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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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  145th Combat Aviation Battalion
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 145TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco, 96227

AVGC-CC

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65-(U)(UIC: WYNAHBJ)

TO: See Distribution

(U) Under provisions of AR 1-19, dated 26 May 1966, USARV Reg 1-19,
Aviation Group letter, Subject: Operational Report of Lessons Learned,
dated 27 September 1966, the Quarterly Operational Report of Lessons
Learned is hereby submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES R. TURLEY
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

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SECTION II

PART II

RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS

26
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 145TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96227

AVGC-CC
12 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January
1968 Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65-(U) (UIC: WYNAHB)

TO: See Distribution

SECTION I
SIGNIFICANT UNIT ACTIVITIES

A. (U) GENERAL: The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion has been
committed to combat assault and direct support operations during the
entire reporting period.

B. (U) MISSION: To augment the aviation support capability
available to II FFORCEV and the Republic of Vietnam Forces operating
within the III Corps ARVN Tactical Zone.

C. (C) ORGANIZATION:

1. The 117th Assault Helicopter Company was assigned to
the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion on 1 January 1968.

2. The 140th Transportation Detachment was assigned to the
145th Combat Aviation Battalion on 1 January 1968.

3. The 256th Signal Detachment was assigned to the 145th
Combat Aviation Battalion on 1 January 1968.

4. The 335th Assault Helicopter Company was reassigned to
the 268th Combat Aviation Battalion on 1 January 1968.

5. The 166th Transportation Detachment was reassigned to the
268th Combat Aviation Battalion on 1 January 1968.

6. The 234th Signal Detachment was reassigned to the 268th
Combat Aviation Battalion on 1 January 1968.

7. The 25th Medical Detachment was reassigned to the 268th
Combat Aviation Battalion on 1 January 1968.

8. The 74th Reconnaissance Airplane Company was reassigned to
the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion on 15 January 1968.

9. The 363rd Transportation Detachment was reassigned to the 210th
Combat Aviation Battalion on 15 January 1968.

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10. The organization of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion during the reporting period included the following units, located as indicated.

a. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Bien Hoa.

b. 68th Assault Helicopter Company, Bien Hoa.
   (1) 391st Transportation Detachment
   (2) 282nd Signal Detachment
   (3) 430th Medical Detachment

c. 118th Assault Helicopter Company, Bien Hoa.
   (1) 573rd Transportation Detachment
   (2) 198th Signal Detachment

d. 190th Assault Helicopter Company, Bien Hoa.
   (1) 605th Transportation Detachment
   (2) 520th Medical Detachment

e. 334th Armed Helicopter Company, Bien Hoa.
   (1) 571st Transportation Detachment
   (2) 320th Signal Detachment

f. 117th Assault Helicopter Company, Bien Hoa.
   (1) 140th Transportation Detachment
   (2) 256th Signal Detachment

g. 74th Reconnaissance Airplane Company, Phu Loi.
   (1) 563rd Transportation Detachment

h. 335th Assault Helicopter Company, Bien Hoa.
   (1) 166th Transportation Detachment
   (2) 234th Signal Detachment
   (3) 25th Medical Detachment

11. The 335th Assault Helicopter Company was TDY at Phu Hiep in support of the 173rd Airborne Brigade until reassigned to the 268th Combat Aviation Battalion on 1 January 1968.
12. The 190th Assault Helicopter Company was TDY to the Hue/Phu Bai area in support of the 3rd Marine Amphibious Task Force until 15 November 1967 when it returned to Bien Hoa.

13. Approximately 40% of the 334th Armed Helicopter Company has been TDY on a classified mission since 25 November 1967.

D. (U) COMMAND: Significant changes of command in the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion during this period were:

1. LTC Robert M. Deets assumed command of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion from LTC John A. Todd on 1 December 1967.


E. (C) PERSONNEL:

1. ADMINISTRATION: The 292nd FDS assumed the responsibility for the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion finance records from the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion Personnel Section. Personnel from the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion Personnel Section are on special duty with the 292nd Finance for the purpose of maintaining the finance records for the battalion personnel.

2. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS: The following awards were received by individuals in the battalion during the reporting period:

   a. Silver Star 2
   b. Distinguished Flying Cross 38
   c. Soldier Medal 2
   d. Bronze Star "V" 7
   e. Bronze Star (Service) 50
f. Air Medal "V" 98

g. Air Medal 1542

h. Army Commendation "V" 1

i. Army Commendation 30

j. Purple Heart 34

k. Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry 6

3. COMMAND INFORMATION PROGRAM: Command information is first presented to new personnel arriving at the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion by means of a Command Orientation Pamphlet entitled Welcome to the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion - "First in Vietnam." The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion also publishes a weekly bulletin to keep the officers and enlisted men informed of the current situations. It covers duty rosters, notices of information, announcements of coming events, and chapel schedules. It also has a command information annex which covers a weekly topic of command wide importance. The Battalion also receives different weekly newspapers from the various units it supports e.g. 1st, 25th, and 9th Infantry Divisions. In addition to the above mentioned newspapers, the battalion also receives the Army Reporter, The Observer, Hawk Talk, Army News Features, and Commanders Digest. The weekly and monthly newspapers are supplemented by the daily distribution of the Stars and Stripes. Command information is further augmented by the weekly Commanders Call and the daily company formations.

4. CIVIC ACTIONS:

a. Presently, the Battalion's Civil Affairs Program is centered around the Battalion MEDCAP Team. The team has been making weekly trips to the Tai Hung Village, located on the Southern edge of War Zone D. Their accomplishments in providing medical aid are exemplified by the increasing number of villagers who gather around the MEDCAP team when they make their weekly visits to the village. Several projects are being planned by the MEDCAP team to improve the living conditions of these people. These include a preventive medicine project, assistance in construction of additional school facilities and possible teaching assistance.

b. Since the future of Vietnam lies in the hands of today's children, several members of the battalion have been conducting English classes for the children that live near Cong Ly street. Classes are held every Tuesday and Thursday evening. The attendance average is above 18 students.

