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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 23RD ARTILLERY GROUP
APO 96289

AVGI-C

9 February 1968


THEU: Commanding Officer
II Field Force Vietnam, Artillery
ATTN: AVFB-FAC
APO 96266

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVH3C-DST
APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GPGP-OT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION 1 (C)

. (C) PERSONNEL:


b. Significant SI activities

(1) Reduction of rotational humps for 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery was completed.

(2) Reduction of rotational humps for 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery was initiated by Headquarters, USARV. A total of 67 EM
were infused with the 4th Infantry Division on 8 and 20 January 1968. No other infusion is planned for the Battalion. Headquarters, USAV is planning to assign approximately 30 EM to the Battalion in February to reduce the detrimental effects of a large rotation in March 1968.

c. The 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery minus Battery B, two (2) Forward Observer sections and the Metro section returned from attachment to the Americal Division and came under 23d Group control in January 1968. The status of the elements remaining with the Americal Division was not defined as of the end of the reporting period. Request was made to Headquarters, USAV for a definitive breakdown of responsibilities of commanders concerned to preclude personnel administration problems.

d. Casualties as a result of hostile action increased during the reporting period with 1 KIA and 35 WIA. Nonhostile casualties decreased with 0 death and 5 injuries.

e. Awards presented during this period decreased mainly due to the decrease in rotations. There were 54 Bronze Stars, 65 Air Medals, 43 Army Commendation Medals, 15 Purple Hearts and 1 Soldier’s Medal awarded.

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE

a. The visual reconnaissance (VR) program suffered a cutback of 4 of the 5 allocated daily mission O-1 aircraft. However, judicious management of remaining assets, coupled with close monitoring and exclusion from the Group’s VR coverage of areas falling under the responsibility of other major US units has enabled the Group to cover its VR areas relatively adequately.

b. The following number of security clearances was granted or validated during the reporting period: Top Secret Validation: 25; Secret Validations: 147; Secret (Final) granted: 41.

c. During the reporting period, elements of the Group collectively flew 1176 VR missions consisting of 2647 VR hours. 944 significant sights were made and 591 fire missions were conducted by aerial observers performing VR missions.

3. (C) TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

a. Major emphasis in the area of training was placed on the training of howitzer/gun sections and fire direction centers. This was
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done to aid in the reduction of artillery firing incidents.

b. The program developed in the 23d Artillery Group consisted of gunnery proficiency tests for officers and fire direction center personnel and gunner tests for howitzer gun crews conducted by the battalion. At the Group level and Unannounced Proficiency Test (UPT) was developed and to date five (5) Group Batteries have been tested. The objectives behind this program are to review basic artillery principles and evaluate the proficiency of the Group units.

c. In-country replacement training for 23d Group personnel was accomplished at the training centers of the major maneuver elements in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

d. A fourth firing battery was organized in the 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery. This organization was accomplished by using Battalion assets with some augmentation from Group and based on a projected employment of from 3-6 months.

e. Two battalions in the Group received the 90mm and 106mm recoilless rifles on a temporary loan basis to supplement the defense structure of isolated fire support patrol bases. Orientation and training were conducted on these weapons to include practice firings.

4. (C) OPERATIONS

a. 23d Artillery Group continued support of operations in the III Corps Tactical Zone throughout the reporting period. The Group Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and all Battalions assigned to the Group were engaged in training, troop movements or operations the entire reporting period.

b. The major troop movements during the reporting period were the move of the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery minus Battery B from Due Pho to Bien Hoa, and the subsequent move of Battery C from Bien Hoa to Thu Rai. The move of the Battalion minus to Bien Hoa was accomplished by LST. The move of Battery C was accomplished by airlift. Both moves were completed without incident.

