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AD NUMBER

AD390024

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

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FROM:

Controlling DoD Organization: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Washington, DC 20310

AUTHORITY

28 Feb 1980 per DoDD 5200.10 document marking; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

TO: See Distribution

References: AR 1-19 dtd 26 May 1966; USA & NV Reg 1-19 dtd 8 Feb 1967; and IPFV Reg 1-3 dtd 29 Sep 1966.

SECTION I (C)

A. SIGNIFICANT UNIT ACTIVITIES: Elements of the brigade were involved in combat operations during the entire reporting period with the exceptions of 25-30 November 1967 and 8-15 January 1968. Training was conducted concurrently with combat operations and during periods when units were refitting and preparing for future operations.

B. OPERATIONAL TIMELINE: A summary of the concept and execution of each of the brigade operations is given below:

1. Operation WISE−LION
   a. Dates: 11 September - 25 November 1967,
   b. Mission: To conduct search and destroy operations northwest of TAM KX (BT667) find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps,
   c. Location: QUANG TIN Province, RVN
   d. Commander: IG S.M. Methevan
   e. Forces involved:
      (1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division; 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, Americal Division (GPOC during period 11-26 Sep 67); 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, Americal Division (GPOC during period 4 Oct - 5 Nov 67).
      (2) Other: CIDG Company from TIEI PHUC Special Forces Camp; one Mobile Strike Force from Company G, 9th Special Forces Group (DAK NAM); one Reconnaissance Company from 2d Division (ARVN).
      (3) Enemy forces: 40th and 60th Battalions, 1st VC Regiment; 11th, 22d and 33d Battalions, 21st VC Regiment; 21st NVA Regiment.
   f. Concept of Operations: Operation WISE−LION commenced with the employment of five battalions by the Americal Division to destroy enemy base camps, fortifications, and forces operating west of TAM KX (BT667) and along Route QL between TAM KX and HILL 63 (BT1345). As Operation WISE−LION progressed through Phase I through III (Quarterly Operations Report for period 31 October 1967) intelligence reports indicated that the larger elements, mainly Headquarters, 2d NVA Division, were located to the west of the brigade's area of operations. To initiate Phase IV of Operation WISE−LION (6-25 November 1967) the brigade developed a concept of operation designed to block enemy routes of egress in all directions and to close in on the entrapped enemy.
   g. Execution: Commencing 6 November 1967 the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry air assaulted into the western portion of the brigade area of operation and established blocking positions along the routes of egress to the
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east. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 237th Infantry remained in its area of operation and were utilized to the north to block routes of egress to the southeast. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry was deployed to the tactical command post of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry and conducted search and destroy operations to the north and blocked routes of egress to the east. On 15 November 1967, the Americal Division directed the brigade to resubmit two companies to the eastern portion of the area of operation to conduct search and destroy operations and to block enemy routes of movement to the south. (Companies B and C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry were displaced into the assigned area). From 23-25 November 1967 the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry were relieved in place by elements of the 166th Light Infantry Brigade. Units deployed to Tan Ky Airfield (HTC657) and moved by US Air Force C-130 aircraft to the Brigade Base Camp at FP 1L3N for a four day stand down and prepared for future operations in the II Corps Tactical Zone as directed by MACV.

2. Operation ROSE


b. Mission: To conduct search and destroy operations to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces to neutralize their base camps, to provide security for engineer works parties along Highway QL 1.

c. Location: TINH KIEN THUAN and TINH BINH THUAN Provinces, RVN.

d. Commander: LTC John P. Geraci

e. Forces involved:

(1) US: 3d Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry

(2) Other: Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) team from KIEN THUAN Province; 3d Battalion, 65th Regiment (ARVN).

(3) Enemy: C/270 LF Company, 112th LF Company.

f. Concept of Operation: 3d Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults with three companies, using multiple LZs in the central portion of Secret Base 35 and conducted search and destroy operations in zone (Operation ROSE was, in addition to its primary purpose of conducting search and destroy operations, a showdown for the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry, recently arrived from the US).

g. Execution: Commencing 11 November 1967 the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults utilizing six LZs. Elements of the battalion conducted search and destroy operations within their assigned sectors utilizing various tactics and techniques (i.e., closer leaf patrols, harass and antt, coordinated ARVN and US operation etc.) Operation ROSE terminated 30 November 1967.

3. Operation BATTLE FALLS


b. Mission: To conduct search and destroy operations in LAM DOMO and OKIN THUAN Provinces, to find, fix and destroy the Headquarters of VN-6, the 14th, 186th, 188th and 896th KP Battalions and to open Highway QL 1 from PH-N R.50 to the II/III CTZ boundary in coordination with the 23d Division (ARVN).

c. Location: LAM DOMO and OKIN THUAN Provinces, RVN.

d. Commander: COL S.H. Matheson

e. Forces involved:

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(1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division; 2d Battalion (Airborne); 7th Cavalry; 1st and 2d Platoons, Company K, 20th Infantry (I FORCEN V IRRP).

(2) Others: 2d, 3d and 4th Battalions, 64th Regiment (ARVN), 11th Ranger Battalion (ARVN); BINH THUAN and BINH THUAN Province forces; one National Police Field Force Company.

(3) Enemy: 186th MP Battalion; 182d VC MP Battalion.

f. Concept of Operation: The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division conducted airborne operation with four airborne battalions and TF 2-17 to locate and destroy HQ MR-6 and enemy forces in southern KAM DONG and BINH THUAN Provinces, and, in coordination with 23d ARVN Division, opened Highway QL 1 from PHAN RANG to II/III CTZ boundary to permit transit of ARVN convoys over QL 1 by 1 January 1968.

g. Execution: To accomplish the assigned mission the brigade on 30 November 1967, using a cover and deception plan, air assaulted the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry from its field position southwest of PHAN RANG (S00M MAO, RVN. On 1 December 1967 the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry moved by Air Force aircraft to a staging area at 110 (ZT0978), RVN. On 2 December 1967 the two battalions staging at 110 (ZT0978) conducted airmobile assaults into the northeastern and northeastern portions of the brigade area of operation as the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry moved by Air Force aircraft to PHN THIET (AN0903), RVN. On 3 December 1967 the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry air assaulted into the southern portion of the brigade area of operation.

h. Concept of Operation: Elements of the 1st Brigade, staging from SONG BE (YU1407), conducted operations beginning 16 January 1968 in three phases as follows:

(1) Phase I: Two battalions air assault into assigned area of operations on D-Day with one battalion air assaulting into its assigned area of operation on D+1.

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(2) Phase II: One battalion continues search and destroy operations in assigned area of operation as one battalion displaces its firebase on D+3 to within supporting distance of DU GIA MAP (YU3437) and establishes blocking positions vicinity of DU CHIR PHUC (YU1926) during TET truce period, while a third battalion air assaults to vicinity DU GIA MAP (YU3437) to secure airfield and establish blocking positions during TET truce period; brigade prepares to upgrade DU GIA MAP Airfield (YU3437) to accept C-130 traffic.

