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**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

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| 31 Mar 1980, DoDD 5200.10; DoDD 5230.24, 18 Mar 1987 |

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (AR), Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 136 CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO San Francisco, California 96490

AVDACG 17 March 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

THRU: Channels

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff For Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Summary of Personnel Activities: Morale remained high during November and December as the Division continued operations on the Bong Son Plain. Administrative support elements remained based at An Khe and experienced no new problems in providing personnel services for the forward elements. In mid January the Division Headquarters and 1st Brigade moved from the Pershing AO to the Hue Phu Bai-Quang Tri area and were joined there by the 3rd Brigade. The shift of the division away from An Khe taxed the administrative support agencies and brought about a realignment of responsibilities. The most significant of these was the planning for consolidation of all rear area activities under the Adjutant General. Replacements are to be received, equipped, trained and moved forward to their units under AG control. By the end of the month most important personnel services had been reestablished in the Jeb Stuart AO.

2. Intelligence:
   a. Weather and Terrain (Det 31, 9th Weather Squadron)
      (1) November 1967. The northeast monsoon, although a dominating influence on the weather pattern during November, was relatively mild having only three identifiable surges, and these were of light to moderate intensity. The duration of the surges was two to four days. One typhoon (Typhoon Freda) developed rapidly west of the Philippine Islands and moved at 12 knots westward making its landfall on 9 November at Tuy Hoa. The remainder of the month was characterized by mild weather.
      (2) December 1967. The northeast monsoon continued to dominate both the Pershing AO and the An Khe areas during the month of December. The monsoon was light to moderate in intensity with only two surges (remnants of cold fronts) moving through the area. The surges occurred from the 1st thru the 3d and again from the 11th thru the 17th of the month. Other passages were suspected; however, 60% of the total precipitation for the month at both An Khe and LZ Two Bits occurred during the five day period that the surges were in the area. Maximum wind speeds and gusts also occurred during the surge period.
      (3) 1-18 January 1968
         (a) The weather in the Pershing AO was generally good. The major problem encountered was low clouds that tended to form during the night over the higher ridges causing partly obscured tops until 1000 to 1200 IL. Ceilings on the Bong Son Plain were generally 2,000 feet or higher. Visibility on the plains was good with few restrictions below three miles. Dense morning fog occurred in the interior valleys about once every three days.

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SUBJ: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(a) The northeast monsoon continued to be quite weak during operations in the Joa Stuart AO. The major problem encountered was fog and ground fog. The formation of ground fog was an almost daily occurrence. The ground fog formed between 0300 and 0400L and dissipated between 0600 and 0900L. Dense fog formed in the interior coastal valleys, dissipating between 0945 and 1030L. On three occasions, dense fog formed over the lowlands causing 1/8 to 1/4 mile visibilities and to improve very slowly. The fog lifted into a stratus deck and visibilities improved two to three miles by 1030L, while continued improvement produced clear to scattered sky conditions and six mile visibility by 1200L.

b. Enemy Activities:

(1) Operation Pushing (1 November 1967 - 18 January 1968)

(a) November 1967. During the month of November the regiments of the 3d WVA Division remained relatively stationary, making minor moves to avoid contact with the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The 2d WVA Regimental Headquarters remained in the Cuy Clop Mountains; the 93d Battalion moved south into the Mui Niu Mountains; the 8th Battalion operated in the mountains northwest of the An Leo Valley; and the 9th Battalion remained scattered on the Dong Son Plain. The 18th WVA Regimental Headquarters and the 9th Battalion remained in the CRID AO (Phu Cat Mountains) and were joined by the 8th Battalion during November. The 7th Battalion, 18th WVA Regiment remained in the mountains west of L2 Crystal. Contact with the enemy during November was light; however, the enemy did increase his harassment program.

(b) December 1967. During December the regiments of the 3d WVA Division moved generally southward. During early December the 22d Regimental Headquarters and support elements, as well as the 7th and 9th Battalions, moved from the Binh Danh-Quang Ngai border onto the northern Dong Son Plain. In a reversal of tactics, the enemy avoided the possibility of decisive contact with US and SVN forces at 1500 on 6 December, marking the start of the Battle of Tan Dak. The Battle of Tan Dak continued until 17 December and resulted in a major defeat for the 22d WVA Regiment. Enemy elements identified in the action included the 22d WVA Regimental Headquarters, 132d Signal Company, and the 7th and 9th Battalions. During late December the 22d WVA Regimental Headquarters moved to the northern Cuy Clop Mountains; the 7th Battalion moved to the foothills of the northeastern Cuy Clop; while the 8th Battalion possibly moved into the central portion of the Cuy Clop. The 9th Battalion remained unlocated, however, the 52d Company and possibly the 93d Company of the 9th Battalion were reported in the Vinh Thanh area in late December.

In early December the 2d WVA Regiment moved from the Cuy Clop Mountains into the Mui Niu Mountains, joining the 93d and 95th Battalions which had moved from the western pass area. The 7th Battalion moved south from northern Quang Ngai (P) and joined the rest of the 2d WVA Regiment in the Mui Niu Mountains in mid to late December. Possible elements of 93d and 95th Battalion engaged friendly units east of the Mui Niu Mountains on 17 & 18 December in the only moderate contact with the 2d WVA Regiment during the month.

The 18th WVA Regimental Headquarters and the 8th and 9th Battalions remained in CRID AO (Phu Cat Mountains), while the 7th Battalion, 18th Regiment, remained in the mountains west of L2 Crystal and avoided major contact.

(c) 1-18 January 1968. During the period 1-18 January the battalions of the 22d WVA Regiment continued to avoid contact with the 1st ACB in the Pushing AO. The 22d WVA Regimental Headquarters and the 7th and 9th Battalions remained in the Cuy Clop Mountains. The 9th Battalion, 22d WVA Regiment was believed to be located east of the An Leo Valley in the foothills in the vicinity of BS 6010.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

The 2d VC Regiment continued to operate in the Nui Mieu Mountains. The 93rd Battalion and elements of an unidentified Sapper unit attacked LZ Noon during the early morning hours of 10 January. The 2d Battalion, 41st ARVN Regiment repulsed the attackers and killed 41 NVA. The 97th Battalion was engaged on 2-3 January in the Battle of the Dam Tra O Lake and suffered 97 KIA. Five crew served weapons were captured along with two NVA soldiers. The 95th Battalion continued to operate in the southern Nui Mieu Mountains and suffered 30 KIA, including the Battalion Executive Officer, on 10 January in contact with C 1/9 Cav and as a result of USAF air strikes.

The 7th Battalion, 18th NVA Regiment moved from the mountains west of LZ Crystal and joined the remainder of the 18th NVA Regiment in the Phu Cat Mountains in the CRID AO.

Effective 190001 January 1968 the 1st Air Cavalry Division turned operation Pershing over to the 2nd Bde, under the operational control of IFFORCEV, and deployed to the Jeb Stuart AO. Enemy losses during Operation Pershing (11 Feb 67 - 182400 Jan 68) were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
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<th>WEAPONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA/VC</td>
<td>2,003/3,367</td>
<td>256/2/123</td>
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<td>1,329/137</td>
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(2) Operation Job Stuart (19-31 Jan 68)

The 1st Air Cavalry Division (-) with the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division attached, conducted Operation Job Stuart on 220001 Jan 68 against elements of the 512th NVA Regiment, 9th NVA Regiment, and 7th NVA Regiment in Bao An 101 and against elements of the 6th NVA Regiment-in-Bao An 114 in northern I Corps. The 1st ARVN Division conducted operations in the Quang Tri City area and defended the city from the enemy elements around and within the city. Operation Job Stuart continues. Enemy losses for the period in Operation Job Stuart are as follows:

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<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
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<th>WEAPONS</th>
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<tr>
<td>NVA/VC</td>
<td>269/54</td>
<td>51/12</td>
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(1) B2 Aerial Surveillance

(c) Mission statistics for the period 1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68

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<th>LEADERSHIP</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
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<td>IE</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>999 Hot Spots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLGR</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>592 MTI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>77*</td>
<td>24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo (Hand Hold)</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suprivt</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
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* = 15 Missions pending
** = 2 Missions pending
*** = 2 Missions pending

(b) General Observations: Aerial surveillance operations were hampered throughout the reporting period by the effects of the northeast monsoon.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

1. III. The ASTA Platoon exchanged the three original OV-10 aircraft deployed to RVN with the 1st Cavalry Division. During the reporting period the ASTA Platoon completed 185 of 310 missions with the remainder cancelled due to weather and/or sensor or aircraft malfunction. TFORESY support was provided by the 223rd Aerial Surveillance Company during operations in the Pershing AO. IR requirements in the Job Stuart AO cover 1,150 square kilometers compared to 300 square kilometers in the Pershing AO.

2. IIIII. The ASTA Platoon continued to support the Market Time operation in conjunction with the US Army and the Lightning. Two operations at the 223rd Assault Helicopter Battalion during operation Pershing.

3. Photo. The Hand-Held-Camera Program was officially adopted by the Division and became operational in December. Numerous requests for these coverage missions were received upon arrival in the Job Stuart AO.

(2) 54th Infantry Detachment (Ground Surveillance Radar)

During the period 1 November 1967 - 17 January 1968 the 54th Infantry Detachment (Ground Surveillance Radar) provided radar support for the 1st Air Cavalry Division in the Pershing AO and the TINH. Effective 17 January 1968 the 54th Infantry Detachment was detached from the 1st Air Cavalry Division and attached to the 177th Air Base. Organic radar distribution is in two HS-45s at 15 English. TFORESY directed that the Detachment report to position in the Pershing AO. Two HS-45s are presently located at Camp Evans and stores                                    are presently being taken to organize a Division Ground Surveillance Radar Detachment with radar equipment that is organic to each Brigade but without personnel allocations.

(3) G1 E, 526th Infantry (Long Range Patrol)

During the reporting period the 1st ACM's LRRD Detachment became G1 E, 526th Infantry (LRRD) on the 21st. The company conducted 107 patrols during the period, operating from bases at Tri Ton River, LZ Uplift and LZ English. Training was conducted in the Crip Rockcliff YOS for both US and indigenous personnel. 350 sightings of enemy personnel were made by the LRRD Company during the reporting period. During January the LRRD Company moved seven teams to the Job Stuart AO and left six there in the Pershing AO with the 21st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division. One operation was conducted in the Job Stuart AO. Complete LRRP statistics for Operation Pershing will be included in the 02 After Action Report.

3. Operations and Training


b. Operations

(1) General. During the period 1 November 1967 to 21 January 1968, the 1st Cavalry Division continued to conduct operations in Bien Hoa Province, including a Battalion Task Force to the 101st Air Biv (Operation Kamafe Fallo), a Brigade Task Force to the 101st Air Biv (Operation Nungky/Phu Yen), and a Regiment Task Force to the 4th Infantry Division (Operation HocDieu). During the period 21 January 1968, the 1st Cavalry Division conducted operations in the AVN 1st Corps Tactical Zone (Operation Job Stuart).

(2) 1st Brigade

(a) During the period 1 November 1967 to 21 January 1968, the brigade conducted extensive operations throughout the Kong Son Plain, the An Lao Valley, the coastal highlands overlooking the Kong Son Plain east of the An Lao Valley. The operations were characterized by a
variety of techniques employed to destroy the NVA/VC infrastructure while
constantly keeping the enemy off balance. Cordon search and
"Scout" Operations were emphasized in the Ia Drang located within the
3d in conjunction with the USAF. These operations took advantage of the
intelligence available to destroy the VC infrastructure and evacuate
population control, in the AO. Psychological leaflets were used in support of their
Collections. During daylight hours, census Census and search/attack operations were conducted throughout
the area to search and destroy the VC forces in the area, and when found to
expose or destroy them. "Light Search" Operations were conducted continuously
to intelligence indicating suspected enemy locations anywhere in the AO.
"Selective Switch" operations were employed during daylight hours to deny
the enemy a sanctuary among the local population. During the hours of
curfew, the brigade employed "Bunker Killers" and used "Atmospheric Operations" to deny the enemy movement at night. Brigade
forces were augmented to provide, for additional security of critical installations during the Christmas Holidays period. There were no unusual
incidents during the Christmas Holiday period.

