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**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

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**LIMITATION CHANGES**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
<th>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</th>
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<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>Controlling DoD Organization: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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**AUTHORITY**

AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980
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OBJECTIVE

1. (C) GENERAL

a. General Situation. During the period 1 October - 30 November 1965 the 1st Cavalry Division operated over an area of about 170km by 170km in Binh Dinh, Phu Loc, and Phu Yen Provinces. Division operations extended from the China Sea to the Cambodian Border along the axis of Highway 19, and from Bong Son to Qui Nhon along the China Sea Coast. Operations were characterized throughout by heavy reliance on air mobility. (For example, during one 37 day period beginning in late October-an-equivalent of 22 infantry battalion moves and 66 artillery battery displacements were made using helicopters ranging from distances of a kilometer to as much as 120 kilometers). The division base remained at its location near An Khe throughout the period. During most of the period, two brigades operated away from the base, while one brigade of 2 infantry battalions secured the division base and improved the security of the base. Brigade operations were largely search and destroy operations or pacification of areas previously controlled by the Viet Cong. The defense of the division base at An Khe, construction of barriers around the base, and a vast supply build-up continued simultaneously with tactical operations. Base defense operations were characterized by battalion size or small offensive operations, daytime saturation patrolling, and night-time ambush patrols.

b. Division organization and key personnel at the end of reporting period were as follows:

(1) Division Headquarters

Maj Gen Harry W. O. Kinnard  Commanding General
Brig Gen John H. Wright  Asst Div Commander
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Brig Gen Richard T. Knowles
Lt Col John N. White
Lt Col Bobby R. Lang
Lt Col Earl K. Buchan
Lt Col Benjamin S. Silver
Lt Col Robert J. Craig

(1) 1st Brigade (Airborne)
Colonel Elvy B. Roberts
Lt Col Kenneth D. Hartel
Lt Col John A. Hamphill
Lt Col Rutland D. Board Jr.

(2) 2d Brigade
Colonel William R. Lynch
Lt Col Frederic Lokenson
Lt Col Edward G. Mayor
Lt Col Earl Ingran

(3) 3d Brigade
Colonel Harold G. Moore Jr.
Lt Col Raymond L. Karpe
Lt Col Robert A. McDade

Asst Div Commander
Chief of Staff
ACofS, G1
ACofS, G2
ACofS, G3
ACofS, G4
ACofS, G5

CO, 1st Bde (Abn)
CO, 1/8 Cav Bn
CO, 2/8 Cav Bn
CO, 1/12 Cav Bn

CO, 2d Bde
CO, 1/3 Cav Bn
CO, 2/5 Cav Bn
CO, 2/12 Cav Bn

CO, 3d Bde
CO, 1/7 Cav Bn
CO, 2/7 Cav Bn
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(5) Division Artillery

Colonel William J. Becker  
Lt Col Francis J. Rush  
Lt Col Nelson A. Malone Jr.  
Lt Col Robert M. Short  
Lt Col Harold T. Smith  

Co, 1st Cav Div Arty  
Co, 2/19 Arty (Abn)  
Co, 2/20 Aerial Rocket Arty Bn  
Co, 1/21 Arty Bn  
Co, 1/77 Arty Bn  

(6) 11th Aviation Group

Colonel Allen M. Burdett Jr.  
Lt Col Jack Cranford  
Lt Col Max Clark  
Lt Col Robert S. Kellar  
Major Paul E. Clark  

Co, 11th Avn Gp  
Co, 227th Aslt Hel Bn  
Co, 228th Aslt Spt Hel Bn  
Co, 229th Aslt Hel Bn  
Co, 11th Avn Co (GS)  

(7) Support Command

Colonel John J. Hennessey  
Lt Col Frederick Osterhout  
Lt Col Juari Syvajuntsov  
Lt Col Charles McGueary  
Lt Col Granville M. Stagg  
Capt John Q. Adams  

Co, Spt Cdr  
Co, 15th Sup & Svc Bn  
Co, 15th Med Bn  
Co, 15 TC Bn (AMSC)  
Co, 27th Maint Bn  
Co, 15th Admin Co  

(8) Lt Col Robert H. Shoemaker  

Co, 1/9 Cav SQN  

(9) Lt Col Robert J. Miley  

Co, 8th Engr Bn  

(10) Lt Col Tom M. Nicholson  

Co, 13th Sig Bn  

ATTACHED UNITS

(11) Lt Col Richard L. Moriarty  

Co, 6/14 Arty Bn  

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ATTACHED UNITS

(12) Lt Col Charles L. Zolner CO, 3/18 Arty Bn
(13) Lt Col Harry O. Amos CO, 2/17 Arty Bn
(14) Capt Gary B. Schultz CO, B Btry 29th Arty (Slt)
(15) Maj Raymond D. Franklin CO, 17th Avn Co
(16) Maj T. J. Clark CO, 478 Avn Co (Bvy Heli)
(17) Capt Charles L. Leasure CO, 586 Sig Co (Spt)
(18) 1st Lt Walter A. Jones CO, 184 Chemical Plt (Ds)
(19) 1st Lt William W. Toney CO, Det 1, 54th Sig Bn
(20) Maj Gary D. Collier CO, 191st Hl Det
(21) Maj Roy W. Haygood Jr. CO, 14th Hist Det
(22) Capt John M. Arnold CO, 10th BRU
(23) Capt Charles B. Hill CO, USAF Weather Tm
30th Weather Sqdn
(24) Capt Edward L. Parham CO, 26th Cal Det
(25) Sgt b5) Ted Clayton 54th Inf Det (2nd Surv)

SUPPORTING UNITS

(26) Colonel Richard T. Bull CO, 34th QM Bn (DS/GS)
(27) Lt Col Leonard Idelstein CO, 70th Engr Bn
(28) Lt Col Francis C. Dimond Jr. CO, 2d Sur Hosp (Mobile Army)

2. (C) PERSONNEL

a. Strengths authorized and assigned strength at the beginning and close of reporting period were as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>WO</th>
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<td>676</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>1273</td>
<td>435</td>
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(2) Close of Report Period

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<th>AGGREGATE</th>
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<td>676</td>
<td>14099</td>
<td>15955</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>15042</td>
<td>16732</td>
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</table>

b. Replacements: A total of 5211 enlisted replacements were received, most without weapons and equipment; during the same period division losses were 3459. The major problem in the area of replacements was that over 4000 replacements did not arrive until the month of December.

c. Morale and Personnel Services: The following numbers of awards were recommended and/or awarded during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Recommended</th>
<th>Awarded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medal of Honor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers Medal</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star with V Device</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal with V Device</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>1711</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commandation with V</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commandation Medal</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>433*</td>
<td>433*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate of Achievement</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Recommendations</td>
<td>2755</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Total Awarded: 573

* Does not include Purple Heart Medals awarded by hospitals or to personnel evacuated from the division.
AVOG

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(2) Combat Badges Awarded

Combat Infantry Badge 4361
Combat Medical Badge 104
Total 4465

a. USAV delegated authority to division to award the Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal, Purple Heart, and the Army Commendation Medal.

b. Promotions: A total of 4575 division enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period.

c. Reenlistments: A total of 211 reenlistments or extension actions were completed. Six first-term RA, 170 career men and 3 AUS personnel reenlisted. There were 8 RA and 24 AUS extensions.

d. Administrative Services: Reproduction requirements during the period exceeded any comparable period. This was attributed to the reorganization and movement of the division necessitating the updating of all division publications. An LG forward element of 1 officer and 2 enlisted men was located at Pleiku during the period 21 - 26 November 1965. Message transmission time was drastically reduced by the mailing of all routine precedence messages. Adverse weather and high humidity caused paper to become damp and caused excessive waste in printing. To offset this factor a space heater was installed in the reproduction tent, and paper stocks stored near it; resulting in a 95% usage factor.

e. Postal: Postal activities during the period of this report were unusually heavy. The ordinary order sales for the quarters were $1,935,001.19. Postage and parcel post fees reached a high of $29,959.00 during December bringing the total for the period to $62,596.25. Mail was received on 81 days and dispatched on 86 days. Incoming mail for the period amounted to 239,899 lbs; 134,178 being processed in December with a daily average of 4,325 lbs. 16, 239 pieces of incoming accountable mail and 4310 pieces of outgoing accountable mail were processed. To provide adequate storage space for the incoming mail, two mess tents and twelve 20' x 20' paulins were used. Fourteen additional personnel, 9 from division units and five from lst Log Command, assisted in the handling of the holiday workload.
I. Special Services: A total of 92 movies and 19 TV films were circulated. The division received $42,647.00 in Special Service equipment. $8,684.15 worth of Christmas decorations purchased with welfare funds were distributed to division units. A total of 6 USO shows played in the division area with an estimated total attendance of 24,000. Construction and related materials for the stage were procured and transported from Saigon. During the quarter, 1369 BAR quotas, 766 in-country and 603 out-of-country, were received. Difficulty was experienced in filling the in-country quotas due to inadequacy of air transportation. Operation Christmas Star resulted in the distribution of 5,109 packages and 12 COMEX inserts, including 7300 paperback books.

j. Finance:

(1) The Centralized Automated Military Pay System (CAMS) has been successful since the finance office became operational 10 October 1965. The former military pay voucher (MPV) system would have precluded a normal payday due to excessive dust and moisture encountered during initial establishment of working facilities. Though CAMS smoothed into a routine operation, lack of a transceiver capability remained a problem. Delays caused by the use of airmail to the US Army Finance Center at Indianapolis accounted for most of the errors detected in pay vouchers and sometimes resulted in financial hardship for dependents. There was a transceiver capability to Tan Son Nhat, but none to the out-of-country terminal at the 27th Data Processing Unit at Cholon.

(2) Since there were no banking facilities available in Vietnam, the finance officer provided many services such as cashing and selling of checks, sales of foreign currency, and accepting post office and post exchange receipts, thereby multiplying the disbursing workload. This has imposed a requirement for having more cash on hand than would normally be handled in CAFMS.

k. Chaplain Activities: Weekly briefings for senior Unit Chaplains were held on Saturday morning to coordinate overall religious services. Bishop Arnold Lewis, Episcopal Bishop for the Armed Services, was guest speaker at special Episcopal Services 1 December 1965. Congressman Joseph Y. Bannack, Congressman of the 28th District of New York, was guest speaker for Jewish Services on 29 December 1965. Cardinal Spellman held Christmas Day Mass at the New Division Bowl.

l. Inspector General's Activities: Four Inspector General investigations were directed and completed in the period. Inspector General complaint periods were conducted at all scheduled major commands. A total of three requests for assistance were received and processed. Requests for assistance in pay actions became minimal during the quarter, and some reduction in personnel actions (assignments) was apparent.
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Information Officer Activities.

(1) During the reported period the section was understrength with only 50% of authorized officer and enlisted men present, but was able to meet all of its priority missions. The division has hosted an average of 30 newsmen on each occasion of combat activity. During every major operation it was necessary to establish a forward press center to assist newsmen in reporting division activities.

(2) A division newspaper, the AVV-JAIR, was published weekly by the Information office. Also an Armed Forces Radio Service station was established in the base area. The Information office gave support to several special projects which included:

(a) A CBS Television, half-hour, “Instant News Special” on the Pleiku Campaign.

(b) An ABC Television one-hour special featuring a division officer.

(c) A Time Magazine cover and story directly related to this division and its role in Vietnam.

(d) A Life Magazine feature story on a division officer that appeared 6 December 1965.

(e) The US Army portion of a VBC documentary on the buildup in Vietnam was done on the 1st Air Cavalry at Pleiku.