(3) Phase III: G order, deploy one Battalion Task Force to operate in the DU PHUC (YU9326) area.

g. Execution: The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division commenced Operation SAN ANGELO on 16 January, air assaulting the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry into the northeastern portion of the brigade area of operation and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry assault into the southwestern portion. On 22 January 1968 the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry was extracted from its assigned area of operation to the SONG 10 Base Camp (YU407) to prepare for the air mobile assault on DU GIA MAP (YU3437). The movement of the supporting firebase was delayed until 23 January due to nonavailability of aircraft. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry established the firebase in the vicinity YU24500 on 31 January. The air assault on DU GIA MAP (YU3437) was postponed on a daily basis until 31 January 1968 when the CG, 101st Airborne Division postponed the operation for an indefinite period. As the TET truce period approached the brigade received a directive from higher headquarters to formbattalion size firebases and reinforce the SONG 10 Airfield (YU1407). At the close of the reporting period the maneuver battalions of the brigade were situated as follows:

1. 1-277, battalion size firebase vicinity YU26166
2. 2-327, battalion size firebase vicinity (DU CHIR PHUC)
3. 2-502, reinforcing the SONG 10 portarory, SONG 10 Airfield
4. 3-506, located at PHAN THIET, RVN (AN8309) OPCON to 1 FFORCE

C. TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

1. During the reporting period the brigade deployed its maneuver battalions by assigning them relatively large areas of operation. The maneuver battalions would conduct airmobile assaults on multiple landing zones within their assigned areas of operation, with the size of the elements conducting the airmobile assaults varying from platoon to company depending upon the enemy situation. Each sub-unit, once on the ground, operated semi-independently, but controlled by company and/or battalion. Units carried three to five days rations and required resupply by helicopter every three to five days. This system provided a certain amount of security and allowed the brigade elements to operate in a semi-guerrilla role until contact was made with the enemy and the helicopters did not disclose the tactical units locations. In addition, the brigade maintained the flexibility of supporting and/or reinforcing units by cross attaching and extracting and inserting units within supporting distances.

2. Toward the close of the reporting period (Operation SAN ANGELO), the brigade, being OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division (--) and not having the necessary airlift capability to maneuver as described in para (1) above, changed its methods of operation to the establishment of battalion size firebases and the conducting of search and destroy operations from these bases.

D. TRAINING:

Most of this period was spent in the conduct of combat operations. During periods of refitting and preparations for future operations, training was oriented
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Towards improving weaknesses noted during previous operations, in addition the following training was conducted:

1. All incoming personnel continued to be processed through the Brigade Replacement Company, MAN RMD where they received six days of land navigation, patrolling, enemy mines and booby traps, enemy sniper techniques, first aid and physical conditioning. This training period also served to acclimatize personnel to the climate of Vietnam.

2. During the reporting period the Brigade Combat Leaders Course was reopened. Junior leaders, four per maneuver battalion, one from the cavalry troop, engineer company, and ENO, 1st Bn, were sent to the Brigade Base at MAN RMD each week to undergo refresher training in land navigation, repelling, stream crossing techniques, armsfire techniques, scouting and patrolling, and small unit tactics.

3. At MAN RMD Base (25-30 Nov 67) and 3K0 LOC Base (7-1 Jan 68), live fire ranges were established in order that brigade combat units could conduct live fire training during refitting periods.

B. OPORD-OPCRDS: The following OPORDs and OPCRDS were published during the reporting period. The brigade was not called upon to execute any contingency plan.

1. OPORD 35-67 (ROSE) (U) dated 31 Dec 1967 covered the deployment of the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 186th Infantry into an area of operation southwest of MAN RMD (BN585). Weather had no significant effect on the carrying out of this plan.

2. OPORD 36-67 (EASTTIMOR) (U) dated 29 Dec 1967 covered the deployment of the 1st Brigade, reinforced, 101st Airborne Division from I Corps to II Corps for search and destroy operations against NVA. Weather had no significant effect on carrying out this plan.

3. OPORD 37-67 (KELLER) (U) dated 22 Dec 1967 covered the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division from II Corps to I Corps and an airborne assault to seize the airfield at 31 G12-66 (TN3437). The order was issued, however, it was never executed.

4. OPORD 38-67 (EASTTIMOR) (U) dated 24 Dec 1967 covered the conduct of briefings and security for the visit of the Chief of Staff, US Army to the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division on 27 December 1967. Weather had no significant effect on carrying out this plan.

5. OPORD 1-68 (SAN ANGELO) (U) dated 04 Jan 1968 covered the revision of OPORD 37-67. This order was issued, however, it was never executed as additional changes to the tactical employment were issued by COMSHOC.

6. OPORD 2-68 (U) dated 7 Jan 1968 covered the deployment of Company D, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry to 3K00 US Airfield (Y4107) to provide security against enemy attacks on the airfield. Weather had no significant effect on carrying out this plan.

7. OPORD 3-68 (SAN ANGELO) (U) dated 08 Jan 1968 covered the revisions of OPORD 37-67 and OPORD 1-68 and deploying the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division from II Corps to III Corps for Op SAN ANGELO.

C. ORGANIZATION:

See Inclusion 1.

D. POLITICAL-STRATEGIC OPERATIONS:

1. During the reporting period 1,785,100 leaflets were disseminated in support of brigade combat operations and 22 hours, 5 minutes of loudspeaker broadcasts were logged. Theses utilized in both the leaflet and loudspeaker missions were:

   a. National Safe Conduct program.
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b. Acquainting population with 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division policies, curfews, etc., and urging them to cooperate.
   c. Several versions of CHEFBOI appeals.
   d. Instruction on how to CHEFBOI.
   e. Weapons reward.
   f. Appeal to people not to aid VC/PA and to report all incidents or presence of VC/PA in their area.

2. Special Operation: One special leaflet and loudspeaker tape were prepared and utilized as the result of the CHEFBOI of a VC Battalion Executive Officer. Leaflets were prepared with the officer’s picture and personal handwriting urging other personnel to CHEFBOI. The officer also consented to make a tape, using the same theme as the leaflet. Loudspeaker broadcast were conducted in conjunction with the leaflet dissemination.

3. The brigade was supported by the 24th Psychological Company during the month of November and the 8th Psychological Battalion during December and January.

H. CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

1. During the reporting period the 20th Chemical Detachment dropped 12.8 tons of bulk CS (tear gas) on enemy fortified defensive positions, base camps, and avenues routes. An additional 2.8 tons of bulk CS was utilized to seed 13.4 tons of rice. Also during the reporting period 20th Chemical detachment personnel flew a total of 23 parachute personnel (‘People Sniffer’) missions totaling 49 hours of mission time.

2. Training: The 20th Chemical Detachment conducted instruction and demonstrations for members of the brigade as follows:
   a. During November, 23 personnel of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry were trained in the employment of the portable flame thrower and 42 personnel of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry received the training. All personnel had a reliability of six months within the command.
   b. During the brigade’s stand down at PHAK KAI (BNO) (38993) members of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Artillery witnessed a live fougasse demonstration. The purpose of the demonstration was to make personnel aware of the potential of fougasses when integrated into a defense plan. Seven 55 gallon drums, filled with fougasse, each command detonated, were rigged and exploded during the demonstration. Average effects achieved were 75-80 meters in range, covering an area approximately 25-35 meters wide.
   c. Protective mask training conducted by 20th Chemical Detachment personnel during the reporting period for Company A, 30th Engineer Battalion (Airborne), Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry, 2d Battalion (Airborne) 327th Infantry, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Artillery. Instruction covered care, maintenance and storage of the H-17 protective mask.