(5) During the period 23 January 1967 to 31 January
the brigade conducted a tactical move to the 1st Corps Tactical Zone. The majority of effort was directed towards
establishing suitable fire bases to support further offensive operations in the area. 1st CTZ. 101st

(6) 2d Brigade 101st AB: Arriving in the Job Stuart 20
area on January 31, the 2d Brigade 101st AB spent the remaining seven days in
January conducting combat patrols in the 1st ABZ and tactical area of respons-
ability (TAR) around Da Nang. When the Division moved to Camp Evans on 27 January, the 2d Brigade 101st AB assumed responsibility for all
combat operations in the TAR.

(7) 3d Brigade: During the period 25 January 1967 to 21
January 1968, the 3d Brigade continued to find, engage, and destroy enemy forces in the Phuoc Duc Operations, which were conducted in the
Concanton, Bu Long, Cao Gai, and Giai Valley. The 3d Brigade, continued to be prepared
in a manner that allowed for quick response, and smaller size companies were utilized in ambush and search operations. The brigade also continued to provide security for the 1st ABZ, 2d Brigade, 2d psychological
"ATMOS" Operations, and continued operations in conjunction with the
4th AVN Regiment and Marine 3d-4.

(8) 7th Cav: During the period 25 January 1967 to 21
January 1968, the 7th Cav performed combat patrols in both the TAR at Gia Lo and the Job Stuart 20. at Camp Evans.

(9) 3d Squadron, 7th Cav: During the period 1 November
1967 to 21 January 1968, 7th Cav continued Operation Pernhing with
no change in mission or unit location. The troopers were attached to the
3d Brigade for Operation Whiskey in Quang Tin Province, while other
detachments continued to support TF 2/7 Cav in the Khe Sanh Valley and
Operation Sabato in the MAG. The Squadron provided intelligence for the
Piercings, 2nd and reconnaissance to the 1st and 3rd Brigades on
a routine basis. The Squadron also continued to direct security operations for
the 2d TSBs complex. Only once during the reporting period, did
the TSBs receive indirect fire. Reconnaissance efforts were concentrated
on the Dong Son Plains, Cao Gai Mountains, Bu Long Mountains, and Quang
Gia Valley to locate elements of the 3d NVA Division and main forces VC
units. These operations not with singular success when on 6 December, "A"
troop located major elements of the 22d NVA Regiment on the Dong Son
Plain (see and fo).
(b) During the period 21 January thru 31 January 1968, the Squadron (-) moved with the 1 LCD to the Job Stuart AD. "A" Troop remained in the Pershing AD providing reconnaissance and support to the 2d Brigade. In the Job Stuart AD, the Squadron (-) provided support to the Brigade on a mission-related and preplanned basis of the new Division AO. Initial priority of reconnaissance was directed toward base area 101 and 114.

(7) Combat Support Elements

(a) Division Artillery

1. During the period 1 November 1967 to 21 January 1968, Division Artillery continued its fire support mission in the Pershing and Dazzlom AD's, 2d BN, 20th Artillery (ABA)(-), continued in a general support role with Battery A (-) continued in a general support role with Battery A (-) and Battery B (-) in the Pershing AD and one platoon in support of the Division AD. Battery E, 52d Artillery (ABA) continued support of Division Artillery in the Pershing and Dazzlom AD's. 1st BN, 13th Artillery continued in a 2d role to the 1st Bde. The 1st BN, 77th Artillery (-), with Battery C, 2d BN, 17th Artillery attached and Battery E, 7th BN, 13th Artillery repositioned, continued support of the 2d Bde. One significant action of the reporting period was a contact initiated on 6 December 1967 in the 1st Bde AD.

2. During the period 21 January thru 31 January 1968, Division Artillery supported the 1st LCD in the Job Stuart AD.

(b) 11th Aviation Group

1. During the period 1 November 1967 to 20 January 1968, Headquarters, 11th Aviation Group, provided support to operations from 2d Two Bits. The 227th AD (-) supported 2d Brigade from its location at Chin Lai; B Co (-) supported Pershing from 2d Bog with six lift ships at Kanto during Operation MacArthur and A Co continued support of Operation Tyndall at Pham Thist with additional lift support to 1st Bde, 10th Airborne Division during Operation Kolonath Falls. The 228th AD (-) supported Pershing from its location incoming base at 2d English. A Co (-) provided support for Operation Wheeling/Wallowa. Tyndall and Dazzlom were supported with three OH-47 aircraft each throughout the period. The 225th AD (-) supported 1st and 2d Bde's in the Pershing AD from 2d English. B Co provided base defense at An Khe and supported the 4th Inf Div at Kanto during Operation MacArthur.

2. On 21 January 1968, the 11th Aviation Group (-) moved from the Pershing and Dazzlom AD's to Hao Binh. When the 1 LCD moved to Camp Evans, the 11th Aviation Group (-) followed. Camp Evans became the 1 LCD primary helicopter landing base for helicopters in the Job Stuart AD.

(a) 6th Engineer BN: Continued to support the 1 LCD in the Pershing and Dazzlom AD's until 19 January 1968. On 19 January 1968 the 6th Engineer BN (-) arrived in the Job Stuart AD and provided engineer support to the 1 LCD in the new AD.

(a) 13th Signal BN

1. During the period 1 November 1967 to 19 January 1968, the 13th Signal BN continued to provide the 1 LCD and its supporting units with communications support for Operations Pershing, Dazzlom, Klamath Falls, Wheeler/Wallowa, and MacArthur. Initial communications support was provided to the 2d BN Division, Capital Division, Capital BDE Inf Div, and 3d BN, 4th Inf Div. The Battalion also completed the base development of the communications site on Hong Kong Mountain, culminated by the dedication of Hong Kong by MS Colonel to the men of the Signal Corps who were killed in its defense.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

2. On 19 January 1968, the 13th Signal Battalion (-) departed the Dazzle AO and initiated operations in the Job Stuart AO. For the remainder of the reporting period the BN (-) supported the 1st Bn in the Job Stuart AO.

3. Discussion and Analysis of Major Operations

(a) Attached and supporting units of the 1st Cavalry Division (Air-mobile) (-) continued throughout the reporting period to conduct Operation Porch in northeast North Binh Dinh Province. The period saw a marked increase in enemy activity and consequently the Division was engaged in heavy contact on numerous occasions. The Battle of Tan Quan (date incl 12) lasted for 11 days (6-17 Dec) and was the most significant contact to date in this operation, resulting in 647 enemy KIA, 6 engaged and 99 weapons captured or destroyed. There can be little doubt that the 7th and 8th Bns of the 22d RVN Bn were thoroughly routed from the field of battle and virtually defeated. However, the Binh Son Fish was only one of a number of areas that saw a sudden resurgence of action during the report period. It is obvious that the 22 RVN-enhanced by a new course of action for reasons unknown at this time. The Bulletin of Air-mobile and normal reconnaissance which have been practiced for so long paid off handsomely as the enemy found himself confronted by massive firepower and superior strength every time he tried to concentrate his own forces.

(b) Significant actions occurring in Operation Porch during the reporting period were:

1. On 24 November 1967, a Co 2/5 Cav observed and engaged a 10-man enemy force north of the mountain (via BG 923984). Co 1/9 Cav supported the contact with gunship fires. Results of the engagement were 9 NVA KIA, 1 M16 and 9 NVA captured.

2. A contact from a LORP sighting occurred in the Saed-e Valley on 4-5 December. The Xo of the 22d RVN Force WD Battalion and 21 other RVN were killed and 3 captured by 5-9 Cav. The element was a recon party and propaganda column from the Binh Dinh Province Headquarters on a supply mission to the 22d Battalion. Three PBO-25's and 2 weapons were captured.

3. The Battle of Tan Quan was fought on the Binh Son Plains during the period of 6-17 December against elements of the 22d RVN Regimental Headquarters and its 7th and 8th Battalions. The most significant contact resulted in almost 650 enemy KIA and should have an impressive effect on the local population in that area. (See incl 12)

4. On 16 Dec, the 41st En, 2d VC Regt attacked Trung Xuan Hamlet (CR 008672) and overrun a RF outpost in an effort to draw Allied Forces into an ambush. However the 21st Bn reinforced by a RP Company and 1-5th Mech disrupted their plan by forcing the 41st Battalion into contact before allied units reached them. In a sharp two day contact the enemy was pounded by artillery and 250kts almost without lifting. Total results of the action were 115 NVA KIA, 16 weapons and 5 NVA captured by allied units.

5. A contact with 2d VC Regimental Headquarters elements on the beach south of the Hai Nicu Headland (CR 051737) from 17-20 December resulted in a total of 21 enemy KIA and 6 weapons and several valuable documents captured. Some of the documents indicated that one of the KIA was possibly the 2d Regt Co or Deputy Co.
On the 19-20 Decj, 1/9 Cav responded to a LBFP sighting in the South Go Valley (via BR 842651). In two days of combined air and ground action, 6/1 Cav killed 16 enemy from the 125th Air Dcaft Co of the 16th Regt including a platoon leader. Some 123 files were captured.

On 22 Decj, elements of 1/9 Cav responded to an intelligence report of a CP located in the north Di Nhon Mtns (via BR 996687). Contact was made with elements of the 93d Bn, 2d Regt and artillery, 120 air strikes, and naval gunfire were called in on the enemy positions and routes of access. Air strikes and 1/9 Cav elements accounted for 29 NVA KIA on this day and elements of 2/5 Cav and 1/50th Regt moved into the area to block routes of escape. The following day, two companies of the 43rd NVA Regt conducted search operations in the area and made contact resulting in 12 NVA KIA and 5 NVA POWs. Total results for this operation were 39 NVA KIA, 9 NVA POW and 15 weapons captured.

On 29 December, a CIDG Company, reinforced with two CPs, conducted search operations in Happy Valley (via BR 628552) and at 0930h made contact with the 924 Co, 9th Bn, 22d NVA Regt. One additional CIDG company reinforced from the Vinh Thonh Camp and gunships 1/9 Cav were sent to the area. At the contact continued to develop, two companies from 2/5 Cav and one company from 1/9 Cav were air assaulted into the area to provide additional support and to restrict enemy movement. Additional artillery was quickly air lifted to the Vinh Thonh Camp to provide increased firepower support. Fighting continued through the next day. Total enemy losses were 52 NVA KIA (32 by US and 20 by CIDG/PF), 6 NVA, and 17 weapons captured.

During the period 20-24 December, Operation Prostitute was conducted by 17th Recon Support Comd. 1st Air Cav forces in Operation Prostitute played a vital and important part in Operation Prostitute which involved the movement of the entire 11th Light Infantry Brigade from Qui Nhon to Da Pho via Highway 1. The enemy was aware of the arrival of the 11th LIG in Qui Nhon and announced over the radio that these forces would never reach Da Pho by highway. In a highly coordinated operation 1 ADO provided highway security and reaction forces tied together in a responsive posture. Operations along the highway area were increased to detect and deter any enemy attempt at ambush. The success of this operation may be judged by the fact that not a single enemy initiated incident marred the movement of the Brigade and its equipment and personnel.

On 2 January 1968, in the vicinity of coordinates (VR 806670), elements of the 1/9 Cav observed numerous enemy with packs and weapons. An infantry platoon was inserted and engaged the enemy as gunships provided aerial gunfire support. Results of the contact were 20 NVA KIA.