c. The Headquarters and Headquarters Battery continued command, control and support functions from Phu Loi. Primary operational support function was establishing liaison with the major units, US and ARVN, operating in the III Corps Tactical Zone and the Capital Military District. This liaison proved to be a most valuable asset in anticipating future employment of Group assets to best support current and future operations.
The 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (155mm Towed) with Battery C, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery attached began the reporting period providing general support to the Americal Division from its base at Duc Pho. The Battalion continued this support until 2 January 1968 when the move to the III Corps Tactical Zone was initiated. This move was completed on 10 January 1968 when the final elements of the Battalion closed at Bien Hoa. Battery C began support of 9th Infantry Division Operations on 11 January. On 14 January Battery A was attached to the 101st Airborne Division and airlifted to Song Be and continued support of 1st Brigade operations in that area until the end of the reporting period. On 26 January Battery C was attached to the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and was airlifted to Phu Bai to support operations in that area. The Headquarters and Service Batteries are currently located at Bien Hoa.

e. The 2d Battalion, 15th Artillery (105mm Towed) began the reporting period with a mission of General Support - Reinforcing the 1st Infantry Division Artillery. Battery A was attached to the 25th Infantry Division providing support to the 3d Brigade. On 2 November Battery C was attached to the 1st Infantry Division and airlifted to Loc Ninh (XU7309). During the period 2-5 November, maneuver forces in the Loc Ninh area battled a regimental size force. Battery C fired 1001 rounds during this period and was credited with forty-three (43) VC killed by their supporting fires. On 11 November Battery A relieved Battery C in place. Battery A continued support of 1st Infantry Division Operations until 16 November. Battery C reverted to Battalion control and was emplaced in Phu Loi. On 15 November the Battalion began the first phase of assuming a Direct Support mission to the 5th ARVN Ranger Group by displacing Battery B to Thu Duc to support the 30th ARVN Ranger Battalion. In addition Battery D was organized by taking two howitzer sections from Batteries E and C and forming Headquarters, FDC and support elements from Headquarters and Service Batteries. This resulted in three (3) four howitzer Batteries, B, C and D, and one (1) six howitzer Battery, A. Battery D was given an intense two (2) week training program which was completed on 30 November. On 30 November and 1 December Headquarters Battery displaced to Cat Lai, Service Battery displaced to Long Binh and Battery C displaced to Binh Chanh. On 1 December the Battalion assumed the mission of Direct Support 5th ARVN Ranger Group with territorial responsibilities to the Capital Military District (CMĐ). On 15 December Battery D displaced to Nha Be completing the phase out of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade and the 2d Battalion, 40th Artillery from the CMĐ. On 16 December the Battalion Headquarters displaced to the CMĐ compound in Saigon placing it in a better position to provide the artillery support required. From 1 December through 31 January the Battalion minus Battery A supported
Ranger Group operations displacing a forward command post element and firing units when required. In its territorial support role the Battalion provide artillery fire to vital installations in and around Saigon. Battery A was attached to the 101st Airborne Division and displaced to Phuoc Binh (YU1506) on 7 January. This was Battery A's status as of the end of the reporting period.

f. The 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery (155mm Self Propelled) began the reporting period with the mission of General Support - Reinforcing the 25th Infantry Division Artillery. On 15 November the Battalion Headquarters provided a control element for Battery A, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery; Battery A, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery and Battery A, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery for the initial phases of 25th Infantry Division Operation Atlanta. The Battalion control element returned to Dau Tieng on 19 November. Battery A was attached to the 25th Infantry Division and continued support until the conclusion of the operation. On 6 December the Battalion was attached to the 25th Infantry Division to support Operation Yellowstone. Battery B, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery (8 inch self propelled) was attached to the Battalion for this operation. The Battalion was displaced to Fire Support Patrol Base (FSFB) Knox (XT2778). Battery A was released from Operation Yellowstone on 15 December after supporting from FSFB Ord (XT0976). Battery A continued support of 25th and 1st Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division Operations for the remainder of the reporting period. Battery C was released from Operation Yellowstone on 24 January and displaced to Phu Loi to provide General Support to the Phu Loi area.