I. INTELLIGENCE

1. A summary of the intelligence situation of each of the brigade’s operations during the reporting period is as follows:
   a. Operation WILDFIRE: The initial stages of Operation WILDFIRE were characterized by small contacts with local force units to include elements of the 72d LF Battalion. The lack of contact in the area and significant intelligence to the west warranted a change in the area of operation. Once the brigade moved.
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west, significant contacts were made with elements of the 2d NVA Division which were well trained and armed with modern communist weapons. The enemy base camps and storage areas were seldom found high in the mountains or far from supporting populated areas. Interrogation of local residents indicated extensive enemy control of the hamlets within the area of operation with a complex infrastructure of organizations. There was continual movement of NVA units through populated areas. During Operation WHEeler the enemy travelled generally in platoon or larger size units, moved predominantly during the early hours of the morning and in late afternoon-early evening, using major high speed trails, traveling six to eight kilometers in one night. The enemy initiated numerous daylight and night attacks, invariably supported by heavy fires of 60mm or 82mm mortars. The enemy seemed to have an abundance of mortar ammunition and frequently used 37mm and 75mm recoilless rifles as well as 3-4O rocket launchers. Reports indicated that prior to a planned large scale attack, shallow graves were prepared for disposal of the dead during withdrawal. The majority of the enemy large scale attacks occurred in the late afternoon and early evening. The enemy exploited periods of inclement weather by initiating several attacks, confident that the brigade could not employ air strikes or gunships due to poor visibility. It is estimated that approximately one-third of the 2d NVA Division sustained casualties, either killed or wounded. Contact was made with the following units:

(1) 1st VC Regiment, 40th Battalion
(2) 1st VC Regiment, 60th Battalion
(3) 21st NVA Regiment
(4) 21st VC Regiment, 11th Battalion
(5) 21st VC Regiment, 22d Battalion
(6) 21st VC Regiment, 33d Battalion

b. Operation KILMAUTH FALLS: All stages of Operation KILMAUTH FALLS were characterized by small contacts with local guerrillas and main force units to include sporadic contact with elements of the 186th NP Battalion and the 482d VC IP Battalion. The lack of contact in the initial area and lack of significant and reliable intelligence during the first ten days in the immediate vicinity of Headquarters Military Region VI (MR-6) warranted a change in orientation. Once the brigade oriented to the northern and western portion of the area of operation, sporadic contacts were made with enemy forces of less than squad size. Throughout the operation the enemy moved in small groups and utilized sniper fire effectively. The enemy moved in definite pattern of moving out of his area of operation. During the early stages of Operation KILMAUTH FALLS the enemy broke up into two distinct groups; a political Staff Section and a Military Staff Section. The political Staff Section moved along the Song Nga River from the vicinity of ZT2545 northwesterly into the mountainous area. It travelled in groups of 7 to 10 personal along different routes, regrouping periodically in the base camps in the area. The military Staff Section moved similarly to the political Staff, but moving southeasterly along small streams. Eventually this group joined elements of the 482d IP VC Battalion which provided security.

c. Operation SAN ANGELO: Enemy activity in the area of operation has increased since the middle of January. Many of the contacts have occurred with what is believed to be NVA elements in the immediate vicinity of SU BLM (ZT2530). Enemy units in the area appear to be well organized and equipped. The enemy displayed an ability to employ heavy volumes of automatic weapons and mortar fires, both 60mm and 82mm. He has demonstrated his ability to jam communication frequencies on a large scale and to engage all firebases. It is believed that the enemy will continue to engage friendly elements in order to delay exploitation to the east and northeast where lucrative targets are believed to exist. At the close of the reporting period the enemy units in contact remain unidentified.

2. The following is a recapitulation of enemy losses per operation for the reporting period:

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a. Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC/NVA KIL</th>
<th>KIL/TH</th>
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<tr>
<td>VC/Navs</td>
<td>271/19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/Navs P</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/Navs H</td>
<td>22/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Weapons

| Indiv Wns | 28 | 8 | 74 | 23 |
| Crew Served Wns | 6 | 0 | 3 | 2 |
| Indiv Wns Cache | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Crew Served Wns C | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| Grenades | 12 | 0 | 20 | 0 |

3. Problem Area

Insufficient aviation support for Personnel Detector (People Sniffer) or visual reconnaissance operations.

a. Discussion: Aviation support was not adequate during the reporting period to fulfill the daily requirements of the brigade for Personnel Detector or visual reconnaissance missions. Personnel Detector missions required a minimum of one UH-1B and two UH-1C aircraft which were seldom available due to other operational commitments throughout the area of operation. When the UH-1B aircraft allocated to the brigade was down for maintenance and/or repair, no replacement aircraft was available for visual reconnaissance.

b. Solution: During Operation S/N ANGELU, the 101st Airborne Division allocates aircraft for Personnel Detectors and visual reconnaissance missions on a daily basis. This system is working quite satisfactorily.

J. PERSONNEL

1. The quarter, 1 November 1967 through 31 January 1968, saw the completion of the fourth phase of Operation WHEELER, the whole of Operation KIL/TH FALLS and the inception of Operation S/N ANGELU. The brigade personnel strengths at the beginning and conclusion of each operation are listed below:

a. Beginning of Operation WHEELER

| Authorized | 4368 |
| Assigned   | 4853 |
| Present for Duty | 4537 |

(1) The assigned strength was 111% of the augmented authorized strength.

(2) The present for duty strength was 103% of the augmented authorized strength.

b. Conclusion of Operation WHEELER

| Authorized | 5187 |
| Assigned   | 5534 |
| Present for Duty | 5197 |

(1) The assigned strength was 107% of the augmented authorized strength.

(2) The present for duty strength was 100.2% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength at the completion of Operation WHEELER, 13 were in transit, 170 were on TDY/SD status, 140 on leave, 8 in confinement, 1 missing and 3 AWOL.
a. Beginning of Operation KL. W. FALLS

Authorized Augmented 5187
Assigned 5627
Present for Duty 5287

(1) The assigned strength was 100% of the augmented authorized strength.

(2) The present for duty strength was 102% of the augmented authorized strength.

d. Conclusion of Operation KL. W. FALLS

Authorized Augmented 5187
Assigned 5079
Present for Duty 4709

(1) The assigned strength was 98% of the augmented authorized strength.

(2) The present for duty strength was 91% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength at the completion of Operation KL. W. FALLS, 9 were in transit, 140 were on TDY/SD status, 197 on leave, 12 in confinement, 7 missing and 7 AWOL.

e. Beginning of Operation S.A., N. E. FALLS

Authorized Augmented 5187
Assigned 5122
Present for Duty 4677

(1) The assigned strength was 99% of the augmented authorized strength.