3. (c) INTELLIGENCE.

a. During operation SHIPY BAYONET, which was conducted 10 - 15 October 1965 a division forward command post was established and operated at the CIDG Training Camp (BR 9146). Intelligence personnel gained valuable experience in handling Viet Cong Captives (VCC), Viet Cong Suspects (VCS), and dissemination of information.

b. During the Pleiku Campaign, which was conducted 23 October - 29 November 1965, a forward division command post was operated in Pleiku. Since the operation was conducted in an environment which approximated conventional warfare, more information about the enemy was obtained through capture of documents and interrogation of VCC and VGS than during previous operations.

c. Total enemy losses and weapons captured during the periods:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>VCC</th>
<th>VCS</th>
<th>WEPS CAPTURED</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1530</td>
<td>2201</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>1286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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d. In October, during the PLEIKU Campaign the Intelligence Processing Center (IPC) became operational: its function being to compile and analyze information about the enemy and prepare estimates and reports to support division operations.

c. Order of Battle Section:

(1) Although overstrength, the section needed additional personnel to provide adequate support for air-mobile operations. A change to the NI Detachment TACC was submitted requesting authorization of 4 officers and 9 enlisted men for the OB section.

(2) Detailed studies of trails and infiltration routes across the Cambodian, Lao, and South Vietnamese borders were initiated.

f. G2 Air

(1) The Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition (ASTA) Platoon became operational on 7 October 1965 and has supported the division throughout the reporting period.

(2) Missions flown during the reporting periods:

(a) Visual - 68
(b) Photo - 176
(c) IR - 169
(d) SLAR - 106

(3) Total number of flight hours for the reporting period was 1223.6 hours.

(4) Shortages of photographic supplies and technical representatives were reported to G4 and corrective action was taken.

g. Intelligence Problem Areas.

(1) A major problem was encountered by the weather team in the field of communications. Two single side band radios with radio teletype (RTT) capability were authorized but only one was on hand and its RTT component was inoperative because of a missing part. During the reporting period VRC-46 radios were used as an alternate means of communication. Transmission of weather data to observing teams at the Division Forward CP at Pleiku was not dependable because of terrain obstructions. Action continues to improve service.
4. (c) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

a. Organization.

(1) During the reporting period four units were attached to the division:

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<thead>
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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CLOSED IN RVN</th>
<th>ATTACHED TO</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B Battery, 29th Artillery (Searchlight)</td>
<td>23 October 1965</td>
<td>Div Arty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/14 Artillery (175 Gun SP)</td>
<td>29 October 1965</td>
<td>Div Arty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/18 Artillery (8&quot; How, SP)</td>
<td>30 October 1965</td>
<td>Div Arty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Military History Detachment</td>
<td>23 December 1965</td>
<td>HHC, 1st Air Cav</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) On 15 December 1965 the An Khe Airfield Command (Provisional) consisting of 9 officers and 70 enlisted men, was established from internal division resources. The unit provides continuous airfield and flight operations service to all aviation elements of the division and to transient aircraft of all U.S. and allied forces as required. During the quarter there were 161,539 take-offs and landings with a monthly high for December of 57,862 - more than O'Hare International Airport. The command operated the An Khe fixed wing strip, the Golf Course helipad and the Nong Kong approach system. Action was taken to replace this provisional unit with a WVR TD detachment thus freeing the current personnel and equipment for their assigned forward flight control operations in support of committed brigades.

(3) The Division Chemical Section has been closely integrated with the G3 Section. The CBR element of the division chemical section has been cross-trained in operations. Thus the chemical officers and enlisted men can perform additional duties as operation officers and operations specialists in the WVR. The division chemical officer performs additional duty as a Deputy G3. This flexibility in the use of the CBR element of the WVR evolved as a necessity to meet frequent requirements for 24-hour operation of both a Forward WVR and a WVR in the base area. A separate plans section has been necessitated by the far-ranging operations of the division from the China Sea to the Cambodian Border, with consequent requirements to coordinate with ARVN II Corps, 22d ARVN Division, the ROK Capital Division, other U.S. units and the U.S. Air Force, in addition to normal higher level command coordination.

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To provide mobile, quick-reacting, forward control of operations, a CH-54A flying crane pod was equipped with complete communications, maps and desks to serve as a forward DFCO. This pod proved extremely flexible and useful. A CV-2 TOO ship, specially fitted with 9 radio consoles, 6 sliding map boards, teletypewriter and desk space was received to provide an airborne CP for direct control of operations. This proved useful when brigades operated at great distances on terrain which degraded normal ground-to-ground radio communications.

b. Training.

(1) A division directive was published in November which announced requirements and provided for the conduct of training and development of training facilities during the period 20 November 1965 to 31 March 1966.

Training emphasized by the division program included:

(a) Individual training on quick-fire reaction courses.

(b) 81mm mortar training.

(c) Replacement training at unit level except for orientation of all personnel in the Division Replacement Detachment. Other mandatory orientations were conducted at battalion level for all personnel. Aviation personnel received a special aviation operations orientation.

(d) Door gunner training for all personnel assigned as door gunners.

(e) Airborne proficiency training. All airborne personnel made a proficiency jump.

(f) Trooper ladder training. Only limited training was conducted due to the delayed arrival of these devices. As added ladders are received training will continue on this system for introducing and extracting personnel in areas where the CH-47 and UH-1D helicopters cannot land.

(2) Training support from non-divisional sources included:

(a) 117 division personnel attended aircraft maintenance training on the UH-1 and CH-47 aircraft under the Army Aircraft Mobile Training Assistance Program (AMTAP).
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(2) 500 personnel received training on the new series of night vision devices in preparation for receipt of this equipment by the division in 1966.

(3) The division training program outlined a plan for development of ranges and other training facilities to meet the immediate and long range requirements of the division. Training facilities were assigned to non-engineer troop units for construction using native timber and salvage materials. Six ranges were completed prior to 31 December. The following training facilities are planned for the division base areas:

- Autorotation areas: 3
- Drop Zone: 1
- Aerial weapons range: 1 (completed)
- Artillery and mortar firing area: 1
- Quick-fire reaction courses: 3 (1 completed)
- Small arms ranges: 9 (4 completed)

c. Operations.

(1) During the quarter, 4 major plans, 6 major operations orders and 76 fire orders were issued. During the period the eight organic infantry battalions operated away from the division base a total of 440 battalion days, nearly 60% of the total infantry battalion days (736) in the quarter. Division artillery battalions were committed for 359 battalion days, in support of operations away from the base camp, an average of 65% of the total battalion days in the quarter.

(2) Two to three battalions were required during the period to defend the division base and to conduct offensive operations within 20 kms of the division base. The missions performed by these forces included: security of the base, an Khe airfield, the bridges in an Khe, and the ground line of communication thru Deo Heng Pass; patrolling, snow of force, support of local CIDG forces, pacification, and civic action. Construction was begun on a 100 meter barrier around the base. The barrier consists of five separate and complete barbed wire and anti-personnel weapons barriers, and was 65% complete at the end of the period. One hundred and seventy-seven hectares were defoliated to enhance observation in the close in areas.
d. Discussion and Analysis of Major Operations:

(1) The operations discussed below have been chosen as examples of division operations. Indocare 3 gives a complete listing of battalion and brigad-size operations conducted during the reporting period. Operations during the reporting period were of five types:

(a) Search and Clear - operations conducted with a permanent intention to remain in the area and pacify the area.

(b) Search and Destroy - operations to seek, find, and destroy enemy forces.

(c) Support of RVNAF Forces - largely artillery support operations, although several operations were actually conducted in conjunction with RVNAF operations.

(d) Security Operations - operations whose primary purpose was to provide security for incoming units, or security of ground lines of communications such as Highway 19.

(e) Surveillance Operations - operations whose purpose was to provide information on trails, movements, and build-up of enemy forces.

(2) Operation HAPPY VALLEY is probably the best example of a search and clear type operation which was successfully followed by pacification of an area. The operation took place in the Vinh Thanh Valley, a small valley about 2 to 5 kilometers wide and roughly 20 kilometers long, surrounded by high hills on the east, west, and northern sides. This valley was controlled by the VC. The males were conscripted into the VC forces, and most hamlets were vacant. Because it was the neighboring valley to the An Khe base complex, it represented a real threat to the division's security. The clearance and eventual pacification of this valley took place over the period 6 October to 19 November 1965, at which time responsibility for its security was returned to the RVN Special Forces and the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG). The operation was accomplished in three phases:

Phase I from 6 October to 19 October 1965.
Phase II from 20 October to 25 October 1965.
Phase III from 26 October to 19 November 1965.

(a) In Phase I, two brigades were used. Initially from 6 through 9 October 1965, the 3d Brigade with 3 infantry battalions...
and an artillery battalion conducted search and clear operations. At the conclusion of this period, the 3d Brigade was committed to operation SHINY BAYONET, a search and destroy operation in the neighboring Soai G Valley to the east. The 2d Brigade then assumed responsibility for the Vinh Thanh Valley, operating there until 31 October 1965. During this phase a daily massive show of force was conducted in sections of the valley by one and two company size forces. Thorough pre-landing preparations consisting of suppressive fires on critical terrain surrounding each landing zone were made. The usual procedure involved a twenty minute airstrike, followed by a two to three minute artillery preparation, and finally, use of aerial rocket artillery within seconds of the lifting of the artillery. Troops ships followed within 30 seconds of the aerial rocket firing. Once on the ground each company size operation lasted from 24 - 72 hours; covered an area from 3000 - 5000 meters in length and a thousand meters in width. Most of the movement was over rice paddies, through villages, across grazing land, and up the fingers of the surrounding hills. All troops were very lightly equipped. Usually only one 81mm mortar was carried forward from the battalion because of its weight and the weight of the ammunition. Similarly the 106 recoilless rifle, being roadbound, was not usefully employed. Evacuation of rice and captured equipment posed a problem. A satisfactory system was worked out using two helicopters and one squad equipped with shovels and sandbags for bagging the rice. These evacuation teams were maintained on standby at the CP.

(b) During the resettlement and construction period (Phase II) artillery fires were restricted to the ridgelines and trails leading out of the mountains. Daily air assaults of company and platoon size units continued and small unit saturation patrolling and night ambushes were increased. Point assaults utilizing helicopters were used to force VC elements to withdraw from the villages and move toward established blocking positions. Helicopters equipped with loudspeakers were used to encourage the people to return to their villages, explain curfew and disseminate items of interest. Curfew was enforced by the utilization of PPS-4 radar. Aircraft equipped with searchlights were called into the area to illuminate the location of any radar sighting. This procedure impressed curfew violators with our detection capability. National Police were used during this period in conjunction with our operations to reestablish a Civil Police structure as rapidly as possible.

(c) During the consolidation phase (Phase III) daily saturation patrolling continued, but now with platoon patrol bases and with squad size patrols. Psychological warfare and civil actions took on momentum with increased propaganda leaflet distribution, announcement of items of interest, medical treatment, distribution of CARE clothing and repair of buildings and roads in the hamlets. That
this final phase was successful, was evidenced by the increased number
of village informants who gave information on the locations of caches
of rice and equipment, and by the fact that the National Police began
pointing out VC suspects.

(4) In retrospect the operation was a complete
success; more cooperation from the civilians would have been obtained
earlier if tighter steps had been taken initially to exclude unnecessary
property damage and personal injury. Where eventual pacification is
the aim, this is important. In later operations, considerably longer
time was allowed units to develop psychological warfare and civil action
programs pertinent to the specific area of operation prior to commitment
in the area. Increasing the psychological warfare and civil action
tempo shortened the time required for domination.