g. The 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (6 inch/175mm self propelled) began the reporting period with the mission of General Support-Reinforcing the 1st Infantry Division Artillery. The Battalion supported numerous Special Forces operations during the reporting period with forward observers, liaison parties and artillery fires. On 21 December Battery C closed out its base camp in Phuc Vinh and displaced to Phu Loi. A heavy artillery position was under construction at Loc Ninh and the battery displaced to that position on 25 January. The Battalion Headquarters closed its base camp in Phuc Vinh on 9 January and displaced to Quan Loi where a new base camp position was occupied. On three (3) occasions during the reporting period a 155mm towed howitzer platoon from Battery B, 1st Battalion, 24th Artillery was attached to the Battalion and emplaced at Special Forces Camps to provide Direct Support artillery for Special Forces Operations. Battery A supported 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment operations and Battery B assumed the mission of General Support-Reinforcing the 101st Airborne Division Artillery on 11 January. Throughout the reporting period the Battalion followed a program of attacking known, hardened, enemy targets with heavy artillery fires.
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h. The 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery (8 inch/175mm Self-Propelled) began the reporting period with the mission of General Support – Reinforcing the 25th Infantry Division Artillery. Battery B closed out its base camp at Soui Da on 5 January, was attached to the 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery and supported 25th Infantry Division Operation Yellowstone until the end of the reporting period from a position at FSPB Knox (XT2778). On 6 December Battery A displaced to FSPB Sherman (XT1169) to support Operation Yellowstone and the Special Forces Camp under construction at Thien Ngan (XT0860). This camp received ground attacks and mortar fire many times throughout the reporting period and Battery A responded with counter-mortar and defensive fires on every occasion. Battery C was attached to the 25th Infantry Division on 6 December to support Operation Yellowstone and displaced to FSPB Grant (XT3762). The Battery was detached on 16 December and placed in a General-support reinforcing role at Tay Ninh. On 26 and 27 January Batteries A and C changed battery positions with Battery A displacing to Tay Ninh and Battery C to FSPB Sherman. Throughout the reporting period the Battalion supported Special Forces operations in Tay Ninh Province and conducted artillery assaults to attack targets in Northern War Zone C and along the Cambodian Border. In addition to its GS-R mission the Battalion functioned as the Fire Support Coordination Center and Air Warning Control Center for the Tay Ninh Base Camp.

i. The following number of missions were fired with ammunition expenditures as indicated during the reporting period.

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<td>105mm</td>
<td>34,959</td>
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<td>155mm</td>
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5. (U) LOGISTICS

Normal supply and logistics support was provided for all Group operations.

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6. (c) AVIATION

   a. Normal aviation support for 23d Artillery Group Headquarters and assigned Battalions was provided.

   b. Two (2) OH-6A aircraft were assigned to the Group for test and evaluation.

   c. The following aviation sorties and missions were flown by 23d Artillery Group aircraft during the period 1 November 1967 - 31 January 1968.

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<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
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<th>UH-1 Skirts</th>
<th>OH-6A Skirts/Landings</th>
<th>OH-13 Skirts/Landings</th>
<th>OH-23 Skirts/missions</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>OH-4A Skirts/Landings</th>
<th>OH-6A Skirts/Landings</th>
<th>OH-23 Skirts/Landings</th>
<th>OH-1 Skirts and missions</th>
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<td>FAC</td>
<td>C.A.M.</td>
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7. CONFIDENTIAL
7. (U) CIVIC ACTION

a. The major civic action project of the 23d Artillery Group continues to be the Gadsden Refugee Village. There are currently 141 homes occupied. Construction of 44 more houses has begun. This project is a result of the combined efforts of the RVN Government who supplied the land, the citizens of Gadsden, Alabama, who contributed financial help, USAID which supplied materials and commodities, labor furnished by the refugees and supervision was provided by the 23d Artillery Group.

b. Expansion of the 23d Artillery Group's Boy Scout programs was firmly established during the quarter. Currently seven Boy Scout troops are being sponsored with plans for organizing an additional six during the upcoming quarter.

c. The Group distributed approximately 10,000 pounds of commodities to needy families during the quarter.

d. Medical conducted by doctors of the 23d Artillery Group continues as a major civic action project.