5. INFORMATION PROGRAM:

a. Nightly operational summary of events is called in to the USARV Information Office each evening. The summary emphasizes hard news items rather than feature stories and is released daily to major news media.
b. Hometown news releases are made on each individual when he is assigned to the battalion with additional releases as the individual is mentioned in feature stories.

c. During this quarter, the following news items were dispatched:

(1) Feature stories 30.
(2) Feature pictures: 11.
(3) Hometown news releases 164.

6. Personnel Gains and Losses:

a. Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Gains</th>
<th>Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79</td>
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b. Enlisted

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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Gains</th>
<th>Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>227</td>
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F. (C) OPERATIONS:

1. COMBAT OPERATIONS:

a. This battalion is committed daily to tasks varying from combat support missions to reinforced battalion size combat assault operations. Battalion daily requirements for aircraft have been 10 UH-1D lift helicopters, one command and control helicopter, one maintenance helicopter, and four armed helicopters from each assault company; two UH-1D and 14 UH-1C/AH-1G armed helicopters from the 334th Armed Helicopter Company; and until their transfer 15 January 1968, 19 0-1 airplanes from the 74th Reconnaissance Airplane Company.

b. During the reporting period the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion has been involved in general support of III ARVN Corps and US Infantry Divisions operating in the III Corps Tactical Zone. The missions during the earlier part of the reporting period were oriented primarily toward the support of ARVN Divisions in the III Corps area; however, support of US Divisions increased during the months of December and January. During the period 16-18 January 1968, the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion supported the 101st Airborne Division (Operation San Angelo). This support included 2 battalion and 8 company size airmobile assaults lifting a total of 4937 troops during the initial phase of the operation. The battalion also provided general support for the division with a minimum of one assault helicopter company per day throughout the operation.
c. The test conducted by this battalion of habitually committing one assault company to the same ARVN division indicated this was not feasible due to the large difference in the amount of flight time required to support the different divisions. At present the companies are rotated among the divisions in an attempt to equalize the monthly flight time and the maintenance requirements throughout the aviation units. This has proven to be satisfactory for both the supported and supporting units and has not hindered the divisions in accomplishing their respective missions.

d. Liaison officers at the 5th and 25th ARVN Divisions continue to maintain rapport between the divisions and the assault helicopter companies.

e. **Statistical Summary:** Statistical data for the reporting period is indicated below with comparison figures for the preceding period.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Description</th>
<th>1967-68 Nov-Jan</th>
<th>1967 Aug-Oct</th>
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<tr>
<td>(1) Bn Combat Assaults</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Bn Extractions</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Bn Repositionings</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Co Combat Assaults</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Co Extractions</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Co Repositionings</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Flying Hours</td>
<td>40,649</td>
<td>47,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Passengers</td>
<td>143,602</td>
<td>121,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Cargo (Tons)</td>
<td>2,005</td>
<td>2,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Sorties</td>
<td>87,689</td>
<td>84,144</td>
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<tr>
<td>(11) Aircraft Hit</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) Aircraft Lost</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>(13) US WIA</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14) US KIA</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15) VC KIA</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(16) Structures Dest</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17) Sampans Dest</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>823</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. PHYSICAL SECURITY:

a. Phu Loi Airfield: During the majority of the reporting period the battalion had its 74th Reconnaissance Airplane Company stationed at Phu Loi, RVN. The security requirement of the company, in addition to the normal internal security, was to furnish personnel to man a 14 hour, three-man perimeter post. On 15 January 1968, the 74th Reconnaissance Airplane Company was transferred to the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion.

b. Bien Hoa Airbase:

(1) The 335th Assault Helicopter Company was stationed in the 173d Airborne Brigade area of the airbase. This unit has been TDY to the II Corps area since May, which has necessitated additional guard posts in the rear area to secure the equipment and personal items left behind. In addition to the normal internal security, this company provides personnel to man one 24 hour perimeter post and one 12 hour perimeter post. On 1 January 1968 the 335th received orders transferring them to the 17th Combat Aviation Group, thus releasing the extra guards provided by the Security Platoon.

(2) The remaining companies of this battalion are stationed on the Bien Hoa Airbase. Internal security is decentralized to company level. There are two battalion guard posts: the battalion ammo dump and the battalion motor pool.

c. Honour-Smith Compound: The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion was responsible for only 5 guard posts at Honour-Smith Compound during the month of November 1967. On 1 December the battalion assumed complete responsibility of the entire compound. This required a major adjustment in the strength, organization and operation of the Security Platoon. The thirteen posts on the compound include four 24 hour posts. The Security Platoon is billeted on the compound and maintains the security posture of the battalion headquarters.

d. Aircraft of the battalion are located at Bien Hoa and are in revetments.

e. The battalion has adequate defensive bunkers, OPs and LPs located throughout its area of responsibility. Work is continually in progress, improving and expanding passive bunkers for protection against mortars, small arms, etc.

3. TROOP MOVEMENTS:

a. The 335th Assault Helicopter Company remained in the central highlands in support of the 173d Airborne Brigade until it was reassigned to the 268th Combat Aviation Battalion on 1 January 1968, by General Order 6074, Hq, 1st Avn Bde, dated 31 December 1967.

b. The 190th Assault Helicopter Company returned to Bien Hoa from the I Corps area on 15 November 1967. This unit was performing missions in support of the 3d Marine Amphibious Force until 2 November 1967. At this time it moved to Duc Pho in support of the 198th Light Infantry Brigade of the American Division.
c. The 117th Assault Helicopter Company moved from Bao Loc in II Corps to the battalion area at Bien Hoa Air Base on 1 January 1968, where it began training with the assault companies of the battalion. This training ended 14 January 1968, and the unit began performing operational missions on 15 January 1968.

d. The 334th Armed Helicopter Company moved to Nakhon Phanom, Thailand on 27 November 1967 with 12 UH-1C armed helicopters and commenced training in preparation for a classified mission.

G. (U) TRAINING:

1. MANDATORY TRAINING:

a. Mandatory training, as outlined in USARV Regulation 350-1 and 12th Combat Aviation Group Training Memorandum 66-5 is being conducted between breaks in daily missions and at night by all units of this battalion. Emergency first aid procedures and aviator training to include aerial Gunnery are continually emphasized.

b. Classes regarding accidental discharge of firearms were conducted periodically during the period. The class objectives are the prevention of accidental discharge through careless handling or lack of knowledge of individual weapons.