(5) The 3d Brigade conducted two major operations during
3 to 8 October and one, Operation SHINY RAYON, from 10 to 14 October
1965 employing three infantry battalions, the cavalry squadron (-) and
two artillery battalions. The first two operations provided security
to traffic on Highway 19 east from An Khe through Doc Lang Pass to
Binh Khe and a series of search and destroy operations to eliminate
and block the VC in a coordinated effort with Republic of Vietnam (RVN)
Army and Marine units in the Sour Ca Valley area. This five day opera-
tion successfully freed this valley from the VC.

(4) Beginning on 23 October 1965 the division began the
PLEIKU Campaign. Initially involving a battalion task force, the
division commitment rapidly escalated to include a brigade with four
battalions of infantry, a reinforced battalion of artillery and the
cavalry squadron (-). From 23 to 27 October the division's mission
was three-fold. It was to provide security for the US-RVN installations
in Pleiku, provide artillery fire support for the RVN armored task force
moving from Pleiku to the relief of the Plei Me CIDG Camp, and to provide
fire support for the camp itself. On 27 October, the division was given
the mission to search out and destroy the enemy forces that threatened
the security of Plei Me. With a tactical area of operational responsi-
bility (TACR) that reached from Plei Me to the Cambodian border, an area
of about 2,500 square kilometers, the division had the unprecedented
opportunity to prove the validity of the air mobility concept. When
the 1st Brigade completed its operations on 8 November it had destroyed
the major portion of a PAVN regiment, with a total of 216 killed by
body count, an additional 610 estimated KIA and nearly 800 wounded.
A total of 138 prisoners were taken, including two officers. Captured
material included 150 weapons, individual and crew served, a regimental
aid station with $40,000 of medical supplies, almost 200,000 rounds of
small arms ammunition, and assorted other weapons and ammunition. The
operation clearly demonstrated the worth of the air mobile concept.
Particularly noteworthy were the repeated moves of the artillery by means of OH-47 helicopters to provide constant fire support to fast-moving air mobile infantry; the reconnaissance by fire techniques developed by the air cavalry squadron, which kept the enemy on the run; the coming of age of the aerial artillery techniques; and the massive logistical efforts. Initially all supplies were flown by organic aircraft from division base at An Khe to forward areas, a distance of at least 80 kilometers. The organic ALOC later was augmented by Air Force aircraft flying directly from logistical bases. On 9 November, the 34 Brigade relieved the 1st Brigade and continued search and destroy operations, initially east and south of Plei Mei, which served to assure that the enemy had not, in fact, gone to the east, as well as to provide deception for the brigade's forthcoming maneuver. From 9 through 13 November was a period of transition, as three new maneuver battalions and an artillery battalion were brought to the battle area, relieving the units of the 1st Brigade. On 14 November, the 1/7 Cavalry air assaulted to a landing zone known as "X-RAY" at the foot of the Chu Pong Massif and soon was defending against the determined attacks of a PAVN Regiment, newly infiltrated into South Vietnam. The strength and firepower on X-RAY were steadily brought up during the next 48 hours by introducing 2/5 and 2/7 Cav, as the defenders beat back attack after attack. On 15 November a new dimension in the war was added when B-52 bombers struck in close support of ground forces. The strength and firepower on X-RAY were steadily brought up during the next 48 hours by introducing 2/5 and 2/7 Cav, as the defenders beat back attack after attack. On 15 November a new dimension in the war was added when B-52 bombers struck in close support of ground forces. The strength and firepower on X-RAY were steadily brought up during the next 48 hours by introducing 2/5 and 2/7 Cav, as the defenders beat back attack after attack.

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(5) From 20 October - 11 November 1965, Task Force ANMS, an artillery battalion, with one infantry company for security and other supporting elements, supported the 22d ARVN Division in the Song Lang Valley in northern Binh Dinh Province. The Task Force returned to the division base on 25 October. On 27 October the Task Force again departed the division base by land, sea and air to the vicinity of Tuy Hoa to support, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) forces in that area. During the eight day period 20 - 27 October this Task Force executed three major moves over a distance of approximately 350 kilometers. It remained in the Phu Yen Province until 11 November 1965.
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(6) From 3 thru 16 December, local operations in support of the security and surveillance of the division tactical area of operational responsibility were executed. During this period 2d and 3d Brigades conducted four different battalion-size operations, ranging from four to twelve day duration. During most of the period two separate battalions operated simultaneously and for four days of the period, three simultaneous battalion operations were pursued, over an area of roughly 20 x 25 miles. In these operations a company and sometimes a battalion with supporting artillery conducted an air mobile assault into a suspected area of enemy operations and then moved by foot to designated pick-up zones. Continuous daytime surveillance was maintained by the cavalry squadron while night time surveillance was maintained by infrared and side looking radar from the aerial surveillance and target acquisition (ASTA) platform. The ground units movements were controlled to investigate any area of suspected activity. This series of operations is fairly typical of the procedures used for surveillance of very large areas by this division. This technique has been found valuable in destroying enemy prestocked supplies, intercepting and destroying enemy pre-prepared assembly and training areas, and convincing the local population of the presence of adequate troops to protect him. It has the additional advantage of familiarizing our troops with the terrain, trails, and local conditions.

(7) Operations CLEAN HOUSE I, II, and III, conducted from 17 - 20, 20 - 23, and 26 - 31 December respectively, were a series of related search and destroy operations in a broad valley north and east of Binh Pho. On the initial day of the operation three infantry battalions plus supporting elements, (a company of Engineers, a platoon of MP, Signal Support, a Forward Support Element, and a battalion of assault helicopters), On the second day two battalions moved by airlift and assault to battalion dropping zones, and conducted company size search and destroy operations from these LZ's. During CLEAN HOUSE III, three battalions were used. On 29 December, a unique system of response was used. Intelligence indicated that the VC were departing the area through a particularly forbidding piece of heavily wooded terrain. To counteract this possibility and to reconnoiter the area quickly to determine if VC were in the locality, 300 CS grenades were dropped by helicopter on the suspected area from a locally built grenade dispenser mounted on a UH-1D. An area of about 350 meters by almost 350 meters was effectively denied by the agent. No VC were seen moving from the area, and thus with relatively little effort it was determined that VC were not occupying the area. The overall operation was extremely successful, 137 VC were killed by body count and an additional 249 were estimated as having been killed, with only 15 friendly KIA. During the initial stages of the operation VC were observed departing the area in many directions. Although the cavalry squadron elements pursued, captured and killed many, analysis of the operation tended to indicate that had another battalion been available with necessary lift capability more of a sealing effect could have been made initially, with consequent faster and more effective action. Lacking the

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available extra battalion, another solution might have been to have operated from company size landing zones, rather than from battalion size LZ's. This was a spacious valley, and favored such fragmented operation, whereas in more restricted valleys such fragmentation, might well submit to defeat in detail. See Inc 2. Lessons Learned.

o. Combat Developments: During the period of this report the division participated in the testing or evaluation of the following equipment:

(1) Electroluminescent Runway Marking System. On 8 November 1965 this Division submitted an evaluation report to Director, Joint Research and Test Activity on evaluation of electroluminescent runway marker tape. The tape was not considered satisfactory in its present width but the material was considered to have enough merit to warrant further development.

(2) Evaluation of two commercial telescopes proposed by Limited Warfare Laboratory (LWL) to meet the requirements for sniper telescopes continued during the period.

(3) A test program was established for the XM 546, 105mm beehive round. Due to the lack of any requirement for combat firing of the round arrangements were made to test fire four rounds. Excellent target coverage and target effect were attained. A report of results was submitted to U.S. Army Munitions Command.

(4) Training began for two aircraft crews on use of the LWL Jung Canopy Platform. Completion of training and demonstration of the device was not completed due to damage to the dispenser.

(5) One LWL nondirectional bullet detector was installed on a UH-1 aircraft for evaluation. Evaluation of this device is due to be completed during March 1966.

(6) This division submitted the Field Commander's Report on Rifle 5.56mm (RCS AMC - 149) to OS, US Army Weapons Command on 11 November 1965. The overall evaluation was that the M16 rifle was considered an excellent weapon for counterinsurgency operations and use by airborne division personnel.

(7) In December, an expedient dispenser was built from empty 2.75" rocket container tubes for dropping smoke and CS grenades from a helicopter. The device can drop up to 400 grenades at once or in four separate groups from an altitude of 1500 feet absolute. Coverage ranges from 40,000 to 100,000 square meters with agent CS depending on wind and terrain conditions.
(a) A field expedient system for spraying defoliants from a UH-1 helicopter has been built and successfully used. The system employs a 55 gallon drum, a spray bar made from 3/4 inch galvanized pipe and parts from the H-27 service kit. The drum is mounted on a pallet and strapped to the floor of the helicopter's passenger compartment, while the spray bar is attached to the rear skid mounts. Compressed air from a portable flail thrower passes through a regulator valve set 5 to 8 pounds per square inch pressure and forces the defoliant from the drum through the spray bar. The system can deliver defoliant at a rate of 6.9 gallons per minute with a width of spray of about 8 meters per pass. One drum of defoliant covers about 5.6 hectares. The optimum aircraft speed is 20 to 30 knots at as low an altitude as safety and skill will permit.

f. Aircraft Operations. During the period, division aircraft flew 165,156 softies, moved 31,788 tons of cargo and 199,577 troops. In performing these missions, 236 aircraft were hit by ground fire, with 21 being downed. Of the downed aircraft, 13 were recovered and 8 were lost. During the entire period, they were 9 crew members killed; 51, wounded in action; and 4, missing in action.

g. Major problems during tactical operations:

(1) Shortly after the start of the campaign, it was found that the infantry units were having difficulty maintaining communications with higher headquarters. The primary problem was that the range and terrain involved proved to be too great an obstacle for the AN/PRC-25 radio. The problem was solved by placing a VHF Airborne Relay (AvR) in orbit directly above the units equipped with the AN/PRC-25 radio. The airborne relay was utilized in this manner on a basis of twenty-four hours per day for a period of twenty-eight days of the campaign. It was found that operating at an altitude of nine to ten thousand feet directly above the using units proved to be the most effective employment method. Utilizing the above criteria, the range of the AN/PRC-25 radio was extended fifty to sixty miles even when operating in dense undergrowth.

(2) Installation of a VHF relay system from Division Forward to each Brigade Headquarters was a definite asset. Each system afforded the Brigade headquarters direct telephone contact to both the Division Forward TOC and the Division Rear TOC. In addition, a user telephone was made available from each Brigade Headquarters to the Division Forward Switchboard which in turn had access to the Division Rear Switchboard.

(3) Casualty reporting proved to be a temporary problem for two reasons. First, Casualty reports are normally classified and secondly, the Casualty Reporting Teams did not have ready access to a secure circuit. Since the Casualty Reporting Teams are normally based at the Forward Support Element supporting the combat operation, the Admin/Logistical Net was converted to a secure system. In addition a secure single sideband radio was located at the Casualty Reporting Section at Division Rear. This gave the Forward Casualty Reporting Teams direct contact to the Casualty Reporting Section at Division Rear. The time required to pass casualty reports was reduced by at least fifty percent.
LOGISTICS.

a. Logistical Support. The month of October 1965 was a crisis month logistically for the 1st Cavalry Division. Although the division began moving into the An Khe area the previous month, the last element did not close until 2 October 1965. During this period, PLL's, ASL's and accompanying supplies were depleted. Resupply was not forthcoming and supply-wise the division was at a lowebb. Despite these shortages, two major operations, SHINBAY MONT and ALL THE WAY were supported successfully.

(1) A Senate Preparedness Sub-Committee visited the division during this period to be briefed on the logistical posture of the division. Areas covered included the logistical status prior to embarkation from CONUS, the division's move overseas and the current status.

