CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: unclassified

FROM: confidential

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

FROM:
Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 05 MAY 1966. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

31 May 1978, DoDD 5200.10; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO San Francisco, Calif 96290

SUGGESTED CHANNELS

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 Apr 66

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. General Situation. During the period 1 January - 30 April 1966, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) operated over an area of about 170km by 170km in the Dinh Dinh, Pleiku, Kontum, Daklac and Phu Yen Provinces. Division operations extended from the China Sea to the Cambodian border along the axis of Highway 19, from north of Buon Son to Qui Nhon along the China Sea Coast and from near Ben Me Thuot to Dak To along the Cambodian border. Operations were characterized throughout by heavy reliance on air mobility. The Division base remained at Camp Radcliffe near An Khe throughout the period. During most of the period, two brigades operated away from the Division base, while the other brigade conducted offensive operations in the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) and improved the security of the base. (For example, during the Buon Son campaign four to six of the Division's infantry battalions conducted sustained operations and maintained contact with the enemy for forty-one days at an average distance of approximately 65km from the base in An Khe.)

The Division clearly demonstrated its capability to conduct operations for an extended period against insurgent forces in some terrain which previously had been considered totally inaccessible to helicopter operations. Brigade missions during the period were largely search and destroy operations leading to the pacification of areas previously controlled by the Viet Cong. Security of the TAOR and Division base, construction of barriers around the base and a vigorous base development program continued simultaneously with tactical operations.

JUN 17 1966

DECL. TO BE DECLASSIFIED AFTER 20 YEARS

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMMERCE DEPT.

SECRETARY OF STATE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CONFIDENTIAL

DECL. TO BE DECLASSIFIED AFTER 20 YEARS

CONFIDENTIAL

DECL. TO BE DECLASSIFIED AFTER 20 YEARS

CONFIDENTIAL

DECL. TO BE DECLASSIFIED AFTER 20 YEARS

CONFIDENTIAL
OPERATIONAL REPORT ON LESSONS LEARNED

Operations in the TAC were characterized by numerous company sized offensive operations, daytime saturation patrolling, and night-time ambush patrols.

b. Division organization and key personnel during the reporting period were as follows:

1. Division Headquarters
   - Maj Gen Harry W 0 Kinnard
   - Brig Gen John W Wright
   - Brig Gen Richard T Knowles
   - Colonel William A Becker
   - Col George S Beatty Jr
   - Lt Col John D White
   - Lt Col Bobby A Lang
   - Lt Col Earl K Buchanan
   - Lt Col Benjamin S Silver
   - Lt Col Robert J Craig
   - Lt Col Monroe Kirkpatrick

2. 1st Brigade (Airborne)
   - Colonel Ivy B Roberts
   - Colonel John J Hennessey
   - Lt Col Kenneth D Mortel
   - Lt Col Levin B Broughton
   - Lt Col John A Hemphill
   - Lt Col Rutland J Beard Jr

3. 2d Brigade
   - Col William R Lynch
   - Col Marvin J Borenzweig

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned

Lt Col Frederick Ackerson
Lt Col William D. Hay
Lt Col Edward C. Meyer
Lt Col Earl Ingman
Lt Col Otis C. Lynne

3d Brigade

Col Harold C. Moore Jr
Lt Col Raymond L. Haup
Lt Col Robert A. Mcabee
Lt Col Robert P. Little Jr

Division Artillery

Col William A. Becker
Lt Col Lloyd J. Paton
Col William F. Brand
Lt Col Francis J. Bush
Lt Col Nelson A. Balm Jr
Lt Col Morris J. Brown
Lt Col Robert L. Short
Lt Col Ernest W. Reuth
Lt Col Harold W. Smith

11th Aviation Group

Col Allen J. Birdette Jr
Lt Col Jack Crawford
Lt Col J. Clark
Lt Col Robert T. Keller
Sgt. Paul T. Clark

CO, 1/5 Cav Bn
6 Feb 66
CO, 2/5 Cav Bn
23 Feb 66
CO, 2/12 Cav Bn
9 Mar 66
CO, 3d Bde
CO, 1/7 Cav Bn
CO, 2/7 Cav Bn
CO, 1st Cav Div Arty
CO, 2/19 Arty (Artillery)
CO, 2/20 Tn
CO, 1/21 Tn
CO, 1/77 Tn
CO, 11th Arm Co (Sp)
CO, 227th Aslt Hel Bn
CO, 22nd Aslt Hel Bn
CO, 23rd Aslt Hel Bn
CO, 11th Arm Co (Sp)
CONFIDENTIAL

Subjects

(7) Support Command
- Col John J Honnessey
- Lt Col James C Smith
- Lt Col Frederick Costerhout
- Lt Col Juari Svjaigtsoy
- Lt Col Charles McGraw
- Lt Col Granville H Stagg
- Capt John Q. Adams
- Capt Earl D Rawlings
- CO, Support Command
- 15th Sup & Svc Bn
- 15th Med Bn
- 15th TC Bn (AM&AS)
- CO, 27 Maint Bn
- 15th Admin Co
- 4 Jan 66

(8) Lt Col Robert MSoosek
(9) Lt Col Robert J Malloy
(10) Lt Col Tom M Nicolson
     Lt Col Paul N Simon
- CO, 1/9 Cav Sqdn
- 8th Engr Bn
- 13th Sig Bn
- 1 Jan 66

(11) Capt Paul Lewis Jr
(12) Capt Glen C Stephens
(13) Special Staff
- Lt Col James E McCarty
- Lt Col Francis A McInerney
- Lt Col Morris D Hodges
- Lt Col Chester R Lindsey
- Lt Col Malcolm H Baer
- Maj Charles C Silver
- Capt Wayne C Campbell
- CO, 545th MP Co
- HqG, 1st Cav Div
- Surgeon
- Inspector General
- Staff Judge Advocate
- Chaplain
- Adjutant General
- Information Officer
- Finance Officer
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

Lt Col David W Hinsel Jr
Lt Col Horbert W Uhland

Chemical Officer
Provost Marshal

(14) Attached Units

Lt Col Charles L Zolner
Lt Col Harry O Jones
Lt Col Norman P Chandler

CO, 3/18 Arty Bn
CO, 2/17 Arty Bn
15 Mar 66

Capt Gary E Schultz
Maj Raymond D Franklin
Maj T J Clark
Capt Charles L LeMoro

CO, B Dtry 29th Arty (Slt)
CO, 17th Avn Co
CO, 478 Avn Co (Hvy Hel)
CO, 586 Sig Co (Spt)

1st Lt Walter A Jones
1st Lt John J Siffrin
1st Lt William W Toney
2nd Lt Ernest J Scharpf

CO, 184 Chem Plt (DS)
21 April 66
CO; Det 1, 54th Sig Bn
23 Feb 66

Maj Gary D Collier

CO, 191st MI Det

Maj Roy W Haygood Jr
Maj Peter J Samulevich

CO, 14th Mil Hist Det
15 April 66

Capt John M Arnold
Capt Charles E Hill

CO, 10th RRU
CO, USAF Weather Tn
30th Weather Sqdn

Lt Patrick Murphy

CO, 241 Sig Det

(15) Supporting Units

Col Richard T Bull
Lt Col Charles E Leacock

CO, 34th QM Bn (DS/OS)
18 Mar 66

Lt Col Leonard Bierlein

CO, 70th QM Bn

Lt Col Francis O Dinon Jr

CO, 2d Sur Hosp (Ma)
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

2. (c) Personnel

a. Strength. Authorised and assigned strength at the beginning and close of reporting period were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGGREGATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>1180</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>14,099</td>
<td>15,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>15,042</td>
<td>16,732</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Begin Report Per

(2) Close Report Per

b. Replacements: A total of 3365 enlisted replacements were received. During the same period Division losses were 4013, 2074 of which were KT3 losses. Some 396 emergency leaves were processed during the period.

c. Morale and Personnel Services:

(1) Morale throughout the Division and attached elements remained excellent.

(2) Decorations awarded:

- Distinguished Service Cross 1
- Silver Star 41
- Distinguished Flying Cross 34
- Legion of Merit 2
- Soldier's Medal 2
- Bronze Star with V Device 424
- Air Medal 6064
- Army Commendation with V Device 37
CON

FIDENTIAL

AVGCT-T
SUBJCT: Operational report on lessons learned

Army Commendation Medal 77
Purple Heart 635
Certificate of Achievement 37
TOTAL AWARDED 7354

(3) Combat Badges Awarded:

Combat Infantry Badge 2751
Combat Medical Badge 172
Aircraft Crewman Badge 463

(4) Recent changes to Army Regulations authorize the
Division Commander to award the following ratings and badges: Master
Aviator Badge, Senior Army Aviator Badge, Senior Flight Surgeon Badge,
Flight Surgeon Badge, Master Aircraft Crewman Badge, Senior Aircraft Crewman
Badge and Aircraft Crewman Badge.

d. Promotions: A total of 2179 enlisted personnel were promoted
during the reporting period.

e. Reenlistments: A total of 287 reenlistments or extensions
actions were completed. The enlistment/extension breakdown: 54 first
term RA reenlistments, 200 career reenlistments, 5 AUS reenlistments, 42
RA extensions and 8 AUS extensions. Counselors visited units in the base
and in forward areas on a continuous basis.

f. Postal activities for the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Money Order sales $2,252,554.38
(2) Postal & Parcel Post fees $92,261.00
(3) Incoming Mail 1,110,221 lbs
Daily average 9,250.17 lbs
(4) Outgoing mail 560,825 lbs
Daily average 5,001.71 lbs
(5) Number of incoming mail days 97
(6) Number of outgoing mail days 110

The 23 days that the Division did not receive mail was larger by far than in any other reporting period.

g. Special Services: During the reporting period a total of 163 movies and TV films were circulated throughout the Division. Seven USO shows played to an estimated attendance of 22,000. A larger amount of R&R quotas were received during the period; 1370 in-country and 2864 out-of-country were filled. A total of 26,841 paperback books and magazines also were received.

h. Financial Services: The finance data records folders (FDRF) prior to March were alphabetized by organization. Therefore, there were 114 different alphabetical files. Each time an individual was reassigned within the Division, the record would have to be pulled, forwarded to the new unit clerk for filing. In view of the numerous reassignments within the Division, there was always a movement of FDRF's within the five pay terms. In addition, all the incoming correspondence had to be identified by unit before it could be processed and subsequently filed. The pulling of FDRF's for rotation was a slow process since each of the 114 units normally had 114 losses. The financial data records folders of the entire Division were alphabetized on 20 March without regard to unit. The alphabetizing of the FDRF's accomplished the following:

1. Accelerated locating and pulling FDRF's for large shipment of personnel such as for rotation, EL, WL, etc. (In the event an assignment for an individual was incorrectly stated on the roster, it no longer delayed the locating of the record as was previously the case.

2. Eliminated the necessity of obtaining the unit of assignment prior to processing and filing correspondence in FDRF.

3. Eliminated the constant movement of FDRF's because of Division reassignments.

4. Streamlined FDRF maintenance in preparation for the large volume of summer replacements.

5. Will facilitate the out-going of the Division personnel returning to GUNUS this summer.

1. Chaplain Activities:

(1) Total service attendance 60,526

Roman Catholic 26,258

Protestant 33,969

Jewish 399
(2) Religious Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Roman Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group instruction</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private instruction</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious film and film strips</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Group parish activities participated in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Roman Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>163</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Pastoral Visits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplinary Confinement</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling/Interviews</td>
<td>5694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barracks/Quarters</td>
<td>1315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Training/Duty Areas</td>
<td>1908</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Sacraments and Ministries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sacraments and Ministries</th>
<th>Number of Occasions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baptism/Dedication/Christening</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confession</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communion</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funeral</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmation/received into Church Membership</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Character Guidance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SU23STI - Repo on Lessons Learned

Instructions 7

(6) Off Post Community Relations

Religious Services 11

Other 107

(7) The effectiveness of religious programs was outstanding. During combat operations the unit chaplains made every effort to minister to the men in the field, the men at medical stations and the hospitals. During the period covered by this report there was a concerted effort to erect semi-permanent or permanent chapels. Chapels were being constructed to a large extent by funds donated by the men. Within three months every area will have an adequate chapel.

(8) In the month of January Chaplain (Captain) Billy R. Lord was awarded the Silver Star for heroic duty in the Ploikli Campaign.

J. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order

(1) Discipline: A total of 564 incidents were reported to the Provost Marshal's Office during the reporting period.

(2) Military Justice:

(a) General Courts Martial 15

(b) Special Courts Martial 64

(c) Summary Courts Martial 57

(3) The Division's low percentage of courts-martial was indicative of the low rate of serious incidents and offenses being committed by members of this command.

K. Inspector General Activities

(1) Normal Inspector General activities were conducted during the reporting period. Two IG investigations were directed and completed and a staff visit by the Military Assistance Command Vietnam Inspector General was conducted. One IG inquiry was completed. No significant trends in complaints and/or requests were revealed.

10

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational report on Lessons Learned

1. Public Information Office

   (1) During the reporting period the Division's Information Office activities were as follows:

      (a) Direct support was given to news media representatives.

      (b) Articles were written and released to "Fifteen Nations," the North Atlantic Treaty Organization magazine.

      (c) During all combat operations a field edition of the division's newspaper "GIV-LEAD" was published primarily for the skytroopers participating in the operation.

      (d) An article, "Trial by Fire," the story of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airborne), by newsman Charles Black was published in Argosy Magazine in March 1966.

      (e) Two articles by-lined by Major General Harry W. O Kimnoid were written and released — one to DIII Magazine and the other to the Army Magazine.

      (f) The US Army Exhibit Unit was furnished with photographs depicting activities of the Division from its arrival in Vietnam to the present, for an exhibit entitled, "The Airborne Soldier."

      (g) The Army Information Digest was furnished with photographs depicting activities of the Division, which appeared in the February and March editions.

      (h) The office answered numerous queries from throughout the United States as a result of the news interest that this Division has created and the active role it is playing in the Vietnam conflict.

      (i) The office summarized and reported significant actions to MACV for joint briefings.

      (j) The Hometown News Release and Command Information programs were continued.

2. (c) INTELLIGENCE:

   a. G2 Organization. During the reporting period the G2 Section was reorganized to increase responsiveness to operational planning requirements posed by the conduct of Airborne Operations throughout a corps tactical zone. Additional personnel (6 Off, 3 En) were authorized which will permit 24 hour operations in the DNO's Forward and Base, the establishment
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

of a plans element, and the formation of a reports and analysis section without stabilizing other activities within G2.

b. Operations.

(1) Operation HICBEG was conducted during the period 1 - 17 January 1966 in Western Pleiku and Kontum Provinces. No major units were believed to be in the area, with the possible exception of an infiltration group. No significant enemy contact was made, but good detailed knowledge of infiltration routes and way stations was gained and a number of large caches uncovered. One new unit was identified (13th _... 2h - NVA - located in Cambodia).

(2) Operation KASHEE-WHITE ING was conducted during the period 25 January - 6 March 1966, in Northeastern Minh Dinh Province. One confirmed regiment was believed to be in the area. Contact was made with two previously confirmed regiments (2d VC, 18th NVA) and one new NVA regiment (Vayet Tam or 22d RV). Interrogation of prisoners and examination of documents confirmed a VC military structure in Minh Dinh Province: an NVA Division (SAO VCF) complete with support units, parts of which were newly infiltrated. The battalion commander of the 95th BN, 2d VC Regt., Capt. Doan, was captured at 1400 hours, 15 Feb 66 in a cave via 3767783 by elements of 2/5 Cav, 2d Brigade (Incl./2). In addition, a company commander rallied. Several large weapons caches were uncovered and detailed information on VC structure and tactical doctrine was obtained from VC's and a large quantity of documents captured.

(3) Operation JIM YOW was conducted during the period 13 - 27 March 1966 in North Central Minh Dinh Province. Elements of one regiment alone, with elements of the SAO VCF Division, a Regional Headquarters and Support Units were believed to be in the area of operations with an estimated strength of 3000. No significant contact was made however, and strong evidence of an orderly VC withdrawal from the area, prior to the start of the operation, was noted. A previously unexplored area was penetrated, disrupting VC patterns and denying him reorganization areas following. HAMMER-VCF XENG. A small number of significant documents were captured.

(4) Operation LINCOLN-MOSBY I was conducted in Western Pleiku and Kontum Provinces during the period 25 March - 17 April 1966. At least three NVA Regiments (32d, 33d, and 66th) were believed to be in the area of operations. Contact was sporadic ranging from light to moderate, and did not involve elements of the known NVA Regiments. A high rate of NVA Infiltration from December 1965 to March 1966 was confirmed as well as the use of previously identified infiltration routes. Three new infiltration groups were identified as possible replacements for the 32d, 33d and 66th Regiments in the area. Also confirmed was one new 1st front (16th NVA) and one engineer company (28th).
Through captured maps and prisoners from the Engineer Company, information was gained of three newly constructed routes in Kheiku Province, which could be expanded to accommodate trucks. Interrogation of prisoners also revealed that cover stories were being utilized. A major ammunition cache was uncovered and a major NVA buildup along the Cambodian border was confirmed.

(5) Operation MOSBY II began in the Kheiku area on 21 April 1966 and continued through the reporting date. Elements of up to two NVA battalions were believed to be in the area of operations, but no significant contact or findings were reported.

(6) Overall results of operations during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Order of Battle.

(1) Units confirmed and/or reconfirmed along with possible identifications and movements are as outlined in previously submitted reports.

(2) The section processed all incoming intelligence reports extracting pertinent data (personalities, unit identification and locations, fortifications, caches) for card files.

(3) The problem of insufficient personnel to process information necessary to support combat operations has been partially alleviated by the increased personnel authorization.

d. G2 air

(1) Missions flown during the reporting period.

(a) RH = 222

(b) Visual = 175

(c) Photo = 198

(d) Sidewall = 128
(2) **Long Range Surveillance and Target Acquisition**

(a) IR data was used for artillery H&I fires and by the infantry brigades in their patrol plans. Ground/air follow-up inspections proved most of the "hot spots" to be brush fires and bomb craters, although a few recently vacated bunkers were found.

(b) Visual surveillance was the most profitable. Significant visual action included the locating and destroying of a possible multi-barrel automatic weapon; surprising a VC platoon-size work force in the open leading to an engagement by armed helicopters; and discovering a previously unlocated 3-57 wreckage that had not yet been stripped by the VC.

