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HEADQUARTERS, 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO San Francisco, California 96490

AVCG

SUBJECT: Quarterly Command Report (GCS G9GPO(1))

(REDACTED) Period ending Sept. 65.

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
Department of Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I. COMMANDER'S NARRATIVE

1. (c) GENERAL

a. Pursuant to the provisions of Third United States Army General Order Number 165 dated 29 June 1965, the 11th Air Assault Division was redesignated 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (1st Cav Div (AM)) under TOA 672. The 82nd Infantry Division and 11th Air Assault Division provided the major assets for the reorganization. The date and location was 1 July 1965 at Fort Benning, Georgia. Division organization and key personnel were as follows:

(1) Division Headquarters.

Maj Gen Harry W. O. Kimmard
Brig Gen John M. Wright
Brig Gen Richard T. Knowles
Colonel George S. Beatty, Jr.
Lt Col Robert A. Meda
Lt Col Robert A. Meda
Lt Col Robert A. Meda
Lt Col Robert A. Meda
Lt Col Robert A. Meda
Lt Col Robert A. Meda

Commanding General
Asst Div Commander
Asst Div Commander
Chief of Staff
ACOF, 01
ACOF, 02
ACOF, 03
ACOF, 04

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(8) 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, CO, Lt Col John B. Stockton

(9) 6th Engineer Battalion, CO, Lt Col Robert J. Malley

(10) 13th Signal Battalion, CO, Lt Col Tom M. Nicholson

b. Concurrent with the reorganization the Division had the mission of obtaining Readiness Condition (REDCON 1) not later than 28 July 1965 and of being prepared for subsequent deployment overseas.

2. (C) PREPARATION FOR MOVE.

a. Personnel.

(1) Scope of personnel requirements: Division personnel deployable status as of 1 July 1965 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
<th>SHORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFICERS</td>
<td>1,175</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WARRANT OFFICERS</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENLISTED</td>
<td>14,042</td>
<td>8854</td>
<td>5188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Airborne space of the Division increased from a battalion combat team to a brigade task force; in terms of people from 900 to 3,470. This requirement was met by intra-division moves, fillers from the Airborne School and the training of personnel of the division.

(2) In processing. Commencing 15 July 1965, at Fort Benning, the Division AG and G1 in-processed a total of 769 Officers and Warrant Officers and 5,206 enlisted men. All in-processing was accomplished with organic personnel and equipment. Replacements were processed on a 24 hour basis. They were not billeted at the Replacement Detachment due to the number of personnel involved and the inherent need for speed. Personnel reporting were fed a hot meal, processed, assigned and transported to their unit.

(3) FOR Administrative Requirements: The AG in conjunction with the Division Surgeon, Finance Officer, and Staff Judge Advocate established a central FOR/PO processing unit in a field house in the Division area. The facility was staffed completely by Division personnel to prepare all Division personnel both medically and administratively for overseas service. G3 scheduled FOR/PO processing-by unit-in conjunction with all other training requirements. All personnel available were processed within the time frame allotted. Approximately 800 personnel were processed daily, six days a week, with make-up during the last week. The posting to individual records of all FOR/PO requirements was assisted by a Third US Army team of 80 records personnel.
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(4) Many officers and men were ordered into the Division without being informed of the impending deployment to Vietnam. As a result, many arrived at Fort Benning with their families and subsequently suffered financial hardships and other related problems caused by a second relocation of families, especially since the sponsor was not available for the second move.

(5) All filler personnel, including those who arrived as late as 8 August, completed POM/POR requirements; however, sufficient time did not exist for the late comers to train with their organization prior to deployment on 14 August.

b. Intelligence.

(1) Based on personal guidance from the Chief of Staff US Army to the Division Commander, the G2 operations section had been conducting studies on the area of Vietnam to which we were deployed since February 1965.

(a) This six month lead time permitted an orderly build up of intelligence files, preparation of Order of Battle studies and compilation of enemy, weather and terrain information. Intelligence material prepared as a result of these studies was issued to troop units immediately upon announcement of the impending deployment to Vietnam.

(b) Sensitivity of planning until late July 1965 precluded direct contact with outside agencies with exception of personal contact in the guise of establishing training programs. This type of support caused the Division to duplicate compilation of data and to prepare studies already in the hands of other commands. However, this action fulfilled the Division's intelligence needs and permitted the G2 personnel to accomplish their POM/POR requirements simultaneously with the issuance of the studies.

(e) The G2, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, provided invaluable support in meeting overall intelligence requirements throughout the study period.

(d) The Pacific Command (PACOM) Weekly Intelligence Bulletin and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Daily Summary were used extensively in compiling division information.

(e) Direct contact with MACV was not authorized until the Division Advance Liaison Planning Detachment moved to Vietnam on 2 August 1965. This group took many questions with them; however, time precluded the answers being returned to the main body at Fort Benning prior to deployment.

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1. MACV has produced an Intelligence Guide and Operating Procedure Manual which is the Intelligence SOP for Vietnam operations. Copies of this document were received and are being incorporated into the TAC SOP at the close of this report.

