquarters, Personnel Service Division, Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division; Pre-movement After Action Report


2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky

3. Control or Command Headquarters: Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division.

4. Subordinate units: N/A

5. Supporting units: N/A

6. Mission: To prepare for and execute the displacement of the Adjutant General's Section from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Bien Hoa, RVN.

7. Concept of Operations: To airlift all personnel of the 101st Airborne Division (-) plus all mission essential equipment. Non-mission essential equipment to be sea transported.

8. Execution:

   a. Established necessary procedures between Administrative Machine Branch and Personnel Management Branch to determine deployable and non-deployable personnel in the Division.

   b. Established a one-man statistical section to maintain and prepare reports on personnel strengths, both deployable and non-deployable.

   c. Supervised the establishment of both in and out processing teams to process approximately 3500 men out and approximately 5000 in.

   d. Obtained additional fund of $3500.00 with which to purchase expendable supplies for deployment.

   e. Appointed a movements control officer to provide coordination with 101 Admin Co in the packing and outloading of all personnel and equipment.

   f. Conex containers were loaded and shipped on 5 Nov 67. Inserts were loaded and prepared for air shipment with each of the departing increments.

   g. Chief, PSD and BCM departed 17 Nov 67 with Advance C&C. Two clerks and Assistant Chief, PSD, remained and deployed with the 3d Bde TF.

9. Administrative: Very poor cooperation from 2d Airborne Division in that they did not ship the necessary number of personnel they were supposed to, they did not provide revocation orders on personnel that were short shipped and clerical personnel were not allowed to depart in sufficient time to take leave and still have enough time to process prior to deployment. It also
caused some of the current members of the section to have to curtail their leaves because no one was there to take their place.

b. Supply: Some items such as generators were still not issued prior to departure. Many of our personnel were not issued jungle fatigues and boots prior to deployment.

c. Maintenance: All office machines were serviced and repaired prior to shipment.

d. Transportation: Very good support from the Post motor pool after we had turned in our own vehicles for sea transport.

10. N/A
11. N/A

DENNIS J. FLYNN
MAJ, AGC
Chief, PSD
Personnel Actions Branch, Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division; Pre-movement After Action Report

1. Date of Operation: 2 Aug 67 - 31 Dec 67

2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky

3. Control or Command Headquarters: Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division.

4. Subordinate units: N/A

5. Supporting units: N/A

6. Mission: To plan and execute movement of the Personnel Actions Branch of the Adjutant General Section.

7. Concept of Operation: Air movement of forward element from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Bien Hoa, RVN.

8. Execution: The PAB was to move in three increments. The first comprised of one officer and two enlisted personnel (departed CONUS 17 Nov 67). The second increment comprised of 10 enlisted personnel (departed CONUS 5 Dec 67). The third increment comprised of 15 personnel. The Rear Detachment comprised of one officer and two enlisted men (28 Dec 67).

9. Administrative: The Personnel Actions Branch is authorized 1 WO and 12 EV. The functions of this office consists of Awards and Decorations, Casualty Reporting, and Personal Affairs (1049's, eliminations, leaves, Congressional Inquires, etc.). Through inquiries of units already in-country the Branch learned the TO&E strength would be unable to accomplish its mission. A request was submitted for additional personnel strength of one officer and twenty-five enlisted personnel. Additional equipment was to be issued in-country. Planned liaison visits to counterparts in Divisions and USARV Headquarters.

10. Requested signature machine for awards section to reduce workload of the Commanding General signing each award certificate. Polaroid Camera equipment was requested for ID Card Section. Both requests ended with negative results.

11. Commanders analysis, recommendations, and lessons learned: Movement information was inadequate. The Movement SOP published was not disseminated properly. Personnel were not kept informed and changes to the procedures were misinterpreted or failed to reach all personnel. This possibly could have been alleviated by more briefings to the personnel in charge of increment movements. Shipment of equipment directives and personnel shipment directives were changed often and as a result personnel did not know which was correct. This mainly was a problem of dissemination of information.
Prior planning should take all requirements into consideration and be in final form prior to informing the personnel.

RICHARD R. FOUTTER
C/T, AGC
Asst AG
Reenlistment Branch, Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division, Pre-movement After Action Report

1. Date of Operation: 2 Aug 67 - 31 Dec 67

2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky

3. Control or Command Headquarters: Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division

4. Subordinate Units: N/A

5. Supporting Units: N/A

6. Mission: To establish a 101st Airborne Division Reenlistment Program for Vietnam

7. Concept of Operation: N/A

8. Execution: On 22 Nov 67 our representative arrived with the advance party. By 1 Dec 67 he had procured a building for the Division Reenlistment Office. On 8 Dec 67 the entire section was in Country with the office equipment. By 10 Dec 67 the office was operational.

9. Administrative: After becoming operational four (4) career counselors were attached to Division units, 1st; 2d Brigade, 3d Brigade, Support Command, and Division Artillery. On 10 Dec 67 we began to make liaison visits to Headquarters, USAFRV, and from there we went to 1st Infantry Division, 25th Inf Div, Saigon Support Command, and the 25th Inf Div, to find out how their Reenlistment Program was organized. As a result of these visits we have submitted a draft of a proposed Reenlistment regulation for approval.

10. Special Equipment, Techniques, and Procedures: N/A

11. Commanders Analysis, Recommendations, and Lessons Learned:
When this Division was alerted for Deployment overseas, a Reenlistment section was not authorized. Prior to departure for overseas, there was a change to the TOE, which authorized, seven (7) Career Counselors and one (1) Reenlistment Officer. However, there was no equipment authorized to operate the section. The following equipment is necessary for this section to operate effectively: one (1) 1/4 ton truck, three (3) typewriters, and three (3) desks.

Michael L. Clements
2LT, CMI
Actg Asst AG
Administrative Machines Branch, Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division; Pre-Movement After Action Report

1. Date of Operation: 2 Aug 67 - 31 Dec 67

2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky

3. Control or Command Headquarters: Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division.

4. Subordinate units: N/A

5. Supporting units: N/A

6. Mission: To prepare for and execute the displacement of the Administrative Machines Branch, AG Section, from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Bien Hoa, RVN.

7. Concept of Operations: The Administrative Machines Branch was to be Airlifted with 101st Airborne Div (-). This Airlift was to include all assigned personnel and all TOE equipment. Major portion of equipment made up three "outside" aircraft loads.

8. Execution:

   a. Upon notice of alert on 2 August 1967, an accelerated program was started to purify and update the personnel file maintained on punched cards.

   b. Also at this time, planning for deployment of organic personnel and equipment was started. This included obtaining and training of replacements and renovation of equipment.

   c. A major series of file updates was started, designed to identify and eliminate those personnel who are non-deployable; indicate POR status; and prepare data upon which to base personnel requisitions.

   d. In early October, major renovation of equipment was initiated. This included a complete check of the FG13 Vans containing data processing equipment, to include reconditioning of heaters and refrigeration units, line check of all electrical circuits, including special wiring, replacement of light units and painting.

   e. At the same time, action was initiated to accelerate delivery of a newer model collator (IBM 186).

   f. A programmed leave schedule was established and initiated.
g. At the end of October, the final "Zero Balance" of the master data file was started, and completed on 10 November.

h. The collator was delivered and installed on 6 November.

i. Renovation of the M313 Vans was completed on 24 November, and manufacturer representatives began a series of comprehensive checks, with organic personnel, to insure that data processing equipment was in the possible condition, and that an adequate supply of spare parts was on hand.

j. On 2 December, operational functions of all data processing equipment were terminated, and packing and bracing commenced.

k. Except for six personnel to accompany outsize loads, all personnel departed CONUS on 6 December, arriving in RVN on 8 December.

l. Outsize loads departed on 8 and 10 December, arriving in RVN seven days later via C-133 aircraft.

m. Equipment was operation in RVN on 20 December 1967.

9. Administrative: A lack of coordination by other headquarters was evident since four key senior NCO replacements did not arrive until 1 Dec 67.

10. Special equipment, techniques, and procedures: Data processing equipment, by nature of its design, is not easily moved. Preparation for moving requires the services of personnel who are trained in the maintenance of this equipment. Their knowledge and experience from a maintenance point of view enables them to pack and brace machines for maximum safety in transit.

11. Commanders Analysis, recommendations and lessons learned: This operation was conducted in relatively efficient manner, however much of this efficiency was due to aggressive, efficient NCO's who had the knowledge and experience to take the initiative and make decisions and to direct actions when and where required. Little technical guidance was available.

J. F. ROBERTS
CW2, USA
Chief, AMB
Personnel Records Branch, Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division
Pre-Movement After Action Report

1. Date of operation: 2 Aug 67 - 28 Dec 67

2. Location: Ft Campbell, Ky

3. Control or Command Headquarters: Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division

4. Subordinate Units: NA

5. Supporting Units: NA

6. Mission: To prepare and process all personnel records for Division personnel for deployment. Plan and conduct a Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM) Records Check for all deploying personnel to insure accuracy and completeness of records. Monitor preparation of Morning Reports for deploying units to insure proper entries. Prepare the personnel and equipment of the Personnel Records Branch for deployment.

7. Concept of operation: NA

8. Execution: a. The consolidation of non-deployable personnel for better control of strength accounting is discussed in detail at Tab A.

   b. The concept and operation of the Final POM Records Check is described at Tab B.

   c. The methods used in processing personnel dropped from rolls as deserters are described at Tab C.

   d. The instructions and control measures used in the preparation of Morning Reports upon deployment are covered in detail at Tab D.

   e. The procedures used in the shipment of personnel records are described at Tab E.

   f. The preparation of the personnel and equipment of the Personnel Records Branch for deployment is discussed in Tab F.

9. Administrative: NA

10. Special equipment, techniques, and procedures: NA

11. Commanders analysis, recommendations, and lessons learned: NA
Tab A - Consolidation of Non-deployables

1. In Oct it was decided that the consolidation of all non-deployable personnel in Det A would simplify strength accounting, reassignment and identification of those non-deployable personnel. The original concept is contained in the DF attached at Incl 1. The implementing instructions are contained in Incl 2.

2. This action did not produce the desired result. It was found that it was extremely difficult to continually verify the status of deployable / non-deployable personnel due to the receipt of replacements up to D-day, the changing status of personnel due to volunteer statements, and personnel action requests such as requests for defestation, hardship discharges, compassionate reassignments, etc. Further, the monitoring of unit morning reports to insure compliance with the instructions issued was extremely difficult. It is believed that such a program could be of benefit, provided that all such personnel could be physically located in one place, and that requests for personnel actions and replacement personnel not be accepted after a specified date at least 2 weeks prior to deployment.
DISPOSITION FORM

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL: AJEAG-Pb
SUBJECT: Strength Accounting For Non-Deployable Personnel

TOG-1 FROM AG (Div) DATE 12 Oct 67

1. PROBLEM: To establish procedures for accurate strength, accounting and reassignment of non-deployable personnel.

2. FACTS: a. Every division unit has a number of non-deployable personnel presently assigned and carried as assigned strength on the morning report. These individuals are not readily identifiable by examination of the morning report. The morning report and unit commanders must presently maintain an additional system of accountability in order to rapidly identify these personnel.

b. Personnel records of non-deployable personnel are presently maintained with the unit of assignment in order to facilitate maintenance and add to the problem of record screening for POM movement.

c. The Detachments 3 and 4 morning reports (TRAPP Personnel) will soon be reduced to a near zero balance.

d. The number of non-deployable personnel presently in the Division is 400.

3. ASSUMPTIONS: a. All non-deployable personnel will be reassigned from the Division prior to deployment.

b. Units desire to retain non-deployable personnel as long as possible to permit their utilization in the unit.

4. DISCUSSION: The attached draft circular, which would implement the assignment of all non-deployables to a detachment morning report and reattach them to their former unit of assignment, offers a solution to the problems of strength, accountability and reassignment of these personnel. It would offer the following advantages:

a. It would allow unit commanders to rapidly and accurately identify non-deployable personnel. The assigned strength total on the morning report would indicate the total number of deployable personnel; the attached strength total would indicate non-deployables.

b. Morning report entries required of the units upon reassignment or ETS of non-deployable personnel and subsequently upon deployment of the units would be simplified. As an example, upon ETS of an attached Non-deployable, the entry for the unit of attachment would simply be "Relieved from attached, departed." The individual would be discharged from the appropriate Detachment.

c. The initiation of the system will not cause additional work for the units concerned. Morning report entries made upon the transfer and reattachment of
SUBJECT: Strength Accounting For Non-Deployable Personnel

non-deployables will be group entries, requiring only 2 entries by unit morning report clerks.

d. Records for all non-deployables could be consolidated and prepared for outprocessing. Records teams would then be able to devote full time to the processing and control of records of deployable personnel.

e. Units would retain usage of non-deployable personnel until reassignment of the individual or deployment of the unit.

f. Normal personnel actions, promotion and military justice of non-deployable personnel would not be affected.

5. RECOMMENDATION: That the attached draft circular be approved and that the system established by it be implemented.

6. CONCURRENCES:

a. 101st Abn Div Finance Officer

b. Commanding Officer 2d Brigade

c. Commanding Officer 3d Brigade

1 Incl

as

s/DAVID T. OWEN
DAVID T. OWEN
Major, AGC
Division Adjutant General

APPROVED

s/JAMES B. HOBSON
JAMES B. HOBSON
LTC, GS
ACofS, GI
Circular number 335-2, 10 Oct 67, (Cont)

(1) All personnel reassigned to a detachment morning report will be reported as REASSIGNMENT LOSSES by the units concerned. The same morning report will reflect those personnel under ATTACHED PERSONNEL in accordance with rule 4, table 3-11, AR 335-60. "Pending reassignment" will be reflected in the remarks column. Group entries should be used in accordance with figure 3-2, page 3-4, AR 335-60. The duty status for ATTACHED PERSONNEL will be reflected as follows:

(a) Attached personnel present for duty will be reflected in item 13g, DA Form 1.

(b) Attached personnel not present for duty (i.e. Hosp, Conf, TDY and Leave) will be reflected in item 13r, DA Form 1.

(c) Attached personnel subsequently reassigned will be reflected on the morning report in accordance with rule 5/table 3-11, AR 335-60.

(d) Non-deployable personnel still attached to a division unit upon its deployment will be released from attachment in accordance with rule 5, table 3-11, AR 335-60. All correspondence pertaining to the individual (to include health, dental and clothing records, PD card, etc) will be forwarded to the Division AG, ATTN: AJEAG-PR, for inclosure in individual's 201 file.

(2) All personnel, present for duty, assigned to a detachment morning report, will be reflected TDY. Personnel in the hospital, confinement, on leave, etc, will be reflected in the appropriate duty status column of item 13, DA Form 1. Units to which non-deployable personnel are attached will reflect changes in duty status (i.e. Dy to Abs, Dy to Confined Civil Auth, etc) under ATTACHED PERSONNEL. Each entry will be followed by "Det 4" or "Det 3" (as appropriate) in the remarks section. Care must be taken by unit commanders to ensure that all entries concerning these personnel are annotated with the "Det" remark and to preclude changes in their duty status from being reflected under the heading "REDISTRIBUTION".

4. GENERAL: The following areas are clarified to assist commanders in specific cases as they arise.

a. Promotions: Personnel in an attached status may not be promoted by their unit of attachment. However, a commander may recommend non-deployable personnel for promotion to the next higher grade under the same criteria as those personnel assigned to him. Requests for promotion will be forwarded to the Division Adjutant General, ATTN: AJEAG-PR, on a "Request for Personnel Action" (DA Form 1049). Requests for waiver of time in grade must be placed on a separate "1049" and attached to the basic request. All recommendations will be accompanied by a Request for Orders (DA Form 2446-R).
Circular number 335-2, 10 Oct 67, (Cont)

b. Courts-Martial Authority: The UCMJ authority for the commander of the attached individual is the same as it is for assigned personnel.

c. Reduction Authority: Commanders exercise the same reduction authority for attached personnel as they do for assigned personnel.

d. Administration: Non-deployable personnel are attached for rations, quarters, administration, training and military justice and all administrative functions required except that all correspondence and documents pertaining to attached personnel will reflect "Assigned to Det __, 101st Airborne Division, Attached to Company __, 3d Bn, ___ Infantry, etc."

OFFICIAL
Withko

TALLON
CofS
Tab B - Final FOM Records Check

1. The concept of operation of the Final FOM Records Check is shown on Incl 1. Briefly, the check was to insure the personnel records and related documents of all deploying personnel were accurate and complete. Further, it was to insure that all personnel properly cleared post.

2. The actual processing was accomplished in accordance with Incl 2. In addition to those personnel listed, it was found necessary to have a transportation co-ordinator to control the 3-50 passenger buses that were used to transport units to the processing site.

3. The systems and procedures used in conducting the check proved highly successful. It was found that 100 personnel per hour could be processed with no difficulty.
POM Processing of Division Personnel

1. Purpose: To establish policies and guidance for the accomplishment of post clearance and preparation for overseas movement (POM) processing of all Division personnel prior to deployment.

2. General:
   a. Processing of personnel for post clearance and POM check is divided into three areas, namely, post clearance, preparation for POM check, and the final POM records check.
   b. Timetables for POM processing and post clearance (Appendix I) show the general time frame for the accomplishment of the necessary processing. Detailed schedules for the final POM records check for all units are shown in Appendixes II and III.
   c. Procedures for the processing of the advance party and all larger increments are described in paragraphs 3a through c below. Procedures for smaller groups are described in paragraph 3d.

3. Procedures and Responsibilities:
   a. Post clearance:
      (1) Units will accomplish post clearance of their personnel. Unit commanders will insure that all personnel are given an opportunity to clear post agencies in accordance with CAM Regulation 210-6 prior to the dates shown in Appendix I for unit clearance check.
      (2) The Division Adjutant General Personnel Records Branch will furnish a machine listing of all personnel to be cleared, to the post agencies listed below, on 6 November 1967.
         (a) Officers' Open Mess.
         (b) NCO Open Mess.
         (c) Provost Marshal.
         (d) Post Library.
(3) Each company-size unit will provide an NCO, grade E-7 or above, with an accurate company roster, to visit the post agencies listed in subparagraph (2) above, on the dates specified in Appendix I, to clear each individual in the unit. Each post agency will annotate its machine listing from the company roster upon clearance of each individual. Unit commanders will notify individuals who have not cleared all post agencies and require them to take necessary action. Upon completion of clearance of all individuals in the unit, each unit will indicate on the roster that clearance is complete. Rosters will be signed by the unit commander and forwarded to the Division Adjutant General, ATTN: AJEAG-PR, according to the schedule shown in Appendix I.

(4) The Division Adjutant General Records Branch will prepare DA Form 137 (Installation Clearance Record) for each deploying individual.

(5) A representative from each post agency to be cleared will be present in the POM processing line in Estep Gymnasium. As each deploying individual moves through the processing line with his DA Form 137, the post agency representative will check the annotated machine listing to insure that the individual has cleared, and mark the DA Form 137 accordingly. At the end of the processing line, one copy of the completed DA Form 137 will be given to the individual and one copy will be placed in the individual’s personnel records.

b. Preparation for POM check:

(1) Adjutant General areas:

(a) Unit commanders will insure that all actions necessary to prepare an individual for overseas movement, except the final records check, are accomplished prior to the final POM check on the dates shown in Appendices II and III. Time will not permit physical examinations, dental checks, immunizations, qualification firing, required training, preparation of wills and powers of attorney, and like actions in the processing line. All of these actions must be completed prior to final POM check.

(b) AR 220-10, AR 612-35, and CAM Regulation 1-34 provide guidance to the unit commander on those actions which must be completed prior to the final records check. DA Form 613 (Check List for Overseas Movement) may be used as a check list for necessary actions.
Prior to the final POM check, commanders of company-size units will prepare a DA Form 613 for each individual. The entry, "Special Orientation--Vietnam," will be placed in Item 14 of the DA Form 613. Column A of Section II will be checked by the unit for all items. Section III must be signed by the unit commander.

Units will withdraw Geneva Convention Cards from STRAC folders and retain them for issue to individuals. STRAC folders will be given to the service member concerned, for disposition. Units will complete Geneva Convention Cards and issue them to individuals 24 hours prior to deployment.

Finance area. Personnel should review the following financial actions and accomplish those desired during the Finance team's visit. The schedule is maintained by Division Finance.

(a) Preparation of DD Form 137 (Application for Basic Allowance for Quarters) for each individual in receipt of BAQ.

(b) Preparation of DA Form 1561 (Statement to Substantiate Payment of Family Separation Allowance) for each individual authorized to draw family separation allowance.

(c) Preparation of DA Form 1341 for those individuals desiring to start, stop, or change a Class E (support) allotment.

(d) References: See DIV Cir 37-1 and AR 600-20 (Dependents' Support).

Division Surgeon area:

(a) Health and dental records:

1. Records will be picked up at the servicing dispensary and Kuhn Dental Clinic and maintained thereafter at company/detachment level. These records contain information of a personal nature and will be secured in such a manner as to preclude compromise of their contents. The health record will be screened by unit personnel to insure that the following forms are inclosed:

a. Left side - DD Form 735 only.

b. Right side - SF 600 chronologically
   SF 601 (Immunization Record)
   Physical Profiles
   DD Form 771 (Spectacle Form)
   SF 88 (complete)
   SF 89 (complete)
   Consultation
   Electrocardiograph Reports
   SF 514 (Laboratory)
   SF 519 (X ray)
2. Unit commanders will insure that the jacket and its contents are serviceable, and that each deploying soldier has both medical and dental records.

3. Commanders will insure that troops receive required immunizations prior to POR leave. The following immunizations are required:
   a. Smallpox - Annual
   b. Typhoid - Annual
   c. Tetanus - Annual
   d. Yellow Fever - Six years
   e. Influenza - Annual
   f. Typhus - Annual or as required by area surgeon.
   g. Cholera - Six months
   h. Plague - Six months or as required by area surgeon.

4. Unit commanders will insure that individuals without health and/or dental records report to the Adjutant General to have records made. Following this, individuals will report to servicing dispensary and Kuhn Dental Clinic to have the new record completed.

   (b) Dental checks. Men found to have dental problems of such magnitude as to predictably render them dental casualties within the next 90 days will be appointed by the Division Dental Surgeon for required restoration. Unit commanders will insure that dental appointments are made and kept.

   (c) Eye check. Unit commanders will insure that eye clinic appointments are made and kept.

4. ACofS, G2, area:

   (a) Aliens. Unit commanders must insure that they comply with DIV Cir 380-10, 26 September 1967.

   (b) Security clearances. Unit commanders must insure that the names of personnel requiring a security clearance are submitted to the unit S2.

   (c) Area orientation briefing. Commanders must insure that newly assigned personnel receive the area orientation briefing as prescribed in DIV Cir 350-21, 27 September 1967.

(6) ACofS, G4, area. Logistic requirements for POM and POR are being furnished periodically in the Logistics Notes published by G4 (Div).

c. Final POM records check:

(1) The final POM records check will take place in Estep Gymnasium. Exact dates and times for processing will be coordinated between the Personnel Records Branch, Division Adjutant General's Section, and major subordinate units. It is imperative that unit commanders accomplish all actions required for POM processing prior to reporting to the processing location for the final check.

(2) Units will report to the processing facility at the scheduled time with completed DA Form 613's, medical records, and health records. All assigned personnel must be present for the final POM check.

(3) Each individual will have in his possession ID tags, ID card, immunization certificate, health and dental records, and DA Form 613 prior to reporting to the processing line.

(4) The processing line will consist of representatives from the Division Adjutant General, Division Finance, Division Surgeon, and the post agencies listed in paragraph 3a(2) above. Control and coordination are the responsibility of Personnel Records Branch, Division Adjutant General's Section.

(5) Division Personnel Records Branch will perform a complete records check covering all items in the Required Records portion of Section II, DA Form 613. Column B of Section II will be completed in the processing line. Health and dental records will be collected and filed with the field 201 files.

d. Movement of small increments. Deployment of increments composed of small detachments from several company-size units, such as the advance command and control element and individuals accompanying heavy equipment shipments, will use the following procedure:

(1) Units will prepare DA Form 137 (Installation Clearance Record) and individuals departing will clear post in the manner prescribed for normal reassignment in CAM Regulation 210-6.

(2) Units will furnish the Personnel Records Branch a list of those personnel deploying, no later than 10 days prior to deployment. This list will show name, rank, service number, and departure date.
(3) Unit commanders will complete DA Form 613 as required in paragraph 3a(3) above, prior to final records check.

(4) Individuals will report to Division Adjutant General Personnel Records Branch Outprocessing Section (Building 2613) with all items listed in paragraph 3b(3) above, for final records check, seven days prior to deployment. Personnel Records Branch will accomplish the final POM records check; collect and distribute completed DD Form 137's; complete and retain DA Form 613's; and collect dental and health records.

4. References:
   a. AR 220-10.
   b. AR 612-35.
   c. CAM Reg 1-34.
   d. CAM Reg 210-6.

(AJCGA)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL: 

G. C. BURCH
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

August G. Seibert
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
A plus
100 - AG Pub
Appendix I

TIMETABLE
for
POM PROCESSING AND POST CLEARANCE

6 Nov 67 - Machine listings provided to post agencies by Division Adjutant General to indicate clearance action.

6 Nov 67 - Units start post clearance procedures for deploying personnel.

10 Nov 67 - Units complete clearance action for advance party personnel and forward roster to the Division Adjutant General, ATTN: Personnel Records Branch.

15 Nov 67 - Units complete clearance of all remaining personnel and forward roster to the Division Adjutant General, ATTN: Personnel Records Branch.

17 Nov 67 - Final POM records check for advance party personnel, per schedule shown in Appendix II.

18 Nov 67 - Final POM records check begins for Division, per schedule shown in Appendix III.

1 Dec 67 - Personnel readiness date for Division.

1 Dec 67 - Make-up, as required.
Appendix II

POM CHECK SCHEDULE
(Advance Party)

17 November 1967:

0700 - Co C, 326th Engineer Battalion
0800 - Co B, 326th Engineer Battalion
0900 - HHC, 326th Engineer Battalion
1030 - HHC, 101st Airborne Division
1100 - 2d Brigade
1145 - 2d Squadron, 17th Cav: and 101st MP Co
1300 - 801st Maintenance Battalion
1345 - Division Artillery
1415 - 501st Signal Battalion
1515 - Support Command
1700 - 3d Brigade
1800 - 101st MI Det and 265th ASA Co
STANDING OPERATION PROCEDURES - POW RECORDS CHECK

1. General. This SOP outlines the procedures to be followed in conducting the final POW records check for units of the Division. The final POW records check will be conducted in Estep Gymnasium. The physical arrangement of the processing line will be as shown in incl 1, Physical Arrangement of Processing Facility. Work will flow as graphically described in incl 2, General Work Flow Chart. Detailed descriptions of the staffing and functions of individual processing stations are given in paragraph 2 below.

2. Procedure.

a. Individuals will be seated in the bleachers shown in incl 1 at the beginning of processing. Each individual will have in his possession the following items:

   (1) Health records
   (2) Dental records
   (3) ID Tags
   (4) ID Card
   (5) DA Form 613 (Checklist for Preparation of Replacements for Overseas Movement, incl 3) completed and signed by the unit commander
   (6) Immunisation Certificate

b. The Control NCO is responsible for monitoring the flow of personnel through the processing line and controlling personnel awaiting processing. He will insure that sufficient personnel are in the processing line at all times to insure maximum utilization of processing personnel yet prevent clogging the line with an excessive number of people. (Station 2)

c. DA Forms 137, Installation Clearance Record; (incl 4), will be prepared in two copies for each individual in the processing line. Three clerks will be available to prepare the forms. An overprint DA Form 137 will be used; the only information to be added will be personnel data pertaining to the individual. Individuals will hand carry the DA Forms 137 through the processing line. (Station 3)

d. Medical processing will consist of a check of the medical, dental and shot records. Two medical personnel will man the processing station. (Station 4)

   (1) Records will be screened to insure that:

INCL 2, TAB B, PRB
(a) The individual has a medical record, a dental record and an immunization card.
(b) The individual has a current physical.
(c) The individual has a current dental check and a dental chart in his record.
(d) The individual has received all the required immunizations, and that the necessary information to include blood type and RH factor has been recorded on the DD Form 737, Immunization Certificate.