(c) A large portion of the photo missions performed by the army were relatively small and completed within a few hours to a few days. This type mission supplemented the USAF large area coverage missions.

(d) No intelligence information of use to the division was gained by SLR. Nearly all missions were flown in support of Operation MASH/WHITE WING and for higher headquarters.

e. Maps. There were no significant problems in map supply other than periodic shortages of Series L701, Scale 1:50,000 maps. This series was not being received from the depot since it was being phased out. The new replacement series, L7014 is due in country on or about 1 July 1966.

f. Det 24, 30th Weather Squadron

(1) Support (24 hour forecasts, climate summaries, flight briefings) was provided to operating brigades and to the base camp.

(2) The problem areas were:

(a) Teletype outages causing discontinuance of forecasting data.

(b) The lack of a permanent location for the detachment. One relocation due to construction on the Golf Course and the incomplete facilities at the on-the-airfield precluded stability.

(c) Necessary equipment was periodically disabled due to tool and spare parts shortages.

h. 10th RUM. This unit participated in all combat operations during the reporting period. The most significant intelligence contribution occurred during operation MASH/WHITE WING. As a result of adequate lead time,
target entities located in the area of operations were completely developed
to the start of the operation. Special intelligence items were also
produced during the operation relating directly to enemy activity.

1. MI Detachment

(1) The CIC Section interrogated over 600 prisoners in support
of combat operations and screened over 1250 pounds of documents, of which 45
documents were translated. Items not translated at this echelon were trans-
mitt to I Field Force Vietnam for further exploitation. Considerable
intelligence was gained to include unit designations, locations, strengths
and activity. The addition of three Vietnamese speaking American interrogat-
ors was a significant factor.

(2) CI Teams consisting of two agents... one interpreter
each supported brigade operations by screening refugees, interrogating VCO
and VSO, processing documents and conducting liaison with local Republic
of Vietnam (RVN) agencies to obtain Order of Battle enemy and counter intelligence
information. Considerable information was gained of VC infrastructure. As
a result of CI conducted operations during the reporting period it was con-
cluded that:

(a) There were no known threats to the internal security
of the Division.

(b) The Personnel Security Program was adequate.

(c) Timely reporting of CI information was enhanced by
the establishment of an office operated by CI personnel in an Nha as a
point of contact, and closed liaison with local intelligence agencies.

(3) Special Areas receiving attention at the end of reporting
periods:

(a) Document security to include accountability and
destruction of classified information;

(b) Physical security of the Base Camp area.

(c) Slowness in processing of VCO from time of capture
till arrival at the Division Cage.

4. C Operations and Training

a. Organization

(1) Attachments and Detachments. During the reporting period
two units were detached and one unit attached. On 1 Feb 66 the 6/14 artillery
Battalion (175mm Gun; SP) minus Battery C was detached. On the same date
Battery "C", 3/19 Artillery (6" How, SP) was also detached. On 7 March the
24th Signal Detachment (Avionics) was attached to Support Command for
further attachment to the 478th Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter).

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

(2) Revision of Division Task 67T. A review and evaluation of personnel and equipment requirements for the airmobile division, T67T, was completed on 27 April and submitted through channels to the Combat Developments Command. The proposed changes were based on a period of 7½ months of airmobile experience against insurgent forces in South Vietnam and were designed to advance the mobility and agility of the division on the battlefield. The major changes recommended were the addition of: (1) a ninth infantry battalion with adjustments in the battalion organization to increase the number of machine guns and non-mobile mortars while deleting the 90mm recoilless rifles; (2) a third lift battalion (UH-1) and a fourth UH-47 Company to increase the lift of the division; (3) six OV-1L aircraft for increased surveillance and target acquisition and (4) additional personnel for command and control and maintenance. The proposed change represents an increase of 2152 personnel spaces (division total 17,999), 20 vehicles (total 1631) and 114 aircraft (total 548).

b. Training

(1) Training activities continued under the provision of Division Circular 350-44 which included the period 1 January through 31 March. A revised program was issued to cover the period 1 April through 20 September. Training emphasized by the division program included:

(a) Individual training on Quick-fire Reaction Courses. Each replacement arriving during the period was qualified on the course.

(b) 81mm mortar training. Gunner tests to include live firing exercises were conducted for all mortar crews.

(c) Replacement training was conducted at unit level except for the initial division level orientations conducted during processing in the Replacement Detachment. Complete and detailed orientations were conducted at unit level. Aviation personnel received a special aviation operations and safety orientation. In addition to orientation and qualification on the Quick-fire Reaction Course, replacement personnel were required to zero their basic weapon and become familiar with other weapons in the unit.

(d) Door gunner training was conducted for all incoming personnel assigned as door gunners or crew chiefs. Refresher training was conducted for all door gunners and crew chiefs during the period.

(e) Trooper ladder training. Additional equipment was received during the period and permitted training by approximately 60% of the infantry personnel in the airmobile brigades.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

(2) Training support from non-divisional sources included:

(a) 65 division personnel attended aircraft maintenance training on the UH-1 and CH-47 aircraft under the Army Aircraft Mobile Training Assistance Program (AMTAP).

(b) 180 artillery personnel received new equipment introductory training on the 105mm Howitzer, M102. These personnel conducted unit level training for all the 105mm Howitzer crews in the three divisional battalions.

(c) 2 civil affairs personnel attended a one week course conducted by MCoV/USCM advisory personnel.

(3) Special training programs:

(a) Aerial suppressive fire. Aviation personnel assigned to weapons companies and air cavalry troops conducted training in preparation of landing zones and suppressive fire using aerial weapons.

(b) Rappel training. All infantry units continued to train personnel in rappelling techniques.

(c) FLC Training in adjustment of artillery. A program was initiated to train all USAF FLC's in adjustment of indirect fire.

(d) Autorotation training with the CH-13 and UH-1 aircraft was conducted with the majority of aviators conducting a minimum of three autorotations during the period.

(4) Training facilities. Ranges and training facilities were completed to meet the immediate and long range requirements of the division. All areas were constructed using troop labor and salvage material. The following training facilities are available within the division base area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autorotation Areas</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Weapons Range</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery and Mortar Firing Area</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick-fire Reaction Course</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms Ranges</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Training Area</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c. Operations.

(1) During the quarter 10 major plans, 15 major operations orders and 126 FAP orders were issued. During the quarter the 8 organic infantry battalions operated away from the division base a total of 629 battalion days, nearly 66% of the total infantry battalion days (960) in the quarter. During February and March the percentage of infantry battalions committed on operations away from Camp Radcliff was 74 and 75 percent respectively. Division artillery battalions were committed for 428 battalion days in support of operations away from Camp Radcliff. In all, 182 battery moves were conducted by the use of aircraft, 167 battery ground moves were made, and 5 battery moves were made using an aircraft ground vehicle mixture. The cavalry squadron was committed in operations outside of Camp Radcliff 84% of the troop days during the quarter and was committed 59% of the days in operations beyond the normal division tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR). During February the cavalry squadron was committed in support of operations outside the division TAOR for 75% of the troop days available.

(2) During the reporting period two to three battalions, reinforced by up to 570 personnel from the resident units, continued to defend Camp Radcliff and conduct offensive operations within 21 kilometers of Camp Radcliff. These missions, broadly described throughout this report as TAO operations, included security of the base, an Khe army airfield, the bridges in an Khe, and the ground line of communication (National Route 19) from the Deo Mang Pass to the Mang Yang Pass; patrolling; show of force; support of local CIDG forces; pacification and civil action.

(3) Since January a 7.1 kilometer extension was added to the barrier system around Camp Radcliff to enclose the an Khe logistical installation, the Division supply area and the Hon Cong Mountain Signal facility. An additional 7.8 kilometer extension was begun to enclose the an Khe army airfield. The installation of wire and mines on these outer barriers was about 65% complete at the end of the quarter. Figure 1 shows diagram of Camp Radcliff. Much improvement was made in the barrier system itself. Flame fougasse devices, trip flares, anti-intrusion devices and riot control agents were being installed in the barrier by the end of the reporting period. All of the above devices were in addition to the Claymore mines previously installed in cement in the barrier. Considerable progress was made in the construction of fighting positions and communications trenches. The installation of 59 fourteen-foot towers was almost complete at the end of the period. These towers, when complete, will provide complete visual observation of the barrier. During the quarter 621 hectares were defoliated to enhance observation in the barrier and adjacent areas.

a. Discussion and analysis of major operations.

(1) The operations discussed below were the major operations which the division conducted during the period 1 January to 30 April 66. In addition to these operations, the division participated in many smaller operations. Within the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR), platoon to battalion
size airmobile search and clear, as well as, search and destroy, operations were performed daily. All of these operations were characterized by intensive daytime patrolling and extensive night time ambushes ranging from fire-team size to entire company operations. Some of the other types of operations which the division accomplished but which are not discussed below were: support of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces with aerial artillery, tube artillery, and forces up to complete battalion task force; escort of both US and SVN convoys; escort of engineer and logistical convoys; security of downed aircraft; spoiling attacks in the vicinity of the Cambodian border and Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camps; show-of-force operations; reconnaissance missions by the Cavalry squadron throughout Pleiku, Kontum, Phu Yen, Daklao and Binh Dinh Provinces; and surveillance and reconnaissance of areas where enemy activity had been reported.

(2) Operation MATADOR I & II: On 1 January, the 1st Brigade moved to initiate Operation MATADOR I, a search and destroy operation along the Cambodian border north of Highway 19, and to secure a base area for the incoming 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division north of Pleiku. On 4 January the 2d Brigade was committed to conduct spoiling attacks approximately 50 kilometers west of Kontum along the Cambodian border. (MATADOR II) The spoiling attacks were characterized by aggressive, offensive action with units operating from company-size bases. For the first time the division operated in heavily forested areas where no LZs existed. In several cases the air delivered 750 pound bombs to cut holes in the forest. In other cases, trooper ladders were used to enter areas, followed by clearing an area with saws for 1 or 2 helicopters, and then expanding the LZ with heliborne engineer equipment. Similarly personnel were extracted using trooper ladder; including, on one occasion, extracting a VC into a hovering OH-47. Although contact was limited to occasional encounters with small groups of local forces, Operation MATADOR served several very useful purposes: (1) It convinced the CIDG and SVN forces that there were no massive VC forces along the border and thus bolstered their morale tremendously, and served to encourage offensive operations by them.; (2) It provided mutual experience to our forces and the CIDG in operating together and (3) the Division gained detailed knowledge of the trails along the Cambodian border, while destroying the VC way-stations, training areas, and generally disrupting his necessary logistical support facilities. This operation ended on 19 January.

RESULTS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENEMY LOSSES</th>
<th>FRIENDLY LOSSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KL 4(3C)</td>
<td>KL 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1(Not)</td>
<td>WLA 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOC 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCS 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Confiscated 538,000 pounds of rice

(3) Operation MASH/WHITE WING: On 25 January the division launched operation MASH/WHITE WING in the northeastern portion of Binh Dinh Province. This became the largest offensive undertaken by the 1st Cavalry Division (Armored) since its arrival in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). The principal combat operations occurred in the Huu Phong District coastal plain northeast of Dong Son (38493) and in the An Lao and Kim Son Valleys southeast of Dong Son.
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

(a) Operation IWIM began with a deception operation south of Bong Son to increase the security of Highway 1 and to lead the enemy to believe efforts would be directed southward. On the 28th of January, in conjunction with the ANVN airborne brigade, air assaults and overland attacks were launched north of Bong Son with the ANVN airborne Brigade on the east along the coast and the 1st Cavalry Division to the west of Route 1. In these attacks, two battalions (the 7th and 9th of the Quyet Tan Regiment) were found, fixed and destroyed. The division attempted to cut off the enemy retreat by landing in blocking positions to the west and north along expected routes of withdrawal. Although many small VC elements were killed or captured, intelligence indicated that the enemy had exfiltrated from the coastal plain to the adjoining high ground to the north and west.

(b) The next phase of the operation involved an attack on the high ground between the coastal plain and the An Lao Valley, and into the An Lao Valley itself. The plan was for the III MAF to block enemy escape routes to the north of the An Lao Valley with the ANVN 22d Division blocking the southern escape routes, while the 1st Cav was to attack with five battalions simultaneously from both sides of the valley on 4 February. "Ad weather delayed the attack until 6 February at which time the III MAF landed a battalion in the north by helicopter; the 1st Cav assaulted 3 battalions on to the high ground west of the valley sweeping from west to east, and simultaneously attacked with 2 battalions in a ground attack from the high ground on the east. This attack was followed by a ground sweep to the south through the valley. The attack into the An Lao Valley met only light resistance. Through the division's psy Ops program the people of the valley were informed that the Division would not be remaining. The opportunity was offered to leave the valley if they chose to do so. About 4500 of the total population of 8000 did elect to leave the valley. Over 3300 of these people were flown to freedom in division Chinooks. The 2d Brigade protected this exodus while continuing to clear the enemy from the An Lao Valley and the high ground to the east.

(c) While the 2d Brigade was thus engaged, the 3d Brigade launched an air assault into an enemy base area in a series of valleys southwest of Bong Son which branch out from the Son Long Valley - an area which was dubbed the "Eagles Claw" or "Crow's Foot". The 3d Brigade air assaulted to seize the foot of the "Crow's Foot" while simultaneously landing blocking forces at the end of the "toes" to prevent escape from the valleys. This strategy succeeded in capturing or killing many enemy and keeping them well contained until the 2d Brigade could land on the ridges in the high ground southeast where intelligence indicated the enemy was hiding in strength and possible had a major headquarters.

(d) It was in the 2d Brigade area, that the enemy was found entrenched at LZ METE (211374) and the "Iron Triangle" (217876). In destroying the enemy here the 2d Brigade used all its organic weapons, plus 2.5 air, B-52 strikes, and riot control agents (RCA) to successfully destroy the enemy. This action resulted in many enemy killed, wounded and captured, plus many large weapons caches. The amount of communication gear and wire captured gave evidence that the enemy installation included a VC regimental headquarters.
Subject: Operational Report on Lessons Learned.

(e) As this operation was proceeding, the 3d Brigade was relieved by the 1st Brigade which began a series of assaults and sweeps through the high ground around the "Crow's Foot" and then moved into the high ground along the eastern and southeastern sides of the Son Long Valley. Here elements of the 18th NVA Regiment were encountered, including its headquarters company and its heavy weapons companies. The 1st Brigade captured ten of the twelve 12.7mm AA machine guns and nearly all of the recoilless rifles of the Quyet Thang Regiment, much communications gear and a hospital with all its medical supplies.

(f) The 1st Brigade, joined by the 2d Brigade then made a series of air assaults and sweeps in the eastern end of the Son Long Valley.

(g) The final phase of these operations, called WHITE WING (Black Horse), was aimed at destroying the enemy forces in the Cay Giai Mountains southeast of Song Son. This is a forest-covered mountain stronghold where assault was made by bombing holes through the cover and then repelling and using Chinook ladders to assault the dominant high ground and sweep down the hills. This operation was done simultaneously with the 22d Division who swept and blocked along with two battalions of the 2d Brigade in the low ground south of the mountains. No large number of VC were killed, but many were captured and the myth of this being a strong enemy base was exploded.

(h) On 6 March, the operations ended with the 1st Cav forces back in the area south of Song Son where they had started 41 days before. The division had made a 360 degrees traverse around Song Son in which enemy contact was maintained for 41 consecutive days.

(1) The results of this 41 day operation were:

1. With the aid of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) forces, the division returned 140,000 Vietnamese to RVN control by clearing the enemy from the coastal plain north of Song Son.

2. The inhabitants of the Dak Lao and Son Long Valleys were given a chance to be freed of VC domination by moving to areas which were under government control. About half of the total residents responded.

3. A hard blow was struck at enemy units which had long threatened Song Son and Route 1 from Qui Nhon to Song Son. All three regiments of the Sao Vang Division (the Quyet Chien, the Quyet Thang and the Quyet Tam Regiments) were engaged, rendering five of the nine battalions ineffective. Additionally, a mortar company, a recoilless rifle company, an anti-aircraft company, and a signal company were rendered ineffective. Three field hospitals were also captured. Specific results of this fighting were
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

EMEY LOSSES

KIA 1342 (BC)
1746 (wet)
WIA 1348 (wet)

**Includes 42 personnel killed

VOC 633
VGS 1060
Chieu Hoi 485
Indiv Wpns 208

Captured & Civco rice 91 tons
Captured & Civco salt 41 tons

*Enemy captured included a Battalion Commander, mortar company commander and Regimental headquarters executive officer. Weapons captured included parts of a 105mm Howitzer; ten 12.7 and three 50 caliber machine guns, all types of ammunition (including 126 rounds 105mm) communication equipment and individual equipment in large amounts were also captured.

4. Much tactical intelligence was obtained which was useful to the division and of significant strategic importance to higher headquarters. It was this type of intelligence which enabled the division to maintain forty-one consecutive days of enemy contact, a length of time which was unheard of to this time in this type warfare.

5. The ability to air assault into even the most difficult terrain was demonstrated, yielding an unexpected tactical advantage to the division forces.

6. The division artillery was employed in unlikely areas thus providing greater tactical advantage while giving continuous and complete coverage to all tactical infantry and cavalry units. This was the first time 155mm Howitzers were emplaced by helicopters.

7. Two airfields were built by the division engineers, a 2100 foot CV-2 and C-123 strip north of Bong Son and a 3200 foot strip west of Phu Cat capable of parking 8 C-130’s.

8. Continuous psychological operations were conducted which produced 593 prisoners, 485 Chieu Hoi and kept the inhabitants of the areas informed as to what to do to avoid harm and how to return to government control.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

2. Fighting was successfully conducted in densely populated areas, strongly defended by the VC, with minimal damage or casualties to non-combatant personnel.

10. Complete coordination and cooperation was maintained in combat operations on a daily basis with the ROK, the ROK Air Force and Marines in this long complex operation.

11. At least 4 infantry battalions (usually 6) were maintained in sustained operations, 65 kilometers from base camp for 41 consecutive days, thus laying to rest any residual doubt about an airborne division's ability to conduct sustained combat operations.

