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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade (Lt) (Sep), Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 199TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP) (LIGHT)
AFO San Francisco 96279

AVBH-MH 18 February 1968

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

THRU: Channels

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development
   Department of the Army
   Washington, D.C. 20310

The Operational Report - Lessons Learned of this headquarters for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968, is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15 and USARV Regulation 870-2.

ROBERT C. FORBES
BG, USA
Commanding

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SECTION I OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

A. (U) COMMAND:

Brigadier General Robert C. Forbes continued to command the 15th Infantry Brigade until his departure on leave 15 January 1968. Before his departure for the United States for 30 days, General Forbes officiated at the formal dedication ceremonies of the brigade base camp, Camp Frenzell-Jones, near Long Binh, Vietnam. The base camp is named for two men, former members of the brigade, who were killed in action. The commanding general unveiled a plaque outlining the heroic action of these two young men. Upon the departure of General Forbes, the Deputy Commanding Officer, Colonel Frederic E. Davison, assumed command.

B. (C) PERSONNEL, ANNEX A:

The total assigned strength of the brigade decreased by 187 personnel, showing the unit to be operating at 102% of its authorized strength. Infusion continues to eliminate rotational humps in this unit and other units throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The command presented 432 awards in this period, including 3 Silver Stars. Rest and recuperation leaves were taken in-country by 165 men, with 983 going outside of Vietnam for their leaves. The brigade enlistment rate was well above the Department of Army goals.

C. (U) For intelligence activity, see ANNEX B.

D. (C) OPERATIONS, ANNEX C:

The brigade main base remained at Long Binh and Operation FAIRFAX was continued throughout November. In December the brigade began a withdrawal from the Operation FAIRFAX mission and to phase into the Operational areas of MANCHESTER, UNIONTOWN/STRIKE and UNIONTOWN I. With the termination of the commitment in FAIRFAX, training assistance and logistical support of the Vietnamese Army 5th Ranger Group was also terminated. RF/FF training support continued at the Thu Duc Infantry Training Center (ARVN). Three HAT teams and one Impact Team supported Gia Dinh. The brigade deployed to 3 fire support bases with battalion size task forces, each having a direct support artillery battery. During December the brigade was reinforced by elements of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division, 25th U.S. Infantry Division and the Vietnamese 2d Marine Battalion for operations in the MANCHESTER area. Large VC base camps were located and an increase in the numbers and volume of enemy contacts was experienced through December and January. Large quantities of Viet Cong and Chinese Communist weapons and supplies were captured in the new area of operations. At the end of January the VC/NVA launched coordinated rocket, mortar and ground attacks on a number of South Vietnamese, U.S. and allied
installations. Elements of this brigade engaged enemy units within 20 minutes of the truce breaking initiation of action by these enemy units, resulting in 538 VC KIA (BC) and 116 VC KIA probable during the first 14 hours of fighting.

E. SUPPLY OPERATION, ANNEX D:

During November and December, the truck platoon attached from the 48th Transportation Group (MT) displaced the forward brigade elements from GIA Dinh Province to Camp Frenzel-Jones for a three day refit period. The 7th Support Battalion conducted inspections and issued supplies where necessary. When the units were redeployed to a new area of operations, the brigade assumed responsibility for coordination of all aerial resupply. The 7th Support Battalion assumed responsibility for operating the departure airfield. Air Force airdrop was utilized to develop a 2,000 round stockpile of 155mm artillery ammunition. The 40mm Grenade ammunition for the grenade launcher was used quite successfully in the heavy jungle of the new area of operations; the 40mm HE round could not travel far enough to arm itself resulting in a very high dud rate. The brigade received 2500 M16A1 rifles to replace the M16E1. Rations are now being drawn direct from the 506th Field Depot, resulting in fresher chill items. Normal resupply and maintenance activities presented no significant difficulties. Base camp construction is progressing satisfactorily.

F. CIVIC ACTION, ANNEX E:

During the month of November, the brigade completed its efforts in area of operation (AO) FAIRFAX. Cooperation from civilian personnel for the civic action program continued at a high level, and self-help projects were successful due to the supervision exercised by the battalion S5 staffs. In December, after moving into the MANCHESTER and UNIONTOWN AOs, Government of Vietnam (GVN) and civilian participation in the civic action effort was limited to providing organizational and technical aid. For example, the Christmas Party at LOC Lai Refugee Hamlet, Ho Nai Village, was organized with the assistance of the priest who cares for the people there. Coordination was completed between
brigade and battalion S5 staffs and GVN officials. During January, the brigade set to work in its assigned areas, establishing permanent MEDCAP sites, aiding refugees arriving without food supplies, and providing quick-reaction emergency relief of affected facilities in TÀY Hài Hamlet, HO Hài Village, after a MiG F5 jet crashed into their hamlet. Psychological operations continued at a high level during the past quarter. The month of November was devoted to continued support of the Chieu Hoi Campaign; six leaflets were developed and 2,500,000 of these disseminated. During December, efforts were directed at the support of the combat battalions in the new AO. Saturation drops of Chieu Hoi and quick-reaction leaflets were laid on over two kinds of targets: population centers and known Viet Cong concentrations. January was a month of consolidation of effort; the battalion and brigade S5 staffs coordinated closely to exploit Viet Cong weaknesses learned during the previous month. On a cordon and search operation in PHU GL6 District, BÌNH DUONG Province, the people were made aware of the need to support the GVN. The PsyOps used there was directed to their needs and concerns, and is assumed to have been successful as the citizens provided the Military Intelligence Detachment with valuable information, even after having lived under Communist rule for some time. The Tet Campaign was also placed into operation, with the dissemination of 3,262,000 Tet leaflets and the announcement of Tet greetings to the civilian population as well as to the friends and employees of the brigade. The Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) declined in scope during and after the Brigade moved into its new AO. During November the permanent MEDCAP sites established in AO F.FUHAX were gradually turned over to the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) 5th Ranger Group. December was a month of re-organization; the research of needs and abilities. During January, the MEDCAP program was re-established in the battalion and headquarters areas of MANCHESTER and UNIONWOOD; 2,996 patients were treated.

G. (U) MEDICAL SERVICE, ANNEX F:

In this period the total number of quarters beds has dropped from 58 beds to 25 beds. The number of Front Line ambulances has decreased from 34 to 25 in the month of January. The battalion aid stations continue to give local area medical support. The battle casualties have shown a marked increase in gunshot wounds. The incidence of skin disease has had a marked drop. Diarrhea increased due to an episode of food contamination. Malaria chemoprophylaxis now includes a daily Dapsone tablet to prevent Falciparum malaria. Medical supply inside the brigade has been good but supply outside the brigade presented some problems which we could not solve. Civic Action Medical Programs have dropped markedly due to a change in operational areas.
H. (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, ANNEX G:

In the period 1 November through 31 January, 1965, this command paid $2261.35 in personal property claims and the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate handled 295 legal assistance cases. The command tried 17 cases by Special Courts-Martial. Disciplinary action has been taken under Article 15, UCMJ, in 138 cases.

I. (U) PUBLIC INFORMATION, ANNEX H:

The period 1 November through 31 January has witnessed an increase in the detachment's activities. The areas of improvement include the Hometown News and Picture Release program. In addition, news releases have increased, but are restricted because of the classification of brigade combat operations. All units of the brigade have cooperated in accommodating Public Information personnel who have worked with individual units. Recommendations have been made to realize closer liaison with brigade units for increased Public Information Office coverage and for improvement of the photo sections capabilities.

J. (C) PROVOST MARSHAL, ANNEX I:

The operational control of the Provost Marshal has been greatly expanded and now has the additional responsibility of operating a Security Guard Platoon. With the change in the operational control of the Brigade Main Base (BNB) guard force have come many improvements in the overall physical security and law enforcement programs within the BNB. The relocation of the Military Police Checkpoints and the construction of a stable perimeter has brought many additional apprehensions especially in the possession of marijuana. This improvement has resulted in a more efficient and thorough crime prevention program. The establishment of a central Detainee Collection Point has greatly improved the overall system of the processing and securing of detainees. The forward battalions no longer have the responsibility of processing these personnel but merely insure that they are returned to the collection point in the BNB. Military policemen are present in many of the forward areas to assume the securing of such individuals. Convoy are now provided with a Military Police escort to enhance security and control any traffic problem. Convoy are moving in a more expeditious manner and are not getting tied up in congested and populated areas. The BNB establishment of a static guard force at the BNB has improved the reaction time during an alert and has insured that the sentinels are properly trained in their duties. This improvement was due to simple consolidation and operation under a single head. The Criminal Investigation Detachment has taken a more aggressive role in the prevention of crime.
and the gathering of information to prosecute all offenders.