(2) On 28 October 1965, elements of the Rear Detachment arrived from Fort Benning, Georgia. The mission of the logistical personnel of the detachment was to close the division area, return buildings and equipment to the Infantry Center and to arrange movement of deferred personnel to Vietnam. This mission was successfully accomplished during a 60 day period (26 August to 20 October 1965).

(3) During the month of November, operations conducted in the Central Highlands near Plei Me were successfully supported. Resupply was initially effected by Air Force and division organic aircraft. Highway 19 was opened by the division in conjunction with II Corps and a ground line of communication (GLOC) established from Qui Nhon to Pleiku from 9 - 30 November 1965. Supplies and troops were moved by this route to the maximum extent practicable. All supply needs were met and at no time did logistical considerations prevent an operation from being executed.

(4) The month of December was characterized by a period of extensive maintenance of division aircraft, vehicles and other equipment. Combat losses resulting from actions during October and November were replaced, the tempo of combat actions decreased and allowed the division to concentrate on placing itself in a proper logistical posture to conduct another series of sustained combat operations.

(a) The division logistically supported one Brigade Task Force operation in the vicinity of Binh Khe, one Battalion Task Force in the vicinity of Pleiku in the support of the 25th Division and several Battalion Task Force operations within the division TAOR. All supply needs were met without any serious shortages.

(b) The influx of large numbers of replacements for casualties and programmed losses placed the division in a position...
of being overstrength. Replacements arrived without complete TA.50-901 items of equipment in their possession. The division was hard put to equip these individuals, and float stocks of individual field gear were completely depleted. Priority supply action was effective in reducing the criticality of these shortages, however many recent replacements are not properly equipped at the present time. Headquarters, USARV was informed that it is imperative that replacements arrive fully equipped. Present DA policy indicates that CORUS Commanders are responsible to completely equip personnel ordered to Vietnam. This policy is being complied with slowly.

5. Reports to higher headquarters continue to absorb a large amount of man hours and effort. It is felt that a periodic review is necessary at each echelon to eliminate those reports which have become obsolete or outgrown their usefulness. Specifically, the Periodic Logistical Report submitted weekly to USARV and monthly to PAVN, should be all encompassing, thus eliminating such reports as the Roadball (three each) and the Boot Report.

b. Supply and Services

(1) Supply

(a) Quantities of "A" rations increased during the period; however, they must be issued as soon as received due to lack of refrigeration. Turkey and all the trimmings were served on Thanksgiving and Christmas.

(b) The first replacements for destroyed or abandoned aircraft arrived on 22 November 1965. Two OH-IB's were received by the division.

(c) Substantial quantities of construction and barrier materials were received and work on the barrier around the base camp continued.

(d) Some critical items such as boots, fatigue, aircraft repair parts and tentage were received during the period, however, these items continue to be in short supply.

(e) The USARV IG visited the division to discuss shortages of jungle boots, jungle fatigues, tentage, refrigeration equipment, generators and other critical items. He was escorted throughout the division area and toured one infantry battalion.
A need for a lightweight collapsible bag, water, 50-gallon capacity was realized. A letter was forwarded to CG, USARV requesting action to be taken to initiate development and procurement of a collapsible water container, 50-gallon capacity. A container of this type is considered essential for air mobile operations.

A number of 5-gallon plastic containers were locally procured to replace the plastic "lugs-a-juice", which have had a high mortality rate in the terrain of this area. These new plastic containers have thicker plastic and are less easily punctured.

The Division ACofS, G4, has been active during this period in the allocation of all controlled and critical items within the division. The division is still faced with a shortage of covered storage space for Class I and sensitive Class II & IV items. This problem was resolved to some extent by using CONEX containers as temporary storage and issue shelters for clothing items, paper products, electronic equipment and other items sensitive to environmental conditions.

During December, response to supply increased somewhat over October and November. The major problem encountered in supply procedures was the failure of logistical support agencies to furnish status on requests for supply actions.

An expedited supply procedure for critical repair parts, "Redball", was initiated in Vietnam on 1 December 1965. This system appears effective and the division is benefiting by it with reduced EDP's on aircraft and vehicles. A complete report on the effects of the "Redball" system will be compiled on 3 January 1966.

A commercial contract was negotiated with businessmen in An Khe to provide free laundry service to the division. Each man in the division could have two sets of fatigues washed each week. This service included pressing, minor mending and replacement of buttons. It is planned to extend this service to three sets of fatigues per man per week.

Transportation.

From 9 to 30 November 1965 II Corps opened Highway 19 from An Khe to Pleiku. One way traffic was programmed for every other day because of by-passes around destroyed bridges. Traffic along this road was composed of RVN and US convoys. Security was provided by a combination of 1st Cavalry Division and RVT Forces. A traffic control point was established by the division at the intersection of Highway 19.
and the entrance road leading to the division base area. No intersec-
tional traffic regulation was provided. Requests for deviation from
the one-way policy had to be cleared with II Corps, Field Force,
Vietnam and the Qui Nhon Support Area.

(2) Operation of a GLOC and resupply by surface effec-
tively conserved the number of flying hours required to support a
Brigade Task Force in the Pleiku area.

(3) The Ist Logistical Command has developed a "through-
put" system of resupply for division operations in the Highlands Area
which is compatible with the air assault concept and delivers supplies
directly from Logistical Bases to Brigade Bases. This system is expected
to greatly reduce division level resupply problems during future opera-
tions in that area.

(4) The CH-54, "Flying Crane" proved to be invaluable
for recovery of battle damaged aircraft. It was used for a wide variety
of missions; lifting high priority CONEX containers from the aircraft
carrier Point Cruise at Qui Nhon, lifting bulldozers to inaccessible areas
for the construction of helipads, moving heavy signal vans to crests
of hills, and movement of 1000 gallon fuel tankers and other heavy
equipment over enemy infested areas.

d. Maintenance.

(1) General support aircraft maintenance presented a
problem in that the nearest direct support unit was at Vung Tau. This
presented time and distance problems in obtaining back-up support for
the Division's aircraft. This problem will be eliminated in the near
future when the 546th TO Co becomes operational at Qui Nhon.

(2) Lack of aircraft repair parts continues to present
a problem to the division. At present the division's aircraft ASL is
only 32.5% filled. An average of over 14% of assigned aircraft were
EDP throughout the reporting period.

(3) A one time inspection of swash plate inner ring
trunnions was performed on all UH-1 aircraft; three assemblies were
found defective.

(4) On 12 November 1965 a transceiver link was completed
to the Army Supply Point to process lst Cavalry Division Technical
Supply Requisitions. The initiation of this system should effectively
reduce processing time for parts requisitions.
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(5) On 23 December 1965 a complete recap of all parts requests with priority designators 02-17 was completed with the Aircraft Supply Point in Saigon. Some 10,357 requests were unfilled at this time.

(6) The division experienced numerous problems with its tactical generators. The LSL and PLL computed by LMS for the Military Standard family of generators has not met replacement requirements. Additionally, the lack of large capacity generators has resulted in constant use of these tactical generators to provide lighting within the base camp area.

o. Construction Materials, R & U, Base Camp Development and Procurement

(1) Construction Materials. Procedures for issue of construction materials were not defined. All attempts to receive lumber and culverts were very involved, slow, and have only resulted in receipt of a few items. All materials were controlled by USARV Engineer. Repeated conferences relieved restrictions on Pacific Engineers and Architects to allow them to build 250 latrines for the An Khe Complex. The General Support Engineer Battalion has drawn materials for a help construction of mess halls. The actual construction by help should begin in January 1966.

(2) R & U. Pacific Architects and Engineers have the R & U contract for Vietnam. A token force of P & A personnel arrived in An Khe without equipment to assume all aspects of their R & U function. Recommendations made to the 1st Log Cdl and USARV Engineers to improve aspects of inherent engineer problems included requests that a Post Engineer be assigned in An Khe without delay.

(3) Base Camp Development. An approved copy of the Base Development Plan has not been received by the division, although it was submitted 24 September 1965. Certain Military Construction, Army Funds have been approved and a construction directive issued, but materials are in a very short supply. The USARV Engineer advises that our living conditions will not improve noticeably within four months. Individuals have taken the initiative in many units and have purchased materials and have constructed living areas, clubs and eating areas from local resources and private funds.

(4) Procurement. The local economy of the An Khe/Pleiku area has an abundance of lumber. The availability of lumber through supply channels is very limited and in some cases non-existent. Attempts to initiate procurement procedures for lumber have been burdensome, time consuming, and mostly unproductive. Procurement for all of Vietnam...
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is controlled in Saigon. With the large concentration of US Military personnel in Vietnam, local supporting agencies need responsive procurement authority. Repeated visits to Ist Log G and P&O have failed to produce local procurement authority.

f. Medical

(1) Disease and Injury Statistical Data:

(a) Injured as a Result of Hostile Action (IRHA) 736
(b) Non-battle Injuries (NBI) 364
(c) Diseases
   1 Malaria 1087
   2 Scrub Typhus 54
   3 Others 1698
(d) Killed in Action 334
(e) Returned to Duty 862
(f) Remaining in Hospital 2966

(2) Discussion of Disease and Injuries

(a) Ratio of killed to wounded (KIA/IRHA)

The ratio is 334/736 or 1/2.2 was considerably higher than the 1/4 experienced in WWII and the Korea conflict.

(3) Types of battle injuries (IRHA)

Most of the battle wounds were caused by small arms fire; very few fragment wounds occurred. A rather high percentage of head and chest wounds occurred and many of the dead had multiple small arms wounds.

(4) Non-battle injuries. No unusual type of non-battle injuries were seen.

(a) Animal bites. Six animal bites have occurred; two dogs, three monkeys and one parrot. Three of these animals could not be observed and it was required to treat the patients with duck embryo vaccine.
Three bamboo viper bites have occurred. The patients were treated with the standard antivenom; there were no deaths and morbidity was very low.

The most important disease was malaria due to a chloroquine-resistant strain of *Plasmodium Falciparum*. All cases treated with chloroquine have relapsed; several patients have died, all due to cerebral malaria. Quinine has been found to be an effective drug for therapy. The scrub typhus encountered is very mild and responds dramatically to tetracycline.

Malaria has been the number one problem. A strain of chloroquine-resistant malaria which responds only to quinine is present throughout the division's tactical area of responsibility.

Battalion surgeons were more frequently than not excluded from the medical evacuation and treatment chain for battle casualties because of overflow by helicopter evacuation. Patients were picked up at the injury site and taken directly to the clearing company. As a result, unit and division level medical services were amalgamated and performed by the medical companies.

While shortage of blood was a problem in early October due to the distribution system; these difficulties were eliminated. Now, an abundant supply is available to all medical companies. The distribution system is in brief:

1. A request is given either by radio, telephone or carrier to the 428th Medical Laboratory in Qui Nhon.
2. The blood is packaged by the 428th Medical Laboratory and is forwarded expeditiously, usually by air, to the requestor.
3. The 428th Medical Laboratory receives its blood from the depot in Nha Trang.

Medical Supplies were a problem before the 32d Advanced Medical Supply Team in Qui Nhon became operational in early November. Disposable syringes, ointments of all kinds, syrups, and diarrheal medicines are still in short supply.
(a) Medical reporting has been a continuous problem in the Airmobile Division; the problem was accentuated by the large number of casualties suffered, the distance between the operational areas and the lack of field tested systems. The medical reporting system was altered in an attempt to rectify these problems, reporting is much improved. The reports in question: The weekly and monthly morbidity report; the admission and distribution sheet; and the out-patient reports. Completed Field Medical Cards from each supported medical company were forwarded to the division headquarters for further consolidation prior to submission to higher headquarters. The command health report was sent through command channels.