(4) 20 February Attack on Camp Redcliff. At 0020 hours, 20 February 1966, elements of the 407th VC Battalion attacked Camp Redcliff with a well-coordinated attack including concurrently an assault on Hon Cong mountain (BR 5346) as the main attack; an infiltration of the barrier on the opposite side of Camp Redcliff (BR 57486) as a diversion; and a mortar attack on the division base area. The VC company attacking Hon Cong used one platoon to conduct the actual attack on the communications facility atop Hon Cong with two platoons being used in ambush positions to attack any ground relief forces which might be committed. The attack on the communications facility did not succeed in destroying any of the vans or transmission facilities except for the destruction of four generators and the capture of one 60 machine gun. All reinforcement of the facility was performed by helicopter thus avoiding the enemy ambush sites. The infiltration of the base resulted in 3 personal entering through the barrier, all three of whom were KIA. The mortar attack delivered 106 82mm mortar rounds into the western positions of the division base from a position to the north of the base.

RESULT:

FRIENDLY LOSSES

6 KIA
1 WIA

FRIENDLY LOSSES

7 KIA
62 WIA
1 CH-130 destroyed
8 CH-47 damaged (all repairable)
4 Generators destroyed

(5) Operation JIM BOWIE: In Operation JIM BOWIE, which began on 13 March, 1st and 3d Brigades executed a search and destroy operation in
Operational Report on Lessons Learned

northern Binh Dinh province against the suspected Ken Truk VC base area. The operation had been delayed for 3 days by low ceilings each morning. This precluded the execution of the desired combination of TAC air sorties, armed helicopter attacks, and airdropped assaults prior to darkness. A ceiling above 4000 feet absolute was desired but the operation was finally executed with a broken ceiling of 1200 feet. Only light resistance with very limited contact resulted from this operation. On 21 March the 1st Brigade was returned to base to proceed to the Pleiku area and commence Operation LINCOLN, 90 kilometers to the west. The 3rd Brigade continued Operation JUN BOWIL by conducting a ground and heliborne sweep from the operational area, thru the old Special Forces Camp Kamack area back to the division base at An Kho ending the operation on 28 March. Although this operation had relatively light contact, it destroyed a goodly number of way stations, training areas, and caches of supplies and provided excellent intelligence of the trails and routes in this vital area near the division base. Of interest is the fact that this operation was logistically directed from the Division base at An Kho, 60 kilometers away.

The results of this operation were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENEMY LOSSES</th>
<th>FRIENDLY LOSSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA 25 (BC)</td>
<td>KIA 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA 3 (lst)</td>
<td>WIA 377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA 10 (lst)</td>
<td>The majority were punji stakes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCC 7</td>
<td>Only 7 personnel required evacuation from the Division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCS 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiv wpn 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although this operation did not large numbers of enemy personnel and equipment the following positive benefits were derived:

(a) The techniques of assault operations in mountainous and extremely dense jungle terrain were improved.

(b) A double-sling system was developed for lifting Howitzers by CH-47. This system allowed the artillery crew to ride in the aircraft, with the Howitzer being slung loaded underneath and a sling load of 105mm ammunition slung loaded under the Howitzer. This provided for a quick-reacting package which could be deposited in a small area within a LZ.

(c) The intelligence gained was very valuable in determining actual enemy strength and geographic information of the area.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 1st Cav Div (AM), 5 May 1966

(6) Operation LINCOLN:

(a) On 25 March the division began Operation LINCOLN in the western Pleiku Province - a search and destroy operation in the vicinity of Duc Co, Plei Me and the Chu Pong Massif.

(b) Initially the 1st Brigade was committed. One battalion air assaulted directly from the An Kho base by UH-1D and CH-47 to an LZ vicinity of Duc Co. This 130 kilometer air assault established a record for the co-belt air assault movement of an entire battalion. The other two battalions moved to the area of operations by C-130 and ground convoy. Initially the brigade conducted small unit recon patrols north and east of the Chu Pong Massif, while the 1/9 Cavalry Squadron screened along the Cambodian Border north and south of Chu Pong. On 30 March the 1/9 Cav sighted 3 VC in the open south of Chu Pong (YV-63678) and observed 30 VC hiding. They committed a platoon which came under heavy fire and was reinforced with company C of the 1/12 Cavalry. This company too became heavily engaged during the night and was reinforced in the morning by the remainder of the battalion. As a result of this operation 3 UH-1D’s were destroyed, with one CH-47 and one UH-ID downed, but recovered.

RESULTS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENEMY LOSSES</th>
<th>FRIENDLY LOSSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIL. 75</td>
<td>KIL. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC. 6</td>
<td>WLB. 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiv Wpns 14</td>
<td>UH-1D 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) At 1000 hours the following morning (31 March) the decision was made to advance the time schedule of the operation. This was done by assuming operational control of the 3d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division and by moving the 3d Brigade to Plei Me. By nightfall the 3d Brigade had closed including its supporting artillery, engineers and FOB. One Battalion was moved by CV-2 directly to Plei Me, the 3d Brigade base, while another battalion moved by ground convoy and C-130 to Pleiku.

(d) The Chu Pong Massif was then attacked with all three Brigades, the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division from the north, 1st Brigade from the south and the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division from the east. The actual attack was initiated on 4 April by establishing blocking positions along the Cambodian Border to prevent enemy withdrawal across the border. In the course of the attack the entire Chu Pong was traversed with light contact. No bunkers or cave systems were discovered. It thus became apparent that the myth of the Chu Pong base was indeed a myth. SKR reports did indicate a sizable force to the west of Chu Pong across the Cambodian
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

Border. Of curious interest, Landing Zones XYL and XMNY, the site of the November In Drang Campaign, showed no signs of having been occupied since the departure of the division. The operation was terminated on 8 April.

RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ENEMY LOSSES</th>
<th>FRIENDLY LOSSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XIA</td>
<td>447 (80)</td>
<td>XIA 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232 (Est)</td>
<td></td>
<td>WL 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>163 (Est)</td>
<td>UK-1D's 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOC</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENEMY EQUIPMENT CAPTURED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual weapons</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew-served weapons</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4lb blocks TNT</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packs</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binoculars</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tons Rice</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 bed hospital</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar Sights</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar Sights</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiesters</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds .50 Ammunition</td>
<td>4,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds 12.7mm RL Amm</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds 82mm Mortar Amm</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flares</td>
<td>1,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.30i Radio</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICK-10 Radios</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boxes of Documents</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm Mortar Bipod</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numerous SOI Items</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) This operation was the 1st Cavalry Division's first opportunity to combine the relatively heavy elements of the 25th Infantry Division, a tank company and their armored cavalry squadron, with its APC's, with the very light mobile operations of the lst Cavalry Division. A team composed of elements of the division's 4th cavalry squadron, with 4 company 3/4 armor (9 tanks and 17 APC's) and a heavy artillery battalion (8" and 175mm gun) proved particularly effective. The tanks, APC's and artillery moved with relative ease over the lightly wooded Pleiku area using the helicopters as their eyes. This team operated from Pleiku to Dac Co and from Pleiku to Plei Ne to area, TURNLE (near the eastern edge of the Om long massif) and thence to vicinity the Cambodian border along the In Drang River. Desupply of the tanks and artillery was by CH-47. The tanks proved very useful in quickly clearing LZ's. The tanks, and artillery in turn, were able to operate almost unrestrictedly because they could be directed and resupplied by helicopter wherever they were.

(f) From the support viewpoint, the engineers built a membrane-covered 0-130 strip (3500 foot) capable of parking 10 O-130's using the new T-17 membrane at Le Thanh (Z. 120310), southwest of Goteock, where
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

the 1st Brigade forward OI, brigade base and support elements were located. An equal fact was the construction at LZ C-T3 (southeast of Chu Pong) of a 2300 foot 0-123 strip capable of parking 6 O-123's at a time. This air strip provided direct support for a battalion task force to include artillery and direct resupply. For this strip, 51 tons of airborne engineer equipment was moved into and out of the site by helicopter alone. The entire strip was constructed in 96 hours.

(g) This operation provided detailed intelligence as to what actually was located in the so-called Chu Pong bases and again provided valuable area intelligence for future operations.

(7) Operation MOBY I:

(a) Three days after Operation LINCOLN, on 11 April, the division commenced Operation MOBY I in the western Moc Lo-Kontum provinces (along the Cambodian Border) to locate infiltration routes, interdict enemy movements and destroy VC forces and installations in the area of operations.

(b) Two brigades, the 1st and 3d Brigades, operated in an area along the Cambodian Border extending 70 kilometers north of highway 19 while the 1/9 Cavalry Squadron and an attached company operated in an area from Dak To to the Cambodian Border. The Division area of operations for MOBY I was 70 x 120 kilometers.

(c) This operation was characterized by small unit recon and ambush patrols from bases in the area of operations. Enemy contact remained light throughout the operation and consisted mostly of sniper fire. On one occasion brief contact was made with an estimated enemy platoon. Excellent knowledge of the Cambodian Border trail network was gained and a large number of small LZ's were located. This operation was conducted in conjunction with eight Companies of CIDG personnel from the USA/CIDG camps at Plei Meu, Plei Djerong, Duc Co and Dak To. This gave excellent training to these forces and will undoubtedly raise their esprit and aggressiveness.

RESULTS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ENEMY LOSSES</th>
<th>FRIENDLY LOSSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>3 (killed)</td>
<td>KIA 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>16 (wounded)</td>
<td>WIA 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>WIA 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

UNIT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Switchboards</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Grenades (cases)</th>
<th>75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75mm M-14 Rounds</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>50 Cal Ammo (cases)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120mm Mortar Rounds</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>82mm Mortar Rounds</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines (type unknown)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mortar Rounds</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosives (cases)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Operation MOBY II:

(a) On 21 April the 2d Brigade commenced Operation MOBY II, a search and destroy operation in northeastern Ieikun Province. The mission of MOBY II was to locate infiltration routes, intercept the enemy and destroy enemy forces and installations in the area of operation.

(b) No significant hostile contact was made until 22 April, when a heliborne assault into LZ HUNG (AR 927572) encountered heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. No further significant contact was made in the first phase of the operation. Sweeping actions netted 27 VGS, 1 Chieu Hoii small arms, 3050 rounds of small arms ammo, 8 grenades, 10 bengalor torpedos, 1 pair field glasses, 1 bedroll and 1900 lbs of rice.

(c) Phase II of the operation began with the deployment to Kontum Province on 25 April. Recon in force movements northeast of Kontum City met with no enemy contact until 28 April, when B Company 2/12 Cavalry received 15 rounds of small arms fire vicinity Bn 112062. Artillery fire was directed to the origin of the small arms fire. On 29 April, A Company 1/5 Cavalry engaged 5 persons vicinity AR 887487 with small arms and M-16.

Results of MOBY II as of the reporting date (30 Apr 66) were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LHDY LOSSES</th>
<th>FDLFY LOSSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>4 (BC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VGS</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EQUIPMENT

3059 rounds
Grenades 11
Mines 19
Rice 3400 lbs

6. Combat Developments: During the period of this report the
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

Division participated in tests and evaluation of the following equipment:

(1) Tests were conducted on the helicopter trap weapon on 26-28 January 1966 in conjunction with JRATA. The results achieved were unsatisfactory due to the high percentage of duds encountered.

(2) Five power units (1.5 KW, 28 Volt DC) were tested to determine if the equipment could be used as an interim solution to the requirement for an auxiliary power source for the UH-1B command aircraft while on the ground in the forward areas. The equipment proved satisfactory in performance but was determined to be too heavy and required excessive space in the aircraft.

(3) Two L-L acoustic telescopes were tested during tactical operations. The equipment was very fragile and could not be carried due to the configuration. Numerous mechanical problems were encountered with the wiring circuits due to the equipment being too fragile for normal handling.

(4) The two commercial telescopes tested during the last reporting period were returned and an evaluation report submitted. Both scopes were satisfactory and compatible with the respective weapons (M-14 and M-16 rifles)

(5) Evaluations were conducted with the shotgun adapter for the M-79 Grenade Launcher. The equipment proved to be excellent in meeting the requirement for a close-in area type weapon. It was determined that the weapon was effective up to 30 mtr and would penetrate fairly heavy vegetation. This division favors using the 40mm multiple projectile when stocks become available. This will eliminate the grenadier from having to remove the adapter to fire HE or other ammunition and will achieve a greater killing zone.

(6) The test program with the XM546, 105mm beehive round continues. There was no requirement for combat firing of the round during the reporting period. The XM590 - 90mm beehive, XM591 - 90mm HE, and XM591 - 106mm beehive rounds were received for test and evaluation. The initial evaluation reports will be submitted based on combat operational results.

(7) The initial battalion size packet of individual and crew-served weapons night vision sights was received during mid-January. An additional packet was received during March. The first packet
was evaluated within one infantry battalion and later distributed equally to all divisional combat units. The sights have proven satisfactory for ground night observation except in areas of heavy vegetation. The weight of both sights makes it difficult for them to easily be transported during tactical operations. The individual sight has proven satisfactory for use from helicopters at altitudes above 1000 feet on nights when there is no quarter or moon. The crew-served sight could not be focused during tests from the helicopter.

(8) One Stanford Research Institute non-directional bullet detector was evaluated and proved to be very satisfactory in detecting ground fire. An evaluation report was submitted through command channels which included a recommendation that the device be procured as an interim solution until development of the directional detectors.

(9) Twenty-two 130-lb clusters, canister, riot control, CS were received during the quarter for test and evaluation. Thirteen of the clusters were used, nine of them on combat support missions. The clusters all functioned well except one which had probably been subjected to too much rain prior to use. All of the clusters were modified by mounting the timers at a 60 degree angle from the strong back assembly so as to permit release of the cluster from 1500 foot altitude instead of the designed 500 foot altitude. The clusters were dropped from the pod mounting racks of the M16 ammun subsystem. Coverage of the munitions ranged from about 100 x 150 meters to 150 x 300 meters depending on the altitude of functioning. The only design deficiency found was that the timers were not accurate. An evaluation report was being submitted at the end of the period recommending that the cluster be procured as a CS delivery system.

During the period covered by this report the psychological warfare effort of the Division developed from a part time duty under the staff supervision of the G-5 into a primary duty under the staff supervision of the G-3 on 7 February. The Division made extensive use of psy war in support of 6 major operations: Operations TASH WHITE I and II, BLUE LIGHT, HUSH WHITE WING, JILL BOUL, LINCOLN, MOSBY I and II. (See incl for samples of leaflets used).

(1) Operations TASH WHITE I and II covered the period 1 - 17 January. During this time 6,000 leaflets were distributed in two missions.

(2) Operation HUSH WHITE WING covered the period 25 January through 6 March. During this operation 85 missions distributed 37,600,000 leaflets. Besides the leaflets 104 loudspeaker missions were
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

(3) Operation JIM BOWIE covered the period 13 - 27 March. Some 26 missions distributed 1,160,000 leaflets. Twenty loudspeaker missions were conducted; 27 hours and 30 minutes speaker broadcast time was presented; 4 interpreter teams and 483 ralliers were recorded.

(4) Operation LINCOLN covered the period 25 March - 9 April during which time 55 missions distributed 1,126,000 leaflets. Fifty-six loudspeaker missions were completed; speaker broadcast time of 70 hours and 55 minutes was used; 12 ground loudspeaker interpreter teams worked and 1 raller was recorded.

(5) Operation MOBY I covered the period 11 - 17 April. During this period 23 missions distributed 2,365,000 leaflets. Some 23 loudspeaker missions were conducted; 28 speaker broadcast hours were used and 1 raller recorded a rany Wav tape.

(6) During Operation MOBY II from 21 April to the reporting date (30 April), 24 missions distributed 2,480,000 leaflets. Some 21 loudspeaker missions were conducted; speaker broadcast time of 21 hours was used and 10 ground loudspeaker and 1 interpreter team was used.

(7) The rany Ops enjoyed particular success whenever the Division maintained contact with enemy forces. Most apparent in the Bong Son Campaign when 483 VC/NV4 rallied. More than 100 additional VC/NV4 rallied to local forces following the departure of the Division elements. The effectiveness of rany Ops. During Operation LINCOLN, even though the Cambodian border was close enough for retreat, 5 NV4 allowed themselves to be taken prisoners. Experience has proven that casualties, sickness, lack of food, artillery fire, air strikes and continued day and night broadcasts of CHILO HOI appeals weaken the will of the enemy. During this reporting period rany Ops facilities were expanded to day and night operations with the result of an increase in numbers of ralliers which was impressive. During the initial phase of the Bong Son Operation, hostile fire from populated areas was necessary. A problem existed in relation to noncombatant casualties. The resulting procedure was established: First, a warning to the population and VC not to fire at our aircraft. If firing continued, the non-combatants were instructed to move away from the populated area, and after the strike, the VC were blamed for the destruction. The non-combatants were allowed one hour to comply.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

with the instructions. Although those procedures were time consuming, the Division adopted them as necessary procedures because of the potential non-combatant casualty problem.

(8) The VC/NVA propaganda effort significantly increased in both volume and variety with occasional high quality printing on a good grade of paper. The themes were not new. They represented the standard Communist party line of Imperialism and war mongering leaders. The soldiers were exhorted to go home, not fight and disobey combat orders. However, even with the increase of the VC/NVA propaganda effort there was little danger to the integrity of Division troops.

(9) During the reporting period, the key Ops resources were reorganized at I FFOMUSV level. This eliminated the attached Division key Ops support and created a delay of 7 - 10 days in obtaining requested leaflets. Additional support has been requested to enable the Division to control both printing and ground loudspeaker interpreter team capability.

c. Aircraft Operations. During the reporting period, division aircraft flew 236,117 sorties, moved 54,417 tons of cargo and 323,339 troops. In performing these missions, 343 aircraft were hit by ground fire, with 23 being downed. Of the downed aircraft, 15 were recovered and repairable. During the entire period, there were 10 crew members killed and 76 wounded as a result of enemy action (See Incl 7).

h. Operational Problems:

(1) The major operational problem during the reporting period continued to be the limited availability of sufficient numbers of mission ready aircraft. The aircraft availability throughout most of the reporting period was such that it frequently required modification of tactical operations, rather than permitting a full range of tactical schemes of maneuver. The air mobile concept, as tested in COMUS, provided for a helicopter lift battalion which could lift the combat elements of an infantry battalion. Even if comparable aircraft availability existed in Vietnam to that for which the T65h was designed, a severe reaction in air mobility would result in Vietnam due primarily to the much higher air density prevalent in this Division's operational area (over 4000 feet density altitude), coupled with the added weight of armor necessary emergency supplies, and ammunition has reduced the lift capability of a lift battalion by roughly one-third. Superimposed on this problem, was a reduced availability of mission ready aircraft due to lack of all types of aircraft parts.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVOG:
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

It is anticipated that this problem will be considerably improved in the future for two reasons. Aircraft spare parts arrived in much greater quantities toward the end of the reporting period. Separate action was initiated on 27 April, as part of the proposed TOAII revision, to request extra aircraft and maintenance personnel for operations in Vietnam.