K. (C) SIGNAL, ANNEX J:

The communications effort of the Brigade was completely removed from FAIRFAX AO and transferred to AOs UNIONTOWN/MANCHESTER/COLUMBUS. The primary brigade-level means of communications in OPN FAIRFAX was radio relay from which telephone and teletype-writer service were derived.
SECTION II  PART I
OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

A. (U) SUPPLY

1. Item: Coordination of helicopter resupply.

   Discussion: When several units are being resupplied by helicopter from a common pickup zone to several landing zones, the operation must be centrally controlled. A coordination meeting is held each night for the next day's operation. At this meeting, representatives from all units involved are present, and problem areas are discussed. A schedule of sorties is determined to ensure priority lifts arrive when needed.

   Observation: This procedure has resulted in a much smoother operation. All units are fully informed, and are able to plan the use of their limited sling gear to a greater extent. It also allows better consolidation of partial unit loads and better utilization of loading zone and landing zone personnel.

2. Item: Centralized control of pickup zones/landing zones.

   Discussion: When several units are being resupplied by helicopter from a common pickup zone to several landing zones, the operation must be controlled by one designated unit at each point. The pickup zone and the several landing zones all operate on the same radio frequency, as well as having artillery control monitors on the same frequency.

   Observation: With a designated unit responsible for each pickup/landing zone, everyone using the facility is aware of whom the point of contact is, who will control operations and solve problems attendant to the operation. With all parties on the same frequency, everyone is fully aware of the current situation and the aviation unit supporting the operation has fewer problems communicating with the landing/pickup zones and the artillery control personnel.

3. Item: 40mm Cannister ammunition for the M-79 grenade launcher.

   Discussion: During operations in dense jungle terrain and when targets are obscured, the weapon-target distance may not be great enough for the 40mm HE round to arm itself. An increased allocation of 40mm Cannister rounds was requested and received for the units operating in this type of terrain.

   Observation: The 40mm Cannister round has proved much more effective in jungle terrain. This item should be made available in greater quantities for units operating in close terrain so that it may be used as the primary ammunition of the 40mm grenade launcher (M-79).
4. **Items:** Air drop of supplies.

**Discussion:** When a large immediate stockage of ammunition or other heavy or bulky items is required, Air Force assistance via heavy cargo air drop has been used. Due to the criticality of CH-47 (Chinooks) it was decided to build-up a stockage of 155mm ammunition by use of Air Force C-130 air drop.

**Observation:** This procedure is extremely effective for build-up of supplies in areas of poor or non-existent ground lines of communications (LOC's) and air heads. However, additional personnel must be provided to the receiving unit to assist in rapid recovery of air items to preclude mission interference of the receiving unit.

B. (U) CIVIC ACTION

1. **Item:** The S-5 staff ought to be encouraged to attend Vietnamese activities and festivals at both the civic association and hamlet/village levels as often as practicable.

**Discussion:** The events available to the S-5 staff at both the association and hamlet/village levels are beneficial in two ways. They broaden the participants' knowledge of Vietnamese customs and manners and they provide a conference site for the exchange of ideas on the practical workings of the pacification effort.

**Observation:** Judicious presence of brigade personnel should be permitted at activities and festivals, a number of the S-5 staff should be consulted to explore unfavorable aspects on an individual function basis.

2. **Item:** Maintenance of standby emergency supplies.

**Discussion:** On 11 January 1968, a MiG jet crashed into the hamlet of THI HAI, THI HAI Village, killing 9 persons and injuring 26, all from 15 families. In addition, the homes of the 15 families were either extensively damaged or completely destroyed. The S-5 staff arrived at the scene of the tragedy and aid the families in taking the wounded to hospitals, directing family members to hospitals to identify the dead, and providing food and blankets for the emergency comfort. A number of hours were spent gathering canned goods and blankets from various sources at Camp Pringle-Jones.

**Observation:** It is advantageous to maintain a supply of canned goods and blankets at the Brigade S-5 or other central
location to be easily available in the event of emergency or disaster.

3. **Item:** An interesting program featuring entertainment and refreshments ought to be provided villagers during cordon and search operations.

**Discussion:** On 10 January 1963, this Brigade conducted a cordon and search operation at Dong S.C Halet, Anh Ha Village, Phu Giao District, Minh Duong Province. The villagers were conducted to a collection point in an open clearing, where they were interrogated and provided a MEDCAP. After five hours in the sun and in an abandoned school building the people grew restless. They read the leaflets provided them with interest, but afterwards desired to go back to their homes, which were then being searched by the Vietnamese National Police and U.S. M.Gs.

**Observation:** If possible, PsyOps activity in the form of entertainment and the distribution of small quantities of food and/or refreshments ought to be arranged during cordon and search operations.

4. **Item:** Establishment of permanent MEDCAP dispensaries

**Discussion:** When this Brigade moved into AO Manchester Uniontown from Gia Dinh Province, the accepted thought was that permanent dispensaries would be immediately established by headquarters and the subordinate battalions. The battalions, however, moved their base location a number of times during the first month in the new AO, and the S-5 staffs were not situated in one place long enough to organize an effective program. In January, semi-permanent MEDCAP dispensaries were established in four locations, which have become effective and popular in the village and surrounding areas. They will be maintained barring relocation of the brigade itself.

**Observation:** Permanent MEDCAP dispensaries ought not be established until the battalions are situated in at least a semi-permanent location.

C. **MEDICAL SERVICE**

1. **Item:** On 25 December 1967 men in the brigade developed symptoms of food poisoning.

**Discussion:** Food was carefully prepared on a large scale in unit mess hall for a Christmas dinner. There was no contamination due to good supervision. After the food was brought to the field, it was removed in part from the insulated food
containers and placed in large open trays, especially the cornbread stuffing. Operational necessity precluded immediate serving.

Four to six hours after the food was served the men began to develop nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and headaches. These symptoms resolved in 24 hours. Of the 69 men who became sick, 53 were hospitalized. Bacterial cultures indicated contamination of the triad of turkey, gravy, and cornbread dressing with a Staphylococcus aureus exotoxin.

Observation: Despite pressure in the rear mess hall, good food handling techniques were utilized. But in the field, due to a combination of inexperience and equipment shortage food distribution was below standards. If qualified non-commissioned officer had been available to be in attendance in all of the field locations this problem could have been completely avoided.

2. Item: The number of patients seen in the Medical Action Program dropped to a total of patients seen in this quarter which was less than the number seen in one month of the previous quarter.

Discussion: In this quarter a total of 26,988 patients were seen by the brigade in comparison to 30,017 seen in the month of October. Several of the causes behind this change cannot be altered. The brigade cannot give large operational areas with a high density of Vietnamese population for an extended period of time to any infantry battalion. This precludes setting up regular fixed dispensaries scattered out in such an area. Indeed, much of the area invested by the battalions recently has been devoid of civilian population. The ability to establish fixed dispensaries near the brigade base camp is limited due to the amount of time spent in the field by the battalion surgeons. But areas near Camp Frantzoll-Jones could be assigned to the infantry battalions, and assistance given to assure that a suitable fixed installation in the area be found for those with their aid. Attempts made in the area have not been great success due to the discovery of several units already "MEDCAPed" those areas. Better coordination with higher headquarters would hopefully avoid this problem.

Observation: The total number of people seen in our Medical Action Program would increase if the infantry battalions could be provided fixed areas near Camp Frantzoll-Jones which, due to prior coordination, would be "MEDCAPed" only by them.

D. (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

Item: Military Justice Administration.

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Discussion: Due to the fact that Special Court-Martial jurisdiction is exercised at battalion level where there is a lack of qualified courts and boards personnel to properly supervise the preparation and processing of charges and records of trial, many technical errors occurred in the trial of cases by special courts-martial. Such errors sometimes resulted in reversals of convictions or modifications of sentences imposed. In an attempt to alleviate this situation, it is now required that all charge sheets and allied papers be referred to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate for clearance before referral to trial by courts-martial. Completed records of trial must also be cleared through the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate before the convening authority takes action on the record. This latter procedure allows for technical errors which occur during the proceedings to be purged by recommending that the convening authority reassess the sentence in light of such errors.

Observation: Institution of this screening procedure has improved the administration of military justice within the command by assuring that the accused's rights and the government's interests are properly protected in the processing of charges.

E. (C) SIGNAL

1. Item: The Brigade Tactical Operations Center (TOC) should have a separate Switchboard to terminate all point-to-point and special purpose circuits.

Discussion: when the Brigade TOC was located at Cat Lai, all circuits were terminated in individual telephones. Since the terminations were not under the direct control of the communications personnel, checking and troubleshooting circuits presented a continuous problem. Terminating the circuits directly into instruments also limited their accessibility. Upon displacement of the Brigade TOC to Camp Frenzell-Jones, all point-to-point and special purpose circuits were terminated in a 33-36 Switchboard.