2. PHYSICAL SECURITY TRAINING: A new physical security plan has been written and implemented for the battalion area at Bien Hoa Air Base. The battalion physical security officer has conducted rehearsals and instruction through announced and unannounced practice alerts. Emphasis has been placed on training of the reaction forces and proper functioning of the perimeter guards.

3. ASSIGNED TRAINING TASKS:

a. Two VNAF aviators completed flight training and received certificates at a graduation ceremony conducted at 12th Group Headquarters on 9 December 1967. Eight VNAF aviators joined the battalion on 15 December 1967 for training. Two of the aviators were assigned for transition training only. They completed an intensified ground school and transition training and were released to rejoin their squadron on 12 January 1968. The remaining six aviators are scheduled to complete transition training and fly with the assault companies for a period of ninety days. Transition training was conducted for these individuals in 20 days, and they are now flying operational missions with their respective assault companies.

b. Fifteen aviators and eight enlisted crewmembers from 3/17 Cavalry and ten aviators from 101st Airborne Division were given in-country orientation and flight training within the battalion. Individuals were attached to the assault helicopter companies stationed at Bien Hoa Air Base and received orientation training followed by participation in actual combat and combat support missions.

c. Aviators from the newly assigned 117th Assault Helicopter Company received training with companies of this battalion during the period 1 January to 15 January 1968.
d. LTC ... Argent of the Royal Australian Army was given orientation and flight training with this battalion during the period 15-28 December 1967. He was shown the various procedures used in planning an airmobile assault operation and then participated in actual combat operations.

e. Instruction on survival, escape, and evasion was presented to selected members of the battalion by representatives of the Naval Survival, Escape, and Evasion School in the Philippines.

4. SPONSORSHIP OF NEW UNITS: The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion sponsored the 308th Combat Aviation Battalion which was activated on 15 January 1968. This unit conducted necessary briefings and rendered necessary logistical support to assure that the battalion headquarters and personnel housing areas were established. The battalion also insured requirements delineated in USARV Regulation 220-10 were met.

H. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

1. Enemy activity accelerated greatly during the reporting period. The dry season brought large scale enemy movement, mostly to the north, and a marked increase in enemy initiated activity. Elements of the 88th NVA Regiment attacked the Song Be area on 27 October 1967 beginning a chain of events that may prove to be one of the major conflicts of the war. The enemy lost 134 KIA in that first attack. Early in November the enemy lost 860 KIA in five ground attacks against the sub-sector headquarters and CIDG compound at Loc Ninh. Bien Hoa Airbase was mortared on 5 November 1967 resulting in 1 Vietnamese civilian KIA, 5 WIA, 2 US military personnel slightly injured. On 6 December 1967 an unknown number of VC conducted a number of attacks in the yen Hoa area. The major attack appeared to have been directed toward the ARVN RF/PF compound, 400 meters southeast of Honour-Smith Compound. There were 5 friendly KIA and an unknown number of WIA. During November and December there were 4 sightings of unidentified high performance aircraft in the Cambodian border area. In mid-December, Operation YELLOWSTONE forces made numerous small contacts and captured vast quantities of rice, ammunition, etc. Near the year's end another large scale repositioning took place when the 271st and 272d VC Regiments moved westward into northern Tay Ninh Province. It is believed that they participated in the attack on Fire Support Base Burt in the waning hours of the New Year's cease fire. Again the enemy suffered heavy casualties. The Viet Cong are believed to have received an abundance of new and improved weapons during the reporting period. One such weapon that is being reported more and more in the III CTZ is the 122mm rocket. There is reported to be a new round for this weapon having a maximum range of 19,000 meters. The B-60 (RPG-2) and B-47 (RPG-7) rockets are also being employed more in this Corps Zone. Reports state that these weapons are being used in an anti-aircraft role. The VC violated the cease fire agreements in every Corps Zone in numerous instances. Again in most of these incidents he took many more casualties than he inflicted. The overall pattern of activity during the reporting period was as expected. The VC in this area were persistent in their endeavor to obtain a victory, but as yet have been unable to do so.

2. At 0300 hours 31 January 1968 a coordinated attack was launched against Bien Hoa Airbase, the Long Binh/Plantation Complex, Tan Son Nhut
Airbase and other installations in central III CTZ. These attacks were believed to be conducted by elements of the 271st and 272d VC Regiments. The first phase of these attacks included the employment of 122mm rockets and various calibers of mortars. This was followed by a massive ground attack with SA, AW, B-40, and B-41 rocket fire. Intelligence sources had reported the probability of such an attack and the 22th Combat Aviation Group had initiated OPLAN CHECKMATE. This OPLAN caused C&C ships to be airborne continuously throughout the night. At 0740 31 January the enemy blew up a portion of the Long Binh ammunition dump. The enemy was unable to break contact with the gun ships and suffered extremely heavy casualties. Fighting in central III CTZ continued throughout that day closing this quarter's activities.

I. (C) LOGISTICS:

1. CONSTRUCTION:

   a. The battalion completed construction on two barracks under Project 79 (Self-Help) during this period. Overall responsibility for support on our construction project has been assigned to 159th Engineer Group, 92d Engineer Battalion. During this period directives were sent out changing the scope of the project from all self-help to engineer troop construction except for the barracks construction program.

   b. The 335th Assault Helicopter Company was directed during the month of November to evacuate their area on the northeast corner of Bien Hoa Airbase. Provisions were made to relocate the unit to an area adjacent to the heliport south of the main runway. Due to this move, the portions of our construction direction relating to the 335th were cancelled.

   c. As of January 1968 the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion lost the 335th and gained the 117th Assault Helicopter Company. Due to the assignment of a new unit, minimum essential requirements were requested and furnished to complete a suitable area on Bien Hoa Airbase to accommodate the 117th. At the present time the enlisted men are billeted in tents on the airbase while officers and warrant officers have been provided BQ facilities in Honour-Smith Compound.

   d. Major Donald E. Van Pieterson has been assigned as special assistant to the commanding officer in charge of construction of the battalion cantonment area on the Bien Hoa Airbase. Construction should be completed and the facility ready for occupancy within the next five months.