2. Maps. Maps are one of the most important intelligence support items. Based upon plans previously prepared on 19 June 1965 the planning and operational map requirements were forwarded to CONARC. Several additions were forwarded as requirements were recognized.

   a. Map coverage was supplemented and approved by USAFRAC and USAGRIK, without additional action by the division. AMS handling was excellent throughout.

   b. The existing division map issue plan and regulation provided an accurate guide for determining quantities of various types of maps to be issued. A 50% overage was applied to basic requirements to insure an adequate back-up supply; a total of 25-30 tons of maps actually made up the issue.

   c. Special map requests were initiated for the following:

      1. Composites of four 1:50,000 sheets covering Kontum, Pleiku and An Khe areas which lie near the junction of sheets were requested. The An Khe sheet was requested very late because of a change in initial deployment planning and was received after arrival in Vietnam.

      2. Survival Maps for Aviators. These maps are printed on material which is produced in Japan. A shortage of the material delayed filling of the order. The maps were subsequently received and distributed in Vietnam.

   d. Storage, classification handling and issue of 30 tons of maps was accomplished by the 15th Supply and Service Battalion. The distribution point was not large enough to facilitate effective handling of this quantity of maps, especially since they were classified.

3. Aerial Photographs.

   a. Basic cover of the Division area of interest was requested. Cover was provided by DIA but was classified SECRET NO FOREIGN, Category 1. A tactical unit without safes cannot accommodate or secure the 32 cubic feet of SECRET material which was received. Requested regrading action was denied by DIA; action was still being pressed at close of the reporting period.
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(b) Limited point and route cover was provided by the Division Advance Liaison Detachment operating in-country utilizing hand held still and motion picture cameras. Mosaics of the beach, important towns and the primary route of march anticipated were requested of MACV. Highway 19 was received in part.

(4) Air Weather Augmentation. On 19 June COMARC was requested to add five Army EM plus vehicles, tentage, weapons and communications equipment to BHC, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), to provide Air Weather Support. The USAF was requested by COMARC/Da to provide 2 Off and 18 EM to perform the support.

(a) Personnel and Equipment.

1. The augmentation is considerably larger than that of a regular division because of the density of aircraft and the concept of operations.

2. Army personnel and equipment were received and shipped in good order.

3. USAF personnel and equipment were to be provided by the 30th Weather Squadron, 1st Weather Wing, PACOM. One Officer and nine EM subsequently were provided during the reporting period with the remaining 20 due during October 1965.

(5) Interrogation Prisoner of War (IPW). The IPW section (6 Off and 15 EM) was omitted from the activation order for the MI Detachment and Third US Army was asked to provide a section complete with troops, vehicles and weapons. The assumption was that the 519th MI at Fort Bragg or the unit at Fort Meade would be tasked to fill the requirement from the pooled language spaces assigned to those units.

(a) The requested section was not assigned, rather a space increase of 21 personnel was authorized which necessitated individual fillers. The section received 6 Off and 3 EM. Da assigned 2 additional linguists and returnees from Euro to be reassigned with Fort Call on the West Coast of 30 September for further shipment to Viet Nam.

(b) Actual IPW qualification provided a language mix of two high school French students, two Vietnamese and three Chinese linguists.

(c) Military Intelligence (MI) Branch maintained that they were not kept informed of the deployment schedule for the division and considerable conflict occurred on the priority of individual fill action for the 191st MI Detachment vs other MI units being prepared for overseas shipment at the same time.

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(a) The G2 agreed to accept linguists or interrogators when it became obvious that qualified IFW personnel would not be available. Even with that concession no additional personnel arrived.

(e) Attempts to borrow Vietnamese language trainees from the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii has met with no success as of the reporting period.

(6) Army Security Agency (ASA). On 19 June an ASA Division Support Company, organised to support an airborne division was requested through CONUS. Company C, 313 ASA was attached on 2 July. In absence of a TOE, the United States Army Security Agency (USASA) General Order effecting attachment furnished a list of equipment and specified the organisation for the company. The mission, equipment, strength and organisation was not as recommended in the joint studies which had been made. Further, the communications equipment specified was not compatible with that of the division. It required a month to resolve organisation differences and arrive at a point of mutual understanding with USASA.

(c) Operations and Training: The vast training requirement of FFR/PM for the entire division was accomplished by means of centralised direction and decentralised execution. Mission type assignments were made to subordinate units to distribute the responsibility for training activities on a committee basis. This course of action was required due to the extensive training and FM Processing Requirements, short time frame allocated, limited resources and the large input of filler personnel.

(1) The Division conducted training on a scheduled six (6) day week; the seventh day being utilized for training make-up and to conduct training on subjects not programmed into the committee system. Commanders, General and Subordinate Staffs operated on a seven (7) day week in order to implement directives received from higher headquarters, prepare plans for anticipated requirements and fulfill normal staff functions.

(2) Training actually conducted during the period was directed by 11th Air Assault Division Circular 350-1, Reorganisation Period Training Program and 1st Air Cavalry Division Circulars 350-35, Movement Training Programs, and 350-40, Operational Training in Vietnam.

(a) Circular 350-1 provided instruction on reorganization and training required to integrate the Division into the overall Army Force Structure and to conduct intensified combat readiness training to rapidly bring the Division to REDCOM status.

(b) Circular 350-35, outlined the concept and scope of training for the Division Main Body and Advance Party, assigned responsibility for planning, preparation, and conduct of training included within the program.

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(a) Circular 350-40, provided guidance for planning and conduct of training during the initial period after arrival in Viet Nam.

(d) Training assistance was provided by the Airborne School at Fort Benning and the Aviation School at Fort Rucker, in that they conducted special classes as listed below:

1. The Airborne School. Two special ten day airborne qualification course which graduated 659 new airborne personnel.

2. The Aviation School. Two special classes:

   a. A UH-1 Helicopter transition class for eighty-nine (89) aviators. Each aviator received a minimum of ten (10) hours flight time.

   b. A UH-1 Aerial Weapons firing course designed to qualify previously trained aviators and familiarize new aviators with the weapons systems. A total of 120 aviators attended those classes.