   (1) 8604 patients were treated during the reporting quarter.

   (2) Bowser's Dispensary, Gadsden Village accounted for 5723 of the above total.

e. A total of 133 TB patients are treated bi-weekly at Gadsden Village.

f. Under the sponsorship of the 23d Artillery Group, 16 units of blood were donated to Phuoc Vang Province Hospital. This blood has been donated to fill emergency requests by the Philippines Surgical team at the hospital.

g. The civic action program of the 23d Artillery Group continues to help the Vietnamese people to help themselves and also continues to have favorable impact on the local populace.

8. (C) MEDICAL

a. Total outpatient visits have decreased over the last quarter. No significant increases in specific disease states has been noted.

b. Several units in field positions have begun taking Dapsone, the daily anti-malaria tablet.
SECTION II, PART I

OBSERVATIONS

1. (G) PERSONNEL

a. ITLM: Infusion Program

(1) DISCUSSION: The infusion of the 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery with the 4th Infantry Division was accomplished by the use of one (1) C123 aircraft. This aircraft was requested by the GQ, 4th Infantry Division and departed Pleiku with personnel from the Division Artillery. Personnel from the 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery were transported from Dau Tieng on the same aircraft on the return flight to Pleiku thus accomplishing the infusion with minimum delay. Representatives of the 23d Group Personnel Section were dispatched to Dau Tieng a day prior to the moves to out-process personnel from the 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery and in-process personnel from the 4th Infantry Division Artillery.

(2) OBSERVATION: Infusion of personnel between widely separated units is possible with a minimum loss of vital man-hours, if transportation from the base camps of the respective units can be arranged and a team from the personnel section is dispatched to the unit to accomplish in and out processing.

b. ITLM: Class A Agents.

(1) DISCUSSION: The units within this command are widely dispersed throughout the western two thirds of the III Corps Tactical Zone. Normally each battery has a class A agent to pay its personnel. On the last day of the month each class A agent is required to travel to the 91st Finance at Long Binh to pick up the payroll and to return prior to the 7th of the month to make turn-backs.

(2) OBSERVATION: Difficulty in obtaining transportation and loss of the Class A agents' time are experienced every month in picking up, paying and turning back the payroll. Limited aviation assets and the large number of Class A agents result in numerous transportation difficulties. On the average, 3 to 5 days per Class A agent is required to complete the paying process.

2. (U) INTELLIGENCE

a. Status of Operational Areas (AO) and TACR's
AVGC. 9 February 1960
SUBJ: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1960,
(AGS GMP-65) UIC VAAKH.

(1) DISCUSSION: It is difficult for major tactical
units to maintain current information on AO's and TACR's of other units
located in an area of interest. Time and distance factors often cause
excessive delay in transmission of information of this nature, since
it is normally routed by courier or messenger in overlay form.

(2) OBSERVATION: Current status of major unit AO's and
TACR's must be maintained by general support artillery units in order
effectively to manage general support artillery deployments and to
operate an effective visual aerial reconnaissance program in accordance
with current directives.

b. Hand-held Camera program

(1) DISCUSSION: This headquarters was issued a hand-
held camera (Asahi-Pentax SLW w/200mm telephoto and standard 50mm
lenses) for test purposes. This camera has an integral rangefinder
and lightmeter. Even the first pictures were of good quality. One
of the initial problems encountered was ability to plot a target
once the film had been developed. Often the target photograph con-
tained no features which could be related to the map. One technique
which proved effective was to lay out the area to be photographed in
a rectangle. Photographic passes were made along one end and one
side using the 50mm lens, to make oblique overlapping photographs on
the entire area. Vertical photographs were then taken of pinpoint
targets with the 200mm lens from an altitude of 1000-1500 feet.
These verticals usually included some identifiable terrain feature
which could be related to the area photographs taken with the 50mm
lens, and then related in turn to the map. Photographs taken with
the hand-held camera have been useful for orientation of aerial obser-
vers, comparing activity in a given area over a period of time, locat-
ing targets not otherwise detected by the observer, and in performing
post-strike assessment of targets attacked by artillery or aerial
bomb strikes.