2. HONOUR-SMITH COMPOUND:

   a. As of 20 November 1967 the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion assumed responsibilities as coordinator for the Honour-Smith Compound. In addition to the compound coordination function, the 145th now supplies 100% of the security force required at the compound.

   b. Utilities: The battalion has experienced considerable
difficulty with utilities maintained by P&ME civilian contractors. The Bien Hoa Power Station, water system and sewage systems became inoperative in late October and at present are not providing satisfactory service, primarily due to equipment breakdowns. Road maintenance continues to be negligible.

3. Supply: On 1 October 1967 all units of the battalion submitted requisitions to supporting supply for tropical hat with net. These items were received by mid-November. On 25 December 1967, USARV authorized 3 camouflage uniforms to each member of the Pathfinder Detachment and requisitions for these items have been submitted. All body armor in excess of authorized allowances was turned in to 12th Combat Aviation Group to be redistributed to units within Group.

J. (U) MAINTENANCE (Aircraft):

1. The lack of water has had an adverse effect on the maintenance of this battalion. Each engine intake area should be cleaned at each intermediate inspection, and more often if dusty or dirty conditions prevail. Clean intakes, filters and particle separators offer more torque available to the pilot.

2. The electrical supply source available to the battalion maintenance area has had numerous problems during the last few months. Since the majority of aircraft maintenance is performed at night, this reduces the efficiency of the maintenance effort. Lights are not available for the revetments and cause aircraft to be bunched at the hangar entrance for available light. This congested posture offers excellent targets for mortars or rocket attacks. This risk is accepted to offer more reliable maintenance with better light. A lighting system at the revetments and a reliable power source would greatly assist the over-extended maintenance program. The crew chief often must perform his pre-flight and post-flight with a flashlight.

3. The average aircraft availability for the reporting period was 70.3%. Aircraft were down for supply 9.9% and down for maintenance 19.8%.

K. (C) SIGNAL:

1. AN/ARC-119 RADIO TELETYPE SET: During the current reporting period three of this battalion's companies received AN/ARC-119 HF/SSB Radio Teletype Sets. This radio set now gives the battalion headquarters and units a long-needed capability of long distance teletype communications. The basic transceiver is the Collins 618T which is avionics repairable, dependable, and easy to operate. Under our present tactical situation only one unit is out of F/F range, however, a weekly practice net will be conducted to maintain operator proficiency in preparation for extended mission requirements.

2. MOBILE NCS: In keeping with the concept of flexibility and air-mobility during this reporting period, a 1/2 ton vehicle was converted into mobile NCS for rapid movement requirements. Presently the battalion headquarters utilizes generator power. It was determined that if this power
failed, or the generator were destroyed, it would be difficult to place a reliable replacement power system into operation, especially if it became necessary to relocate the headquarters due to enemy activity. A 1½ ton vehicle with a 100 amp system was wired and mounted with one AN/VRC-24 UHF radio and one VRC-47 FM radio. A rear seat from a salvaged jeep was modified to provide a platform on which a TSEC KY-8 mount, AN/FRC-74, and a rotary converter were mounted. Two additional rear seat clamp rests were added, enabling the platform to be placed into the rear seat area without requiring time for special mounting. With the vehicle arranged in this manner the battalion operations center radio communications capability is duplicated. In operation it provides one UHF station, two FM receivers and one transmit station, one FM secure capability, one HF/SSB station and 115 volt AC power for black out lights with one additional AC power source. This mobile NCS is operational in less than 15 minutes.

3. AN/ARC-134 VHF TRANSCEIVER: During the previous reporting period a high failure rate had been experienced with this item of equipment due to internal cooling difficulties. During this reporting period the cooling problem has been solved by Cobranett personnel by removing two inspection plates and replacing them with screens plus addition of a small air scoop. Prior to this modification, engine exhaust would travel the length of the tail rotor drive shaft tunnel and cause temperatures in the avionics compartment to become extremely high.

4. UH-1 ELECTRONICS BENCH LOCKUP: During this reporting period the 282d Signal Detachment solved a problem that had given some trouble, that of checking aircraft sets quickly after repair. They constructed a bench console utilizing aircraft wiring, and an impedance pad so that UHF, VHF, FM and HF radio checks may be completed on the bench making their operation considerably more efficient.

5. DECCA: Recently the 282d Signal Detachment which has the only Decca repairman in the battalion, discovered a simple but easily made modification that once completed improves the set’s operation, by placing a strip of masking tape over the four buttons of the display head control. Dust that previously had been a primary cause of failure of this device is kept out. The tape is flexible enough to allow movement without tearing, and is easily replaced.

L. (C) SAFETY:

ACCIDENTS, INCIDENTS, AND LOSSES:

1. DISCUSSION: During the reporting period, the battalion experienced 14 accidents, 8 incidents, 2 forced landings, and 4 precautionary landings. The major accidents include 3 fatal accidents resulting in 9 deaths. One significant ground accident resulted in 3 deaths. Resultant monetary damage from above accidents and incidents totaled $1,982,500.00.

2. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

a. Major Charles R. Byrd was assigned to the battalion as safety officer effective 20 January 1968. This battalion has not had a full time safety officer since 28 September 1967.
b. On 11 December 1967 a UH-1D crashed as a result of an engine failure shortly after takeoff. Exact cause of engine failure is unknown. However, it is suspected that a faulty EGT gauge allowed the engine to be operated with excessive EGT without being monitored as such. The EGT gauge read approximately 40 degrees low during a calibration check.

c. On 26 December 1967 a UH-1D crashed and burned during a Firefly mission. The cause of the accident is unknown. All five personnel aboard were killed.

d. On 2 January 1968 a UH-1D made a night approach to an unlighted airfield and encountered dust conditions. Both pilots experienced dis-orientation and flew between two other UH-1s which were parked on the left side of the airfield. Three personnel were killed and aircraft damage totaled $362,000.00.

e. Two other major accidents occurred on 2 and 17 January 1968 as a result of dust.

f. On 5 November 1967 a grenade exploded in a UH-1D during shut down. The aircraft exploded and burned three personnel.