(2) The burden of required operational reports continued to be quite high and consumed much valuable staff time at all levels. A study was conducted concerning reports, their coverage and their distribution. This study indicated that all significant actions were being reported at least twice in varying detail to higher headquarters, and that in most cases the two or three reports required for each operation went to the same office of the higher headquarters. The study also indicated that the most comprehensive reports had the shortest reporting times, while simpler reports had longer reporting times. Action was initiated to Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam regarding simplification, reduced repetition and adjustment of reporting times.

5. (c) Logistics
   a. General

   (1) During the period covered by this report, logistical support was provided for 8 major operations: NATADOK I and II, BLUE LIGHT, ASHER-WHITE WING, JIM BOWIE, LINCOLN, HARRY I and II. A detailed study of airborne logistical support was completed. The results of this study are shown by major operation in Enclosure 5.

   (2) Operations NATADOK I and II covered the period 1 January through 17 January and were one brigade operations supported by the 1st Forward Support Element (FSE). The 1st FSE was located in the vicinity of Catoock (24 202342) and received backup support from Log Cond activities at Camp Holloway, Iloika.

   (3) Operation BLUE LIGHT was a one brigade operation conducted during the period 4 - 12 January, inclusive. This operation was supported by the 2d FSE co-located at Camp Holloway with the supporting Log Cond supply activity.

   (4) Operations ASHER-WHITE WING were conducted during the period of 24 January through 6 March in the northeastern Binh Dinh Province. These were two brigade operations with all three brigades participating during the period. The two FSEs located with brigade bases at My Quy and Long Son supported their respective brigades. Resupply from Log Cond, was effected by ground line of communication (GLOC) over Route 1.
CONFIDENTIAL

"A.VCOQ"

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

which was secured and maintained by ARVN and AOX forces. Log Cond supply
points were co-located with Division Support Command elements in the Phu
Cat and Bong Son areas and resulted in outstanding coordination and
liaison.

(5) Operation JUNO II, 13 March through 27 March,
was a two brigade operation supported by the 1st and 3d FSB's operating
from the Division Base. The FSB's configured their units in the base area
to respond to brigade demands on a timely basis. The FSB's were supported
directly by Support Command with backup support coming from the An Khe
BS/GS Battalion. Reports from the committed brigades indicated that logis-
tical support provided during the JUNO II Operation was the most complete
and most responsive since the Division has been in Vietnam. Units were
resupplied by helicopter a maximum distance of 65 kilometers. An emergency
resupply point with JP-4 and AVGAS was established vicinity the CLOT Camp
in Vinh Thanh Valley. This supply point was serviced by GLOC from the Qui
Nhon Support Area.

(6) Operation LINCOLN began on 25 March with the com-
mitment of the 1st Brigade in the Pleiku area. The 1st FSB was established
at Le Thanh. Log Cond co-located their Forward Supply activity at Le Thanh.
On 31 March the 3d FSB deployed to Plei Me to support 3d Brigade operations
in that area. The plan of logistical support for the 1st and 3d Brigades
was a GLOC from Qui Nhon Support Area to the forward elements of the 34th
BS/GS Battalion in Pleiku, then a GLOC to Division FSB's at Le Thanh and
Plei Me. A Log Cond liaison officer was present with Division elements at
Plei Me. Operation LINCOLN terminated 8 April.

(7) Operation MOBY I, which began on 11 April and termi-
nated on 18 April was a two brigade and 1/9 Cavalry Squadron TF operation
and was supported by the 1st, 2d and 3d FSB's located at Le Thanh, Plei
Mrong, and Dak To. Forward Support activities of the Qui Nhon Support Area
were co-located with the Division FSB's at Le Thanh and Dak To. Log Cond
liaison officers were located with Division logistical elements at Plei
Mrong. Resupply was characterized by GLOC from Pleiku via Qui Nhon to Le
Thanh, Plei Mrong, and Dak To, with throughput from Qui Nhon to Le Thanh
and Plei Mrong. A partial GLOC was utilized in effecting resupply from
Pleiku to Dak To. During this operation, the Division FSB's were located
over a 115 kilometer spread supporting troop operations on a 175 kilometer
front.

(8) Operation MOBY II began on 21 April with commitment
of a 2d Brigade TF to the Pleiku area. The 2d FSB was established at Pleiku.
and was supported from Log C-12 stocks that had been built up at Camp Holloway, Icikau. On 25 April the 2B FRC displaced to Kien Tu as the brigade entered Phase II of the operation. Log support was received from supplies on-stocked at Kien Tu for this operation. Resupply was affected by GLOG from Qui Nhon and Kontum with minimal stocks of J-4, M-30 and some Class V items was established at Nhat Nau Gi. Operation HIGHWAY II was continuing at the end of the reporting period.

(9) Qui Nhon to Kien Tu is approximately 225 kilometers and Qui Nhon to Dak To is approximately 250 kilometers. These long road distances caused some unique problems. Some of these roads required extensive engineering effort to repair damage inflicted by hostile action. A 30 kilometer section of secondary road from Icikau to the junction of Highway 1E had to be repaired. In spite of efforts made to expediently handle vehicles involved in the throughput from Qui Nhon, it was not feasible to effect a one day turn around. This reduced the available truck transport. This long GLOG disclosed a sore spot, though not yet critical, shortage of water transport existing in the 1st Log Cond elements operating out of Qui Nhon.

(10) During the LINCOLN/HIGHWAY operations the security of logistical convey from Icikau to Le Thanh, Kien Tu, Kien Lung, Kontum, and Dak To and return was a primary consideration. Hostile snipers, air and ground, and communication capabilities were provided for these logistical conveys. No losses due to hostile action were incurred.

(11) The new airfields constructed were: area DOG near Long Son (BR 8702), Interite, capable of C-123 use; Nam Can Field, near Lam Cat (BR 8854), Interite, capable of C-129 use; Le Thanh, all weather, T-17 Lanscrams covered (the first constructed in Vietnam), capable of C-130 use; and area 0.2 (TV 9589), Interite, capable of C-123 use. In addition to this new construction, the airfield at Kien Lung was improved to take C-130's on the parking and taxiways at Kontum and Nhat Nau Gi were improved to increase their capability for handling C-130's. This airfield construction and improvement program materially increased the range of Division operations by providing the additional facilities needed for logistical support of operations distant from present airfields.

(12) A first was accomplished during Operation LINCOLN-WHITE when a CH-54 lifted and positioned a 185 howitzer in a combat zone. This was made possible after field fabrication and testing of a special sling by Division Support Command.

(13) Commanders of units within the Division became aware of the distinct advantages of aerial resupply in certain situations. For
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational report on losses learned

example: During Operation LINCOLN, thirty-five aerial delivery sorties were flown, delivering eighty (80) tons of urgently needed supplies. Two of these sorties, delivering critically needed Class I and V, were flown at midnight to a unit in contact with the enemy, when no other means of effecting re-supply was available. All of these missions were accomplished using the rigging capability organic to this Division and aircraft attached to the Division.

(14) Priority requirements have been met throughout the reporting period by close liaison visits with the support area and Qui Nhon support area.

b. Supply and Services

(1) Class I: The Division subsisted primarily on Class I modified 4 ration, with C ration being used as required on field operations. Delivery of fresh produce was increased from 3000 pounds daily to 9000 pounds daily during the month of April. Effective 26 April the Air Force assumed the mission of transporting produce from Dalat to Qui Nhon for the Division. The funding for these produce contracts will expire at the end of the current fiscal year; however, no problems are anticipated in funding these contracts for FY 67. The Division was scheduled to go on a permanent modified 4 ration as of 1 April. However, modified 4 rations were only received on an as available basis. The objective to provide the Division with a permanent modified 4 ration issue was negated by a lack of adequate refrigerated storage in Qui Nhon and the An Khe area. The problem was further complicated by transportation shortages between Qui Nhon and An Khe. At the end of the reporting period, 1600 cubic foot prefab refrigerators were being installed in the 34th Quartermaster Battalion and nine 800 cubic foot units in the Division Class I plants. These refrigerators would solve the storage problem; however, generators were not available to power any of this refrigeration.

(2) Class II & IV: A Self Service Supply Center and a Central Issue Facility became available to the Division during April. Liaison between this non-warehouse Qui Nhon Support Center was instrumental in establishing these facilities. They are operated by the 34th Quartermaster Battalion. However, no such facilities were available to the Division and all requests for clothing and expendable supplies were channeled through the Division Supply Officer on requisitions. The establishment of these facilities reduced the excessive work load on stock record personnel and expedited processing of supply requests for major items and non-expendable supplies. Controls were imposed by this headquarters on the purchase of these items which were continually in short supply to assure equitable distribution to using units. Concurrent with the establishment of these facilities, it was agreed by this headquarters and Qui Nhon that all requests from the 34th...
AVCOG
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

Cavalry Division for major items of equipment and non-expendable supplies would be sent to Qui Nhon. Formerly, requests were sent through the 34th Quartermaster Battalion, An Khe. This new policy reduced supply reaction time by eliminating one processing agency from the supply system. During this report period, the civilian laundry contract was broadened to provide increased service to the division. The new contract provided for laundry of cooks whites, sheets and pillow cases. On 24 April the quartermaster laundry integrated a dyeing process in the laundry cycle to dye all white underwear, towels, and handkerchiefs an OD color. This dyeing station will be a permanent addition to the laundry. Replacements for mission essential equipment lost during tactical engagements were received on a timely basis. The overall responsiveness of the supply agencies showed a marked improvement during the period. Although some items of supply remained in short supply the logistical depot and associated agencies were initiating positive action to correct problems.

(3) Class III: Class III operations functioned smoothly during the reporting period. Three Fuel System Supply Points (FSSP's) were delivered to the Division from Qui Nhon to expand the product handling capacity of the Division. These FSSP's will be deployed with the three FSSP's in support of unit operations. The receipt of these systems greatly increased the forward storage capacity for fuel. The amount of fuel which could be placed at the FSH sites increased the latitude for operation of transportation elements transporting the fuel forward. It provided a storage facility which in capable of operation without overextending available petroleum transporting equipment. Class III operations were stabilized and well tailored to meet the Division requirements.

(4) Class V: The major area of significance during this reporting period was 81mm mortar ammunition, C225, with H-52 series fuse. This ammunition was restricted to emergency combat use only and comprised all 81mm assets on hand. A renovation point for reworking the suspect ammunition was projected for Qui Nhon sometime during the next reporting period. As an interim measure all assets on hand in the Division were being inspected by the 661st Ordnance Ammunition Inspection Team to insure maximum serviceability. Use of this ammunition for 81mm fire for perimeter defense was authorized by USAVR.

(5) The following amounts in short tons were used by the Division in January, February, March and April:

37
CONFIDENTIAL

A VOGG

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

Class I

A Rations

844.2

B Rations

5.001.3

C Rations

732.3

Class II

Type AVGAS

Jallons

939,000

JP-4

5,848,632

MOGAS

1,584,895

DIESEL

681,529

Class V

Tonnage

7,346.9

c. Transportation

(1) USAF airlift in support of MOSBY I was unsatisfactory. Twenty-six sorties were programmed to lift the 1st Brigade from Oasis to An Khe on 17 April. Load time confirmed by IFFV was 0735. The first airlift arrived at 0855. By 1730 only 21 sorties had been flown and 12 CV-2B sorties were required to close the 1st Brigade by 1915 hours.

(2) USAF airlift was requested to move the 2d Brigade TF to Pleiku on 21 April. Two aircraft positioned at An Khe on the evening of 19 April were damaged by the attack on An Khe Airfield in the early hours of 20 April. The airlift on 21 April was delayed by late arrival of the C-130 aircraft but a total of ten aircraft were devoted to the effort during the afternoon and the programmed 16 sorties were completed at 1730 hours.

(3) Aircraft repair parts continued to be flown to An Khe from Saigon by the Southeast Asia (SEA) airlift System. Additional airlift was obtained from USARV 04 on 20 April and CV-2B aircraft were employed to supplement USAF airlift for project code 031 through 034 aircraft repair parts shipment.

(4) On 8 April a Caribou mounted refueling system was tested by the 00, Support Command and found to be unsatisfactory because of the weight of the system. A formal evaluation was forwarded to Headquarters, USARV.

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Reports on Lessons Learned

(5) On 19 April the 70th Eng Bn began to work to replace defective pierced steel planking (PSP) on the an Khe airfield. Work was accomplished at night to avoid cessation of airlift operations.

(6) Scheduled bus service from Base Camp through an Khe to the an Khe airfield began on 25 March 66 using army commercial type buses. The CO, an Khe DS/GS Bn, was given the responsibility for operation of the bus service. Seven drivers were provided from Division resources to DS/GS Bn on a temporary basis to operate the buses.

d. Maintenance

(1) Ground Maintenance

(a) A new Redball Express Format was received from 1st Log Comd requiring units to use a block form to facilitate transmitting information onto punch cards.

(b) The XM-102 Light Weight Howitzer Calibration Team arrived in the Division and immediately started calibrating the XM-102's that were on hand in Division Artillery. As of 30 April 66, 56 each XM-102's had arrived in the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

(c) Three critically needed IU 304 generators for the AN/MPQ-4 Radar Sets arrived 26 March and were issued to Division Artillery. A list of deadline parts for the radar sets was transmitted to the lst Log Comd through the Division Liaison Office. 1st Log Comd prepared to send these parts from float radar sets to the Division to facilitate removal of all MPQ-4 sets from deadline during the next reporting period.

(2) Aircraft Maintenance

(a) Nine (9) OH-13S, 10 UH-1B, 23 UH-1D, 3 OH-47s and 1 CH-54 aircraft were dropped from property accountability due to combat and crash damage.

(b) Two (2) OH-13S, 9 UH-1B, 10 UH-1B/540, 10 UH- and 1 CH-54 were issued to the Division from theater assets.

(c) As a result of the Mabry Committee's recommendation, 198 aircraft mechanics were requested as additions to aviation unit's TO&E's.

(d) Ten (10) RT 348 for AN/AIRC 54 radio and 19 each CU942 couplers were received as float stock from theater stocks.

(3) Status of Maintenance at End of Period:

(a) Aircraft ASL 51.4% fill

Avionics 34.5% fill

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

2. Armament 36.5\% fill

3. Aircraft 61.8\% fill

(b) Ground ASL 48.1\% fill

(c) Vehicle deadlined 5.1\%

(d) Aircraft EDP 10.7\%

(e) Aircraft availability 68\%

f. Construction and Facilities

(1) Construction materials for the self help building of latrines arrived in the form of a ship load of lumber, plywood and cement. Pacific Architects and Engineers, a contracting firm, will prefab the latrines.

(2) A new Division Regulation 420-15, Repair and Utilities, was published 20 April routing all Job Order requests through this Headquarters. A review of all outstanding JOR's resulted in the cancellation of several involving use of laborers inside the barrier.

f. Medical

(1) Disease and Injury Statistical Data:

(a) Injured as a Result of Hostile Action (IRH) 1135

(b) Non Battle Injuries (NBI) 668

(c) Diseases 2842

(a) Malaria 587

(b) Scrub Typhus 33

(c) Hook Worm 30

(d) Psychiatric Cases 322

(e) Others 1900

(d) Killed in Action (KIA) 206

(e) Returned to duty 2251
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

(f) Remained in Hospital * 2168

* Some of this number were returned to duty, but records on them were not available as of the end of the period.

(2) Discussion of Diseases

(a) The number of malaria cases dropped in January, February, and March when compared to late 1965, but a marked increase took place in April reflecting Operation JIM BOWIE in the Vinh Thanh Valley and Operation MOSEY I & II along the Cambodian border.

(b) Hookworm was recognized in 30 1st Cavalry Division personnel. It had previously been reported in troops operating in the Delta region but never before in American personnel within the II Corps area. These infections probably occurred during the Tung Son activities.

(c) A consultant, Major Phillip Russell, the Virologist from the SAFO Laboratory in Bangkok reviewed all cases of Fevers of Unknown Origin (UO) occurring in division personnel. It was his opinion that most of them were caused by Anterior Cytopathogenic Human Orphan (EBOO) Viruses. A study of the condition was beyond the current capabilities of the research facilities in South East Asia.

(3) Discussion of IHL, WLI, and NBI

(a) KL/IHL ratio. 206/1131 or 1/5.5 which was considerably different from the ratio of 1/4 observed in Korea.

(b) Types of IHL's

During the reporting period 446 punji stake wounds occurred. This was almost 5 times as great as the 83 which had occurred previously.

(c) NBI. No unusual non-battle injuries occurred.

(4) Medical Directives Published: Revisions, updating and/or changes were made on six Medical Circulars during the reporting period. These changes pertained to Housing and Control of Respiratory Diseases; Medical Civil Action Program (MCAP); Field Sanitation Team Training; Hearing Program; Control of other Communicable Diseases and Problems of Extreme Climate, and Control of Amphetamines and Barbiturates.

(5) Medical News Letters: Advance Civilian Education Opportunities and Difficulty in Receiving Medical Supplies were the topics of two newsletters released 3 Jan 66. Following these were Class III Physicals of Door Gunnery; Administration of IV Fluids; Audiograms; Mobile Army Surgical

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

Hospital; Optical Laboratory and use of Tranquilizers; Black Water Fever; Health and Dental Records; Penicillin, Facilities; Immunization Medical Clearance; Gamma Globulin; Spectacles Requisitioning; Course Announcement; Professional Training; Residency Training; Rabies; Food Handlers Certificates; Dental Facilities; Course Announcement; Wound Study Data Collection Program; Reporting of Venereal Disease.

(6) Civil Affairs Activities

(a) MEDCAP: All regulations and directives on MEDCAP II activities are published and MEDCAP II supplies are available to all teams with an approved project.