During the period 2-4 January 1968, east of the Son Tra 0 elements of the 1/50 Regt came under heavy fire while attempting to cordon the hamlet of An Loc (via BR 955825). The size of the enemy force was estimated to be a battalion. Additional units of the 1/50 Regt, 1/5 Cav, and 2/5 Cav moved to the area of contact. ADO and 120 air strikes were called in on the enemy positions. Enemy automatic weapons fire and rocket fire halted US attempts to attack the enemy positions. By 4 January enemy resistance in the area diminished, and elements of the 1/50 Regt and 1/5 Cav were able to sweep the area. Total enemy losses in the area of contact were 37 NVA KIA, 2 WIA, 23 SA's and 5 crew served w/o wcn.
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12. On 11 January 1968, in the south Dong Son area (vic BR 906676) elements of 1/9 Cav spotted a group of NVA with one gear and weapons. The 1/9 Cav initiated contact with the enemy. As the contact developed, one company of 5/5 Cav was air assaulted into the area of contact. Another company from 1/90 Heck moved overlaid toward the area of contact. Results of the battle were 89 NVA KIA and 1 NVA.

12. On 14 January 1968, ARVN elements conducting operations on the coast Dong Son Plain made contact with an estimated enemy battalion (-) (vic BR 907002). The contact lasted throughout the afternoon with the enemy forces using automatic weapons and R-40 rocket fire. Their engagement resulted in 30 NVA KIA, 11 small arms captured and one KIA captured.

(c) Total enemy losses for Operation Perchini are:

- KIA NVA/VC: 3023/3365
- WIA NVA/VC: 256/2120
- Captured: 226
- Wounded: 1974
- KO's captured SA/OS: 1330/137
- RDS/SA: 449/42/25

(2) Operation Bazlen continued throughout the reporting period with no change in mission. The Base Defense Task Force was strengthened by the addition of an armored Cav Platoon and a Tank Platoon. Two forces (1/1/1/63 Cav and 1/92/1/25) were received OOSN from the 5th Inf Div on 13 September and are being employed for high security along Highway 19 within the TA0II. On 3 December OOCM N Vaudel, a detailed ground control of the area around Camp Radcliffe, was executed due to intelligence indications of an impending attack. There were no negative significant results. On 3 December 1967, the 1/12 Cav relieved the 2/5 Cav and assumed responsibility for the Base Defense mission. On 9 November the 1/12 Cav was relieved by the 5/5 Cav. On 20 December the 1/12 Cav relieved the 1/5 Cav. At 1800 hrs on 17 January 1968 the 1/2D was relieved of the mission of base defense at Camp Radcliffe. The 173d Abn Bde (SAD) assumed the mission and assumed the 5/505 Abn the mission of base defense.

(b) Significant actions occurring in Operation Bazlen during the reporting period were:

1. Enemy attack on 02 December on 60 man CP out- post (vic BR 550516) by an estimated company size enemy force. Under cover of heavy fog and darkness, enemy forces launched a ground attack against CP Henry and succeeded in breaching the perimeter and occupying the CP for a short period of time. The defenders fought well until the enemy entered the position and they became outnumbered and lost the advantage of prepared positions. The enemy paid for his success by losing 11 KIA's hanging on the perimeter wire and by failing to eliminate the FF force which suffered only moderate casualties.

2. Enemy attack of a 60 vehicle convoy on Highway 19 on 04 December. At 0815H an estimated 3 NVA platoons ambushed a large convoy vic BR 34459. The convoy had its own security forces which responded in a curtailed manner. In addition artillery, ADA and GO-GO responded and were in the contact area within minutes. One company from 1/5 Cav was on the ground in the area within 15 minutes. In all, 17 NVA were killed and five enemy weapons captured. One US was killed and 4 wounded.

3. On 4 January 1968, the enemy launched a mortar attack against Camp Radcliffe. ADA and flamethrowers responded immediately and artillery initiated counter mortar fire. Approximately 85 mortar rounds were fired by the enemy resulting in 7 aircraft damaged. Early morning search resulted in negative enemy contact.

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(a) Total enemy losses from Operation Barac:

- KIA NVA/VC
- WIA NVA/VC
- Returnees NVA/VC
- GD's captured
- Dead
- Wounded
- Captured 2A/CS
- Rice/Salt seized

- Total

(b) Operation Job Stuart (21 January 1968 - continuing)

(c) Task Organization

1. 1st Brigade

- Maneuver Battalions
  - 2/19 Arty (25)
  - A Btry (105)
  - B Btry (105)
  - C Btry 1/77 (105)
  - D Btry 1/77 (105)
  - A Co., 8th Inf (36)
  - Plt., 545th HP Co
  - 2 Sqns, 25th Inf Plt (Scout Det)
  - Det PFC Detectors
  - 4 LSP Truck
  - Tk, 15th Sig Rq
  - Tk, 14th Sig Co
  - Tk, 25th Sig Co
  - Tk, 5th Weather Sqdn

2. 2d Brigade 101st Abn

- Maneuver battalions
  - 1/251 Arty (25)
  - A Btry (105)
  - B Btry (105)
  - C Btry, 26th Med (25)
  - D Btry, 26th Med (25)
  - Plt., 101st Med Co (25)
  - Tk, 101st Med (25)
  - 2d PASGT, 501st Sig (25)
  - Plt., 25th Med Rq (25)
  - 34th Plt (25)
  - Tk, 35th Sig

3. 3d Brigade

- Maneuver Battalions
  - 1/12th Arty (25)
  - A Btry (105)
  - B Btry (105)
  - C Btry 1/77 (105)
  - D Btry, 101st Med (25)
  - Plt., 25th Med Rq (25)
  - 2 Sqns, 34th Inf Plt (Scout Det)
  - Det PFC Detectors
  - 3 LSP Truck
  - Tk, 13th Sig Rq
  - Tk 251/251 Med
  - Tk, 25th Sig Co
  - Tk, 5th Weather Sqdn

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4. Operation Battalions

1/7 Cav
1/8 Cav
1/12 Cav
1/501 Atm
2/501 Atm
1/302 Atm
1/7 Cav
5/7 Cav
2/12 Cav

5. Division Artillery

Bn Btry
Bn Btry, 822nd Arty (AVN) (-) GS
2/20 Arty (-) GS
1/30-82 Arty GS
A 1/50 (155-Hw)
B 1/50 (155-Hw)
C 2/11 (155-Hw)
5th 155 Gun Btry (inf) (155/6" How) (U.S.M.C.)

6. Division Troops

N NV, 1st Air Cav Div (-)
1/9 Cav Sqn (-)
8th How Rch (-)
13th Sig Bn
9th Atm Bn (-)
571st Hq Co
545th Hq Co (-)
3d, 41st CA Co
184th Gun Det (-)
Det (-), 5th Weather Sqn

(b) During the period 19 thru 31 January 1968, the 1st ACO (-) conducted a tactical move to McNair and consolidated forces for a commitment into the Job Stuart AO. Initial reconnaissance of the Job Stuart AO indicated the presence of a considerable number of major NVA and VC units. On 27 January the Division Command Post moved from McNair to Camp Evans and established the Division Base Camp for operations in the AO. The Brigade and Maneuver Battalions of the Division used the last 10 days of January to position forces and establish fire bases from which offensive operations could be launched against enemy bases across 101 and 114.

d. Combat Developments

(i) Scintilla Devices

(a) On 7 and 8 November MVC Moore, ACTIV project officer, and two tech representatives from the Scintilla Corporation delivered three Scintilla seismic intrusion devices to the division and conducted new equipment training for personnel from Div Arty, 0-51, and 1/9 Cav. The devices were initially deployed by 2/19th Arty in conjunction with an artillery ambush along a trail three kilometers west of LZ English. A total of five sets were issued to the division during November. The 2/19th and 1/77th Arty Bn each employed two; the remaining one was issued to 1/9 Cav.

(b) All sets were employed in areas of known VC activity in an attempt to detect movement at night. Artillery or mortar concentrations were registered in the areas and were fired whenever movement was detected. To date there have been no confirmed kills; however, bloodstained backpacks and two badly damaged NVA helmets were found in the vicinity of two of the detectors. In addition, an EW report revealed
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that NVA soldiers have been warned to avoid a trail on which four of the detectors have been installed. The prisoner stated that he did not know the source of 'US Intelligence;' however, every time his unit used this trail they were hit by artillery.

(c) In general the detectors have functioned well. By attaching an SCR 252 antenna to the indicator, units can employ the detectors at ranges up to ten kilometers. Units have experienced difficulty in keeping the indicator batteries charged. One detector was destroyed by artillery fire; another is missing and presumed to be in enemy hands. As of the close of this reporting period two sets are with 2/16 LAR in the Job Stuart AO; two sets are being employed by 1/77 Arty in the Pending AO. The indicator for the fifth set is imperative.

(d) On 31 Jan 69, Boeing, the current project officer, delivered 15 portable passive intrusion detectors to the division. The maximum effective range of these sets is approximately 500 meters. They have been issued to infantry battalions for use on ambush patrols, OPs, and similar local security missions.

(3) Anti-Intrusion Devices

(a) AN/PSQ-4. A total of 100 AN/PSQ-4 anti-intrusion devices were issued to the division in late October. Each combat battalion was issued four; the remainder were issued to base defense units at an AO. The device is ideally suited for early warning around static defensive positions. Results of employment during the reporting period were generally satisfactory.

(b) MCID. On 15 November a tech rep from USARV introduced the multi-purpose concealed intrusion detector (MCID) to the division. The device consists of a wire loop buried in the ground which detects any metal object which may be carried across it. Due to the time required to install it the device is best suited for early warning around permanent or semi-permanent bases. One set provides approximately 500 feet of coverage. The division received an initial issue of eight MCIDs in early December. A total of 10 will be issued during FY 69. Two sets will be issued to each of the brigades, Div Arty, and 1/9 Cav. The remaining sets will be reserved for base defense.

(4) Night Vision Devices. On 5 November, 71 additional individual night weapon sights (straight scopes) were issued to units throughout the division. Each infantry battalion now has a total of 37; the ultimate objective is 40 in each battalion. The scopes are extremely popular in most units. They have been used successfully on night ambush and to a limited extent, on night hunter missions. The division has a total of 72 crew served night weapon sights; 24 of these have been issued to 1/90th Inf. The division also has on hand nine medium range night observation devices. Due to their size, weight and excellent range capability they are well-suited for employment by artillery units on OPs or at fire bases. All nine have been issued to 1/9 Arty for this purpose.

(5) Stripper Clip Ammunition. On 9 November the division concluded its evaluation of stripper clip ammunition, pre-packaged 10 round clips of 5.56mm ammunition which allow the soldier to load his weapon quickly and easily. The clips are immensely popular with all units. The division recommended them as a substitute for pre-loaded,
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The division also recommended that nine-round clips be produced to facilitate loading 18 rounds in each magazine.

(6) XM-166 - 169 Smoke Signals. There were miniature smoke pots, roughly the size of a 35mm film o-meter. They are a convenient substitute for smoke grenades for marking targets and blank rounds in open terrain. During the period, however, it was too short to allow the smoke to penetrate dense jungle canopy. The division recommended they be issued in limited quantity.

(7) Caliber .45 and .38 Multiple Part Ammunition. The division was issued 10,000 rounds last summer for evaluation. To date none have been fired in combat. USARV has approved an extension of the evaluation through February 1968.

(8) Airborne Survey System (ALBC). Div Arty continued their evaluation of the ALBC survey system throughout the reporting period. Surveys conducted on 11 and 15 January were compared with fourth order surveys. Computed ALBC survey points were 4.27 meters southeast and 5.4 meters southwest of the fourth order survey points. ALBC tapes are still required to ease the burden of computation. A radio altimeter and a hoverright have also been requested. Div Arty plans to use the system extensively in the Job Stuart AC.

(9) AN/VRC-74. The AN/VRC-74, while not a developmental item, is a new, low power, transistorized, single sideband radio which provides either voice or CW communication where direct line of sight is not possible. The division received an initial issue of 33 AN/VRC-74's in late 1966. Forty-five additional sets were received in December 1967. Each infantry battalion now has five sets, brigade headquarters two to four, and 1/9 Cav twelve.