(e) Training conducted at Fort Benning included as a minimum:

   1. Aviator Transition.
   2. Air to Ground Gunnery for Aviators.
   3. Air to Ground Suppressive Fires for Gunners.
   4. Portable Flame Thrower.
   5. Field Fortifications and Protective Construction.
   6. Unit Terminal Guidance Team Leaders (Pathfinder).
   7. Demolition and Explosives.
   8. Sniper.
   9. Pre-Embarkation Orientation and Briefings.
   10. Escape and Evasion.
   11. Rappelling.

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12. General military and specialized training on weapons, gas masks, cargo net, etc., as would raise the overall combat effectiveness of the division upon arrival in Vietnam.

(f) Training conducted on board ship included as a minimum:

1. Physical Training.
2. Language Introduction where possible.
3. Country and area orientation covering history, culture, customs, weather and environmental factors.
5. Weapons Firing.
6. Squad size tactics where possible.

(g) Transition training for 300 newly assigned aviators, most of whom arrived after 15 July, was beyond the division capability. Even with the help of the Aviation School at least 50 aviators deployed while still in various stages of transition.

(h) Adequate unit and combined arms training was not conducted due to requirements to provide aircraft for transition training of aviators and for completion of Modification Work Orders (MWO) on the aircraft. Aviation units deployed without having an opportunity for the newly assigned aviators to take part in unit or combined exercises.

(i) Organisations: A review of the Table of Organisation and Equipment (TOE 67-7, dated 22 Jun 65) was accomplished and Equipment Modification Lists (EML's) were submitted based upon the unit mission and errors noted during the review. Due to the short reaction time involved, the EML's were hand-carried to USCOMARO for consideration where they were promptly reviewed and acted upon by forwarding recommendations to Department of Army. The immediate attention given to the EML's by Department of Army and Third US Army greatly reduced the normal time required to complete EML type action.

(j) Plans:

1. A special study group operated apart from the normal division functions in developing five (5) operation plans.

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a. The first plan provided for the Division to go ashore and establish a division perimeter via Qui Nhon while consolidating the entire division.

b. The second plan moved the Division overseas and established a "hard base" in the vicinity of An Khe.

c. The third plan envisioned a 2d Brigade Task Force acting as the division spearhead, to secure An Khe, and establish route security from Qui Nhon to An Khe along Highway 19.

d. The fourth plan was basically the same as the third except a 1st Brigade Task Force was assigned a portion of Highway 19 to secure.

e. The fifth plan called for all personnel of the Division to be airlifted into An Khe and for vehicle convoys to move on Highway 19. Basic assumptions for this plan were that Qui Nhon, An Khe and Highway 19 would be secured by friendly forces.

2. Lack of an assigned mission or even a designation, as to the geographical location for employment required that assumed missions and assumed areas of operation be developed. This process slowed preparation of the final plan.

(k) Logistical Factors.

1. Preparation of the Division for overseas movement was hampered by the fact that the Division was undergoing a major reorganization and did not have all its equipment or personnel.

2. The packaging of equipment and supplies began in early July and continued through the week preceding movement. In general the dispatch of equipment and supplies was in two phases: general cargo and aircraft departed during the later part of July and early August and TAT equipment departed approximately one week before the troops. The overall preparation was hampered due to the lack of definitive guidance concerning rules and guidelines to be followed. AR 220-40 establishes a complete set of rules and guidelines for an administrative move. Initial instructions referred to this AR and plans were made and partially executed prior to receiving changes which required combat loading. Due to a firm deployment time schedule the change to combat loading was not accomplished, however as a compromise, personnel comprising task forces were grouped and embarked as for tactical deployment.

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3. The schedule of shipment of conex containers
required units to load and ship material while still training and processing
equipment. As a result certain items of equipment were assigned inappropriate
shipment priority.

3. (c) MOVEMENT.

a. Personnel: The movement of personnel of 1st Cav Div (AM) from
Fort Benning to Viet Nam was accomplished in three increments.

(1) An Advance Liaison Planning Detachment consisting of an ADC
and 31 officers and enlisted men departed 2 August by commercial air.

(2) An Advance Party of 1030 officers and men and 152.4 tons of
cargo deployed by MATS from Robbins AFB, Georgia during the 14 August through
20 August period with subsequent arrival in Viet Nam 19 - 28 August. The Div-
sion Commander and Staff departed Fort Benning 16 August.

(3) The following is a recapitulation showing the salient fea-
tures of the movement of the 1st Air Cavalry Division from CONUS ports of em-
barcation to An Khe.