(2) The present for duty strength was 90% of the augmented authorized strength.

2. The assigned strengths of units assigned to the brigade at the end of the reporting period as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>UPF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn (Abn), 327th Inf</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn (Abn), 327th Inf</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn (Abn), 502d Inf</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn (Abn), 320th Artillery</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spc 3d (Incld Repl Det)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co A, 326th Eng Bn</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>171</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trp A, 2d Sqdn, 17th Cav</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 1st Bde</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The assigned strengths of units attached to the brigade at the end of the reporting period as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>UPF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>0</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501st Sig Det</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181st ML Det</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44th APO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42d Inf Plt (Set Dog)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th PI Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22d MI Base Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Plt 12 Civil Affairs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Cal Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (RFS C512R-65) (U)

1. Casualties, as a result of hostile action, for the period 1 November 1967 through 31 January 1968 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>On Base</th>
<th>On Road</th>
<th>Off Base</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NHA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Personal Programs:

a. Awards and Decorations: The following awards and decorations were approved during the reporting period:

- Distinguished Service Cross: 10
- Distinguished Flying Cross: 4
- Silver Star: 17
- Bronze Star: 17
- Bronze Star with "V": 119
- Distinguished Meritorious: 167
- Air Medal: 3
- Air Medal Meritorious: 130
- Purple Heart: 254
- Good Conduct Medal: 67
- Good Conduct Medal: 70
- Parachute Wings: 25

b. Personnel Services: Personnel services were conducted in the PH/N RNC (NA593) Base Camp under the auspices of the AG Section. During the reporting period there were 1,054 personnel actions completed to include leaves; congressional inquiries; applications for RQ appointments; helicopter training, JES, Warrant and direct commissions; and special cases. Expedient handling of personal actions was guaranteed with daily courier services between PH/N RNC and the forward area of operation.

c. Postal Activities: There were 1,091,093 pounds of mail distribution to the brigade during the reporting period.

d. Red Cross Services: The Red Cross center at PH/N RNC had an attendance of 26,912 and the mobile unit had an attendance of 12,267 during the reporting period. In addition to a Red Cross representative being available to members of the brigade at the forward base camp, Red Cross workers were present in the forward area during the holiday season, distributing Red Cross "Santa Bags" to the members of the brigade.

e. Morale: The morale and spirit of the 1st Brigade while normally excellent, were enhanced during the holiday season by the efforts of the Chaplain's Section, which provided Vietnamese ceremonies for the troops and special Christmas services.

6. Commanders and Principal Staff

a. Brigade Headquarters

- Brigade Commander: COL George H Matheson
- Brigade Deputy Commander: COL John W Collins III
- Brigade Executive Officer: LTC Ralph Puckett
- S2: Maj Richard H Kaupu
- S3: Maj Carl P Allen
- S4: Maj Edwin P Cosey
- S5: LTC Elliott P Sydnor Jr
- S6: Maj John J Shalikashvili
- S7: LTC Robert M Allen
- S8: Maj Wayne J Prokop
- S9: Maj Patrick Miguez
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Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (OSR CEPM-65)(D)

b. Battalion Commanders:
   1st BN (Alam), 327th Inf  LTC Gerald Morse
   2d BN (Alam), 327th Inf  LTC Elliott P. Spence Jr
   3d BN (Alam), 326th Inf  LTC Robert G. Yorks
   4th BN (Alam), 326th Inf  LTC Howard B. Cehan
   5th BN (Alam), 326th Artillery  LTC John P. Geraci
   Spt BN, 1st Bde  LTC Andrew J. Hallar
   Spt BN, 2nd Bde  LTC Quinton P. Sunday
   Spt BN, 3rd Bde  LTC Richard H. Kapek

c. Separate Companies
   Co A, 326th Engr BN  CPT Michael Ward
   Co D, 326th Medical BN  1LT Edward P. Kane
   Trp A, 2d Sqdn, 17th Cav  CPT Robert A. Arban
   HHC, 1st Bde  CPT James R. Harding
   CPT Raymond C. Hartjen Jr
   CPT Leroy G. Stevens
   CPT Peter S. Riemch

K. LOGISTICS

1. General: No major changes occurred in the concept of logistical support during the reporting period. Throughout most of the period the brigade continued to obtain the bulk of its supplies through a Forward Support Area (FSA) established by the 1st Logistical Command. Class II and IV items continued to be supplied by FMN RSM Sub Area Command and US Army Support Command, CAM RSM JAI.


   a. Support Battalion: A Forward Support Element (FSE) was provided by Support Battalion. When lines of communication became too long, a forward supply point (FSP) was established.

      (1) Forward Support Element

          (a) Headquarters Detachment provided command and control and was organized into command, operations, movement control and food services elements.

          (b) Supply Detachment received, stored and issued all classes of supply and provided a limited rigging capability.

          (c) Administrative Detachment provided Adjutant General personnel, postal and finance services.

          (d) Maintenance Detachment provided a repair capability for automotive, ordnance, quartermaster and signal items.

          (e) Company D, 326th Medical Battalion (Airborne) provided clearing station facilities including surgical, dental, holding, and emergency treatment sections.

      (2) Forward Supply Point

      Generally the FSP provided a limited forward point of distribution from which the maneuver units could draw their high turn-over items in all classes of supply.

3. Materiel and Services

   a. Supply

      (1) Class I:

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Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (USC C/PR-65)(I)

(a) 1-24 November 1967 (Operation WHIRLWIND) - Meal, Combat Individual formed the bulk of all Class I consumed. "A" rations were fed when conditions permitted and "A" rations supplemented for "C" rations were issued when readily available. No significant shortages were encountered.

(b) 25-30 November 1967 (Stead-down at PHN ANU) the ration was modified 3 type. Thanksgiving Day meal was fed late to allow troops to eat at PHN ANU due to move from area of operation (Op WHIRLWIND).

(c) 1 December 1967 - 9 January 1968 (Operation KLINN BAD) Meal, Combat Individual formed the bulk of all Class I consumed during the operation. "A" rations were issued when available. The primary problem area was the poor response by CAM DHK Div Support Command to the Brigade Class I demands. As an example, "A" rations which had been requested for seven days were finally brought to PHN LEO by "Combat Essential" airdrop.

(d) 10-31 January 1968 (Operation SAIN ANGEL) The SAIN ANGEL area of operation presents special logistical problems due to air L.E. All subsistence/rations must be airlifted to the brigade forward area. Items such as meal combat individuals and "C" rations, never before in short supply, now have to be checked daily. Back up Class I came from PHN ANU. Due to lack of aircraft, "A" rations and perls hables are at zero balance for one seven day period.

2. Class II & IV

(a) 1-24 November 1967 the bulk of class II & IV items used by the brigade was drawn through the 94th Supply and Service Battalion, America Support Command. The tactical situation created a demand for bunker material which, at times, exceeded the resources. Other items in short supply were small size fatigues, poncho liners and ruck sacks.