(b) Comprehensive bilingual directives for Ice Plant and restaurant operations were written.

(7) Inspections

(a) Inspections were made of health and narcotic records and comprehensive reports were rendered.

(b) Mess and sanitary inspections were conducted.

(8) Preventive medicine: All units were notified that plague, cholera and gamma globulin immunizations were required.

(9) Problems Unsolved:

(a) A good malaria prophylaxis tablet was still not available at reporting date.

(b) The standard prophylaxis tablet, Chloroquine-Primaquine, FSN 6505-755-5043 (C-P Tablet) has been proven to be unsatisfactory for two reasons:

1. It is not effective against many strains of Plasmodium Falciparum malaria, the predominant strain found in Vietnam. The division has had 1882 cases of Plasmodium malaria since its arrival in Vietnam. All these individuals are believed to have taken their prophylaxis tablet for the following reasons: First, the malaria relapsed with chloroquine treatment, and Second, these were pure infections, i.e., they did not have Plasmodium Viral malaria associated. Twenty-four cases of Vivax malaria have occurred, but all were in individuals who probably did not take the Chloroquine tablet. Since the 1882 patients did not have mixed infections, and since Plasmodium Vivax malaria was prevalent in the area, it was concluded that all 1882 cases took their Chloroquine-Primaquine tablet.

2. The tablet caused diarrhea and gastrointestinal upsets in many individuals.
6. (C) Civil Affairs

a. General. Civil affairs efforts during the period were directed both to support combat operations and civil action in the vicinity of Camp Radcliff.


(1) Operation NATAOH. Approximately 15 tons of captured rice was evacuated from coordinates YA 645487 to Le Thanh District Headquarters for distribution to the refugees and local population. The operation took two days to complete. An additional 45 tons of rice was destroyed because of evacuation difficulties. On 5 January 1966, 160 refugees were transported from Son Tuo to Le Thanh District Headquarters. Some 40,000 expedient leaflets were distributed in the vicinity of the Chu Pong area. The theme of these leaflets was two fold. First to inform Vietnamese citizens to remain in the vicinity of their homes; not to move in roads and to observe the district curfew so that they would not be mistaken for VC and be fired on. Second, to provide safe conduct passes for prospective VC ralliers.

(2) Operation INHERENT WHITING. This operation had the largest civil affairs requirement in support of combat actions of any operation performed in Vietnam to date because it was conducted in the heavily populated Eastern coastal plain - the Hoai Nhơn and Hoai An Districts.

(a) Refugees:

1. Refugees in Bong Son prior to the operation totaled 7,806. As operations began approximately 13,000 war victims moved to Highway 1. District officials initially permitted 3,400 true refugees to enter Bong Son and kept evacuees north of area DOG. During An Lao Valley operations, 4,500 refugees moved to Bong Son. Of those, the division transported 3,322 refugees from An Lao Valley by helicopter. At the end of operations, Bong Son contained 15,836 refugees and Highway 1 north of area DOG contained 11,806 evacuees. Hoai Nhơn District contained a total of 27,652 refugees and evacuees after the operation.

2. In Hoai Nhơn and An Lao Districts the Division captured and evacuated 47 tons of rice and 14 tons of salt to the district headquarters in Bong Son. Evacuation was made by CH-47 aircraft. In addition a two ton cache of rice was captured at BS 645097 and distributed to moody, local civilians.
3. Refugees in Hoi An District prior to 11 February 1966 totaled 7,514. Subsequent operations freed over 10,000 war victims, most of whom occupied vacant buildings or moved into homes of friends between area BIRD and district headquarters. The Division evacuated 320 refugees by helicopter. A total of 2,876 refugees from the Song Long Valley moved into secure areas by foot with their food supplies and personal belongings. The refugees population in Hoi An District at the end of April was 17,622.

4. Hoi An District officials and MACV advisors distributed the following USID supplies to refugees: Bulgar wheat - 68,640 pounds; cooking oil - 1,520 gallons; canned milk - 480 cans. The following items were furnished to the district headquarters by the Division for civil action support of war victims: blankets - 30; soap - 75 bars; VIS magazines - 200; blue medical trousers - 240 and 120 blue medical shirts. GVN civilian supply support of refugees was reduced because the district chief permitted refugees to return to their homes to retrieve food and clothing.

(b) Captured supplies.

1. In Hoi Nhon and Lao Districts the Division captured and evacuated 47 tons of rice and 14 tons of salt to the district headquarters in Bong Son. Evacuation was made by CH-47 aircraft. In addition a two ton cache of rice was captured at BS 843097 and distributed to needy, local civilians.

2. In Hoi An District the Division captured 42 tons of rice. Twenty and one-half tons of this rice and ten pigs were delivered by helicopter to the district headquarters. The remaining 22 tons of rice was evacuated from BS 825828 and BS 825821 by 900 civilians acting under orders from the district chief. Small quantities of VC medical supplies, text books and clothing were captured and presented to VN medical personnel.

(c) Medical Treatment.

1. During sick call activities in Hoi Nhon and Lao Districts, the Division treated 2,362 Vietnamese patients and evacuated 62 seriously injured personnel to the Bong Son dispensary. Medical treatment was provided along Highway 1 and in areas adjacent to tactical operations to assist the GVN. Treatment was given on 35 occasions at 19 different locations.
Operational Report on Lessons Learned

2. In Hoai An District a total of 707 patients were treated. Three seriously injured patients were evacuated to the district dispensary. Treatment was given on fourteen different occasions in the vicinity of tactical areas.

(d) Chieu Hoi

1. During operations in Hoai Nhon and An Lao Districts a total of 408 Chieu Hoi surrendered to GVN officials. Of those 270 used leaflets to surrender; 302 were VC guerrillas, and 106 were infrastructure cadre.

2. A total of 75 Chieu Hoi surrendered to GVN officials during operations in Hoai An District. Of those five utilized safe conduct passes; 50 were VC guerrillas, and 25 were infrastructure cadre.

(e) Short-term, high-impact projects

1. Coordination was effected with an 150D team from the 184th Ordnance Battalion to remove 500, 250 and 100 pound bombs from near Vietnamese hamlets (BS 890062, BS 901129 and BS 895126).

2. Candy was distributed to children.

3. Engineer units repaired Bong Son streets and the roads leading to the three refugee camps.

4. A water pump was installed at Hoai Nhon District dispensary.

5. A VC monument was destroyed at BS 882062.

6. The Division assisted in obtaining Bong Son Catholic Priest to perform services for VN civilians in Hoai An District.

7. Actions were initiated to construct a well and latrine in the new Bong Son refugee camp.

8. A unit solatium contribution; letter of condolence, C4RE fabric kit, and cooking oil were presented through SVN district officials to grandparents of six year old Bong Son traffic victim.

9. In conjunction with SVN officials, C4RE fabric kits and assistance in claims form preparation were given to a VN man and girl who received minor injuries in a misfire in Bong Son.

45
AVUGG

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

10. A Vietnamese widow, child and relatives were escorted to a cemetery in the Division CP area to permit mourning at husband's grave.

11. Hoai Nhon district chief presented 20,000 sheets of leaflets paper featuring GVW flag for use in local VIS Pay Ops program. Assistance was given VIS in formulation of special news bulletin published and distributed in the Bong Son area.

12. Gifts of cooking oil, fabric kits and clothes were distributed through the district chief to 11 VR citizens who forfeited property for forward Division CP area and access roads. Assistance was given in preparation of claims forms and GVW officials were encouraged to expedite processing.

(3) Operations JIM BOWIL had minimal civil affairs activities since it was conducted in an unpopulated area.

(4) Operations LINCOLN, ROSBY I and ROSBY II

(a) General

1. During operations no problems concerning refugees or non-combatant casualties developed due to the absence of civilian communities within the areas of operation.

2. Small caches of rice were discovered during operations in inaccessible locations and evacuation generally was not possible.

(b) Operations in Thanh An District

1. An active civil action program was conducted in Thanh An District. Direct assistance was given to the Thanh An District Chief and NIAC Subsector Advisor in the improvement of the district headquarters defensive perimeter and in the construction of a market place. A pump was also provided so that the headquarters well would be operational. Extensive sick call activities were conducted during which 3,111 patients were treated on 27 occasions at 11 different locations. The following supplies were distributed to newly resettled refugees:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blankets</td>
<td>23 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabric kits</td>
<td>49 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powdered milk</td>
<td>50 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>665 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooking oil</td>
<td>74 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>645 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>175 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap</td>
<td>1,760 bars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. In order to develop good relations with Montagnard and Vietnamese civilians and to win acceptance for US military personnel, distribution was made of 31 boxes of candy, 48 yo-yos, and one case of calendars.

(c) Operations in Kontum, Dak To and Pleiku City area.

1. During operations 135 pounds of VC equipment, medicine and clothing were captured by the 3d Brigade in Kontum Province. This material was presented to Kontum District Headquarters after intelligence processing for distribution to RF soldiers and needy refugees.

2. Headquarters and headquarters Company of the Division made a 3/4 ton truck and driver available to the Kontum District Headquarters for use in transporting lumber to the site of a new hamlet being established south of Kontum City.

3. The village of Plei Ke, west of II Corps Headquarters, was visited and distribution of 57 yo-yos, candy, and chewing gun was made to Montagnard residents.

4. The 1/9 Cav assisted Dak To District officials and MACV advisors by transporting an estimated 3,000 pounds of VC rice from the area of operation to the district headquarters.

(d) Operations in Le Truong District.

1. The Be Klanh Village Chief was provided with an OH-13 helicopter to assist him in conducting a survey of outlying village crop lands. Sick call activities were conducted during which 314 patients were treated on 5 occasions at 4 different locations. In order to improve sanitation standards, a class on the use of soap was given to residents of Be Klanh Village. A small cache of rice (600 pounds) was discovered at coordinates AR925575. The rice was evacuated to Le Truong District Headquarters. The following supplies were distributed to needy residents of Le Truong District:

- Assorted food stuffs
- Vitamin pills - 2 bottles
- Dry Milk - 4 packages
- Cooking Oil - 3 gallons
- Soap - 50 bars
- Salt - 35 pounds
- Blankets - 2 each
- Rice - 600 pounds
C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

a. Civil Actions in the Vicinity of Camp Radcliff

(1) Refugee Centers

(a) Three centers were being supported by 2d Brigade and Support Command as follows: Distribution of food, clothing, building materials, candy, and tools. Barrels furnished for incineration of refuse, and ash removal scheduled. Medical treatment provided regularly. Vector control spraying to eliminate flies and mosquitoes. Concrete platforms constructed around wells to improve sanitation. Partitioning of individual family living quarters. Establishing laundry businesses.

(b) An Tu District Dispensary - 15th Med Bn. This project is about 75% complete. During the reporting period the roof was repaired and walls and floors repaired; a screened-in porch was constructed; VN doctors quarters were completed; VN medical personnel were trained and construction of separate kitchen and new latrine were completed. Further work however is needed to complete interior remodeling, plumbing and a patient room ward. Groundwork on the ward, a 40' x 120' structure began on 27 March.

(c) Model Home. A model home designed to overcome material shortages and provide a better overall product for duplication by indigenous personnel was completed in a new Khe housing area. Materials were furnished by USAID and M&CV subsector advisor and 15th Med Bn supplied funds - the 70th Engineers provided design and technical assistance. Two families, widows and children of PF soldiers and GVN official moved into the home after the 18 Feb dedication ceremonies.

(d) Schools. A 5 room school to accommodate 50 students per room has been designed for construction in the resettlement area by 8th Engineers. The school is scheduled for completion by mid June. Plans and estimated building costs were developed by Support Command for addition of 5 rooms to an Khe Elementary School. These rooms also are designed to accommodate 50 students and construction of necessary tables and benches is proposed. One room was renovated in the Vietnamese Information Service building for use as a library. This Division CA Team project is 50 percent complete.

(2) Division Short-Range, High-Impact Civil Action Projects.

Some 19 separate periodic or necessitated endeavors were tallied in this area during the reporting period. This included sick calls; food distribution; immunization against plague, typhoid, cholera; claims settlements; Pay Op movies; road grading; culvert installations and bridge building; repair of schools; communications facilities; Christmas parties with toys for children; Med evac; assistance in collection of VN bills; band concerts; dud removal; hiring of civilian laborers; construction of a brick factory; posting of rewards for lost equipment; guidance in unauthorized use of M-60s; granting of leave to civilian laborers during "Tet" holidays, and price control and rationing guidance.
Operational Report on Lessons Learned

(f) Miscellaneous Data. During the reporting period 288,210 Vietnamese labor man days were employed in Division base; 39,210 Vietnamese patients were rendered medical treatment; 3,115 immunization shots were given Vietnamese civilians; 61 students were furnished school supplies. Rice captured during operations tallied 236,600 lbs and salt captured came to 28,000 pounds. Not including projects of units or unit personnel of personnel aid, Division personnel contributed $2,565.96 for use in unit civic actions programs. U.S. Citizens provided the division with over 431 boxes and 4,560 pounds of clothing and supplies for civic action use.
Base Defense Diagram for Camp Radel
SECTION II - Commander's Analysis and Recommendations

1. Lessons Learned

Location of Trails

ITEM: Location of trails in dense forested areas.

DISCUSSION: In dense forest areas vertical aerial photography will not reveal the complete trail network. Low level visual aerial reconnaissance also is ineffective due to the thickness of the overhead cover. Only by placing ground reconnaissance patrols in the area can a complete trail network be determined.

OBSERVATION: Ground reconnaissance patrols are required if complete trail networks are to be developed.

Unlikely Landing Zones

ITEM: During operation Lasher/White Wing, advantages were gained by using unlikely LZ's located on ridgelines and pinnacles.

DISCUSSION: Experience proved that using this technique significantly less ground fire and hits on aircraft resulted.

Trooper Ladder

ITEM: Use of trooper ladder during combat operations.

DISCUSSION: During all operations in heavily wooded and mountainous terrain the trooper ladder was used in operations ranging from fire team size to entire companies. The trooper ladder is a 36" wide series of aluminum rods arranged as a ladder on three 4000 pound tensil strength cables. Each ladder is 100 feet long and can be reeled from a hovering CH-47 or UH-1D to permit personnel to descend or ascend through very small holes in the jungle canopy. When desired two trooper ladders can be joined together with rappelling snap links through the loops at each end of the trooper ladders. The ladder has been used successfully both at night and during the daytime. Trooper ladders are issued to aviation units and are operated by the aircraft crew members.

OBSERVATION: Units conducting air mobile operations should plan for the use of trooper ladders.

Use of Napalm to Clear LZ's

ITEM: Use of Napalm to clear landing zones.

CONFIDENTIAL
DISCUSSION: The use of napalm to clear LZ's for landing was of limited benefit during operations. If it is attempted early, surprise is lost. If it is done just prior to an assault it results in reduced visibility, increase in density altitude and creates a fire hazard to aircraft using the LZ.

OBSERVATION: This method of clearing a LZ proved to be of limited tactical value and should be utilized only when methods such as the trooper ladder, rappelling or air force 750 or 1000 pound bombs are not available.

Landing Zone Expansion

ITEM: Landing zones can be expanded during early stages of occupation by the use of a lightweight bulldozer.

DISCUSSION: The use of lightweight bulldozers in clearing LZ's will eliminate a large amount of hand clearing. This reduces the time required to make the area completely operational.

OBSERVATION: Units conducting airborne assaults should include a lightweight bulldozer in their plans and airlift it into the LZ as soon as feasible.

ITEM: Tanks and self-propelled artillery can be very effectively used to create helicopter landing zones in lightly wooded areas.

DISCUSSION: During Operation LINCOLN, M-48 tanks and self-propelled artillery were used as part of a mechanized-airmobile team. When a landing zone was needed for ammunition or POL resupply the tracked vehicles merely ran down a few trees, made several quick turns and thus developed a hasty ZL. This technique permitted almost unlimited air support operations since airmobile reinforcements and aerial resupply could always be effected.

OBSERVATION: When tracked vehicles are available, consideration should be given to their use in creating hasty LZ's for refueling, resupply and reinforcing.

Pathfinder

ITEM: Pathfinder Support.

DISCUSSION: During operations involving small LZ's it is mandatory that a high degree of control be exercised over aircraft entering and departing the area. This is particularly true when artillery and mortars are firing from the LZ.

OBSERVATION: A minimum of two pathfinders with equipment should be provided.
each infantry battalion during airmobile operations.

Viet Cong Spider Holes

**ITEM:** VC use of extremely small spider holes (covered foxholes) for greater protection.

**DISCUSSION:** During Operation LINCOLN south of CHU PONG, the 1/9 Cavalry Squadron found a number of extremely small spider holes which provided a considerable degree of protection from TAC air and artillery fire. The holes were so small that the VC left their packs outside the spider hole. The packs actually provided friendly forces a means of detecting the normally well-camouflaged positions.

**OBSERVATION:** This VC technique should be made known to all forces.

Repeated Use of Ambush Sites

**ITEM:** The use of the same ambush site for three or four days.

**DISCUSSION:** During the early phase of Operation LINCOLN north of DUC CO, 1/12 Cavalry Battalion caught 12 enemy personnel walking across a stream with no security. In the succeeding three days several more personnel were caught in the same ambush. From this experience, it appears that the enemy does not have an effective means of communicating to his troops, who are enroute regarding the location of our ambush sites. Once a good ambush site is used it may sometimes not be necessary to move it if suitable supporting fires are available to secure it.

**OBSERVATION:** It is not always necessary to move a good ambush site after each successful ambush, particularly when operating along infiltration trails.

Flush Tactics

**ITEM:** Flush techniques were used effectively during operation WASHER/WHITE WING by the 3d and 1st Brigades.

**DISCUSSION:** About two-thirds of the forces take up well concealed ambush positions covering natural routes into and out of the area. This ambush force is positioned by carefully chosen flight routes and deceptive landings. The ambush force is prepared for 48 hours operation without resupply. The remainder of the force is positioned to act as "beaters" moving towards the ambush forces. Based on observed movements away from the beater force artillery and air interdiction is used on the routes between the beater and
ambush forces day and night. Flares and searchlight illuminate the area at night, thus permitting the Air Cav and other forces to continue surveillance and bring accurate fire on moving enemy forces. This keeps the pressure on the enemy and makes him very susceptible to Psy War.