(10) SS-11 Anti-Personnel (LMES) Warheads. A total of 50 SS-11 LMES warheads were issued for evaluation in February 1967. Twenty-six have been fired since the evaluation began in May 1967. One warhead was lost in a fire at 2/20 Artillery HP in September; another was found to be unserviceable and was turned in; one is still on hand at 2/20 Artillery. The remaining 21 warheads were destroyed in the fire which levelled the HP at LZ English in June. Results of the 26 firings have been submitted to USARV. The warhead has functioned well; unfortunately, 2/20 Artillery has not had the opportunity to employ it against troops in the open. The division has recommended that USARV conduct tests under controlled conditions to compare the effects of the LMES and SS warheads against personnel targets.

(11) Experimental Material Recoiling Device (Comox Puller). The 15th SOS 3d evaluated a light-weight, mobile device for loading, unloading, and moving Comox containers in forward areas. A final report was submitted to USARV in December.

(12) Cargo Restraint/Load Limiter. This was an experimental tie-down device for CH-47's. The 228th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion was issued 72 for evaluation during December 1967. The device proved to be too complicated and too time consuming for use on our CH-47's. The standard tie-down strap is more satisfactory for the type loads and short turns around times experienced in the 1st Cavalry Division CH-47 operations. A final report was submitted to USARV in January 1968.
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(1) Illuminates Runway Markers. Two sets were delivered to the 11th Avn Gp for evaluation during December 1967. Both sets were installed on the airfield at LZ English. The sets were easy to install, and training personnel for installation was not complicated. The major deficiencies noted were:

(a) The lights burned out quickly and could not be repaired.

(b) The lights could not be seen beyond two miles from the runway (five miles is required).

(c) The unipods broke and could not be repaired.

A final report on effectiveness and recommended improvements was submitted during January 1968.

c. Training

(1) Division Schools

Division Training Center. The division training center will remain at An Rho during Operation Job Stuart. During the past quarter a total of 5,507 officers and enlisted non attended replacement training; 124 division soldiers and 6 ARVN NCO's graduated from the Combat Leaders Course. Maj Andrew T. Ushua replaced Maj Christian D. Nebis as commandant of the division training center on 10 December.

(2) Non-division Schools

(a) Aviation. The division sent 177 personnel to Army Aviation Technical Assistance Program (LAEAP) classes at Vung Tau. Courses included aircraft supply; airframe, engine, and avionics maintenance. Twenty-seven aviators completed pilot transition courses on the AH-1G, Huey Cobra, at Bien Hoa, 80 crew chiefs and mechanics attended AH-1G engine, aircraft, and avionics courses.

(b) Recondo. Eight members of E Co, 52d Inf (MRP) attended class R-8-68 at the MACV Recondo School at Kontum during the quarter; six graduated. Eight are currently attending class R-10-68.

(c) Artillery Training. In January I ARMEX established a forward observer (FO) school at An Rho and a fire direction officer (FDO) school at Phuoc. Div Arty disbanded its own FO school and had planned to send all newly assigned FO's to the course at An Rho. This is being re-evaluated in light of the division's recent move to I CTZ. Div Arty will continue to train its own FDO's as it has in the past.

(d) Aviation Training

1. Pilot transition training on the OH-6A was conducted at An Rho under the assistant division aviation officer (ADO). A total of 39 aviators completed transition training on the OH-6A this quarter.

2. An OH-13 maintenance training team from 3/11 Helicopter Co conducted on-site training for personnel from 1/9 Cav and R/82d Arty. The training to date has been highly beneficial. By conducting the classes in the units' maintenance areas, the instructors can correct improper pride-of-place and improve the quality of organizational

(3) ARVN/NSF Training
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(a) Division CMIT/CQTT trained 34 Regional Force companies and 58 Popular Force Platoons. In December one CMIT was transferred from Phu Yen to Binh Dinh Province to train PF units guarding key bridges on QL1. This team is currently operating in Phu My District. On 21 January the CMIT and CNT originally assigned to Phu Yen Province were transferred to Binh Dinh Province. The division was not relieved of its CMIT/CMTT responsibilities in II CTZ when it moved to I CTZ.

(b) On 13 Dec a conference was held in Pleiku to evaluate the effectiveness of the CMIT/CMTT program. LTG Rosson, CG I FORSCOM, and LVO Vinh Loc, CG II Corps, were co-chairmen of the conference. MG Tolson and representatives from MACV, G-3 and the Division Training Center attended. Both US and Vietnamese representatives agreed that the program had been successful and should be continued. LVO Vinh Loc directed the Vietnamese division commanders in II Corps to provide terms similar to those already provided by US forces, in early 1968.

(4) M16A1 Rifle Training

(a) In view of the recent emphasis given the M16A1 rifle, the division training center now takes the following action to ensure that each replacement reports to the field properly trained and armed with a serviceable, zeroed weapon:

1. Requires each replacement to report to the training center with his assigned individual weapon.

2. Insures that each trainee zeroes and tests fires his assigned weapon.

3. Requires that each replacement has a copy of the "M16 Rifle Tips" card and that each officer and 300 has a copy of the "M16 FM Indicators" card.

4. Conducts two hours training for replacements on the care and cleaning of individual weapons in the field.

5. Instructs students attending the Combat Loaders Course in techniques of inspecting the M16A1. In addition, the 27th Maint Bn provides a maintenance contact team to inspect each replacement's weapon for serviceability and, if necessary, make repairs on the spot.

(b) All Publications has issued 15,000 copies of USARV Pamphlet 350-50, a reprint of a "PS Magazine" article on care and cleaning of the M16A1. An additional 10,000 copies have been issued to the division training center for distribution to replacements. The "M16 FM Indicators" card has been issued to all supervisory personnel down through platoon leader. "M16 Tips" cards have been ordered for all division personnel.

(5) USARV Training Seminar. The division training officer presented a 30 minute lecture on combat refresher training at the USARV training seminar in Long Binh on 29 November. Each US division gave a 30 minute talk on a particular phase of training in Vietnam. Topics included leadership training, replacement training, and mobile training teams.

f. Doctrine

The division processed the following documents this quarter:

(1) Drafted a Cav Circular on practice alerts at Camp Radcliff.

(2) Wrote a division SOP on handling and firing anti-personnel (Techwiz) ammunition.

(3) Wrote a division SOP on the techniques of controlling aerial rocket artillery (ARR).
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(4) Reviewed and submitted comments to USARV on ST 17-31-4, The Amored Cavalry Squadron.

(5) Reviewed and submitted comments to USARV on USACAID's proposed draft of FM 54-2, The Division Support Command.

(6) Reviewed and submitted comments to the US Army Aviation School on their proposed draft of ST 57-20-1, Air Movements Guide.

C. TOE/MJR Action

(1) NTOE for Non-Divisional Air Cavalry Squadrons. At USARV's request this division reviewed a proposed MOE for non-divisional air cavalry squadrons. USARV had considered standardizing all air cavalry squadrons in-country. The non-divisional MOE, however, cannot be applied to divisional squadrons. It includes additional administrative and support personnel not required by divisional units. In addition USARV requested our comments on a proposal to replace the wheeled vehicles in D Troop with M-113 personnel carriers. The division did not concur; this would seriously reduce the squadron's degree of airmobility. However, the requirement for a lightly armored, highly mobile, amphibious vehicle which can be transported by CH-47 helicopter remains valid.

(2) DA has approved the MOE for the air mobile infantry battalion and the air mobile 2nd artillery battalion. Implementing general orders have not yet been published.

4. Logistics

a. General: During the period 1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68 combat service support was provided initially for three major operations: Byrd, Pershing, and Wheeler/Wallowa. On 15 January the division was given the mission to redeploy its forces to Operation Job Stuart. The 1st and 3rd Brigades with their accompanying MSE's and the 3d FSE which supported the 2d BN, 7th Cav redeployed to the new area of operation during the period.

(1) The 1st Brigade was the first unit to redeploy from Operation Pershing to Operation Job Stuart, and was accompanied by the 2d FSE which moved with the brigade from 12 English by C-130 to Phu Bai air facility and then to El Paso. The brigade remained at El Paso from 17 to 19 Jan and then moved to Z12 El Paso on 21 Jan where it replaced the 2d FSE, in supporting the division base.

(2) The 3d Brigade deployed from Operation Wheeler/Wallowa to Operation Job Stuart, moving from El Baldy to Camp Evans with the Provisional FSE. The move was initiated on 24 Jan and the FSE became operational at Camp Evans on 31 Jan.

(3) In mid January the 2d Brigade assumed the responsibility for Operation Pershing and the FSE team at Z12 Uplift was moved hurriedly to Phu Bai. This move required immediate adjustment of FSE-FSA operations and redistribution of FSE personnel and equipment to provide continuous support of all units in the AO. The FSE headquarters is presently at Z12 Uplift with the personnel and equipment split between Uplift and English.

(4) The 2d BN, 7th Cav was relieved from responsibility of Operation Byrd and returned to division control Op Con 2d Brigade in Operation Pershing. The 2d FSE moved from Phu Bai to El Paso on 21 Jan where it replaced the 2d FSE in supporting the division base. When the division headquarters moved from El Paso to Camp Evans the FSE moved with DISMON to Phu Bai with the intent of subsequently moving to Camp Evans to combine with the Provisional FSE where it would support the 3d Brigade and the division base. However, before the move could be
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accomplished the tactical situation via the closed road making the move impossible and caused the FSB to remain at Phu Bai.

b. Major Problem Areas: During the period no major problems were encountered until the move to Operation Jeb Stuart was initiated on 15 January. Although the move had been planned and published as a contingency in OPLAN 37-67, the detailed planning by division units had not been completed. When the order to move was received, the extremely short notice time did not allow for further planning. The shortcoming in detailed planning was overcome by determined efforts on the part of all personnel in spite of numerous perplexing changes and unforeseen difficulties.

(1) The most immediate difficulty encountered upon arrival in the new AO was the absence of refuel facilities for helicopters. The PDL distribution system deployed with the first elements of the division, but it required two days to install the refuel point at LZ El June and hold in adequate quantities of JP-4. During the two day interim helicopter operations were severely limited because of the lack of fuel. A tactical emergency was declared and fuel was flown from Marine airfields until the organic facilities became operational.

(2) Another source of difficulty was caused by the shortage of trucks in the area. During Operation Perching, the division was augmented by an attached light truck company. With this attachment the division was able to adequately accomplish its local haul requirements; however, the truck company remained in the Perching AO leaving the division handicapped at the out post. This handicap was first felt when elements arrived at Phu Bai and sufficient trucks were not on hand to move troops and equipment from the airfield to the division base.

(3) The full impact of the shortage of trucks in the Jeb Stuart AO was felt when it became necessary to log trucks from division units to accomplish line haul of supplies into the division.

(4) Division reacted to the lack of sufficient transportation by controlling all available resources, both trucks and helicopters at division level, and through rigid and judicious management was able to get maximum utilization from what was available. In addition critically needed items of supply were brought in by air drop.

(5) A final difficulty which compounded the problems involved in the move to the new AO was the subsequent move of the division base from LZ El Paso to Camp Evans and the move of the 1st Brigade base from El Paso to LZ June and from June to LZ Betty. Each move delayed the support units of the division in becoming operational at their full capacity and greatly reduced the efficiency of organic support operations. However, because of the determined effort of all personnel and stringent management of resources, the fighting units of the 1st Cav received the support necessary to continue full scale offensive operations against the enemy.

5. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations: Efforts were directed toward support of combat operations in the Pershing AO, and continuation of civic action in the IAM.

6. Commander's Observations and Recommendations

a. Personnel: None

b. Intelligence:

(1) IDH: Interrogation of I/4's

DISCUSSION: The Vietcong do not classify inlaws as relatives.

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OBSERVATION: When questioning the Vietnamese about relatives, the interrogator must refer to in-laws as a separate group.

(2) ITEM: Interrogation of Communist Party Members

DISCUSSION: Communist party members always hold positions of trust in NVA units and can usually be expected to have more information and knowledge about operational units than other NVA.