1. (U) FLIGHT STANDARIZATION: The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion Standardization Program has been improved during this reporting period. A problem area had developed in the flight standardization area due to the fact that the Battalion SIP was also Officer in charge of the battalion operations center. The majority of his effort was directed toward battalion operations and flight standardization had become a secondary duty. The battalion S-3 section was reorganized with an assistant S-3 for standardization and training officer and an assistant S-3 for operations. This reorganization has allowed the SIP to devote the majority of his time to flight standardization. He flies with the units during operational missions in order to detect discrepancies which need to be emphasized by unit IPs. The result of the SIP's work has allowed him to give timely recommendations to commanders, unit IPs and individual aviators.

2. (U) MEDICAL:

1. The battalion dispensary continues to function as a consolidated battalion facility, providing equal support to all companies in the battalion. The average daily sick call is 25-30 patients and immunizations and flight physicals are given following daily sick call. No unusual problems have arisen in the past three months. The major diagnostic difficulty continues to be the difference between non-specific urethritis and acute gonococcal urethritis. Considerable progress has been made in solving this diagnostic dilemma since the acquisition of an incubator for bacteriologic culturing.

2. A battalion field sanitation team has formed to oversee problems in this area at battalion level. This team made a detailed study of the water supply, chlorination and drainage in the battalion area and pointed out a number of serious problems, most of which were attributed to failure of P&E to provide maintenance on those systems. Steps for correction of the problems were suggested but have not yet been acted upon, despite repeated promises by supporting agencies to do so without delay.

3. The present plan for handling mass casualty situations remains
intact, but in addition a crash alert plan has been affected. A hot line from the helipad control tower to the dispensary was installed and an ambulance specially equipped with supplies for handling burns was set up. In the case of a helicopter crash on our own helipad, casualties should be better handled in the future.
SECTION II
OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

PART I

A. (U) PERSONNEL: None

B. (C) OPERATIONS:

   a. ITEM: Airmobile assaults are being made along or adjacent to waterways in an attempt to locate and destroy known enemy forces.
   b. DISCUSSION: In most assaults of this type an appreciable amount of sampans and/or boat traffic is initiated on the waterways by civilian personnel in an attempt to vacate the area where the assault is being conducted. In many instances enemy personnel have forced the civilians to extract them from the area and have been positively identified by armed helicopter crews. Even though identified, the enemy cannot be engaged due to the possibility of injuring friendly civilians.
   c. OBSERVATION: When planning operations of this nature every effort should be made to provide a friendly force on the waterway to detain and search the fleeing sampans to preclude an avenue of escape for enemy forces.

2. Firefly Scheduling.
   a. ITEM: Nightly Firefly schedule has remained unchanged for an extended period of time.
   b. DISCUSSION: Firefly is a recurring mission performed in the III Corps area on a nightly basis. It has become stereotyped to the extent that we can assume the scheduled time in any given area will be 1930-2030; 2400-0100; and 0200-0300 hours nightly. The indications are that the enemy has become aware of these items by observing the aircraft perform the mission in an unchanging time sequence. This is evidenced by the fact that enemy activities have been occurring between these time periods or when the Firefly teams are in another area.
   c. OBSERVATION: Firefly mission should be scheduled on a more random basis encompassing all of the available night time flying hours.

3. Acoustics Detector System.
   a. ITEM: Acoustics detector system for AH-1G.
   b. DISCUSSION: The pilots of AH-1G type aircraft are unaware of ground fire being directed toward the aircraft due to the completely enclosed canopy. Several experiments have been conducted by this unit and the fact that pilots are unaware they are receiving fire until the aircraft is hit in the forward section has been substantiated.
   c. OBSERVATION: ENSURE action regarding the ground fire detection device submitted to ACSFOR should be acted upon as soon as possible.

CONFIDENTIAL

   a. **ITEM:** Securing safety lever on hand grenades prior to boarding Army aircraft.

   b. **DISCUSSION:** In one instance during the reporting period an explosion occurred in an aircraft during passenger unloading. The most probable cause of this incident was the inadvertent arming and subsequent detonation of a hand grenade. This explosion was probably the result of the safety ring being pulled after becoming entangled with another item of equipment. This incident resulted in the complete destruction of the helicopter, 3 KIA, and an aviator severely burned.

   c. **OBSERVATION:** Personnel carrying hand grenades in Army aircraft should secure safety ring and lever prior to boarding the aircraft. Safety rings and levers can be secured with tape without restriction in response time when needed and be safely transported aboard aircraft.

5. Aerial Parachute Flares.

   a. **ITEM:** Use of aerial parachute flares during emergency night operations.

   b. **DISCUSSION:** On several occasions during the reporting period the units of the battalion were required to perform emergency night operations. In one instance a helicopter was extracted at night by CH-47. The use of the Mark 24 Flare proved invaluable during this extraction. These flares were dropped from a UH-1D on order of the command and control aircraft over the extraction site.

   c. **OBSERVATION:** This technique should be used to assist in the extraction of aircraft forced down in late afternoon. This would allow the aircraft to be removed to a secure area and preclude the possibility of destruction or booby traps being placed in and around the helicopter.

6. Use of Aircraft Smoke Dispensing Devices.

   a. **ITEM:** Use of smoke to aid in the extraction of downed aircraft.

   b. **DISCUSSION:** Another technique used to assist in the extraction of downed aircraft by the battalion is a smoke screen laid by a UH-1C equipped with a smoke dispensing device. When the extraction site is subject to enemy fire, this smoke screen can be used very effectively if the smoke dispensing aircraft flies a 360 degree pattern around the downed aircraft. After the initial pattern is flown the aircraft moves inside the initial smoke ring and continues to discharge the smoke around the recovery site.

   c. **OBSERVATION:** The aircraft transporting the rigging crew to downed aircraft should be equipped with a smoke dispensing device to be used if the rigging crew or recovery aircraft are engaged by enemy fire.
CONFIDENTIAL

7. Ammunition Resupply by UH-1D.

a. ITEM: Increased use of sling loads for UH-1D.

b. DISCUSSION: On numerous occasions UH-1D aircraft are utilized for emergency ammunition resupply into areas where ground units are in contact with enemy forces. Minimum ground time is necessary to reduce vulnerability, but unloading of ammunition can cause lengthy delays and require the aircraft to remain on the ground for extended periods of time.

c. OBSERVATION: The use of the sling load would increase the safety margin for aircraft supporting ground units in contact by allowing rapid discharge of cargo and eliminating ground time.