(2) OBSERVATION: The hand-held camera, when properly
utilized, can provide valuable augmentation to a unit's target acqui-
sition program.

3. (C) TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

a. ITL: Proficiency of Firing Units

(1) DISCUSSION: Due to the artillery incident rate
in Vietnam, the requirement existed for an effective method of
evaluating a firing unit's proficiency in the basic artillery techniques and the special situations posed in Vietnam. The 23d Artillery Group initiated the semi-annual, Unannounced Proficiency Test (UPT) to accomplish this objective. A team consisting of a chief inspector, one (1) FDC inspector, two (2) firing battery inspectors, one (1) communications inspector, and an aerial observer arrive at the battery position unannounced. The battery is required to fire four (4) missions including a registration, a time on target and two (2) will adjust missions. During the test, each inspector uses checklists to insure that all required procedures are being followed and personnel are proficient in their duties. Battery personnel are questioned by the inspectors and required to accomplish certain techniques that are not evaluated during the course of firing. To date five (5) batteries have been tested and the evaluations have proved to be a valuable tool for the commander in gaining an accurate appraisal of his units' capabilities.

(2) OBSERVATION: A system of testing a unit's proficiency can be effectively applied under combat conditions without disrupting operations. This testing program insures that units maintain a high degree of proficiency in all phases of firing battery operations.

b. ITEM: Formation of a Fourth Firing Battery

(1) DISCUSSION: In order to conserve artillery assets the 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery was required to form a fourth firing battery. The mission of Direct Support to the 5th ARVN Ranger Group could be adequately fulfilled by positioning batteries in three locations in the Capital Military District. It was determined that four (4) 105mm howitzers in each position could provide this support since there was sufficient ARVN and US artillery in and around the CMD that could provide reinforcing fires when required. By forming a fourth firing battery, it was possible to retain one (1) six howitzer battery for other missions. Battery D was formed by taking two howitzer sections from Batteries B and C, the battalion fire direction center personnel, ammunition and maintenance personnel from Service Battery and a Headquarters element from Headquarters Battery. The Battery was given a two (2) week intensified training program prior to assuming a specific mission.

(2) OBSERVATION: Formation of a fourth firing battery from battalion assets is possible. One of the disadvantages noted was the depletion of the battalion FDC. Personnel from the survey section were used to reconstitute the FDC, however, this left the battalion without a survey capability. Batteries B and C realized no detrimental
OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(2d CORPS Artillery) U.S. ARVN

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9 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(2d CORPS Artillery) U.S. ARVN

effects from the formation of the additional Battery.

44 (C) OPERATIONS

a. ITLM: Defense of Fire Support Patrol Bases (FSPB)

(1) DISCUSSION: There are times when sufficient ground forces or automatic weapon assets are not available to adequately defend an isolated FSPB. There are certain actions that can be taken and equipment available to artillery units to provide the additional firepower required. 81mm mortars emplaced in the position, manned by battery personnel and controlled out of the battery fire direction center can provide a close-in illumination and defensive fire capability. 106mm and 90mm recoilless rifles are available on a 180 day loan basis. These can be manned by battery personnel and provide both a high explosive and canister or crowd that is extremely effective in a defense role. Additionally, close in defensive concentrations can be planned and fired by the howitzers using shell HE with fuse time. Initial experiments with the 105mm, 155mm and 8 inch howitzers using this technique have proven successful and highly reliable and accurate.