(4) Movement of cargo:

(a) Ship Schedules:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>UNITS</th>
<th>DATE OF DEPARTURE</th>
<th>DATE OF ARRIVAL</th>
<th>DATE OF UNLOADING</th>
<th>CLOSURE DATE</th>
<th>AN KHE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheldon Lykes</td>
<td>1st Bde TF</td>
<td>8 Aug</td>
<td>3 Sep</td>
<td>6 Sep</td>
<td>10 Sep</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Lykes</td>
<td>2/17 arty</td>
<td>0/a 16 Aug</td>
<td>9 Sep</td>
<td>12 Sep</td>
<td>19 Sep</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lykes</td>
<td>1st Bde TF</td>
<td>9 Aug</td>
<td>15 Sep</td>
<td>22 Sep</td>
<td>26 Sep</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayo Lykes</td>
<td>1st Bde TF</td>
<td>10 Aug</td>
<td>14 Sep</td>
<td>19 Sep</td>
<td>25 Sep</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcon Trader</td>
<td>2d Bde TF</td>
<td>6 Aug</td>
<td>15 Sep</td>
<td>27 Sep</td>
<td>30 Sep</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brinton Lykes</td>
<td>2d Bde TF</td>
<td>13 Aug</td>
<td>13 Sep</td>
<td>20 Sep</td>
<td>28 Sep</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Lykes</td>
<td>3d Bde TF</td>
<td>12 Aug</td>
<td>15 Sep</td>
<td>29 Sep</td>
<td>2 Oct</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruth Lykes</td>
<td>Div (2)</td>
<td>7 Aug</td>
<td>15 Sep</td>
<td>27 Sep</td>
<td>2 Oct</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carol Victory</td>
<td>Div (2)</td>
<td>0/a 8 Aug</td>
<td>17 Sep</td>
<td>27 Sep</td>
<td>1 Oct</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirley Lykes</td>
<td>Div (2)</td>
<td>0/a 14 Aug</td>
<td>19 Sep</td>
<td>29 Sep</td>
<td>2 Oct</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(b) The Division was informed that it would move administratively to one port in Viet Nam. Subsequent instructions provided for landing a Brigade Task Force at Cam Ranh Bay and the balance of the division - personnel prior to cargo - at Qui Nhon. The loading and load scheduling plan was revised to implement these instructions. Later the instructions were modified and the entire division was directed to stage through Qui Nhon. The final amendatory instructions were issued to the division after departure of the first cargo ships, passenger ships and aircraft carriers. Consequently the arrival of cargo, personnel and aircraft was disjointed.

(5) Movement of passengers and TAT cargo:

(a) Ship Schedule:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE OF DEPARTURE</th>
<th>DATE OF ARRIVAL</th>
<th>CLOSURE DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USNS Buckner</td>
<td>2d Bde TP</td>
<td>16 Aug</td>
<td>12 Sep</td>
<td>14 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Derby</td>
<td>1/9 Cav plus</td>
<td>17 Aug</td>
<td>13 Sep</td>
<td>14 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Upshur</td>
<td>Spt Cav plus</td>
<td>18 Aug</td>
<td>15 Sep</td>
<td>16 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Ratch</td>
<td>Div (-)</td>
<td>20 Aug</td>
<td>15 Sep</td>
<td>17 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Geiger</td>
<td>1st Bde TP</td>
<td>21 Aug</td>
<td>20 Sep</td>
<td>21 Sep</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Movement of personnel from the Qui Nhon port to the An Khe area was accomplished primarily by utilizing CH-47 aircraft. These aircraft flew 1100 hours in support of this mission.

(6) Movement of Aircraft:

(a) Ship Schedules:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CARRIER</th>
<th>NO &amp; TYPE ACT</th>
<th>DATE OF DEPARTURE</th>
<th>DATE OF ARRIVAL</th>
<th>CLOSURE DATE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>USS Boxer</td>
<td>57 ea CH-47</td>
<td>16 Aug</td>
<td>10 Sep</td>
<td>15 Sep</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>107 ea GH-13B</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 ea CH-54</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 ea OV-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37 ea UH-1D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>USS Kula</td>
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<td>16 Aug</td>
<td>14 Sep</td>
<td>23 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>14 Sep</td>
<td>25 Sep</td>
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<td></td>
<td>21 ea UH-1B</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(b) Overcrowding and unsuitable accommodation assignments aboard the USNS Kula Gulf and USNS Card resulted in approximately 110 officers and 214 EM being transferred from these carriers to the USNS Patch immediately prior to departure. Civilian crews of the USNS Kula Gulf and USNS Card threatened to refuse to sail when attempts were made to utilize portions of the billeting area.

(c) Aircraft debarking from the aircraft carriers landed at Qui Nhon for fuel and were immediately flown to the Division Base Helipad at An Khê. Subsequent flying was temporarily restricted by the lack of an organic refueling capability in the Division Base Area.

(7) Surface movement of equipment to An Khê.

(a) During the period 5 September through 3 October conex containers, shelters, organic vehicles and general cargo were transported from Qui Nhon to An Khê. Daily averages were as follows:

1. Conexes - 60.
4. General cargo - 35 (2½ ton or equivalent).

(b) The movement of division equipment from Qui Nhon to An Khê by surface was delayed initially by lack of cargo vehicles.

(8) As of 1 Oct 65 the following items of equipment had not been located:

(a) Conexes - 38.
(b) X4 containers - 3.
(c) Miscellaneous crates and pallets containing various items - 193.
(d) Mobiliser - 3.
(e) Platform, twin deck - 1.
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(f) Vehicles:

1. Fork Lift, 3,000 lb cap - 1.
2. Truck, ½ ton - 7.
3. Trailer, 1½ ton - 2.
4. Trailer, platform ½ ton - 6.
5. Trailer, water - 1.
6. Trailer, ½ ton - 3.
7. Trailer, ammo - 3.
10. Scooter, 2 wheel - 2.

(g) A search of the port areas and units in the Qui Nhon and An Khe areas continues for the lost items.

(9) Problem areas.

(a) Insufficient time to properly plan, program and execute movement.