C. (U) TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION: None.

D. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

1. SECURITY:

a. ITEM: Physical security.

b. DISCUSSION: Intelligence sources and agencies in the Bien Hoa area have improved greatly in the past months. In each instance of hostility in or around Bien Hoa, Military Intelligence agents have gained prior knowledge of the incident, evaluated it properly, and informed friendly units within the area. Having such knowledge enables the commander to effectively plan his defenses.

c. OBSERVATION: Liaison with agencies such as Military Security Service (MSS), National Police, Dong Nei Sensitive Area, Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) and local Military Intelligence has proved most valuable in the past and hopefully will become even more productive in the future. To accomplish a rapport with these agencies it is necessary to go to their headquarters and relate to them your unit's identification, mission, and areas of interest.

E. (U) LOGISTICS: None.

F. (U) MAINTENANCE:

1. HYDRAULICS SPECIALIST:

a. ITEM: Lack of hydraulics specialist.

b. DISCUSSION: Hydraulics work in the maintenance detachments is to be accomplished by 67N20 mechanics under the present TOE. Hydraulics repair requirements are multiplying annually, especially with the weapons system now used on UH-C and AH-1G aircraft.

c. OBSERVATION: Specially trained hydraulics personnel are required in armed helicopter companies and should be organic to the service.
platoon. Currently, additional on-the-job training and cross training are required to fill this void.

2. **New Equipment Augmentation:**
   
   a. **Item:** New equipment augmentation.
   
   b. **Discussion:** AH-1G Cobras were assigned this quarter to the armed helicopter company. At this time the transportation detachment supporting the armed helicopter company does not have personnel authorized for the maintenance of AH-1G weapons systems. The combined number of 45J20 personnel organic to the company and the detachment is six. This number is barely adequate to maintain weapon systems on the UH-1C aircraft.
   
   c. **Observation:** An operational AH-1G unit cannot sustain its weapons maintenance without the addition of one 45J20 per aircraft being assigned in addition to the 2d and 3d echelon maintenance section of the unit. The MOS previously authorized, 11E20, is not considered suitable since firing the weapons is no longer required. This information is reflected in the proposed MTOE previously submitted by this unit.

3. **Particle Separator:**

   a. **Item:** Installation of the particle separator.
   
   b. **Discussion:** If installed on an overhauled engine that is approaching tolerance limits, the sand and particle separator has a much larger effect than normally encountered on the available shaft horsepower. This has been evidenced in this unit on two separate occasions. There was four additional pounds of torque available with the particle separator removed.
   
   c. **Observation:** Overhaul tolerances need to be re-evaluated and tested under the operating conditions experienced in this area. If these tolerances are correct then it is recommended that when necessary the engine be operated without the particle separator. Even though this will shorten the TBO for the engine, it will provide an acceptable engine for a shorter period of time rather than having to remove a recently installed engine because of unsatisfactory performance.

4. **Tail Rotor (AH-1G):**

   a. **Item:** Tail rotor drive shaft (AH-1G).
   
   b. **Discussion:** The #2 drive shaft blower couplings have caused some problems to date. Bonding separation occurred in many instances.
   
   c. **Observation:** The blower couplings are rubber bonded to the #2 drive shaft by four fingers to drive the oil cooler blower. The rubber in the -1 type coupling was found to be unsatisfactory. A new type rubber was used to make the -3 type oil cooler blower coupling. This coupling is bonded to the drive shaft by four fingers also. The -5 coupling is bonded to the drive shaft by eight fingers in eight places;
therefore this -5 coupling is much stronger than either the -1 or -3 types. EIRs have been submitted on this item on numerous occasions.

G. (C) SIGNAL:

1. COMAND CONSOLES AN/ASC-10 .ND-N/ASC-11:
   a. ITEM: Excess weight and bulk of present consoles.
   b. DISCUSSION: Due to a lack of command consoles in this battalion's aviation units, a company C&C aircraft was modified by including a second AN/RC-54 with existing aircraft radios. The radio was wired through position four on the C-1611 intercom control. In effect this duplicates the capabilities of present command consoles. Of course the crew is restricted to some degree in their use of the FM sets; however, since they support ground units entirely, the ground commander has use of both FM sets. The aircraft commander makes his transmissions on UHF. The trend in this battalion has been toward miniaturization as much as possible to include removal of command consoles at company level. It has been the experience of this battalion during a large operation that the battalion command and control party are the only personnel who have benefitted by using a command console, since company commanders normally use their aircraft as a lift ship or carry a large C&C party. With an additional aircraft FM radio built into the ship, the bulky console may be removed, giving considerable freedom inside the aircraft for a company level operation. The original idea for a command console came from commander's mounting ground radios or aircraft radios in their aircraft. However, they were mounted in small right enclosures that took a minimum of space. Our present consoles, although they perform well, are spurned because of their size and weight.
   c. OBSERVATION: An effort should be made to construct a more compact console no larger than the size of aircraft FM and UHF aircraft sets, or provisions should be made for additional radios to be built into existing avionics compartments. The C-1611 could be modified to handle additional radio sets, depending on a unit's mission requirements. A new intercom control could be developed to give flexibility to special mission requirements at company level.

2. AN/TRC-146 HF/SSB GROUND STATION:
   a. ITEM: RWI phone patch.
   b. DISCUSSION: The AN/TRC-146 HF/SSB ground station (as reported last period) has been an outstanding addition to this unit's mission capability. There is only one difficulty however, and that is with its phone patch capability. When a party wishes to make an RWI call an operator must key and unkey the set for the calling party. The VOX circuit works only with the telephone to which the radio is connected. Calls may be placed quite easily with good quality.
   c. OBSERVATION: The phone patch circuit of the AN/TRC-146 cannot be keyed through a telephone system by voice transmission. Suggest that a refinement of this circuit be made.
3. **AIRMObILE MESSAGE CENTER:**
   a. **ITEM:** Storage and operating area.
   b. **DISCUSSION:** This battalion has previously expressed the need for a TOE airmobile message center. The AN/MGC-9 shelter that is presently being utilized as this battalion's message center provides us an example of an air transportable, storage and operating area for cryptographic equipment.
   c. **OBSERVATION:** An airmobile message center of S-190A shelter size should be provided for use at battalion level.