(2) The medical personnel will place a check mark in column b of See II, DA Form 613, opposite the following items:

(a) Item 10 Medical Qualifications
(b) Item 11 Dental Qualifications
(c) Item 19 Immunization Administration
(d) Item 20 Spectacles and hearing aids
(e) Item 42 Health record jacket
(f) Item 43 Immunization Certificate

e. The Division Finance Officer will furnish two clerks to screen the individuals finance records to insure that they are accurate and complete. (Station 5) Particular attention will be paid to allotments for support of dependents. No allotments or avarice payments will be prepared in the processing line. Finance representative will place a check mark in column b Section II DA Form 613 opposite the items shown below:

(1) Item 35 Financial Data Folder
(2) Item 36 Military pay Voucher
(3) Item 37 Employees withholding exemption certificate
(4) Item 41 Military leave Record

f. The Officer's Open Mess and the NCO Club will furnish two representatives to insure that all departing personnel have properly cleared the club facilities. Copies of the machine rosters previously annotated as prescribed in the basic directive will be checked for each individual as he proceeds through the line. If an individual has properly cleared, the club representatives will stamp or initial item 11 of DA Form 137 on both copies. If an individual has not properly cleared, he will be instructed to do so before processing further. (Station 6)

g. The Provost Marshall will furnish two individuals to check the clearance of personnel deploying. The Provost Marshall representatives will process personnel as described in paragraph 2h above and will stamp or initial item 23 of DA Form 137 on both copies. (Station 7)

h. The Central Accounting Office will furnish two representatives to conduct a clearance check as described in paragraph 2g above, and will stamp or initial item DA Form 137 on both copies. (Station 8)

i. The post Library will furnish two representatives to conduct a clearance check as described in paragraph 2h above, and will stamp or initial item 15 of DA Form 137 on both copies. (Station 9)

j. The Credit Union will furnish two representatives to conduct a clearance check as described in paragraph 2i above, and will stamp or initial
item 30 of DA Form 137 on both copies. (Station 10)

k. The Central Family Housing will furnish two representatives to conduct a clearance check as described in paragraph 2j above, and will stamp or initial item 25 DA Form 137 on both copies. (Station 11)

Finance

l. The Ft Campbell Installation and Accounting Office will furnish two representatives to conduct a clearance check as described in paragraph 2k above, and will stamp or initial item 13 DA Form 137 on both copies. (Station 12)

m. The Special Services Officer will furnish two representatives to conduct a clearance check as described in paragraph 2l above, and will stamp or initial item 28 DA Form 137 on both copies. (Station 13)

n. When the individual arrives at the station issuing personnel records, he will show the records clerk his ID card and ID tags. The records clerk will ensure that the individual has these items in his possession prior to the issue of records. Individuals who do not have the required items in their possession will be directed to report to station 15 to acquire the necessary items. Upon presentation of the required items, the records clerk will give the individual his personnel records. (Station 14)

e. Facilities will be available for the preparation of ID tags and ID card applications on a limited basis. They will consist of a manually operated ID tag punch and a station for the preparation of DD Form 428, Application for ID Card. Applications will be verified against personnel records at station 14 and authenticated at station 17. Applicants will then hand carry the authenticated forms to the Post ID facility, Bldg _____ for processing. After receipt of his ID Card, the individual will return to the processing facility and report to station 14 to continue processing.

p. The records station (Station 16) will consist of 20 personnel records specialists.

(1) The personnel records specialists will perform a screening of the individual's military personnel records jacket to ensure that the personnel records are in fact accounted for and that the personnel data maintained therein is accurate and current. This screening will include:

(a) A review of the individual's DA Form 3654 (SGL) and change of beneficiary options as desired.
(b) An audit of the DA Form 41 (Record of Emergency Data) by the individual and preparation of a new form as necessary.
(c) A screening of the 201 file to eliminate obsolete or unnecessary documents and to ensure that the required documents are properly filed therein (permanent, semi-permanent, temporary and military history).
(d) A screening of the DA Form 20 (Enlisted Qualification Record) to insure that all items of personnel data are current and correctly posted. A DA Form 1-1 (Personnel Data Report) will be prepared to report any change in the mandatory training items, i.e. CER Tag, Wms Qual, Code of Conduct and applicable courses of military justice training.
In the absence of the mandatory training entries on the DA Form 20 a properly executed certificate or DA Form 613 (Checklist for Preparation of Replacements for Overseas Movement), signed by the unit commander, is considered acceptable. Upon completion of this check the annual audit date in item 48 of the DA Form 20 will be updated.

(2) The clerk will place a check mark in column b, Section II of DA Form 613 opposite the following items, provided a substantiating entry appears in the individual's personnel records, or an authenticated entry appears in column a, Section II of DA Form 613:

(a) Items 1 thru 9
(b) Item 12
(c) Item 14
(d) Items 17 and 18
(e) Item 21
(f) Items 26 and 27
(g) Items 30 thru 33
(h) Items 38 thru 40

(3) After completing the DA Form 613, the records clerk will separate the two copies of the DA Form 137 and staple the original to the DA Form 613. He will then place the Health and Dental records, the DA Forms 137 and the DA Form 613 inside the Personnel Records Jacket and return them to the individual.

q. The Final Records Check (Station 17) will consist of three officers, warrant officers, or non-commissioned officers with an appropriate signature stamp. Representatives at this station will make a final check of all records to assure completeness and proper document arrangement. They will authenticate the completed DA Form 137 and return the carbon copy to the individual for retention. The original DA Form 137 and the DA Form 613 will be placed in the records and the records will be returned to the individual.

r. The Records Turn-in Station will consist of two clerks who will receive the processed records from the individual and place them in the appropriate file.

s. After completion of processing, personnel will move outside the building, or in the case of inclement weather, to the bleachers, to await transportation to return to units.

3. Staffing of Processing Facilities. The number personnel at each processing station prescribed by paragraph 2 above is tentative and may be adjusted after the start of processing to equalize the flow of personnel at all points in the processing line. The Chief, Division Adjutant General Personnel Records Branch, will monitor the processing activity to insure maximum utilization of available personnel, and will notify the agencies concerned of changes in personnel requirements.
Tab C - Processing of Personnel Dropped from Rolls as Deserters.

1. The Division had numerous personnel in an ADOL status upon deployment. These personnel were dropped from rolls as deserters upon deployment. The Policy and guidance on proper procedures for processing these individuals that was give to the units is attached at Incl 1.

2. Difficulties experienced in this area resulted from non-compliance by units with published policies. Despite constant monitoring by this section, and many reminders, 2 Bn 506th Inf deployed from Ft Campbell without taking any action in compliance with the attached circular. Many units shipped clothing records and other necessary documents by sea and said documents were not available when the individual was dropped from rolls. It was only by constant pressure by this section that any of the necessary documents were obtained from the units. Records on approximately 20 deserters were brought in country to be closed out due to lack of necessary documents.
**DISPOSITION FORM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AG-</td>
<td>Accounting Procedures for AWOL and Deserter Personnel Upon Deployment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MATHRU:** G-1  **FROM:** AG(DIV)  **DATE:** Nov 67  **CRT:** 1  **CPT** Holder/cjh/3328

**TO:** C of S

1. **PROBLEM:** To establish procedures for processing and accounting for personnel in an AWOL status upon the deployment of the Division.

2. **FACTS:**

   a. The Division will have a number of personnel in an AWOL status upon deployment. These personnel will be dropped from rolls as deserters on the Morning Report for the day prior to deployment as prescribed by AR 630-10.

   b. When an individual is dropped from rolls as a deserter, his personnel records, health and dental records, supply and clearance papers, and Morning Report entry extracts must be forwarded expeditiously to the Post AWOL and Deserter Control Section. This action presents a problem in the case of deploying units due to the limited time frame involved.

   c. Morning reports for the fifth and succeeding days prior to deployment will be retained in the units until their arrival in country as specified by AR 335-60. However, it will be necessary to monitor those Morning Reports up to and including the day of deployment to insure that those personnel reported AWOL and those personnel returning from AWOL during that period are properly processed.

3. **DISCUSSION:**

   a. In order to insure accuracy and consistency in the control and processing of personnel reported AWOL or returning from AWOL after the fifth day prior to deployment and personnel in an AWOL status upon deployment, specific instructions must be given to unit commanders as to the actions they must take in processing them. The time frame must be established for the accomplishment of necessary actions to allow sufficient processing time both at unit and Division level.

   b. The draft circular attached at Tab A contains specific and detailed instructions to unit commanders as to the actions they will take immediately prior to and upon deployment. It implements the instructions contained in pertinent Army Regulations and Fort Campbell directives.

4. **RECOMMENDATION:** That the attached draft circular be approved for publication and implementation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 Incl as</th>
<th>D. T. OWEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major, AGC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Division Adjutant General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Incl 1, TAB C, PRB  

DA FORM 2496 REPLACES DD FORM 95, EXISTING SUPPLIES OF WHICH WILL BE ISSUED AND USED UNTIL 1 FEB 63 UNLESS SOONER EXHAUSTED.
1. **PURPOSE.** To establish procedures for processing personnel in an AWOL status upon deployment.

2. **GENERAL.** Personnel in an AWOL status upon deployment of a unit must be promptly and correctly processed to insure that all necessary actions are completed prior to the departure of the unit. The timely execution of military justice depends upon the accuracy and availability of the necessary documents when an individual is apprehended. Conversely, the personnel documents of those personnel who return from an AWOL status immediately prior to the deployment of a unit must be properly processed so that the individuals may accompany their unit. The accomplishment of both these actions depends upon the timely reporting by the unit commander of individuals who go AWOL and who return from AWOL, and the timely submission of the necessary documents by the commander concerned. The procedures outlined below prescribe the actions to be taken by unit commanders to insure the proper processing of personnel in the categories discussed above.

3. **PROCEDURES.**

   a. Morning Report preparation for the sixth and succeeding days prior to deployment will be as prescribed in the references cited in paragraph 6e and 6f below. Units will report changes in the status of personnel and strength changes shown on the Morning Reports prepared for the fifth and succeeding days prior to deployment by telephone to the Division Adjutant General Personnel Records Branch (Div PBR), (460-5116) prior to 0900 hrs on the day the Morning Report is prepared. Particular stress will be placed on the prompt reporting of "AWOL", "dropped from rolls", "
and "AWOL to duty" entries, so that the individual might be properly processed prior to the unit's deployment. Telephonic reports of status changes will be made up to and including the day of deployment. Negative reports are required.

b. On the fifth day prior to deployment, all units will handcarry to the Div PRB, bldg 2613, the documents listed below for all personnel in an AWOL status on that day's Morning Report.

1). DA Form 188, Extract Copy of Morning Report (show closing Morning Report entry dated the day prior to deployment).

2). DA Form 10-102, Organizational Clothing and Equipment Record

3). DA Form 10-195, Individual Clothing Record

4). DA Form 442, Inventory of Personnel Property

5). DA Form 137, Installation Clearance Record

6). DD Form 115-1, Receipt and Request for Turn-in

7). DD Form 722, Health Record

8). DD Form 722-1, Dental Record

9). DD Form 458, Charge Sheet

10). Copy of Commander's Letter of Inquiry

11). Copy of Commander's Letter to Next of Kin

12). Receipt of Money (if applicable)

c. For individuals reported AWOL or dropped from rolls after the fifth day prior to deployment, units will forward the documents listed in paragraph 3b above to the Div PRB on the day the status change is reported.

d. All personnel in an AWOL status on the day prior to deployment will be dropped from rolls as a deserter on the Morning Report prepared for

102
that day. Unit commanders will insure that the documents listed in paragraph 3b above have been delivered to the Div PRB for all personnel dropped from rolls prior to the deployment of the unit.

h. REFERENCES.
   a. AR 335-60
   b. AR 630-10
   c. CAN Reg 335-60
   d. CAN Reg 630-10
   e. CAN Cir 630-15

OFFICIAL
WITKO

TAILON
Cofs
Tab D - Morning Report Preparation upon Unit Deployment

1. The FRB provided instructions to units as to the proper Morning Report entries upon deployment, conducted classes in proper Morning Report preparation and monitored Morning Report entries to insure compliance with published instructions.

2. Instructions on proper Morning Report entries upon deployment are contained in Incl 1. Information on Morning Report classes is contained in Incl 2.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
FORT CAMPBELL, KENTUCKY 42223

AJECS

SUDJECT: Morning Report Entries for Deployment

TO: See Distribution

1. This letter is to inform each unit commander submitting a morning report to this headquarters of the required entries for personnel and unit moves.

2. In the event of a unit PCS from CONUS to an overseas command, entries will be made on the unit morning report IAW Section III, paragraph 4-3, Table 4-5, Rules 12, 13 and 14, AR 335-60. Entries will be made as follows:

a. For the 6th day prior to departure date. This will be the last morning report submitted at this station.

   RECORD OF UNIT ACTIONS/EVENTS

   Intransit (Rsg)

   PCS fr Third US Army to _______ on (date of departure)

   Last MR for Third US Army DFA

b. For the 5th day prior to departure date. This MR will be prepared and held by the unit for submission to the Division Adjutant General Personnel Records Branch Morning Report Section, ATTN: AJEAG-PR, upon arrival at new station.

   RECORD OF UNIT ACTIONS/EVENTS

   Intransit (Rsg)

   PCS fr Third US Army to _______ on (date of departure) ADCON

   OPCON UIC ch fr ___________________________ First MR for USARV DFA
SUBJECT: Morning Report Entries for Deployment

For date of unit's arrival at new station.

RECORD OF UNIT ACTIONS/EVENTS

Asg

PCS for Third US Army arrived. (See MR dated (date of MR prepared for 5th day prior to departure))

3. a. Members of unit advance parties deploying with the Division Advance Party and the Command and Control Element will be attached to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 326th Engineer Battalion, immediately upon departure and will remain so attached until the arrival in-country of parent units.

b. Units with personnel departing with the Advance Command and Control Element and the Advance Party not as a part of an organic unit move, will submit a request for orders listing the Advance Party personnel by name, rank, service number, MOS and unit, requesting that they be attached to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 326th Engineer Battalion, for rations, quarters and administration. Request will be submitted to this headquarters, ATTN: AJECS-PR not later than 3 November 1967.

c. Units of assignment will not be required to make a morning report entry upon the departure of Advance Party personnel. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 326th Engineer Battalion, will make an entry in the Records of Events Section of the morning report for the day of departure as required by Rule 5, Table 4-3, AR 335-60. When the unit of assignment arrives in-country, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 326th Engineer Battalion, will release the attached personnel to their units with a morning report entry as required by Rule 7, Table 4-3, AR 335-60.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/ROBERT H. ALLAN
ROBERT H. ALLAN
Colonel, CE
Acting Chief of Staff
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
FORT CAMPBELL, KENTUCKY 42223

AJEOA-PR

9 November 1967

SUBJECT: Morning Report Classes

TO: Commanding Officer

1. Classes in Morning Report preparation will be conducted in building 6915 from 1430 - 1630 hrs on 14 - 16 Nov 67. Material covered will include basic techniques of preparation and special entries required upon deployment. All the morning report units will send at least one clerk. First Sergeants, Company Commanders, Battalion S-1/Adjutants and Personnel Staff J00's are encouraged to attend.

2. Personnel attending will bring AR 335-60, w/ch 1, CAM Cir 335-60 and 2 copies of blank DA Form 1 for reference.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/CHARLES J. HOLLER
CHARLES J. HOLLER
CPT, AG
Asst AG
Request for notice in Daily Bulletin
Chief, PRB
9Nov67
CPT HOLDER/pd/3328

Request the following be placed in the official section of the Daily Bulletin for 10Nov and 13Nov.

ATTENTION UNIT COMMANDERS: Classes in Morning Report Preparation will be held in building 6915, 1430 - 1630 hrs, 14, 15 and 16 Nov 67. Attendance is mandatory for all unit morning report clerks. Those attending will bring a posted copy of AR 335-60, CAM Cir 335-60 and 2 blank copies of DA Form 1.

CHARLES J. HOLDER
CPT, AGC
Chief PRB
Tab E - Shipping of Personnel Records

1. Personnel Records were shipped to arrive at the same time as the troops, as nearly as possible. Rosters were requested from units indicating those personnel departing with each movement increment. Records for each increment were shipped with the increment.

2. Records were shipped in one drawer record cases banded on wooden pallets and further palletised on aircraft loading platforms in such a manner as to allow immediate access to any record.

3. Records were held at PRB until immediately before shipment and were then placed on the aircraft for shipment. PRB personnel picked the records up from the staging area immediately upon arrival. All records arrived intact and in good condition.
Tab F - Preparation of PRB Personnel and Equipment for Deployment

1. PRB personnel and equipment deployed according to the attached schedule.

2. Deployment was made in such a way as to have sufficient personnel in country to initiate necessary actions, yet retain sufficient personnel at Ft Campbell to insure efficient closing of operations there.
Personnel Management Branch, Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division; Pre-Movement and Movement After Action Report

1. Date of Operation: 02 August 1967 to 31 December 1967

2. Location: Prior to movement—Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Subsequent to movement—Bien Hoa, Vietnam

3. Control or Command Headquarters: Adjutant General Section, 101st Airborne Division

4. Subordinate units: NA

5. Supporting units: NA

6. Mission: To requisition enlisted personnel, classify and assign replacement personnel, and reassign non-deployable personnel out of the 101st Airborne Division. Also, prepare the Personnel Management Branch for deployment to Vietnam.

7. Concept of Operations: To reassign all non-deployable personnel out of the 101st Airborne Division. To fill the vacancies within the Division by qualified replacement personnel. To airlift all personnel of the Personnel Management Branch plus mission essential equipment.

2. Execution:

a. Upon notification the 101st Airborne Division was alerted for deployment to Vietnam, all non-deployable enlisted personnel (i.e., RVN returnees, ETS losses, 17-year-olds, etc) were identified.

b. Maximum publicity (Division Circular 600-200) was distributed to Unit Commanders thereby enabling the commanders to solicit volunteer statements from selected personnel.

c. All enlisted volunteers were quick checked with higher headquarters (i.e., senior enlisted personnel with Headquarters, Department of the Army, while E1 through E6 were checked with Headquarters 3d USA) to insure they were qualified for the overseas tour.

d. At this time all enlisted personnel shortages were identified and a requisition was hand-carried to Department of the Army.

e. Non-deployable personnel that did not desire to deploy with the division but did desire to continue serving in airborne units were reassigned to Fort Bragg, N.C.

f. Enlisted Personnel started arriving from the Department of the Army sources and were assigned duties in accordance with the need of the Division. It was necessary that battalions be at 75% strength prior to start of Division training.
g. Advance party (2 FMs: PME NCOIC and Senior enlisted NCO) departed Fort Campbell, Kentucky for Vietnam on 17 November 1967.


9. Administrative:

a. Personnel from USAFEUR and USAESO were assigned directly to a specific unit within this Division. Due to the large input of personnel being received, this procedure was totally unacceptable. Several instances were revealed wherein enlisted personnel had not inprocessed through the various facilities of the Adjutant General Section and the 101st replacement detachment. As a consequence, the established controls were neglected and the strength accounting of the Division seriously hampered. Also, as previously stated in par 8f above, personnel were being diverted in order to fill the Division on an equal basis to ensure that intensified training period procedures produced optimum results. The policy of direct assignment to units created an imbalance of personnel in some units along with the necessity of removing the enlisted individual from training to inprocess into the Division, and in some cases reassignment to an organization where a greater need existed.

b. November 1967 MOS testing was suspended for all enlisted personnel except those individuals that made a request to be tested.

c. An unexpected levy was made on this Division 23 November 1967 for 450 EIs to fill the 173d Abn Bde in RVN. This, coupled with frequent TCE changes prior to deployment and the change in actual deployment date from February 1968 to December 1967 brought about several problem areas that were overcome through perseverance.

10. Special equipment, techniques, and procedures: NA

11. Commander's analysis, recommendations, and lessons learned: In future instances where division size organizations are being rapidly deployed it is recommended that all replacement flow be assigned to division replacement detachment for further assignment to units of the division based upon current needs.

J. W. DUPRIEST
CM3, USA
Chief, PM 101st Abn Div
Subj: "Pre-Deployment, Movement, and Post-Movement after Action Report"


3. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

4. Control or Command Headquarters: XVIII ABN Corps.

5. Subordinate Units: 1/4

6. Supporting Units: 1/4

7. Concept of Operations: Preparation of the division for deployment was broken down into two phases. During phase I from 2 Aug to 5 Oct 67, emphasis was placed on individual training. During phase II, from 9 Oct to 4 Nov 67 (10 Nov for the 2d Bde), emphasis was placed on unit training. The period from 4 Nov (10 Nov for the 2d Bde) to 1 Dec was used for FR/FM activities, leave and make-up training.

5. Execution: The division was alerted on 2 Aug for deployment with a PCOD on 5 Oct, and a scheduled in-country arrival during Feb 68. With these dates given our recommended dates for ERD were approved for 19 and 29 Jan. It was told informally that four ships would be available to us on the west coast in late Jan and early Feb. With the known dates of PCOD, ERD and FRD, other significant events could be programmed. Three liaison visits to INL were planned and completed. With a PCOD restricting the commencement of training on 1 Sep, all packing, PT requirements and leaves on the other, only a 9 week period was left for intensified, uninterrupted training. On 1 Sep we received a message from DA indicating they were considering airlifting the division to the Republic of Vietnam in two increments. The last increment would consist of a brigaded TF and a division command and control element with an ERD of 1 Dec, a FRD of 15 Jan, and closing in-country by 31 Jan. The remainder of the division would have an ERD of 15 January, FRD of 25 Jan and close in-country by 31 Jan. The division received its advance movement directive on 15 September. On 4 Oct DA asked us to evaluate the impact of a further accelerated movement which called for deploying the entire division by air between 1 and 26 Dec. From our evaluation it was decided that the division could conduct a 4 week intensified training program (5 weeks for the 2d Bde) commencing on 9 Oct and ending on 4 Nov (10 Nov for the 2d Bde), and an ERD/FRD of 1 Dec was established. This accelerated schedule was directed on 23 Oct and the division moved at full speed ahead on its new schedule.
We divided our training program into two phases. During Phase I, emphasis was placed on individual training rather than unit training. Priority was given to POR/PCM requirements, annual arms qualification, and a study of Vietnam, combat actions and maximum attendance at schools. A schools command was established using non-deployable personnel as cadre to conduct these schools. Of significance is the squad leaders course and long range reconnaissance patrols. A total of 3847 division personnel were trained in on-post schools. Significant here is the air-ground operations course at Eglin Air Force Base, and the 81mm and 4.2 inch mortar courses at Fort Benning. A total of 859 personnel were trained in off-post schools. Phase II of our training program consisted of basic unit training of squads and platoons, and included artillery battery tests and mission training for combat support units. The training program was a 44-hour week with 4 hours added on Saturday afternoon for personnel requiring make-up training. Emphasis was placed on sound fundamentals, which included use of the chain of command, security, ambush and counter-ambush techniques, patrolling, use of supporting fires and the art of staying healthy. Additionally, all fire squads negotiated a live fire squad reaction course which required the use of the latest quick kill techniques. Although the four week training program did not allow sufficient time to become proficient in airmobile operations, we did take advantage of our available training time to integrate as much airmobile operations into our basic unit training as possible. As for the other combat arms training, the division artillery completed battery tests, the engineer battalion was able to conduct basic unit training, and the cavalry squadron, which deployed with its headquarters, one ground troop and the aero rifle platoon, completed small unit training. The combat service support units completed POR training and conducted TOE mission training. Although no advanced unit training was accomplished during the four week training program, division and brigade headquarters functioned from field locations.

9. Administrative: The G3 section was organized into eight sections as outlined below.

   a. Headquarters section - Responsible for all activities under the G3.

   b. Administrative - Responsible for accurate administration, administrative procedures and maintaining of files.

   c. Plans and Operations - Responsible for all operational aspects of the division, preparation of the combat SOP and division readiness reports.

   d. Plans - Responsible for preparing plans for deployment, and stationing in-country.

   f. Training - Responsible for the conduct of training activities within the division to include schools.
11. Commanders Analysis, Recommendations and Lessons learned:

Item - Changes in LRD/FRD.

Discussion - Constant changes in FRD/LRD's caused some initial confusion as to training programs. The final LRD/FRD shortened our training program from 9 to 4 weeks. This reduced our Bn/Bde operational readiness and necessitated a 30 day in-country training program.

Recommendation - That units be fully trained prior to deployment so that immediately upon arrival in-country they may commence combat operations.

Item - Changes in TOE.

Discussion - Numerous changes were made in the airborne division TOE to FHD/JID. This resulted in some confusion as to what the division was/was not authorized in personnel and equipment.

Recommendation - That a firm TOE be established for deploying units in sufficient time to have on hand all equipment and personnel for pre-deployment training.

Item: Late arrival of Replacements.

Discussion: Although the POSD of the division was 5 October, numerous replacements arrived after that date and a few arrived after 1 Dec. Thus, all individuals did not receive unit training with their unit. Also, the late arrival of personnel necessitated the scheduling of many make-up classes to insure all deploying individuals met the PCR/CK training requirements.

Recommendations: That if at all possible deploying units be filled by their POSD date so that all individuals may receive unit training.
TRAINING
Schools Command

1. Purpose: To prescribe the mission, organization, and responsibilities of the 101st Airborne Division Schools Command.

2. Objective: To train individuals and small unit leaders of the 101st Airborne Division and selected Fort Campbell units.

3. General: During the 101st Airborne Division Intensified Combat Training Program, the scheduling, supervision, and coordination of all on-post schools will be accomplished by Headquarters, Schools Command, which will be co-located with the Recondo School and will be responsible directly to the ACoS G3, 101st Airborne Division. The Commandant, Schools Command, will coordinate through the appropriate headquarters with Army/Corps and 101st Airborne Division units/agencies for the establishment and conduct of additional on-post schools as directed by the Commanding General.

4. Implementation:

a. Organization:

(1) Authorized strength: 14 officers, 124 enlisted men, 138 aggregate.

(2) Cadre personnel will be selected from units of the 101st Airborne Division and Fort Campbell in accordance with the manning level established by this headquarters, as shown in Appendix I.

(3) Schools Command personnel will remain assigned to their parent units but will be placed on special duty to their respective schools. Assignment of nondeployable personnel to special duty is effective as of 1 September 1967. On or about 7 October 1967, or as on-post schools are discontinued, the remaining nondeployable Schools Command personnel will be assigned permanently. As these nondeployable personnel become available for reassignment, the Commandant, Schools Command, will provide appropriate rosters to ACoS G1, 101st Airborne Division.

(4) Leaves and passes for Schools Command personnel will be granted only on approval of the Commandant.