(b) 1 December 1967 - 9 January 1968. The bulk of expendable Class II & IV items used by the brigade was drawn through CAM DHK Div Support Command. Slower moving items were supplied by the brigade's Support Battalion. Fatigues remained a problem area in that usage rate is greater than resupply rate. Other shortages included ruck sacks and, on occasion, batteries. Ruck sacks have not been available since 15 October 1967.

(c) 10-31 January 1968. Support was obtained from FSL, 20th Support Group, 1st Logistics Command, except for clothing, boots, T.A. 30 and Type C items, which were provided by 101st Airborne Division Support Command and the Brigade Support Battalion (-) PHN ANU. The limiting factor was the lack of available airdrop to ship the supplies to the forward area. Barrier materials and lumber were a problem; it took the 1st Logistics Command more than two weeks to build up stock to support the operation. Much of this stock came in after the operation was underway. Temporarily has not reached its stockage objective.

3. Class III

(a) 1-24 November 1967 - The 221st Supply and Service Company provided all types of Class III in sufficient quantities to support logistical and tactical operations. DOD

(b) 1 December 1967 - 9 January 1968 = CAM DHK Div Support Command generally provided all types of Class III in sufficient quantities to support logistical and tactical operations. However at PHN THIET, CAM DHK Div Support Command did not meet its Class III stockage level by the required delivery date in JP-4, CS-30 and packaged POL.

(c) 10-31 January 1968. Support was obtained from the 1st Logistics Command FSA. The apparent lack of responsiveness by 1st Logistics Command to its FSA caused some anxious moments. In JP-4 the balance on hand was allowed to drop to 300 gallons at one point before resupply could be effected.

4. Class V
(a) 1-30 November 1967 - The 25th Ammunition Platoon supplied the brigade with all Class V items. There were no significant problems of shortages.

(b) 1 December 1967 - The brigade was supplied with all Class V items by 2nd BN 5th Support Command. There were no significant problems or shortages.

(c) 10-31 January 1968 - Support was obtained from the PSE operating the Class V yard augmented by the 29th Support Group Class V personnel. The problem with airlift again ceased problems, however the biggest problem was the 1st Logistical Command's inability to meet all pre-stockage objectives in Class V.

b. Services

(1) Bath and laundry services were provided by 1st Logistical Command. There were no problems encountered during the reporting period.

(2) Graves Registration services were provided by 1st Logistical Command. There were no problems encountered during the reporting period.

(3) Transportation

(a) Air: UH-1F C-7A, C-123, C-130 and US Army CH-47 aircraft provided airlift support for the reporting period. C-130 aircraft moved the majority of the airlift from TAM II and CHU IAI to PHU RANG (termination Op WESLORD); PHU RANG to PHU TAN and B.1. LOC, PHU TAN to BAO LOC (Op ELMARTh FALLS) and B.1. LOC to SONG BE, PHU RANG to SONG BE (Op SONG 17) to include passengers, mail and limited amounts of all classes of supplies. C-7A and C-123 aircraft supplemented the C-130 airlift. CH-47 aircraft were used exclusively to resupply PSEs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CARGO (SHORT TONS)</th>
<th>PASSENGERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOVEMBER</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>2,042,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECEMBER</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>2,137,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JANUARY</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>1,399,868</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Sea: The Military Sea Transportation Service provided landing ships, tank 111 (LST) for movement of brigade from CHU IAI (termination Op WESLORD) to the Brigade Base Camp PHU RANG. Two LSTs were dispatched from PHU RANG to CHU IAI with cargoes of vehicles to assist the brigade in moving to PHU RANG. Seven LSTs were utilised in moving vehicles and heavy equipment which could not be air transported from the CHU IAI area to PHU RANG.

(c) Land: During the reporting period, one major convoy was conducted by the elements of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. On 12 December, Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion (Airborne) moved from PHU RANG to BAO LOC. No problems were encountered enroute.

(d) Maintenance:

(a) General: Company B, Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division continued its mission of providing direct support maintenance, aircraft maintenance and Class IV repair parts to the brigade and attached units. Company B was divided into two elements: a PSE consisting of 2 officers and 31 enlisted, adapted to respond to forward elements of the brigade; and the company minus, remaining at PHU RANG Base and performing direct support maintenance.

(b) PSE Maintenance Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAINTENANCE AREA</th>
<th>REPAIRS</th>
<th>REPAIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Report for Quarter Period Ending 31- \January 1968 (ACS CSFOR-65)(U)

Maintenance Area (MILTEX): RECEIVED NEW (REXD)

| Instrument | 44 | 51 |
| Signal | 710 | 712 |
| Engineer | 62 | 45 |

(e) Company (-) Maintenance Statistics:

| Automotive | RECEIVED | REPAIRED |
| Armament | 309 | 286 |
| Instrument | 6.2 | 565 |
| Signal | 79 | 565 |
| Engineer | 110 | 76 |

4. Rear Base Camp Operations:

a. Replacement Company:

(1) During the period 1 November 1967 thru 31 January 1968, Replacement Training Company continued its mission of processing, billeting, and casing all personnel moving through the Brig de Base Camp, as well as training all newly arrived replacements.

(2) In November 1967, Replacement Company was given the additional mission of training the newly arrived 36 Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry. This was accomplished during the period 1 thru 7 November 1967.

(3) During January 1968 the company trained, housed and fed 661 101st Airborne Division replacements.

(4) Replacement Company also renovated its mess and troop billeting facilities. The mess hall, which previously could accommodate only 150 personnel was enlarged to accommodate 500 personnel. The supply system was re-organized to efficiently handle both in and out processing and a new supply room was constructed.

(5) Tents which had housed replacements for the past year was replaced by semi-permanent structures.

(6) Statistics show a total 23 officers and 632 enlisted men (brigade replacements) trained in the Proficiency Training Courses. 32 Officers and 122 enlisted men were trained in the Combat Leaders Course for 1st Brigade units. Six officers and 657 enlisted men (division replacements) were trained for the division.

(7) During the reporting period, the unit processed 343 personnel for R&R, 475 personnel for DROES, 163 for special leave, 27 emergency leave, 1,391 hospital returnees and 503 personnel passing through PHN ENGS on miscellaneous official business.

b. Installation Coordination and Defense:

(1) General: The brigade's responsibilities for installation coordination were discharged by the Support Battalion through the Installation Coordination Center (ICC). Daily and weekly meetings with representatives of all Free World Military Forces in PHN ENGS area were conducted. Monthly Friendship Council Meetings were held to insure a continuation of the excellent relations enjoyed between allied forces and the Vietnamese people.

(2) During the reporting period three installation practice alerts were held to insure a constant state of readiness. On 24 January 1968, I Field Force Vietnam, conducted an alert to inspect alert procedures. All discrepancies were being corrected. During the Lunar New Year from 25 January to 1 February 1968, at the direction of the Assistant Deputy Installation Defense Coordinator,
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the entire installation was placed on full alert status (Red).

(3) The ICC has continued to act as the coordinating agency for artillery and mortar fires. The bulk of the local artillery support is supplied by the 311th 105 mm. Also during the reporting period ICC coordinated 6 daily, 3 gunships missions, 22 spotter missions, and 8 airstrike missions. The Security Platoon was deployed 3 times during this period.