Observation: The termination of all point-to-point and special purpose circuits into a TOC Switchboard has resulted in:

a. Minimum outages due to continuous communications checks.

b. Better quality circuits due to continuous monitoring.

c. Better service because these circuits are available to more individuals.
2. **Item:** Logs should be maintained on all radio relay systems.

**Discussion:** Radio relay systems are checked by having periodic system alignment, then conducting an audio check on each channel. This method of monitoring could not forecast outages and when outages did occur it could not rapidly isolate the problem. To augment the above check, a system log was initiated. This log required the hourly check of selected meter readings for each radio relay system. The trends noted on these readings when compared to the applicable Technical Manual would indicate possible deterioration of the system. Corrective action would be taken on the possible problem area before it could cause a prolonged system outage.

**Observation:** The utilization of radio relay system logs have minimized outages due to equipment trouble.

3. **Item:** Infantry Battalion MI radio command nets should operate on a decade channel (XX.XO mHz) below 51.90 mHz.

**Discussion:** The FAC aircraft and AC-47 aircraft (Gunship, Flare Ship) have the old family series of MI radios, i.e., AN/PRC-37. They are compatible with the new family of MI radios on decade channels below 51.90 mHz with the new family of MI radios Model "OLD SQUID". Due to the limited number of MI radios available in the battalion to operate on different frequencies the battalion command nets have been assigned frequencies that are compatible with the old family of MI radios.

**Observation:** The battalion and rifle company commanders can now communicate on a common frequency with the Forward Air Controller (FAC) who controls the Close Air Support aircraft or directly to supporting AC-47 aircraft. This procedure facilitates operations and the exchange of information since the maneuver commander does not have to switch to the FACs frequency.
SECTION II, PART II: RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. (U) CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. The S-5 staff ought to be encouraged to attend Vietnamese activities and festivals at both the civic association and hamlet/village levels as often as practicable.

2. An interesting program featuring entertainment and refreshments ought to be provided during cordon and search operations.

3. Permanent MEDCAP dispensaries ought not be established until the battalions are situated in at least a semi-permanent location.

B. (U) MEDICAL SERVICE

1. It is recommended that a qualified non-commissioned officer with a cook's MOS be placed in each forward mess area.

2. It is recommended that a fixed dispensary site be provided for each infantry battalion in the area of Camp Fronzoll-Jones which is not being "MEDCAPed" by another unit.

C. (U) STAFF JUDGES 

Commanders at all levels re-emphasize the necessity of expediting the processing and forwarding of court-martial charges and the necessity of reducing periods of pretrial confinement of accused.

D. (C) SIG: That all supporting aircraft be retrofitted with FM radios that are completely compatible with the new family of FM radios.
PART III: SUPPORT TO LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS

4. (C) OPERATIONS

1. (C) Organization and Training:


(1) The new HUMINT 7-157E for IRP Detachments was published on 5 Oct 67 and disseminated in January 1968. While it makes no change it implements the airborne operational and personnel requirements.

b. Training:

(1) Personnel in the Long Range Patrol Detachment have received specialized training in map reading, repelling, intelligence, first aid, immediate action drills, communications and other related fields.

(2) Team loaders, assistant team loaders and selected individuals receive further training at the H&CV RECONDO School when spaces are available.

(3) Physical training in new techniques is continuous, emphasizing the team and the development of team SQT's.

(4) Experienced personnel are used to instruct in such fields as artillery, Forward Air Control procedures, intelligence, medical training and wire tap devices.

2. (C) Techniques and Employment

a. Teams are given one of two missions or a combination of both.

(1) The first is to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of an area or location by actively patrolling or by remaining in one location for a given period of time ranging from 24 to 96 hours.

(2) The second is to conduct night ambushes in areas where routes are known and when the Viet Cong have set patterns of traveling in small two or three man groups. The duration of this type mission is usually 24 to 48 hours.

b. A technique used is to insert two teams into adjacent AOs. Each team then actively patrols its AO during daylight hours. They then link up prior to darkness and establish an ambush for the night. This gives the team greater staying power in the event of contact with the Viet Cong elements.
c. Some of the means of insertion are night infiltration by foot from a secure location, stay behind patrol, helicopters, seaplanes, and boats, APC, or a combination of these.

3. (c) Losses Learned

a. Each after action report submitted by a returning team includes techniques used, comments for future evaluation and possible employment and the lessons learned.

b. Teams must be alert at all times to insure their given mission is accomplished.

c. When claymore mines are used, personnel must take precautions to prevent the enemy from tampering with them. Such precautions include placing H-14 anti-personnel mines around the claymores. Luminous tape placed on the back of the claymore mine also helps the team observe any tampering which might occur.

d. Although the primary mission of the LRP remains to conduct surveillance, teams have been given interdiction and fixing missions. The most important factor of this type employment is the ability to reinforce the LRP element in contact.

e. Many times when interdiction and fixing missions are assigned to the LRP, two teams are combined to make one (1) "heavy" team. Additional equipment will include one (1) H-60 MG which is not normally carried by a single team. Although the MG adds weight and bulk to the amount of equipment carried, the advantage of the added firepower greatly out weights these shortcomings.

f. Gunships have, in the past, proved to be invaluable in supporting teams in contact. One of the most valuable uses of gunships is to provide a base of fire for teams breaking contact and for coverage of landing zones during emergency extractions.

g. Prior to insertion, it is extremely advantageous for the team leader to make an aerial reconnaissance of the intended area of operation. This flight provides the team leader with first hand, up to date knowledge of the terrain, lines of communications, landing zones and both man made and natural obstacles. With the above knowledge, the team leader is able to conduct exact planning, concerning areas and points of interest.

h. Experience has shown that either foot infiltration or stay behind insertion is the most secure and therefore the most desirable method of introducing a team into its area of operation. The use of helicopters to insert a team into an area should be limited to areas where foot infiltration or stay behind insertions is not feasible due either to the distance involved or the
tactical situation and disposition of friendly troops.

1. Communications with employment teams is one of the greatest problems we face. Radio relay teams are located with the nearest friendly elements in the area of operation. Because of the jungle terrain, this solution is at times inadequate. The use of an aerial relay is most desirable but extremely difficult to procure. The brigade is expecting to receive a balloon in April 1968 to serve as an aerial relay. The 9th Infantry Division presently has such a balloon which is being used very effectively.

j. LRP teams should be OPCON to the Brigade versus one of the battalions. The Brigade is infinitely more responsive in employing Light Fire Teams, Artillery, dust off and possibly ready reaction forces to reinforce teams in contact or follow up developing situation.

4. (U) Conclusions

a. The LRP teams have been invaluable in providing early warning. Teams committed just prior to TET holiday season were instrumental in the reporting of large troop movements in the Brigade area of operation. During the battle of 31 January 1968, the LRP teams were responsive in keeping the Brigade informed of the enemy's attempts to first infiltrate then reinforce and later withdraw from HO HAI Village, Vic grid 0812.

b. The LRP resources continue to be one of the Brigade's most valuable intelligence gathering media, and have firmly established themselves as the eyes and ears of the Brigade Commander.

c. Air assets for insertions, support, and extractions, continue to be a problem. The 71st LRP Detachment, during the periods of employment, should have 2 UH-1D slicks, 1 UH-1D C & C ship and 1 LFT on a stand-by basis. Those ships would be used to insert teams, to assist teams in contact, and for planned or emergency extractions.

B. (U) MEDICAL SERVICE

Until the middle of January the 71st LRP detachment relied upon the headquarters medical section for medical assistance. It was then placed under the control of the 7th Support Battalion. They were provided with medical classes on the basic medical problems to be expected in the field. Also, medical supplies, including morphine and codeine for each team were provided. Local medical care in Camp Frenzell-Jones was provided as needed.

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 17 MAR 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGO(DST), APO 96375

Commander, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This command has reviewed the attached ORLL of the 199th Infantry Brigade (SEP) (LIGHT) and concurs with it.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

E. M. McGRATH
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 28 MAR 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Light) (WFBDAA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning maintenance of standby emergency supplies, page 8, paragraph B2: Concur. Although relief support of Vietnamese civilians is the responsibility of GVN and provisions for use of military supplies for emergency and disaster relief are made in MACV Directive 500-1, the response time through these channels is not sufficient in situations such as the case cited. Low level stockage of emergency supplies to handle immediate needs until requests can be processed through emergency channels is desirable. A staff study is being prepared recommending authority for low level stockage of emergency relief supplies down to divisions and separate brigades.

   b. Reference item concerning a program featuring entertainment and refreshments provided villagers during cordon and search operations, page 9, paragraph B3; and page 13, paragraph A2: Concur. Entertainment and refreshments establish good rapport between the unit and the people and foster a cooperative attitude among the villagers. In addition, these programs contribute to control of the people and prevent interference with the tactical operation.

   c. Reference item concerning Infantry Battalion FM radio command nets, page 12, paragraph E3; and page 13, paragraph D. All aircraft of this command are equipped with, or are being retrofitted with, the ARC-54 FM radios. This set has a frequency range of 30.00 to 69.95 mhz and nets with the VRC 12 series FM radios. Specific reference is made to FAC and AC-47 aircraft page 12, paragraph E3 which are Air Force aircraft. Until such time as the Air Force procures the ARC-54 or similar FM radios to net completely with the VRC 12 series, it appears that the 199th Brigade has taken appropriate action to insure communications with Air Force aircraft providing support.