TAB A, ACoS G-3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School &amp; Courses</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Unit Requirement</th>
<th>Completion Date</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Advanced Airborne School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Jumpmaster Course</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1 per plt</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Air Mobility Course (Lab Tech)</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1 Off &amp; 2 NCO</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Air Delivery Course</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1 Off &amp; 3 ECO/Co</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Airborne Refresher</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>as req</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Jumpmaster Refresher</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>as req</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. CBR School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Officer CBR Course</td>
<td>1 week</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1 per co</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. NCO CBR Course</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2 per co</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Plane Ops Course</td>
<td>1 week</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>24 per Inf Bn</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. CBR Refresher Course</td>
<td>3 days</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Riot Control Agent Course</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Recon School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Squad Leader's Course</td>
<td>9 days</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1 per squad</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. LRP Course</td>
<td>3 weeks</td>
<td>10 ea</td>
<td>8 per Bde + 1/2 from 2/17 Cav</td>
<td>22 Nov 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rifle &amp; Pistol Team</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Sniper School</td>
<td>3 weeks</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>2 per plt</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Quick Kill Course</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1 Off &amp; 10 NCO</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Starlight Scope</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2 per squad</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. FO &amp; FAC School</td>
<td>3 days</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Inf &amp; Cav Plt Ldrs and above + FOs and Pilots</td>
<td>28 Sep 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. EOD, Mines, and Bomb Exp School</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1 per squad</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Director of Maintenance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Armorer's School</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2 per company</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School or Courses</td>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Unit Requirement</td>
<td>Completion Date</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Preventive Maintenance</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Explosive Ordnance Recon Agent</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2 per company</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td>Conducted by EOD Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Signal School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Basic Radio Communications (RTO)</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Telephone, Switchboard, and Field Wiring</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Radio Telegraph (CT) Operators</td>
<td>7 weeks</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>1 Oct 67</td>
<td>28 Aug – 1 Oct 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Signal School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Basic Radio Communications (RTO)</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Communication Chief Refresher Course</td>
<td>1 week</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. AN/GRC - 106 &amp; AN/UGC-2 (SSB) Radio Operators</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Communication Center Course (SOC 72B)</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Pit Sgts &amp; above</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td>To be conducted after equipment arrives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Officer &amp; NCO Special Communication Course</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. TS39/KY-8 Operators Course</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Post Engineer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Utilities Utilization</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Kitchen Equipment</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Utilities Self-Help</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Off &amp; NCO Organization</td>
<td>1 week</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>as required</td>
<td>7 Oct 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Supply School
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese Language</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jungle Operations</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Ground Operations</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Mortar</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathfinder</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image Interpretation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar Material Course</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Radio Mechanics</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Teletypewriter Operator</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transportability Planning</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotor Wing Tech Inspector</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH6A Helicopter Repair</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Precise Power Generator</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Circuit Controller</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Relay &amp; Carrier</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrogator Course</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeled Vehicle Course (Mechanic)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter Rappelling</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Patrolling</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ON-POST SCHOOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL</th>
<th>COMPLETED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JUMPMASTER</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR MOBILITY</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR DELIVERY</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFFICER CBR</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO CBR</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAME OPERATIONS</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SQUAD LEADER'S COURSE</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNIPER SCHOOL</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUICK KILL</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STARLIGHT SCOPE</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FD &amp; FAC SCHOOL</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMO, MINES &amp; BOOBY TRAPS</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMORER'S SCHOOL</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREV MAINTENANCE</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BATTALION MOTOR OFFICER</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASIC RADIO. COMMUNICATIONS</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELEPHONE, SWITCHBOARD &amp; FLD WIREMAN</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIO &amp; TELEGRAPH</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMO CHIEF REFRESHER</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ON-POST SCHOOLS CONT'D

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese Language</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRRP</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Sanitation</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Observer</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rappelling</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad Radio</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/GRC-106 AND AN/VSE-2 (SSB) Ops</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer &amp; NCO COMMO Refresher</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization &amp; Supply</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathfinder Techniques</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Training</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TRAINING


1. INTENT: (See Inclosure 1)

2. PURPOSE: To issue instructions for the conduct of training during the period 21 Aug - 22 Dec 67.

3. MISSION: a. Phase I (21 Aug - 7 Oct 67): To conduct mandatory individual training first in those subjects common to both deployable and non-deployable personnel, and second, in those subjects specifically required for r/cd/G, and to accomplish maximum school training during this phase in order to minimize absence from tactical training during phase II.

   b. Phase II (8 Oct - 22 Dec 67): To train individuals and units to the highest possible level of combat readiness.

4. CONSIDERATIONS: a. Phase I: During the extensive personnel turnover anticipated during this phase, individual training will be emphasized as opposed to unit training.

   (1) Deployable Personnel: (a) Individual training records must be kept on all training which is FOR/POR qualifying.

   (b) Cadre training, weapons qualification, study of "Lessons Learned", and accomplishment of the administrative, medical, dental, and similar FOR requirements will receive priority.

   (2) Non-Deployable Personnel: Individual training records will be kept for all training listed as "refresher training" in AR 220-1.

   b. Phase II (8 Oct - 22 Dec 67): (1) Combat/Combat support units: In addition to completing r/cd qualification for all individuals, and Intensified Combat Training Program will be conducted progressing from squad through battalion "vignettes" with units conducted at the completion of each unit phase. During the period 10 Oct - 1 Nov, two infantry battalions per week will train off-post at Camp Shelby, Miss or Ft Stewart, Georgia. One week is allocated to each battalion sized unit for make-up in arms qualification and Quick Kill Training. The final two weeks of the training period will be used for in GRTs in conjunction with Bde FIs, to include participation by elements of Division (-).
(2) Combat Service Support Units, (CSS): In addition to qualifying for qualification for all individuals, training will be conducted to support CSS to attain and maintain proficiency in accomplishing missions assigned in appropriate TO&Ls of each respective unit. All CSS units will develop the capability to operate under secure conditions created from their own resources.

(3) The Intensified Combat Training Program week is a six-day (48 hour) week. The four hours on Saturday afternoons are Commander's time and will be devoted to make-up training.

5. Objectives for All Units of the Division: a. Improve the basic and advanced soldier skills with emphasis on counterinsurgency operations.

b. Achieve proficiency in the use of individual and crew served weapons to include quick kill techniques and cross-training.

c. Instill in individual soldiers the importance of intelligence and security.

d. Develop individual strength and endurance for extended field operations.

e. Train non-commissioned officers.

f. Train and exercise communications and headquarters personnel in sustained operations.

g. Develop unit proficiency at all levels.

6. Specific Unit Objectives: a. 2d Brigade and 3d Brigade:

   (1) Conduct an intensive progressive training program to include

      (a) Squad, platoon, company, and battalion training phases.

      (b) OTRs at the completion of each phase.

   (2) Conduct specialized training for platoon sections in techniques of fire without a fire direction center.

   (3) Train and maintain at least one LAR per attached Infantry battalion (part of the reconnaissance platoon), and one LAR at brigade level (part of the security platoon).

   (4) Place special emphasis on proficiency in the conduct of air objections.

b. Division Artillery: (1) Prepare and conduct OTRs for batteries and LTR.

   (2) Support Bde and Inf Bn OTRs/ORTs.
(3) Conduct Forward Observer/Forward Air Controller (F-O/F-A-C) training during the periods 12-14, 19-21, and 26-28 Sept 67, for infantry and cavalry mortars. Forward observers, platoon leaders, and platoon sergeants, company commanders, and air observers.

(4) Conduct fire planning classes for infantry brigade and battalion S-3s, infantry company commanders, and cavalry troop commanders. Coordinate directly with the brigades and cavalry squadron for scheduling.

(5) Place special emphasis on proficiency in the conduct of air-while operations.

c. 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry: (1) Conduct an intensive progressive training program to include:

(a) Squad, platoon, and troop training phases.

(b) OIFs at the completion of each phase.

(2) Train three LAMPs for employment at Division level.

(3) Place special emphasis on proficiency in the conduct of air-while operations.

d. 326th Engineer Battalion: (1) Conduct an intensive progressive training program to include:

(a) Squad, platoon, and troop training phases.

(b) OIFs at the completion of each phase.

(2) Conduct those support projects that constitute beneficial training.

(3) Support Bde and Inf Bn FTXs/ORTs.

e. 501st Signal Battalion: (1) Support Division Signal Schools as required.

(2) Support Bde FTXs.

f. 101st Avn Bn: (1) Aviation qualification: Conduct continuous aviator qualification and standardization training, utilizing available organic pilots and aircraft and attached aviation units.

(2) Provide airlift and armed helicopter support to other Division elements commensurate with status of training.

g. Support Command: Conduct continuous individual and unit readiness training.

h. Schools Command: Insure the proper conduct/coordination of all on-post schools.

(1) Advanced Airborne School (Schedule THA):
I) Jumpmaster Course.
(b) Air Mobility Course.
(c) Aerial Delivery Course.
(d) Airborne Refresher Course.
(e) Jumpmaster Refresher Course.

(2) CBR School (Schedule TBA): (a) Officer CBR Course.
(b) CBR and Course.
(c) Gas Operations Course.
(d) CBR Refresher Course.
(e) Riot Control Agent Course.

(3) Recon School: (a) Squad Leader's Course: 5-13 Sept, 15-23 Sept, 26 Sept - 4 Oct, 7-15 Oct.
(b) LDRP Course: 20 Oct - 9 Nov, 13 Nov - 3 Dec.

(b) Quick Kill Cadre Courses: 30 Aug, 1 Sept, and additional courses as required.
(c) Starlight Scope Instruction (Given by team from Fort Benning, Ga): 18 Sept - 7 Oct. Schedule TBA.

(5) Forward Observer & Forward Air Control School (conducted by Div Arty and Div ALO): 14-16, 19-21, 26-28 Sept.

(6) Demolitions, Mines, and Booby-Traps School (conducted by 326 Engr Whl): Schedule TBA.

(7) Director of Maintenance: (a) Armor's School.
(b) Preventive Maintenance.
(c) Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic Course.
(d) Motor Officers School.

(8) Explosive Ordnance Recon Agent (EORA): Schedule TBA.

(9) Signal School: Schedule TBA. (a) Basic Radio Communications.
(b) Telephone, Switchboard, and Field Operator.

c) Radio Telegraph (w) Operators.

(d) Communications Chief Refresher.

(e) AN/GHC-106 & AN/VMC-2 (SSB) Radio Operators.

(f) Communication Center Course (L-122).

(g) Officer & NCO Special Communication Course.

(h) FLS/KY-8 Operators Course.

(lu) Officer & NCO Organization Supply School: Schedule IIA.

(11) Intelligence School (a three day course conducted by ACO/G2): Conducted for 2-2 sections the week of 23 Oct.

(12) Radar Operators School (a three day course conducted at Ft. Huachuca by personnel fro. Fort Huachuca): Conducted for all personnel assigned to radar sections of Inf bns and the Cavalry Squadron.

(13) Supply Officer Course (conducted by S36): Schedule IIA.

. 2lst FA Co: Support I div Field Training Exercises.


k. 265 ASA Co: (1) Support the conduct of Inf, Bde, and Div level training as required.

(2) Conduct a nine week Intensified Combat Training Program, UP ASa TC 2-11 beginning 9 Oct 67.

(3) During the period 4-9 Dec 67 undergo an ATT/ORY administered by 301st ASA Bn.

7. TRAINING POLICIES AND GUIDELINES: a. Maximum attendance at morning training. In order to insure the maximum attendance of personnel for training during the morning hours, administrative duties will be accomplished during the afternoon hours, unless precluded by unforeseen exigencies.

b. Maintaining troop interest: Make all tactical training interesting. Utilize Vietnam lessons to maximum advantage; present unusual and surprising situations. Base "aggressor" actions on known characteristics of the enemy encountered in Vietnam.

c. Night Training: During Phase II, a minimum of 25% of all field training will be conducted during the hours of darkness. This will normally consist of offensive missions, e.g., patrols and ambushes as opposed to static defense.
d. Officer and NCO Training: Officer and NCO schools will be conducted during non-duty hours not less than two (2) hours per month. The subjects to be emphasized are those found in the Infantry Leader's Check List - Southeast Area, primarily distributed by this headquarters.

e. Live Fire Exercises: Conduct maximum live fire exercises to include all organic and all supporting weapons available.

f. Weapons Training: (1) Accurately qualify for all personnel.

(2) Train all riflemen in the Quick Kill Techniques concurrently with arms qualification.

(3) Training of selected personnel on the use of the Starlight Scope will be conducted during the period 18 Sept - 7 Oct with make-up during the week of 13 Nov 07. Training will be conducted under the supervision of the rifle and pistol range.

(4) Utilize competition to the maximum extent particularly during machine gun firing.

g. Off-post Training: Schedule units will comply with the provisions of Div Circular 350-1, Small Unit Off-post Training.

h. Compliance with Al 220-10, CECOM Reg 350-1, NMC Reg 350-1. All deployable personnel must receive the training included in Inc 3, Required Off-post Training.

i. Fire Planning Training: (1) Brigades, Battalions/Squadron Commanders are responsible for conducting classes in fire support planning of Infantry crew-served weapons for unit staffs and commanders. Division Artillery will support this training by preparing and conducting appropriate classes for Infantry, Brigade and Battalion S3s and Infantry Commanders and Cavalry Troop Commanders to include, but not limited to such subjects as: fire planning terminology, components of an artillery fire plan, offensive and defensive fire planning, artillery fire planning channels, appreciation of probable error and a practical exercise in fire planning. Forward Observer Sections and Artillery Liaison Teams will participate in fire planning during company/troop and battalion size exercises upon request, unless the requirement interferes or detracts from the artillery training mission. Similarly, FACs will participate in battalion and squadron tactical exercises as available.

(2) Make advantage of every opportunity in artillery and mortar firing to test accuracy. Establish crosstabs so that scores will always be kept prior to the rounds going down-range.

j. Physical Conditioning: (1) During Phase I, units will conduct four hours of strenuous organized athletics each week. Touch football, volleyball, or bayonet training are appropriate activities.

(2) During Phase II, units will conduct two hours of strenuous organized athletics each week. In addition, two hours of off-road foot marches will be conducted each week.
k. Policies: Stress basic fundamentals of security, light & noise discipline, proper formations and control, communications, flow of information, and alertness.

(WEGC-T)

For M. Col. Officer:

OFFICER:

W. F. Talmon, Jr.
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

DISPOSITION:

A = Full
10 = G3
10 = Div Fubs

? Incl
DIV Chim 350-11

Army Regulations

AD 220-10, Preparation for Overseas Movement (FON)
AD 220-58, Organization & Training for Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Operations,
AD 350-225, Survival Escape, and Invasion
AD 350-81, Command Information Program
AD 370-5, Qualification/Familiarization in Armas
AR 612-35, Personnel Processing (FOR)
AR 614-20, Overseas Service
Army Subject Schedule 21-6, Individual Protective Measures for Chemical and Biological Operations and Nuclear Warfare.
ADP 21-114, basic Combat Training and Advanced Individual Training.

CONARC Regulations

LUSA Reg 350-1, Training

US Reg 350-1, Training

US Message No. 68135, 072-1812182 July 67, (Advanced information on revisions to be published in LUSA Reg 350-1)

LUSA Reg 20-1, Inspections and Investigations

101st Abn Div and Ft Campbell

US Reg 1-34, Administration
Division Training SOP

US Circular 1-102, Commanding General's Conference, dated 24 July 1967
Training Guidelines for 1st and 2d Quarters, FY 1968

Incl 1, References

129
Required FOR/POW Training (for additional references see Annex B of Div Tag SOP)

1. Required Training:
   a. BCT plus AIT for a total training time of not less than 16 weeks (already accomplished).
   b. Qualification and/or Familiarization in arms within twelve months. Each individual will qualify with his assigned individual weapon and all gunners and assistant gunners will qualify with assigned crew served weapons. All deployable personnel through the grade of Major regardless of weapon assigned will undergo a minimum of eight (8) hours training on the M-16 rifle (four hours mechanical training: one and one half hours zero, and automatic fire familiarization: two and one half hours of record firing).
   c. Battle Indoctrination (This is met by undergoing the infiltration course and close combat course under live fire as part of BCT/AIT ATP 21-114. Forms 20 and 66 should have this already entered).
   d. Code of Conduct (1 hour annually, AR 350-227).
   e. Survival, evasion, and escape (1 hour annually, AR 350-225).
   f. Chemical biological, and nuclear training (AR 600-98, FM 21-40 TUSA Reg 350-1, Army Subject Schedule 21-6).
   g. Overseas orientation (2 hours during the training year AR 350-92).
   h. Perimeter Defense (1 hour).
   i. Duties of Sentries (1 hour).
   j. Ambush Drills - Dismounted and Mounted (8 hours).
   k. Sanitation (1 hour).
   l. Jungle Survival (1 hour).
   m. Lessons Learned (1 hour).
   n. VC Village orientation (2 hours).
2. Areas requiring emphasis and/or practice:

(a) Unit standing operating procedures (SOPs): Evaluate and change where necessary.

(b) Tactical motor marches: Convoy formation and control, defense against air and ground attack, countermobush drills, security at the halt hand and arm signals, and night driving.

(c) Occupation and defense of assembly area day and night: perimeter defense, sentinel duties, CBR defense, blackout discipline, and night adaptation.

(d) Communication procedures: Use of SOI and SSI radio procedures and communication security.

(e) Day and night patrolling: Land navigation, camouflage and concealment techniques of reporting information and immediate action drills.

(f) Integrated training. In addition to the minimum requirements for O., the following subjects should be integrated whenever possible:

(1) Counterguerrilla training.

(2) Code of Conduct.

(3) Survival, escape, and evasion.

(4) Mines and booby traps.

(5) Personal hygiene and field sanitation.

(6) First Aid.
Subj: "Pre-movement, Movement, and Post-movement after action report".

1. Dates of Operation: 30 Sep - 28 Dec
2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Bien Hoa, RVN
3. Control or Command Headquarters: Hq USARV
4. Subordinate Units: N/A
5. Supporting Units: N/A
6. Mission: To move from Ft Campbell Kentucky to Bien Hoa, RVN
7. Concept of Operations: Move the G3 Staff section by echelon to the RVN.

8. Execution: One officer arrived in Vietnam on 20 Oct to provide initial liaison between Vietnam and the G3 section at Fort Campbell. Four officers, three non-commissioned officer and 4 other enlisted men departed Fort Campbell on 17 Nov with the Advance Command and Control Element, and two officers, one non-commissioned officer and one enlisted man departed Fort Campbell on 20 Nov with the Advance Party Group. The G3 representatives who departed with the Advance Command and Control Group and the Advance Party Group provided an in-country G3 capability in operations, plans, training, air and administration. Thus the G3 of the 101st Abn Div had an in-country and Fort Campbell capability simultaneously. The deputy G3 and two officers plus six other enlisted personnel departed Fort Campbell on 9 Dec, and the G3 departed Fort Campbell with the Commanding General on 11 Dec. This left one officer back at Fort Campbell to insure the proper close out of administrative and logistical actions. The last officer departed Fort Campbell on 28 Dec on the Division Rear Detachment.

9. Administration: N/A

10. Special Equipment, Techniques and Procedures: N/A

11. Commanders Analysis Recommendation and Lessons Learned: All movement was accomplished in a satisfactory manner.
ACofS G-4

SUBJECT: "Pre-Movement, Movement, and Post-Movement After Action Report"

2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
4. Subordinate Units: N/A
5. Supporting Units: N/A
7. Concept of the Operation: The following is a syntax of the major phases in the ACoS, G-4 pre-movement, movement and post-movement operation.

a. Reconfiguration of Division equipment under the "G" series "A" (modified by TUSA #320) and MTUE to include:
   (1) Requisitioning of new equipment.
   (2) Turn-in of excess (items deleted).
   (3) Lateral transfer (redistribution of assets).

b. The formulation of Division deployment plans to include:
   (1) Establishment of Movements Control Coordination Group.
   (2) Preparation of movement data.
   (3) Participation in STRICOM Movement Conference for Operation "Eagle Thrust."
   (4) Hosting of several Air Force Liaison visits.

c. The preparation and dissemination of policy guidance on all matters of supply and maintenance functions. This included:
   (1) Publication of regulations, circulars, logistic notes, and bulletins.
   (2) Frequent meetings with unit S-4's and Property Book Officers.
ACoS G-4 (Cont.)

SUBJECT: "Pre-movement, Movement, and Post-Movement After Action Report"

d. The establishment of an equipment, supply, and maintenance POM inspection which included:

1. Establishing a Division POM inspection schedule.
2. Coordination with Post G4 in establishing a POM inspection team.
3. Establishing pre-inspection assistance visits.
4. Conduct of POM inspections.

e. The establishment of an in-country operation in October 1967 with the mission to prepare for the reception of the Division and open G4 operational channels in country.

f. A liaison visit to country, by the ACoS, G4 in late October - early November.

g. The clearance of all division buildings and the turn-in of all post, camp and station property at Fort Campbell, Ky. This included:

1. Preparation of a Division clearance inspection schedule.
2. Coordination with Post G4 on the establishment of a Post Clearance Team and the clearance procedures.
4. The establishment of a Rear Detachment with the responsibility to clear the Division. The designated Rear Detachment Commander a non deployable, field grade officer.

8. Execution:

EVENTS

2 Aug 67 Division alerted for Deployment (warning order)
4 Aug 67 Implementing instructions to units on conversion to MTOM "G" series (modified by TUSA GO #320)
16 Aug 67 Separation of Division and Post Staffs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 Sep 67</td>
<td>Requisition of shortages under MTOE &quot;G&quot; series submitted to Division Supply Office for action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Sep 67</td>
<td>Subordinate unit readiness report due to Division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Oct 67</td>
<td>Division personnel on station date and initial readiness report due Third Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Oct 67</td>
<td>G4's recommendation to establish a Movements Control Coordination Group accepted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Oct 67</td>
<td>Movements Control Coordination Group begins operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Oct 67</td>
<td>Review changes to MTOE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Oct 67</td>
<td>STRICOM Movement Planning Conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Oct 67</td>
<td>Military Airlift Command visit to Campbell and C-141 troop seating capacity test.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Oct 67</td>
<td>ACofS, G4 Liaison visit to country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Nov 67</td>
<td>Cancellation of requisitions for stock funded items with unsatisfactory delivery dates (after 1 Dec 67).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Nov 67</td>
<td>Draft copies of final readiness report submitted by units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Nov 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-18 Nov 67</td>
<td>1st Surface echelon Unit POM inspections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Nov 67</td>
<td>Advance Command and Control Party Departs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Nov 67</td>
<td>Advance Party departs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Nov 67</td>
<td>Rear Detachment Commander appointed on orders and given the responsibility to (1) insure all Division buildings were cleared and turned over to Post. (2) Process all Division replacements reporting in during movement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: "Pre-Movement, Movement, and Post-Movement After Action Reports"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 Nov 67</td>
<td>Unit installation clearance schedule furnished to G4 (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Nov 67</td>
<td>Submission to Post G4 FOM Equipment Status Records (DA Form 413)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Nov 67</td>
<td>First Divisional unit received Post clearance inspection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Dec 67</td>
<td>One G4 Officer Supply Section deployed to country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Dec 67</td>
<td>Deputy G4 deployed to country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Dec 67</td>
<td>ACOfS, G4 deployed to country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15 Dec 67</td>
<td>Operation established by G4 Division to receive from Consolidated Supply all Division equipment arriving late and equipment the units could not pick-up due to deployment dates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Dec 67</td>
<td>Rear Detachment departed Fort Campbell with all buildings and property cleared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jan 68</td>
<td>2d Surface echelon.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Administrative:

a. The ACOfS, G4 was organized into four (4) sections.

   (1) Headquarters Section - responsible for all activities under G4.

   (2) Administrative Section - responsible for accurate administrative activities and maintenance of files.

   (3) Supply - Responsible for supply activities of the Division.

   (4) Maintenance - Responsible for maintenance activities of the Division.

b. One officer was temporarily assigned to Movements Control Coordination Group to serve as G4 representative.

c. One officer was in-country as of 20 Oct 67. He established a forward G4 operations and effected initial in-country operations.
SUBJECT: "Pre-Movement, and Post-Movement After Action Report"

d. The Staff of ACoS, G4 at Fort Campbell was six (6) officers
and nine (9) enlisted men.

10. Special Equipment, Techniques and Procedures: N/A

11. Commander's Action: Recommendations and Lessons Learned:

ITEM: TOE Changes

DISCUSSION: A difficult problem arose in determining the
proper authorization for equipment and the amount of equipment the units
were authorized. This was due to the frequent changes in unit TOE's.
These changes were often telephoned into the Division or sent individually
on messages from various headquarters. Printed copies of TOE's were late
in arriving, many were pencil copies.

OBSERVATION: Reorganization of a deploying unit should
be held to an absolute minimum, and no change made within 60 days of
PRD/ERD, and not effective until printed approved TOE is received.

ITEM: Lateral Transfer (Redistribution of Assets.)

DISCUSSION: Due to TOE changes, equipment had to be
lateral transferred within the Division. Units delayed transferring
equipment to gaining units and in some cases, when transfer was made,
this equipment was unserviceable. This response caused the gaining unit
function without their full allowance of equipment and in some cases
delayed or hampered the equipping of the Division.

OBSERVATION: A sense of urgency, cooperation, and an
understanding of the Division logistics posture must be realized and
stressed by unit commanders.

ITEM: Exchange of M16A1 Rifles.

DISCUSSION: Although enhancing the combat posture of the
Division; the last minute exchange of M-16 rifles for the new model
M16A1 Rifles resulted in a double supply operation, and required duplica-
tion of training efforts (zeroing the new weapon).

OBSERVATION: Unit equipment necessary for deployment
should be determined at the earliest possible date and furnished prior
to beginning of training.
SUBJECT: "Pre-Movement, and Post-Movement After Action Report"

ITEM: Army Materiel Command Customer Assistance Team

DISCUSSION: An AMC Customer Assistance Team was established at Fort Campbell, Ky to aid the Division in expediting needed items of equipment. This team proved to be an invaluable asset to Division and performed in an outstanding manner.

OBSERVATION: This concept should be used at every installation wherein a unit is preparing to deploy.

ITEM: Turn-in of Air Items

DISCUSSION: The lengthy delay in receiving information concerning what air items would be turned in and where, resulted in a delay in supply procedures and movements planning.

OBSERVATION: Decisions of this nature should be resolved at the earliest possible date to avoid a chain reaction of delays and associated difficulties.

ITEM: Issue of Jungle Fatigues and Sized Items

DISCUSSION: The issue of jungle fatigues and other sized items was accomplished at unit level. This method caused innumerable problems in obtaining adequate quantities of the various sizes, particularly odd sizes.

OBSERVATION: Sized items should be issued from the highest level of consolidation possible, i.e., Post Central Issue Facility, with greater flexibility to respond to the varying need of the units.

ITEM: Deployment of Division Supply Office

DISCUSSION: The early deployment of the Division Supply Office resulted in several ad hoc organizations being formed at home station to receive Division supplies arriving at Fort Campbell during the Division movement phase.

OBSERVATION: It is highly advantageous to deploying units to take as much of their equipment with them as possible; rather than having it shipped to them in-country. Hence the established supply organization, (in our case the Division Supply Office) should continue operations at home station until the majority of the units have deployed.

ITEM: PLL/ASL for Aircraft

DISCUSSION: Due to lack of firm guidance on what types of aircraft the Division would deploy with, the US Army Aviation Material Command was delayed in computing the aircraft PLL/ASL. As a result the unit did not receive the parts prior to deployment. Result was a delay in filling ASL/PLL, required air shipment, and loss of the Division Aircraft PLL after arrival in-country.
ITEM: Movements Control Coordination Group.