(2) OBSERVATION: There are techniques and equipment available to artillery units to supplement the defense of FSPB's when required. A highly effective defense system can be realized through the use of all firepower available.

b. ITLM: Use of VT Fuze

(1) DISCUSSION: Many areas in III Corps Tactical Zone are farm areas for friendly Vietnamese during the day and infiltration routes for the VC at night. Firing harassing and intimation fires into these areas is required, however, shell HE fired with fuse quick damages the farmlands, and due to the softness of the ground, has little effect on VC moving through the area. HE fired with fuse VT does less damage to crops and produces a better fragmentation effect for use against enemy troops in these open areas.

(2) OBSERVATION: Shell HE with fuse VT should be used for firing H and I fires into rice paddies and open farmland.

c. ITLM: U.S. Artillery in Direct Support of ARVN Maneuver Units

(1) DISCUSSION: The 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery was assigned the mission of direct support to the 5th ARVN Ranger Group,
which was assigned the mission of defense of the Capital Military District (CMD). The initial problem anticipated was the language barrier between the two units. This was solved by obtaining an ARVN interpreter team for each battery FDC. In this way fire missions could be received by the battery directly from ARVN forward observers with the maneuver elements. The battalion was supplemented with officer personnel to fulfill the additional liaison requirements inherent in a direct support mission. Liaison teams were provided to each of the three Ranger Battalions, the Ranger Group Headquarters and the CMD Tactical Operations Center. These liaison teams worked closely with the U.S. advisors to the Ranger Group and proved to be a most valuable asset in planning artillery support for future operations. The Battalion Operations Center displaced with the Ranger Group Headquarters, when required, to effectively coordinate the artillery support. Assets positioned outside CMD were requested through the 23d Artillery Group and coordinated by the battalion to provide reinforcing fires when required. The battalion also provided training in forward observer techniques and conducted service practices for ARVN officers that would be acting as forward observers.

(2) OBSERVATION: U.S. Artillery units can effectively provide direct support to ARVN maneuver units. Additional liaison personnel may be required and interpreter teams are necessary to provide the rapid response required. U.S. advisors with the ARVN unit should be used to establish the proper rapport between maneuver unit personnel and the personnel from the artillery units.

d. ITEM: Effects of Heavy Artillery in Dense Jungle

(1) DISCUSSION: During the reporting period, tests were initiated in both heavy artillery battalions to evaluate the effects of heavy artillery in dense jungle. Both high and low angle fire were employed using fuze quick and delay. Though not complete, the tests have revealed certain facts. Fuze quick is not effective against targets in dense jungle except troops that are unprotected above ground. Fuze delay penetrates the jungle canopy and is effective against troops above ground and in fortifications with less than three feet of overhead cover. Fuze quick is effective for opening the canopy to obtain better observation of the terrain underneath. High angle fire in no way improves the effects of the fire and long time delays were experienced in obtaining the high altitude air clearance as expected. These observations were made by entering the target area after firing and searching the area to determine the effects produced.
2. OBSERVATION: Heavy artillery fired with fuze delay is effective against targets in dense jungle. Fuze quick should be used to open the canopy to improve observation. High angle fire should not be used unless the target area is in defilade. Tests will be continued to determine the number of rounds required to saturate a given area and the effects of using fuze concrete piercing.

e. ITEM: Artillery Support for Special Forces Operations

(1) DISCUSSION: Special Forces Operations of significant size (two (2) companies or larger) and duration (five (5) days or longer) that are not within the range capabilities of US or ARVN artillery have been supported by displacing a 105mm or 155mm platoon with fire direction center to the Special Forces Camp nearest the area of operations. The platoon is assigned the mission of direct support of the maneuver force. Forward observer parties are provided if required and liaison is established with the headquarters controlling the operation. Resupply of the firing element is accomplished by air and the platoon is left in the position only as long as operational requirements dictate.

(2) OBSERVATION: This method of support has provided numerous Special Forces Operations with a close fire support means that was previously not available. Preparations, defensive concentrations and on call missions are fired as requested by the maneuver force and recommended by the artillery liaison officer. Having this type support available results in a more effective operation being conducted.