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10 Applies
AVHGC-DST (18 Feb 68) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
G. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
HQ, II FFORCEV
HQ, 199th Inf Bde (Sep)(Lt)
GPOP-DT (18 Feb 68) (U) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 199th Inf Bde (Sep)(Lt) for Period
Ending 31 January 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558  23 APR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference page 8, paragraph B1; the relaxed atmosphere during various
activities serves as an excellent backdrop for free informal exchange of
ideas and the promotion of understanding. The word of caution under
"Observation" is well taken.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

CL SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
ANNEX A (C) PERSONNEL

1. (C) PERSONNEL:

a. Strength:

(1) The strength of the brigade decreased by a total of 187 personnel. During November 1967, 870 officer and enlisted replacements were received by this command to offset the loss of 775 personnel. During December 1967, the command received a total of 157 personnel and experienced a loss of 168 personnel. During January 1968, 337 officer and enlisted replacements were received to offset the loss of 308 personnel.

(2) As of January 31, 1968, the strength posture of this brigade was as follows:

(a) Units authorized and assigned strengths:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>WARRANT</th>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASTGD</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 3d Inf</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn, 7th Inf</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn, 12th Inf</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 40th Arty</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Spt Bn</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC Bde</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Trp, 17th Cav</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRRP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87th Engr Co</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Enlisted Infusion Program:

(1) During November this command infused 23 enlisted personnel to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) with DEROS of November 1968. In return, this command received 35 enlisted personnel from the 11th ACR with DEROS of August 1968. This infusion primarily involved Troop D, 17th Cavalry. Also during November, this command received 122 enlisted personnel with DEROS of June and July 1968 from the 196th Infantry Brigade in return for CONUS replacements diverted to the 196th Infantry Brigade by USAV.

(2) During December, this command infused 24 enlisted personnel to the 1st Infantry Division with DEROS of February and March 1968. In return we received 21 enlisted personnel from
the 1st Infantry Division with DEROS of June and July 1968. This program was set up to alleviate the DEROS hump facing the 298th Signal Platoon.

(3) During January, this command infused 3 enlisted personnel to the 4th Infantry Division with DEROS of April 1968. In return this command received 3 enlisted personnel from the 4th Infantry Division with DEROS of October 1968.

2. (U) DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF MORALE:

a. Awards and Decorations: The following awards were presented to individuals in the units as indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IM</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>ESV</th>
<th>BSM</th>
<th>AGI</th>
<th>ACHM</th>
<th>AM</th>
<th>PH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 199th &amp; Atch Units</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 3d Inf</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn, 7th Inf</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn, 12th Inf</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Spt Bn</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn 40th Arty</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Trp 17th Cav</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87th Engr Co</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Rest and Recuperation: The brigade continued to exploit the morale benefits of the H&R program. Listed below is a breakdown by unit of the H&R program utilization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IN COUNTRY</th>
<th>OUT OF COUNTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 199th &amp; Atch Units</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 3d Inf</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn, 7th Inf</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn, 12th Inf</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Spt Bn</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn 40th Arty</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Trp 17th Cav</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87th Engr Co</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>175</td>
<td>983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (U) REENLISTMENT: This command was the leading unit in USAARV during the December 1967 reenlistment program in the retention of first term Regular Army soldiers. The reenlistment rate in the brigade continued to improve indicating a high state of morale within the brigade. The statistics for this reporting period was as follows:

24
### Reenlistments for November 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elig Reenl %</th>
<th>Elig Reenl %</th>
<th>Elig Reenl %</th>
<th>TOTAL %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Reenlistments for December 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elig Reenl %</th>
<th>Elig Reenl %</th>
<th>Elig Reenl %</th>
<th>TOTAL %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>91.6%</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Reenlistments for January 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elig Reenl %</th>
<th>Elig Reenl %</th>
<th>Elig Reenl %</th>
<th>TOTAL %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>76.6%</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DA GOALS: 33.3% 80% 6.7%
1. Elements of five local force battalions continued to operate in or on the periphery of the FAIRFAX area of operations.

   a. HUC MIN District (VC GO IaK District) - The 2d Local Force (IF) Battalion, with an estimated strength of 250 men, participated in the 31 January 1966 attack on Saigon, in particular the Tan Son Nhut Airbase. They incurred few losses in the attack.

   b. DI An District (VC DI An District) - The 3d LF Battalion, with an estimated strength of 275 men operates in the northern part of Gia THU Duc District. This unit probably participated in the attack on the THU Duc District Headquarters on 31 January 1966. The Battalion received 100 reinforcements bringing its strength to an estimated 375 men. In December the THU Duc District Chief was killed while on a combined operation against this unit in THU Duc.

   c. THU Duc District (VC THU Duc District) - The 4th IF Battalion has increased its activities considerably in the last 45 days. Contacts made with the 4th IF Battalion by the 30th Hanger Battalion have increased in intensity, due to the addition of replacements and the completion of the 4th IF Battalions Training Program. This unit now has an estimated strength of 200 men.

   d. NHA Ba District (VC NHA Ba District) - The 5th IF Battalion also participated in the 31 January 1966 attack on Saigon. This unit is reported to be marginally combat effective with a strength of 200 men.

   e. BTNH CHANH District (VC Binh Chanh District) - The 6th IF Battalion carried out a major portion of the attack on Tan Son Nhut Airbase and the area around Phu THU Race Track in Saigon. Heavy contact has been encountered with this unit since 31 January 1966. The current estimate of strength is at 100 men. After sweep operations are completed near the race track, the 6th IF Battalion will be generally ineffective.

2. Guerilla units have increased in strength and activity in recent weeks. The absence of constant pressure by allied forces, has given these units time to recruit replacements and increase their influence in the village and hamlets of GIA DINH. The guerilla units have had opportunity to regroup and retrain in the last several months. An RD Cairo was ambushed by a platoon of VC near GO CONG in December with 13 RD killed as a result. The Local Force can be expected to increase team activities in keeping with PHASS IX of the Winter Spring Campaign.
3. Viet Cong casualties and equipment losses during the period 1 November 1967 through 31 January 1968 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Action (Body Count)</td>
<td>801 Sampans 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Action (Possible)</td>
<td>144 Mil Struct 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners of War</td>
<td>48 Fortifications 1651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>135 Rico (tons) 2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew served Weapons</td>
<td>70 Mines 517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>1056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. General: The brigade continued to maintain its base camp at Long Binh (YT 073122). During November 1967, the brigade prepared for final phase out of the US effort in Operation FAIRFAX. 4/12 Inf completed its phase out on 9 November and moved on 15 November to assume a new mission under CP CON 9th Inf Div. 3/7 Inf terminated Operation FAIRFAX on 29 November and 2/3 Inf terminated operations on 14 December which officially terminated 199th Inf Brigade participation in GIA DNH Province and Operation FAIRFAX.

2. November Operations: Primary concern during the month was the readying of the 5th ARVN Ranger Group to assume the FAIRFAX mission. Enemy contacts during the month were few. Highlights of the month's activities were as follows.

a. A concluding evaluation exercise was administered by the 5th Ranger Group to the 38th ARVN Ranger Bn during the period 11-18 November. The unit was rated combat ready.

b. On 26 November, TF 2/3 Inf conducted an airborne assault employing two companies. At 1159 hrs, one company, while conducting a search and sweep operation, located three ammunition and equipment caches resulting in the capture of 11 prisoners (1), 28 German Mauser rifles, 1 Soviet carbine (Model 1944), 140 rounds 60mm mortar, 10,050 rounds of SA and AW ammunition, 350 chicom grenades, 4 Soviet RK 6-3 HE VT hand grenades, 5 chicom claymore mines, 150 hand grenade flares, 9-40mm: M-79 grenades, 1 Remington electric adding machine (Model 99), 1 FACIT Swedish Model QIZ-16 adding machine, 1 German Olympia typewriter, 1 electric tape recorder, 2 PRC-10 radios, 1 Sony UHF transmitter receiver, 1 Italian radio transmitter and receiver, and miscellaneous items.


b. Enemy losses during FAIRFAX were: 1050 VC KIA (30), 535 VC KIA (295), 3094 detainees, 125 POVs, 69 Chieu Hai, 289 Sampans, 13 GS wpns, 63,478 Sn ammo, 330 GS wpn ammo, 339,075 tons of rice, 7108 fortifications and 694 sampans destroyed.