**Displacement of Medium Artillery by CH-54 Helicopter**

**ITEM:** 155mm Howitzers can be moved by CH-54 aircraft.

**DISCUSSION:** A four gun unit, a Battery, 1/30 Artillery, was repositioned on several occasions by four CH-54 sorties. The personnel and remaining equipment were moved by nine CH-47 sorties. 155mm Howitzers can be placed in strategic positions that best support the tactics of a particular operation. By using the CH-54 the howitzers can be positioned in areas that are completely inaccessible by any means other than aerial lift.

**ObserVATION:** This capability permits 155's to occupy firing positions to support tactical operations which otherwise would be inaccessible.

**Displacement of Ligh Artillery by CH-47 Helicopter**

**ITEM:** The displacement of 105mm Howitzers, basic load of ammunition and artillery crew in one lift.

**DISCUSSION:** Utilization of a double sling system allows one CH-47 to move one 105mm howitzer slung below the CH-47, with a second sling below the howitzer carrying the basic load of ammunition (75 rounds). The howitzer crew rides in the helicopter. Upon arrival at the battery position the ammunition is positioned, the howitzer is emplaced a few feet from the ammunition, and the crew departs from the helicopter as it lands a few meters from the howitzer.

**ObserVATION:** The use of the double sling system provides a fast means for the placement of complete artillery sections and does not require rehandling or moving either the howitzer or the ammunition. (See Figure 2)

**Downed Aircraft**

**ITEM:** Security force for downed aircraft.

**DISCUSSION:** It is desirable to form a small reserve unit to provide security for downed aircraft. This prevents tasking a tactical unit in the vicinity which already has a tactical plan and mission to accomplish. A suitable solution developed was to keep a portion of a base or FOB security force on ground alert to provide security for downed aircraft.
Reconnaissance When Moving Artillery and Track Vehicles

**Observation:** Security for downed aircraft is essential and should be considered in all airmobile planning.

**Observation:** Reconnaissance when moving artillery and track vehicles

**Discussion:** During Operation LINCOLN it was found that APC's, M-48 tanks and self propelled artillery could move very fast and surmount most obstacles. Since these tracked vehicles frequently returned from an attack position via the same route, much greater attention was required on the initial reconnaissance to determine likely ambush sites. Artillery concentrations were then registered on these sites, to the sides, front and rear as the column entered the area.

**Observation:** Likely ambush areas must be checked as a new area is entered. It is desirable to register concentrations to the sides, front and rear of columns to counter possible ambushes.

Armored - Airmobile Task Force

**Observation:** An Armored Task Force combined with airmobile elements can be extremely successful.

**Discussion:** During Operation LINCOLN the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division and elements of the 25th Infantry Division maneuvered a task force of artillery, APC's, tanks and airmobile forces throughout Pleiku, Chu Pong, Phu Ho and Duc Co areas, conducting link-up and reconnaissance operations using the armored elements for ground fire superiority and using helicopters as the eyes of the task force. No trafficability problems were encountered even though there are no roads in the area. The soil in these areas seems to absorb rain and dry quickly. The use of armor and airmobile forces added a tremendous increment to overall ability to exploit since the availability of resupply for ammo, FOL and reinforcements permitted almost unlimited range for the armored elements, while the airmobile elements enjoyed the advantage of the great ground fire-power of the armored elements.

**Observation:** When both armored and airmobile forces are available consideration should be given to their use in combined task forces.
Use of T-17 Membrane for Airstrips

ITEM: The use of T-17 Membrane to cover a runway.

DISCUSSION: During Operation LINCOLN, T-17 membrane was used for the first time to cover a runway which could accommodate C-130 traffic. Eighteen hours were required to lay a 3500 foot strip 80 feet wide. This membrane is thicker and comes in narrower strips than the previous T-15 membrane. The membrane has a non-skid surface and provides excellent, quickly built, tactical air strips.

OBSERVATION: The T-17 membrane provides a very suitable all weather tactical air strip cover.

Construction of Airstrip at CAT

ITEM: Construction of a 2300 foot airstrip in a wooded area to accommodate C-123 traffic using organic engineer equipment.

DISCUSSION: During Operation LINCOLN Company A, 8th Engineer Battalion constructed a 2300 foot C-123 airstrip at a location where no roads existed into the site. All of the 51 tons of organic engineer equipment and materials required was moved by helicopter to the otherwise inaccessible area. Movement of all the heavy engineer equipment by helicopter was possible because of its specially designed sectionalized engineer equipment. The ability to build such strips provides complete freedom in tactical maneuver planning since heavy logistic support can be delivered directly by the Air Force to precisely where it is needed.

OBSERVATION: Airstrips can be built in areas which are only accessible by helicopter, if sectionalized engineer equipment is available. Other engineer units operating in remote areas should consider the possibility of obtaining airborne engineer equipment.

Destruction of Food Storage Areas

ITEM: Destruction of VC food storage areas.

DISCUSSION: Secondary explosions occurred while burning rice and other food storage areas which indicated that ammunition and other items of equipment were concealed under food stuffs.

OBSERVATION: All rice or food caches should be probed prior to burning. Once the storage area has been ignited all troops should move to a safe distance from the area.
Use of Riot Control Agents with Artillery

ITEM: Riot Control Agent (RCA), CS, can increase the effectiveness of artillery fires.

DISCUSSION: During the battle of the IRON TRIANGLE, entrenched enemy positions had resisted against artillery fire for over a day. Agent CS, delivered by helicopter and followed by artillery and rocket fires, was used to drive the VC from their entrenchments in a matter of about 2 hours with three repetitions of the CS—artillery procedure. Of interest, on one occasion during Operation LINCOLN, VC did not leave their entrenchments. In this case rocket fire was delivered both immediately before, during and following the CS attack. It is presumed that in this case the rocket fire was so intense that the VC suffered thru the CS rather than leave their entrenchments. The VC did cease firing at helicopters though. From the single case, it would appear that a sufficient pause must be allowed in artillery fires for the enemy to feel he has a chance to escape the CS cloud.

OBSERVATION: This technique should be considered in the attack of any fortified area against unmasked personnel.

Techniques for Clearing Operations

ITEM: Riot Control Agents (RCA) can be very effectively used in clearing operations.

DISCUSSION: During the PITCHER/WHITE VING Operation, which occurred in a highly populated area, CS hand grenades were used on larger suspect areas. This provided an opportunity to determine whether the occupants were merely civilians hiding or were armed VC's. This technique aided in reducing the number of non-combatant deaths. On another occasion 43 VC were pursued into a cave. All 43 departed when CS hand grenades were thrown into the cave. Only one was killed who refused to surrender.

OBSERVATION: CS can be very effective for clearing operations in populated areas.
2. Personnel Management:

a. An aviator infusion program was initiated during the reporting period in order to reduce the August aviator losses from 72 percent to less than 47 percent of the total number of aviators assigned (908). Seven hundred and eight were originally due to rotate in August. At the end of the period the division was at the midpoint of a 10-week aviator infusion program involving other units in Vietnam. The reassignment of 250 aviators and replacing them with personnel with a Date of Expected Rotation from Overseas Assignment (DBLOS) other than August was designed to provide a training period of sufficient length to provide minimum continuity in the aviation elements. Completion of the aviation infusion program was expected not later than 10 June 1966.

b. The August rotational hump was in the planning stage at the end of the reporting period. The proposed plan was designed to lend itself to phasing out some 8000 troops during the month of August without seriously hampering the combat operations and effectiveness of the division. The DBLOS peak for the division is 17 August 1966. The known losses for June and July will be replaced routinely without regard to any redistribution of August losses. The input of replacements for August losses will be distributed over a sixty day period. Total number of personnel rotating during the month of August represents 59 percent of the division authorized strength. However, 77 percent of authorized officers and warrant officers and 75 percent of non-commissioned officers and specialist and above have an August DBLOS. It is not anticipated that our officer, warrant officer and noncommissioned officer status will improve enough to materially change these percentages. At this time there are no discernable problems that cannot be overcome by meticulous planning and energetic follow through. Over a 60 day period it is expected that the August rotational hump will have minimum impact.

3. (C) Intelligence. During the reporting period a tremendous amount of intelligence was gained - much of it through successful operations to include occasions when enemy regimental headquarters were actually captured or annihilated. For instance, documents captured during operations Basher and Lincoln from enemy higher headquarters provided valuable information for the current Division operations as well as providing strategic information of great value for future operations. Enemy captives also provided much valuable intelligence. The IW section interrogated over 600 prisoners in support of combat operations.

Reorganization of the Division intelligence section made possible faster, more efficient application of intelligence data to operations. This reorganization and the addition of personnel provided smoothly functioning round-the-clock operation of the D200, plans element and report and analysis section.

Visual and photo surveillance proved most profitable. Very little intelligence was gained by SLAR in support of Division operations although SLAR
provided considerable intelligence on the strategic level during the period. Additional visual/photo surveillance aircraft, (six OV-1A's) have been recommended in this Division's 27 April submission of recommended changes to TASK 67T to enhance this valuable intelligence source.

4. Operations and Training

a. During the reporting period the Division extended its range of operations beyond the already large area in which it had operated during the past quarter. Along the China Sea in the vicinity of Bong Son, the Division successfully engaged the major elements of Sao Vang Division, in a 41 day campaign which maintained continuous contact with the enemy while traversing a complete circle over an area almost 80 kilometers by 50 kilometers which was densely populated and a traditional VC stronghold. Along the Cambodian border the Division conducted thorough search and destroy operations over a 170 kilometer portion of the Cambodian border from south of the Huong Massif to north of Dak To, gaining much valuable information on the trail networks, destroying way-stations and logistical facilities and instilling confidence in the RVN forces of the area, plus forcing the VC and NVA units to retreat into Cambodia.

A number of firsts were accomplished during the reporting period. The CH-54 was used for moving 155mm Howitzers to previously impossible locations, thus greatly increasing the available fire power of the Division. Techniques were greatly improved for operations in densely folioted areas where no LZ's existed. In those cases trooper ladders were used, holes were blown in the jungle canopy with Air Force bombs, or small air transportable bulldozers were helilifted to the area. Landing strips capable of handling C-123 aircraft were constructed in remote areas with heliborne engineer equipment. This technique provided and will continue to provide improved response times for supplying and supporting all forces directly by Air Force lift. Riot control agents were used as a limited combat support technique for driving enemy from entrenched positions and caves, for suppression of small arms firing and in areas where civilians were possibly intermingled. Combat psychological operations were extensively and very successfully used, coupled with close and detailed guidance to combat soldiers in the use of limited response firepower. All of these measures were instrumental in achieving successful operations in heavily populated areas without undue casualties to the noncombatant population. The Division also initiated an intensive PsyOps program during the reporting period. This program proved extremely effective. In Operation HUSHAL alone, 483 enemy rallied. These ralliers provided much useful intelligence and greatly aided in expediting combat operations.

A request has been made that additional support be provided to the Division to provide printing and ground loudspeaker/interpreter team operations capabilities.
The only operational problem area was the generally low availability of aircraft throughout the period. At the end of the reporting period, aircraft availability was increasing due to the generally increasing supply of aircraft parts and increased command emphasis on all possible areas which could lead to increased aircraft availability - such as maintenance, pooling of the administrative flight requirements and the use of ground transportation whenever possible.

b. No major problem areas arose in the training area. Much training was accomplished by smaller units while on combat operations. Training facilities within the Division base were completed and will probably be heavily used during the expected heavy turnover of personnel during July and August 1966. Replacements during the period were arriving without training on the M-16 rifle or armament technique.

5. (0) Logistics

During the reporting period logistical support for the Division was greatly improved. Forward Support Elements were deployed from 65 kilometers to over a 115 kilometer spread supporting troop operations on a 170 kilometer front. Aerial delivery sorties, using the rigging capability organic to the division and aircraft attached to the division, were used to resupply critically needed supplies. A Self Service Supply Center and a Central Issuance Facility became available during April. This eliminated requisitions for expendable supplies and reduced the workload of the stock control personnel. A marked increase in mail flow was experienced during the reporting period. The Skymaster system, augmented by additional OV-2B aircraft, moved large quantities of aircraft repair parts from Saigon to An Khe. A 14 percent deadline of generators existed throughout the division at the end of the reporting period which is attributed to the lack of spare parts and the continual use of tactical generators in an administrative role. Separate action has been initiated to obtain the necessary extra generators and spare parts.

6. Civil Affairs

Civil affairs efforts during the period were directed both to combat support operations and civil action in the An Khe area. In support of combat operations, 3802 refugees were airlifted to GVN controlled areas. Captured supplies, including 236,600 pounds of rice and 28,000 pounds of salt, were distributed to refugees and needy civilians. Sick calls held in combat operations areas treated 3,056 civilians. In the Division TOR, three refugee centers were supported by Division elements with distributions of food and other supplies, regular medical treatment and vector control spraying. Construction projects included a dispensary for the An Tuong District, a five room school for the Resettlement Area and a five room addition to the An Khe Elementary School. Short range, high impact civil actions included
sick calls, Psy Ops movies, repair of schools, Mod evac, hiring of civilian laborers, and removal and band concerts.

6 Incls
1 - Table of Contents
2 - Photo
3 - Task Organization by Operation
4 - Aviation Statistics
5 - Logistical Summary by Operation
6 - Psychological Operations
FIG 2
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for the Period 1 January - 30 April 1966, Reports Control Symbol CSGPO-28 (R1)

HQ, U.S. ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 17 AUG 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) The Operational Report on Lessons Learned of the 1st Infantry Division for the period 1 January - 30 April 1966 is forwarded herewith. This is an outstanding report that deserves careful study. The value of the report is greatly enhanced by the attachment of significant supporting documents.

2. (U) For ease of reference, this headquarters' comments are separated into subject areas.

3. (C) CBR. With reference to Section II, paragraph 1d(1), of the basic ORLL, and paragraph 8, USARV 2d Indorsement, concerning the requirement for a rice contaminant, COMUSMACV requirements and concepts of use have been obtained and provided to AGSFOR DA. Additional tests on the toxicity of the contaminant, which produces a bitter taste and has a laxative effect, have been scheduled. The urgency of the requirement for this item remains high.

4. MTOE's and Personnel Shortages.

   a. (U) Reference paragraph 5, USARV 2d Indorsement. The basic MTOE mentioned in Section II, paragraph 1a(5) of the ORLL was forwarded to DA for approval on 28 June 1966.

   b. (U) Reference paragraph 3, USARV 2d Indorsement, and Section II, paragraph 1a(3), basic ORLL. MTOE 5-148E has not been received by this headquarters. Separate action has been initiated by this headquarters to verify the AVLB requirement, which will clarify the status of this MTOE.

   c. (C) Reference paragraph 2, USARV 2d Indorsement and Section I, paragraph 9a(1)(a) of basic ORLL. The reported shortage of interrogators, MOSC 96C20, is valid, for USARV, as of 30 April, had only 72 percent of its authorization. The situation has improved somewhat since that time, but there remains a world-wide shortage of MOS 96C in grades E-4 and E-5. Resources are not available within this theater to relieve the shortage, which remains a critical matter.

   d. (C) In regard to the same references, the reported shortage of cooks was not valid for the reporting period. As of 30 April 1966 USARV had 4,186 cooks assigned against an authorization of 3,823. If the shortage was as critical as the 1st Infantry Division stated, the problem could have been solved by reassignments within USARV.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS,
DOD DIR 5200.10
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for the Period 1 January - 30 April 1966, Reports Control Symbol CGPO-28 (RL) (U)

5. (U) Signal.

a. Concur with paragraphs 4 and 9, USARV 2d Indorsement.

b. Reference paragraph 1a(4), Section II, basic ORLL. In view of the problems encountered with AN/MRC-69's, it is recommended that consideration be given to utilization of the Light Mobile Tactical Relay Equipment.

6. (C) Aviation.

a. Reference Section II, paragraph 1a(2), basic ORLL. The recommended increase in OV-1 aircraft is not in consonance with the DA ARCSA study, which recommends deletion of OV-1 aircraft from all types of divisions except airmobile divisions. USACDC is currently developing TOE's in accordance with the ARCSA study, and the TOE revision is to be completed by 1 October 1967. Actually, under the provisions of ARCSA, presently OV-1 aircraft could be withdrawn from the 1st Infantry Division.

b. Accordingly, this headquarters must disapprove the recommendation that the 1st Infantry Division be provided with additional OV-1 aircraft.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

D. A. Harrison
Capt, AGC
Asst AG

Copy: Furu:
CG USARV, Attn: AVC-DH

DECLAS: 8 APR 1972
DOD DIR 5200.10
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96240 3 JUN 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310
    Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307

Concur with the comments in basic report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JOHN R. DEANE, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

[Redacted text]
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

THRU: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: OPOP-MH, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters concurs with the 1st Cavalry Division's Operational Report on Lessons Learned and with the 1st Indorsement.