(f) Fixed wing medical evacuation became necessary during the PLEIKU Campaign because of the large numbers of casualties generated in a short period of time and the distance between Pleiku and QuiNhon. Division resources were used but a system is being worked out with the Air Force to use C-123 aircraft.

6. (c) CIVIL AFFAIRS.

a. During the reporting period Civil Affairs efforts were concentrated in support of combat operations and civic action near the division base.

b. During four major operations conducted by the division, significant civil affairs problems were met and successfully overcome:

(1) During the operation HAPPY VALLEY the 2d Brigade captured 2½ tons of rice and 500 pounds of peanuts. These items were evacuated and presented to the Binh Khe district headquarters. Five hundred refugees resulted from the operations personnel of the 2d Brigade assisted district officials in treating the injured, in housing and in feeding the refugees. Airborne loudspeakers were used in conjunction with district officials to control non-combatant movement. Medical evacuation aircraft were used to transport 27 seriously wounded refugees to the Qui Nhơn field hospital. Five refugees were treated for fragmentation wounds and delivered to the refugee camp by field ambulance.

(2) The 3d Brigade during operation SHINY RAYNET captured three tons of rice and presented it to the Phu Cat district headquarters. Three tons of rice and two tons of salt were evacuated of the 224 ARVN Division. 1/9th Cavalry evacuated approximately 2½ tons of captured rice to An Nhơn district headquarters. An estimated 17½ tons of rice was destroyed because evacuation was not possible. Approximately 250 refugees were evacuated to the vicinity of Phu Cat,
and fifty were treated for minor injuries and released. Fifty thousand
leaflets were distributed to inform Vietnamese citizens to remain in
the vicinity of homes, not to move on roads, and to observe the district
curfew so that they would not be mistaken for VC and fired upon.

(3) During division operations in the Pleiku - Plei
No area 2,200 pounds of rice, 300 pounds of clothing, 1000 pounds of
medical supplies, and 400 surgical instruments were captured. Twelve
hundred pounds of rice was destroyed because evacuation was not possible.
The balance was evacuated and presented to GVN officials. Approximately
2,700 refugees were transported from insecure areas to the Le Thanh
district headquarters. A total of 334,000 leaflets were disseminated
in support of combat operations. Safe conduct passes and themes to
induce VC defection were utilized. Medical personnel treated 777
Vietnamese patients during the operation. Three civil affairs teams
from II Corps and Pleiku Province and one team from the 4th CA Company
ARVN were obtained to support operations.

(4) In operation CLEAN HOUSE, conducted by the 3d Brigade,
2,800 pounds of rice was captured, evacuated, and presented to Binh Khe
district headquarters. Eighty refugees were evacuated from the area of
operations, and twenty-five non-combatants received medical treatment.
At total of 380,000 psychological warfare leaflets were disseminated.
These designed to induce VC defection, explain US presence in Vietnam
to support the Government of Vietnam (GVN), warn VC not to fire on
helicopters, and appeal to Vietnamese citizens to furnish information
on VC activities. Two civil affairs psychological warfare teams from
the 22d ARVN Division were attached to the 3d Brigade to support
operations.

b. The division was active in six major civic action projects
in areas of An Tuc district adjacent to the division base.

(1) Six refugee centers were sponsored. Support included
distribution through Vietnamese officials of food, clothing, building
materials, and tools. Regular medical treatment was scheduled as well
as chemical spraying to destroy flies and mosquitoes. Concrete platforms
were constructed around wells to improve sanitation, and individual
family areas were partitioned to provide privacy.

(2) A cooperative pig farm is being constructed utilizing
village laborers. United States Operations Mission (USOM) is providing
the required materials and the animals to start the program. Division
personnel are providing equipment, technical knowledge, and supervision.
(3) The division medical battalion sponsored the An Tue district dispensary. Improvements, to include a roof, wall, floor repairs, and screening windows and doors were accomplished. A home for the Vietnamese doctor and a 300 gallon water tank were constructed. This project included assisting the Vietnamese district medical personnel in treating patients and in training medical technicians and nurses.

(4) A house is being constructed in the new An Khe housing area to be used as a model by refugees building their homes in this resettlement area. Materials were furnished by USOM and the MACV subsector advisor. Construction was 80% complete on 31 December 1965.

(5) A five room school will be built in the new An Khe housing area. The school playground was completed.

(6) A new four-building refugee camp is being constructed in An Khe. USOM hired the contractor and furnished the materials. Division personnel leveled the site to permit construction, improved access roads, delivered the water used for concrete block fabrication, supervised Vietnamese laborers, and assisted in the construction.

d. The division was active in many short-range, high-impact, civic action projects designed to win acceptance of US personnel and support for the GVN from Vietnamese citizens.

(1) Medical treatment was given to 11,482 Vietnamese patients during this quarter. This service was provided in twenty-six different locations; it took place in district dispensaries, villages, hamlets, refugee camps, and areas adjacent to tactical operations.

(2) Distribution of food, clothing, tools, and building materials was made to refugees, needy families, and war victims.

(3) Medical personnel assisted in giving 4,940 immunizations to Vietnamese citizens to protect them against plague, cholera, and typhoid.

(4) Prompt claims settlements were made and combined with solatium gifts and letters of condolence.

(5) Vietnamese Information Service psychological operations films were shown to Vietnamese civilian audiences on four occasions.

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(6) Engineer projects included the improvement of six roads, the construction of four bridges, and the installation of numerous culverts.

(7) Repair and improvement programs were conducted in two An Tuoc district schools.

(8) Nine units in the division held Christmas parties in refugee camps and in communities in the An Tuoc district. Approximately 4000 gifts were distributed. Many of the gifts were donated by division personnel, their relatives, and donors from CONUS. Festivities included local Vietnamese Special Forces and Popular Forces soldiers and their families.

(9) Injured Vietnamese non-combatants were evacuated by air to GVN hospitals in Qui Nhon and Pleiku.

(10) The division band and unit musicians presented six performances to Vietnamese audiences.

(11) English classes were held in three schools in An Khe to assist Vietnamese citizens in learning the language.

(12) Units of the division assisted Vietnamese refugees and citizens in establishing laundry, lumber, and concrete building businesses.

(13) Health, hygiene, sanitation, and first aid classes were conducted in eight locations in the An Khe area.

The following supplies were received and utilized in the Division's civic action program:

(1) An estimated 116.12 tons of civilian supplies were received.

(2) Men of the division voluntarily contributed $2100.84 to assist needy families, churches, and civic action projects.

(3) Units of the division captured 108,450 pounds of rice; 36,000 pounds were destroyed because of problems in evacuation, and 72,250 pounds were presented to officials of the GVN for distribution to needy families and refugees.

A total of 208,529 Vietnamese labor man days were utilized by the division during this quarter.

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A. A total of 847,200 psychological warfare leaflets were disseminated in support of combat operations and civic action activities during the quarter.

B. A Friendship Council was formed which will permit Vietnamese officials and citizens to meet periodically with representatives from the division. The meeting will coordinate US/GVN activities to prevent military-civilian problems from developing, and to promote a harmonious relationship.

SECTION II COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE

1. (O) GENERAL.

Operations in this quarter have further proved the feasibility of the airborne concept. The division operated successfully over a very wide area of operation, (approximately 125 x 125 miles). The division successfully engaged and defeated organized PAVN units of regimental size and, according to intelligence, probably of division size. A vast quantity of intelligence was developed as a result of contact with the enemy. In addition, the quantity and quality of information received from agents also improved. The division has been particularly successful in operating from areas which had no established radio system and where minimal population exists. Operations have integrated Air Force support to include B-52 bombers in tactical support roles. A preplanned target grid system over the tactical area of interest was developed which reduced the reaction time of B-52 bombers so that tactical commanders could plan for and utilize B-52 air strikes as part of their normal routine. TAC air support. The division cleared a formerly VC-controlled area of approximately 240 square kilometers in the Vinh Thanh and an Kho areas, returning it to AVN authority.

2. (O) INTELLIGENCE.

During the reporting period the division developed considerable enemy intelligence as a result of the extended actual contact that the division had with enemy units. The intelligence provided to be an invaluable source of intelligence information. Intelligence mission: 51 missions/13 hours (1,233.6 miles) during the quarter covered by this report.

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the coverage amounted to less than half of the total division requirement. This situation will be alleviated if the recommended increase in the number of OV-1 aircraft is approved. A minor problem existed in that a critical shortage of 1:50,000 maps was experienced.

3. (c) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

a. Operations. Inadequate communications was the most significant problem encountered in this area. During the PLEIKU Campaign, the infantry units found it extremely difficult to maintain contact with higher headquarters. The primary problem was that the range and terrain proved to be too great an obstacle for the AN/PRC-25 radio. The use of airborne radio relay and the use of a forward division DTOC largely alleviated the problem.

b. Training. Although, 5,211 replacements were received during the quarter, nearly all of whom arrived without training on the M-16 rifle or airborne techniques, training is now at a high level and has not been a major problem. Ranges and training facilities are being built in the division base area, but were only about 50 percent complete at the end of the quarter. Aviator proficiency training is at a high level, although provisions must be made for future input of CH-47 and CH-54 trained pilots since the flying hours of those aircraft continue to be totally required for combat operations.

4. (c) LOGISTICS.

a. The major problem encountered in logistics has been the lack of aircraft repair parts. At the end of the reporting period, division aircraft ASN's were only 32.5% filled. For the entire period, an average of over 14% of the assigned aircraft were EMF. At times more than 20% of the aircraft were EMF. This reduction in aircraft availability resulted in a considerable change of tactics since operations had to be based on minimum availability rather than optimum.

b. Critical shortages of tentage, covered storage space and construction materials still exist within the division. Replacements received by the division arrived without complete TL 50-901 items. Equipping these individuals depleted the division float stocks of individual field gear. This situation now seems to be improving.

c. In the field of transportation, the division initially used organic aircraft for logistical resupply from the division and logistical bases. Later in the operation, an air line of communications
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SUBJECT: Quarterly Command Report (RGCSGPO(31)) for Second Fiscal Quarter, FY 66

utilizing Air Force aircraft, and eventually a ground line of communications was established to deliver supplies to the forward brigade FSE. This permitted use of the division's organic aircraft for combat operations forward of the brigade bases, leading to more effective operations. In the establishment of a ground line of communications, considerable difficulties have arisen since coordination of convoys must include approval of II Corps, ARVN, ROK, other U.S. forces and the Qui Nhon Support Area Command for travel over High 19. A definite requirement exists in this area for an intersectional traffic coordinator.

This division is progressing on a program of base development although lack of construction materials severely limit the rate of progress. A Base Development Plan was submitted to USLNV on 24 September 1965. Percentage of completion of this program cannot be properly evaluated at this time since the approved Base Development Plan has not been received.

5. (c) CIVIL AFFAIRS.

The two basic areas where civil affairs efforts have been concentrated are the support of combat operations and civic action in areas within the division's area of operation. Close coordination with JUSPAO and the Vietnamese Information Service has been of great assistance in the division's psychological warfare effort and will be continued. Large quantities of civilian supplies have been made available to this division from USOK. No major problems exist in civil affairs.

SECTION III COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

1. This division and other units of its type should continue to be targeted in underdeveloped areas where there are few roads, minimum population and civilian development. Because of the vastly increased amount of intelligence which accrues to a unit in contact, consideration should be given to keeping this or similar units committed to a tactical area for periods of weeks rather than operating in an area for a relatively limited period of time. Such a longer commitment permits greatly increased efficiency in the collection of intelligence and the pursuit of the enemy.