4. December Operations: 199th Infantry Brigade commanded Operation UNION/TOW/STRIKE on 1 December 1967, with the mission to prevent rocket and mortar attacks on the LONG BIHN - JIDEN complex and to destroy the Dong Hai Regiment. TF 4/12, with 3/17 Air Cav Sqdr attached, were committed to this mission initially.
On 4 December, TF 3/7 was deployed to conduct the UNIONTOWN mission. TF 4/12 established FSB NASHUA (XT 986327) north of the Dong Nai River and assumed the Strike mission. Operation UNIONTOWN/STRIKE covered the period 1-17 December. On 18 December Operations UNIONTOWN and MANCHESTER were begun with TF 4/12 (FSFB NASHUA), TF 3/7 (FSFB KINHE, XT 043307) and TF 2/3 in UNIONTOWN. Highlights of December activities were as follows.

a. On 6 December, the 4/12 BN CP at NASHUA received 20-25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 3 US WIA. Based on intelligence information and a back azimuth of the mortar direction of fire 4/12 conducted a search and destroy operation to the SE of NASHUA. At 1445 hrs, 4/12 made contact with an estimated VC/NVA Battalion. Airstrikes, LFTs, artillery and flareships supported the operation. Results of the contact were 25 US KIA and 82 US WIA, VC losses were 67 VC KIA (BC) and 85 VC KIA (POSS), 900 rounds SA Ammo, 48 rds CS wpns ammo, 17 mines, 200 grenades, 2 tons rice and 132 fortifications destroyed.

b. On 7 December, 2nd VN Marine Battalion, 1st Marine Task Force was airlifted to FSB NASHUA to augment friendly forces and to conduct operations in AO Strike. The battalion conducted operations in the brigade AO from 7-15 December. During this period 2 marines were KIA and 10 WIA. Enemy losses for the period were 3 VC KIA (BC), 7 SA, 11 mines, 250 lbs medical supplies, 1000 lbs salt, 30,500 lbs of rice and 52 fortifications destroyed.

c. On 19 December, 2 IRP teams of the 199th made contact with 2 VC squads resulting in 6 VC KIA (BC). To exploit the contact, 4/12 Inf airlifted a company into the area and began a search and sweep operation. At 1720 the unit was heavily engaged with an estimated reinforced VC company. LFT, Spooky and artillery supported. Results of the operation were 4 US KIA, 10 US WIA and 38 VC KIA (BC).

d. On 27 December, 4/12 conducted a search and sweep operation SE of NASHUA. At 1543 hrs, the unit made contact with an unknown size VC force. LFT and artillery supported. Results were 3 US KIA, 28 US WIA; 30 VC KIA (BC), 400 grenades, 5000 rounds SA ammo, 4 SA, 500 lbs of rice and 52 fortifications destroyed.

e. December Statistics


(2) Enemy: 200 VC KIA (BC), 116 VC KIA (POSS), 27 SA, 8149 rounds SA ammo, 86 rounds CS wpns ammo, 45 mines, 617 grenades, 28.4 tons rice, 375 fortifications, and 9 sampans.
5. January Operations: The 199th Infantry Brigade continued offensive operations in AOs UKINTOWN and MANCHESTER. Highlights of the month's activities.

a. On 3 January, a IRP team ambushed an estimated VC platoon resulting in 4 US WIA and 11 VC KIA (BC).

b. On 12 January, Operation MANCHESTER was terminated. During the period 1-12 January there were 28 US WIA, 27 VC KIA (BC), 5 SA, 1 CS wpn, 19 grenades, 4645 lbs of rice, 600 rounds SA ammo, 291 fortifications and 10 military structures destroyed.

c. On 13 January, battalions of 199th Infantry were redeployed as follows. TF 2/3 in AO COLUMBUS, TF 3/7 in AO H.VERFORD in DS of GMD and TF 4/12 in AO UKINTOWN.

d. On 16 January, a 199th IRP team ambushed 5 VC resulting in 1 US WIA and 5 VC KIA (BC).

e. On 22 January, TF 3/7 conducted a cordon and search operation resulting in 7.5 tons of rice captured and 2 detainees.

f. On 23 January, TF 3/7 conducted a search and sweep operation and found 2-57mm recoilless rifles, 29-57mm rounds and 3 chicom claymore mines.

- During the later part of the month, 199th units were deployed in a defensive posture in preparation for the Lunar New Year. On 31 January, NVA/VC forces launched rocket and mortar attacks and ground assaults on the Long Binh/Bien Hoa Complex. Initial sightings of large enemy forces were made during the early morning hours. At 0300 hours, the enemy launched its rocket and mortar attack. Elements of TF 4/12 were moved to make contact with the enemy forces. Contact was made and 199th units were heavily engaged in close-in fighting. Artillery, Spooky, TAC Air and LTF supported the operation. Approximately 200 enemy were located in the vicinity of Ho Nai village adjacent to the brigade main base at Long Binh. TF 2/3 and elements of the 2/47 Inf, 9th Inf Div, who were attached to the brigade, were committed to the contact which continued throughout the day. Results: 9 US KIA, 54 US WIA. Enemy losses were 527 VC KIA (BC), 100 VC KIA (Poss), 30 POW, 42 detainees, 78 SA and 66 CS wpns captured.

h. TF 3/7 was committed to Saigon on 31 January. Contact was made with VC forces in the vicinity of the Saigon race track. Heavy fighting continued during the daylight hours and sporadic fires continued throughout the night. Results: 3 US KIA, 18 US WIA. Enemy losses were 11 VC KIA (BC), 5 POW and 6 SA captured.
1. January Statistics:

(1) Friendly: 18 US KIA, 135 US WIA.

(2) Enemy: 587 VC KIA, 116 VC KIA (Poss), 35 POW, 92 Detainees, 93 SA, 71 CS wps, 13.8 tons rice, 16 mines, 32 grenades, 464 fortifications and 15 military structures destroyed.
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ANNEX D (C) SUPPLY OPERATIONS

1. During November and December, the truck platoon attached to this unit from the 48th Transportation Group (MT), displaced the three line battalions from Operation FAIRFAX in CIA Binh Province surrounding Saigon. The units were brought into Camp Frenzell-Jones for several days for maintenance, inspection and refit, conducted by the 7th Support Battalion, and then conducted to a new area of operation (AO). Through close coordination between the battalion S4 and the Brigade Transportation Office these moves were conducted on schedule and with a minimum of difficulties.

2. On 4 December, two battalions were deployed into AO KANCHANABURI. As the roads were impassable due to enemy mines, it became necessary to resupply these units by CH-47 (Chinook) from Camp Frenzell-Jones. Because this was a multi-battalion force being supplied from one pick-up zone, it became necessary to establish brigade level control for this operation. This was a new concept for this brigade, because previously all resupply had been by road, to the widely separated battalion base camps and then by helicopter to individual company areas. From 8 December to 12 January, the Brigade S4 assumed responsibility for coordination of aerial resupply to the forward areas. 7th Support Battalion had the responsibility of actually controlling the pickup zone adjacent to the brigade heliport, and the respective battalions had the responsibility for controlling landing zones in their areas. A total of 1,701 sorties, totaling 4,253 short tons of cargo, were moved.

3. To support Battery A, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery (155 SP), in general support of the brigade at Fire Support Base IASHUA, it was desired that stockage of 2,000 rounds of 155mm ammunition be on position with the battery, however, CH-47 assets were too limited to allow this buildup. Air Force heavy airdrop was requested for this purpose, and from 11 December to 14 December, approximately 2,000 rounds were airdropped into the position. The Container Delivery System (CDS) was used for the drop. USAF Pathfinders were at the drop zone for control purposes, and US Army Riggers jumped in to supervise the recovery of the air items.

4. On 25 December, an outbreak of food poisoning occurred in the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry. All personnel were returned to duty within two days. During the investigation it was found that the food had been left in the open on the serving line for an inordinate time to permit the troops free and liberal access to the food for the Christmas dinner. It was further found that there were a number of unserviceable food containers in use throughout the brigade. Since there was a number of units which had turned in this type container, it had been necessary to use other
unserviceable containers to move the food to the field for the troops. Because of the non-availability of this item in the supply system, management of this supply area and close liaison with higher headquarters prompted USAFRV headquarters to direct lateral transfer of serviceable Hermitite cans from several units that were not utilizing them. A rigorous program of inspection and classification of food containers has since been initiated by the Brigade Food Service section and has proven helpful in identifying potential problem areas.

5. Upon deployment into AO MANCHESTER, a problem was realized with 40mm grenade ammunition. The HE round, in the dense jungle, could not travel far enough to arm itself. An increased allocation of the 40mm Canister round was obtained for the operation. This round was found to be quite effective in this type of terrain.

6. A total of 2,500 XM16E1 rifles have been exchanged for the M16A1 rifle to date. The new model has not been in the hands of the troops long enough to obtain a valid comparison with the older one.