OBSERVATION: Particular emphasis should be placed on Communist party members.

c. Operations:

(1) ITEM: Mechanized Operations

DISCUSSION: Units conducting mechanized operations in heavy vegetation should check the area thoroughly, especially tree lines and hedgerows, and zoom by fire whenever possible. Each track should have an M-79 grenadier assigned to it and should carry at least five M72 LAWs to clear bunkers. Tracks and dismounted troops should advance on line together. Bunkers must be destroyed or cleared as the unit advances. Enemy soldiers crawling in partially destroyed bunkers and trenches have waited until the assaulting unit was past, then surfaced and fired into the rear of it.

OBSERVATION: Tracks and dismounted infantry must provide mutual support. Bunkers, spider holes and other hiding areas must be cleared as the unit advances. A second assault line is often useful to clear these areas and allow the lead unit to continue its advance.

(2) ITEM: Combined Operations

DISCUSSION: ARVN units often lack a communications capability equal to our own. Many of them are not thoroughly familiar with US methods of operations.

OBSERVATION: US units conducting combined operations with ARVN units must insure through detailed, personal coordination that the ARVN units are aware of routes of movement, location of adjacent units, and fields of fire. Detailed coordination is essential for safe, successful combined operations.

(3) ITEM: Booby Traps

DISCUSSION: Mines and booby traps still account for a high percentage of US casualties. Units discovering new types of booby traps or new techniques of avoiding them must spread the word to adjacent units and higher headquarters.

OBSERVATION: The following techniques should be considered:

(a) A double point should be used whenever possible. Even in dense terrain it should operate a minimum of ten meters in front of the nearest troops. The point must be prepared to take cover immediately if a booby trap is tripped.

(b) A thin flexible branch, three or four feet long, can often be used to detect trip wires. The point man should carry it loosely with the tip close to the ground. When the branch contacts a trip wire it will bend without dislocating the wire.
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(a) Key personnel should be dispersed throughout the formation to prevent the loss of more than one should a booby trap be activated.

(b) The M26 grenade safety spoon makes a distinct sound as it frees itself from the grenade. Point men should be alert for this and similar warnings which may provide even a fraction of a second reaction time.

(c) Techniques of Movement

DISCUSSION: Experience has shown that the techniques prescribed in field manuals and taught at any service schools are valid. Most units which get into trouble have generally neglected these techniques due to carelessness or haste.

OBSERVATION: Commanders must continue to emphasize proper movement techniques. Double points should be used whenever possible. Faint security is essential even in rugged terrain. Units should move by bounds and change punching part of the force as a reserve. Commanders should refrain from and avoid rigid time limits to subordinate units. This often results in hasty and careless movement to the final objective or pickup zone.

(d) IMI: Techniques of Movement

DISCUSSION: Experience shows that the techniques prescribed in field manuals and taught at any service schools are valid. Most units which get into trouble have generally neglected these techniques due to carelessness or haste.

OBSERVATION: Commanders must continue to emphasize proper movement techniques. Double points should be used whenever possible. Faint security is essential even in rugged terrain. Units should move by bounds and change punching part of the force as a reserve. Commanders should refrain from and avoid rigid time limits to subordinate units. This often results in hasty and careless movement to the final objective or pickup zone.

(e) IMI: Police of Landing Zones

DISCUSSION: The engine on a CH-54 helicopter failed just as it landed in a forward LZ. Cause of failure was a foreign item which had been ingested into the turbine. The helicopter had just delivered a 105mm howitzer. Had the failure occurred during landing, the results would have been disastrous.

OBSERVATION: Units must continuously insure that landing zones are policed prior to the arrival of cargo helicopters.

(f) IMI: 4.2 Inch Mortars for Base Defense

DISCUSSION: The acquisition of 4.2 inch mortars by 1/9 Cav significantly increased the fire power available for base defense of the Two Bits complex. Their fires were used to supplement M-42 "Duster" and 81mm mortar fires in the nightly interdiction of known enemy approach routes into the Two Bits/Bong Son area. They also provided an immediately responsive means of support for combat patrols and ambushes operating in the Two Bits' base defense area. They were used extensively to supplement artillery interdiction of the "W Valley" area (northeastern Cuy Giep). Finally, they offered an alternate source of illumination that could be most important during the rainy season. These weapons were obtained on a 90 day loan. The division has no intention of submitting a TOE change request, because the 81mm mortar is more suitable for normal operations. However, since the 4.2 has proven so useful for base defense, a request is being prepared for special authorization to retain it on temporary loan for this purpose.

OBSERVATION: AB 310-34 authorizes units to draw special items of equipment on temporary loan for 180 days. One extension of 180 days may be authorized on each loan. Units should take maximum advantage of this procedure rather than submit NPR for special items of equipment.

(g) IMI: Utilization of Aero Scout and Aero Weapons Helicopters.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

DISCUSSION: The division's air cavalry squadron regularly used its armed weapons teams (red teams) for wide-ranging reconnaissance on the perimeter of the division's AO. The OH-4 helicopter due to its greater power and heavier armament in better suited for reconnaissance in rugged, mountainous terrain where enemy base areas generally exist. The OH-13 scout helicopter, is used primarily in the lowlands and in populated areas where its low speed, excellent visibility and excellent maneuverability are used to maximum advantage.

OBSERVATION: Air cavalry commanders must consider the performance characteristics of their aircraft when planning reconnaissance missions.

(3) ITEM: Tracked Vehicles for D Troop, 1/9 Cavalry

DISCUSSION: The wheeled vehicles currently authorized in the ground cavalry troop of the air cavalry squadron are basically road-bound in Vietnam. This division stated a requirement in 1966 for a lightly armored, highly mobile, amphibious personnel carrier which can be transported by CH-47.

OBSERVATION: This requirement is still valid. Vehicles such as the M116 should be considered for field test in Vietnam.

(3) ITEM: Reduction in Artillery Ammunition Expenditures

DISCUSSION: Division Artillery was tasked to reduce ammunition expenditures in the Pershing AO in November to 75-80% of the expenditure for October. This was accomplished. The reduction amounted to 25.3%.

OBSERVATION: It is significant that no mandatory reduction of ammunition expenditure was imposed by this headquarters. Reductions were realized as the normal result of a directed, formalized targeting sequence and skilled utilization of target gathering agencies already existing or available to the division. It is not possible to quantify completely the effects of reducing ammunition expenditures. It is possible to state that, during the month, the reduction did not significantly alter the favourable ratio of combat power which this division enjoyed over the enemy in the Pershing AO. Div Art will continue to improve its planned fire programs. However, the monsoon season may make it necessary to increase planned artillery fires to compensate for reduced mobility and limited air operations. Enemy activity may increase. It is impossible to predict whether the current rate of expenditures can continue without a tactical gain for the enemy. Further reductions are not considered warranted at this time. Rather, expenditures should be based on valid intelligence related to enemy action and/or intentions.

(10) ITEM: Mine Sweep Techniques

DISCUSSION: Lengthy deliberate mine sweeps (in excess of 5 miles) are mentally and physically tiring to sweep team personnel.

OBSERVATION: When employing a deliberate mine sweep in excess of 5 miles, three teams should be committed and rotated frequently along the route of the sweep.

(11) ITEM: Availability of Gunships

DISCUSSION: The division's aviation group has consistently been unable to provide sufficient gunships to meet division requirements. Division aviation battalions are authorized only 12 gunships to support 60 lift ships, the ratio in the 1st Aviation Brigade is 24 gunships to 69 lift ships.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

OBSERVATION: This division is preparing a request for MTOE to provide additional gunships in the assault helicopter battalions.

(12) ITEM: Combat Assaults

DISCUSSION: Experience has shown that maintaining a tight formation during the enroute flight affords better control. Routes to the LZ should be curved instead of straight to allow the flight leader a greater margin for adjusting his timing and spacing. Marking rounds should be placed downwind from the LZ and left or right of the flight path to permit the pilots to maintain good visual contact all the way to the ground. Aircraft should be spaced 15 seconds apart to ensure fast, efficient unloading on one-ship LZ's.

OBSERVATION: The techniques discussed above are considered critical in planning and executing combat assaults particularly on one-ship LZ's. Commanders should continually emphasize them.

(13) ITEM: Night Illumination During Tactical Emergencies

DISCUSSION: During two tactical emergencies in December employing CH-47 aircraft, supported units failed to provide continuous illumination. Apparently ground units feel the only time a pilot needs illumination is on short final. This is erroneous. Illumination also provides a safety margin by outlining high terrain in the immediate area. Intermittent lighting is an added hazard, because the human eye cannot respond to rapid changes. Continuous light is the safest means of illumination.

(14) ITEM: Fire Power Coordination in Multi-Unit Operations

DISCUSSION: During the 6 December contact on the Dong Son Plain (Battle of Tam Quan), one infantry battalion commander was placed in control of all maneuver units; in conjunction with that, his artillery liaison officer was placed in control of all fire support in the area, and of the observers on the ground. This led to a maximum of confusion and errors and a maximum safe utilization of fire power means.

OBSERVATION: When elements of two or more battalions are in close contact with the enemy force, the liaison officer attached to the maneuver commander in charge of the situation must be the only fire support coordinator for the action. He must be collocated with the maneuver commander and must insure that the forward observers are aware of company boundaries and fire coordination lines.

(15) ITEM: Compensatory Use of CS and Artillery

DISCUSSION: During the 6 December contact, bunkercitch complexes were attacked by first delivering a short, but heavy-volume artillery preparation, followed immediately by a CS attack by JMB. After giving the gas a few minutes to take effect, another heavy preparation, using fuse quick and fuse WP, was fired catching numerous enemy out of their holes attempting to avoid the gas.

OBSERVATION: The use of CS in conjunction with artillery appears to be an effective technique. Its use should be considered for future operations.

(16) ITEM: Necessity of Heavy Artillery Coverage

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

DISCUSSION: Prior to the 6 December contact vicinity BS 9166, A/7/15th Arty, an 8-inch battery stationed at LZ English, had been retooled with 175mm tubes and displaced from the Pershing AO, leaving only B/7/15th Arty to provide 8 inch support in the entire Pershing AO.

The decision was made to split B/7 by leaving two howitzers at LZ Uplift, and move the other two into A/7/15th Arty's old position at LZ English. The two guns were actually on the road when the contact broke out; however, firing was delayed for several hours while the guns moved into position and were readied to fire. The need for an entire battery of 8-inch guns was apparent, but this could not be provided without leaving the southern half of the Pershing AO without 8 inch support. As it was, contact was made in the southern portion of the AO on 14 December, and the two 8-inch guns at Uplift were used extensively.

OBSERVATION: Eight-inch artillery support must be available throughout the area of operations. The "moving battery" concept, whereby an 8-inch battery is displaced from fire base to fire base depending on firepower needs, is not an acceptable solution because of the delay inherent in the move. Timely fires are often the determining factor in a battle. It is imperative in the Pershing AO under present circumstances that at least two battalions of 8-inch howitzers be available for support, one north of the Bong Son River and one south of it.

d. Logistics

(1) ITEM: Ammunition Handling Safety

DISCUSSION: Supply personnel were transporting packaged 81mm mortar rounds from issue point to firing point. It was assumed that the ammunition was in its original packing with all safety devices properly installed and could be handled as desired. As one box was being placed in the ammunition storage bunker at the firing point it exploded and simultaneously detonated the other rounds in the bunker. Results: three US KIA and six WIA. Upon investigation, removal of unexploded rounds from their containers revealed that safety pins were missing from the fuses. Rough handling, in this case, caused the round to arm and additional rough handling caused it to detonate.

OBSERVATION: All mortar ammunition must be inspected at the ASU before it is issued. If the seals are not intact the individual rounds must be inspected to insure that safety devices are in place and that the rounds are try and serviceable. Particular attention must be paid to ammunition which has been back hauled from units in the field. All ammunition which has been issued must be thoroughly inspected before it is reissued.

(2) ITEM: Hook Damage

DISCUSSION: A CH-54A had its cargo hook damaged while picking up a 155mm Howitzer. The swinging hook rode contact with the howitzer with such force that the mechanical release was extensively damaged. The hook would no longer function, therefore the use of the CH-54A was lost for the duration of the mission.

OBSERVATION: Hookup crews must grasp the hook while completing the hook-up so as to prevent the swinging hook from striking the piece of equipment to be transported. Maximum care must be devoted to hook-up procedures and deter all attempts to place the claw on a swinging hook.