2. Adequate spare parts for this division, and any other unit having large numbers of aircraft, should be provided prior to combat operations to prevent limitations of tactical operations by a lack of flyable aircraft.
3. Airmobile units should plan for and rely heavily on Air Force support. In airmobile operations, the pace is fast, the range of operations is great, and no lines of battle exist. Consequently very large areas should be kept under visual, photo and electronic surveillance. Long range fires which only the Air Force can provide should be relied upon for day and night interdiction and attack of distant enemy assembly areas. Air Force heavy bombers, such as the B-52 can and should be used to support tactical operations. Finally, Air Force logistical support should be counted upon to bring supplies forward to brigade base areas to permit maximum utilization or organic aircraft for tactical operations.

4. The organizational concept and the existing equipment of the division were thoroughly tested during the period covered by this report. Having been exposed to both hit and run tactics of the VC guerrillas and the massed frontal assault of the better trained and equipped PAVN units under varying conditions of weather and terrain, the resultant experience and knowledge is now being used to determine what changes in the present TO&E will further enhance the division's capability to find, fix, and destroy the enemy. The most significant changes being considered are: increasing the number of infantry battalions from eight to nine; deletion of the 90mm and 106mm recoilless rifles; replacing the 81mm mortar in the rifle companies with the 60mm mortar; increasing the number of assault helicopter battalions from two to three; adding one additional CH-47 assault support helicopter company for logistics support; and increasing the number of OV-1 aircraft from six to twelve.

HARRY W. O. KINNARD
Major General, USA
Commanding
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1. For your information, copies of this division's "Lessons Learned," for the period 1 October - 30 November 1965, are attached. Copies of these Lessons Learned were submitted as inclosure 1 to the division quarterly command report for the quarter ending 31 December 1965.

2. The division's activities during the period 1 - 31 December did not lead to any additional Lessons Learned.

3. Future Lessons Learned will be submitted in the prescribed format.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MALCOLM R. BAKER
Lt Col, AGC
Adjutant General
TO: See Distribution

1. This letter contains an accumulation of experience and lessons learned during combat operations from 1 October until 30 November 1965 in the Republic of South Vietnam. The primary purpose of this publication is to insure that combat experience is available for reference use by units in this division and other commands.

2. A brief outline of the tactical operations from which those lessons learned were consolidated are included as Inclosure 1. Complete after action reports are available at this headquarters.

3. Maps and areas of operation are included as Tabs to Inclosure 1.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MALCOLM R. BAER
Lt Col, AG
Adjutant General

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Distribution:

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plus 1 - CG, CINC
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Incl 2
Lessons Learned 1 Oct - 30 Nov 65

1. ENEMY TECHNIQUES.

a. Location of Enemy Forces.

Observation during the Plei Me Campaign indicates that local VC tend to operate primarily near villages and roads. Hard core VC and PAVN units in particular normally set up harboring sites in more remote areas close to fresh water.

b. Enemy Deceptive Measures.

During recent operations in the Ia Drang Valley, PAVN troops frequently attempted to confuse US troops during battle at night by yelling "FRIENDLY FORCES, FRIENDLY FORCES". This sometimes caused momentary confusion among our troops and allowed the enemy to either fire first or take evasive action.

c. PAVN vs VC Battle Techniques.

A marked difference between PAVN and VC fighting was observed during recent operations in the Chu Pong and Ia Drang areas. The PAVN units are better equipped and trained and fought tenaciously in the face of overwhelming US firepower. In contrast with local VC units the PAVN pressed the attack, becoming decisively engaged and disengaged only after taking severe losses. PAVN units attempt to employ "close embrace" tactics to prevent our use of supporting fires. An attacking unit must be careful to keep PAVN units at arms length because once a unit is involved in "close embrace" attempts to draw back to place supporting fires on the enemy are frequently met by the enemy's following immediately as the friendly forces draw back.

d. PAVN Mortar Firing Pattern in Support of an Attack.

Contrary to US practice of firing mortars throughout the area, PAVN mortar firing generally is conducted only in front of their route of attack and frequently in a creeping pattern. The creeping of PAVN mortar fire will usually pinpoint the route of attack to be used in the assault of a defensive position. PAVN mortar burst patterns should be monitored to anticipate where the assault is most likely to occur.

2. INFANTRY OPERATIONS.

a. Movement through Thick Vegetation.

In many operational areas, the vegetation has been found so thick that an infantry company tends to become channelized into a single file. One rifle company solved this problem by employing one platoon with a "cutting detail" of six to eight personnel which moved ahead of the unit. Using machetes and hatchets, the advance platoon would clear trails while the company minus established a perimeter defense. Although it delayed forward progress, it greatly reduced the company's vulnerability to enemy surprise attack and penetration.

Incl 1 to Ltr, NVGCT-T, Subjects: "Lessons Learned, 1 Oct - 30 Nov 65", dtd 10 Jan 66 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY!
b. Use of the Buddy System.

Many friendly casualties have been caused by punji stakes, snipers firing from trees and by lead elements tripping booby traps. The use of two-man teams operating on the "buddy" system greatly reduced the occurrence of these incidents. One man should watch primarily for punji stakes and booby traps, while his buddy searches the trees and the area to the front for snipers.

c. Counter Sniper Action.

One unit during the recent operation achieved considerable success in combating snipers by systematically spraying all trees to their front with automatic fire, at first light, and on a given signal. The process must be deliberate in that a unit such as a squad or platoon should be given a sector to cover instead of firing at random. In addition to killing the enemy it will cause him to think twice before climbing a tree which affords him no cover but only concealment.

d. Stay Behind Forces.

On several occasions when a US unit departed an area VC elements returned to recapture the area or search for discarded American equipment. During recent operations, well camouflaged US stay behind units have been successful in ambushing returning VC forces. When a stay behind force can not be left, aerial surveillance, and H and I fires have been effective in causing VC casualties when they re-enter the area.

e. Marking of Friendly Positions at Night.

Throughout the Pleiku - Plei Me Campaign, aerial fire support was used to repulse enemy attacks at night. In most instances no prominent terrain feature existed that could be used to mark the friendly positions. The use of C-ration cans or artillery canisters filled with sand and saturated with fuel provided a simple method of marking the trace of friendly positions. The containers were emplaced around the perimeter and ignited on order by using a wire to ignite a trip flare over the container. The fuel could be delivered to the unit when it is resupplied at its night location.

f. River Crossing.

Rivers and streams with varying degrees of fordability have frequently become obstacles to units on patrols and large scale operations. Units should carry at least 200 feet of rope per rifle company and enough ponchos to construct rafts for the transportation of radios, weapons, and non-swimmers across unfordable streams. Nylon rappelling rope was found to be particularly suitable.
Search and destroy operations where VC and innocent women and children are intermingled continue to be a problem. If an operation is imminent, women and children normally hide in holes for protection against artillery and small arms. In areas where innocent personnel are involved, interpreters should call into the holes before clearing them. Smoke and/or CS has proved effective in clearing holes and tunnels; small arms and automatic weapons are not particularly suitable.

h. Target Detection and Destruction.

Operations by the division elements in the Pleiku area refined a previously tested technique of reacting to enemy targets of opportunity. All surveillance and intelligence reports were radioed directly to the forward DTOC. This raw data was evaluated immediately. The DTOC then reacted as follows:

(1) Information on any target confirmed in the vicinity of maneuver elements was passed to the brigade. The brigade reacted by maneuvering forces to engage the target, by firing artillery, by directing supporting TAC air or by any combination of these actions.

(2) If a target was of no immediate threat to maneuver elements, the DTOC recorded the target for strike by close air support aircraft which could no longer remain in the tactical area or engaged it with H and I fires. During the period 18-22 Nov 65, twenty-two targets were so recorded; thirteen were engaged by TAC air resulting in four secondary explosions and six cases of personnel and military structures destroyed. On four occasions aircraft drew fire. This system is ideal for use in sparsely populated areas, which allow freedom in use of TAC air and artillery.

i. Use of the SS-11 Missile in an Expedient Role Against Hard Targets.

Although the SS-11 missile was designed as an antitank weapon, it has been found to be a particularly effective weapon against a number of hard targets. In one recent operation the VC took shelter in a masonry building. Attacks initially with 2.75 in rockets produced little results. A single SS-11 missile delivered from a helicopter quickly destroyed the house. In another action west of Pleiku, the SS-11 was used several times to blow barricades around a village where pinpoint accuracy was needed to avoid destruction of neighboring houses. The SS-11 has demonstrated its capabilities for destroying fortifications that can be observed from the air.

j. Tree Climbing Techniques.

In the Plei Me and Chu Pong areas many units placed infantry and artillery observers in trees to improve observation. Although tree climbers would have worked well, an expedient of two short lengths of rope...
was used. One section of rope was passed around the far side of the tree and held by hand. The second length of rope was tied to each boot leaving 12-20 inches of rope between the boots. By using the knees a tree could be climbed easily.

k. Division Forward Tactical Operation Center.

Coordination with allied headquarters and maintaining communications with division headquarters creates many problems for brigade commanders conducting operations at extended distances from the division base. The 1st Air Cavalry Division has solved this problem by using a CH-54 pod equipped for operating as an air/mobile forward Division Tactical Operations Center co-located with the allied tactical headquarters. Communications from the forward brigade terminated at the forward DMO and necessary information was relayed to the Division Headquarters. During operations in the Cao Valley, Plei Me, Chu Pong and in Da Nang Valley, this proved to be an invaluable asset to the forward brigade commanders. All coordination with allied headquarters was accomplished at the forward DMO allowing the brigade commanders to devote full time to tactical operations.

l. Standard Procedures.

Operations conducted in Vietnam to date have demonstrated the importance of standard SOPs, SOIs, and training. With standard procedures, any battalion can work under any brigade and companies can work when attached to any battalion. This has proved particularly important in air assault operations, since every unit not engaged is, in effect, a possible reserve for every other unit.

3. ARTILLERY OPERATIONS.

a. Vectoring Aerial Rocket Artillery.

During recent combat operations, target location was given to the aerial rocket artillery with reference to direction of flight. This method was found to be unsatisfactory in that the pilot was reacting to external commands and had no way to orient himself in relation to the target. A more effective procedure developed to locate the target was to select a distinct terrain feature and give the pilot an azimuth and distance from the feature. In the absence of a distinct terrain feature a smoke grenade can be used.

b. Simultaneous Ground and Aerial Observation.

In rugged or heavily wooded terrain ground observers frequently encounter difficulty in locating and adjusting the initial rounds. The aerial observer cannot always see the target. If both observers are monitoring the same radio frequency, desired results are most efficiently obtained by combining the capabilities of both observers. The aerial observer "walks in" the initial fires until the ground observer can assume control for the close-in adjustment.

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. Adjustment of Illumination and HE.

Frequently close in defensive fires must be adjusted under illuminating rounds. The following method of adjusting HE and illuminating rounds greatly reduces the expenditure of HE and illuminating rounds. The observer requests and adjusts the illumination in the normal manner except that the observer announces "best light" to the FDC when the round best illuminates the target. The FDC uses a stopwatch to time the illumination round's time-of-flight to "best light". The observer requests HE when the desired illumination has been determined. The FDC controls the firing so that the HE rounds land on target at the time previously determined to be "best light".

d. Artillery Fire Technique in Support of Ground Movement.

Recent operations conducted in the Pleiku area revealed the potential of artillery in dispersing or preventing possible ambushes and assisting personnel to maintain direction while moving through dense terrain. The use of artillery fires to probe suspect enemy positions allows our forces to gain definite intelligence with minimum exposure of friendly personnel. WP or HE air bursts were particularly useful to the companies in maintaining a fix on its location and direction.

e. Mutually Supporting Artillery Fires.