7. On 4 January, the Class I Section of the 7th Support Battalion began operating its own ration breakdown point. Rations are drawn directly from the Class I depot in Saigon and delivered to the units at Camp Frenzell-Jones. As a result, fresher chill items are being obtained.

8. Resupply and maintenance activities were routine and presented no difficulties. The following statistics show the Brigade Supply Office's activity:
   a. Class I - 1091 tons issued
   b. Class II & IV - 5880 requisitions processed
   c. Class III - 817,815 gallons
   d. Class V - 2397 tons issued

9. The following engineer construction was completed by the 87th Engineer Company:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Building</th>
<th>Number Contracted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BEQ</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20x50 Admin Building</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type Building</td>
<td>Number Contracted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20x100 Admin Building</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Building</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer's Open Mess</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Operations Center (Bunker)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. The following engineer construction is underway:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Building</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Building</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin Building</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO Open Mess</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Other engineer projects completed:
   a. Grading and excavation of brigade heliport.
   b. Resurfacing and dust control of roadways on the base camp.
   c. Construction of secondary electrical system on the base camp.
   d. Construction and issue of 130 bunkers (prefabricated, air moveable)

12. The logistical advisory effort for the 5th Vietnamese Ranger Group was concluded in November, when the Group Advisory Team received an S-1/4 Advisor. Their progress in logistical activities was quite satisfactory.

13. Items drawn on 180 day loan to support the brigades missions are shown in the following list.

   - 2 Bath Units, Portable
   - 13 Truck, 1/4 ton, M151A1
   - 1 Truck, 2½ ton, M35A2
保密

1 Truck, 3/4 ton, M37B1
1 Truck, Tank, M49A2
4 Truck, Tractor, 5ton
1 Truck, Van, M109A3
1 Tank, Liquid Storage, 600 gal
3 Tank, Assemble, Fabric, Collapsible, 1,000 gal
4 Tank and pump units, trk mounted
1 Semi-trailer, tank, fuel, 5,000 gal
10 Drum, Fabric, Collapsible, Liquid Fuel, 500 gal
3 Generator Set, 100 KW
45 Telephone Set, TA-1/PT
1 Antenna Group RC-292
3 Radio Set, AN/VRC-46
18 Mount, Tripod, MG M60, M122
3 Mount, Pedestal, MG M60
18 Machinegun, 7.62mm, M60
104 Pistol, Cal .45
27 Detecting Set, Mine, P-153
69 Compass Lensatic
2 Rifle, 106mm Recoiless
18 Crew Served Night Weapons Sight

32

(保密)
ANNEX E (U) CIVIC ACTION

1. Civic Action

a. Construction and Repair:

(1) During the month of November, units attached to this command constructed one footbridge, repaired five footbridges, and repaired two vehicle bridges. Also, one temple was repaired by U.S. and Vietnamese personnel and one dispensary constructed. Three homes were repaired by U.S. forces and local Vietnamese. The U.S. forces leveled and graded two areas, constructed three swing sets, and repaired 2,300 meters of road. In addition, five schools were repaired and two Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) bunkers were constructed by U.S. and Vietnamese personnel.

(2) During the month of December, units attached to this command repaired one dispensary, whitewashed two schools, and built ten concrete well bases. The above projects were completed with the assistance of local Vietnamese.

(3) During the month of January, five schools were whitewashed, one dispensary was whitewashed, and one dispensary was repaired. In addition, four concrete well bases were constructed, the digging of one well was commenced, and one water supply point was established. The 2d Plt, 67th Engr Co constructed one vehicle bridge (38' 6") in Binh CHANH District, GIA BINH Province. 150 picket posts were delivered to the MACV Sub-Sector Team located in CONG THANH District, Binh HOA Province, for the repair of one Popular Forces outpost.

b. Distribution of Commodities:

(1) During the month of November, the following commodities were distributed to needy Vietnamese:

(a) 530 pounds of clothing.
(b) 4,670 pounds of foodstuffs.
(c) 15,800 board feet of lumber
(d) 9 midwife kits.
(e) 100 school kits.
(f) 2 teacher kits.
(g) 100 bars of soap.
(2) During the month of December, the following commodities were distributed to needy Vietnamese:

(a) 100 pounds of clothing.
(b) 7,192 pounds of foodstuffs.
(c) 2,700 school kits.
(d) 100 bars of soap.
(e) 200 Dr. Thomas A. Dooley Family Kits.

(3) During the month of January, the following commodities were distributed to needy Vietnamese:

(a) 200 pounds of blankets.
(b) 18,155 pounds of foodstuffs.
(c) 4,900 board feet of lumber.
(d) 50 pounds of toys.
(e) 50 school kits.
(f) 255 bars of soap.

c. Educational Efforts:

(1) During the month of November, nine English classes were taught by the Brigade S5 Staff in CAT LAI, THU DUC District, GIA DINH Province, with a total attendance of 95.

(2) After moving into COMHSLTER in December, efforts were made to coordinate with the USAID Office of Education in SAIGON to obtain supplies for a new English class, to be taught in the HO N.I./BIEN HOA area. To that end, USAID supplied the Brigade S5 Staff with 5% English language textbooks and the Staff teacher is now coordinating with DUC TU District and BIEN HOA Province officials to obtain use of a classroom. The new series of English language classes will probably begin in February.

2. Psychological Operations:

a. Total PsyOps Activities:

(1) Leaflets distributed:
(a) November: 8,654,404.
(b) December: 5,284,474.
(c) January: 5,296,960.
(d) Total: 19,235,838.

(2) Loudspeaker broadcasts:
(a) November: 92 hours.
(b) December: 16 hours.
(c) January: 2 hours.
(d) Total: 110 hours.

b. Campaign Leaflets:
(1) Chieu Hoi Campaign:
(a) November: 2,500,000.
(b) January: 1,109,380.
(c) Total: 3,609,380.

(2) Safe Conduct Passes:
(a) November: 120,000.
(b) January: 196,000.
(c) Total: 316,000.

(3) Tet Campaign: January: 3,262,000

c. Ground Operations:
(1) Leaflets hand-delivered:
(a) November: 1,406,404.
(b) December: 41,474.
(c) January: 8,160.
(d) Total: 1,456,038.
(2) Ground/waterborne loudspeaker broadcasts:
   (a) November: 79 hours.
   (b) December: 101 hours.
   (c) January: 3 hours.
   (d) Total: 90 hours.

(3) Movies:
   (a) November: 33 movies.
   (b) December: 27 movies.
   (c) Total: 60 movies.

d. Civic Activities and Children's Parties:

   (1) During the month of November, members of the S5 Staff attended two events at the Vietnamese-American Association in SAIGON and two community festivals at C.T Lai and Thanh Huy Loi Hamlets, THU DUC District, GIA DINH Province.

   (2) During the month of December, members of the S5 Staff attended one event at the Vietnamese-American Association in SAIGON and presented one children's party at LOC Lam Refugee Hamlet, HO NA Village, DUC DU District, Binh HOA Province, on Christmas Day. Another unit attached to this Brigade's Headquarters held a children's party at the Mi Quan Charity Home, HO NA Village, also on Christmas Day.

   (3) During the month of January, members of the S5 Staff attended one event at the Vietnamese-American Association in SAIGON and presented one children's party at DA My Orphanage, HO NA Village, DUC DU District, Binh HOA Province, prior to, and in commemoration of, the Tet holidays.

3. Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP):

   a. MEDCAP patients, both medical and surgical:

   (1) November: 19,296.
   (2) December: 4,706.
   (3) January: 2,996.
(4) Total: 26,998.

b. Training of nurses and midwives: November: 3
1. In the beginning of November due to the relatively fixed areas of operation for our infantry battalions, each battalion aid station remained in the same location. This enabled them to maintain a ward using a G.P. medium tent to keep many of their own quarters patients. Each unit had 5 to 20 beds. At the same time the Brigade Medical Company maintained a 25 bed ward at Camp Frenzell-Jones in a permanent building and the Headquarters medical section maintained a 15 bed ward in a permanent building at Cat Lai. By 15 November 1967 the 20 bed ward run by the medical platoon of 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry had been closed as they moved to Camp Frenzell-Jones and subsequently to AO Uniontown. By 1 December the 8 bed ward run by the medical platoon of the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry had been closed as they moved to Camp Frenzell-Jones and subsequently to AO Uniontown. By the 15th December the 5 bed ward run by the medical platoon of the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry had been closed for the same reason. The brigade medical section also moved during the period on 15-18 November, closing their 15 bed ward. The 25 bed ward maintained at Camp Frenzell-Jones by the Medical Company remains. The forward battalion aid stations have no quarters capability at the present. With the movement of battalion surgeons into forward areas, all sick call at Camp Frenzell-Jones was being carried out by the Brigade Medical Company after 15 December 1967.