DISCUSSION: The MCCG was recommended by ACoS, G4 for the purpose of consolidating the planning and operation of the Division movement under a single staff. The staff was composed of representatives from all staff sections both Post and Division, unit representatives, the Division Transportation Officer, Air Force Liaison personnel and other interested personnel. The concept worked in an outstanding manner moving the Division in seven (7) air echelons and two (2) surface moves.

OBSERVATION: This concept should be considered for use in the movement of all major units.

II.5: Rear Detachment Commander.

DISCUSSION: This position was recommended by the ACoS, G4 with the mission to insure all Division buildings, and Post Camp and Station property were turned over to the post prior to the unit receiving final clearance. The concept worked effectively and the Division was cleared according to schedule, with a minimum of difficulty.

OBSERVATION: This concept should be considered for use in clearing any major unit for deployment.
PRE-MOVEMENT PHASE PART I

1. Date of Operation.
   b. POSD - 050800 Oct 67.
   c. ERD/PRD - 300800 Nov 67.

2. Location - Fort Campbell, Kentucky

3. Control or Command Headquarters - HQ, XVIII Airborne Corps and HQ, 3d US Army.

4. Subordinate Units - N/A

5. Supporting Units - Support Units assigned to Fort Campbell.


7. Concept of Operation - N/A

8. Execution: During the later part of September the G5 office was organized. Action was initiated to assure assignment of all authorized personnel. Steps were taken to assure that officers and NCOs of the G5 office and of subordinate units were trained in matters pertaining to Civil Affairs. A total of 17 officers and 26 enlisted personnel received Civil Affairs training. The officers attended a two week training course at Fort Gordon, Georgia. The enlisted personnel received a one week condensed course at Fort Campbell.

9. Administration - Key personnel of the G5 office reported for duty on the following dates:
   a. LTC Roy A. Williams - 21 Sep 67
   b. MAJ Paul S. Moscovic - 5 Oct 67
   c. SFC (E7) Robert Habersetzer - 5 Oct 67

10. Special equipment, techniques, and procedures - N/A

11. Commanders Analysis, Recommendations and Lessons Learned:
   a. Item: School Trained Personnel.

   b. Discussion: Personnel scheduled for assignment to TOE CA positions should be school trained prior to reporting for duty to a deploying unit. Once personnel report for duty, the maximum expenditure of time must be devoted to the preparations for deployment.
MOVEMENT PHASE PART II - ACoF G-5

1. Dates of Operation:
   a. Deployment of advance command and control element - 170900 Nov 67 from Fort Campbell, Kentucky. This element arrived in country 92345 Nov 67.
   b. Departure of Commanding General and party - 111500 Dec 67 and arrived in country 131000 Dec 67.

2. Location:
   a. Departure: Fort Campbell, Kentucky
   b. Arrival: Bien Hoa, RVN

3. Control or Command Headquarters: HQ USARV

4. Subordinate Units - N/A

5. Supporting Units - USAF (MAC)

6. Mission: To move from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to RVN and to establish base camp and prepare for future operations.

7. Concept of Operation: Movement by military airlift.

8. Execution: One officer and two enlisted personnel, a 1/4 ton truck w/trailer and office supplies and equipment were transported to RVN as a part of the advance command and control element. One officer and one EM were transported to RVN as part of the Commanding General's party.

9. Administration - N/A

10. Special equipment, techniques, and procedures - N/A

11. Commanders Analysis, Recommendations and Lessons Learned:
    Movement progressed as scheduled. No significant problems were encountered.
PRE-MOVEMENT AFTER ACTION REPORT
AIDE SECTION OF ADVANCED PLANNING GROUP

1. Dates of operation:

   Initial notification: 3 Aug 67
   PSOD: 5 Oct 67
   EN/FRD: 18 Oct 67

2. Location:

   Fort Campbell, Kentucky

3. Control or Command Headquarters:

   326th Engineer Battalion (-)

4. Subordinate Units:

   N/A

5. Supporting Unit:

   326th Engineer Battalion (-)

6. Mission:

   To prepare for departure of ADE section of advanced Planning Group.

7. Concept of operation:

   To effect liaison for Division and provide Base Camp Development after arrival in RVN.

8. Execution:

   On 10 Oct 67 we received notice that we would leave on 19 Oct 67 as part of the Advanced Planning Group. We prepared our personal, equipment and records for movement. We attended an initial briefing conducted by LTC Bryant which outlined what the mission of the Advanced Planning Group would be. On 18 Oct 67 the Advanced Planning Group briefed the Commanding General on the concept of operation. Each unit representative made a list of items to be checked and work to be accomplished upon arrival in RVN.
9. Administration:

There were twenty-six (26) personnel in the advanced planning group who represented those units which could best prepare for the receipt of the Division. We all obtained only those supplies which we felt would be absolutely necessary. Maintenance was not a consideration due to the fact that we did not have any equipment going with us that would require it. Transportation was to be by group travel from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Bien Hoa, Viet Nam. We were to come to Viet Nam on TDY orders and remain on TDY until the Division closed. We hand carried all of our records and were to turn them in to the nearest unit to keep for us.

10. Special equipment, techniques and procedures:

There was no special equipment used and techniques and procedures are included in Paragraph 9 (Administration).

11. Commanders analysis, recommendations and lessons learned:

ITEM: Personnel records

DISCUSSION: Due to the short notice it was difficult to obtain all records in preparation for departure.

OBSERVATION: In the future, if a detachment is to leave CONUS on short notice, all records should be consolidated and turned over to the detachments records custodian.

ITEM: Personal affairs

DISCUSSION: With the short, it was impossible to handle all personal affairs prior to departure.

OBSERVATION: In this situation, the only solution would be to take care of as much as possible prior to departure and handle the rest by mail.

ITEM: Supplies needed

DISCUSSION: There was no up to date list of what supplies items should be taken and what should be turned in, thereby causing some unnecessary items to be taken and some essentials to be left behind.

OBSERVATION: An up to date list of items necessary for move to Viet Nam should be on hand at all units for use by departing personnel.
ITEM: Selection of personnel

DISCUSSION: There was not a representative from each of the units thereby making it difficult to obtain information about that unit.

OBSERVATION: At least one representative from each unit who knows his commander's desires should be present on the Advanced Planning Group.

ITEM: Chain of Command

DISCUSSION: There was no chain of command other than the CO and XO and consequently, people were being ordered by any senior from any unit to do anything.

OBSERVATION: A specific chain of command should have been established and adhered to.

PHILIP A. WILLOCH
2LT, CE
Liaison Officer
MOVEMENT AFTER ACTION REPORT
AIDS SECTION OF ADVANCED PLANNING GROUP


2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky and Bien Hoa Air Base, RVN.

3. Control or Command Headquarters: 101st Airborne Division.

4. Subordinate units: N/A


6. Mission: To move from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Bien Hoa Air Base RVN.

7. Concept of operations: Advanced Planning Group of twenty-six (26) people went to Bien Hoa, Vietnam by group travel on a commercial airline from Fort Campbell, Kentucky where they were to prepare for the reception of the Division and effect liaison

8. Execution: At 2200 hours on 19 Oct 67, the Advanced Planning Group assembled at Support Command Headquarters for a briefing from the Division at 2300 hours. They boarded a bus and proceeded to Nashville, Tennessee Airport. At 0255 hours, 20 Oct 67 they boarded a plane which took them to Bien Hoa Air Base via Memphis, Dallas, San Francisco, Seattle and Tokyo.


10. Special equipment, techniques and procedures: N/A

11. Commanders analysis, recommendations and lessons learned: Item: Travel schedule.

12. Discussion: We traveled by group travel, commercial airlines and there were many long lay-overs which increased the travel time considerably.

S/PHILIP A. MARLOP
PHILIP A. MARLOP
2LT, CK
Liaison Officer
CHEMICAL

Part I - Pre-Movement Phase

Items 1 through 7 are applicable to tactical units only. The Division Chemical Section conformed to the schedule of the Division Headquarters Company.

a. EXECUTION: On receipt of the alert order, an initial assessment of CBR training and maintenance requirements within the division was made. Initial steps included the following:

b. Revision of CBR School courses for emphasis on operations in SEA.

c. Increased emphasis on flamethrower training and flame field expedients.

d. Special training in tunnel clearance operations.

e. Scheduling of special maintenance assistance out of Third U.S. Army resources for inspection and repair or replacement of protective masks and flamethrowers.

f. In-country liaison visit by the Division Chemical Officer.

f. A review of current in-country after action reports to determine special equipment/training requirements.

g. Publication of a Division Pamphlet on CBR operations in SEA for distribution to units.

9. Administrative: Routine administrative procedures were followed by the Chemical Section during all phases of the move.

10. As a result of liaison visits, a requirement for racks to be used in employment of drums of RCA CS was developed. Based on plans provided by the 1st Inf Div, CS deployment racks were fabricated prior to deployment at Fort Campbell. The plans were altered to allow disassembly of the racks into segments which would fit in a standard CONEX container.

11. N/A
Part II - Movement

Items 1 through 7 are not applicable to the Chemical Section.

8. The assistant Division Chemical Officer and the Chemical Operations Sergeant departed on 17 Nov 67 with the advance Command and Control Group. They were to establish initial contact with higher headquarters, make plans for initial training of chemical personnel and arrange for procurement of items of equipment which were not available in COMUS. The remainder of the Chemical personnel followed on 9 Dec 67 with Division Troops.

9. N/A

10. N/A

11. N/A

2. Location: Ft. Campbell, Kentucky.


4. Subordinate Units: None.

5. Supporting Units: None.

6. Mission: To effect continuous payment of all pay and allowances to members of the division during the period while at the same time processing all members of the division in any pay actions desired by them based on service in Viet-Nam, and preparing the finance section for movement.

7. Concept of Operation:

a. Continuous normal pay actions.

b. Develop plans for out-processing (non-deployable) some 3,500 personnel and in-processing some 4,000 personnel.

c. Develop plans for servicing all units of the division for pay changes desired by members due to impending service in Viet-Nam.

d. Develop plans for getting all equipment, blank forms and supplies on hand before deployment.

e. Develop plans for procuring all shortages of TOE equipment and develop requirements for equipment needed above and beyond TOE authorization.

f. Determine the best time to physically deploy the finance section.

g. Execution: Formal announcement of the impending deployment was first received on 2 August 1967. Planning was immediately started on all tasks that at that time appeared would have to be accomplished. Initial planning first considered the assigned and authorized strength of the section and the equipment then authorized and on hand to get the mission of finance service to the troops accomplished at that time as compared to what the estimated requirements would be for service in a combat zone.

It was determined that TOE for personnel and equipment was not adequate yet the job accomplished, so immediate requests were initiated to get an authorization for 21 more enlisted men which it was felt was the minimum essential augmentation to be able to get the job done in country.

Concurrent with this request action was initiated to secure authorization for certain minimum essential items of station property it was felt was needed to be able to operate in country. The request was for such items as adding machines, check writer, check signer, file cabinets, desks and chairs.
Pre-Movement and Post Movement After Actions Report - 3 Jan 1968 (cont't)

The first major task that faced the finance section was the development and execution of a plan for out-processing of the non-deployable personnel of the division (some 3,500). To execute the plan required an augmentation of 14 pay clerks from the Post Finance and Accounting Office. A large OP tent was erected in the rear of the finance office at Ft. Campbell to take care of the out-processing actions which took place during the period 27 August-5 September 1967. A time schedule was developed for all units to have their personnel report for processing. The processing consisted of payment of advances of pay, partial pays and travel pay. This operation ran very smoothly with very few problems encountered whatsoever. 

Word was received that a large part of the replacement into the division would be coming from the 82d Airborne Division, what was then thought to be a wise move, due to the fact that both the 82d Division and the 101st Division were under mechanized pay procedures, would be to exchange IBM card pay decks of known gains and losses in each of the divisions, which would facilitate continuous mechanized pay procedures for all personnel involved. This action was taken and worked quite well except that many cards received from the 82d Airborne Division were for personnel that for some reason or other never arrived in the 101st Airborne Division.

The next major thing facing the finance section was to develop and execute a plan for in-processing some 4,500 personnel during the period 22 September-6 October 1967. The plan that was executed was a part of a central in-processing plan in coordination with the Adjutant General section that envisaged establishment of a central in-processing facility in the post sports arena with representatives of every post agency participating who had an interest in incoming personnel. The finance section of this operation consisted of gathering the Financial Data Records Folders of all incoming personnel at the Replacement Company the night before they processed through this facility. During the night these were segregated by units and each record analyzed for needed pay action. The following morning, after the Commanding General's address to the personnel, all personnel who had travel claims to file did so at this time by centralized instruction as to what to put on their vouchers. The personnel were then transported to the sports arena where their travel vouchers were computed and paid on the spot. As each man processed through the various stages of in-processing, pay for prior months that he might have coming to him was being computed. By the time he reached the end of his processing he was paid any back pay and allowances he had coming to him before the day was over.

About Mid-October, after weighing the pros-and-cons of whether to remain under mechanized pay procedures or convert to manual pay procedures the decision was made to continue mechanized pay procedures in-country. As the Adjutant Generals section was also interested in mechanized procedures and wanted to stay mechanized a joint effort was made to get all of the vans housing the IBM and UNIVAC equipment completely overhauled and weatherized so as to have some assurance of adequate protection for the sensitive equipment installed therein. The post Consolidated Services cooperated wholeheartedly in this effort and the vans were put into excellent condition.
From the period 13 October-5 November finance service teams were sent to each unit on post for the purpose of processing any pay actions that members desired based on service in Vietnam. The actions included starting, stopping or changing of allotments of all kinds with particular emphasis on Class "E" support allotments and savings allotments (Soldier Savings and Bonds), initiation of Class "L" allotment authorizations (split-pay options available to members in Vietnam), and processing applications for Basic Allowance for Quarters and Family Separation Allowance. This action was well received by the units and eliminated a tremendous workload that would have developed in country had it not been accomplished prior to deployment.

From Mid-October through the end of November was spent in continuous processing of normal pay actions and developing a plan to pay the some 1,100 people of advance elements who would be in-country on November payday. The plan consisted of identifying the personnel and then extracting their vouchers from the unit November payrolls and creating payrolls for all personnel in Vietnam. These rolls were carried by one of the officers of the finance section to Vietnam on 1 December 1966 where a smooth payday was accomplished. The finance section closed in-country on 11 December 1966.

9. Included in the execution phase (See Paragraph 8 above).

10. None.

11. Finance Officer's Analysis.

a. Even though an augmentation of 19 personnel was authorized the finance section, the authorization came too late (20 November) to be able to get the personnel aboard prior to departure. These personnel were vitally needed during the months of September thru November to help accomplish the tremendous workload during these months in which there was such a turbulence of personnel within the division. Accuracy of pay to the division declined during this period due to insufficient number of personnel to get the job done on a timely basis. Of all the equipment requested above and beyond TOR, practically all of the request was disapproved even though items requested were not above and beyond what was then being used as station property to get the job accomplished. An authorization for a few additional adding machines came through at the last minute, but not in sufficient quantity to get the job done in-country where it is a recognized fact that more equipment is needed.

b. More recognition should be given to administrative elements in an operation of this type to their requests for additional equipment and personnel if a good quality product is expected of them. Outside of this I would do it no differently than was done if I had it to do again.
PRE-MOVEMENT, MOVEMENT, AND POST-MOVEMENT
AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Date of Operation: 1 November-11 December 1967

2 - 7 Same as Inclosure 1

8. One officer and four enlisted men of the finance section were sent to Viet-Nam on 20 November as part of the division advance party to act as a quartering party for the main body and to make contact with USARV finance representatives in-country for assistance and guidance in technical matters that would have had to be faced by the finance section upon their arrival. The assistance asked for was given which eased many burdens the section would have had without the assistance.

It was determined that finance service at Ft. Campbell had to cease no later than 5 December to allow enough time to pack and load equipment and complete all the necessary final personnel processing that had to be accomplished before departure on 9 December. It would have been desirable to have ceased operations on 1 December 1967, but one of the brigades still had 40% of their personnel on leave at this time, the last of which would not return until 4 December. To get these troops paid it was necessary to continue in operation through 5 December 1967. The finance section closed in-country on 11 December 1967.

9. Same as Inclosure 1

10. None

11. Same as Inclosure 1.
(Pre-movement Phase)  HQ 101st Abn Div - HQ C&C

Subj: "Pre-movement, movement and Post-movement after action report".

2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky
3. Control or Command Headquarters: XVIII Corps.
4. Subordinate Units: H/A
5. Supporting Units: H/A
6. Mission: To prepare to set up the 101st Abn Div base camp in XVIII.
7. Concept of Operations: The bulk of the preparation done by this section was packing and procuring items required by the Adv C&C group.
8. Execution: On 17 November this section prepared to depart Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
9. Administrative: The HQ Omit Section consisted of three individuals as outlined below:
   a. 1 Officer grade: E4 CIC
   b. 1 NCO grade: E6 Cmp Sgt
   c. 1 En grade: E4 Driver
10. Special Equipment, Techniques & Procedures: H/A
11. Command Analysis, Recommendations & Lessons Learned:

LIAISON: Liaison Visit.

DISCUSSION: The Headquarters Commandant was responsible for allocation of spaces for the Division Headquarters, General - Special Staff.

SUGGESTION: That the HQ Omit make a liaison visit to the proposed HQ site prior to the arrival of the Adv C&C in order to make a tentative plan and get a first hand view of the buildings and facilities available. If this had been done the Adv Party would have been better prepared to make necessary repairs and changes.
SECTION TOE Strength

DISCUSSION: The mission of the Hq Cdt Section underwent considerable change upon arrival in country. In a training situation many of the tasks required were accomplished by coordination with other units. In a combat situation, it is not feasible to do this.

SUGGESTION: That the section be properly augmented prior to arrival in country so it would be as self-sufficient as possible. This could be accomplished by the addition of several lower grade enlisted men to act as drivers, handymen, and laborers when necessary.
HQ 101st Abn Div- Ord

Subj: "Removal, Movement and Post Movement, after action report"

1. Dates of operation 30 Sep - 17 Nov 67
2. Location: Ft. Campbell, Ky to Bien Hoa, RVN
3. Control or Command Headquarters: Hq LSA RVN
4. Subordinate Units: N/A
5. Supporting Units: N/A
7. Concept of Operation: Move the Hq Sect in its entirety to RVN.
8. Execution: One Officer, One Non-Commissioned Officer - C.E. departed Fort Campbell on 17 Nov with the Advance Command & Control Element
9. Administrative: N/A
10. Medical Equipment, Techniques and Procedures: Since the duties and responsibilities of the Hq Sect could not be delegated to any other section; and a temporary section was established at Ft. Campbell, Ky. This section consisted of (1) 2Lt, (1) E6 & (1) E4
11. Commander Analysis: (Items 2-4)

ITEM 2: Officer billeting

DISCUSSION: The Hq Sect was initially responsible for billeting both Admin & H/C officers.

SUGGESTION: Each company should be responsible for billeting its respective officers. This would facilitate better control and the officers would be able to live nearer to their place of duty.

ITEM 3: Supply

DISCUSSION: The advance party encountered considerable difficulty in procuring many ordinary supply items.

SUGGESTION: That the Div Supply Office persons be in country long enough to establish operations initially before the arrival of the Advance Party. The mission of the advance party was hindered by the fact that D.S.O. could not begin to function immediately upon arrival in country.
Pre-Movement Phase (PIO)


2. Fort Campbell, Ky.

3. Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division

4. Subordinate Units: 25th and 34th Public Information Detachments.


6. Mission: To establish a working Division Information Office at Ft. Campbell, Ky., and prepare the PIO offices in Bien Hoa for the arrival of the Information Officer.

7. Concept of Operation: Nine men (three officers and six enlisted men), along with two jeeps and trailers were sent out on 17 November 1967 with the Advance Command and Control element to set up camp facilities, coordinate publishing of a Division magazine and newspaper, and establish press relations with USA RV, MACV, FFV, and all bureau chiefs in Saigon to include AP, CBS, ABC, NBC, and BBC. Upon the arrival of the 25th and 34th PI Detachments each was married up with the respective Brigade they would be supporting and traveled in-country with this Brigade. On 6 December 1967 the remainder of the Division Information Office, less the Information Officer, moved out. This group totaled seven men. This was a non-scheduled move. These men were alerted at 1600 hours 5 December 1967 and moved out at 0230 hours 6 December 1967. The Information Officer moved out on 11 December 1967 with the Command Group.

8. Execution:

   a. 3 October 1967: Division Information Office broke away from Post Control and set up offices in the Division area.

   b. 4 October 1967: Letters began returning from in-country Information Officers telling us the size of each Division IO Office and the supplies required.

   c. 18 October 1967: A letter was prepared by the Division Information Officer requesting local procurement of pictorial, photo laboratory, and sound equipment.

   d. 15-25 October 1967: 2 CONEX containers received, loaded, and shipped.


   f. 6 December 1967: Seven men depart with 3d Brigade.

   g. 8 December 1967: Authority is received from DA to local purchase photo lab equipment and supplies. Action is initiated that day and supplies are procured.
Pre-Movement Phase (PIO) Cont'd

h. 11 December 1967: Information Officer departs Ft. Campbell with Command Group.

9. Administrative: Special Duty Regulations were established for many staff sections to include PIO. Twelve (12) men, with specific MOSs were asked for and nine (9) were received. All SD personnel received were qualified.

Initially problems were encountered trying to establish a Self Service Supply Account for PIO. Previously this had been taken care of through Post PIO. After one week of paperwork and negotiations, PIO was given a one-time grand of $800 to set up shop and buy a 60 day supply of expendables for in-country use. Supply support rendered by G-6 (Division) was outstanding.

10. Special equipment: The 101st Airborne Division by TOE is authorized no photographic capabilities. Based upon this, letters from in-country IOs and the knowledge that no photographic support would be given to the 101st by in-country units, a request was submitted, through channels, to local purchase $11,379.39 of cameras, dark room equipment, and tape recording equipment. On 8 December this approval was granted and purchases were made that day. The above stated dollar figure includes cameras for G-2 and G-5.

11. Commander's Analysis:
   a. Reverting from Post control to Division control.
   b. Discussion: The breakaway was too late. The Post Information Office wanted to retain control of Division PIO up to the last minute. Consequently, when the break did come, there was no time to establish procedures, SOPs, and methods of operation. It was pack and go.
   c. Observation: The Division PIO could have been released 30 days earlier by Post. This would have allowed a smoother transition from actually working to moving.
   a. Personnel movement.
   b. Discussion: The Division PIO moved too many people forward and left too few at Fort Campbell to cover departure activities.
   c. Observation: Insufficient PIO coverage was given to the departure by Division Information personnel.
Post-Movement Phase (PIO)

1. 5 Oct 67 - 13 Dec 1967
2. Bien Hoa, Vietnam
3. Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division
4. 25th and 34th PI Detachments
5. N/A
6. Mission: To prepare Base Camp Information Office and establish relations with local media. To establish procedures for publishing a Division newspaper and magazine.
7. Concept of Operations: As stated in TAB A.
8. Execution: Due to the high priorities established for setting up the base camp as a whole, the PIO Advance Party was unable to successfully execute Pre-planned actions.
9. Administrative: Personnel who were sent on the Advance Party to accomplish a specific number of tasks found themselves on details non-related to the purpose they were sent to accomplish. Vehicles sent by PIO were pre-empted by other staff offices thereby leaving PIO with no transportation. Due to the low priority given PIO in the accomplishment of its assigned mission, this office is still, as of the date of this writing, working on tasks which should have been accomplished by the Advance Party.
10. N/A
11. Commander's Analysis:
   a. Misuse of personnel and vehicles.
   b. PIO planned sufficiently in advance to foresee what the requirements for personnel and equipment would be in-country. PIO did not plan upon the requirements placed upon them by higher Headquarters. By placing personnel and equipment in unrelated tasks, higher Headquarters detracted from PIO accomplishing assigned missions.
   c. Observation: It appears that, due to the accelerated move, proper foresight and planning could not be accomplished to foresee what the requirements would be to establish a Base Camp.
PRE-MOBEMENT AFTER ACTION REPORT - STA

1. DATES OF OPERATION: 1 August 1967 - 30 November 1967

2. LOCATION: Fort Campbell, Kentucky

3. CONTROL OR HEADQUARTERS: 101st Airborne Division

4. SUBORDINATE UNITS: NONE

5. SUPPORTING UNIT: Office of the Post Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters Fort Campbell, Kentucky 42223

6. MISSION: a. To prepare for and deploy the Office of the Division Staff Judge Advocate, 101st Airborne Division.

b. To provide legal assistance to all members of the 101st Airborne Division, to insure that their personal legal affairs were in order prior to deployment. Also to advise the dependents on their personal legal affairs.

c. To insure continuity of courts-martial jurisdiction during deployment phase.

d. To dispose of pending courts-martial cases, pending civil court actions and to arrange appropriate transfer or release actions on all division personnel in the Post Stockade, Fort Campbell.

e. To train potential trial and defense counsel and inform them of problems they were likely to encounter in RVN.

f. To train courts and boards clerks and adjutants and inform them of problems they were likely to encounter in RVN.

7. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: Not applicable

8. EXECUTION: a. The Division Judge Advocate Office consisting of:

- 3 Officers
- 1 WO
- 4 EM

separated from the Post Judge Advocate Office on 18 August 1967. From 18
August 1967 until 6 November 1967, LTC DeFiori divided his time between both offices as Staff Judge Advocate of each. On 6 November 1967, LTC Alton H. Harvey assumed the duties of Post Staff Judge Advocate. On 20 November 1967, SP5 Samuel E. Johnson joined the Division Judge Advocate Office.

b. In order to accomplish the mission as set forth in paragraph 6, above, the following actions took place on dates indicated:

(1) 7 August 1967 - letters were dispatched to Staff Judge Advocate's operating in Vietnam; Commandant, The Judge Advocate General's School; Staff Judge Advocate's who had recently departed Vietnam; and to the Post Staff Judge Advocate of Fort Riley, Kansas who had assisted in deployment of the 9th Infantry Division. The purpose of the letters was to obtain as much information as possible of the problems that were to be encountered, solicit their suggestions and to acquire Judge Advocate regulations from SJA's in Vietnam.

(2) 10 August 1967 - the combat law library and Special Set of SJA regulations were checked for completeness and all shortages were requisitioned. The two recording machines and three typewriters, all TZ items, were turned in for repair and servicing in preparation for shipment.

(3) During the period 10 - 30 August all TOE equipment was readied for shipment. Six containers for the combat law library were constructed by Post Engineers.

(4) 25 September 1967 - provided information to ACofS, G3 for establishing special court-martial jurisdiction for deploying units during the separate echelons of movement.

(5) On 2 October 1967 this section requested 180 days of supplies and a 90 day supply of blank forms.

(6) 10 October 1967 - an extensive program was initiated to insure that all personnel of the division were advised to review their personal legal needs and to prepare Wills and Powers of Attorney prior to deployment. To accomplish this, the Post Legal Assistance Officer conducted an orientation class for each battalion size unit and therewith aided those desiring in the execution of their legal documents. The unit visited was requested to furnish the necessary space, four typists and typewriters. The annual legal check-up form was given to each individual.

(7) 17 October 1967 - this section submitted a request that the TOE of each battalion be amended to authorize each special court-martial convening authority a legal section consisting of one (1) legal
clerk and one (1) typist. The intent of this request was to eliminate a problem for the commander operating some distance from Division headquarters, allowing him to maintain a high degree of quality in the administration of military justice and other legal matters.

(8) 18 October 1967 - requests were made to screen all records of personnel within the division who were in a deployable status and who possessed a law degree or were attorneys and to insure that photographic support was available to the section to be used in claims investigations, etc.