(4) Presently the ICC, in close coordination with other installation units, is undertaking modifications to insure better communication with all units in the defense of FULCAKAN Air Base, and is providing supervision and recommendations for the improvement of installation defenses.

(5) Friendship Council Meetings: During the reporting period, three Friendship Council Meetings were held. Topics for discussion included the USN 611N Water system, the construction of the Refugee Road, Civic Action projects and areas off-limits to US Forces.

c. Base Camp Development:

USAF directive dated 12 September 1967 remains in effect. The 1st Brigade Base Camp Development remains negative.

d. Civil Affairs:

(1) General: All Civil Affairs projects of the Support Battalion were oriented toward having the people relate to their national government and to enhance the image of the Republic of Vietnam in the eyes of the people. This is accomplished through encouraging maximum participation by local officials in government activities and coordination with M.C. Subsector and ICNRS. The Support Battalion 35 is concerned with the following six general categories in its daily operations: education, health and sanitation, distribution of commodities, construction, monetary support of educational instruction through voluntary contributions, and community relations.

(2) Education: Each company in the Support Battalion has voluntarily assumed responsibility for sponsoring an elementary school in the THAN CHAN/KHUNG area.

(3) Health and Sanitation: MDL.P is the primary vehicle used in support of health and sanitation programs in the area. During the last quarter the following was accomplished:

(a) 1,316 local Vietnamese were treated by US medical personnel
(b) 23 classes and demonstrations on sanitation and personal hygiene were conducted
(c) 21 local Vietnamese were evacuated to receive more intensive care

(4) Distribution of Commodities: The Christmas/TET season expanded the commodity distribution program. The three largest areas of distribution were:

(a) Refugee Center
(b) Chieu Loi Center
(c) Province Chief's Beggar Eradication Program

In support of these programs the following items have been distributed during the quarter:

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(a) 7,062 pounds of cement.
(b) 4,300 pounds of fruit.
(c) 2,100 pounds of milk.
(d) 1,600 pounds of miscellaneous canned/boxed food.
(e) 370 pounds of flour.
(f) 260 pounds of sugar.
(g) 1,900 pounds of miscellaneous small items.
(h) 70, 2" x 2" x 14' pieces of lumber for MCV projects.
(i) 20 rolls of barbed wire for the NIE S&M agriculture center.

(5) Construction:
(a) Two culverts 16 foot long
(b) 50 foot timber trestle bridge, capable of supporting 2½ ton trucks.

(6) Voluntary Monetary Support: $20,500.00 was distributed to 125 US high school students as part of the Support Battalion's Scholarship Program. The money was raised by voluntary contributions by officers and enlisted men of Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

(7) Community Relations: Ten American movies were shown at the PHN KSC Recreation Center to local NIE children.

c. Base Camp Service Company (Company E (Prov) Support Battalion):

(1) General: Company E (Prov) continues to operate under Brigade 60475 with the mission of base camp security and service.

(2) Security Operations:
(a) Security Platoon continued to provide security for the base camp, tower security and reaction force for the PHN KSC Installation.
(b) An element from the Security Platoon provided security for a fresh water well site 3,000 meters SW of the base camp.

(3) Maintenance and Holding Teams: The maintenance and holding teams continued to provide the maintenance, security, and storage facilities for all equipment not required in the brigade forward area. These teams continued to make coordination movements of necessary TOE equipment and supplies to the area of operation.

4. A significant activity was the incorporation of Brigade NBC into the 326 Engineer 6th/17 Cav MHC Team on 30 January 1968. This reorganization has effectively increased the control of assigned and transit personnel and vehicles of Brigade NBC.

f. Administration Section (Company A):

(1) General: During the reporting period this unit continued its mission of administrative support to the brigade in finance, personnel actions, management and records and administration of military justice.

(2) Finance: Finance activities for the reporting period included maintenance of an average of 4,920 finance records, in processing 962 finance
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Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (NSS NFM-45) (U)

records, out-processing 1192 finance records, disbursing in NPC $2,489,287.93 sold
VH $1,896,908.300 (in $160,726.30), prepared 8,509 checks (total $64,584,361.72) and prepared $361 allotments.

(3) Adjutant General:

(a) Personal Actions: There were 49 emergency leaves, 130
ordinary and compassionate leaves, 54 special leaves, 63 congressional investigations, 13
support of dependents, and 463 letters of indebtedness, processed during the reporting period.

(b) Awards and Decorations: 10 DCS's, 4 DFC's, 117 355's,
3 Legion of Merit, 17 Soldier's Medal, 15 Air Medal (V), 130 Air Medal, 119 DS
t (V), 167 BEM, 108 LDCM (V), 317 LDCM, 276 PH were processed and awarded during
the period.

(c) Special Services: FSC - 1229, Movies - 100, and BSO shows
-21.

(d) Records Branch: 766 personal in-processed and 465
personal out-processed.

(e) Casualty Branch: 496 casualties, 180 processed out of
country medical evacuations.

(f) Postal: A total of 9979 money orders were sold ($695,273,
$1) and 1903 money orders paid ($954,677.33), stamp sales totaled $18,927.50. There
were 24,650 pieces of mail and 1102 insured pieces of mail, 73 claims were
processed on incoming mail and 31 outgoing mail. The average transit times were
3.5 days for armail, 4.3 days for FAX, 4.9 days for first class mail and 28 days for
surface mail.

(g) Staff Judge Advocate: Staff Judge Advocate processed 4
General Court Martials, 5 Summary Court Martials and 16 Special Court Martials
during the period.

(h) Post Exchange Activities: During the period the Post Exchange
conducted a total of $435,829.57 in retail sales business and recorded $60,405.08
in concession sales. The Post Exchange received the following amounts of merchandise
from the 0.1. N.A.H. S.M. Depot: November - $355,328.81, December - $321,905.80 and

(1) In anticipation of the return of the Brigade to the base
camp on or about 20 November 1967, the exchange prepared for an increase in sales.
When the Brigade did return to PHN H.M.I. the FX was stocked with high demand
rationed items. FX sales during the stand down were very favorable. Average
daily sales were over $15,000 during the 3 day period.

(2) On 1 December 1967 the FX opened a Snack Bar located in a
mobile van along side of the exchange building. Sales included sodas, ice cream and
cold sandwiches.

(3) At Christmas the exchange shipped several pallets of beer and
soda forward along with a mobile FX with a limited selection of items.

(4) On 10 January 1968 the exchange closed for its quarterly
inventory. Upon completion of the inventory the L.A.P.E.S., 2nd Logistics Command,
G.H. N.A.H. S.M., assumed control of the post exchange.

(h) Support Battalion 54 Activities:

(1) The Support Battalion 54 processed a total of 58 Reports of
Survey during the quarter for the approval of the Deputy Installation Commander.
The total value was $167,499.57.
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(2) Water delivery: 3,700,000 gallons of water were delivered to base camp units during the quarter.

(3) Miles driven: 266,253 miles were logged on vehicles of the Support Battalion during the quarter.