2. During January, due to the close proximity of the rear detachment of the battalion aid stations to the Brigade Medical Company ambulance platoon, the battalion aid stations lost three of their Front Line ambulances to turn in as of 31 January 1968.

3. Air ambulance capability was supplied by area coverage. No unit was assigned to us. Occasionally, as the tactical situation demanded, the brigade organic helicopters carried out air evacuation. This service was also supplied by gun ships of "A" Troop, 3/17 Cavalry when needed.

4. The forward operational areas found the forward contingent of the battalion aid stations with the battalion surgeon and/or the medical operations assistant at the fire support base. This followed the movement of each battalion from the old operational area in Operation FAIRFAX to the ones subsequently assigned. In new areas, the aid station gives local medical support. But, in the field, most patients are evacuated by air ambulance to rear medical establishments of the 67th and 68th Medical Groups.

5. The forms of injuries resulting from hostile action during December reflected the change in the quality of enemy force.
The number of wounds from booby traps dropped markedly in November and December as finally all infantry battalions left their previous AOs. At the same time there was a marked rise in the number of gunshot wounds.

6. There were no significant changes in overall number of patients seen on sick call, but there was a marked change in certain illnesses.

7. The incidence of skin disease in November, December and January showed a continuing drop in quarters and out-patients. The number of people with involvement of feet and legs dropped from 125 in October, 15 in November, 22 in December, and 1 in January. This is due to the cessation of the rainy season and movement of the brigade into an uninundated area.

8. There was a marked rise in case rate of diarrhea from 26/1000/per annum in November to 280.8/1000/per annum in December. This was due to a food poisoning episode which occurred on the 25th of December. The 20th Preventive Medicine Unit aided the brigade in the investigation. It was discovered that the contaminated food was the triad of turkey, gravy, and cornbread stuffing. The contaminant was Staphylococcus Aureus which had been introduced by relaxed food handling procedure in the field. Efforts in food service have been made to ensure that this does not occur again in the future.

9. In November the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry was started on daily Dapsone due to the close proximity with VC who were suffering large numbers of casualties from Falciparum malaria. Subsequently, each of the infantry battalions was started on Dapsone as they moved North. By 23 December the entire brigade had been started on Dapsone. This eliminated any problems which might have occurred initiating the program on 31 January when the Camp Frensell-Jones came in close contact with other vectors from the same army. The brigade continued to take the weekly Chloroquine Primoquine tablet.

10. Medical supply was a problem only in that a few standard items were not available such as Hydrocortizone Vioform cream. Despite discussions with the USHIV supply officer this shortage could not be relieved. Therefore, supply personnel had to obtain Vioform and Hydrocortizone creams, then mix these two together. Supply systems outside the brigade became nonexistent the last 10 days of January due to the 1st Platoon, 32d Medical Depot preparing for an annual General Inspection. They were unable to supply anything unless it had an O2 priority.

11. The Medical Civic Action Program has gone into hibernation
on a gradual basis over the past three months. The movement of
the battalions eliminated their permanent dispensaries in civilian
areas. Attempts were made on the part of infantry battalions
to develop MEDCAP programs in their new operational areas, but
these areas were either devoid of civilian population or being
redeveloped by other units from outside the brigade. The bri-
gade S-5 attempted to establish a permanent dispensary in Ho
 Hai village, near Camp Frenzell-Jones, but their medical spec-
ialist went on a 30 day leave. This left the onus on the office
to provide them with an alternate. This was done with the help
of the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry which supplied one of its ad-
vanced trained medics beginning 18 December through 15 January.
Subsequently on the 30 and 31 January this facility was robbed of
many of its medical provisions by the VC regiment which the bri-
gade decimated. The total number of patients seen on MEDCAP
dropped from 35,017 in October to 19,296 in November, 4,706 in
December and 2,996 in January.
1. In the past quarter this command paid $2261.35 in personal property claims to individual United States military personnel. The majority of the claims resulted from loss of personal property due to enemy action. Over $61,200 in solatium payments were made for damage and personal injury occasioned by Vietnamese Nationals as a result of combat and non-combat activities of personnel of the brigade. Twenty-six claims filed by Vietnamese Nationals under the Foreign Claims Act, AR 27-28 were investigated and processed.

3. Courts-martial rates within the command continue to be low and well below overall Army level. Greater emphasis is being placed by unit commanders at all levels on the use of nonjudicial punishment to enforce and maintain discipline within their commands. More emphasis must be given to the responsibility of unit commanders and battalion courts and boards sections to expedite the processing and forwarding of court-martial charges once preferred against an individual. Special emphasis must be given to the expeditious processing of charges in cases involving pretrial confinement.

4. Non-Judicial Punishment: The following is a breakdown by commands of article 15 punishment imposed during the second quarter FY 68.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Charges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 Infantry</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-7 Infantry</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-12 Infantry</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-40 Artillery</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Spt. Bn.</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Troop, 17th Cav.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87th Engineer Co.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>738</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Courts-Martial: The following is a breakdown of cases tried by courts-martial during the reporting period.

a. General Courts-Martial

NONE
b. Special Courts-Martial

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 Infantry</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-7 Infantry</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-12 Infantry</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-40 Artillery</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Spt. Bn.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Troop, 17th Cav.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87th Engineer Co.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Summary Courts-Martial

NONE

6. Claims: The following claims were paid to members of this command for personal property lost, destroyed or damaged incident to service UP AR 27-29.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO. CLAIMS PAID</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMOUNT PAID</td>
<td>$70.15</td>
<td>$2092.00</td>
<td>$99.20</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

7. Legal Assistance: The following is the breakdown of Legal Assistance cases handled during the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTRUMENTS</th>
<th>INQUIRY OR CORRESPONDENCE</th>
<th>REALIZED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adoption &amp; Change of Name</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship &amp; Immigration</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Relations &amp; Paternity</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notarizations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Finances, Debts,</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Property- Automobiles, ETC.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powers of Attorney</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Property- Sale, Lease, ETC.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxation</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wills and Estates</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>153</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX H (U) PUBLIC INFORMATION

1. The period 1 November through 31 January showed that the 40th Public Information Detachment has improved its command information and public information program. Effort has been made for closer liaison with the brigade's units. News stories of the brigade's combat activities have been classified and have restricted the detachment's activities in that area. Effort is being made to improve the photographic processing and development support for the detachment Photo Section. The detachment does not have this capability.

2. The 40th Public Information Detachment and the Brigade Photo Section continued the Public Information - Command Information Program during Operations Manchester and Uniotown/Strike.

a. Following standard operating procedures, this detachment submitted to II Field Force Information Office a request for clearance of Operation Uniotown/Strike. This request was denied after review by II Field Force G-2 and G-3 and by Military Assistance Command Vietnam J-2 and J-3. With this handicap it was necessary to delete combat material submitted for general news release and United States Army Vietnam Daily Summary input.

b. Operation Manchester was cleared for release from 19 December 1967 to 11 January 1968. Uniotown operations were not reportable at any time until 31 January 1968.

c. Since early November 1967 until 31 January 1968 (except for the three-week period of Operation Manchester) brigade tactical operations have been censored due to the sensitive mission and areas of operations around the Long Binh-Bien Hoa-Saigon Area.

3. During Operations Uniotown/Strike and Manchester, information personnel continued the weekly summary report of brigade activities which was distributed to brigade units. Material for this summary was censored in keeping with classification of Operation Uniotown/Strike.

4. The following is a breakdown of 40th Public Information Detachment activities.

- News Releases: 67
- Pictures released: 65
- Hometown News Releases: 646
d. Hometown Pictures released: 26

e. Hometown Tapes: 177

f. Press Interviews and Briefings: 14

g. News Media Visits: 19

h. TV Film Clips: 45

i. Escort and coordination was provided for five different groups of entertainers who visited the brigade.

j. The detachment presented a formal briefing to Brigadier General Wendell Coates, Department of the Army Chief of Information concerning detachment activities.

k. The photo section supported daily brigade photo requirements.

l. Four "Fact" Sheets were published concerning Malaria, Proper Foot and Skin Care, Bien Hoa Province, and Customs Laws affecting U.S. servicemen in Vietnam.

m. An information letter was distributed concerning ways individual units could help the brigade information program.

n. A background file of the brigade's officers has been expanded to include pictures for the Commanding General's Reference album.