(3) ITEM: Transportation for Line Haul of Supplies to the FSA's.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

DISCUSSION: When the division moved into I CTZ sufficient trucks were not available to haul supplies to the division. To overcome this critical situation trucks were levied from the subordinate units to help bring in supplies. This impaired the operations of the units and supplies remained at a critically low level.

OBSERVATION: Trucks must be prepositioned by the logistical support agency to haul supplies to units when they arrive in the area.

(4) ITEM: Pre-positioning of Essential Supplies

DISCUSSION: In preparation for the contingency plan OPLAN 37-67 arrangements were made for the pre-positioning of ammunition at Phu Bai and Quang Tri. However, when the division base moved to Camp Evans and the road was closed between Phu Bai and Camp Evans by enemy action this stockage was of no use. The stockage at Quang Tri was not adequate for the whole division and transportation was not available to haul it to the FSL's.

OBSERVATION: Prior to the movement of a brigade or larger size unit into a new area, critical supplies (ammunition, POL, and rations) must be pre-stocked and provisions made for getting them to the FSL on a timely basis.

(5) ITEM: Placement of Material Handling Equipment (MHE) to Support Large Scale Moves

DISCUSSION: On the air movement to the new AO large quantities of general cargo was shipped on pallets. Much of this cargo was essential equipment which was needed immediately upon arrival. However a great deal of difficulty was encountered at the air field because of non-availability of forklifts and even more difficulty was encountered at the new base camp for the same reason. In the ASP at Camp Evans again there was no MHE for unloading ammunition.

OBSERVATION: In a move which involves bulk cargo MHE must be moved prior to the cargo or pre-positioned to facilitate air field clearance and destination off loading.

(6) ITEM: Preparation of Loading Plans

DISCUSSION: Many units prepared loading plans and submitted movement plans accordingly, but when they arrived at the departure airfield they had larger quantities of equipment than they had requested transportation for. This caused movement schedules to be adjusted and generally created delay and confusion of the entire operation.

OBSERVATION: Units must prepare accurate loading plans and stick to them.

(7) ITEM: Establishment of Movement Priorities

DISCUSSION: Many units moved by air various items of non-essential gear such as furniture, refrigerators, showers, etc. This misuse of air transportation caused other operational essential items to be delayed in movement.

OBSERVATION: Commanders of all units must insure that all non-combat essential gear is placed in the load tail and only combat essentials are moved by air. Priority list must be made and adhered to.
SUbject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1966

(8) ITEM: Use of CH-47 Helicopters for Airfield Clearance

DISCUSSION: When units arrived at Phu Bai Air Facility much of the equipment such as howitzers and bundles of ammunition were pre-rigged for sling out. Had a CH-47 been available these combat essential items could have been moved immediately to position. As it was the sling rigged bundles were extremely difficult to handle with fork lifts and trucks.

Mules which were combat loaded offered the same difficulty. They had to be unloaded by hand, the contents placed on trucks, and the mules themselves placed on trucks by hand. Had a CH-47 been available they could have been slung or carried internally to position.

OBSERVATION: In tactical moves use of CH-47 helicopters should be planned for moving certain combat essentials from the arrival airfield to the combat position.

(9) ITEM: Unit Marking of All Equipment

DISCUSSION: Some units experienced difficulty in identifying their equipment when it arrived in the new area. This was particularly true of Conex containers and other look alike items.

OBSERVATION: Each unit must have a distinctive mark which is clearly visible on all items of equipment.

(10) ITEM: Advance Parties

DISCUSSION: Many units arrived without knowing where to go or what to do when they arrived. This caused a large amount of confusion at the airfield and at the new base.

OBSERVATION: Every effort must be made to get advance parties from each unit into the new area early, with transportation and communications.

(11) ITEM: Transportation for Airfield Clearance

DISCUSSION: In support of the move into the Phu Bai area, III MAF tasked subordinate Marine units at Phu Bai to provide 20 trucks for arrival airfield clearance. On the first day of the move thirteen (13) trucks showed up and on subsequent days various other reduced numbers of trucks were provided. The reduced amount of truck transportation was not adequate to accomplish airfield clearance in a timely manner.

OBSERVATION: When a large unit moves into a new AO the headquarters to which it is Op Con must provide sufficient transportation to move the unit from the airfield to its base.

(12) ITEM: Location of Division Maintenance Battalion

DISCUSSION: When the division moved from El Paseo to Camp Evans the 27th Maintenance Battalion remained at Phu Bai. Shortly after the move the road between Phu Bai and Camp Evans was closed because of enemy action. This has separated the division base and all three brigades from the maintenance battalion severely limiting the capability of the battalion to maintain the vehicles of the division.

OBSERVATION: Whenever the division moves the 27th Maintenance Battalion must move close to be in a position to provide proper maintenance support to all units.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(13) ITEM: Rigging of Airdrop Loads for Expeditious drop zone clearances

DISCUSSION: The most rapid and efficient method of clearing heavy drop bundles from the drop zone is by use of the CH-47 helicopter. The 1st Cavalry Division frequently used this method in receiving supplies at Camp Evans. However much time was lost once the bundles landed in rigging then for sling out. If the bundles were pre-rigged prior to drop, the personnel on the DZ would only have to remove the parachute and attach the sling to the hook on the helicopter. The same sling would be used for both the parachute and the helicopter.

OBSERVATION: Resupply bundles should be rigged for helicopter sling out prior to drop, attaching the parachute to the same sling that will be used for sling out.

(14) ITEM: Air Movement of Supplies

DISCUSSION: Containers which are not properly mounted on Air Force pallets or exceed maximum take weight, cause unnecessary delay in aircraft loading.

OBSERVATION: Commanders must insure proper loading and palletizing of containers through close supervision and inspection of loads.

(15) ITEM: Fragmentation of Medical Companies During Out-loading

DISCUSSION: Fragmentation of medical units during outloading operations cuts unit effectiveness and causes loss of time in the accomplishment of medical missions.

OBSERVATION: Medical companies should not be fragmented during out-loading.

(16) ITEM: 6,000 lb Rough Terrain Forklifts

DISCUSSION: The 3,000 lb forklift organic to the 1st Cavalry Division has an unacceptable service lift for normal FSE operations. The 6,000 lb rough terrain forklift is ideal for FSE operations and is transportable by C-130.

OBSERVATION: All 3,000 lb forklifts in the FSE’s should be replaced by 6,000 lb forklifts.

(17) ITEM: Placement of Parachute Rigger Detachments at Each FSE

DISCUSSION: Parachute rigger detachments at the FSE’s greatly facilitate sling out operations and assist the units in forward areas in the retrograding of air delivery equipment.

OBSERVATION: Rigger detachments should be made a normal part of the FSE organization.

(18) ITEM: Efficient Maintenance of Aircraft Records

DISCUSSION: Unit maintenance personnel are not maintaining aircraft records in accordance with procedures outlined in appropriate publications. This causes the Direct Support Unit to expend an excessive number of manhours in correcting forms and records.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

OBSERVATION: Unit maintenance personnel should be instructed as to the importance of maintaining correct aircraft forms and records. Maximum command emphasis should be devoted to this subject.

(19) ITEM: TOR-29-87T

DISCUSSION: Forward Support Detachments are continually called on to provide recovery services for 2½ and 5 ton trucks, and to change major assemblies in these vehicles. Based on these requirements, the 3/4 ton wreckers now authorized in the Forward Support Detachments are inadequate. Detachments "A" and "C" presently continue to use 5 ton wreckers, which are hand received from Headquarters and Main Support Company.

OBSERVATION: Experience to date has illustrated the inadequacy of TOR 29-87T to provide effective recovery and lift capability in the Forward Support Detachments. This problem has been fully justified and a 2½ ton wrecker along with trained operators have been requested in TOR 29-87T dated 20 October 1967.

(20) ITEM: Ration Requests

DISCUSSION: Units are not reporting changes in personnel strength as they occur. As a consequence, variations in requirements, not previously known by Class I personnel, result in unnecessary overages or shortages in rations. This is particularly true when units are preparing to move to new base areas, and during the initial occupation of these areas.

OBSERVATION: Strength changes for Class I purposes must be kept current with the FSE. Units should report operational attachments not included in the Morning Report in order to expedite the processing of ration requests.

(21) ITEM: Handling and Supply of Barrier Material

DISCUSSION: Prior to August 1967, all barrier material used in divisional units in an area was received directly from Qui Nhon by the Division Class II & IV yard. All issues of barrier material were made to units from the Class II & IV yard and to satisfy stockage requirements, it required a large storage area within the II & IV facility. Coordination was made with the 540th Engineer Co, AREA for the support of all barrier material and to eliminate existing stockage requirements.

OBSERVATION: Currently, all barrier material, for use in the TACR other than the heavy timber, i.e. 4x4 and larger, is requisitioned from the 540th Engineer Company for issue to units within the division. For those items not stocked at the Class II & IV, i.e. 4x4 timber and larger, requests are forwarded by Class II & IV, to the 540th Engineer Company for issue and pickup by the unit. The system now utilized has proven to be beneficial to the division in that the number of days of supply on hand at the Class II & IV yard has been substantially reduced and storage space is being effectively utilized for other resources.

(22) ITEM: Dirty LZ's

DISCUSSION: Dirty landing zones continue to be hazardous for aircraft, crews, and ground personnel. Items of debris noted are empty sandbags, empty C-rations cartons and empty cargo nets.

OBSERVATION: Repeated emphasis must be placed on keeping landing zones well policed. Safe and timely recovery by air is dependent upon the absence of debris on landing zones.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(23) ITEM: Refueling Delays

DISCUSSION: Fuel management is a vital aspect of the CH-54A mission. As the load weight is increased the fuel load must be decreased proportionately. Refueling with hand nozzles at locations such as Dak To and LZ Baldy requires the aircraft to shut down, thereby greatly increasing refueling time.

OBSERVATION: At least one pressure refueling nozzle should be located at all major refueling areas to expedite refueling for CH-54A aircraft.

(24) ITEM: CH-54A Mission Performed

DISCUSSION: On 31 December 1967, the 478th Aviation Company accomplished another first for the CH-54A. As a test, two 105mm Howitzers were rigged and strapped side by side and lifted successfully in one combined lift. On 21 December 1967, 478th Aviation Company recovered two (2) UH-1s in one combined lift.

OBSERVATION: The results of this test indicate that it is feasible that one CH-54A could lift three 105mm Howitzers with basic loads of ammunition. UH-1s rigged and strapped side by side can be efficiently air lifted for retrograde movement.

o. Civil Affairs

(1) ITEM: Selective mistreatment for interrogation purposes.

DISCUSSION: In some cases innocent civilians have valuable intelligence but are hesitant to divulge information when extracted individually from an area because they are easily identified once they return.

OBSERVATION: Where possible it is better to extract two or three persons in a group to provide anonymity to that person inclined to give information.

(2) ITEM: Rice Storage

DISCUSSION: Province decrees the amount of rice people can store in their homes. Dissemination of this decree is extremely slow, especially outside areas under firm GVN control. This results in confusion among the local populace and causes ill feeling when rice above allowable limits is taken.