(9) 23 October 1967 - a letter was dispatched to the Commanding General, Assistant Division Commander, Chief of Staff, all Chiefs of General and Special staff sections, and major unit commanders advising them of the need for their personal legal affairs to be in order, providing them with the Annual Legal Check-up Form and soliciting them to make appointments for Wills and powers of attorney. Also, on this date a letter was distributed throughout the division for dissemination to all personnel advising them of their tax liabilities and benefits in Vietnam.

(10) 27 October 1967 - this office forwarded a letter to all members of the Bench and Bar of Christian County, Kentucky and Montgomery County, Tennessee soliciting their assistance in the expeditious processing of civilian cases involving members of the division.

(11) 13 and 17 November - this office conducted a four hour course for all Special Court-Martial Counsel in an effort to apprise them of trial techniques, law, and their responsibilities. Also a two hour course was presented to legal clerks and adjutants.

(12) During the period of 15 - 24 November 1967 the Staff Judge Advocate along with the Adjutant General and Finance Office presented four discussion periods to the wives of all deploying personnel.

(13) During the period of 1 November and 6 December, increased emphasis was placed on disposing of all untried courts-martial, transfer of jurisdiction, release of prisoners from the stockade and coordination with local civilian judicial authorities.

(14) During the period of 1 August thru 1 December 1967, other details, such as preparation of constitution and by laws of Officer and NCO Open Messes, security clearances for section personnel, change of status for Judge Advocate Legal Service and Decisions of Court of Military Appeals, securing of supplies, forms, packing, etc., were accomplished.

9. ADMINISTRATIVE:

a. All personal FOR processing was done within a minimum amount of
time.

d. All necessary office supplies were not available and shipment of CONEX's were hurriedly prepared because of lack of notification and funds to properly stock needed office supplies.

c. Supplies were obtained on a "scroung" basis to facilitate at least a 60 day foundation.

d. Lateral transfer of some items although requested in sufficient time were not accomplished until the last moment, which caused a shortage of much needed office equipment and furniture, in country.

10. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: Not Applicable

11. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. (1) Item: Security Classification of the move.
   Discussion: Classification prevented the publication of necessary regulations or changes to regulations as they applied in RVN. Upon arrival in country, regulations were produced but cast a heavy burden on AG Reproduction Section.
   Observation: If possible, future moves should be unclassified, or special provisions made for publication of regulations in CONUS.

   (2) Item: Notice of move
   Discussion: The earliest notice of, and planning for, the move is absolutely necessary. Many actions take time to accomplish and in at least one instance required reaction by civil authorities.
   Observation: All section chiefs should be included in all briefings or conferences concerning the move, to allow for necessary planning and actions.

   (3) Item: Separation of staffs
   Discussion: The separation of the Division and Post Judge Advocate Sections was completed about one month prior to the move. The JA Section could not devote exclusive attention to Division problems until that date. One month was too short a time to attend to all problems as comprehensively as desired.
   Observation: Future separations of integrated staffs should be made as early as possible.
Part I - Pre-Movement Phase - Div Surgeon

1. Date: 03 August 1967 - 28 December 1967.

2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky 42103.

3. Control & Control Headquarters: III, 163rd Airborne Division.

4. Subordinate units = Medical personnel/wt for technical supervision.

5. Supporting Units - VIII Airborne Corps.

6. Mission: To ready the division medical service for overseas movement.

7. Concept of Operation: To bring all 163rd Airborne Division medical units up to required strength and proficiency.

8. Execution:

   a. A review of medical qualifications in the 163rd Airborne Division revealed that medical personnel in some cases were not proficient in their fields. This was due to lack of sufficient CTR.

   b. Obtained list of all medical personnel and forwarded to VIII Airborne Corps Surgeon.

   c. Two medical refresher schools for MOS 916 were conducted.

   d. The Preventive Medicine Officer conducted three field sanitation schools to orientate and train unit field sanitation teams.

   e. Some medical MOS were substituted for critical medical MOS's (e.g. 916 for 91D and 91C. 91A directly from the medical training school were allotted in senior medical aidman slots with little or no additional training).

   f. Division was medically FOR qualified with eye checks, and dental checks.

   g. All profiles were reviewed.

   h. Division received fill of professional medical personnel.

   i. The 9662 proved to be unrealistic as personnel did not arrive at station with sufficient time to permit any proficiency training in their MOS.
9. Command Analysis:


b. Recommend that all personnel be required to be on station prior to the start of the training and IOF qualification check period.

c. Lessons Learned - Changes to IOF equipment and personnel should be made in sufficient time to allow training prior to deployment.
Part II - Movement Phase - Div

1. In or.: 3 August 1967 - 28 December 1967.

2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky HK-3.


4. Subordinate Units: Medical personnel/units for technical supervision.

5. Supporting Units: The 67th Medical Group.

6. Mission: Movement of Division Surgeon’s Section to Vietnam.

7. Concept of operation - Move in small elements to Vietnam, arriving before the main body and establishing medical support.

8. Execution:

   a. Advance Planning Group: The administrative assistant represented the advance planning group for this section.

   b. Advance Party Group: The advance party was made up of 1 LTC and 1 CPT. The LTC immediately made coordination with the Field Force Surgeon and the USARV Surgeon. He also began writing the medical regulations necessary to function in Vietnam. The CPT made preventive medicine studies of the area and coordinated with the 20th Preventive Medicine Unit. The Chief NCO arrived on 22 November 1967 along with two enlisted men bringing the advance party up to functional strength.

   c. Operational Phase: The OA Team of the 67th Medical Group became functional on 1 December 1967 and continued to support the staging phase until 20 December 1967. The 101st Airborne Division medical service became operational on 21 December 1967.

9. Command Analysis:

   a. Analysis: Shortage of a permanently assigned division surgeon and administrative assistant hampered sound medical movement.

   b. Recommendations: That all staff officers should be permanently assigned prior to starting of the planning phase.

   c. Lessons Learned: The smooth operation of a movement such as this must depend on good prior staff planning.

165
Part I: Pre-movement Phase - 2d Bde

2. Location: Fort Campbell Kentucky, DR 259253.
3. Control or Command Headquarters: 101st Airborne Division.
4. Subordinate Units:
   a. 1st Battalion (Abn) 501st Infantry.
   b. 2d Battalion (Abn) 501st Infantry.
   c. 1st Battalion (Abn) 502nd Infantry.
   d. HHC, 2nd Brigade.
5. Supporting Units:
   a. 1st Battalion (Abn) 321st Artillery.
   d. 2d Flat, B/501st Sig (Abn).
   e. 2d Fwd Spt Flat, A/501st Maint Bn (Abn).
   f. 2d Flat, 101st MP Co (Abn).
   g. 2d Flat, 265 ASA Co (Abn).
   h. Team 2, 101st MI Det (Abn).
   i. USAF TAC.
   j. 67 Maint Co (6-10 Nov 67).
   k. Airmobile Co, 10th Avn Cp (6-10 Nov 67).
6. Mission: Prepare the 2d Brigade for deployment to USARVAC as an integral part of the 101st Airborne Division:
   a. Conduct an intensified combat training program beginning 21 August 1967.
   b. Reassign non-deployable personnel and fill units by 5 October 1967 (POSD).
c. Requisition and receipt for TOE shortages by 5 December 1967 (TR).

d. Accomplish ICM requirements by 5 December 1967 (FRT).

7. Concept of operation.

a. Intensified combat training was to be accomplished in two distinct phases of training, Phase I (Individual Training) and Phase II (Unit Training). Phase I (21 August - 7 October) was designed to increase the proficiency of each individual in his assigned duty. Phase II (original dates 8 October - 22 December) was designed to train squads through battalions and was to terminate with a Brigade TX.

b. Non-deployable personnel were to be determined by a personnel survey using current deployability criteria. Volunteers were to be solicited among non-deployable personnel. Personnel requirements to fill to TOE were to be determined by slotting personnel assets against vacancies, and requisitioning the remainder.

c. Requisition and receipt of TOE shortages was to be accomplished through comparison of equipment on hand to the amounts required by TOE, by early requisition and by continuous follow up. Special inspections were to be organized to insure that each unit was requisitioning, accounting for, maintaining, and turning in equipment properly.

d. Accomplishment of ICM requirements was to be accomplished through a systematic review, execution of requirements, and up-dating of each individual's records.

8. Execution: The 2d Brigade was notified 2 August 1967 of impending deployment to Southeast Asia. Brigade and attached units immediately began planning and execution of guidance received from higher headquarters. During the period 3 - 21 August, brigade and its units prepared training programs, began requisition of equipment under the modified "O" series K.N.E., surveyed the personal situation, and began reassignment of non-deployable personnel to units outside the division. On 21 August the intensified training program commenced with primary emphasis on individual level training. Concurrently, selected personnel were assigned to attend ground surveillance, ranger, airborne, signal, long range reconnaissance patrol, administration, supply, weapons, repair, mortar, demolition, forward observer, air mobility, and leadership schools.

On 1 September Colonel J. H. Cushman assumed command of the 2nd Brigade, replacing Colonel J. E. Kitchell.

During September Phase I (individual level) training continued. The influx of new personnel made necessary repetition of several of the Phase I training programs, e.g., weapons, qualification, and CBR.
By mid-September, all units were reorganized under G Series Tab, required the activation of a fourth rifle company and a combat support company in each infantry battalion.

During September non-deployable personnel were reassigned and in-processing personnel were processed and assigned by C&O. By 1 C&D, 5 October 1967, the brigade was 76% of required strength.

Phase II (squad, platoon, company, and battalion-level training) commenced on 8 October. In mid-October, the programmed 9-week training program was reduced to five weeks, to be concluded on 10 November. Four weeks of this program were to be squad and platoon training, with the final week to consist of company and battalion training in a brigade FTX framework. Weapons firing, demolitions, heavy traps, mines, field fortifications, communications, adjustment of mortar and artillery fires, air mobile operations, patrolling, search and destroy operations and establishment of night perimeter defensive positions were emphasized in Phase II training.

FOR qualification continued to be accomplished, but the continuing arrival of new personnel made repeat FOR qualification necessary.

On 16 - 17 October, the division-level CIX OUSD (HUM T) was conducted.

On October 18 the brigade was required to recognize under the change from the "G" series Tab to the 7-55T and 57-42G (M) Tabs. In addition, the personnel requirements required reassignment.

During the period 6 - 10 November, FTX BRAVE EAGLE was conducted in the vicinity of Stewart State Park, Dover, Tennessee. This exercise consisted of company and battalion operations in a brigade framework. It included daily air mobile operations for each company, search and destroy operations, patrolling, construction of field fortifications and establishment of night perimeter defensive positions. The exercise was terminated by an air mobile assault by each battalion into the Fort Campbell Reservation.

The period 3 November through 4 December was devoted to FFR leaves, final FOR processing for selected individuals, repair and cleaning of troop billets and packing for the overseas movement.

On 10 November the Final Readiness Report was submitted, and on 17 November the advance command and control party departed for SEA. On 21 November the advance party departed for SEA. Extensive preparations for picking TOE equipment, weighing of pallets and final inspections of personnel and billets were conducted and completed during the period 1-17 December.

9. Administration.

a. Personnel. The following problems were experienced in the field of personnel:

(1) Personnel fills continued to arrive well past OCT. 
(2) A substantial percentage of the personnel fill possessed police, signal, engineer and artillery MOSs but were assigned as riflemen.

(3) Additional MOS imbalances were caused by a TOE change in the middle of the training period. The change left the infantry battalions with excess vehicle mechanics who had to be retrained at this late date as riflemen.

(4) The two-grade substitution of enlisted personnel resulted in a critical shortage of experienced noncommissioned officers.

(5) Non-deployable personnel were not moved out of the unit prior to POSD, resulting in problems in accountability and morale.

(6) Units of the Brigade deployed at 85-90% strengths. Rifle companies on the average deployed at 82% strength.

b. Supply: The changes to the TC2 created the major supply problems. Specific problems were maintaining a current P1L, obtaining the required publications, and supply turbulence. Courtesy supply inspections conducted by a team from Consolidated Supply, Fort Campbell, were very helpful in maintaining proper accounting procedures and in training supply personnel. Courtesy CSMI maintenance inspections assisted in resolving the P1L and publication problems.

The shortages of Claymore Mines, Pyrotechnics and demolition limited the training in the use of these items.

c. Maintenance: Maintenance problems were limited. Crew served weapons presented the major problem. 10-60 machine guns, 81 mm mortars and 4.7 mortars required extensive repair in order to meet POM standards. The problems with crew served weapons resulted from extensive use in training and old age. Maintenance problems were solved by courtesy CSMI type inspections and by excellent support from the Fort Campbell Consolidated Field Maintenance Facility.

d. Transportation. Transportation resources provided the 2d Brigade during the intensive training phase and the movement phase were insufficient. The transportation needed for troops, ammunition and supplies far exceeded normal requirements. In addition, 2 1/2 ton trucks were deleted from the TC2 leaving the battalions without necessary administrative support. This problem persisted throughout.

Additional transportation problems were encountered due to the phased move. By surface and air, CCMX containers and Air Force 463L pallets, required material handling equipment and tractor trailer trucks. The limited amount of this equipment placed a significant additional burden on unit supply personnel. It was necessary to conduct round the clock operations for extended periods during the loading of CCMX containers and during the packing and loading of 463L pallets, because of the shortage of equipment.
10. Special equipment, techniques, and procedures.

a. An administrative "unit wash" was conducted on 21 and 26 October, and 2 November, processing one battalion on each day, with full support by division administrative agencies. The objectives of the "unit wash" were:

(1) A 100% personnel records check for accuracy and completeness.

(2) Provide each soldier the opportunity to initiate and/or change financial allotments.

(3) Provide each soldier the opportunity to execute a will and/or power of attorney.

b. The intensive training program severely reduced the time available for maintenance. This problem was overcome by the use of a maintenance "unit wash", which consisted of a working inspection and repair conducted by Consolidated Field Maintenance. The Director of Maintenance, in coordination with the 2d Brigade, made the entire field maintenance facility available to repair brigade equipment, one battalion at a time. A team of inspectors from Consolidated Field Maintenance inspected each item of equipment. If the inspection revealed a maintenance fault the piece of equipment was immediately repaired in place or evacuated and repaired. This procedure resulted in all equipment being inspected and repaired in twenty four hours or less. This program allowed the brigade to get the maximum time for training and deploying with its equipment in superior condition.

c. These two techniques got the required job done with maximum efficiency and minimum loss of training time.

11. Commander's analysis, Recommendations and Lessons Learned.

a. Commander's Analysis.

(1) The primary problems of this preparation for movement were: personnel turbulence; shortage of qualified junior non-commissioned officers; organizational changes; supply turbulence; a foreshortened period of preparation, and the consequent need to telescope and overlap personnel fill; supply fill, training, "ON" qualification, and final movement preparations.

(2) The shortage of experienced and knowledgeable non-commissioned officers and technicians hindered the accomplishment of many tasks normally performed without difficulty, and presented serious problems of command and supervision to the battalion commanders and their relatively inexperienced staffs. The battalions were able to respond to the requirement, only by reason of great time, effort, and personal guidance given by the battalion commanders.
(3) The supply problems caused by the changes in the T-6s were also quite severe. The T-series T-63 stripped units of most of their vehicles, and the maintenance capability to go with them at a critical time in the training program. Borrowed vehicles met the requirements in part, but at costs in efficiency.

(4) On the other hand, obstacles were reduced or overcome through achievement of personal and material readiness, on a "unit wash" basis supported by division and post agencies. The assistance of these supporting agencies was invaluable.

(5) The training program made the most efficient use of the time available possible under the circumstances. Squad and platoon proficiency was satisfactory upon deployment, and companies and battalions had received an excellent week of continuous training in the brigade-FM, with ample helicopter resources.

b. Command's Recommendations.

(1) Resolve unit TOE early in preparation and minimize subsequent changes.

(2) Allow enough time so as to permit sequential training, inspections, leave, packing, and MCR qualification. Concurrent activity in these areas spreads resources, and detracts from efficient training and allocation of resources, both in manpower and equipment.

(3) Leader Courses for small unit leaders, to include the company, platoon, and patrol leaders, needed to improve the performance of the new commissioned and non-commissioned officer. The squad leader course conducted by division paid good dividends. This sort of centralized leader training is essential.

(4) Use special teams from Finance, AG, Medical, administration, supply, and maintenance to "unit wash" units in their areas of interest. This time conserving measure proved of considerable assistance.
Part II: Movement Phase - 2d Bde


2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky (DR259253) to Bien Hoa, RVN (X028151).

3. Central or Command Headquarters: 101st Airborne Division.

4. Subordinate Units:
   a. 1st Battalion (Abn) 501st Inf.
   b. 2d Battalion (Abn) 501st Inf.
   c. 1st Battalion (Abn) 502d Inf.
   d. 1st Battalion (Abn) 321st Arty.
   e. HHC, 2d Brigade.
   g. 2d Plt, B/5th Sig Bn (Abn).
   h. 2d Fwd Spt Plt, A/801st Maint Bn (Abn).
   i. 2d Plt, 101st MP Ce (Abn).
   j. 2d Plt, 265 RRU (Abn).
   k. Team 2, 101st MI Det (Abn).

5. Supporting Units:
   a. USAF MAC.
   b. 504th Quartermaster Company.

6. Mission: 2d Brigade prepares for deployment via air, deploys by air via air to VIET NAM, establishes base camp.

7. Concept of Operation: The operation was conducted in two phases:
   a. Phase I: Preparation for deployment, 2d Brigade prepared for deployment by scha'er to VIET NAM via air.
   b. Phase II: Deployment:
      (1) Advance Party: 2d Bde deployed an advance C & C element on 17 November 1967 and an advance party on 21 November for the purpose of
insuring the orderly arrival of the Brigade in-country, coordinating subsequent meter moves to CU CHI, RVN, and preparation of an in-country training program and use of training areas.

(2) Main Body: Commencing 12 December 1967, the Brigade main body began departing Fort Campbell in a continuous airstream and closed in-country 17 December 1967.


8. Execution: 2 August 1967, the 2d Brigade Task Force was alerted for surface deployment to the Republic of Viet Nam, as part of the 101st Airborne Division (minus). The advance party/rear detachment was to depart Ft. Campbell, Kentucky via air so as to arrive in-country prior to the main body. The main body was to depart Ft. Campbell on 17 Jan 1968, travel to the point of debarkation, Gulfport Miss., by train and from there to RVN by ship.

Preparation for movement began with a briefing of transportation requirements presented by the Post Transportation Officer on 1 September 1967. On 15 September 1967 requests for packing, crating and tie down materials were submitted to the Post Engineer and Post Consolidated Supply. Requirements for CONEX containers were submitted to the Post Transportation Officer on 20 September 1967.

Overall responsibility for the move was assigned to the Post G4. A movements Control Coordination Group was established to coordinate the movement requirements between the U.S. Air Force and the 101st Airborne Division. The 2d Brigade Task Force established liaison with the Movements Control Coordination Group 1 Oct 67, and assigned overall responsibility for movement to the Brigade S4. At Battalion and Brigade level the S4 and S3 air worked together on plans and preparation for the move.

The surface transportation requirements of the 2d Bde Task Force were submitted 1 Oct 67, (CONARO Form 900R). On 6 Oct 67, the 2d Bde Task Force was alerted to prepare for either a surface move or an air move, and a possibly early deployment date. Air movement data was submitted to division in preparation for STRICOM movement conference. The unit move consist of the Task Force was submitted 15 Oct 67. This consist was based on surface movement plans. On 19 Oct 67 the decision was made that the Task Force would deploy via air and the date of departure was advanced to 12 Dec 67. On 18 Oct 67, the infantry battalions were reorganized under the T Series TOE. The change in deployment dates and the concurrent changes in TOE of Task Force units, necessitated a change in leading plans. New movement plans were made, and on 15 Nov 1967, the Bde Task Force shipped 211 20' Containers, by surface echelon. Because of the changes in movement plans and TOE, no vehicles were shipped in the 1st surface echelon.
During November 1967, the advance party departed and air movement plans were updated because of continuing T & E changes. The Aircraft Flow Plan was received 22 Nov. Task Force units were allocated aircraft and began planning their loads. A few minor changes were made in the aircraft flow plan to allow the task force units to maintain unit integrity. Air Force Loadmasters reported to the Movements Control Officer on 7 Dec 67. Minor changes were made to the load plans submitted by the units in order to more efficiently utilize the aircraft. The first chalk of the task force departed 1830 hrs 12 Dec and there was continuous movement of the task force until the main body completed departure on 16 Dec, with only minor interruptions due to weather. The rear detachment of the brigade task force departed Ft Campbell 28 Dec and the task force was completely closed in Viet Nam 30 Dec 67. The airlift requirements necessary to move the 2d Brigade TF were estimated at 86 C-141 sorties. 82 sorties were used to move the task force; the four remaining sorties were utilized by the Division minus.

The packing and loading of materiel was completed in four phases:

Phase I, 22-29 Nov, consisted of the units packing equipment and loading their 463L pallets. Phase II, 30 Nov - 6 Dec, consisted of weighing and marshalling 463L pallets and vehicles. Phase III, 7-12 Dec, consisted of inspecting pallets and leads and placing them in chalk order in the marshalling area. Phase IV, 12-16 Dec was the introduction of the equipment and material into the airstream. Phases I through III were supervised by the Brigade Movements Control Officer and Phase IV was supervised by the Division Movements Control Coordination Group.

Because of the changes in T & E and the limited time to readjust plans from a surface move to an air move just prior to departure of 1st sea echelon (15 Nov) a second sea echelon was planned to depart Ft Campbell 15 Dec. This forced the task force units to lead and prepare for shipment CONEX containers while they were in the process of leading aircraft. The CONEX leading was completed 10 Dec and the shipment departed Ft Campbell 15 Dec 67. The Brigade, minus the rear party, closed into RVN on 18 Dec 67. The closure into RVN, and the movement of personnel and vehicles from Bien Hoa to Camp Cu Chi were handled efficiently.

9. Administration:

a. Personnel: Few administrative problems were encountered in the movement phase:

(1) Few pay problems were encountered for the month of November.

(2) Frequent manifest checks were made during the marshalling period to account for personnel.

(3) The barracks and headquarters facilities were cleared by the rear party personnel, as were the items of supply and station property. No problems were encountered.

b. Supply: There were no major supply problems during the movement phase. The post supply facilities reacted rapidly to any problem that did arise. Although many items arrived while units were in the process of
moving, the method used by Consolidated Supply to ship the items directly to BWM from their warehouse saved the units considerable time and reduced their loading problems.

c. Maintenance: Maintenance problems that occurred during the move were corrected very efficiently by the standby maintenance crews working for the Movements Control Coordination Group.

d. Transportation: There was sufficient transportation to meet all requirements during movement.

10. Special equipment, techniques and procedures: The establishment of a Brigade Movements Control Coordination Group parallel to the Division MACO was beneficial in providing accurate and timely guidance to task force units. The outloading was conducted similar to outloading for airborne operations and the same techniques were used.

11. Commander's Analysis, Recommendations and Lessons Learned:

   a. Commander's Analysis: The move was conducted in an efficient manner. Close liaison and coordination within the brigade task force and with supporting units was essential because of the constant changes that occurred during the planning and during the move. Strict packing criteria and loading procedures were established and closely supervised. By standardizing the loads to the maximum extent possible no problems were encountered in the loading of the aircraft.

   b. Recommendations and Lessons Learned:

      (1) Recommendations:

          (a) Unit TO & E be firmly established early in preparation for movement.

          (b) Planning movement data not be required so far in advance that it becomes outdated before use.

          (c) Division Finance should have a rear detachment to handle late replacements and pay complaints.

      (2) Lessons Learned:

          (a) Direct coordination with supporting Air Force units necessary to avoid confusion and to effectively utilize aircraft capability.

          (b) Standardization of loading procedure at Brigade level insured continuity of movement and precluded any delay other than weather.

          (c) Normal airborne operation control measures (Check point 1, MACO, DACO, DAG) are adequate to control the administrative move of a deploying unit.
1. Dates of Operation: 16 August - 4 November 1967

2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky

3. Command Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

4. Subordinate Units:
   a. 1st Bn (Abn) 506th Infantry
   b. 2d Bn (Abn) 506th Infantry
   c. 3d Bn (Abn) 187th Infantry

5. Supporting Units
   a. Support Command, 101st Airborne Division
   b. US Army Fort Campbell, Kentucky

6. Mission:
   a. Training: To conduct eleven (11) weeks of intensified training to prepare the 3d Brigade to conduct combat operations in Southeast Asia.
   b. Movement: To prepare for strategic lift of 3d Brigade to Fort Campbell, Kentucky to USARPAC using both air and surface transport.

7. Concept of Operation:
   a. Training: An eleven (11) week training cycle was broken into two (2) phases. The first phase was oriented toward individual training. This included arms qualification and schools. Courses in all related combat skills were conducted, ie, squad leaders course, language school, FO and FAC course, Starlight scope course, aerial delivery and jumpmaster school. Phase II was oriented toward unit training through company level. Squad, platoon, and company level missions were emphasized and conducted during this period.
   b. Movement: Based on the Commander's estimate, units planned movement of equipment by surface and air. Items not needed for training nor required immediately upon arrival in country were shipped by conex container and surface mode. Combat and training essentials were to accompany troops by air.
After Action Report (Eagle Thrust) (cont)

8. Execution:

a. Beginning of Phase: This Phase began with unofficial notification received 16 August 1967. Eagle Thrust Operation Order 3-67 not received until 15 November 1967.

b. Command Action: Command emphasis on intensified training and personnel and material readiness. Information passed to troops by means of weekly Deployment Bulletins.

c. Action by other personnel: Fort Campbell established a Movement Control Coordination Group (MCCG) for the purpose of assisting the Division move to USARPAC. Liaison was established with MCCG on a full time basis with one officer from the 3d Brigade on 14 October 1967.

d. The first seatail departed by rail from Fort Campbell en-route to Mobile, Alabama on 24 October 1967. 3d Brigade units (1/506, 2/506, 3/187 and Brigade HHC) shipped a total of 178 Conex Containers and boxed items weighing slightly in excess of 700 tons.

e. Training: 3d Brigade Training Circular 350-5, dated 18 August 1967 (w/ch-1) outlined Phase I training (21 August - 7 October 1967) emphasizing first: individual training and second: PCR/FOM and school orientated training; and Phase II Training (8 October - 22 December 1967) emphasizing individual and unit tactical training during which Sqd/Plt training and testing was conducted, followed by Battalion size airmvovement/parachute assault and five day FTX orientated toward RVM Techniques. This training period was reduced from 6 (six) weeks to 4 (four) weeks with testing being conducted to platoon levels. 3d Brigade conducted AAC for 16 rifle, cal .45 pistol, M79 grenade launcher and M60 machine gun during the period 11-16 September 67. This was followed by a program of periodic qualification and zero firing of replacement personnel and those persons unavailable to fire during AAC. During the period special emphasis was given to formal training of selected personnel in their MOS, and small unit leaders in RVM training, ie, long range patrolling, tunnel rat techniques, airmobile operations, rappel and squad leaders course. This was conducted utilizing extensively on and off-post schooling facilities.

9. Administrative:

a. Personnel: The personnel status during the period prior to deployment fluctuated as follows:

(1) Approximately 800 troops were non-deployable and were transferred to other commands.
After Action Report (Eagle Thrust) (cont')

(2) Replacements came in from Fort Bragg and other units both airborne and non-airborne.

(3) The majority of the lower enlisted grades were assigned from Fort Bragg.