5. (U) LOGISTICS

ITEM: Ammunition Storage

(1) DISCUSSION: During the recent months several incidents occurred in other units and areas involving fires and explosions in ammunition storage areas. In the majority of the cases the damage and injury sustained was due mainly to sympathetic detonation.

(2) OBSERVATION: Precautionary measures taken by this unit to reduce this possibility of sympathetic detonation were:

(a) Reduce the amount of ammunition stored within position areas.

(b) Separation of ammo stored in bunkers by utilizing sandbag revetments between stacks of ammo within the bunker.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968,

(c) Sufficient distance between ammo bunkers.

(d) Construction of additional ammo storage areas outside of the position area.

(e) Revetments built around storage areas should be at least as high as the stacked ammo. No stacks should extend above the revetments.

6. (C) OTHER

a. ITEM: OH-6A Aircraft

(1) DISCUSSION: The 23d Arty Gp received two (2) OH-6A aircraft on 12 January for the purposes of evaluation against the O-1 aircraft. Thus far the aircraft has had a relatively trouble-free operation. Problems encountered so far consisted of FM radio trouble, a leaking tail rotor gear box and a damaged main rotor blade which was discovered on 22 January. The aircraft became operational on 30 January when a replacement rotor blade was received.

(2) OBSERVATION: It is too early to tell how the OH-6A will fare in this evaluation. Indications are that with adequate parts resupply, the aircraft will perform very well.

b. ITEM: AN/HC-74 Radio

(1) DISCUSSION: A AN/HC-74 SSB transceiver was hand received from another unit for use in communicating with a battalion equipped with AN/GRC-106 radios.

(2) OBSERVATION: The AN/HC-74 proved to be extremely reliable and highly suitable for medium range communications to units in field locations not within FM communication range. The AN/HC-74 radio is highly suitable for operation of LMK/IRC Nets.

SECTION II, PART II

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) LACKS N.LEL

NONE

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AVGL-C

9 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968,
(NGS CSR 4-67) UIC 4

2. (U) INTELLIGENCE

Recommend that a secure facsimile transmission network be established linking major tactical units for the rapid and accurate transmission of graphical information.

3. (U) TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

N.M.L.

4. (U) OPERATIONS

N.M.L.

5. (U) LOGISTICS

N.M.L.

Robert J. Stock

In BRT J. M.GCH

Colonel, Artillery

Commenting
SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 25th Artillery Group (WACXIA) adequately reflects the operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.

2. (U) The following comment pertains to Section II of the report:

   Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph 2. Concur. A secure facsimile transmission capability would greatly enhance command and control operations in a combat zone. It is understood that such a capability is within the current state of the art and priority projects are underway.

RAYMOND P. MURPHY
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

DA, HQ II FFORCEN, APO San Francisco 96266 9 MAR 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVGCC(DST), APO 96266
Commander, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This command has reviewed the attached ORLL of the 23d Artillery Group and concurs with it.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CPT. AGC
Asst AG
AVHGC-DST (9 Feb 68) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968,
RCS-CSFOR-65, UIC WAOXAA.

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 23 MAR 1968.

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GFO-P-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group (WAOXAA) as indorsed.

2. Concur with report as indorsed. Report is considered adequate.

3. Correct Unit Identification Code is WAOXAA.

4. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Copy furnished:
HC II FFORCZV
HC 23d Arty Gp

C. S. HANNAH
Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-DT (9 Feb 68) (U) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 23d Arty Gp for Period Ending
31 January 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 APR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
### 1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)
OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

### 2. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Confidential

### 3a. NUMBER
4

### 3. REPORT TITLE
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, 23d Artillery Group

### 4b. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)
Experience of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 67-31 Jan 1968

### 5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)
CO, 23d Artillery Group

### 6. REPORT DATE
9 February 1968

### 7. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES
21

### 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.

### 9. PROJECT NO.
N/A

### 10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
N/A

### 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
N/A

### 12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY
OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

### 13. ABSTRACT

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