The importance of having mutually supporting artillery positions became evident during the Chu Pong and In Drang Valley Campaigns when two artillery positions were attacked. On an LZ surrounded by dense vegetation the 105mm howitzer cannot be used in the direct fire role without causing extensive friendly casualties to security forces. On several occasions it was necessary to organize the artillery into four batteries rather than the customary three to attain proper mutual support.

x. AIRMOBILE TECHNIQUES.

a. Coordination and Operation of Landing Zones.

The air cavalry squadron was frequently tasked to provide initial LZ security. Experience has indicated that the time from arrival of the air cavalry elements to the initial troop lift must be reduced to the absolute minimum. (generally to less than 20 minutes), to take advantage of a secure area before the enemy has a chance to reinforce and build up defenses in that area. In several situations where this close coordination was not accomplished the enemy closed in on the LZ and attacked the second or third lifts.

Recommendation. The time between the arrival of the air cavalry security elements and the initial elements of the troop lift should be held to an absolute minimum by careful planning. Pathfinder teams should be planned for the initial lift to assure early, sufficient, ready control of the LZ and to direct aircraft in between enemy and friendly fires.
b. LZ Selection

Experience indicates that troop landings for search and destroy operations should begin, when feasible, on high ground and extend toward blocking forces located at the base of hills. The down movement conserves the strength of personnel and at the same time allows for complete coverage of the terrain. Moreover, this procedure attacks prepared enemy defensive positions in their rear when they are primarily sited to defend against attacks coming up the hill.

c. Pathfinder Support in LZ's

Experience indicates that pathfinders should always be included in the initial lifts into LZ's to assume functions of navigation assistance and LZ control. The pathfinders are particularly useful in directing the aircraft into and out of the LZ between enemy and friendly fire, both day and night. The pathfinders are equipped with beacons to assist in night resupply and are also used as a reference for USAF flare ships at night operating in support of tactical operations.

d. Flight Altitude

Observation. Despite the fact that many of the aircraft that are hit received their hits at low altitudes, experience indicates that there are times when the best chance to successfully complete a mission is where assault altitude (50 feet or lower) is used. The situations which favor using assault altitude are:

1. Weather limits altitude to less than 2000 feet absolute height.
2. Minimum restriction to friendly support fire is desired.
3. Vector control aircraft are available.

e. Deceptive Air Reconnaissance

Although it is recognized that aircraft become vulnerable to small arms when flying at lower altitudes, a good reconnaissance cannot always be made by remaining at high altitudes. Deception as to actual area of recon is important. One method which has been used with apparent success is fly past area of interest on a high recon for as much as 10 kilometers and returning past the area from a different direction at a low altitude, preferably at a different time of the day.

f. Reconnaissance by Fire

Reconnaissance by fire in open areas has proven to be a valuable air cavalry technique. Scout helicopters in one operation initiated recon by fire in 105 instances, receiving return fire from the ground in 37 instances. These areas were then fixed and proved valuable enemy targets for early artillery and TAC air fire prior to maneuver elements operating in these areas.
g. Management of Aircraft Lift Missions.

When aircraft from many units must be pooled to execute a mass lift as well as several smaller missions it is best to execute a mass lift initially and then allow specific units to revert to separate missions. Except when cogent reasons dictate contrary actions, it is especially important that air assault be accomplished by a minimum number of multiple lifts, scheduled into the LZ at the maximum rate that the LZ or PZ will accommodate. These procedures greatly reduce the exposure time of aircraft and assure having maximum combat power into the LZ in the minimum time, while providing the enemy the least chance to react to the landing.

h. Variable Load Capabilities for Cargo and Utility Helicopters.

Density altitudes in excess of 3000 feet and higher reduces considerably the maximum allowable loads. For example a CH-47 departing An Khe (1500 feet) to Qui Nhon (sea level) can safely transport 9000 pounds. The same aircraft departing An Khe to Pleiku (2500 feet) can safely transport 7000 pounds. All UH-1D and CH-47 ACLs must be recomputed, for each area of operations, and disseminated. The CH-47 will reflect an ACL of 7000 - 9000 pounds, depending on fuel requirement, and the UH-1D 5 to 7 combat troops or 1200 to 1680 pounds, depending on fuel load requirement and expected density altitudes at landing site.

i. Internal Loading of Vehicles in Aircraft.

Time is the essence when the helicopters are loading or unloading under enemy fire in the LZ or PZ. Vehicles which are loaded in a secure area going into a "hot" area should be backed into the aircraft for a speedy exit. Vehicles picked up at a "hot" PZ should be driven on forwards for speeding loading.

j. Aircraft Preventive Maintenance.

Aircraft preventive maintenance can always be performed more effectively and adequately in the aviation unit maintenance areas. Aviation units that leager in field sites at night drastically reduce the capability of the crew chiefs to effectively perform preventive maintenance. When tactical situation requires aircraft to leager with tactical unit, sufficient daylight hours need be allotted to accomplish required preventive maintenance.

k. Use of Non Organic Aircraft.

Except when cogent reasons dictate contrary actions, all possible hauls should be delivered direct from the supplying agency to the rear of brigade bases in non-organic aircraft. By using this method of resupply, we are assured of having a maximum number of organic aircraft to increase the mass, flexibility and tempo of tactical operations. This procedure was an invaluable asset to the Division during operations in the Chu Pong and Ia Drang areas.

Incl 1 to Ltr, AVCGT-T, Subject: "Lessons Learned, 1 Oct - 30 Nov 65", dtd 10 Jan 66
5. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AND ADMINISTRATION.

a. Medical Evacuation.

The reaction time for medical evacuation missions was sometimes increased during the initial stages of airmobile assaults due to lack of familiarity by medical evacuation pilots with LZ’s and LZ’s being used by specific units. Frequently Med Evac ships had to search unfamiliar terrain for the exact LZ’s, thus losing valuable time. Medical evacuation helicopters should follow major troop lift formations during the initial assaults to determine the LZ’s being used and to become terrain oriented. Further, the presence of Med Evac ships in the initial assault echelon greatly speeds evacuation at that critical time.

b. Evacuation of VCC.

The evacuation of VCC became a problem because all of them had to be evacuated by air, and as such they were returned to the FSE. Initially MP support in the proper magnitude was not programmed for the forward FSE’s. Provision of MP support to the FSE corrected this problem.

c. Use of Forward Contact Teams.

Recent operations have shown that demand maintenance (unscheduled maintenance which requires prompt attention) can be reduced considerably by providing direct support capability on site. Demand maintenance is normally carried forward on the DA Form 2408 when a unit is separated from its direct support element. A definite requirement exists for a direct support maintenance team with a sophisticated fly away kit to travel with the aircraft anytime battalion size lifts are out in excess of three days. This team should be readily available at the forward support site. For company and platoon size lift operations only a contact team need be provided at the forward support site.

d. Casualty Reporting.

Although our casualty reporting system is good, difficulties were met when the division operated at extended distance and when the lines of communication were over-burdened. This problem was overcome by the use of air couriers and, by placing personnel from the CAS Casualty Reporting Section forward with the brigades. This problem has been more fully resolved by establishing a secure RITT station at Division Rear operating on the D-7 Mail/Logistics net. The forward casualty reporting teams, located at the FSE, have ready access to this secure teletypewriter system.

e. Use of 4x4 Pallets.

The bulk of supplies delivered by air force aircraft were received on large pallets which division H&Q was unable to handle. Log areas were notified that all supplies must be placed on 4x4 pallets prior to loading on Air Force 463L pallets. However, this procedure was not effective until the latter stages of the LOC.

Incl 1 to Ltr, AVOGT-2, Subjects "Lessons Learned, 1 Oct - 30 Nov 65", dtd 10 Jan 66.
f. Pre-Palletized Loads.

Recent operations pointed out the importance of having supplies pre-palletized. For example the normal loading time for 200 rounds of 105mm ammunition was approximately one hour. The same load pre-palletized could have been loaded internally in a CH-47 in twenty minutes. As a result pallet loads are prepared in advance with a maximum of 1200 pounds so they may be carried by either UH-1D or CH-47 helicopters. Pre-palletized loads are made up for delivery to battalion, company and platoon size units.

g. Use of Cargo Nets.

The same 200 rounds of 105mm ammunition mentioned in paragraph 4e(f) would have been moved in minutes if it had been stacked in a cargo net. The cargo net is being utilized very effectively to transport rations, water, ammo etc; shortening the period aircraft are required to remain in insecure areas.

6. EQUIPMENT AND BAD REQUIREMENTS.


Aidmen have found pole litters to be difficult to handle in dense vegetation such as occurred near the Chu Pong Mountain area. Consequently litters were left behind and improvised poncho litters were the only ones available. In some areas litters could not be made due to the absence of small trees or limbs of suitable size, as in some of the elephant grass areas near Plei Me. In these areas patients occasionally were evacuated to helicopter sites by hand-carry methods. Tactical and medical units operating in areas described above should order and use the non-rigid poleless nylon litter, FSH 6530-783-7510, weight 3.5 pounds.

b. Requirement for a Light-Weight, Noiseless Poncho.

Discussion. The issue poncho shines, rustles and makes noise that can be heard beyond the immediate area of a night ambush site. The FAVN troops in the Plei Me area were equipped with a very light weight, nylon or nylon-like poncho-type which did not make noise. There is a definite requirement for a light-weight, noiseless, lusterless poncho.

c. Requirement for an Expandable Pre-Loaded M16 Magazine.

Combat operations in the Plei Me area demonstrated that infantry elements in forward areas need a cheap pre-loaded light-weight M16 magazine intended for one time use. Although there was an adequate supply of 5.56mm ammunition in forward areas, it was quite difficult and time consuming to load M16 magazines during active engagement with the VC.
d. M16 Rifle Malfunctions.

Several general malfunctions have occurred during recent operations. These malfunctions with recommended corrective action are:

(1) Rounds are difficult to extract after being in the chamber during the cooling off period. Hot weapons should not be allowed to cool with a round in the chamber if the tactical situation will permit.

(2) Magazines fail to seat properly because the magazine retaining clips become bent. Do not slam magazines into the weapon, which bends the retaining clips, but push firmly until the clips secure the magazine in place.

(3) Selector switch freezes in one position. Selector switches should be kept well oiled.

e. Swelling of Wooden Weapons Stocks.

Discussion. One unit, as a result of six days of continuous rain, encountered excessive swelling of the wooden stocks on M14's and M79's. The swelling caused the weapons to become practically inoperable. This problem is eliminated on the M16 by the plastic stock and hand grips. Commanders must insure that wooden stocks and hand grips are liberally worked with linseed oil at regular intervals. A recommendation has been forwarded to equip M14's and M79's with plastic stocks in extremely wet and humid climates.

f. Wet Radio Sets.

Considerable radio trouble was experienced during heavy rain from wet antenna wells and handsets. Plastic bags will keep the handsets dry. In heavy rain antenna wells should be dried out frequently until a boot can be procured to keep the well dry.