(b) The lack of firm guidance and continuous change of plans materially affected the movement plans.

(c) A shortage of materials handling equipment at An Khe delayed the unloading of equipment and supplies.

(d) Viet Cong (VC) probing activity and destruction of bridges along highway 19 caused some slight delay in the closure of equipment.

(e) Logistical support units were not manned and equipped to properly support the division movement from Qui Nhon nor operations subsequent to closing at An Khe. However to their credit, the units that were available did make a maximum effort to support the division.
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4. (C) ACTIVITIES IN COUNTRY.

a. Administration and Personnel.

(1) Personnel Management. All division personnel records were
shipped on one vessel rather than being split out by command. As a result all
arrived together and generally permitted the AG Records Section to be able to
begin work sooner than would have been possible had records been shipped on each
vessel.

(2) Postal. The Advance Party was without postal facilities
except to receive and mail letters. After the main body arrived full postal
facilities were provided for the division. At present approximately 5000
pounds of outgoing mail is handled daily.

(3) Finance.

(a) The Deputy Finance Officer departed Fort Benning,
Georgia on 4 September 1965 for Saigon. He visited MACV and USARV Headquarters
for the purpose of setting up cash funding procedures and then went to
Qui Nhon to meet the troop ships and coordinate the conversion of US currency
to Military Payment Certificates (MPC). The 13th Finance Disbursing Section
at Qui Nhon conducted the actual conversion for arriving troops. The Deputy
Finance Officer also assumed the duties of Imprest Fund Cashier to MACV for the
purpose of paying local Vietnamese day laborers employed in the division area.

(b) The arrival of 70 personnel of the Finance Section by
air coincided with the arrival of 26 personnel aboard the USS Patch. The section
closed in on 16 September along with air shipped equipment and records.
Operations were established and the section paid the entire division on 30 Sep-
tember.

(c) The first experience on Computed Automated Military Pay
System (CAMS) has been gratifying. The Finance Center prepared the payrolls
from the computer and air mailed them so that they arrived on 22 September 1965.
Cash payments desired by each individual were typed on the payrolls from the
individual Financial Data Records Folder (FDRF) and the necessary accounting ac-
tions completed by 29 September 1965. Under the previous pay system, it would not
have been possible to have met payday in such an orderly fashion. A Finance
Center coordinating team joined the division Finance Section to assist in imple-
menting of the CAMS system.

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b. Intelligence.

(1) G2 Operations Section.

(a) Intelligence contributions to plans and orders were prepared to support operational considerations.

(b) Liaison visits were conducted to Headquarters United States Army Task Force Alpha (USATFA) now United States Field Forces Vietnam (Force Victor); II Corps 22d Division Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), Sector Advisor, Binh Dinh Province; Sub-Sector Advisors Binh Khe and An Tuc Districts, Binh Dinh Province; US Special Forces Det G2, Pleiku, and Det B-22 An Khe.

(c) Communications were established and intelligence summaries and reports are being exchanged with:

1. Force Victor.
2. II Corps RVNAF.
3. 22d Div RVNAF.
4. Sector Operations and Intelligence Center (SOICO) Qui Nhon, Binh Dinh.
5. USSF B-22, An Khe.

(d) The operations section supervised the establishment of the information files for the area of interest.

(2) Intelligence Processing Center (IPC). Plans were initiated, space and communications allocated, and equipment positioned to open an IPC at division level.

(a) The IPC is staffed by G2 Operations, G2 Air, Order of Battle (OB), Counter Intelligence (CI), IPW and 10th Radio Reconnaissance Unit (RRC).

(b) The purpose of the center is to compile and analyze information from all sources, prepare estimates and studies as required, and provide intelligence for forthcoming operations.

(c) Counterintelligence direction will be exercised from the IIJ.
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(d) Document translations, IPW reports, and technical intelligence reports will be reviewed in the IPO for exploitation.

(e) Imagery interpretation support while not included on a permanent basis, will be available as required from organic resources of the MI Det.

(3) The OB Section, MI Det, deployed with 4 officers and 4 enlisted men. The 2 officers over strength are used in the IPO.

(4) Maps. A limited number of 1:100,000 maps were procured for distribution. The map itself is very poor and is useful only to establish relationships between points on the grids, roads and rivers will not align, contours are incomplete, and traces of ridgelines are submitted for contours in many locales.

(5) G2 Air. The section is operational but is dependent primarily on USAF coverage at present because organic aircraft do not have sensors or cameras installed at this time. One borrowed camera has been flown on one mission, the results were not available at the close of the period. The G2 section has been utilized to assemble and catalog prints received from film libraries.

(6) Air Weather Augmentation. One officer and nine men are present for duty. Observations are being taken at An Khe Airstrip and at the division heliport. Forecast service will commence in early October.

(7) MI Detachment.

(a) The CI Section has been involved in liaison activities with the Province Eq (Binh Dinh) and USAF B-22 Detachment. Plans have been completed to initiate CI activities in the vicinity of the Base Camp.

(b) IPW Section. The Viet Cong Captive (VCG) and Suspect (VOS) collecting point has been established and about 40 persons have been interrogated and screened. Valuable training and experience in handling VCG/VOS has been gained.

(8) USASA Company. Equipment and personnel are present; operations should commence in early October. Teams have participated in operations with the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and are familiar with that unit's methods. Plans are underway to establish 3 mobile sites for initial operations as soon as equipment is service checked. Communications to the 3rd BN (Saigon) have not been established as of the end of the reporting period, but should be completed soon.