(A) Approximately 15% of the Brigade separated from the service prior to deployment.

b. Supply: Considerable turmoil occurred in Battalion and company supply sections due to successive changes from "F" series to "G" series to "T" series TOE. Units were hard pressed to support the intensified training program and issue and turn-in of TOE. In some cases, items to be turned in were being used for off post training at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

c. Maintenance: All units due CMMI underwent inspections with satisfactory results. Brigade and Division courtesy inspections were also performed of each unit, with the goal of preparing for forthcoming Preparation for Overseas Movement Inspections. Twenty hours of Maintenance instruction was presented to key officers and NCO's. The commander emphasized early turn-in of equipment no longer authorized by the new TOE to reduce the maintenance load and free troops for required training.

d. Transportation: Conduct of intensified training program was hampered by inadequate troop transport. That transport available at Fort Campbell was over-committed and unreliable. Change to the T series TOE deleted all 2½ ton cargo trucks. Units were dependent on Post Transportation for support of training and administrative supply transaction. Due to the two successive TOE changes, there was a great bulk of equipment to be drawn and turned in. As a result, post support of the entire training and administrative program was unsatisfactory.

10. Special Equipment Techniques and Procedures. None.

11. Commander's Analysis:

a. Item: Original guidance was to plan move by surface means only.

    (1) Discussion: Based on original guidance, detailed plans were made concerning weights and cubes of items to be shipped. Subsequent changes to TOE and changes in readiness dates negated early plans.

    (2) Observation: Successful Movement was planned and conducted in spite of major changes in planning guidance.
b. Item: Preparation for Overseas Movement (FOM) Inspection, identified training program and TOE changes.

(1) FOM inspections followed successive TOE changes and end of training program too closely. Units conducted 24 hour operations continuously the last week prior to FOM inspections.

(2) Units should be allowed more reaction time in preparation for FOM. In spite of the above, all units successfully passed FOM during the next phase.

2. Location: Bien Hoa Army Post, Bien Hoa, Vietnam.

3. Control or Command Headquarters: headquarters, 101st Airborne Division Artillery.

4. Subordinate Units:
   a. Headquarters Battery, 101st Airborne Division Artillery.
   b. 2d Battalion (Airborne) 319th Artillery
   c. 1st Battalion (Airborne) 321st Artillery.

5. Supporting Units: None, other than Division Base.

6. Mission: To bring the Division Artillery Staff and subordinate units to a high state of combat readiness in preparation for overseas deployment.

7. Concept of Operation: The concept of operation envisioned accomplishing the following actions prior to deployment:
   a. Identification and reassignment of nondeployable personnel.
   c. Receipt, processing and training of deployable replacement personnel.
   d. Airmobile training for howitzer batteries and battalion headquarters.
   e. Processing of personnel and equipment in preparation for overseas movement.
   f. Preparation of aircraft load plans and passenger manifests.
   g. Clearance of post, camp and station property, barracks and other buildings at Ft Campbell, Ky.

8. Execution:
   a. The Division Artillery Commander directed a training program consisting of two (2) phases.
      (1) Phase 1: An intensified individual training program consisting of basic soldiering skills and specialized training at on-post and off-post schools.
(Pre-movement Report) to After Action Report, Pre-movement and Movement (Cont'd)

(2) Phase II: An intensified unit training program consisting of crew drill and service practices culminating in battery and battalion ORTs. Training in airmobile operations were also planned for this period.

b. Although battery ORTs were completed, battalion ORTs programmed for Fort Sill, Oklahoma were necessarily cancelled because of the expedited deployment of the division.

c. Helicopter support for airmobile training was obtained from off-post sources during Nov 67.

d. An M18 Gun Direction Computer (FADAC) Training Contact Team from the USAAMS at Fort Sill Oklahoma was made available to the Division Artillery and the team conducted a five day period of instruction during Nov 67.

9. Administrative: There were several problems of an administrative nature encountered during the move from which certain lessons were learned. They are covered briefly in this paragraph. A detailed discussion of other important problems, their solutions, and lessons learned is found in paragraph 11.

a. Personnel: The Division Artillery lost approximately 50% of its assigned personnel because they were nondeployable. The status of non-deployable personnel was determined using prior Vietnam service, age, and expiration time of service (ETS). Although a high percentage of "non-deployable" personnel volunteered to return to Vietnam with Division Artillery units, most units were rendered ineffective for a period of approximately one month while awaiting replacements. The irregular flow of replacement personnel, some arriving as late as the final week of deployment for certain units, permitted only a marginally effective training and POR/POM program to be conducted. The delayed transfer of nondeployable personnel hampered the activities of some units, particularly the unit rear attachment. In some cases the rear detachment commander was not able to determine the exact status of personnel left behind, particularly those in an assigned but not joined status.

b. Intelligence: A voluminous amount of classified documents, 80% of which did not apply to the projected unit mission, was continually received almost up to the deployment date. A cutoff date for issuance of non-mission essential documents should have been established. This would have provided the S2 with sufficient time to process and destroy unnecessary and superseded documents. Also, this action would have reduced the volume of classified documents carried into RVN.
c. Supply: The principal problem in supply was requisitioning of equipment necessitated by three changes of TO
class during the period of preparation for deployment. Arrival of some supplies after the set-sail
dates had been slipped also created an air shipment problem. Overall, the supply support for this movement was excellent.

d. Maintenance: There were no major maintenance problems. Maintenance support from all sources was excellent.

e. Transportation: Transportation became a problem when the "T" series TUC became effective. The airmobile TUC deleted vehicles and did not provide prime movers and other vehicles needed during subsequent training.

f. Other administrative matters and procedures: Most other administrative matters were of sufficient magnitude to hinder the moving operation; however, some are mentioned here in order to assist units deploying in the future.

(1) Late announcement of PC/FCO Boards: FCW/PCO Boards were ordered convened on 22 and 29 November 1967. The announcement was made after FCW leave policies had already been announced which would have found many on leave on those dates. This created some confusion. The PCW/PCO Boards convened for "blanket" coverage of the division instead of convening with a schedule geared to each increment's move. All post facilities, clubs, organizations, etc., should have required representation at this board in order to expedite clearances of personnel.

(2) Units clearing billets should accomplish all the major area police and sorting of equipment for post, camp, and station property inventories prior to departure from their home station. Units can not rely on rear parties to clean up departed unit's residue. Supply personnel, familiar with the property and with supply accounting procedures, must assume tight control of property left for the rear parties to turn in so proper accountability is maintained.

10. Commander's Analysis, Recommendation, and Lessons Learned: Several of the problems mentioned in this report can be attributed to the peculiarities inherent in a large unit (Division) move. However, most of the problems which appeared would be common to all and the lessons learned from them should benefit any sized units.

The deployment date for the Division was changed from February 1968 to December 1967. The advance elements departed in November 1967. This accelerated deployment date hampered the integration of new personnel into the unit and did not provide sufficient time for training as a team. Consequently, training had to be both accelerated and curtailed to meet
(Pre-Dep. Report) to After Action Rep, Prd-Mov. and Move. (Cont)

the new deployment date. Battalion CRTs scheduled for the month of November 1967 had to be cancelled and the units deployed before the battalion command and control elements could be field tested. However, by pushing the basic field artillery units, the firing batteries, through their field CRTs, the amount of curtailment of further training was to some extent anticipated and minimized. Listed below, in numerical sequence are specific points in "lessons learned" format:

ITEM #1

1. Loss of non-deployable personnel.

2. Discussion: The loss of approximately 50% of the Division criteria caused an otherwise combat effective, although understrength, command to be disassembled, reorganized and retrained at great expense and consumption of time so that all men could be required to serve a year in RVN. Since arrival in RVN the command must now undergo "infusion" where it will be disrupted again, although a little more slowly, so that only one twelfth of the men will leave in any one month.

3. Observation: A deployment criteria which would have allowed men closer to ETS to accompany the Division would have kept the unit intact, facilitated training and would have made less infusion necessary in RVN. The Division's mission, up until this deployment, was to be prepared for rapid movement into combat operations anywhere in the world.

ITEM #2

1. No cutoff date for classified document receipt.

2. Discussion: A voluminous amount of classified documents, 80% of which did not apply to the projected unit mission, was continually received at Fort Campbell almost up to the unit deployment date. This interfered with final personnel security clearances and the disposal of several reams of classified documents accumulated through years of contingency planning for STRICOM operations.

3. Observation: A cut off date possibly 1½ to 2 months prior to the deployment date should be established for classified documents on routine distribution. This would facilitate accounting and disposition of existing stocks of classified documents.

ITEM #3

1. Late TOEC changes.
2. Discussion: The TOE was changed three times during the redeployment period. The resulting uncertainty as to the ultimate TOE created considerable logistical problems.

3. Observation: Contemplated TOE changes should be firmed immediately after deployment dates are fixed. This will permit the commander flexibility in gearing his training to his new mission as stated in the TOE.

ITEM 2A

1. Duties of rear detachment.

2. Some units relied on their rear detachment to not only clean up after their main body but also to sort post, camp, and station property for inventory. Where this was done the task was overwhelming and denied the rear detachment CO sufficient time to properly execute his other duties.

3. Observation: Rear detachments should be required to perform minimal cleaning-up activities after the main body departs. Units should progressively police their barracks and arrange post, camp, and station property for orderly turn-over to rear detachment personnel. This takes considerable careful organization and time.
(Movement) to After Action Report, Pre-Movement or


3. Control or Command Headquarters: Headquarters 101st Airborne Division Artillery

4. Subordinate Units:
   a. Headquarters Battery, 101st Airborne Division Artillery.
   b. 2nd Battalion (Airborne) 319th Artillery.
   c. 1st Battalion (Airborne) 321st Artillery.

5. Supporting Units: N/A

6. Mission: to relocate all Division Artillery units from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to the Republic of South Vietnam.

7. Concept of Operations:
   a. To facilitate the simultaneous arrival of artillery units with their supported units, the 2nd Battalion 319th Artillery and 1st Battalion 321st Artillery were attached to the 30th and 26th Brigades respectively for movement.
   b. Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery moved as an individual element within Division Troops.
   c. Upon arrival in SVN units were marshalled in a holding area overnight and then convoyed to their final destination.

   Administrative: During the final stages of the movement phase there were few difficulties encountered. A smooth-working post-movement organization was largely responsible for this.

8. N/A

9. Commanders Analysis, Recommendations, and Lessons Learned: The movement itself was conducted in a highly efficient manner by the US Air Force. Although there were isolated incidents of poor handling of equipment by ground crews, the majority of the equipment arrived in good order. The in-processing crew at Bien Hoa Army Base performed its duties in a highly efficient manner. Altogether, the movement was a highly successful undertaking.
2/17 CAV  Pre Movement, 1 August to 1 December 1967  

1. Pre-Movement: 1 August to 1 December 1967

2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky


4. Subordinate units: Hq & Hq Troop, B Troop C Troop

5. Supporting Units: None

6. Mission: Perform Airborne Cavalry Missions for the 101st Abn Division
   and concurrently progress for a future overseas movement.

7. Concept of Operations: Commenced to prepare subordinate units for combat
   by conducting tactical training and tests, and to prepare equipment for overseas
   movement and subsequent combat.

8. Execution: Upon notification the following steps were taken:
   a. Determine personnel needs by classifying personnel as deployable,
      non-deployable and returnee volunteers
   b. Request fill in personnel to fill vacant slots
   c. Determine equipment needs for the mission in SEA
   d. Request TO3 changes to meet the determined needs
   e. Formulate plans to train existing personnel and for incoming filler
      personnel
   f. Request TA 50-901 and other allied items to meet the commitment for
      SEA, and incoming personnel
   g. Begin a training program to form a combat ready unit

9. Administrative: All Staff Sections began immediate preparation for the
   movement to SEA

10. None
11a. Control of Personnel inflow was insufficient at Division level.

(1) Discussion: Personnel were requisitioned by Division. A roster was maintained at P.O.S of personnel applied to these requisitions. This roster included, by necessity, personnel on whom no definite assignment instructions or orders had been received. It was reconciled periodically with information that came directly to the Squadron. From this roster came the information upon which were based the J-1 readiness reports. However, these reports, although technically correct, were erroneous since the requisition roster was known to be incorrect. Personnel on the roster were often diverted without either the Squadron or the Division being informed. Other filler personnel were reported only as names for whom orders never came; other information was not available to AG as to the status of these personnel. Some filler personnel reported to the unit for whom we had no assignment instructions correlated to the requisition roster. Of the non-reporting personnel, some were for critical slots. By the time definite information came down it was too late to attempt to requisition a new filler. The original AG plan was for each man to be assigned to a unit by paragraph and line number based upon the requisition. This was for personnel control purposes only, since each unit would of course use fillers to suit unit needs, leadership ability, experience levels, etc., especially where the requisition was filled by a lesser grade of a different MOS than required. Thus there would be a control roster which would be the same at AG and at the unit level. This plan failed for a number of reasons, most of which were beyond Squadron's or Division's control. Given the failure of the requisition roster to act as a guide for fill and the lack of a control roster to insure agreement between requisitions and unit strengths, the control of personnel inflow was difficult.

(2) Suggestions: It is suggested that Division requisition filler personnel for the division as a whole, assigning them to a unit only upon their arrival at the Division, based upon the current priorities of the division. No unit would be required to keep track of incoming personnel, upon whom no orders had been issued. Diversions could then be kept to a minimum at unit level, taking place prior to assignment. At the unit level reports would pertain to only those personnel who are reportable by MR, with the possible exception of those whose MOSA has not yet arrived. There would still remain the problem of amended orders not reaching the original gaining unit. It is further suggested that a PI Roster of deployables be the controlling document. During periods of great personnel turbulence, this roster would be issued for reconciliation twice monthly, with up-dating by the units in between issue dates. Rosters would be kept current, with everyone aware of which document is controlling the fill. Rosters could be supplied to Records Branch and to Finance for control of their records. This unit continually sent its own rosters to these sections in an effort to keep records properly assigned. The PI Roster would include in the remarks section a requisition control number, or OPO's or one assigned by Division, so that the PI R could be cross-referenced with the requisition list.
This roster could replace the 861 report if suitable definitions were agreed upon. It would also allow AG to continually requisition as personnel due in or already on station become non-deployable. In this manner there would be one controlling document from which reports could be made, a report easily reconciled by the unit with AG.

b. Irregular and late personnel inflow disrupted administrative and training programs.

(1) Discussion: This problem, although overcome by the Squadron in a satisfactory manner, did cause much extra training and instruction, repetitious checking for POR/FOM, and reduced the effort towards progressive preparation for overseas movement.

(2) Suggestion: Incoming personnel arriving after POSD should not be sent to the gaining unit until they are POR qualified, or at least have completed the majority of their POR qualification. If necessary the individuals could be billeted in the receiving unit yet required to continue to process-in through a divisional unit set up in the manner as the present Replacement Company. In other words, the program at Fort Campbell followed too much the normal in-processing pattern; notwithstanding the rushed nature of the FOM. For peak periods fillers should be treated as replacements are treated here in country, sent to the unit ready for duty.

(3) Comment: The in-processing of personnel prior to POSD, especially the bulk groups from Fort Bragg, was sufficiently efficient to suit squadron needs. So was the out-processing at the same time. These moves, however, were in process when the training program had not gone into high gear; the methods used were not completely satisfactory for the inflow after POSD.

c. Supporting administrative sections must make every effort to reduce the administrative load placed upon a unit preparing for overseas movement.

(1) Discussion: Programs such as those of Finance and SJA which were designed to give fairly complete one-time coverage in certain problem areas were effective. For a unit undergoing intensified training, the constant requirement to send individuals up to Division for administrative purposes reduces the effectiveness of unit and individual training.

(2) Suggestion: Given the large number of new personnel and the irregular flow of personnel into the unit throughout the entire training period, such programs should be enlarged to include other areas and be begun earlier enough to allow a battalion level make-up.

d. There is a need for a single circular describing the requirements for which the DA Form 613 is a Check List.
Pre Movement, 1 August to 1 December 1967

(1) Discussion: the POR check was efficiently run. However, the instructions for the POR qualifications were numerous, sometimes contradictory and open to several interpretations. The Squadron had little difficulty with this except where there were several interpretations. However, AR 612-35 alone is insufficient and the addition of CAM Cir 220-101 was not enough. Other instructions were obtained from: CAM Reg 1-34; CAM Reg 210-6, Div Cir 745-9, several Third Army Circulars, Third Army Reg 40-25, AR 614-30, and AR 606-5, among others. In no place was there a complete set of references by which a Troop Commander could find what was meant when he checked an item in column A, DA Form 615. The check list is worthless unless there is uniformity of meaning.

(2) Suggestion: Prior to overseas movement a circular be issued pertaining to the POR qualifications, describing the requirements in detail or, at least, giving references by paragraph and explaining the DA Form 615 so that the Troop Commander knows which items are his responsibility and what is meant by a check in column A for each item.

e. Instructions were received late from Division.

(1) Discussion: In general instructions for the move were received late by the Squadron. A number of circulars seem to have been dated prior to their issue. Others were issued and lost in distribution. Several times this unit discovered a circular only after compliance date. The G-1 list of deployment activities and information was a good idea. There should have been followup as other instructive sheets were issued.

(2) Suggestion: Units should be given preliminary instructions to include a general concept of a program or plan even though it is recognized that there will be changes. This allows subordinate units to orient their planning in the proper direction while waiting for more precise instructions. Furthermore, units should be informed of proposed circulars and warned to expect them by a certain date.

f. CAM Cir 210-46, Retention of Family Quarters, came out too late to allow some families time to react.

(1) Discussion: Recognized are some of the difficulties in creating this circular, but all instructions regarding or applying to the disposition of families should be issued as soon as possible. Furthermore, incoming personnel should be informed of the status of deployment of their assigned unit. Some personnel expected early departure, others a departure late in February. Had they been better informed most would have made different plans.

g. Div Cir 635-1, Predeployment Leave Policy, was delayed too long. The cutoff was a bothersome arbitrary cut off for leave termination.

(1) Discussion: The lateness problem is discussed in paragraph 2e above. As a leave cutoff caused some problems for units which were scheduled to deploy some week or two after that date. Though exceptions were granted, the problem need not have occurred.
Pre Movement, 1 August to 1 December 1967 After Action Report

(Cont'd)

(2) Suggestion: The leave cut off date should be adjusted to the departure date of the unit, giving the unit sufficient time to prepare at the last minute, but also sufficient time to allow everyone a proper leave.

1. The administrative notes were an excellent idea, but should have started sooner and used more.

2. Insufficient supply of forms were often obtained.

(1) Discussion: A ninety day supply of blank forms were required. These were slow in coming or were never supplied. Some sections of the Squadron were unaware of the needs for such forms for ninety day period.

(2) Suggestion: That DA develop a basic load for such forms to be divided to a deploying unit. An itemized list would allow the unit to order additional forms which were not on the DA load.

j. Non-deployables should be moved out more rapidly. A delay was desired not one which for some people extended until PRD.
2/17 Cavalry Movement Phase, 1 Dec to 10 Dec 67, After Action Report

1. Movement: 1 Dec to 10 Dec 67
2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky
4. Subordinate Units: H Troop, B Troop
5. Supporting Units: C Troop (Air) 2/17 Cavalry
6. Mission: Move 2d Squadron 17th Cavalry (-) from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to SEA
7. Concept of Operation: 2/17 Cavalry prepares to move and moves to SEA by C-141 Starlifter Aircraft
8. Execution: On notification of times for movement of Division (-) the following actions were taken:
   a. Appoint a Squadron Movement Control Officer and assign him assistance from C Troop.
   b. Utilize C Troop Equipment and personnel for administrative aid while the movement phase
   c. Set up priorities for packing of vehicles
   d. Establish priorities for movement of personnel and equipment within Division (-)
   e. Pack, weigh, measure and mark vehicles
   f. Change over from Winter TA 50-901 to Jungle Equipment and Uniforms
   g. Move out, load on aircraft and depart
9. None
10. Special Equipment: Unit utilized Conex Containers, Conex Inserts and Pallets
11a. In general, administrative procedures and instructions for this phase were adequate, especially given the problems the move by necessity caused the Division Administrative section.
   b. Lack of publications
The line units were not provided USAF Regulations and other required information prior to arrival in country. It is recognized that Division desired to publish their own, but the USAF Regulations alone would have provided the Squadron advance planning time and advance knowledge of certain areas peculiar to VN.

(2) Recommend that these publications be procured in advance of the move.

c. Changes in Weights
(1) Weight changes caused changes in chalks
(2) Require Commanders to live with published weights and cubes

d. Add on Cargo
(1) Add on Cargo concept was not emphasized
(2) Emphasize the Add on Cargo concept to enable more flexibility in planning loads.

e. 4631 pallets
(1) Unfamiliarity with the pallet, its capabilities, limitations and changes in emphasis led to confusion as to its value
(2) Publish a document indicating the different methods of shipping cargo that are available and which explains the advantages and disadvantages of each.

f. Reaction Time
(1) Often, changes in times and loads did not give the Commander enough reaction time to insure that all loose ends were tied down

(2) Utilize as much effort as possible to coordinate with the moving company to allow for a maximum reaction time.

g. In-Transit Changes
(1) Chalks were changed enroute causing chalk commanders to lose control of their personnel. The USAF personnel were not concerned with plight of the Chalk commander or his personnel.

(2) Require USAF to propose alternate plans to preclude the breaking of chalks.

h. Marking, packing, weighing and measuring of vehicles
(1) Frequent changes in vehicle markings and measuring techniques caused difficulties.
Movement Phase, 1 Jan to 10 Jan 67

(2) Recommend that a firm list for this be determined in advance, published, and held to. This can be accomplished by utilizing available AM's and direct coordination with the USAF and moving agencies.

i. TOE Changes

(1) The near constant change of TOE authorizations caused a problem in the transfer and receipt of equipment from within and outside of the Division.
(2) Suggest that recommended TOE changes be required to be in by a firm date, press for early approval and effect changes as soon as practical.

j. Shortage of Repair and Stockage Parts

(1) Shortages of certain needed repair parts and parts to fill FII's caused a slowdown in preparation of equipment for PGM inspections.
(2) Recommend Direct Support Supply Unit (DSSU) request an excess stockage of most used parts in order to insure adequate supplies to fill unit requisitions.

k. Delay in Arrival of Filler Personnel

(1) The delay in arrival of filler personnel created a problem in filling school quotas that were given to the Squadron. Further, when the school program was continued to allow filler personnel to attend, it cut into the Train movement schedule.
(2) Recommend that a School program be at the request of the Commander upon his needs and the availability of personnel rather than require him to fill quotas.

l. POR Qualification

(1) There were more than one interpretation of the meaning of POR qualification. This made it difficult to properly qualify personnel with other pressing problems such as PGM Inspections and leaves.
(2) Recommend that a firm POR qualification list be drawn up and held firm.

m. Ranges

(1) Early deployment cut short much needed range time.
(2) Suggest that priorities be set up based upon the needs of the Commander and the allowable time frame.

n. Prior Training

(1) Advantage was not taken of the prior POR Qualification Training received by filler personnel in their last unit, thus requiring duplication of already given training.
Movement Phase, 1 Dec to 10 Dec 67, After Action Report (Con.)

(?) Suggest that during in-processing that FOR qualification be noted for the gaining unit, and that the losing unit be made to furnish information as to the FOR Qualification status of that person.

o. Trailers

(1) All trailers had planned loads when we were required to drop a number of these from movement plans. These loads had to be shifted into less satisfactory configurations.

(2) Had this been known at an earlier date, much of the equipment could have been shipped by SEATAIL.

p. FOR qualification vs FMH inspections

(1) In the short time span it was hard to prepare for both these requirements and still grant leaves.

(2) Establish priorities and minimums for these requirements that the units can live with in the time span allowed prior to movement.

q. Add-On Cargo

(1) The theory of add-on cargo was not emphasized.

(2) In the pre-movement phase, early consideration of this concept would have facilitated less use SEATAIL and better configuration planning of aircraft loads.

r. Tariff per 1000 for clothing

(1) The basic for requisitioning clothing for the troops was invalid. This unit had a large amount of unused sizes.

(2) Recommend that the units be given time to requisition by size since this was what, in many cases, had to be done anyhow.
THRUST

(Pre-Movement Phase) AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR OPERATION EAGLE

1. DATES OF OPERATION - 22 August to 1 December 1967

2. LOCATION - 101st Aviation Battalion, Campbell Army Airfield, Fort Campbell, Kentucky

3. HEADQUARTERS - 101st Aviation Battalion, 101st Airborne Division

4. SUBORDINATE UNITS - Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 101st Aviation Battalion; Company A (Airmobile) 101st Aviation Battalion; Company B (General Support) 101st Aviation Battalion

5. 112d TAM Co, 68th Maintenance Battalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; 101st Aviation Company (Airmobile); 10th Aviation Group, Fort Benning, Georgia.

6. MISSION - To organize, train and prepare for deployment to USARPAC, simultaneous with providing aviation support to the 101st Airborne Division, elements which were preparing for deployment to USARPAC.

7. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - The concept for the pre-movement phase was visualized in six phases, all of which were overlapping. Phases were as follows:

   a. Organize and train existing deployable personnel and begin outprocessing of non-deployable personnel

   b. Complete outprocessing of non-deployable personnel and use previously trained deployable to receive and start training of newly assigned replacements.

   c. Complete the unit and individual training of the battalion, while simultaneously providing aviation support to the division. The integration of unit training with the support of the division would be as much as possible. The use of an attached airmobile company was planned to assist in both unit training and division training.

   d. Initiate administrative FOR processing and begin POM leaves on the basis of 50% of personnel present at all times. Begin unit load planning and preparation of leads.

   e. Complete POM leaves, administrative processing and conduct loadmakeup for all individual and unit training.

   f. Prepare unit equipment loads and finalize personnel and cargo loads.