(4) Quarterly Reports of Operational Loss: A total of 12 QMCL were processed during the quarter for approval of the Deputy Installation Commander. Total value was $2,788.29.

(5) Vietnamese Personnel Section:

(a) Total payroll for the quarter was 6,064,350 (606,435) Piasters ($51,394.41)

(b) The local national labor force daily averaged for the quarter was 145 personnel.

1. Air Equipment Support Platoon:

(1) AES personnel supported four airfields and operations at PHAN RANG, BANG LOC, PHAN THIET, and SONG LE during the quarter. A new roof and other improvements were made on the peaked shed. A total of 9,050 personnel parachutes and 412 cargo parachutes were packed. AES Platoon also made complete preparations for a Battalion Airborne Assault, to include the rigging of platform loads.

(2) On 31 October 1967, the assigned strength of the platoon was 60 EM and 3 officers. By 31 January 1968, the assigned strength had dropped to 51 EM and 3 officers.

(3) On 27 January 1968 the platoon was attached to the 109th Quartermaster Company (AD) CMB for an indefinite period.

L. CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. General: During the reporting period the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division was involved in three operations (WHEELER, KLUH TH FALLS, S.H. ANGELO), plus the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry (OPCON to 1st FFHQ V) participated in a separate operation (KLUH) during the period 11-30 November 1967. Civil Affairs activities were undertaken in QUANG TIN (Op WHEELER); LUONG DONG; DANG THUAN (Op KLUH TH FALLS); QUAN BO DO, QUAN PHUC DIEN (Op S.H. ANGELO) and TINH NINH THUAN, TINH PHUC THUAN (Op ROSE) Provinces.

2. Civil Affairs:

a. During the fourth phase of Operation WHEELER civil affairs activities in direct support of the tactical units were centered in LY TIN and TINH PHUC Districts. The activities included the relocation of 764 refugees within the province, the return of 106 persons detained in the brigades area of operation to GVN control at province or district level, and extraction of 19 tons of polished rice from two VC food caches.

b. During operation ROSE, although no mass refugee movement was planned, 250 refugees from the village of SON HAI, a known VC sanctuary and supply base, were relocated to THON MY NGA (BN477). No significant caches of food were found or extracted during the operation.

c. During Operation KLUH TH FALLS civil affairs activities included the resettlement of 62 refugees within LUONG DONG Province, the return of 19 detainees to province headquarters and the extraction of 64 chickens with the refugees. Due to the tactical situation, difficult terrain or non availability of means of transportation all food caches were destroyed during the operation.

d. Operation S.H. ANGELO, commencing 16 January 1968 and continuing at present encompasses, the districts of PHUC NINH, SO DO and DOC PHUE. Due to the frequency of enemy contact and the terrain in the area of operations all food caches
Program. During the period one of Battalion, laborers located 23 by 16 yards and as such received training in insecticide under the plague control program in area. Including a team from keepers; plated, the placement of water tank and (Z07). Five bane in the regiment. 731 lots, IX TIN b district and TINE PHU Village, TIM PHU district. treatment of the brigade departing the area from the 101st Airborne Division Prevented to the area. An effective civic action program was undertaken at the brigade, without the knowledge of the people of IV TIN HAMLET. Twenty NCCPS were performed and resulted in the medical treatment of 2,596 Vietnamese civilians from LONG LINH, IV TIN and TINH DONG Hamlets, IV TIN District and TINH PHU Village, TINH PHU District. Of these treated, 731 persons received plague inoculations.

b. Operation KLIM TH FALLS: Due to the brigade's short stay a PHAN THIEN no civic action projects other than NCCPS were undertaken at the site location. When the brigade moved to HQ LOC and due to the existing progress in that area, it was decided to direct all efforts toward the Montagnard Hamlet of KINH (Z0978) and NONG (Z0978). Five self-help projects were initiated of which two were completed, the placement of a water tank and tower, and three were not completed (construction of two wells, fabrication of 30 pieces of school furniture) prior to the brigade departing the area of operation. An, 6th ENG BN repaired 8 kilometers of road on Route 237 from HQ LOC to TIM HU. Twenty NCCPS teams from 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry established in the DI LINH District, treated 2,474 Vietnamese civilians throughout the brigade area of operation and the hamlets of KINH and NONG were dated with powered insecticide under the plague control program.

c. Operation SAN MICA: As of the close of the reporting period civic action activities have centered in the LONG LINH area, PHU PHU District. No projects other than NCCPS have been initiated; however, coordination for Civic Action programs is underway. Four NCCPS have been performed, treating a total of 200 Vietnamese civilians.

d. Support Battalion: Throughout the reporting period the Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division has maintained an effective civic action program in the rear base camp at PHAN LINH. Civic action projects included the construction of 4,400 meters of road, the repair of approximately 4,000 meters of road in two separate areas, the construction of three culverts (two 12'x12' and one 12'x16'), construction of one playground, replacement of three wings on an old playground and construction of a 50 foot trellis bridge under the self-help program. During the period 1,971 Vietnamese civilians were medically treated and 23 classes and demonstrations on sanitation and personal hygiene were conducted. Local VN nurses and medics received training by working with the NCCPS.

e. Labor: The forward brigade elements employed 4,326 daily hire laborers for a plaster expenditure of 479,140VND.

f. Distribution of Commodities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>1,735 lbs</td>
<td>Chalk Boards</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>191 lbs</td>
<td>Ink, bottle, 16 oz</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candy</td>
<td>900 lbs</td>
<td>School Kits</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap</td>
<td>7,345 lbs</td>
<td>Rulers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>9,941 ft</td>
<td>Erasers</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Wires, barbed: 3,000 ft
Wires, concertina (50 m ea): 23 rolls
Medical Supplies: 118 lbs
Painted Steel Planking: 132 ft
Paint: 12 gals
Saw-Edge: 18,000 ea
1 1/2" pipe: 10 ft
3/4" pipe: 20 ft
Toys: 650 ea
Dental Care Kits: 112 ea
Pencils: 55 ea
Drums, 55 gal: 24 ea

Paper, Writing: 2 reams
Pencils: 210 ea
Sharpeners, pencil: 16 ea
Pen, ball point: 3 ea
Cement: 110 lbs
Sewing Machine: 1 ea
Polyethylene, 4' x 8': 80 sheets
Tank, water, 300 gal: 1 ea
Deshes, wooden: 3 ea
Gravel: 7 trk lbs
Volley Ball & Net: 1 ea
Fresh Fruit: 3,200 lbs

Polished Rice: 38,000 pounds

h. Voluntary Contributions:

205,000 VND was contributed to the high school scholarship program in PHL N BNG.
5,000 VND in condolence payments were made in connection with accidents involving two Vietnamese.

i. Efforts Not Otherwise Mentioned Above:

(1) Forty students from the 371st LOC Agricultural College visited the brigade and performed an hour long Christmas program at 2d LOC Base Camp. In attendance were the Brigade Commander, to whom the performers presented a bouquet of flowers; the 371st LOC Province Chief, whom the brigade presented a plaque of appreciation; and the principal of the school, who received a special gift from the brigade. Each performer received a gift.