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(9) 54th Infantry Detachment (Ground Surveillance Radar) has 2 each AN/TPS 33's and 4 each AN/PES-4's, manned by 19 enlisted men. Operation control is exercised by the G2; plans to employ the unit to supplement the organic brigade capabilities have been completed.

(a) Detachment personnel plan to conduct an operator's training program at unit level for the Brigade radar operators.

(b) Personnel will assist units in repair and sighting of organic equipment.

(c) The 4 AN/TPS-4's are operable; the 2 AN/TPS-33's are not operable due to maintenance problems. All available sets are being used in the unit training program.

O. Operations and Training.

(1) Actions by Advance Party.

(a) Planned move of Advance Party from Nha Trang into An Khe.

(b) Initiated liaison with CG USATFA (now Field Force Vietnam) and CO, 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division.

(c) Liaison was conducted with Air Force agencies to integrate the Division in the Viet Nam tactical air support system.

(d) After the Advance Party closed into An Khe, the G3 section began preparing plans for the occupation and defense of the Division Base. Advance OPORDS and OPLANs issued:

1. OPORD 652 established defense of the Advance Party Base and for working parties in the Division Base area.

2. OPORD 653 superseded OPORD 652 by expanding and reallocating the missions.

3. OPLAN 4-65, "ADHERE WILLS" provided for a "Scatter Plan" to disperse the Division aircraft in event the Division Base became untenable due to enemy action or severe weather conditions.

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(e) Establishment and operation of the Advance Party Command Post.

(f) Preparation of plans and directives to establish and control Division training and programmed artillery and mortar impact areas; publications included.

1. Circular 350-41 established an orientation program whereby selected officers and key enlisted personnel received six days of training with either the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division or with 173d Brigade (Airborne). A total of 119 personnel participated.

2. Circular 350-42 established an in-country orientation program which was conducted by experienced personnel dispatched and controlled from Task Force Alpha. A total of 8450 personnel received the orientation.

3. A Naval Gunfire briefing was announced in a letter dated 19 September 1965. The briefing was conducted on 29 September at the Division Command Post by a US Navy Officer. 35 Officers attended the briefing.

4. Change 19 to Division Regulation 350-1 updated overall rappelling procedures and techniques.

5. An aerial Suppressive Fire Training Course was developed and lesson plans were distributed to all units on 30 September 1965.

6. Division ranges and firing areas were established.

(g) Tactical operations were directed by the following OPLANS and OPORDs.

1. OPLAN 5-65 provided a coordinated defense of the advance party base in conjunction with 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

2. OPLANS 6-65 and 7-65 were counterattack plans to support OPLAN 5-65.

3. OPLAN 8-65 established the plan of defense for the Division base area. It was changed to OPORD 654 to implement its provisions.
4. OPLAN 9-65 covered the initial acceptance for responsibility of security from 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division by the Division. It was put into effect as OCPPOD 655.

(h) The Division published a Concept of Operation which was delivered to Task Force Alpha. The paper contained a recommended Tactical Zone (TZ) and a Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) plus recommendations as to the type of missions to be assigned during the initial phase (28 September to 31 October). The recommended division tasks were final closure, defense of base, and security of Highway 19 from An Khe to the Division Eastern Boundary vicinity Qui Nhon.

(i) Approximately 50 Officer and Warrant Officer Aviators participated in an In-Country Orientation Program. These aviators were placed with operational Aviation Units and actually took part in combat missions. One aviator was killed by enemy action and another received a severe back injury in an aircraft accident at the termination of a combat operation. Despite these losses the overall orientation program was a complete success and immeasurably contributed to the smooth transition from CONUS Operations to Vietnamese Operations by Division aviation units.

(j) One significant combat action was 1st Cav Div (AM) support provided to 1st Bde., 101st Airborne Division on Operation GIBRALTAR, conducted 18 - 20 September 1965. A need developed for additional fire power to support Operation GIBRALTAR so 3/1/77 Arty and a platoon of A/2/7 Cav were air-lifted into a supporting position by OH-47 helicopters, the first tactical lift of artillery into actual combat by OH-47's. The battery fired 837 rounds of 105 ammunition in reinforcing the fires of 2d Bn, 320th Arty. Additional artillery support in the form of 76 sorties of aerial rocket artillery was provided. When it became necessary for the 1st Bde., 101st Abn to extract the 1/327 Infantry Battalion from the perimeter of the 1st Cavalry Division Base to effect a relief of the 1/502 Infantry Battalion conducting Operation GIBRALTAR, the 1st Cav provided a replacement battalion to secure the perimeter. The repositioning of the 1/327 and 1/502 was by 1st Cav Div (AM) airlift. In addition to flying 96 combat sorties, the 1st Cav Div (AM) flew assorted resupply and Medical Evacuation missions and provided needed artillery support although the Division was less than 50% closed at the time.

(k) The 1st Cav Div (AM) became operational and accepted responsibility for its own security on 28 September 1965 (Exactly 2 months after the President announced the move of the Division to Viet Nam). No significant activities or contacts were made during the last two days of the reporting period.
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d. Logistics.

(1) An area of special interest was water distribution. The advance party had no water trailers and had to rely upon the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div to supply water, except for what could be carried in 5 gallon cans and 5 gallon Lug-A-Jugs, a lightweight collapsible plastic container. As the Division began to close the situation became worse because the few water trailers the division had did not arrive in time to support divisional units. Wells under construction will relieve the water shortage problem in the Div Base area, however, tactical operations away from the base camp will require a large number of the plastic Lug-A-Jugs which are in short supply.