8. EXECUTION - On 22 August 1967 the 101st Aviation Battalion received warning order from division headquarters of the pending assignment of the
AL

- (Pre-Movement Phase) AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR OPERATIONS
THRU Z JCT

101st Airborne Division to United States Army Pacific. Simultaneous with notification was the criteria for the determination of non deployable personnel. The status of the Aviation Battalion at that time was of great significance since it was operating with 30% fill of Officers and Warrant Officers, and only nineteen (19) aircraft in the battalion though authorized only 70% of a total of 37. (less those organic to the previously deployed 1st Brigade.) From this critical shortage of personnel, must be deducted the non deployable personnel, which rendered the battalion further short of officer and warrant officer aviators and required most of the key positions to be filled with deployable personnel. The key positions to be filled included the Battalion Commander, the entire staff, all three company commanders and the Sergeant Major. Only the Battalion Executive Officer and two of the three company first sergeants were deployable. For obvious reasons the initial deployment schedule, programmed the Aviation Battalion for deployment several months after the division. An immediate request was submitted by the Division Commander to Department of the Army to be allowed to deploy with the Aviation Battalion. This request resulted in a study at Department of the Army to determine if personnel and aircraft could be provided to expedite deployment of the Aviation Battalion. Initial inquiries through the chain of command indicated the fill of personnel and aircraft could be accomplished in time for concurrent deployment of the Aviation Battalion with the Division. Pending approval of the Division Commander's request, the Aviation Battalion prepared plans for deployment based upon a 50% fill of aviators by 1 November 1967 and a 100% UH1 aircraft fill by 15 November 1967. During the last week of August a liaison visit to the Aviation Battalion from representatives of Chief of Personnel Operations, CPD, Department of the Army provided a list of aviators to be assigned and reporting dates, with the first personnel reporting on 5 September. However, the bulk of the aviators were reporting directly to Fort Campbell from flight training at Fort Rucker, Alabama. During the period 18 September through 15 October alone, a total of 68 newly assigned aviators reported to the Aviation Battalion. This fact within itself represented a major problem which will be discussed in the training aspects of this report. On 4 September as training in Phase I was progressing and a unit training program for Phase II was being finalized, the non deployable enlisted personnel who were not to be reassigned at Fort Campbell were outprocessed for reassignment to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and transferred the next day. This group totaled seventy (70) personnel and took away from the battalion most of its maintenance capability. This seriously impaired the units capability to support unit training and/or division training. This battalion was the first unit of the division to lose the non deployable personnel in the exchange program established by division, with the 82nd Airborne Division, and the last unit to receive its replacement in return. Several replacements being assigned as late as three days prior to departure of the battalion. This created a serious problem and severely impaired the training program as well as the problem of
FOR qualification and personnel manifesting. On 15 September the newly assigned battalion commander, LTC John E. McGregor, assumed command of the Battalion, however the 53, 54 and two company commanders were not yet on station. On September 28, the 101st Aviation Battalion was directed to provide six UH1 aircraft with crews and organic maintenance to JTF RIO Date, a "STRIKCI" operation to send flood and relief assistance to Acapulco, Mexico, for a period of an estimated 12 days, and which was actually nine days, terminating on 6 October 1967. This operation is the subject of a separate After Action Report and is emphasized here only to point out that it added to an already existent critical shortage of personnel and equipment, in light of the tremendous task of training, preparation, and division support yet to be conducted. On 9 October the Aviation Battalion entered into Phase II of the division training program, the intensified unit training and final FOR qualification which was to be completed on 9 November. At this time the battalion was at 96% fill of aviators. This fact needed to say, impaired the effectiveness of the training, considering the loss of twenty-six mechanics; the operations in Mexico; and the experience level of personnel to be trained. Unit training began with local qualification and standardization of all newly assigned aviators, FOR qualification of all assigned personnel. Company level training was integrated into the support of the two brigades of the division, one training at Fort Campbell and the other training at Fort Stewart, Georgia. The battalion staff personnel were assigned and began functioning effectively in the minimum amount of time. Company commanders were still not on station. A battalion command post exercise was planned and conducted on the reservation over the weekend of 15 October. It served as an initial "shakedown" of the headquarters and demonstrated a number of areas for improvement, as well as the need for more exercises of that type. The second CFX was conducted on 22 October and was very effective. Due to the lack of maintenance personnel the shortage of UH1 aircraft and the level of aviator experience, a request was made by the aviation battalion through O3 to Third United States Army for the attachment of an airmobile company to serve two functions: (1) to provide a training base of experienced aviators with which to train the inexperienced aviators of the battalion, by pairing an inexperienced pilot with an experienced one and (2) to be able to render effective and realistic air mobile training support for the Division on the forthcoming OIRs for each of the brigades. This request was approved, and the 181st Air Mobile Company, Fort Benning, Georgia, consisting of fifteen UH1 aircraft with crews and related maintenance personnel, reported to Fort Campbell on 30 October for an eleven day period, terminating on 10 November. This company was experienced and most cooperative, and provided a most valuable training asset to both the aviation battalion and the combat brigades through numerous and extensive air mobile operations. Between the period 20 October and 11 "evenber the remaining nine UH1 aircraft were assigned to the battalion, coming from both Third Army assets and factory production. The observation helicopters however, were provided on a 50% fill, and were to be used for training only. Organic observation helicopters, OH23s would be provided from in country assets upon arrival of the division. It was
also during this time period that Army Materiel Command, AVCOM, initiated a project to modify the electrical systems of all UH-1 aircraft to accommodate installation of the KY 28, secure net system, for aircraft radios. This project, known as Project ZIR, involved a civilian contract of approximately thirty electricians to perform this work, as aircraft were deadlined for maintenance. This concept proved to be invalid and aircraft which would otherwise be flyable, and badly needed for training, were undergoing ZIR modification. This work, though needed, did further retard aircraft availability thus adversely affected the training. On November 10, the division training program ended. During the last two weeks of October plans were finalized and information disseminated to prepare and dispatch a sea echelon to depart Fort Campbell on 2 November. The guidance provided, relative to what equipment should constitute the sea echelon, was found lacking consequently commanders found themselves faced with the problem of shipping as much as possible by sea yet remain operational both at Fort Campbell and to be operational in country under unknown circumstances. Despite the questions "to ship by sea or not" determinations were made and fifty-seven CONEX containers were packed, marked and shipped timely and efficiently accompanied by unit personnel. All aviators of the battalion were assigned by then, as was most of the enlisted personnel. The aircraft were on this date grounded for maintenance and preparation for shipment. All personnel available were given final POR qualification and fifty percent departed on POM leaves of 10 to 12 days. During this period, movement planning was initiated on a firm basis as all other had been preliminary in nature. Liaison began with the newly established Movements Control Group, and dates and procedures established for the now finalized decision to conduct an air move. Aircraft maintenance and preparation for loading of all UH-1 aircraft on C133s was assigned to the 112th Transportation Aircraft Maintenance Company, 68th Maintenance Battalion, a post unit at Fort Campbell. Assistance was provided by Aviation Battalion personnel where possible. Liaison with and assistance was also provided by AVCOM of Army Materiel Command. Details of this project and accomplishment will be discussed later in this report. The Movements Control Group functioned extremely well and methods were established for preparation and manifesting of loads. During the period 15 November to 1 December all companies established priority of loads to be moved, loaded vehicles and pallets and completed final POR checks and POM leaves. It must again be pointed out that final assignments of all enlisted personnel had not been made. Thus complicating personnel manifest planning. During the period 27 October to 2 November the battalion commander made a liaison visit to our destination. Valuable information was gained, primarily for the establishment of the battalion upon arrival in country, however information of great importance in planning load priorities and procedures were gained and utilized effectively as a result of this visit. On 17 November the advanced party of one officer
(Pre-Movement Phase) AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR OPERATION HACL: THRUST

and one enlisted man departed. This provided timely follow up action on plans made by the battalion commanders visit and information thus forwarded to our battalion in COMUS. On 1 December all personnel of the battalion had reported from R&R leave and all equipment either packed or organized for last minute packing. All unit aircraft were not ready for loading 1 December because several aircraft were deadline for parts, however this was of no consequence since parts did become available in time so as not to interfere with the loading schedule already established for the movement of aircraft. At this date six enlisted vacancies remained to be filled, and the task of training and meeting the Personnel Readiness Date of 1 December was accomplished on time only with very minor exceptions.
9. ADMINISTRATIVE

a. Personnel: In the field of personnel functions, three areas are of significance, and warrant discussion.

(1) Officer/Warrant Officer - The receipt of 50% of assigned officers less than sixty days prior to deployment and the simultaneous loss of most experienced personnel, most of which held key positions, was a problem of great magnitude. Consequently, this fact affected all other areas to be discussed, and was the greatest single handicap throughout the entire training period. Personnel turbulence was minimized under this difficult situation by close and constant liaison between the Aviation Battalion Adjutant and Office of Personnel Operations, OPD, Department of the Army.

(2) Enlisted personnel - The initial screening to determine non deployable personnel and the following action to transfer them was rapid and effective, however the replacement of those personnel was slow, piece-meal and often resulted in misassigned personnel. The fact that the greatest personnel loss occurred in highly skilled fields (mechanics primarily) adversely affected the areas of supply, maintenance and training.

(3) Use of non deployable personnel - Most of the persons determined to be non deployable were rapidly transferred out of the battalion. There were however, a few key positions in which some continuity was maintained due only to the fact that the non deployable persons were being transferred to other units at Fort Campbell. This situation was of great value to the entire operation.

b. Training - Training plans were made and could have been effectively utilized, had the personnel and equipment been available. The influx of aviators required a great deal of time just to get them qualified to conduct training for combat operations. This fact, coupled with the late arrival of inexperienced personnel, both officer and enlisted, made the unit incapable of conducting effective unit training, to the extent required, within the allocated time. The use of an attached armoured company, as previously mentioned, was the answer to an otherwise insurmountable problem. The short period (10 days) which were used to work with them, provided the only truly effective training received, so that it allowed support of the division training from the stand point of sufficient aircraft, and served as a base of experience with which to train organic personnel. The value of this asset cannot be overemphasized. Individual POR qualification was conducted without great difficulties, considering the time and facilities. It must however be re-
emphasized that to train a unit with the experience level as low as this one was, and to provide simultaneous training for the division in an area such as airmobile training, is impossible to accomplish, under the existing conditions, with any measure of effectiveness. Coordination with the 10th Aviation Group at Fort Benning, Georgia allowed the training of armed helicopter pilots and crews to be conducted at Fort Benning by Group personnel with their aircraft and equipment. This too was a valuable service provided in a critical area and allowed concentration on the many other problems at hand.

d. Logistics—This area, contrary to our anticipations, presented the fewest problem areas. This was primarily due to the experience level of personnel within this battalion. The change of TOEs was accomplished rapidly and effectively. This was not to say however without days, nights and weekends of hard work by all persons in the supply field. The establishment of the movement control group facilitated the effectiveness in coordinating required in the preparation of movement plans. The coordination and information provided, with respect to installation clearance and the composition and functions of the Rear Detachment, was the weakest area. Plans had to be made for the rear detachment before concrete information became available, with respect to consolidation of property, building transfer standards, and disposition of buildings and grounds. Consequently the rear detachment worked around the clock to clear the installation, when much of the work could have been done and property transferred to units which were willing to accept it, far in advance of main body departure.

e. The field of maintenance, for purposes of this report, involved the preparation of aircraft for shipment overseas. Initially there was a lack of information as to the criteria to be used; however, when determined, action was taken by the entire chain of command to provide assistance, resulting in rapid and efficient accomplishment of this task. On 10 November all aircraft were restricted to flying transportation for General Officers. Processing began immediately and involved the following: (1) performing of the next periodic inspection, (2) the next hot inspection if within 150 flying hours of scheduled inspection, (3) nine engine changes and disassembly for movement by C133 aircraft. This processing was accomplished without major incident by the 142d TAM Co, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The cooperation and assistance of AVCO was timely and efficient. There were numerous liaison visits, some of which were necessary and productive. However, there were visits which required time and facilities to accommodate visitors and produced no beneficial results. A telephone call could have determined if a liaison visit was necessary. Most of the unproductive and unnecessary visits were made by Department of the Army civilians.
10. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

a. Preparation of UH-1 aircraft for air movement. Aircraft were disassembled and prepared as follows:

1. Removal of main rotor blades
2. Removal of the main rotor head
3. Removal of the main rotor mast
4. One tail rotor blade removed
5. Synchronized elevators removed

The components removed were stowed in the cargo compartment of the helicopter and the main rotor blades were lashed down under each aircraft on salvage mattresses. The assembly line technique was used to disassemble the aircraft.

11. COMMANDER ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATION AND LESSONS LEARNED

Item - Officer/NCO Assignment

Discussion - It is previously indicated throughout this report this battalion underwent a 90% changeover of key personnel. This left little continuity in all command and staff areas, and resulted in the complete loss of many important personnel ranging from aircraft mechanics to the battalion operations officer. This is a most undesirable condition especially with an extremely limited amount of time in which to prepare for actual combat operations.

Recommendation - To allow continuity of operations and permit continuation of essential functions, it is my recommendation that all deployable personnel essential to operations, be transferred from the deploying unit to a holding detachment for administration, but retained by the unit for duty until suitable replacements are received and trained to the satisfaction of the unit commander.

Item - Aviator Training/Division Training

Discussion - When unit training is needed as badly as it was in this battalion of 90% newly rated aviators, it is absolutely impossible to conduct effective aviator training and simultaneously meet the division requirements for aviation support. The situation was greatly aggravated by having one brigade and Division Artillery located at distant locations, while the Aviation Battalion provided aviation support to them.
Recommendation - It is highly recommended that the attachment of an air mobile company to the aviation battalion be incorporated into any future operations in which the organic aviation battalion undergoes such a drastic change in personnel and inherits a training necessity such as was the case with this aviation battalion. To provide aviation support for the division training is an ideally suited mission for an organized, and even partially trained air mobile company, thus allowing the divisional battalion to organize and train at unit level, then to assume support of the division as their capability develops.

Item - Advanced party composition

Discussion - Advanced Party: The composition of the advanced party was dictated by the allocation of two slots by division. Considering the personnel and equipment of this battalion, and the facilities required for its establishment and operation, two people were not sufficient to make complete coordination of all necessary details prior to arrival of the main body.

Recommendation - That the mission and facilities required, incident to a unit's mission, be given consideration in allocating the number of people dispatched on the advanced party.
MOVEMENT PHASE

1. Dates of Operation: 010010Dec67 to 171800Dec67


4. Subordinate Units: HHC, 101st Aviation Battalion, Company A (Air Mobile) 101st Aviation Battalion, Company B (General Support), 101st Aviation Battalion

5. Supporting Units: Military Aircraft Command, 142nd TAM Company, 68th Maintenance Battalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky.


7. Concept: The movement phase was planned in three phases beginning 1 December 1967.
   a. Phase I - Loading and movement of aircraft.
   b. Phase II - Loading and movement of the battalion personnel and equipment, less aircraft and those personnel who deployed with the aircraft. The rear detachment was the last of this phase.
   c. Phase III - Installation clearance and the movement of the rear detachment.

8. Execution: 1 December 1967 marked the beginning of the movement phase for the 101st Aviation Battalion. The first of thirteen C133 loads of helicopters and personnel began departing Fort Campbell on that date. Each C133 was loaded with three UH-1H or UH-1C helicopter, associated tools and equipment, and three passengers. The C133 aircraft were, in each case, loaded rapidly and efficiently by 101st Aviation Battalion personnel, with the exception of the last five aircraft loads in which loading personnel were provided by the 142 TAM Company, under the supervision of Aviation Battalion personnel. Aircraft loads were loaded according to the schedule shown in appendix 1, however, loading at a faster than scheduled, resulting in the advancement of the schedule...
8. (con't) turned in to movement control group on 1 December 1967. A sample of this sheet is shown in appendix 4. From this data, movements control group compiled aircraft loads and submitted them back to the unit for additional names of the personnel to fill passenger spaces. Aircraft loads were returned to this battalion on 3 December 1967 (see appendix 5, 'aircraft loads'). All unit commanders and first sergeants were gathered and each chalk was compiled and finalized with personnel names and a confirmation of vehicles. Each man in the battalion, and all vehicles, were then accounted for and reconciled with unit rosters. By 4 December 1967 all unit loads were finalized, chalk commanders designated, and instructions were issued (see appendix 6, 'Chalk Commanders Check List and Aviation Battalion Instructions for Plane Commanders'). Chalk commanders were given a loading schedule based upon 8 hour (see appendix 7). The departure times were confirmed with the previously issued air movement table. Chalk commanders were then given a time that their chalk would depart, and instructed all chalks to be available on a two hour notice should chalk times be changed. During the period 3 thru 7 December 1967, in addition to outloading the C133 aircraft, the Aviation Battalion prepared the installation property and building for turn-in and completed loading all vehicles and trailers. Several vehicles had been loaded and weighted, then unloaded for unit use until departure. Vehicles were loaded up to 100% over the prescribed load for that vehicle in order to maximize cargo carrying capability, and provide maximum loads for aircraft. On 6 December 1967, a liaison visit by representatives of the installation property clearance team was conducted. It was at this time that several rules were presented with reference to installation clearance. This was the first time that this had been known, and involved movement of much of the unit property which had already been prepared for turn in, however all tasks were completed satisfactorily. On 7 December the first load of personnel and equipment of the Aviation Battalion departed. A total of 20 chalks departed, the last chalk departing on 090030 December. A total of 296 personnel and 54 vehicles or trailers and trailers were moved with the main load body by C141 aircraft. Thirty seven aircraft and thirty seven personnel were moved by C133 aircraft. This included all of the UH1 aircraft in the division. Rear detachment of five personnel remained behind for installation clearance. The only difficulty encountered during the manifesting and movement was the assignment of 14 personnel 4 days before departure which required manifest adjustment and expedited FOR qualification. A special committee was established which proceeded with individual FOR qualification. This was certainly a hardship on all persons concerned, but the task was accomplished. The same system was used when another 8 personnel were assigned 3 days before departure. The
MOVEMENT PHASE

Loading and departures went on schedule with only minor changes. The entire move was made without serious incident and on 10 November the last plane load of the main body closed into the Aviation Battalion concentration area, Bien Hoa AB, Republic of Vietnam. At this time the Aviation Battalion had remaining in CONUS the following personnel: 5 man rear detachment (battalion PBO, S-4 NCO and the master sergeant from each company) 2 officers which were TDY to CONUS schools, and two personnel which were hospitalized at Fort Campbell, with constant work and some manpower provided by the Fort Campbell Post, all property was transferred and installation clearance obtained on 14 December 1967. The rear detachment closed in country on 17 December 1967. The TDY and hospitalized personnel will be forwarded to Republic of Vietnam when released by the schools and hospital as appropriate.

a. The total deployment of the battalion was as follows:

Advanced planning group  = 2 personnel
Advance party  = 2 personnel, 1 vehicle
Sea echelon escort  = 1 personnel, 57 CONEX containers
Division (-)  = 296 personnel, 54 vehicles, 4 pallets
Unit aircraft echelon  = 33 personnel, 3 aircraft
Rear detachment  = 5 personnel
TOTAL  = 339 personnel
= 54 vehicles (including trailers)
= 51 CONEX containers (sea echelon)
= 6 pallets
= 3 aircraft

9. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

a. Personnel - The accountability of personnel and records was the major action occurring during the period covered in this report. Manifesting personnel became a matter of getting all companies together and ensuring each man was manifested. The difficulties occurring all involved late assignments of personnel to the battalion. This occurred on 3 December 1967 with the assignment of 14 personnel and again on 5 December 1967 with the assignment of still another 6 personnel. This resulted in the additional problem of individual POR qualification, to be discussed under training.

b. The training aspects occurred during the movement phase involved two areas, the training of personnel for loading pallets, which was accomplished by Air Force personnel, and the individual POR training given to personnel assigned to this battalion after the completion of individual and unit training phases. This was accomplished using the committee system, in one continuous period.

c. Supply - Supply actions during the movement phase were made difficult due to a lack of transportation and manpower. All TA-50-901 property, not needed in country, had to be turned in according to a schedule prescribed by Post 64. Installation property had to be prepared and displayed for ease in accountability, and unit supplies whic
were needed until departure, had to be packed on vehicles. Considering the work to be accomplished in such a short time, this turned into a difficult task. Complete inventories of all installation property prior to the movement phase proved to be of great value in accounting for property. All unit supply rooms and supply annexes were used to display much of the installation property, such as linens, foot and wall lockers, fans, desks, day room furniture and such property. It was very disruptive to leave the property before the main body departed, what property could not be displayed or stored in temporary buildings, since supply rooms and annexes, and most other buildings in our possession, were temporary buildings. This required moving of all this property at an already critical time, as far as personnel and transportation were concerned. However, the tasks were accomplished and installation property cleared. This accounted for the major supply activities during the movement phase. Assistance from non deploying units at Fort Campbell, arranged on an individual basis was invaluable, as well as the fact the R & U surveys were begun well in advance and that each company and staff section prepared its own area for turn in prior to departure.

10. Special equipment and Techniques and Procedures
   a. The committee system was used for presenting required classes for FOR qualification of late assigned personnel.
   b. Complete inventories and property reconciliation of all installation property were made well in advance of property turn in.
   c. R & U surveys were completed and necessary action initiated well in advance of building and property turn in.

11. Commanders Analysis, Recommendations and Lessons Learned

   Item - Personnel Assignment

   Discussion - The assignment of personnel who are not already FOR qualified, and other when manifesting has already begun, creates difficulties in manifesting and FOR qualification at a critical time. Furthermore, when this unit had deployable personnel who were assigned to other units, but available to assist, it is doubtful that FOR qualification or administrative processing could have been accomplished with these personnel.

   Recommendation - That upon a date predetermined, and based on the departure schedule, all incoming personnel be retained at division level, FOR qualified and deployed, to be assigned to their unit after arrival in country.
MOVEMENT PHASE

Item - Composition of the Rear Detachment

Discussion - Had the information pertaining to installation clearance procedures been known, the rear detachment would have included more personnel for manpower. Through the use of borrowed personnel and transportation, this unit was able to comply with the procedures for property clearance, and simultaneously prepare for, and deploy.

Recommendation - That established procedures relative to installation be provided in advance of the designation of the size and composition of the rear detachment. Further that a manpower and vehicle pool be established and allocated based upon the size of the unit. This could assist in clearance and take care of unusual difficulties.

Item - Installation Clearance

Discussion - The installation clearance information was found lacking when clearance actually took place, and clearance procedures proved invalid. Jointly occupied buildings could have been signed over to the remaining occupant, thus satisfying both occupants completely. This battalion had three examples, the headquarters building, the motor pool and an aircraft hangar. Gaining units in all three cases were willing to assume the buildings in a mutually acceptable condition, however transfer was delayed and buildings prepared to the specification of Post G4 and the incoming division, neither of which were gaining the buildings and grounds. Unknown policy in property clearance created last minute confusion. A good example was the policy that installation property could not have been stored in temporary buildings, yet this battalion had only four permanent buildings, and most equipment was prepared for inspection and transfer in temporary buildings, since that had been the place where the property was used, i.e. supply rooms and annexes. Without any unit transportation all property had to be relocated the day before departure.

Recommendation - That specific guidelines and procedures published well in advance of departure and that property be prepared acceptable to the gaining unit and coordination be authorized between those two, when the gaining unit is known.
Part I, to Letter HQ 326th Engineer Battalion (Abn Div), Subj: Pre-Movement and Movement After Action Report

1. Dates of Operations:
   b. POSD: 5 October 1967.

2. Locations: Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

3. Command Headquarters: 326th Engineer Battalion (-).

4. Subordinate Units: Hq, B, and C Companies.

5. Supporting Units: None.

Mission: To prepare the 326th Engineer Battalion (-) for deployment to and combat operations in support of 101st Airborne Division (-) in the Republic of Vietnam.

Concept of Operation: The preparations of the Battalion were conducted in three phases. Phase I was to consist of organizing the battalion with the personnel and equipment that would be required in the Theater of Operations. Phase II was to consist of individual and small unit training and out-processing of non-deployable personnel. Phase III was to consist of PON, POR qualifying of individuals and ORT's for all elements of the Battalion.

6. Execution:
   a. Phase I: 3 Aug - 8 Oct 67 non-deployable personnel were identified and processed out. Every effort was made to obtain volunteer statements to provide a core of experienced personnel from RVN returnees. Compassionate transfers were processed through division. The non-deployables were processed through division out-processing at Estep Gym, Fort Campbell. Key non-deployable personnel were transferred to Detachment 4 at Fort Campbell and attached to the Battalion to provide continuity during the transition of personnel. Training stressed individual combat skills, including participation in squad and platoon live fire attack course and AAQ. During this time valuable demolition experience was gained by the destruction of ten bridges in a reservoir site for the Nashville District Engineer employing heliborne reconnaissance and assault techniques. A new modified TOE was submitted to provide the personnel and equipment required for operations in SEA. Accelerated change-over to the "G" series TOE was also made at this time.
Part I, to Letter HQ 326th Engineer Battalion (Abn Div), Subj: Pre-Movement and Movement After Action Report (Cont'd)

b. Phase II: 9 Oct - 24 Oct 67. In-coming personnel were assigned OPO line numbers and identified by name, rank, MOS, and station they were departing from. New OPE rosters were made and incoming personnel were slotted into a duty position. Short-falls were identified and requisitions forwarded to division for additional personnel. During this period the new MTOE (T) was initiated which required MOS changes on existing requisitions. These personnel were requisitioned without an OPO line number. While in-coming personnel were arriving, the deployment dates were changed necessitating personnel taking POM leaves earlier than originally anticipated. A program was initiated, by which 50% of the personnel were on leave at one time, thus allowing training and processing to continue. The intensified training program was started, and originally scheduled for six weeks. During this time three days per week were devoted to field training and two days to garrison classes and maintenance. One day was scheduled for inspections and make up training. Squad and platoon ORT's were held during the field training. Other training stressed:

(1) Patrolling.
(2) Counter-ambush techniques.
(3) Minefield laying and clearing.
(4) Road clearing.
(5) LZ construction.
(6) Field fortifications.
(7) Demolitions.
(8) Road Construction.
(9) In-country orientations and lessons learned by units in RVN. Equipment and supply shortages continued to be identified and requisitioned and preliminary planning for outloading the sea-tail was completed.

Phase III: 25 Oct - 17 Nov 67. During this phase the processing of personnel and equipment continued, the sea-tail was outloaded and individual POR/POM qualification completed. Due to further acceleration of the deployment there was considerable overlap between the
administrative activities originally scheduled for phase II and III. All personnel were briefed by the commanders and staffs on the various aspects of the forthcoming movement. This included their responsibilities, entitlements, obligations and future plans. To provide personnel with financial means to take POM leave, arrangements were made for a partial pay. Division finance provided teams augmented by battalion personnel to process this partial pay. In a similar manner, wills and powers of attorney were also processed. Non-essential equipment, files and publications along with a 90 day supply of administrative supplies and spare parts were loaded in CONEX containers for sea shipment. All the battalions 5 ton trucks and the shop truck, were included in the sea shipment. Unit funds were closed out and inspected. Installation and TUSA POM inspections were conducted. POM immunizations and physical examinations were completed. Just prior to movement the division authorized the withdrawal of volunteer statements causing last minute changes in personnel. This combined with personnel being diverted, meant that the battalion deployed under strength after the final readiness reports had been submitted. Action was initiated to drop AWL and hospitalized personnel when the movement began. POM training stressed weapons training and qualification, quick-kill, quick reaction courses, repelling and ladder instruction from the 34 foot tower in addition to the standard POM instruction. Issue of new M-16 rifles and continued arrival of new personnel required these classes to be scheduled repetitively. Issue of individual tropical clothing and equipment and the turn-in of winter clothing was accomplished during this phase. Turn-in issue of equipment and spare parts in accordance with the new TOE continued throughout this period.

7. Administrative: Administrative actions have been included in the execution paragraph of this report.

Special Equipment, Techniques and Procedures: A special course of instruction was conducted by the battalion for the division in the basic fundamentals of mine warfare, demolitions and booby traps used by the Viet Cong. This course was cadred by RVN returnees that were non-deployable, and provided an orientation for a wide group of personnel from all echelons within the combat units of the division. The bridge demolition mission accomplished in phase I provided a unique opportunity for realistic demolitions and airmobile training.
11. Lessons Learned:

a. Item: Scheduling of POM leaves.

(1) Discussion. Due to the accelerated deployment schedule, and the requirement for POM leave with not more than 50% of the personnel on leave at one time, there was an extreme shortage of personnel during the critical period of POM inspections, final processing and outloading. This required repetitive scheduling of training and processing activities. Those personnel present were required to double their output on outloading and other details, thus creating a less efficient operation.

(2) Observation. Leave policy should allow 90% on leave at one time and should be terminated at least two weeks prior to deployment. Only essential security and administrative activities would be conducted during the leave period.

b. Item: Airmobile operations training.

(1) Discussion. The entire airmobile training, with the exception of the one demolitions mission in phase I and the repelling and ladder training from the 36 foot tower, was conducted in the classroom or in static mock-ups. Fortunately, the battalion had several exercises in the past year utilizing helicopters, otherwise there would have been a serious lack of knowledge within the unit about operations with actual aircraft.

(2) Observation. Although in short supply, each deploying battalion should have ready access to at least one helicopter during the advanced phase of training.

c. Item: Replacement personnel qualifications.