2. (U) Most commands experienced days when no mail was received during the reporting period. This was particularly true during January and February because there was a lack of refinement of handling procedures. Since that time the days with no mail deliveries have been reduced to those days when TAC alerts occur. These alerts can be expected on two or three days each month.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

6 Incl

FRANK T. DENNEY
CWO USA
Assistant Adjutant General

"This document may be reproduced "UNCLASSIFIED" when separated from classified inclusions"
### SECTION I

#### 1. General
- a. General Situation ............................................. 1
- b. Organization and Key Personnel ............................ 2

#### 2. Personnel ...................................................... 6
   - a. Strength ....................................................... 6
   - b. Replacements ................................................ 6
   - c. Role of Personnel ............................................ 6
   - d. Promotions .................................................... 7
   - e. Reenlistments ............................................... 7
   - f. Postal .......................................................... 7
   - g. Special Services ............................................. 8
   - h. Finance ........................................................ 8
   - i. Chaplain ......................................................... 9
   - j. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order ............ 10
   - k. Inspector General ........................................... 10
   - l. Public Information Office ................................ 11

#### 3. Intelligence ................................................... 12
   - a. Organization ................................................ 12
   - b. Operations .................................................... 13
   - c. Order of Battle ............................................... 13
   - d. G2 Air .......................................................... 13

---

**CONFIDENTIAL**
CONFIDENTIAL

e. Maps 14
f. 54th Infantry Detachment (Surv) 14
g. Det 24, 35th Weather Squadron 14
h. 10th RRU 14
i. MI Detachment 15

4. Operations and Training 15
   a. Organization 15
   b. Training 16
   c. Operations 18
   d. Discussion and Analysis of Major Operations 18
   e. Combat Developments 28

Psychological Warfare 30

6. Civil Affairs 43
   a. General 43
   b. Support of Combat Operations 43
   c. Civic Actions in the vicinity of An Khe 48

CONFIDENTIAL 1-2
6. Civil Affairs
   a. General
   b. Support of Combat Operations
   c. Civic Actions in the vicinity of an Khe

SECTION II Commanders analysis and Recommendations

1. Lessons Learned
2. Personnel Management
   a. Aviator Infusion Program
   b. August Rotational Hump
3. Intelligence
4. Operations and Training
   a. Operations
   b. Training
5. Logistics
6. Civil Affairs

INCLUSIONS
1. Table of Contents
2. Photo of Captured Battalion Commander
3. Task Organization for Major Operations
4. Aviation Data
5. Logistics During Major Division Operations
6. Psy Ops Leaflets

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

TASK ORGANIZATION FOR MAJOR OPERATIONS

OPERATION:

HAPPY VALLEY I (6 Oct - 19 Nov 65)

Units:
3rd Brigade
1st Bn, 7th Cav
2nd Bn, 12th Cav
2nd Bn, 5th Cav
1st Bn, 21st Arty

HAPPY VALLEY II (9 Oct - 19 Nov 65)

Units:
2nd Brigade
1st Bn, 5th Cav
2nd Bn, 5th Cav
1st Bn, 77th Arty

SHINY BAYONET (10 - 14 Oct 65)

Units:
3rd Brigade
1st Bn, 7th Cav
2nd Bn, 7th Cav
1st Bn, 12th Cav (Abn)
1st Bn, 21st Arty

CONFIDENTIAL
OPERATION:

PLEIKU CAMPAIGN
ALL THE WAY (23 Oct – 9 Nov 65)

Units:

1st Brigade (Abn)
- 2d Bn, 8th Cav (Abn)
- 2d Bn, 12th Cav
- Co B, 1st Bn, 8th Cav (Abn)
- 2d Bn, 19th Arty (Abn)
- Btry B, 2d Bn, 17th Arty
- Btry A, 2d Bn, 20th Arty
- 227th AHB (-)
- 229th AHB (-)
- 228th ASHB (-)
- 17th Avn Co
- 6th Bn, 14th Arty (+)
- 3d Bn, 18th Arty (-)

"Eagle Flight", CIDG

SILVER BAYONET (10 – 20 Nov 65)

Units:

3d Brigade
- 1st Bn, 12th Cav (Abn) (10-12 Nov)
- 2d Bn, 12th Cav (10-11 Nov)
- 1st Bn, 7th Cav
- 2d Bn, 7th Cav (12 – 20 Nov)
- 1st Bn, 5th Cav (15-20 Nov)
- 2d Bn, 5th Cav (11-20 Nov)

CONFIDENTIAL
1st Bn, 21st Arty
Btry C, 2d Bn, 20th Arty (ARA)
6th Bn, 14th Arty (Prov)
2d Bn, 19th Arty (Abn) (10-12 Nov)
1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (-)
229th AHB
228th ASHB

SILVER BAYONET II (20 - 28 Nov 66)

Units:
2d Brigade
1st Bn, 5th Cav
2d Bn, 5th Cav
2d Bn, 12th Cav
1st Bn, 8th Cav
1st Bn, 77th Arty
2d Bn, 17th Arty
Btry B, 2d Bn, 20th Arty (ARA)
1st Bn, 21st Arty
229th AHB
228th ASHB
6th Bn, 14th Arty (-)
3d Bn, 18th Arty (-)

CLEAN HOUSE (17 - 31 Dec 65)

CLEAN HOUSE I (17 - 19 Dec)

Units:
3d Brigade
1st Bn, 7th Cav

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

2d Bn, 7th Cav
1st Bn, 8th Cav (Abn)
1st Bn, 21st Arty (DS)
Btry E, 2d Bn, 20th Arty (GS Reinf)
229th AHB (DS)
Co, 229th ASHB (DS)

CLEAN HOUSE II (20 - 23 Dec)

Units:
3d Brigade
1st Bn, 7th Cav
2d Bn, 7th Cav
1st Bn, 21st Arty (DS)
Btry, 2d Bn, 20th Arty (GS Reinf)
229th AHB (DS)
Co, 229th ASHB (DS)
Trp C, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (-)

CLEAN HOUSE III (27 - 31 Dec)

Units:
3d Brigade
1st Bn, 7th Cav
2d Bn, 7th Cav
2d Bn, 12th Cav

OPERATION:

MATADOR (1 Jan - 17 Jan 66)
MATADOR I (1 Jan - 13 Jan)

Units:
1st Brigade (Abn)
2d Bn, 5th Cav
1st Bn, 6th Cav(Abn)
2d Bn, 8th Cav(Abn)
1st Bn, 12th Cav(Abn)
2d Bn, 19th Arty(Abn)
B Btry, 2d Bn, 17th Arty
A Btry, 2d Bn, 20th Arty(ARA)
B Btry(-), 6th Bn, 14th Arty
B Btry(-), 19th Arty(SLT)
1st Sqdn, 9th Cav(-)
227th AHB
Co, 229th AHB
228th AHB(-)
"Hurricane Team, CIDG"
*Co, 8th Engr Bn
*Plt, 545th MP Co
*IPW/CI Tm, 191st MI Det
*Tm, 10th Rku
*Tm, 41st CA Co
*Sig Spt Tm, 13th Sig Bn
*Tm, 54th Inf Det(Surv Radar)
*Tm, USAF Weather Det
*Fwd Spt Elm, Spt Comd(Spt)

*This grouping is normal for each committed brigade and will not be included in subsequent brigade task organization listings.
2d Brigade

1st Bn, 5th Cav
2d Bn, 12th Cav
1st Bn, 77th Arty (Reinf as required)

MATADOR II (13 - 17 Jan)

Units:

1st Brigade (Abn):
1st Bn, 6th Cav (Abn)
2d Bn, 8th Cav (Abn)
1st Bn, 12th Cav (Abn)
2d Bn, 19th Arty (Abn)
B Btry, 2d Bn, 17th Arty
A Btry, 2d Bn, 20th Arty (ARA)
B Btry (-), 6th Bn, 14th Arty
B Btry (-), 19th Arty (SLF)
1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (-)
227th AHB
Co, 229th AHB
229th AHB (-)

"Hurricane Team, CIDG"

2d Brigade

1st Bn, 5th Cav
2d Bn, 5th Cav
1st Bn, 77th Arty
Btry, 2d Bn, 20th Arty (ARA) (Reinf)
C Trp, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav

Co, CIDG
OPERATION
FLASHIR/WHITE WING (24 Jan - 6 Mar 66)
FLASHIR (24 Jan - 4 Feb 66)

Units:

3d Brigade
1st Bn, 7th Cav
2d Bn, 7th Cav
1st Bn, 12th Cav (Abn)
2d Bn, 12th Cav
1st Bn, 21st Arty (D3)
1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (-) OPOCON
11th Avn Gp (-)
1st Bn, 5th Cav (30 Jan-4 Feb)

WHITE WING (4 Feb - 10 Feb 66)

Units:

2d Brigade
1st Bn, 5th Cav
2d Bn, 5th Cav
2d Bn, 12th Cav
1st Bn, 77th Arty
Tm 245th Psyops Co
TACP
Naval Gunfire Spt Tm
Trp B, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav

3d Brigade
1st Bn, 7th Cav
2d Bn, 7th Cav
CONFIDENTIAL

1st Bn, 12th Cav (Abn)
1st Bn, 21st Arty (DS)
Trp C, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (OpCon)
229th AHB (DS)
228th AHB (-) (S)

EAGLE'S CLAW (11 - 28 Feb 66)

Units:

1st Brigade (Abn)

1st Bn, 8th Cav (Abn)
2d Bn, 8th Cav (Abn)
1st Bn, 12th Cav (Abn) (18-28 Feb)
2d Bn, 19th Arty (Abn) (DS)
A Btry, 1st Bn, 30th Arty (155mm)
Tm (HE), 244th Psy Ops
Water Point, 8th Engr Bn

2d Brigade

1st Bn, 5th Cav
2d Bn, 5th Cav (16-28 Feb)
2d Bn, 12th Cav
1st Bn, 77th Arty
TACP

Trp B, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (OpCon)

3d Brigade

1st Bn, 7th Cav
2d Bn, 7th Cav
1st Bn, 12th Cav (11-17 Feb)
2d Bn, 5th Cav (14-16 Feb)

CONFIDENTIAL

3-8
1st Bn, 21st Arty (DS)
1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (-) (OpCon)
229th ARH (DS)
228th ASHB (-) (S)

BLACK HORSE (1 - 6 Mar 66)
Units:

2d Brigade
1st Bn, 5th Cav
2d Bn, 5th Cav
1st Bn, 8th Cav (Abn)
2d Bn, 8th Cav (Abn)
1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (-)
2d Bn, 12th Cav
1st Bn, 77th Arty
Btry, 2d Bn, 17th Arty

Naval Gunfire Tm
2d Bn, 20th Arty

OPERATION

JIM BOVIE (13 - 27 Mar 66)
Units:

1st Brigade (Abn)
1st Bn, 8th Cav (Abn)
2d Bn, 8th Cav (Abn)
1st Bn, 12th Cav (Abn)
2d Bn, 19th Arty (Abn)
A Btry, 1st Bn, 30th Arty (155mm)

Water Point, 8th Eng Bn

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

3d Brigade

1st Bn, 7th Cav
2d Bn, 7th Cav
2d Bn, 5th Cav (13-15 Mar)
C Trp (-), 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (OpCon)
1st Bn, 21st Arty (DS)
Water Point, 8th Engr Bn

OPERATION

LINCOLN

Units:

1st Brigade (Abn)

1st Bn, 8th Cav (Abn)
2d Bn, 8th Cav (Abn)
1st Bn, 12th Cav (Abn)
Co B, 1st Bn, 69th Armor
Trp C, 3d Sqdn, 4th Armored Cav
2d Bn, 19th Arty (Abn)
Btry B, 2d Bn, 17th Arty
Water Point, 8th Engr Bn

3d Brigade

1st Bn, 7th Cav
2d Bn, 7th Cav
1st Bn, 21st Arty (DS)
Tm 3, 16th Wx Det

OPERATION

OCTBY I (11 - 18 Apr 66)

Units:

1st Brigade (Abn)

CONFIDENTIAL
1st Bn, 8th Cav(Abn)
2d Bn, 8th Cav(Abn)
1st Bn, 12th Cav(Abn)
2d Bn, 19th Arty(Abn)
Water Point, 8th Engr Bn
Co(+), CIDG, Dsc Co USSF Camp

3d Brigade

1st Bn, 7th Cav
2d Bn, 7th Cav
1st Bn, 21st Arty(DS)
Scout Tm, C Trp, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav
2 Co's, CIDG, Plei Mrong
2 Co's, CIDG, Plei Djerong
1st Bn, 21st Arty(DS)
Btry, 2d Bn, 20th Arty(GS Reinf)
229th AHB(DS)
Co, 228th AHB(DS)
Trp C, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav(-)
CONFIDENTIAL
AVIATION DATA

PART I Aircraft Flight Hours (Monthly)
PART II Major Operations
PART III Support Rendered to Non-US Forces and Civilians
PART IV Support Rendered to Non-Divisional Units
PART V Significant Operations (Organic Aircraft)
PART VI Aviation Statistics (Monthly)
PART VII Aircraft Hit Data - Aviation Casualties
PART VIII Monthly Mission Ready Aircraft Availability
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>O-1</th>
<th>OV-1</th>
<th>CV-2</th>
<th>OH-13</th>
<th>UH-1B,D</th>
<th>CH-47</th>
<th>CH-54</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JANUARY 1966</td>
<td>452.0</td>
<td>416.0</td>
<td>531.0</td>
<td>9433.0</td>
<td>207210</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/9 Cavalry Sqdn</td>
<td>1655.0</td>
<td>2843.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Div Artillery</td>
<td>389.0</td>
<td>1977.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support Command</td>
<td>1377.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>698.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>451.0</td>
<td>328.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2d Bde</td>
<td>282.0</td>
<td>348.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3d Bde</td>
<td>257.0</td>
<td>252.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIVISION TOTALS</td>
<td>573.0</td>
<td>416.0</td>
<td>1377.0</td>
<td>3643.0</td>
<td>15,879.0</td>
<td>2132.0</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FLYING HOURS = 24,097.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEBRUARY 1966</td>
<td>497.0</td>
<td>404.0</td>
<td>581.0</td>
<td>9632.0</td>
<td>1854.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/9 Cavalry Sqdn</td>
<td>1421.0</td>
<td>2942.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Div Artillery</td>
<td>456.0</td>
<td>1879.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support Command</td>
<td>1524.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>747.0</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>409.0</td>
<td>371.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2d Bde</td>
<td>344.0</td>
<td>335.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3d Bde</td>
<td>202.0</td>
<td>297.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIVISION TOTALS</td>
<td>525.0</td>
<td>404.0</td>
<td>1524.0</td>
<td>3468.0</td>
<td>16,204.0</td>
<td>1931.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FLYING HOURS = 24,126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARCH 1966</td>
<td>419.0</td>
<td>352.0</td>
<td>415.0</td>
<td>9165.0</td>
<td>1816.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/9 Cavalry Sqdn</td>
<td>1502.0</td>
<td>2832.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Div Artillery</td>
<td>535.0</td>
<td>1855.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support Command</td>
<td>1103.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>689.0</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>418.0</td>
<td>359.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2d Bde</td>
<td>286.0</td>
<td>313.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3d Bde</td>
<td>369.0</td>
<td>286.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIVISION TOTALS</td>
<td>447.0</td>
<td>352.0</td>
<td>1103.0</td>
<td>3582.0</td>
<td>15,499.0</td>
<td>1874.0</td>
<td>89.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FLYING HOURS = 22,946</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRIL 1966</td>
<td>436.0</td>
<td>413.0</td>
<td>465.0</td>
<td>8,602.0</td>
<td>1,820.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/9 Cavalry Sqdn</td>
<td>1752.0</td>
<td>3,127.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Div Artillery</td>
<td>402.0</td>
<td>1,039.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support Command</td>
<td>1,508.0</td>
<td>126.0</td>
<td>831.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>143.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>436.0</td>
<td>291.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2d Bde</td>
<td>434.0</td>
<td>319.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3d Bde</td>
<td>506.0</td>
<td>267.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIVISION TOTALS</td>
<td>448.0</td>
<td>413.0</td>
<td>1,508.0</td>
<td>4,121.0</td>
<td>15,476.0</td>
<td>1,851.0</td>
<td>143.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FLYING HOURS = 26,216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
## AVIATION DATA
(MAJOR OPERATIONS - 1966)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>HOURS FLOWN</th>
<th>SORTIES FLOWN</th>
<th>TONS CARGO</th>
<th>PASSENGERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MATADOR</td>
<td>1-20 Jan</td>
<td>10,008</td>
<td>24,937</td>
<td>4,224</td>
<td>41,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHER</td>
<td>24 Jan-3 Feb</td>
<td>6,801</td>
<td>25,214</td>
<td>3,269</td>
<td>25,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITE WING</td>
<td>3 Feb-11 Feb</td>
<td>6,129</td>
<td>14,798</td>
<td>1,429</td>
<td>28,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAGLE CLAW</td>
<td>11 Feb-28 Feb</td>
<td>15,094</td>
<td>37,627</td>
<td>6,517</td>
<td>66,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (MASHER</td>
<td>24 Jan-28 Feb</td>
<td>28,024</td>
<td>77,627</td>
<td>11,515</td>
<td>120,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITE WING &amp;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAGLE CLAW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIM BOVIE</td>
<td>13-27 Mar</td>
<td>11,215</td>
<td>30,013</td>
<td>4,733</td>
<td>41,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINCOLN</td>
<td>25 Mar-7 Apr</td>
<td>11,370</td>
<td>32,196</td>
<td>4,492</td>
<td>36,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOSBY I</td>
<td>8 Apr-17 Apr</td>
<td>7,289</td>
<td>17,736</td>
<td>2,512</td>
<td>26,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOSBY II</td>
<td>21-30 Apr</td>
<td>9,321</td>
<td>22,854</td>
<td>3,383</td>
<td>27,858</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Aviation support to non-U.S. Forces includes the movement of ARVN, CIDG, Popular Forces, refugees and civic action missions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>TYPE AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>FLYING HOURS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1966</td>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>96.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1966</td>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1966</td>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>163.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>557.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>96.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Aviation support to non-divisional U.S. Forces includes support of the 1/101st Abn Bde, 3d Bde, 25th Infantry Division (except when attached to the 1st Air Cavalry Division) and recovery of downed USMC, USAF and Army aircraft. Detailed accounting of such support has not been a standing requirement. Therefore, the totals presented are estimates gleaned from situation and highlights reports. Support provided by UH-1 and CH-47 is expressed in days only.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>UNIT SUPPORTED</th>
<th>CH-47 DAYS</th>
<th>UH-1 DAYS</th>
<th>CV-2 HRS</th>
<th>CH-54 HRS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 66</td>
<td>FFV support of USSF</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/101 Abn Bde</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>121.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USAF C-123 recov</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 66</td>
<td>1/101 Abn Bde acft recov-52d Avn Bn</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 66</td>
<td>3/25th Inf</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/101st Abn Bde recov Ops-FFV A-1B C-43 OV-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 66</td>
<td>3/25 Inf 'arty'</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recov Ops-FFV</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recov of 2 each C-47 and 2 each OV-1 acft for FFV</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td></td>
<td>158</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>121.7</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

SIGNIFICANT AVIATION OPERATIONS
Performed by Organic Aircraft

26 Nov 65 - 3 Jan 66
Operations CLEAN SWEEP and CLEAN HOUSE I, II and III
32 Infantry battalions airlifted
23 Artillery batteries airlifted

4 - 19 Jan 66
Operation MATADOR
9 Infantry battalions airlifted
20 Artillery batteries airlifted