(2) Messes. Many unit messes did not arrive until weeks after the unit closed. This created a logistical problem in that "C" Rations had to be fed in many units although an abundant supply of "B" Rations were available in the Base Camp; "C" Rations were in critical short supply throughout the theater during this period. Many of the messes which had been shipped RED DISK TAT, were not made immediately available upon landing.

(3) Barrier materials were not available in sufficient quantities and have not been received as of the end of the reporting period.

e. Civil Affairs.

(1) The division, unlike other CONUS Divisions, did not have an active G5 section. When it became apparent that the Division was going to deploy overseas a G5 section was organized. However the newly assigned G5 was reassigned out of the Division just prior to deployment. G5 representation did not accompany the Advance Party, however the Asst G2 of the 1st Bde (Abn), Captain Ronald E. Summers, had prior service in Vietnam and was able to assume the duties of G5 until an in-country officer could be provided. Lieutenant Colonel R. J. Craig who had been Senior Advisor to the 24th Special Tactical Zone for six (6) months was assigned as G5.

(2) Effective 26 September, Mr. Robert A. Cormier, USCM liaison representative, joined the Division.

(3) The initial activity of the G5 section was to meet and coordinate with local officials of An Tuc and Binh Khe Districts, Vietnamese province liaison officer, and other influential citizens. Coordination was also effected with subsector, section and regional MACV advisors, USCM representatives, and USAFPA (now Field Force Vietnam) G5 Section.
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(4) A summary of G5 activities include:

(a) Treatment of local plague cases.

(b) Innocation of 4,500 local citizens for plague.

(c) Distribution of school supplies to 1100 children.

(d) Help with the local medical program by Army personnel.

(e) Development of a fixed-price list for items to be sold in An Khe. This protects the soldiers while tending to stabilize the economy of the Vietnamese.

(f) Hiring approximately 2,500 refugee laborers daily to clear brush continuous to the Division perimeter.

(g) A number of Psychological Warfare Programs have been conducted and leaflets being the prime distribution means.
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HAS 1ST CAV DIVISION (CHIRMBALE)

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SUBJECT: Quarterly Command Report (RCS GSGPO-28(R1) for First Fiscal Quarter, FY 66

SECTION II COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE

1. (C) GENERAL. The most significant problem encountered during the reporting period was time; a simple lack of sufficient time to accomplish the critical tasks required in an orderly, logical sequence and manner. The Division concurrently reorganized and prepared for overseas movement. Although months are normally allocated for each of these tasks the 1st Cav Div (AM) completed these missions between 1 July and 15 August. As laudable as these accomplishments are, the compression of several months activities into a few weeks created many problems which could otherwise have been prevented. Adequate time was not available for planning, with the predictable result that mistakes were made and duplication of efforts occurred. Many tasks were done two or three times since proper coordination could not be made and many short outs were taken. The short time between issuance of PCS deployment orders and departure date did not permit individuals to take time off to relocate families and settle all personal affairs. Considerable personal inconvenience and some hardships resulted. The main point, of course, is that the mission was accomplished. During the quarter the Division was engaged in training and preparation for movement 46 days, movement 43 days and operations 3 days.

2. (C) PERSONNEL.

a. 99% of personnel fill actions were accomplished by DA and CONARC prior to deployment. The short time allotted to bring the division to strength required an immediate fill from all available sources. This resulted in a disparity between authorized and assigned grade structure for rated officers. It is to the credit of the officers concerned that in the true spirit of the Army Officer Corps the vast majority of them adjusted rapidly to the situation and soon were carrying their share of the load and leading their unit/sections.

b. The deployment criteria established for the Division (60 days prior to BTS) had its first impact three weeks after closure as some troops began rotating for discharge. The following is the projected BTS loss for the next 90 days in Vietnam:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 1965</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1965</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1965</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These, as well as a projection of BTS losses through June 1966 were furnished USCOMARC on 15 August for purpose of establishment of replacement flow after arrival in Vietnam.
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3. (C) INTELLIGENCE.

a. Delayed authorization for access to planning and operational maps, coupled with an early requirement to outload YELLOW and RED DISK TAT inserts, resulted in units arriving in-country without maps to adequately support operations initially.

b. Overclassification of estimated departure dates of units and individuals increased personal problems normally associated with a Division deployment. This was further complicated by the news media announcing that the 1st Cav Div (AM) would deploy to Viet Nam several weeks prior to the official announcement.

4. (C) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

a. Training goals were reached so far as FOR was concerned. However, the turnover of personnel within the majority of the Division Battalions seriously reduced the overall training level. There was insufficient time between reorganization and deployment to conduct tactical proficiency and unit training to bring the Division to the desired combat readiness.

b. Concurrent with the reorganization and FOR/FOM requirements the Division still had forces in the Dominican Republic, these elements did not close at Fort Benning until 24 July which was less than 20 days before the units had to deploy for Viet Nam.

c. The Advance Party was limited in size with the result that sufficient personnel and equipment could not be transported to do the job properly. The work in-country proved the entire Engineer Battalion should have been included in addition to normal advance party personnel. Without the Engineer Battalion and its equipment, the advance party work on the Division Base was accomplished by hand tools. An Engineer Battalion was provided by USARV to construct roads, but none of this Battalion's effort could be directed towards the heliport and base construction effort.