(1) Discussion. Replacements arrived inadequately trained and not MOS qualified. There was not sufficient time to allow intensified training or even in some instances to determine the degree of qualification, thus resulting in improper assignment and insufficient time to re-requisition personnel.

(2) Observation. Replacements should be assigned at the earliest practical time or at least carefully screened to insure MOS qualification.
Part I, to Letter HQ 325th Engineer Battalion (Abn Div), Subj:
Pre-Movement and Movement After Action Report (Cont'd)

d. Items Adjustment of EDRSA's of replacements were programmed based
upon the original deployment schedule, hence personnel were arriving
during and after POM processing and deployment.

(1) Observation. EDRSA's should be adjusted to insure assignment
of replacements to deploying units prior to POM processing. Those arriving
after that date should be handled as normal overseas replacements thus freeing the deploying unit from the responsibility
of these personnel during this critical phase of deployment.

e. Items Late a-proval of MTCE.

(1) Discussion. The MTCE was approved too late to request, receive
and process the new items of equipment prior to deployment. Although every effort was made including sending action officers
to DA to expedite this approval, it is doubtful that faster action would have been possible.

(2) Observation. MTCE's should receive special consideration to expedite approval.

f. Item: Excess reports.

(1) Discussion. Reports on equipment status were excessive and
repetitive. It is fully understandable that feeder information
is required by higher headquarters, however, the excessive
number of reports with short suspense dates caused undue hard-
ship on the unit and in turn led to the submission of inaccurate
reports. The reports required by DSO, GSO, TC, MG, and 3i con-
tained the same basic data but each on required slightly dif-
f erent formats. It appears that consolidation of these reports
would have alleviated much of the problem.

(2) Observation. Required reports must be carefully screened to
insure that they are consolidated, reasonable and allow time
for accurate submission.

g. Items Redistribution of excess equipment.

(1) Discussion. Efforts to obtain new equipment in accordance with
the MTCE, were blocked until the existing excess equipment within
the division had been redistributed. At the same time new equip-
ment was being issued to non-deploying units. There was insuf-
ficient time for repair parts, publications, GTS tools, and PLL
to be requisitioned, therefore, the redistribution should have
been desirable for the excess equipment to be issued to non-deploying units and new equipment issued to the deploying units.

(2) Observation. Every effort should be made to obtain the best possible equipment for deploying units.

h. Item: Early Stand-down of direct support maintenance unit.

(1) Discussion. The 801st Maintenance Battalion closed down its activities 15 days prior to deployment, thereby causing this unit to deal directly thru the 68th Maintenance Bn. 3rd echelon jobs and items which and over 20,000 miles were evacuated to the 68th Maintenance Bn. for repair and return to the unit. Normally these would have been floated from assets in post consolidated maintenance. There was a particular problem on direct exchange procedures because items were turned in for repair and not returned. The unit was given authority to requisition these items shortly before departure but with inadequate time for these requisitions to be filled.

(2) Observation. If an early stand-down is required, special efforts must be made to insure a continued maintenance back-up for deploying units.

i. Item: Dissemination of information.

(1) Discussion. Specific instructions pertaining to leaves, PX requirements, and details of proposed personnel actions were not provided in sufficient time to maintain an orderly flow of information to individuals for personal planning consistent with security and other requirements, decisions on pay, leave, government quarters, movement of dependents etc, should be expedited. The unit was not officially informed that personnel could take 10 or 12 days leave until three days before leave period commenced. Also in the cases of personnel desiring leave outside CONUS to take families home, no decision was made. The Battalion was informed that it was being staff studied by Division. Staff studies continued until the POM leave period was over. POM requirements changed up to the last minute. As one example, requirements for Tetanus immunization changed at the last minute, requiring personnel to get shots one hour before POM clearing. Requirements for insignia and uniforms...
for deployment were not decided until after 50% of personnel were on leave. Personnel were informed that allotments would not go into effect until December payday, other individuals were informed that they would go into effect on November payday, causing unnecessary confusion. Similarly information was not dissimulated on the commencement of the fire pay and other allowances causing some difficulty in financial planning. The decision on whether personnel arriving at Fort Campbell after August 1967, were eligible to collect dependent travel and displacement allowances was also delayed.

(2) Observation. Information of the status of personnel for deployment was often vague, misleading or untimely to allow the unit to efficiently solve the many personnel problems attendant on deployment. Timely and exact information must be expedited to the deploying unit by all agencies involved.

j. Items Early identification of replacement status.

(1) Discussion. Seven (7) personnel were redirected to the 1/506th while on orders to the 326th Engr Bn. Those personnel all had MOS's that were critical to the Engineer Battalion. None had MOS's that are authorized in an infantry unit. Five (5) non-deployable personnel were reassigned from the unit on multiple orders causing unnecessary work and confusion just prior to deployment. Five (5) were reassigned or dropped from the rolls as deserters and subsequently joined the unit in country. Twelve (12) personnel were to be reassigned from this unit prior to deployment and unit did not receive orders until after arrival in country. All of the incidents contributed to the personnel strength of the battalion being under TOE by 7%. Many areas were short MOS qualified personnel especially critical was the shortage of water point personnel.

(2) Observation. Timely and exact information must be expedited to the deploying unit by all agencies involved.
Part II, to letter HQ 326th Engineer Battalion (Abn Div), Subj: Pre-Movement and Movement After Action Report


2. Locations: Fort Campbell, Ky and Bien Hoa Air Base, RVN.

3. Command Headquarters: 326th Engineer Battalion (-).

4. Subordinate Units: Hq, B, and C Companies.

5. Supporting Units: None.

6. Mission: To move the Advanced Party Group by C-141 aircraft from Fort Campbell, Ky to Bien Hoa Air Base, RVN.

7. Concept of Operations: The Advanced Party Group departs in two increments by C-141 airlift departing in a continuous flow with sorties approximately one hour apart. First increment to consist of the Advanced Command and Control Group, and the second increment the remainder of the Advanced Party.

8. Execution: The overall movement was the responsibility of the Movement Coordination Group (MCCG), however, each phase was the specific responsibility of one unit. Preliminary planning for movement of the Advanced Party Group was the responsibility of the Advanced Command and Control Group until the departure of the ACCG. Then the responsibility shifted to CO 326th Engr Bn. MCCG was to provide all technical advice, load plans, marshalling area support and aircraft loading. Units were to coordinate with the load planners and to assemble personnel and equipment in the marshalling areas at the correct time. The ACCG departed on the first nine chalks. This resulted in the first few sorties leaving light and generated further changes in attempts to make up the lost weight. For instance many items of equipment were forced to depart at unscheduled times. In spite of this attempt to maximize the aircraft load the ACCG movement was completed with a 3 or 4 sortie deficit. Since the entire planning staff of the movement departed with the ACCG, the APG organized an entirely new staff for the remainder of the movement. Load plans were made up with the assistance of USAF loadmasters in coordination with APG representatives. It appeared that the key man in the chain of events was the chalk commander, therefore simplified chalk commander instructions were issued showing step by step procedures and the responsible individual for each step. Unit commanders and chalk commanders were thoroughly briefed on this document prior to deployment. An emergency operations center was set up to monitor the marshalling, plan the aircraft loads and provide a point of coordination between the MCCG and APG. Three marshalling areas were organized, two for equipment and one for
personnel. The personnel marshalling area was manned by MCCG and operated very smoothly. As soon as personnel reported to this area further processing was handled by MCCG. The equipment was assembled and inspected in one of two marshalling areas. On order this equipment reported to the DACG and was further processed and loaded by MCCG. Minute to minute status was kept on status board in the EOC. The load tables made up by USAF and APO personnel, listed the vehicles, equipment and passengers in each aircraft, and designated chalk commander responsibility. This plan was distributed to the units from which they prepared draft manifests of the personnel on each chalk in three copies. One copy was retained by the unit, one copy went to the chalk commander and one copy to MCCG for typing the official manifest. The chalk commander was thus able to assemble and brief his chalk while the manifest was being typed. Cargo manifests were prepared by MCCG from the load plan. All movement went according to schedule until there was a 10 hour weather delay. In order to regain the original schedule, one chalk departing each hour, it was necessary to have at least six chalks on stand by in order to insure there was no delay in the outloading, until the original schedule was back in effect. In each 24 hour period one chalk was on stand-by with the equipment loaded and personnel prepared to load. After 24 hours of stand-by this aircraft was required to depart and another take its place. Upon arrival at Bien Hoa the aircraft were met by teams arranged by the ACCG, and personnel and equipment directed to assembly areas.


10. Special Techniques: The usual departure from standard air movement techniques as explained in Execution with the exception noted in paragraph II, shows promise of a more efficient system than formerly used. It must be kept in mind that this move was basically administrative in nature thus allowing some flexibility unacceptable in a tactical move.

11. Lessons Learned:

a. Items Continuity of command.

(1) Discussion: In an operation as inherently complicated as this one, a clear chain of command and responsibility is essential. Initial planning emanated from the division staff; subsequently this was changed to the APO staff. Upon departure of the ACCG with the primary APO staff, the movement planning evolved to the 326th Engr Rn. Consequently in the middle of the operation there were at one time three letters of instruction in circulation,
Part II, to Letter HQ 326th Engineer Battalion (Abn Div), Subj: Pre-Movement And Movement After Action Report (Cont'd)

Each with conflicting information. The coordinators and load planners with ACCO also changed upon departure of ACCO. Since the personnel in charge of each phase of movement departed with that phase, there was no carry over of experience to assist subsequent phases.

(2) Observation: Continuity of command and staff should be maintained through out the movement, preferably through the use of non-deploying personnel.

b. Item: Load tables.

(1) Discussion: Load tables were made out with a primary view to maximizing the load on each aircraft. This resulted in an unwarranted mixing of personnel, equipment and units aboard each aircraft. The supposed saving in aircraft did not materialize because of the configuration of the loads would not permit full utilization of the allowable weight. There was enough flexibility in the personnel and equipment of each major unit to allow maximum utilization of the available aircraft cubage. If each unit had been required to make up its own load table, minor adjustments could have been made by the movement commander to insure maximum utilization of each aircraft. The total number of sorties would have remained the same, but unit integrity, simplified control and unit priorities would have been maintained.

(2) Observation: As a first step to movement planning all units should submit an initial load plan.

c. Item: Timely and accurate guidance.

(1) Discussion: During the out loading of both the air and sea elements decisions were urgently required. Since this battalion was the first major unit to deploy, many of the problem areas were resolved prior to movement of the following units. In clearing the unit station property guidance and time to react to instructions was completely unsatisfactory. Changes were continuous up to and including the clearance inspection. Selected items of station property were released for shipment only after the means for transporting the property had departed.

(2) Observation: Guidance on all matters must be specific and timely. Changes should be held to the absolute minimum. Staff
work must be thorough and accurate.

WILLIAM P. REILLY
LTC, CE
Commanding

1. Dates of Operations: 3 August 1967 to 28 December 1967

2. Locations: Ft Campbell, Kentucky

3. Control or Command Headquarters: Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division Support Command

4. Subordinate Units:
   a. 801st Maintenance Bn
   b. 325th Medical Bn
   c. Headquarters Headquarters Company and Band
   d. 101st Administration Company
   e. 101st Quartermaster Company (AE)
   f. 501st Supply Company

Supporting Units:

a. 68th Maintenance Bn (DS)

b. 50th Quartermaster Co (AD)

Missions: Move the 101st Airborne Division Support Command from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to the Republic of Vietnam, and operate the MAOG and DACO for the movement of the entire Division.

Concept of Operations: Deploy Support Command by increasingly larger increments, ensuring that the increments were properly cross-sectioned for the whole command, operate the MAOG and DACO utilizing the 50th QM Company (AD) and leave a rear detachment to clear the buildings and station property at Ft Campbell, Kentucky.

Execution: This Command received the Deployment Warning Order on 3 Aug 1967. The Support Command Commander immediately called for a Command Retreat Formation, and at the formation COL Allan informed the men of the command of its alerted status, and enjoined those individuals who had already served their required combat tours to volunteer to serve again. This request brought very satisfactory
results. Immediately after the receipt of the Warning Order, actions were initiated to prepare the command for deployment to include identifying non-deployable personnel and taking action to transfer them out of the command, surveying the personnel and equipment, and placing those shortages on request, using the priorities authorized by the Warning Order. This action was especially critical in view of the fact that the command was directed to reorganize under the 3-Series TOE as implemented by TUSA General 0.40-250. The implementation of 0.0. 250, with its included line-cuts of personnel and equipment, was not considered appropriate and it was therefore necessary to conduct a study of the personnel and equipment necessary to render the command an effective support unit. After submission of the study, it proved necessary to dispatch Department of the Army, liaison personnel to finalize the proper modification to 3-Series TOE. This resulted in the publishing of TUSA 0.0. 320 in mid-October.

Concurrent with the TOE revision, action was initiated to conduct an extensive training program for FOR/PGM qualification, this program was broken into two phases; Phase I being Individual Training, and Phase II being Platoon Training. Phase I commenced 5 Sep 67, in this phase both on and off-post areas were utilized to the maximum, along with numerous courses of instruction at the unit level. Phase II commenced 9 Oct 67 and ran through 1 Nov 67, the units conducting platoon and company training. Due to the accelerated schedule for movement of the 1st Seabees, only the planning phases of the proposed FY for Support Command were implemented.

Shortly after the Warning Order was given it was decided that it would be necessary to dispatch certain personnel on liaison visits to USAPAC to insure that all necessary information was made available to the planning personnel located in CONUS. The first of these visits was conducted on 1 Sep 67. The Support Command Commander, COL Allen, made the trip to insure that he
had complete knowledge of the situations existing in-country and possible solutions and courses of action. These visits continued until 20 Oct 67, when a permanent Advanced Planning Group was dispatched, whose mission was to make final coordination for base camp areas and plans for receipt of incoming personnel and equipment.

On 23 Sep 67, the Initial Readiness Report was submitted in lieu of the Unit Readiness Report. This report listed all initial shortages against the G-Series TO&E as implemented by TUSA G.O. 250.

During the month of Sep 67, detailed information as to the total amount and description of items to be shipped was collected, and movement plans were drafted for three courses of action: totally by air, totally by sea, or a combination of both. Due to the time frame, the necessary packing and crating materials were requisitioned, so as to be on hand in the event of any contingency.

On 1 November 1967, the 126th BN (Prov) was organized by G.O. 267 and 45, 101st Airborne Division. This battalion was formed utilizing the assets of the 101st QM Co (AE), 501st Supply Co, and the Division Supply Operations Section of HHC and Bnwd. Although this battalion was organized prior to departure, it did not become operational until arrival in the Republic of Vietnam.

Plans for clearance of Fort Campbell, to include station property and buildings were formulated and implemented during late November and continued through late December. Support Command assigned this responsibility, and it was achieved in an orderly manner.


11. Commander's Analysis

a. General: The overall displacement of this command from Ft Campbell, Kentucky to Bien Hoa, South Vietnam was conducted in a highly efficient and professional manner. A number of specific comments relative to the operation are mentioned
by category below:

(1) Personnel

(a) Discussion

1. The conversion from the F-Series to the G-Series TO&E, and the subsequent modification of the G-Series hampered personnel planning greatly. It caused the "Personnel On Station Date" to be unrealistic, in view of the fact that many of the required MOSs were not authorized until mid-October. Consequently many of the personnel received could not be adequately processed, and therefore errors in personnel records maintenance were caused. Many of the replacements were late, and some never did report thus causing the command to deploy at less than full TO&E strength. In addition, many of the replacements possessed MOSs other than those requested, causing the total strength picture to be unclear.

The late arrival of many personnel caused some of them to take less than full POM Leaves. This affected the morale of the unit, and interfered with the complete resolving of personal affairs.

(b) Observations and Lessons Learned:

1. That any anticipated changes, revisions and/or modifications to TO&E be completed prior to a unit being alerted for overseas movement.

2. That a "Personnel On Station Date" be established so that a high percent of personnel may arrive before the date set.

3. That existing MOS vacancies be filled with qualified personnel.

(2) Operations & Training

(a) Discussion:

1. The intensified training program was initiated too late in the final deployment schedule and this, along with the late arrival of many personnel caused the 100% PCR Qualification of all personnel to be very difficult.
2. The concurrent packing and training requirements coexisting in an ever-changing environment caused both requirements to suffer.

(b) Observations and Lessons Learned:

1. That enough time be allotted so that the training necessary can be accomplished smoothly and before the actual packing and loading occurs.

2. That TO&E changes and modifications be accomplished well in advance of scheduled deployment.

(3) Logistics:

(a) Discussions:

1. The area of logistics suffered the worst from the changes and modifications to the TO&Es. The implementation of the G series TO&Es under TUSA 00 250 caused a large amount of equipment to be turned in, and later re-requested under 00 320. This caused the supply system to be unresponsive, and the unit deployed short of some necessary equipment.

2. The initial ERD was 9 Jan 68, but this changed with the advancement of the deployment date. Some of the supporting units were not notified of this change, and consequently some essential equipment did not arrive until after the departure of Seatail I. A second Seatail was formed, and most of this equipment departed Fort Campbell on or about 15 Dec 67.

3. The packing and rail-loading of equipment for the Seatail went smoothly with the only drawback being a lack of time to adequately train rail-loading crews to the point of proficiency necessary.

(b) Observations and Lessons Learned:

(a) That a major reorganization such as a TO&E change or modification be accomplished well in advance of a unit's intended deployment.

(b) That a realistic ERD be established so that supply depots can adequately plan and process equipment to arrive prior to the stated ERD.
Inclosure #2 to letter, HQ 101st Airborne Support Command, Subj: "Pre-movement, Movement, and Post-movement After Action Report".

1. Dates of Operations: 20 Oct 67 - 28 Dec 67, the 101st Airborne Division Support Command, moves from Ft Campbell, Kentucky to Bien Hoa, Republic of Vietnam, beginning with the Advanced Planning Group on 20 Oct 67 and ending with final elements closing on or about 15 Jan 68 with the second Seatail in the following orders:

- Advance Planning Group: 20 Oct 67
- 1st Seatail: 5 Nov 67
- Advance Party: 20 Nov 67
- 3rd Bde Task Force: 1-6 Dec 67
- Div (-): 7-9 Dec 67
- 2nd Seatail: 15 Jan 67
- 2nd Bde Task Force: 10-17 Dec 67
- Rear Detachment: 28 Dec 67

2. Locations: Ft Campbell, Ky; Bien Hoa, RVN


4. Subordinate Units:
   a) Headquarters, Headquarters Company & Band
   b) 501st Supply Company
   c) 101st Quartermaster Co
   d) 101st Administration
   e) 501st Maintenance Bn
   f) 326th Medical Bn

5. Supporting Units:
   a) 504th QM (AD)
   b) US Air Force

6. Missions: To move the 101st Airborne Support Command from CONUS to USARPAC
via Seatail and Airlift, and to operate MACG and DACG facilities for the entire Division deployment.


8. Executions:
   a. Submission of Movement Data - 20 Sept 67
   b. Loaded Rail Cars for Seatail I - 28 Oct 67
   c. Submission of Air Loading Tables - 28 Nov 67
   d. 1st Chalk through DACG - 1 Dec 67
   e. Last Chalk Close RVN - 28 Dec 67
   f. 2nd Seatail Arrives - 15 Jan 68

9. Administrative
   a. Personnel: This command moved over 1400 personnel in the various increments listed in para #1
   b. Equipment: The following were moved by this command:
      No. Conexes = 520
      No. Vehicles = 312
      No. Crates and Boxes = 198
   c. Maintenance: N/A
   d. Transportation: All transportation was handled through a Movement Control Coordination Group at Ft. Campbell Ky.
   e. Arrival: 101st Airborne Support Command operated the MACG and the processing of all Division personnel upon arrival in country.
   f. Commander's Analysis: The movement by air was extremely well organized and professionally handled. The US Air Force coordinated refueling stops with meals, and measures were taken to extend every courtesy to the Support Command personnel.
PART I: Pre-Movement 801 MAINT BN


2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky 42223

3. Control or Command Headquarters: 101st Airborne Support Command

4. Subordinate Units: None

5. Supporting Units: None

6. Mission: To train, equip, and deploy the 801st Maintenance Battalion (-) from CONUS to USARPAC and to provide direct support maintenance and repair parts supply to the 101st Airborne Division and attached units subsequent to arrival.

7. Concept of Operation: The 801st Maintenance Battalion will deploy an advance planning group, advance party, main body, and rear detachment of personnel by air with MEE; remaining portions of TO&E equipment will be prepared for surface movement by 28 October 1967. Final implementation of G Series TO&E as modified by TUSA General Order 250, dtd 18 August 1967 and completion of POR/POM training will also be accomplished. Advance planning group and advance party personnel will pack and prepare for POM leave.

8. Execution: POM training program established by battalion operations section; POR/POM training conducted under staff supervision of S-3; preparation and submission of initial air loading tables; manifesting of personnel and equipment by echelon under the staff supervision of S-3; rail loading of unit supplies and equipment for surface movement under staff supervision of S-4; conversion to the G Series TO&E UP TUSA General Order 320, dtd 18 October 1967 under complete staff supervision. Advance planning group and advance party pack and take POM leaves; packing and leave requirements established for remainder of personnel.
PART I: Pre-Movement


10. N/A

11. GENERAL: The overall displacement of this unit from CONUS to USARPAC was conducted in a highly efficient and professional manner. Specific comments are relative to those items which were felt to be of significance in the various aspects of the operation. These areas are: Personnel, Operations and Training, and Logistics.

A. Personnel

1. Discussion

(a) The conversion from the F series TO&E to the G series TO&E should have been implemented on a clearly defined basis; vacillation as to whether or not the conversion would occur and when, hampered the establishment of firm personnel operations. Upon conversion, replacements were not on station by the anticipated POSD; this necessitated hasty processing and increased the error in personnel records maintenance.

(b) Many replacements were late and some never reported at all causing the unit to deploy at less than its full TO&E authorized strength.

(c) Many personnel received possessed an MOS other than that for which existing vacancies called for. Foremost among these are the electronic maintenance technicians, engine repairmen, and helicopter repairmen of the aircraft maintenance company. The accelerated deployment schedule and late receipt of replacement personnel restricted and in some instances precluded full POM leaves. This was detrimental to morale at all echelons and in some cases personal affairs could not be fully resolved prior to deployment.
PART I: Pre-Movement

2. Observations/Lessons Learned:

(a) That any anticipated TO&E change, revision, or modification be implemented and finalized prior to initiating preparation for deployment.

(b) That replacement personnel be so scheduled that they arrive on station by the designated POSD which should be realistically determined. Further, that realistic deployment scheduling be planned and implemented ensuring availability of adequate POM leave time to all personnel.

(c) That existing personnel vacancies be filled by qualified personnel possessing the appropriate MOS.

B. Operations and Training:

1. Discussion:

(a) The intensified training program was initiated too late as the resultant deployment schedule indicated. Due to non-establishment of firm deployment dates and subsequent accelerated deployment, it was difficult to obtain 100% FOR qualification. FOR training was further aggravated by non-arrival of personnel by the designated POSD.

(b) The concurrent requirements of packing and training simultaneously in a compressed and ever changing time frame was unrealistic and both areas suffered severely.

(c) Accurate deployment planning was hindered because of vacillation between TO&E changes which affected a considerable number of personnel and a considerable amount of equipment. Actual deployment by air and sea was smoothly conducted in a most professional manner once the final concept had been determined.

2. Observations/Lessons Learned:

(a) That realistic deployment scheduling in all areas be planned well in advance and that training requirements be undertaken so as to achieve
PART I: Pre Movement

finality in advance of actual deployment.

(b) That realistic POSD's be established and adhered to in order to assure reception of replacement personnel and of IOR training of these personnel prior to deployment.

(c) That TO&E changes and modifications be finalized prior to implementation of deployment preparations.

C. Logistics:

1. Discussion

(a) The change from the F series to the G series TO&E resulted in equipment shortages which were impossible to receive prior to deployment. The situation was further aggravated by several modifications to the G series TO&E before final organization was determined. The resultant turbulence in equipment led to much confusion and disconcerted effort. This unit was required to turn in many items of equipment due to the first modification of the G series TO&E and later required to requisition the same items which were again authorized by a further modification.

(b) Changes in the deployment schedule and mode of travel led to problems in receipt of equipment due to the fact that no change was made as to the ERD. Consequently, the depots in charge of shipping equipment were still operating under the original schedule. Numerous items which were not received prior to deployment doubtless could have been received and shipped with the unit if a realistic ERD had been assigned and shipment of TO&E shortages expedited. Units were required to use an ERD of 9 January on unit readiness reports, yet it was known that all elements of the Division were scheduled to have cleared CONUS by that date.

(c) The rail loading of equipment was accomplished satisfactorily; however, problems were encountered due to a lack of training of rail loading
PART I: Pre-Movement

teams; this was especially true of supervisory personnel who had the responsibility of checking the work done by the crews. Further, additional rail loading kits would have facilitated the rail loading phase and training in their usage would have reduced the number of components that were rendered unserviceable because of unskilled users.

2. Observations/Lessons Learned:

(a) A major reorganization should be finalized well in advance of a pending overseas movement.

(b) That realistic ERD's should be established and effective coordination made for necessary transfer and turn-ins of equipment.

(c) That firm guidance should be provided as soon as possible in reference to modes of movement so that detailed, accurate planning may be accomplished rapidly.

(d) That sufficient quantities of rail loading equipment and formal instructions in its use should be provided to facilitate actual load out of equipment and maintenance of rail loading equipment.
PART II: Movement

1. Dates of Operation: 030245 Dec 67 - 282400 Dec 67  801st Maintenance Battalion (-) moves from CONUS to USARPAC beginning with chalk #CO43 030245 Dec 67, with 3rd Brigade Task Force, final elements to close in country NLT282400 Dec 67 in the following increments for air and surface movement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCREMENT</th>
<th>TO DEPART</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advance Planning Group - four (4) personnel</td>
<td>20 Oct 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Seatail - three (3) personnel</td>
<td>28 Oct 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance Party - seventy five (75) personnel</td>
<td>20 Nov 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bde Task Force - one hundred and ninety eight (198) personnel</td>
<td>1-6 Dec 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division (-) - ninety one (91) personnel</td>
<td>7-9 Dec 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bde Task Force - seventy two (72) personnel</td>
<td>10-17 Dec 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear Detachment - eighteen (18) personnel</td>
<td>20 Dec 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Seatail - two (2) personnel</td>
<td>Dec 1967</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Location: Fort Campbell, Kentucky 42223; Bien Hoa, RVN

3. Command and Control: Headquarters, Movement Control Coordination Group

4. Subordinate Units: None

5. Supporting Units: None

6. Mission: To move the 801st Maintenance Battalion (-) from CONUS to USARPAC via airlift and seatail.

7. Concept of Operation: 801st Maintenance Battalion (-) departs CONUS to USARPAC IAW Annex (C) (Movement Plan) to OPORD 3-67.
**DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D**

(Subject classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Contractor Source)</th>
<th>1A. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310</td>
<td>Confidential</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. REPORT TITLE</th>
<th>10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, 101st Airborne Division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)</th>
<th>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 2 Aug 67-31 Jan 1968</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. ORIGINATOR (First name, middle initial, last name)</th>
<th>12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CC, 101st Airborne Division</td>
<td>OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>13. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 March 1968</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.</th>
<th>14. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>681291</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. SPECIAL PROJECT NO.</th>
<th>15. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. OTHER REPORT NO(S)</th>
<th>16. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT</th>
<th>18. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>19. ABSTRACT</th>
<th>20. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>