5. The detachment has been handicapped by lack of photographic development support. At the present time action is being taken to clarify and define who has the responsibility for this requirement. If these efforts fail, a letter will be forwarded through command channels.
1. The Forvost Marshal's Office is responsible for the discipline, law, and order of the brigade's area of responsibility and primarily on the installation of Camp Frenzell-Jones. The number of offenders apprehended has increased steadily by over 30% each month and is continuing to rise. This sharp increase is due to the fact that the physical barriers around the base camp have been greatly improved and all personnel must enter and exit through Military Police Checkpoints. Before the Military Police Checkpoints were moved north of Sustainer Boulevard, a main access road bordering the brigade area on the south, people could easily gain access through the II Field Forces installation. Now that the perimeter has been placed on the north side of Sustainer Blvd., personnel may only gain access to the brigade main base (BMH) through the checkpoints at Old Guard and Sustainer Blvd., Warrior and Sustainer Blvd., and Shelby Road and Highway 1A. Many people have been leaving this installation without proper authorization and are now being apprehended when they attempt to exit or enter one of the checkpoints. Although such apprehensions are minor in nature, the search upon apprehension has uncovered a large amount of marijuana and other items of contraband.

2. The 152d Military Police Platoon conducts preliminary investigations on all incidents and accidents that occur on the BMH. It maintains four checkpoints that control all outgoing and incoming traffic, two post patrols, and a civilian laborers' checkpoint that controls the entrance and exit of all Vietnamese civilian laborers. At the Civilian Labor Checkpoint, an area was constructed through which all vehicles containing civilian laborers must pass. All such vehicles are completely emptied and thoroughly searched while all civilian laborers undergo thorough search in that portion of the checkpoint they are required to use. The entire pass system was recently revised because of the fact that approximately 5% of the passes were unaccounted for. The passes were therefore taken in and a new color system was adopted. The 152d Military Police Platoon also initiated two raids in the village of Phuc Lam and Ho Nai. As a result of these raids over $40,000 worth of government property was returned to the proper channels. In addition to the above noted responsibilities, the 152d MP PLT also acts as a quick reaction force in any alert.

3. The Headquarters and Headquarters Military Police Platoon offers combat support to the brigade and its battalions. A Detainee Collection Point has been constructed on the BMH and can hold up to 300 detainees. A squad (-) is also present in many of the forward base camps to provide security for any detainees or PWS. The construction of this centralized Detainee Collection Point has eliminated much of the double processing of these
The CI had noted that a more aggressive attitude must be taken in the field of criminal investigative activities within the command. They have been maintaining a close watch on all items purchased at the Post Exchange (PX) by foreign and US personnel, filing and reviewing all money order purchases on MAC Form 311, ensuring that government and private property are properly safeguarded, maintaining an open door for the collection of information affecting the activity of this command. The CI personnel have especially taken an aggressive role in the prevention of the use of marijuana. The CID keeps the Commander informed on the use of this non-abuse drug and has initiated a program to orientate and educate the brigade officers and non-commissioned officers on its description, use, and effect. Crime Prevention surveys have also been utilized in assessing the physical security of the perimeter and other sensitive areas throughout the command.
ANNEX J (C) SIGNAL

1. 4/12 Infantry Battalion departed THU DUC Area of operations (AO) for Camp Frenzell-Jones 15 November 1967. The radio relay team and radio-teletype (RATT) team providing the communications support displaced direct to Fire Support Base (FSB) CONCORD and established communications to Camp Frenzell-Jones. Upon arrival of 4/12 Infantry Battalion at FSB CONCORD 17 November 1967, they had immediate communications with the Brigade.

2. On 1 December 1967, the Brigade changed command from the FORWARD Command Post (CP) at CAT LII to Camp Frenzell-Jones and 3/7 Infantry Battalion departed BINH CHAM AO for Camp Frenzell-Jones.

a. Statistics - Brigade FORWARD CP

(1) Radio relay systems effectiveness - weekly average of 97 percent.

(2) Switchboard - busy-hour peg count varied between 80-90 calls; daily total peg count averaged 700 calls per day.

(3) Communication Center - a daily average of 80 messages was handled.

b. Signal Team at Brigade FORWARD CP:

(1) Signal Section - Signal Officer and 2 EM
(2) Radio relay Section - 2 NRC-69 with teams
(3) Switchboard Section - 1 NTC-7 with team
(4) Wire Section - 2 Wire teams with equipment
(5) Communication Center Section - 1 MGC-17 with team
(6) RATT Section - 1 GRC 46 and 2 VSC 2 with teams
(7) FM Radio Section - Transportable Communication Facility (4 ground mounted VRC 46 plus 1 R 442) with team.

c. Radio relay and RATT teams with 3/7 Infantry Battalion displaced with BN CP element to Camp Frenzell-Jones.

d. Communication Means - Brigade Tactical Operations Center (TOC), Camp Frenzell-Jones.

(1) Command and Control communications was maintained
via radio relay and FM radio to 2/3 Inf Bn (NHA BE) and 4/12 Inf Bn (CONCORD).

(2) SB 86 was installed in the Brigade TOC as the TOC Switchboard.

(3) The following VRC 46 radios were mounted in the Brigade TOC.

(a) II FFV Cnl Net (Secure)
(b) Brigade Cnl Net (Non-Secure)
(c) Brigade Cnl Net (Secure)
(d) Spare radio to be used as directed
(e) Brigade Avn Net
(f) Artillery LNO radios (2 VRC 46)

(4) The Artillery Liaison Officer (ALO) installed 1 MRC 107, TACP Communication System, in the Brigade TOC as a control station.

3. On 4 December 1967, 4/12 Inf Bn displaced from FSPB CONCORD to FSPB NASHUA, and 3/7 Inf Bn displaced from Camp Frenzell-Jones to FSPB CONCORD. The signal team at FSPB CONCORD remained to support 3/7 Inf Bn.

4. On 5 December 1967, one radio relay team (2 MRC 34½) was airlifted via CH-47 helicopter (2 sorties) from Camp Frenzell-Jones to FSPB NASHUA. They established a radio relay system to Camp Frenzell-Jones that provided command and control telephone communications.

5. On 7 December 1967, the Brigade TAC CP displaced from Camp Frenzell-Jones to NASHUA.

a. The Signal Team for the TAC CP consisted of

(1) FM Radio Team (3 EM) with 2 NW/VRC 49s - one mounted on a ¾ ton truck and the other on a 3/4 ton truck.

(2) Switchboard/Wire Team (3 EM) with 2 SB-22 switchboards, 3 miles WD-1 wire and accessory equipment.

(3) Signal Officer and 298th Sig Plt Ldr.
b. The means of communication provided the TAC CF.

(1) Telephone service to subordinate Infantry Battalions, Bde TOC, 11th Field Force, Vietnam TOC. The service was derived from the radio relay system installed between Camp Frenzell-Jones and NASHUA.

(2) Secure and Non-Secure FM radio.

6. On 15 December 1967, 2/3 Infantry Battalion departed NHA BE AO for Camp Frenzell-Jones. The radio relay team and RTTT team providing communications support displaced with them.

7. On 17 December 1967, the radio relay team (2 MRC 34½) that returned from NHA BE was airlifted via CH-47 helicopter (2 sorties) to FSPB KEENE and installed a system back to Camp Frenzell-Jones. This system provided telephone service to 3/7 Infantry Battalion upon their arrival 18 December 1967 from CONCORD.

8. On 18 December 1967, 3/7 Infantry Battalion displaced to FSPB KEENE from FSPB CONCORD and 2/3 Infantry Battalion occupied FSPB CONCORD. With the three Infantry Battalions in the Forward Area, a separate radio relay system was established to each FSPB from Camp Frenzell-Jones.

9. On 5 January 1968, 2/3 Infantry Battalion and 4/12 Infantry Battalion exchanged positions. The Brigade Signal Support Teams remained at their respective FSPBs. The battalions left their SB 22 switchboards (2 each), 6 RC 292 antennas and all installed lines in place in order to minimize transition problems.

10. On 12 January 1968, the Bde TAC CP terminated operations and returned to Camp Frenzell-Jones. The FM Radio and Switchboard Teams returned from NASHUA since it is contemplated that the Brigade will return to AO MANCHESTER. The radio relay system will afford the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div, an outlet into the Army Area Communications System through Camp Frenzell-Jones.

11. On 12 January 1968, the 2/3 Infantry Battalion returned to Camp Frenzell-Jones from NASHUA for commitment into AO COLUMBUS. The 3/7 Infantry Battalion returned from KEENE to Camp Frenzell-Jones with the Radio Relay Team for commitment in CH. Dinh Province.

12. On 14 January 1968, radio relay systems were established from Camp Frenzell-Jones to 2/3 Infantry Battalion at FSPB TRICORNER and to 3/7 Infantry Battalion at FSPB ZINDERNEUF.
13. On 15 January 1968, secure teletypewriter communications established with FSB TRI-CORNER. Brigade now had secure teletypewriter contact with 2/3 and 4/12 Infantry Battalions in order to pass perishable intelligence information concerning enemy activities in AO UNIONTOWN and COLUMBUS prior to TET holidays.

14. On 24 January 1968, 2/3 Infantry Battalion returned to Camp Frenzell-Jones along with signal team from TRI-CORNER. Battalion will operate in AO UNIONTOWN. 1st Australian Task Force will operate in AO COLUMBUS.
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