d. Logistics. The rapid reaction time required to reorganize and move the division had a substantial effect on the cost of both of these activities. The most notable circumstance evolving from this effort was the complete support and responsiveness of the entire Army logistical system to put the division in the highest possible logistical REDCOM status prior to its departure from CONUS. The only significant area in supply not accomplished was the establishment of aircraft parts ASL prior to departure. In movement, the division did not have a sole source of information to get answers on individual ship capacities i.e. cargo, personnel and aircraft carriers, and peculiarities so it could properly and conclusively plan loading. On the basis of hindsight, the DA decision to not authorize construction materials to accompany the Division was regrettable because construction materials were not made available to the division in-country.
AVCOG
1 December 1965

SUBJECT: Quarterly Command Report (ROS GSGPO-28(R1) for First Fiscal Quarter, FY 66

SECTION III COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A minimum of 90 days notice should be provided any Division prior to deployment to a combat zone if a major reorganization is involved.

2. All personnel transfers and filler action should be completed a minimum of 60 days prior to the target REDCON 1 date. This will permit adequate individual and small unit training as a minimum plus a few days for each individual to settle his personal affairs.

3. A mission statement and a geographical location should be provided the Division as soon as possible and not later than 30 days prior to the time that unit loads must depart.

4. Regardless of the time frame, all units should be outloaded in a combat configuration if possible.

5. A centralized training package covering general military subjects essential for training for overseas movement should be prepared. It should contain lesson plans and at least drafts of training aids. Such a package would be of priceless benefit for a shipboard training program.

6. Qualified language instructors should be provided aboard each troop ship to conduct classes for personnel enroute.

7. Personnel being ordered to a Division within 60 days of a scheduled deployment should be instructed not to move their families to their new CONUS duty location.

8. Movement orders should be issued far enough in advance to permit individuals to relocate and settle personal affairs.

9. The entire Division Engineer Battalion and its equipment should be included when an advance party is required to begin construction of a base.

10. The Advance Party for a Division should be of sufficient size to provide for all operational requirements, to include functional general and special staff sections of Division Headquarters, major unit advance parties and the Division Engineer Battalion. A strength of approximately 2000 would provide for accomplishment of advance party missions.

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11. Dockyard personnel should be required to load cargo with respect to the RED and YELLOW disk marking. If this proves to be impossible, the affected unit should be contacted to permit establishment of new priorities of the YELLOW TAT involved.

12. Water transporters should be provided on a temporary loan basis in order to provide an adequate water supply to incoming units until closure of the unit water trailers.

13. Maps should be prepositioned in-country for contingency units and only planning maps should be issued in CONUS.

14. G5 Sections should be augmented in divisions alerted for movement to Viet Nam early enough to permit adequate section training, division level civil affairs training guidance, and representation in the advance party.

HARRY W. O. KINNARD
Major General, USA
Commanding
S30JOTs Quarterlies Comm3d Report (RCE: GSGPO(R1)) for First Fiscal Quarter, FY 66

Headquarters, Field Force Vietnam, APO US Forces 96240 21 DEC 1965

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307

1. (U) Concur in comments and recommendations of the basic report.

2. (C) Reference paragraph 8, Section III, of basic report. Recommend that for future unit deployments movement orders for filler personnel contain a statement that personnel are to report to a unit or station for further movement to an overseas destination, and movement of dependents to a permanent home is authorized.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. C. BALDWIN
Captain AGC
Asst AG
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307 JAN 1 7 1966

TO: Commander-In-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH, APO US Forces 96558

(0) Reference Section III, Commander's Recommendations:

1. An arbitrary time factor should not be established for deployment of units. Rather, the extent of reorganization, training, and unit readiness criteria should be considered for each unit.

2. Concur.

3. Concur.

4. Concur. Even though this is more expensive, it would materially expedite the capability of units to assume their mission upon arrival in Vietnam.

5. Concur. Training packets, oriented to the geographical and tactical situation of the area of the unit destination, would be of great value.

6. Concur, within available manpower resources.

7. Concur, provided this can be accomplished within existing security regulations.

8. Concur. Publishing of movement orders is not within the scope of this headquarters.


10. Concur. However, inclusion of the entire engineer battalion is contingent on the area to be occupied and the tasks to be accomplished.

11. Concur.

12. In future deployments, units should include water purification equipment and water trailers in their advance party. Requirements in excess of the equipment that can be flown in with the advance party, will be met by the use of water cans until a float of water trailers is available.

13. Non concur. Basic load of maps should accompany unit. Requirements generated in-country should be provided by normal requests through channels.

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GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.
AVC (1 Dec 65) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Quarterly Command Report (RCS CSGPO(R)) for First Fiscal Quarter, FY 66 (26)


FOR THE COMMANDER:

HENRY L. DENNEY
CMO, USA
Asst Adjutant General
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Quarterly Command Report (RCS CSGFO (R1) for First Fiscal Quarter, FY 66 (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 19 FEB 1966

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The Quarterly Command Report of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for the period 1 July - 30 September 1965 is forwarded herewith.

2. This headquarters concurs with the 2nd Indorsement.

3. This headquarters has requested that DA provide a civil affairs staff capability to all tactical brigades and higher units coming to this theater. It has further requested that a representative of the civil affairs staff arrive in-country 20 days prior to the arrival of the main body in order that he may be briefed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D. A. HARRISON
Capt, AG
Asst AG

REGRADED UNTCLASSIFIED WHEN SETA C FROM CLASSIFIED INDOCOSEC(S)