4. **CRYPTO SECURITY:**
   a. **ITEM:** Aviation company airmobile message center.
   b. **DISCUSSION:** With the advent of TSEC KY-28, TSEC KW-7, and TSEC KY-8 equipment at company level, a facility should be provided that would be similar to the battalion communications center for both storage and operation.
   c. **OBSERVATION:** An airmobile message center should be provided for use at aviation company level for operation of secure teletype and storage of cryptographic equipment. This requirement will provide security emphasis when companies operate in remote locations.

5. **UHF GROUND RADIO FOR AVIATION UNITS:**
   a. **ITEM:** AN/VRC-24 UHF radio reliability.
   b. **DISCUSSION:** The AN/VRC-24 ground UHF radio, presently the only ground station UHF set available to aviation units, has not been dependable, especially for continuous duty. Its primary difficulties are (a) overheating, (b) vibrations as a result of normal operation will disturb the transmitter and cause it to fail on certain frequencies, (c) vehicle movement with the set mounted is restricted because of vibration difficulties, (d) unless the set is allowed at least ten minutes to warm up, damage may result to power amplifier tubes. The set does not take advantage of the 50 KC channel separation as does the AN/ARC-51 EX aircraft set. An EIR has been submitted describing these difficulties.
   c. **OBSERVATION:** A ground UHF station similar to the AN/TRC-146 HF/SSB ground station should be constructed, utilizing AN/ARC-51 EX components.
b. DISCUSSION: It has been determined that a large portion of AN/ARC-54 radio failures have been caused by pilots not allowing two minutes warm up time as outlined in the operating instructions. Power amplifier tube schematic number V803 type A0 984 will fail if the set is not allowed to warm up two minutes prior to keying the transmitter. Pilots have been instructed of this requirement; however, the tactical situation does not always permit observing the warm up time.

c. OBSERVATION: A delay circuit should be incorporated in the AN/ARC-54 similar to those found in certain HF sets that would prevent this happening, or a transistorized power amplifier section should be designed that would give an "instant on" capability.

H. (U) MEDICAL:

1. SANITATION:

b. DISCUSSION: Under present regulations including USARV Regulation 40-19 dated November 1967, each company is to appoint a two man environmental sanitation team consisting of an NCO and another enlisted man. The function of this team is to conduct within the unit area special control operations essential to the establishment and maintenance of a healthful environment for the unit's personnel. Its field of concern includes, primarily, mess and water sanitation, insect and rodent control, waste disposal and preventive medicine. The concept of such a team was based on the deployment of company size units to the field. However, the requirements in the field of aviation medicine are somewhat different since most companies, including all those presently in this battalion, are located at semi-permanent or permanent installations which are usually battalion size or larger. In the past three months a battalion level environmental sanitation team has been appointed to supplement the company teams. This team, consisting of an NCO who has a MOS of preventive medicine and a specialist who has a MOS of water sanitation, has completely assumed many of the functions required of the company level teams. This has resulted in a much better quality of supervision over the problems within their area of concern. There are two major advantages resulting from the appointment of this team. First, these personnel are highly trained and highly motivated to perform the function of the sanitation teams. Secondly, the appointment of this team without other functions has made it possible to exert regular and careful supervision of sanitation conditions in the battalion area and to make and implement practical suggestions for the solution of many problems. This had not been effectively done heretofore because the company level sanitation teams were composed of men who took this responsibility secondary to their full time jobs elsewhere in the company's operations.

c. OBSERVATION: The appointment of a battalion level sanitation team has resulted in far superior control over field sanitation conditions that was possible using individual company level teams. It is suggested that aviation units located at semi-permanent or permanent installations of battalion or larger size be authorized this two man team in their Headquarters Medical Section. They would be used to back up company teams and would not replace the teams presently formed at company level.
2. GONORRHEA:

a. ITEM: Diagnosis and treatment of Gonorrhea.

b. DISCUSSION: Within the past three months, an incubator for bacteriological culturing was acquired for the battalion dispensary and a laboratory specialist received two weeks of OJT in bacteriology at the 946th Mobile Laboratory in Long Binh. Subsequently, all cases of urethral discharge have been cultured in an effort to distinguish between acute gonococcal urethritis and nonspecific urethritis. Since this distinction has been made on the basis of actual bacteriologic cultures and specific treatment for the diagnosis instituted, i.e., large doses of penicillin for gonorrhea and a broad spectrum antibiotic for nonspecific urethritis, no failures in treatment have occurred.

c. OBSERVATION: The use of bacteriologic cultures allows more accurate diagnosis of patients with urethral discharge suggestive of acute gonococcal urethritis and has resulted in the elimination of failures in therapy. Perhaps all dispensaries of sufficient size should have equipment for bacteriological cultures included in their TO&E.

I. (C) SAFETY:

1. PILOT ERROR:

a. ITEM: Pilot error accidents.

b. DISCUSSION: During the past three months, several accidents have occurred where pilot error was present. All those accidents occurred during combat assault missions either in hot LZs or dusty PZs.

c. OBSERVATION: Company and unit level standardization programs must be utilized to maximum extent in order to reduce pilot error type accidents. Pilots must be aware of the dangers involved in loss of RHI, tail rotor strikes, main rotor strikes, etc., and must make every effort to minimize these occurrences.

J. (U) FLIGHT STANDARDIZATION:

1. TRAINING FLIGHTS:

a. ITEM: Training.

b. DISCUSSION: Recently the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion has had several major accidents involving inadvertent IFR in dust and loss of RHI on takeoff. Seeking all means to prevent these accidents, a hard look has been taken at the existing standardization program. The Battalion has been performing the required 90 day standardization rides. The emphasis on these flights has been to practice emergency procedures i.e., autorotations, hydraulics off landings, tail rotor failure landings, etc.

c. OBSERVATION: While the emphasis on emergency landings is of course necessary, it is probably more important to evaluate basic aircraft control and pilot judgement. At the battlefield the tested aviator merely
conforms to standard procedures and IP or tower instructions. Where our accidents happen, however, are in the field on combat operations. Our unit SIPs and IPs are now encouraged whenever possible to conduct their evaluation checkrides on actual operational flights. They stop at a suitable airfield and do emergency procedures at the end of their mission. If for some reason it is not practical to fly with an aviator on a mission at least the IP requires the aviator to adequately perform all of the basic maneuvers on the checkride.