24 Jan - 3 Feb 66
Operation Masher
17 Infantry battalions airlifted
10 Artillery batteries airlifted

3 - 11 Feb 66
Operation WHITSMING
10 Infantry battalions airlifted
12 Artillery batteries airlifted

11 Feb - 28 Feb 66
Operation EAGLE'S CLAW
50 Infantry battalions airlifted
21 Artillery batteries airlifted

13 - 27 Mar 66
Operation JIM BOWIE
19 Infantry battalions airlifted
22 Artillery batteries airlifted

25 Mar - 17 Apr 66
Operations LINCOLN AND DOSBY I
34 Infantry battalions airlifted
39 Artillery batteries airlifted

21 Apr - 10 May 66
Operation DOSBY II
10 Infantry battalions airlifted
11 Artillery batteries airlifted
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>FLYING HRS</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>TONS CARGO</th>
<th>PASSENGERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1966</td>
<td>24,097</td>
<td>56,563</td>
<td>23,975</td>
<td>74,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1966</td>
<td>24,126</td>
<td>65,586</td>
<td>16,185</td>
<td>104,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1966</td>
<td>22,946</td>
<td>55,612</td>
<td>5,930</td>
<td>70,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1966</td>
<td>24,041</td>
<td>58,356</td>
<td>8,327</td>
<td>73,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUMULATIVE</td>
<td>95,210</td>
<td>235,117</td>
<td>54,417</td>
<td>323,339</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONFIDENTIAL**
## Unit Hit Data

**Aircraft Hit Data**  
Jan thru Apr 66

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>SRR</th>
<th>SRN</th>
<th>SNR</th>
<th>DAG</th>
<th>DEG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11th Avn Group</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/9 Cavalry Sqdn</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division Arty</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Command</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Brigade</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>343</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Aviation Casualties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>VIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11th Avn Group</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/9 Cavalry Sqdn</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division Arty</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Command</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Brigade</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Brigade</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>78</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Definitions:**

- **KIA** - Shot down - Recovered-Repairable
- **VIA** - Shot down - Recovered-Not Repairable
- **MIA** - Shot down - Not recoverable-Total loss
- **KIA** - Damaged on ground-Enemy action
- **KIA** - Destroyed on ground-Enemy action

---

**CONFIDENTIAL**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>TYPE AIRCRAFT:</th>
<th>OH-13</th>
<th>UH-B</th>
<th>UH-1D</th>
<th>CH-47</th>
<th>CH-54</th>
<th>CV-2B</th>
<th>OV-1</th>
<th>0-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>% AVAILABLE</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>% AVAILABLE</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>% AVAILABLE</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>% AVAILABLE</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4-A

CONFIDENTIAL
**SUBJECT:** Logistics During Major Division Operations

**BACKGROUND:** Tonnage consumption for each of the classes of supply were computed at the end of each major division operation. The purpose of these computations was to provide data on which future requirements could be projected. Consumption of supplies during actual combat was remarkably close to data developed during testing of the airborne Division.

**CURRENT STATUS:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Operation</th>
<th>Incl Nr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RED BAYONET</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHINY BAYONET</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAPPY VALLEY</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL THE WAY</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SILVER BAYONET</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SILVER BAYONET II</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCEAN SWEEP</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATADOR</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGHTER/WHITE WING</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIM BOWIE</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINCOLN I</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINCOLN II</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGBY I</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

1. RED BAYCUT
   5 - 10 October 1965
2. Major Task Organization
   3d Bde TF
   Total Personnel: 3371
3. Location of Support Element: BR 644445 (BINH KHE)
4. Type of LOC: GLOG out of Qu' Nhon
   ALOC out of An Khe
5. Significant Logistical Problems:
   a. Non-availability of aircraft to FOB for logistical support.
      Recommendations: The major unit being supported allocate sufficient aircraft to the FOB to transport the supplies from Brigade Base to Forward Locations.
   b. Insufficient number of water containers.
      Recommendations: Units take additional containers on operation from base camp.
6. Significant Logistical Firsts:
   None
7. Logistical Support Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>GLOG</th>
<th>ALOG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>60,678 f.cas</td>
<td>60.67 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>3F-H</td>
<td>216.0 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>MOLOG</td>
<td>32.5 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>6.0 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>68.75 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVII</td>
<td>41.45 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>366.37 S/T</td>
<td>66.85 S/T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. **SHMAY BAYONET**

   **11 - 14 October 1965**

2. **Major Task Organization**

   **Total Personnel**

   3d Bde TF
   2d Bde TF (-)

3. **Location of Support Elements**

   BR 644445 (BINH KHE)

4. **Type of LOC:**

   - **GLOC** out of Qui Nhon
   - **ALOC** out of An Khe

5. **Significant Logistical Problems:**

   a. Non-availability of aircraft to FSE for logistical support.

      **Recommendation:** The major unit being supported allocate sufficient aircraft to the FSE to transport the supplies from Brigade Base to Forward Locations.

   b. Insufficient number of water containers.

      **Recommendation:** Units take additional containers on operation from base camp.

6. **Significant Logistical First.**

   None

7. **Logistical Support Statistics:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>GLOC</th>
<th>ALOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>29,660 meals</td>
<td>29.66 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>JP4</td>
<td>495.3  S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>22.5   S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NDOGAS</td>
<td>1.1    S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>33.12 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II &amp; IV</td>
<td>.7 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ALL SUPPLIES</td>
<td>582.38 S/T</td>
<td>71.71 S/T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. **Operation:** HAPPY VALLEY  
2. **Major Task Organizations:** 
   1/5 Cav TF  
3. **Location of Support Elements:** 
   Base Camp An Khe  
4. **Type of LOC:** GLOC  
5. **Significant Logistical Problems:** 
   None  
6. **Significant Logistical Firsts:** 
   None  
7. **Logistical Support Statistics:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>GLSS</th>
<th>GLOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III JP4</td>
<td>32.200 meals</td>
<td>32.2 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVCS</td>
<td>74.5 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDCLS</td>
<td>8.6 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>16.2 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II &amp; IV</td>
<td>27.0 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ALL SUPPLIES</td>
<td>3.5 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>162.0 S/T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. **Operations**: ALL THE WAY  
   **24 October - 8 November 1965**

2. **Major Task Organizations**:  
   **Total Personnel**  
   1st Bde TF  
   **5240**

3. **Location of Support Elements**: AR 800469 (Flyknit)

4. **Type of LOC**:  
   - GLOC  
   - ALOC  
   
   **24 October - 8 November**

5. **Significant Logistical Problems**:  
   None

6. **Significant Logistical First**:
   None

7. **Logistical Support Statistics**:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>GLOC</th>
<th>ALOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>91,419 meals</td>
<td>91.42 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III JP4</td>
<td>136.00 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV LCS</td>
<td>5.6 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI LCS</td>
<td>4.6 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>86.87 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI &amp; IV</td>
<td>5.68 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>329.97 S/T</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**CONFIDENTIAL**
1. Operation: HILWak BAYONET 9 - 20 November 1965

2. Major Task Organization: Total Personnel
   3d Bde TF 5123

3. Location of Support Elements: AR 800469 (M31KU)

4. Type of LOC: GLOC 9 - 20 November 1965
   ALOC 9 - 20 November 1965

5. Significant Logistical Problems:
   Insufficient Supply handlers with FSB.
   Recommendation: Cargo handlers move out with FSB at beginning of exercise. Log Cond establish Forward Supply Points.

6. Significant Logistical Firsts:
   None

7. Logistical Support Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>GLOC</th>
<th>ALOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>45,821</td>
<td>45.82 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III JP4</td>
<td>374.0</td>
<td>374.0 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VLS</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>14.9 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HGLS</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.5 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>135.6</td>
<td>135.6 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II &amp; IV</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>3.45 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ALL SUPPLIES</td>
<td>586.27 S/T</td>
<td>1478.79 S/T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
**CONFIDENTIAL**

1. Operation: **SILVER BAYONET II**  
   20 - 29 November 1965

2. Major Task Organization  
   Total Personnel  
   2d Bde TF  
   5477

3. Location of Support Elements: LR 800469 (Pleiku)

4. Type of LOG:  
   - GLOG  
   - DLOG  
   20 - 29 November 1965  
   25 November 1965

5. Significant Logistical Problems:  
   None

6. Significant Logistical First:  
   None

7. Logistical Support Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>GLOG</th>
<th>LOG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>26,800 meals</td>
<td>26.8 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III JP4</td>
<td>447.0 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>20.6 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>5.2 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II &amp; IV</td>
<td>30.0 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II &amp; IV</td>
<td>1.0 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOT. ALL</td>
<td>530.7 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPLIES</td>
<td>1.0 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONFIDENTIAL**
CONFIDENTIAL

1. Operation: QUOG SWEEP 17 - 31 December 1965
2. Major Task Organizations: Total Personnel
   3d Bde TF 3668
3. Location of Support Elements: ER 644445 (BINH KHE)
4. Type of LOC: GLOC 17 - 31 December 1965
5. Significant Logistical Problems:
   None
6. Significant Logistical First:
   None
7. Logistical Support Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>GLOO</th>
<th>GLOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>59,175</td>
<td>59.17 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III IP</td>
<td>640.00</td>
<td>640.00 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>35.00 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>26.00 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II &amp; IV</td>
<td>901.52 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1665.13 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
1. Operation: Masher/White Wing  
   2. February - 6 March 1966.
2. Major Task Organization: Total Personnel
   2d Bde TF 
   3d Bde TF 
   7415
3. Location of Support Elements:
   2d PSE BR 8594 (Song Son) 
   3d PSE BR 9145 (Phu Cat)
4. Type of LOC: GLOG
5. Significant Logistical Problems:
   None
6. Significant Logistical First:
   Logistical Support Unit co-located with FOB which proved very satisfactory.
7. Logistical Support Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>GLOG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>753,955 s/t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>1724.0 s/t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>70.6 s/t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>57.6 s/t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II &amp; IV</td>
<td>3215.97 s/t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ALL SUPPLIES</td>
<td>5863.77 s/t</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

5-9 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

1. Operation: M.T.I.DOR 2 - 20 January 1966
2. Major Task Organization:
   Total Personnel
   1st Bdo TF 3660
   2d Bdo (-)
3. Location of Support Elements:
   1st FSL ZL 202342 (CALJUK)
   2d FSL LR 801475 (PHUJAKU)
4. Type of LOC: GLOC
5. Significant Logistical Problems:
   None
6. Significant Logistical Firsts:
   None
7. Logistical Support Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>GLOC</th>
<th>GLOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>67.548 meals</td>
<td>67.54 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III JPA</td>
<td>292.0 S/T</td>
<td>292.0 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>19.0 S/T</td>
<td>19.0 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOGAS</td>
<td>4.3 S/T</td>
<td>4.3 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>353.0 S/T</td>
<td>353.0 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II &amp; IV</td>
<td>1.1 S/T</td>
<td>1.1 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ALL SUPPLIES</td>
<td>736.94 S/T</td>
<td>736.94 S/T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Major Task Organization: Total Personnel
   1st Bde TF 3670
3. Location of Support Elements:
   ZA 119288 (LE THANH)
4. Type of LOC: GLOC
5. Significant Logistical Problems:
   None
6. Significant Logistical First:
   First night aerial delivery of Class V & Class I to a unit in contact.
7. Logistical Support Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>GLOG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>51,500 meals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>JP4 AVGAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>24.0 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>214.8 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II &amp; IV</td>
<td>15.0 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ALL SUPPLIES</td>
<td>681.3 S/T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Operation: LINCOLN II
   1 - 8 April 1966

2. Major Task Organizations:
   Total Personnel
   1st Bde TF
   3d Bde TF
   7340

3. Location of Support Elements:
   1st FSE 2, 119288 (LT THNH)
   3d FSE 44, 165059 (PLEI NE)

4. Type of LOC: GLOC

5. Significant Logistical Problems:
   None

6. Significant Logistical Firsts:
   None

7. Logistical Support Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>GLOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>238,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III JP4</td>
<td>1640.0 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV MGAS</td>
<td>106.0 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V MGAS</td>
<td>18.0 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II &amp; IV</td>
<td>336.6 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ALL</td>
<td>336.6 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPLIES</td>
<td>2356.6 S/T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL

5-12

2. Major Task Organization: Total Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde TF</td>
<td>1320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde TF</td>
<td>1320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Location of Support Element: Base Camp at Khe

4. Type of LOG: GLOG

5. Significant Logistical Problems: None

6. Significant Logistical First: Supported from Base Camp by two FSE's

7. Logistical Support Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>GLOG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>48,700 meals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>163.0 A/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>13.5 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSOAS</td>
<td>87.1 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>2.1 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL &amp; IV</td>
<td>323.0 S/T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Operation: MOBY I
   11 - 16 April 1966

2. Major Task Organizations
   Total Personnel
   1st Bde TF
   3d Bde TF
   7460

3. Location of Support Elements
   1st FUS Z 2115288 (LL T'LINH)
   2d FUS ZB 016218 (DAK TO)
   3d FUS ZA 116672 (FLEX HRONG)

4. Type of LOC: GLOC

5. Significant Logistical Problems:
   None

6. Significant Logistical First:
   None

7. Logistical Support Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>GLOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>221,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III JP4</td>
<td>1048.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVGAS</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODAS</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>198.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II &amp; IV</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ALL</td>
<td>1,559.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPLIES</td>
<td>1,559.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
NVA Soldiers! The broken bodies of thousands of your comrades lie in lonely graves along the Central Plateau, around PLQI NW, DUC CO, and the coastal plain along SONG SON. The Communist Forces could not resist the invincible land and air forces and the artillery of the GVN and its allies.

Now your Communist Masters make an attempt to save face. They say that the GVN Allied Forces will be slowed by the Monsoon Season. Hear the truth while there is still time to save yourselves. The 1st United States Air Cavalry Division is specially trained for combat in any kind of weather. The deadly War Birds, will relentlessly continue to pursue and destroy the Communist Forces. Neither wind, rain, nor darkness can delay them.

You must choose — either to rally to the GVN and begin a new life, or you can continue to follow the path of darkness and certain death.
NVA Soldiers! The broken bodies of thousands of your comrades lie in lonely graves along the Central Plateau, aroundPLEI ME, DUC CO, and the coastal plain along SONG SON. The Communist Forces could not resist the invincible land and air forces and the artillery of the GVN and its allies.

Now your Communist Masters make an attempt to save face. They say that the GVN Allied Forces will be slowed by the Monsoon Season. Hear the truth while there is still time to save yourselves. The 1st United States Air Cavalry Division is specially trained for combat in any kind of weather. The deadly War Birds, will relentlessly continue to pursue and destroy the Communist Forces. Neither wind, rain, nor darkness can delay them.

You must choose -- either to rally to the GVN and begin a new life, or you can continue to follow the path of darkness and certain death.
Mai Huu Trang was a soldier in the VC Transport Company Ton Bang. He watched his comrades betrayed by their communist Foreign Masters. Mai Huu Trang's Company lacked food, medicine and ammunition. Learning of the CHIM HOI Program, he contacted a unit of the 1st Air Cavalry Division in Binh Dinh. He was warmly welcomed, paid for his weapon and helped in every way to begin a new, productive and honorable life.

Those still in VC ranks should follow Mai Huu Trang's example, and Rally. You will be well treated and you will receive food, clothing and medicine. You will receive financial assistance and given work as you return to the just cause.

Come forward now to begin a new and happy life.
The 1st Air Cavalry Division of the United States Army is here at the request of the Republic of Vietnam to help restore peace and security. You can help make this possible!

If you have any information concerning the Viet Cong, please notify the District Police or any U.S. Army unit. You will be given a reward if the information proves to be factual; the amount of the reward will be determined by the value of the information.

Your cooperation in bringing in weapons and information of the enemy to the District Police will bring you a reward. It also may help save the lives of your friends, relatives, and even your own family. Informants are assured that their identity will not be disclosed.

All persons will be eligible for the rewards, including VC personnel who rally to GVN or assist in the capture of their compatriots.

You may notify any US Army unit of your information; show them this paper.
EXAMPLES OF REWARDS

Information leading to:

a. Capture of personnel

VC political, intelligence, or military personnel $50 - 15,000 VN

b. Capture of equipment, material, or weapons

VC mines or booby traps 50 - 600
Communications equipment 100 - 3,000
Pistols and rifles 800 - 3,000
Machine guns 4,000 - 7,000
Recoiless rifles, mortars, howitzers 2,000 - 40,000

c. Capture of documents

VC intelligence documents 100 - 2,000
VC communication codes 100 - 10,000

Payment will be made for any information of value to the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

PHÀN THƯỞNG MÃI

Tin-tức đưa đến:

a. Bắt được nhân viên

Chính-trị viên VC, Tỉnh-bảo viên VC, lãnh VC thường từ 50$ đến 15,000$

b. Lấy được quân-dụng, vật-liều, hoặc vũ khí

Mìn VC hoặc hây mìn thường từ 50$ đến 600$
Dụng-cụ truyền-tín thường từ 100$ đến 3,000$
Súng lực, súng trường thường từ 800$ đến 3,000$
Dài-liên thường từ 4,000$ đến 7,000$
Dài bắc không phát sáng, cối dài bắc thường từ 2,000$ đến 40,000$

c. Lấy được tài-lieu

Tài liệu tình báo VC thường từ 100$ đến 2,000$
Mật-mật truyền-tín VC thường từ 100$ đến 10,000$

Bắt cứ tin-tức có giá trị nào đến ĐỀ-NHÂT SƯ-DÒA NHỒNG-VÂN HOA-KỲ sẽ được lĩnh thưởng.
The Viet Cong and the Communist North Vietnamese Forces suffered a crushing defeat in the operation in North-East Binh Dinh Province. The major portions of 3 communist regiments were destroyed. More than 3,000 communist were killed. More than 700 VC and Communist North Vietnamese soldiers were captured. Nearly 500 Viet Cong renounced their foreign masters and rallied to the GVN. They were warmly welcomed and received the necessary assistance to begin a new and happy life.

Those who followed the Viet Cong found themselves abandoned by the VC as allied forces approached.

The VC and the North Vietnamese soldiers refused to stand and fight when GVN-allied forces approached.


The forces of the Government of Vietnam and its allies are invincible. They move as swiftly as birds to any point in Vietnam. If the VC return, additional GVN-Allied Forces will return and destroy them.

Do not aid the VC outlaws. Helping the VC can only bring suffering and death to families and hamlets.