OBSERVATION: Although dissemination of such decrees is a GVN responsibility, US units should help, especially in contested areas. GVN officials can make tapes and prepare texts for leaflets which are then put out by US means.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

[13 Inclosures]

US Army

CONFIDENTIAL

11. Civil Affairs
AVFA-GC-OT (17 Mar 68) lst Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 RCS CSFGR-65 UIC NAGEAA lst Cav Div (AM) (U)

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 19 APR 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

Concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES F. GASTON
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
2 - ACSFOR, DA, Wash DC 20310
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 15 ADP 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comment follows: Reference item concerning tracked vehicles for D Troop, 1/9 Cavalry, page 20, paragraph 6c(8). In March 1968, USARV submitted an ENSURE request for two prototype armored assault vehicles (aerial) for evaluation. The first vehicle is scheduled to arrive in RVN in October or November of this year, and the second within six months afterwards. Both vehicles are slated for the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). There is a good possibility that this vehicle will meet the division requirements for a cross country vehicle in the ground cavalry troop.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ I FORCEV
HQ 1st Cav Div (AM)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 January 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 APR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Agt AG
Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1966

1. Morale throughout the division and attached elements remained excellent.

2. Decorations and Awards: (Awarded)
   - Medal of Honor: 0
   - Distinguished Service Cross: 9
   - Silver Star: 134
   - Legion of Merit: 9
   - Distinguished Flying Cross: 185
   - Soldier's Medal: 17
   - Bronze Star w/W: 344
   - Bronze Star (Notorious): 975
   - Air Medal w/W: 64
   - Air Medal: 1215
   - Army Commendation Medal w/W: 344
   - Army Commendation Medal: 1495
   - Purple Heart: 448
   - Combat Infantry Badge: 1499
   - Combat Medical Badge: 106
   - Aircraft Crewman Badge: 104

3. Special Services: During the reporting period, 165 movies and TV shows were circulated throughout the division. 5 USO shows were presented to the troops. 414 out-of-country and 999 in-country quotas for R & R were used.

4. Postal Services: Postal activities for the reporting period were as follows:
   - Money Order Sales: NVAL
   - Postal and Parcel Post Fees: NVAL
   - Incoming Mail: 181 tons
     - Daily Average: 61.2 tons
   - Outgoing Mail: 239 tons
     - Daily Average: 7.9 tons
   - Number of Incoming Mail Days: 88
   - Number of Outgoing Mail Days: 21

5. Financial Services:
   - No specific items are noted based on operations during the reporting period.
   - Highlights during the period:
     - Finance Forward PaydayTeams have proved useful and feasible here. Teams were sent to LZ Baldy and to the Dak To area during the quarter. They delivered payrolls to unit agents to pay and accepted turnbacks in the field. In January, from the 16th through the 18th, $154,000 was issued to 26 agents and 23 agents turned payrolls back in the field. This saved agents "back to base camp in most cases.

6. Chaplain Activities:
   - (a) In a tactical move it was necessary to bring enough supplies and equipment to the office so the office can operate for long periods of time without re-supply, also, there is little time for church activities.
   - (b) Lessons learned for the period is that the building of permanent or semi-permanent chapel structures or the concept of air mobility has to be re-evaluated.
SU~CT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
Inclusion 3: Development and Maintenance of Morale

7. Medical
   a. Injury and injury per statistical data:
      (1) Injured as a result of hostile action (IHMA) 1255
      (2) Hostile injuries 532
      (3) Disease 1274
         a. Malarial Fever
            i. Vivax 105
            ii. Falciparum 159
         b. Scrupt Typhus 17
         c. hookworm 7
         d. Psychiatric cases 31
         e. Animal Bites 11
         f. Hepatitis 31
         g. Dengue Fever 2
         h. Others 1403
      (4) Killed in Action: 264
      (5) Remaining in Hospital: (In-country) 911
   b. Discussion of Diseases:
      (1) Malarial cases: The division had a total of 264 cases of malarial during the period, 1 November 67 through 31 January 1968 inclusive. This compares favorably with the 418 cases for the previous period. Of the 264 cases, 104 were due to Plasmodium vivax.
      (2) Experience gained for the previous quarters indicates that the malarial season in the Central Highlands ranges from March through November with a peak during the period of April through July.
         a. Discussion of IHMA, WIA, and NHI
            (1) KIA/LHA ratio 89/455 or 1/5.11 was different from the ratio 1/4.87 observed in Korea.
            (2) Types of IHMA’s: During the reporting period 18 pungi strike wounds occurred compared to 86 for the last reporting period.
            (3) NHI: The total number of non-hostile injuries for this period was 141.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

1. The Information Office continued to increase its service to the world's press and division troops during the reporting period. The following is an analytical breakdown by function:

a. The Information Section operated forward press centers during the following operations:

- **Pershing:** 11 Feb 67 - 21 Jan 68
- **Byrd:** 26 Aug 66 - 21 Jan 68
- **Wallowa:** 1 Oct 67 - 24 Jan 68
- **Job Stuart:** 22 Jan 68 - continuing

b. The Information Section continued to place emphasis on hometowners both in radio and newspaper form:

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<tr>
<th>1955</th>
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<tr>
<td>1855</td>
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- **Troop Topics** emphasizing 1st Cavalry accomplishment were published each week and command information brochures were distributed on the following subjects:
  1. Artillery Officers Course (2 Nov)
  2. Con Men, Marijuana, and Ecstasy (9 Nov)
  3. Veterans' Day Message (10 Nov)
  4. Educational Opportunities (10 Nov)
  5. Veterans' Day Message (16 Nov)
  6. Enemy Force Strength (14 Nov)
  7. Police Recruiting
  8. Vietnamese New Year (TET) (14 Jan)
  9. Reenlistment Benefits (11 Jan)
  10. Uniform Services Pay Act 1967 (18 Jan)

- One hundred and sixty-two (162) newsmen visited the division during the reporting period. They represented the following agencies:
  - Fairfiel Daily Ledger
  - NAPO-10
  - USARV-10
  - 5th PID Television
  - Contact Magazine
  - Norden News
  - Phillipino Herald
  - Okinawa Morning Star
  - Troy Daily News (Ohio)
  - Washington Post
  - ATO
  - New York Times
  - Australia TV News
  - CBS
  - CNN News
  - BBC
  - Overseas Weekly
  - Time
  - Radio
  - Reuters
  - German National TV
  - French Press
  - Newsweek
  - AP
  - Smithsonians Institute
  - Overseas Weekly
  - Boston Advertiser

- The radio section produced the following news stories, interviews, and editorial support, during the reporting period:
  1. Number of news stories (i.e., news copy) aired over AFRS An Kho totaled 978. Section SOP calls for two newscasts each day at 0605 and 1905. 1st Air Cavalry news headlines are aired at 2305.
  2. Number of taped interviews aired over AFRS An Kho during the period totaled 161. The interviews are usually featured during our local newscast. Nineteen (19) were sent to AFVN Saigon.
SUWOCT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

Inclusion 4: Office of Information and History

(3) Continued to provide AMVN Qui Nhon and Hue with war reports, news stories, taped interviews, Camp 'A's, entertainment activities and slides.

(4) Number of regular taped hometown interviews sent to Hometown News Center, Kansas City totaled 1046.

(5) Continued to provide two newsletters each day totaling 194 newsletters for the period.

(6) Continued to provide, up to 20 January 1968, AMVN An Hue with 3 radio announcers each day giving the division approximately 14 hours of local broadcast time daily. AMVN Saigon provided the other 10 hours to complete the broadcast day. During the local time periods the announcers provided musical entertainment, local weather, information and news programs with emphasis on division policies.

7. The Photo Section of the Office of Information and History was responsible for taking and developing 7571 prints and making 27456 prints from selected negatives.

8. The Military Press Section, in addition to supporting with stories and editing, was responsible for the release of 704 stories and features during this reporting period, many gaining recognition in national papers such as the New York Times, Stars and Stripes, Chicago Tribune, Denver Post, Houston Chronicle, San Francisco Chronicle, Minneapolis Star, Louisville Courier-Journal and the Miami Herald.

9. Provided a report to USARV to publicize the role of the Army Aviation in Vietnam.

10. The publishing of the Cavalier in Tokyo at Stars and Stripes.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

Inlosure 5: Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order

1. Military Justice
   a. General Courts Martial: 10
   b. Special Courts Martial: 69
   c. Summary Courts Martial: 12

2. Inspector General Activities: No significant trends in complaints and or requests were revealed.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
Inclosure 5: Operations and Training Organization

1. On 11 November, 1/12 Cav OPCON to the 1 ACD in the Dazzlem TAOR, was placed OPCON to the 4th Inf Div in the MacArthur AO. The 2/5 Cav assumed the tactical mission in the Dazzlem TAOR.

2. On 13 November, the 1st Bde was placed OPCON to the 4th Inf Div in the MacArthur AO. Maneuver Bns OPCON to the 1st Bde in the MacArthur AO were the 1/12 Cav 2/8 Cav.

3. On 25 November, the 1st Bde (with 2/8 Cav) OPCON to the 4th Inf Div in the MacArthur AO, remained in the Pershing AO.

4. On 9 December, TF 1/12 Cav which had been OPCON to the 4th Inf Div in the MacArthur AO, returned to the Pershing AO, placed OPCON to the Ist Brigade.

5. On 20 December, the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Detachment (Provisional) was officially redesignated as Co C, 527 Infantry (Long Range Patrol) and was assigned to the Ist Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

6. On 17 Jan 68, 1/12 Cav was relieved by the 3/503, 173 Abn Bde in the Dazzlem TAOR. 1/12 Cav returned OPCON 1st Bde.

7. On 26 January, the 1st Bde displaced by 0-130 to the Job Stuart AO. 19 January, 1st Bde task organization: 1/5 Cav, 1/8 Cav, and 1/12 Cav.

8. On 21 January, 1 ACD assumed control of operations in the Job Stuart AO. The 2d Bde (2/5, 2/8, and 1/50) became OPCON to Field Force V and remained in the Pershing AO.

9. On 26 January, the 1/7 Cav which had been OPCON to the 3d Bde in the Wallowa AO, became OPCON to the Ist Bde in the Job Stuart AO.

10. On 27 January, the 1/501, 101 Abn Div became OPCON to 1 ACD in the Job Stuart AO.

11. On 26 January, 5/7 Cav was released OPCON to the Americal Division in the Wallowa AO, arrived in the Job Stuart AO and was placed OPCON to the Ist ACD.

12. On 26 January, 5/7 Cav was released OPCON to the Americal Division in the Wallowa AO and became OPCON to the 1st Bde. 1/501 Abn Division became OPCON to the Ist Bde. The 2d Bde 101 Abn Division initially consisted of Ist Bn 501 Abn and 2d Bn 501 Abn.

13. On 27 January the 1/502d was placed OPCON to the Job Stuart AO. The 902d was later placed OPCON to the Ist Bde.

14. By 31 January the alignment of maneuver Br's in the Brigade of the 1 ACD was as follows:

   a. 1st Bde
      1/12 Cav
      1/8 Cav
      1/5 Cav
      1/502 Abn

   b. 2d Bde
      1/501 Abn
      2/501 Abn

   c. 3d Bde
      2/12 Cav
      1/7 Cav
      5/7 Cav
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

Inclusions: Supply and Services

1. Class I Activities
   a. During the period 60,096 meals of Long Range Patrol Rations were issued to divisional units.
   b. Ice cream in the quantity of 8,520 gallons was shipped to LZ Uplift and LZ English.
   c. During the period 7,288 tons of rations were issued to divisional units.

2. Class II - IV Activities
   a. Division received 4,370 chrome-shafted M-16 rifles for direct exchange during the reporting period.
   b. Thirty-six M-102 (105mm) howitzers were received by the division for direct exchange.

3. Class III Activities
   a. A total of 590 fuel samples were analyzed during the period, of these 351 were on grade, 127 not the use limits, and 102 were off specification. No significant problems exist in fuel quality and sampling which will impair the operational capability of the division.
   b. During the period 20 lifelines were received, processed, and shipped to divisional units for a total of 60 tons.

4. Class V Activities
   a. Ammunition continued to be available in adequate quantities to meet the division needs, but due to eleven items on the ASN careful control had to be maintained.
   b. Class V personnel of the 15th Supply and Service Battalion assisted the EOD in the destruction of unservicable ammunition.
   c. During the period 26 pre-USMID INS inspections and 31 courtesy inspections were conducted.

5. Food Service Activities
   a. During the period liaison visits and advisory visits were conducted at mess halls in the forward areas and base camp.
   b. Pre-USMID INS inspections were conducted on 16 mess halls within the division.

6. Aerial Supply Activities
   a. Aerial equipment support personnel continued to provide rigging support at the forward supply point, to include inspection, recovery, and classification of slings and other aerial delivery items.