2. Evaluation of Standardization Program.
   
   a. **ITEM**: Reporting results of checkrides.
   
   b. **DISCUSSION**: As a result of reviewing the Battalion Standardization Program it also became apparent that unit IPs were not in some cases keeping their unit commanders informed. It is easy to overlook lazy performance by an aircraft commander who is also a good friend. It is also easy for the inexperienced unit IP to tolerate marginal performance by new aviators.
   
   c. **OBSERVATION**: A formal checkride grade slip has been prepared for the use of the unit IPs. This is a comprehensive grade slip to be filled out in duplicate. One copy is to be retained in the individual's flight records or operations. The second copy is to go to the unit commander. This latter copy is designed to positively keep the unit commander abreast with the work of his IPs and the capabilities of his aviators.

3. Unit Instructor Pilots.
   
   a. **ITEM**: Attitude of Unit IPs.
   
   b. **DISCUSSION**: The success or failure of the Battalion Standardization Program depends on the unit IP. He, in conjunction with strong unit leadership, is responsible to reduce the needless slaughter of aircrews and passengers because of accidents.
   
   c. **OBSERVATION**: The Battalion Standardization Officer holds group and individual IP meetings. The purpose of these meetings are to reaffirm the tremendous sense of responsibility each IP must have. The IP must realize he has no "friends" where incompetence is concerned. He must share the blame for unreported incompetence that eventually will kill personnel and/or destroy aircraft.
SECTION II
PART II
RECOMMENDATIONS

A. (U) PERSONNEL: None.

B. (C) OPERATIONS:

1. That the safety lever on all hand grenades be secured with tape prior to being transported aboard Army aircraft.

2. That aerial parachute flares be used to aid in the extraction of downed aircraft from unsecure areas during the hours of darkness.

C. (U) TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION: None.

D. (U) INTELLIGENCE: None.

E. (U) LOGISTICS: None.

F. (U) MAINTENANCE: None.

G. (C) SIGNAL:

1. That a refinement of the phone patch circuit of the AN/TRC-146 be made which will allow it to be keyed through a telephone system by voice transmission.

2. That an airborne message center be provided aviation battalion level to provide operation of secure teletype circuits and storage of cryptographic equipment.

H. (U) MEDICAL: None.

I. (U) SAFETY: None.

J. (U) FLIGHT STANDARDIZATION: None.

"FIRST IN VIETNAM"

/THOMAS M. DEETS
ROBERT M. DEETS
LTC, Artillery
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) for Period Ending 31 January 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96266 26 February 1968

THRU: Commanding General, II FFORCEV, APO 96266

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310


2. No comments or recommendations were made on the observations or recommendations of the battalion commander.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES E. LYBRAND
Major, Infantry
Asst Adjutant

DA, HQ II FORCEN, APO San Francisco 96266 9 MAR 1968

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVRA-D, APO 96307


Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This command has reviewed the attached ORLL of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion and concurs with the report with the following comment: Page 17, B2. This problem has been recognized and Firefly flights are flown at random times.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

E. W. McGrath
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
AVBA-C (2 Feb 68) 3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U) (UIC: WCYNABH)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
        Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, DA (AGSFOR DA),
    Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

2. The following additional comment is considered pertinent: Sec II, Para C-1, page 21; The addition of an FM transceiver is an unauthorized modification to the UH-1 electronic configuration; however, it is recognized that the present command console is bulky. The actual requirement for the command console depends upon the unit's tactical operating procedures and in many cases the company commander is the air mission commander for battalion size operations. Command consoles are authorized and available for issue to include Assault Helicopter Companies.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JAMES M. GOLDMANN
LT. AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 4 APR 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning acoustical detector system for AH-1G, page 17, paragraph 3. An Airborne Acoustical Ground Fire Detector System designed for the UH-1 helicopter in RVN was evaluated by the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) during the period 2 March to 19 May 1967. Based upon this evaluation, the following recommendations were made:

      (1) Expedited action be taken to correct all deficiencies and configuration of a system for use on the AH-1G and OH-6 helicopters be made.

      (2) CONUS testing be conducted to insure correction of all deficiencies determined during the evaluation. Upon successful completion of CONUS testing, it is anticipated that sufficient quantities will be requested for operational use.

   b. Reference item concerning excess weight and bulk of present command consoles, page 21, paragraph Gl.

      (1) The weight and size of the communications command console has been reduced considerably since the introduction of the ASC-5, 6 console series. USAECOM is presently in the procurement stage for a lightweight command console utilizing the light observation helicopter avionics package. This will further reduce the weight and size of the present consoles by 60% without any loss of FM-UHF radio or headset capability. Further, this headquarters has just received plans for a palletized AN/ARC-54, KY-28 configuration which will accomplish the same task as that described in the ORLL, with the exception that it will conform to tempest security requirements.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
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(2) The use of the AN/ARC-54 as described in the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion ORLL compromises the security of FM transmissions even when a KY-28 is installed. This headquarters has expressly directed that no unauthorized entries be made into the aircraft wiring system, reference message AVHGG 87263, dated 25 November 1967. These modifications should be removed immediately.

c. Reference item concerning RWI phone patch, page 21, paragraph 2; and page 26, paragraph G1: Concur. The advantage of being able to key the AN/TRC-146 through a telephone system by voice transmission is recognized. Local USAECOM Area Office representatives indicate that a modification to the TRC-146 is not required and that proper tuning and correct operation procedures will enable the VOX to operate properly. Coordination with the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion and the 1st Aviation Brigade indicates that the problem still exists, but is considered to be only a minor inconvenience. Action is being taken by the USAECOM Area Office to provide guidance and assistance to AN/TRC-146 users.

d. Reference item concerning storage and operating area, page 22, paragraph 3; and page 26, paragraph G2: Concur. A shelter for unit communications center operation and storage of cryptographic equipment is desirable. This unit should initiate MTOE action to obtain authority for required equipment. The type of shelter should be based on operating procedure, mission assignment, and mobility requirements.

3. (U) Correct Unit Identification Code is WCYNAAA.

4. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Copies furnished:
HQ 145th Cbt Avn Bn
HQ 1st Avn Bde

G. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 2 3 APR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
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