10

Incl 1 to Ltr, AVCGT-T, Subject: "Lessons Learned, 1 Oct - 30 Nov 65", dtd 10 Jan 66

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
OUTLINE OF 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION TACTICAL OPERATIONS, 1 OCTOBER TO 30 NOVEMBER 1965

1. General Situation. During the period 1 Oct - 30 Nov 65 the 1st Air Cavalry Division operated over an area about 170km by 170km in Binh Dinh, Pleiku, and Phu Yen Provinces. Division operations extended from the China Sea to the Cambodian Border along the axis of Highway 19, and from Bong Son to Tuy Hoa along the China Sea Coast. Operations were characterized throughout by heavy reliance on air mobility. (For example, during the 37 day period beginning in late October an equivalent of 22 infantry battalion moves and 66 artillery battery displacements were made using helicopters ranging from distances of a kilometer to as much as 120 kilometers). The division base remained at its present location near An Khe throughout this period. During part of the period, two brigades operated away from the base, while one brigade of 2 infantry battalions secured the division base and improved the security of the base. Brigade Operations have been largely search and destroy operations or pacification of areas previously controlled by the Viet Cong. The defense of the division base at An Khe, construction of barriers around the base, and a vast supply build-up continued simultaneously with tactical operations. Base defense tactical operations were characterized by battalion size or smaller offensive operations, daytime saturation patrolling, and nighttime ambush patrols. (See Maps, Area of Operations, and Operation 9).


a. 14 - 19 Oct (Operation LONESOME END). The 1st Bde secured Highway 19 west through Mang Yang Pass employing one infantry and one artillery battalion. The operation permitted more than 1000 ARVN and US vehicles, carrying vitally needed supplies to the isolated Pleiku Province, to move over Highway 19 without enemy interference. (See Map, Operation 9).

b. 6 Oct - 19 Nov (Operation HAPPY VALLEY). The 2d Bde conducted search and destroy operations in the Vinh Thanh Valley. Three infantry battalion supported by one artillery battalion and one cavalry ground troop were used to support the re-establishment of a US/PH/CIDG Camp and permit re-establishment of ARVN government control in the valley. Enemy resistance varied from occasional sniper fire to contacts with small guerrilla units. (See Map, Operation 3 and 4).

c. 3 - 14 Oct (Operation SUHI RAYONET). The 31 Bde conducted two major actions during 3 to 8 Oct and one during 10 - 14 Oct employing three infantry battalions supported by one artillery battalion and elements of the cavalry squadron. The first two operations provided security for traffic on Highway 19 east from An Khe through Dong Mang Pass to Binh Hie and a series of search and destroy operations in the Vinh Thanh Valley, while the 10 to 14 Oct operation was a joint US/ARVN search and destroy operation in the Suoi Ca and Suoi La Tinh Valleys. Enemy resistance varied from moderate to heavy. (See Map, Operations 1 and 2).

Tab A to Incl 1 to Ltr, AVCGT-T. Subject: "Lessons Learned, 1 Oct - 30 Nov 65", dtd 10 Jan 66.
d. 16 Oct - 9 Nov. Beginning the 16th of October, the 1st Bde conducted a security mission of Highway 19 from An Khe east for 40 kilometers by both heliborne and dismounted operations. On 23 October the Bde moved 100 kilometers by air to the vicinity of Pleiku in preparation for a major offensive in the Plei Me area. During the period 23 Oct - 9 Nov, the 1st Bde forces, consisting of four infantry battalions supported by one artillery battalion plus one battery reinforced with aerial rocket artillery and the cavalry squadron minus the ground troop, engaged VC and PAVN units up to regimental size. Operations resulted in over 300 VC KIA and nearly 800 WIA. 117 VC were taken to include 2 officers. Captured material included 150 weapons, over 1000 pounds of medical supplies, 200,000 rounds of 7.62 ammunition, grenades, and rocket launcher and mortar ammunition. (See Map, Operation 5).

e. 20 Oct - 11 Nov. Task Force 160, an artillery battalion with one infantry company for security and support elements, departed division base on 20 Oct to support the 22d DIV in the Song Long Valley in northern Binh Dinh Province. The Task Force returned to the base on 23 Oct. On 27 Oct the Task Force again departed the division base by land, sea, and air to Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen Province to support VCI forces in that area. During the eight day period 20 - 27 Oct this Task Force executed three major moves over a distance of approximately 350 kilometers. It remained in Phu Yen Province until 11 Nov. (See Map, Operations 1, 2, and 6).

f. 20 Oct - 15 Nov (Operation GOOD FRIEND). The 2d Bde provided security for the arrival and establishment of a base for the 1st Cav Regt from the ROK Capitol Division near Binh Khe. Two infantry battalions supported by one artillery battalion and recon elements of the cavalry squadron conducted numerous search and destroy operations in the vicinity of Binh Khe and adjacent mountains to the south. (See Map, Operations 3 and 4).

g. 9 - 20 Nov (Operation SILVER RAIN). The Division continued airmobile search and destroy operations with the 3d Bde in the area between Plei Khe and the Chu Long mountain area near the Cambodian border. The brigade employed four infantry battalions supported by the major portion of two artillery battalions and the cavalry squadron minus one troop in major actions north of Chu Pong and along the Ia Drang River. Organized PAVN units of battalion to regimental size were heavily engaged resulting in moderate division casualties, 1224 confirmed enemy KIA and an additional estimated 1388 KIA. 900 assorted weapons were captured and/or destroyed. (See Map, Operations 7 & 8).

h. 20 - 26 Nov (Operation GREEN HOUSE). The Division continued operations in the Chu Pong - Ia Drang River area with the 2d Bde. In coordination with an AAMN airborne Bde, which operated south of An Co along the Cambodian border, search and destroy operations were conducted to fix and destroy PAVN units in the area. The 2d Bde employed four infantry battalions, supported by a reinforced artillery battalion and the cavalry squadron minus one air cavalry troop. Enemy contact varied from attacks by an estimated enemy battalion down to probing attacks and occasional sniper fire. Confirmed body count of 119 VC and an additional 179 estimated enemy KIA were credited to the Division's artillery fire in support of the AAMN airborne Brigade. Friendly casualties were very light. (See Map, Operations 7 & 8).
1st Air Cavalry Division
Area of Operations

Legend:
- HIGHWAYS
- RIVERS
- BORDERS
- GROUND MOVEMENT
- AIR MOVEMENT

Important Operations (numbers)

Tab B to incl 1

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AVP-CC-TMG (12 Feb 66) 1st Ed
SUBJECT: Quarterly Command Report (RCS GSGPO-20)(R1) for Second Fiscal Quarter, FY 66 (G)

Headquarters, Field Force Vietnam, APO US Forces 96240, 1 MAR 1966

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307

(0) Concur with the comments and recommendations in basic report.

a. Reference paragraph 3e(1), Section I, the recommended change to the MI Detachment TOE was returned to Headquarters, 1st Cav Division, (Airmobile) for resubmission in accordance with USARV Regulation No 11-1. However, in order to obtain the desired personnel, a request was made of CG, USARV for an augmentation to the attached 191st MI Det for two Order of Battle teams consisting of 2 officers and 4 enlisted men each. The request was made in a letter from this headquarters, Subj: Augmentation of Military Intelligence Detachments, 31 Jan 66.

b. Reference paragraph 3g(2), Section I, the desired quantities of 1:50,000 and 1:250,000 maps are still not available, although the 569th Engr Topo Co in Nha Trang has improved the situation by obtaining map reproductions which permit the unit to print standard five colored topographic maps. Normal map requisitions made by the 569th Engr Topo Co to maintain a shelf stock for anticipated requirements are being filled slowly.

c. Reference paragraph 5e(5), Section I, concur that a periodic review to eliminate unnecessary reports is necessary at each echelon. Efforts will be made by this headquarters to eliminate duplication of requested information. The weekly Periodic Logistical Report, the Redball and the Boot Reports are required by HQ, USARV. The monthly Periodic Logistical Report required by this headquarters, which is in greater detail than the one required weekly by HQ, USARV, is necessary for monitoring logistical activities.

d. Reference paragraph 5e(2), Section I, concur that an engineer officer be assigned to An Khe to coordinate base development and perform the functions of post engineer.

e. Reference paragraph 5e(4), Section I, in order to curtail the transportation requirements, the 1st Log Command should procure lumber for the division from the Pleiku - Kontum area. This headquarters will seek to assist in resolving this problem.

f. Reference paragraph 5e(6)(d), Section I, all mentioned medical supplies are currently in stock; however, there is still a low stockage level of disposable syringes because of their rapid turnover.

g. Reference paragraph 1a, Section II, the target grid system used in connection with 9-52 strikes is no longer used because of inflexibility in axis and direction of attack. The following system has been substituted therefor. The target area is defined by the four corners of a rectangle using the
map grid system. The rectangle is selected so that the area is centered on the target mass, with the longest dimension in the direction which will place the maximum number of bombs on the target area. The request also includes a description of the target and terrain, location of center of mass and the desired direction of attack.

b. Reference paragraph 4b, Section II, as a result of continuing status of supply checks, this headquarters is aware of the existing critical shortage of tentage, covered storage space and construction material within the II CTZ. Headquarters, USARV is also aware of the extent of these shortages. Although TA 50-901 items are also critical, most replacements are now arriving with at least part of this equipment. During the past month, several shipments of TA 50-901 and individual weapons have been made to this division.

c. Reference paragraph 4c, Section II, this headquarters established a successful highway traffic regulation center on 24 January 1966, which is currently operating in Qui Nhon regulating traffic over routes 1 and 19. The Traffic Management Agency (TMA) is scheduled to assume responsibility for traffic regulation on or about 10 March 1966.

d. Reference paragraph 2 of Section III, numerous messages have been submitted to HQ, USARV requesting assistance in obtaining repair parts. Because of the Redball Express supply system there has been a noticeable decrease in equipment deadlined for parts within this division. However, the flow of repair parts must be constantly expedited at all levels thereby permitting increased fill of ASL and FLL.

e. Reference paragraph 4, Section III, upon receipt of recommended TCS changes, this headquarters will thoroughly evaluate all aspects thereof and forward to HQ, USARV for further consideration.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

R. C. BALDWIN
Captain AGC

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Quarterly Command Report (RCS CGPO-28) (RL) for Second Fiscal Quarter, FY 66 (U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307   MAR 14 1966

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATM: GPOL-1H, APO US Forces 96558

1. (U) Concur with the recommendations of the 1st Cavalry Division and with the First Indorsement.

2. (C) The following comments are added:

   a. Reference paragraph a, 1st Indorsement: The request for augmentation of military intelligence (MI) detachments is pending. Order of Battle (OB) assets in Vietnam are limited, however an OB company is tentatively scheduled to arrive in April. Two OB teams from this company will be attached to the 191st MI Detachment to augment the OB analyst capability.

   b. Reference paragraph b, 1st Indorsement: This headquarters was never made cognizant of any map shortage.

   c. Reference paragraph c, 1st Indorsement: The reduction of administrative reporting requirements for subordinate commands remains an area of primary concern within this headquarters. DA has granted relief to USARV from performing the formal Periodic Review of Reports (RCS CGSAP-110 (22)) required by AR 335-30, however, an informal periodic review of USARV reports is in effect and has resulted in the elimination of seven reports to date.

   d. Reference paragraph d, 1st Indorsement: The 1st Logistical Command has replaced PA E personnel with military personnel to perform the HEU function at an Khe. Concur with the need for a Post Engineer at An Khe.

   e. Concur with paragraphs e through k, 1st Indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

HENRY L. DENNEY
CWO USA
Asst Adj Gen

3 Incl
nc

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
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GPOP-MH (12 Feb 66) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Quarterly Command Report (RCS CSGPO-28) (R1) for Second Fiscal Quarter, FY 66 (U)
HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 36558 19 APR 1966

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The Command Report of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for the quarterly period ending 31 December 1965 is forwarded herewith. This is considered a highly informative and well written report.

2. Previous indorsements indicate that actions are underway to solve the division's problems and to consider all recommendations. No additional actions on the part of this headquarters are necessary at this time.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D. A. ELLISON
Capt, ANC
Asst AG

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