7. The following supplies were issued to division units:
   a. Class I: 7,595 tons
   b. Class II & IV: 8,745 tons
   c. Class III:
      (1) AVGAS: 459,000 gal
      (2) JP-4: 6,713,200 gal
      (3) HOGAS: 2,423,625 gal
      (4) DF-2: 2,931,475 gal
   d. Class V: 31,771 tons

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

Enclosure 8: Transportation and Maintenance

1. Transportation
   a. Air transportation. Significant movement during the period 1 November 1967 - 31 January 1968 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ORIGIN</th>
<th>DESTINATION</th>
<th>CARGO LBS</th>
<th>PASSENGERS</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>1-11</td>
<td>1st Cav</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>QNH</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>1-11</td>
<td>1st Cav</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>C7A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CB</td>
<td>5-11</td>
<td>11th Avn Gp</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>CHU</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>5-11</td>
<td>2/5</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>ANG</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>13,600</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>5-11</td>
<td>1/12</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>11-11</td>
<td>1/12</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>KAK</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>138,600</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>11-11</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>KOM</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>19,600</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>14-11</td>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>KOM</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>481,600</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>14-11</td>
<td>15th CT</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>KOM</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>109,000</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>23-11</td>
<td>15th CT</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>4-12</td>
<td>34 Bde</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>CHU</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>6-12</td>
<td>15th S &amp; S</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>CHU</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>16,450</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>7-12</td>
<td>2/12</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>ANG</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>51,600</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>23-12</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>CHU</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>23-12</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>GRB</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>28-12</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>79,180</td>
<td>527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>28-12</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>BSK</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>40,540</td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>29-12</td>
<td>1st Cav</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>BSK</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>20,500</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>30-12</td>
<td>1st Cav</td>
<td>ANK</td>
<td>BSK</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>9,200</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Airlift utilized to move division elements from the Pershing and Byrd LoS and from An Khe to the Job Stuart A0:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TOTAL SORTIES</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>AV DAILY SORTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phu Oc</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17 Jan</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Khe</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>17-29 Jan</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>17-26 Jan</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phan Thiet</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>19-22 Jan</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- SEA (USAF) airlift and C7A courier services.
  1. A daily courier service by C7A aircraft was maintained throughout the period to division forward areas. A C7A flight was operable between An Khe, Phu Bai and Quang Tri.
  2. A total of 11 daily passenger/cargo flights were scheduled to An Khe by the SEA airlift service. C-130 Medevac service was available on call.

d. Ground Transportation. The division was supported by the 541st Transportation Company (light trucks) until the move to the Job Stuart A0. The loss of this support has caused a critical shortage of transportation within the division.

2. Maintenance, Ground
   a. Vehicle road side spot checks in both the base camp and forward areas were conducted prior to the move but have been suspended temporarily in the new A0.

   b. Vehicle maintenance capability in the Job Stuart A0 is limited because the 27th Maintenance Bn is separated from the division base and the forward units and the road has been closed by enemy action.

   c. The division GMX Team in conjunction with the Inspector General's Office conducted courtesy pre-AGI-GMI inspections in preparation for the USAF AGI. These inspections were discontinued upon movement to the Job Stuart A0.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1965

Incorporation of Transportation and Maintenance

3. Aircraft Maintenance
   a. The following number of aircraft by type have been removed from accountability during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A/C Type</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CH-135</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-59</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. The following number of aircraft by type have been removed from stock or other categories during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A/C Type</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CH-135</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-6A</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-1C</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-1H</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-59</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OV-1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-6A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. End of reporting period statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A/C Type</th>
<th>Proc. Hours (%)</th>
<th>Av. MH/HR (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CH-6A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-135</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-1H</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report To: Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

1. A proposed base development plan for Camp Radcliff was prepared listing camp real estate assets, requirements, and deficiencies. The plan was prepared on the assumption that Camp Radcliff unit strength would remain the same. With the relocation of major elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division in and consolidation of rear detachment elements in Camp Radcliff under the Division CO, and installation coordination responsibility was transferred to the CO, an Ech Sub Area Command, 1st Marine Support Command, 1st Logistical Command on 19 January 1968.

2. The camp Radcliff base development planning board — with the CO, an Ech Sub Area Command, installation coordinator presiding — met on 26 January 1968 to consider the proposed base development plan in view of the displacement of major division elements. Requirements for construction and administrative structures were reviewed. Requirements for utilities remained the same.

3. Construction projects underway at Camp Radcliff during the relocation of division elements were continued. These included 2 hangars on the Golf Course, and a parachute maintenance shed (for the 173rd Abn Eq). At the 7th Army Airfield, construction included the main taxiway, relocating the airfield access road; enlarging and improving the parking area.

4. Consolidation of 1st Air Cavalry Division rear detachment elements at Camp Radcliff was accomplished from 22 to 30 June 1968 by physically relocating these sections into combined areas. For example, all rear elements of the 11th Lvn Gp, including the group headquarters, the 227th, 228th, and 229th AB's and the 11th G.S. Co moved into what had been the 228th AB area.

5. A physical inventory was conducted on 28 January 1968 by the 1st Air Cavalry Division G-4 facilities officer and a representative of the 1st Marine Division (REIN) to determine quantities of real estate assets located at Camp Evans. The following assets were occupied by the 1st Air Cavalry Division and were received for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSET</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16'x64' Southeast Asia Type Hut</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16'x32' SEA Hut</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16'x16' SPA Hut</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16'x64' Strongback Tent Frame</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16'x32' Strongback Tent Frame (inc 511 tent frames unserviceable)</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Hole Latrine</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120x120' Banker</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30x20' Banker</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24x12' Banker</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 Man Standard Type House Hall</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16'x32' Maintenance Shed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16'x18' Generator Shed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16'x60' Chapel</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90', 3 Leg Observation Tower</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10', 4 leg Tower for 3,000 Gal Water Tank</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

Inclosure (0): Civil Affairs

1. Population & Resources Control
   a. Operation Dragnot continued with good results.
      The 222nd MIPF Battalion remained with the Division in the
      Pershing AO conducting joint operations with the 545th Military Police
      Company and the 1st and 2nd Brigade. Tabulated results for
      Nov-Dec appear below.

      | Item               | Quantity |
      |--------------------|----------|
      | Enemy KIA          | 29       |
      | Enemy POW          | 43       |
      | Houses Searched    | 8484     |
      | GP's               | 170      |
      | FP's               | 107,834  |
      | Weapons            | 18       |
      | Documents          | 35-5 in  |
      | Amm - 1306        |          |
      | Med Supplies       | 2 lbs    |
      | Mines and Grenades | 64       |
      | Rice               | 38,900   |
      | TNT                | 6        |

   b. Rice Harvest Control: Harvest in the AO was completed about
      15 Dec 67. Efforts were directed at coming up with a solution for rice
      storage in contested areas. On 27 Nov the Province Chief decreed that
      people in contested areas can keep 12 kilos of milled rice per person per
      month until the next harvest season. A joint letter by the Province Chief
      and CG 1st AC Cav Div was forwarded to IFF recommending a program be
      worked out to compensate people in contested areas for rice taken from
      them. Planting for the spring harvest began in Phu Pho District.

   c. There were virtually no refugees created during the period.

   d. During the period 181,825 lbs of rice were captured of which
      167,545 lbs were evacuated and distributed in GVN controlled areas,
      mainly to refugees in I Corps.

2. Revolutionary Development: 2nd Brigade continued providing
   a protective outer shell for the 12 MC Teams conducting pacification
   programs in Phu My District. Nine RD Teams were received by Phu
   My District in early January with an additional team to arrive after TET.

3. Civic Action:
   a. 550 MEDCAPS were held treating 28,489 patients.
   b. In early December 1967 the 1st ACD SJA was appointed a
      Foreign Claims Commissio with authority to adjudicate all non-combat
      claims not in excess of $1,000.00 value. This greatly expedited process-
      ing of minor claims and proved to be an effective means of restoring good
      will with the local peasants after they suffered losses from non-combat
      incidents.
   c. Two holidays were celebrated during the quarter: National
      Day on 1 Nov and Christmas. The 1st ACD sent a marching unit, the Mv
      Band, and a civic action display to Qui Pho to participate in the former
      and over 20 parties were held in local hamlets and refugee camps during
      the latter holiday.
   d. Construction of four dispensaries commenced in Heai Duu
      Village, Heai Pho District. All school projects initiated in the Pershing
      AO by the 1st ACD were completed.
   e. The 'n Trung High School is now approximately 80% completed.
      A number of the G-5 staff remained in An Kho to supervise completion of
      this project.
   f. All other incomplete projects in both the TAOR and AO were
      turned over to the local MACV Advisory Teams or locally stationed US units.
   g. Civil Affairs Team #14 reverted back to the 41st CA Company
      when the 1st ACD moved into I Corps. The 9th ACD (Provisional) from
      the 39th CA Company was attached to the 1st ACD upon arrival in I Corps.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

Enclosure 10: Civil Affairs

There was no participation by units of the Div in Tet celebrations because of the move to the new AO and intense VC/NVA activity; however, three thousand toys, fifteen hundred Tet envelopes and one-hundred and fifty pounds of candy will be distributed in hamlets near Phuoc Binh Headquarters in early February. These Tet activities will include participation by the District Chief or his representatives.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

Inclosure II: Psychological Operations:

1. General
   a. 45,325,000 leaflets were dropped and 204 hours of taped aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were recorded. Eleven VC/NVA rallied to elements of the divisions, and most were exploited by making tapes, and producing special leaflets which included their photographs and handwritten messages.
   b. One Armed Propaganda platoon of 27 Ho Chi Minh was received into the division during December, and the men dispersed to units of the 1st and 2nd Brigades and 1st Squadron 9th Cav.
   c. Christmas carols were broadcast over GVN controlled areas on Christmas day, using 1,000 watt heliborne loudspeakers.
   d. A significant event was the rallying of three NVA in the 506th Valley after the Second Brigade Psyops Field team made a heliborne loudspeaker appeal over a contact area, giving specific instructions on how to rally.

2. Programs and Themes:
   a. Programs
      (1) Anti-Vo tax
      (2) Give Allied Forces information
      (3) NVA hardships
      (4) Use National Safe Conduct Pass
      (5) General Chieu Hoi Appeal
      (6) What ‘Open Arms’ means to you, fighter of the front.
      (7) Weapons/information reward
      (8) Do not harbor VC
      (9) NVA cadre do not trust VC soldiers
      (11) Curfew on the waterways
   b. Posters and leaflets developed
      (1) Leaflets on the Hoi Chahhs messages
      (2) Weapons captured in Battle of Tam Quan
      (3) Highway Safety
      (4) VC terrorism in Trung Thanh Hamlet
   c. Tapes Used:
      (1) Don’t harbor VC
      (2) Curfew on the waterways
      (3) Anti-tax and food collection
      (4) Appeals by Ho Chi Minh to their units
      (5) JUSPAC tape
   d. Chieu Hoi Program:
      (1) During this period, eleven VC/NVA rallied to the division.
      (2) Ho Chi Minh were exploited for psyops by map recorded message appealing to their comrades to rally to the GVN, and by leaflet messages with the same appeals.

3. Equipment and support:
   a. The Ist Cav Div received support from the 8th Psyops Bn in the form of leaflets, posters, and tapes.
   b. The 9th Air Commando Squadron continued air support with the O-2B and C-47 aircraft broadcasting loudspeaker messages and leaflet drops.
   c. Heliborne 1,000 watt loudspeakers were employed by the Brigades for population control and broadcasting Chieu Hoi appeals in support of ground operations.
   d. A test of the effectiveness of US Air Force loudspeaker broadcasts using the O-2B aircraft was conducted on 26 Dec 67. As a result of the test, the Air Force agreed to lower its present minimum altitude of 3,000 feet to a more effective level, the altitude to be determined after further tests have been conducted.
## Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (U)

**Experiences of Unit Engaged in Counterinsurgency Operations, 1 Nov 67-31 Jan 1968**

**CG, 1st Cavalry Division (AM)**

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**ABSTRACT**

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