(2) Fifty-two children from a local orphanage visited the base Camp at 2d LOC for Christmas dinner. Each child received gift packages.

(3) Forty children from the PHN N BNG refugee camp attended a Christmas Party sponsored by the Brigade Replacement Detachment. They each received gift packages and toys.

(4) Eleven American movies were shown to local Vietnamese children.

(5) Electrical lighting and 2,400 gallons of potable water were provided by the brigade for the semi-final sports event in PHN N BNG for the 1968 Winter Olympic Team.

(6) One soccer game was played between US/AVN Soldiers.

(7) Five Certificates of Appreciation were presented to Vietnamese nationals during this period.

(8) One Brigade Certificate of Appreciation was presented to a QMN MNK Province CDRN official.

(9) Five Brigade Plaques of Appreciation were presented to Vietnamese nationals.

(10) The Brigade S-5 was invited to, and did attend, the National Festival Day ceremonies at T.N. X City.

M. MEDICAL

a. During the reporting period unit and brigade level medical support continued to be provided by organic medical elements. The battalion aid stations were employed to provide a limited treatment capability at the battalion tactical command post and a treatment/resupply capability at battalion base camps locations.
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Company D, 326th Medical Battalion (Airborne) routinely operated a 40-bed medical clearing station in the vicinity of the brigade tactical command post.

b. Non organic support was provided by the 55th Medical Group (HU 55M), 434th Medical Group (HUS TH 434), and the 45th Medical Group (HUS 45M). Aeromedical evacuation support was provided by the 45th Medical Ambulance Company (HU 45M), 45th Helicopter Ambulance Detachment (HUS 45H), and the 45th Medical Ambulance Company (HUS 45H).

c. Significant Diseases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scrub typhus</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gastroenteritis</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hepatitis</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pneumonia</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>respiratory infection</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skin problems</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foot problems</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Malaria has continued to be the major source of morbidity in this brigade. Although the rate has been less than half that experienced during the peak of last summer, it is still the highest reported in USRV. Tactical effectiveness must continually be weighed against the increased malaria hazard known to exist when conducting night operations in highly endemic areas. In spite of chemoprophylaxis malaria rates will remain high unless effective individual protective measures are employed. Hepatitis has increased during this quarter and has resulted in the necessity of administering gammaglobulin to at least 34 individuals. In many instances history is obtainable which indicates failure to utilize water purification tablets for nonpotable water. Individuals continue to use local purchase ice and beverages. Supervision is necessary at all times to insure compliance with existing regulations regarding water purification and avoidance of local foods. Gastroenteritis continues to present sporadic difficulties. One episode of bacillary dysentery was attributed to a KP who had prepared food while he had diarrhea. Frequent mass sanitation inspections are being conducted to preclude recurrences from this source.

e. Medical Care and Preventive Medicine

(1) Unit vector control procedures during the quarter were adequate. Continued emphasis is warranted in the role of the unit commander aided by his company field sanitation team in eliminating known causes of morbidity from within the tactical area of operation. Specifically, the area of malaria preventive measures, i.e., use of mosquito netting, taking of chemoprophylactic medications, sleeves down policy at 1800 hours daily, application of insect repellent, as well as the procedures to be followed in disinfecting locally procured water should be closely reviewed.

(2) Aerial spraying for mosquito control was accomplished in the CHU LII area by the 20th Preventive Medicine Detachment. In the PHN TIEET area, brigade and battalion base camps were sprayed by the PHN TIEET PDE entomologist section. To eliminate a possible plague epidemic within the CHU LII area, the 20th PM Det from NH TIEET provided a survey and dusting team to dust surrounding villages near the brigade base camp. Personnel protective measures were stressed and no incidence of the disease was manifested in brigade personnel.

(3) Air ambulance evacuation continued to be accomplished in an excellent manner throughout the quarter. One area which should be considered for improvement was the frequent exchange of medical crews at 1-3 day intervals during Operation KLAK TH FALLS (1 Dec 67 through 10 Jan 68). As a result of these crew changes, confusion was noted in locating tactical units and the exchange of necessary command information was unduly cumbersome. Winch equipped helicopters were available in sufficient quantity to satisfy medical hoist extraction missions.

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1. Prolonged wing Aeromedical evacuation. During Operation KL1M.TH FALLS a field medical evacuation equipped with a single side band radio was made available to the brigade. This resulted in increased effectiveness in the evacuation management of large numbers of patients and proved to be an excellent means of conserving rotary wing aircraft for immediate field extraction and urgent evacuation missions. This capability should be made available on a routine basis since it adds a greater degree of flexibility to the overall medical support that can be provided.

N. SIGNAL

1. The Signal Company (Provisional), 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division had the mission of providing signal service to units in the vicinity of brigade headquarters, installing and operating the brigade command signal systems and providing access trunks to the brigade multichannel system for all subordinated elements.

a. VHF Section: Organic VHF equipment was not used during Operation WHEELER. During Operation KL1M.TH FALLS organic VHF equipment was used to provide multichannel voice communications to the battalion trains area. During Operation SAN ANGELO organic VHF equipment was used to provide multichannel voice communications to adjacent units.

b. FM Radio: FM radio communications were established at CHU L.I for Operation WHEELER, PALM THIST and JOO LOE for Operation KL1M.TH FALLS and SONG B for Operation SAN ANGELO. The various nets in operation for the brigade during these operations are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NET</th>
<th>Op WHEELER</th>
<th>Op KL1M.TH FALLS</th>
<th>Op SANG B</th>
<th>ANZEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cde Command Net #1</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cde Command Net #1A (Secure)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cde Operations &amp; Intel Net #2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cde Admin/Log Net #3</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cde Admin/Log Net #3 (Secure)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Purpose Net</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Wire Integration</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM Relay</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Automatic retransmission relay for nets 1, 1A, 2 and 3 located at ANZEL7A.

2. The KBS station was established at the brigade base in all areas of operation to provide telephone service to the United States.

3. The switchboard/wire section established the brigade command post communications at CHU L.I (Op WHEELER) terminating 96 telephone circuits and installing approximately 65 miles of wire; at PALM THIST and JOO LOE (Op KL1M.TH FALLS) terminating 96 telephone circuits and installing approximately 30 miles of wire; at SONG B (Op SANG B) terminating 96 telephone circuits and installing approximately 65 miles of wire.

4. The communication center terminated two teletype circuits at CHU L.I, one to the Army Division and one to the brigade rear; at PALM THIST and JOO LOE it terminated one full duplex teletype circuit to IFPV; and at SONG B one half duplex circuit was established to Hqs, 101st Abn Div.

5. The HN radio section operated secure radio teletype circuits at CHU L.I and PHN NANG (Op WHEELER); PALM THIST, JOO LOE and PHN NANG (Op KL1M.TH FALLS); SONG B and PHN NANG (Op SANG B) on a 24 hour basis.

6. The maintenance section continued to provide signal maintenance support for the brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company and all attached elements throughout the reporting period.
2. **Supporting Units**

a. During Operation WHEELER, VHF carrier support was provided by the 30th Signal Battalion, Americal Division with twelve VHF circuits for the brigade command post. Of these twelve, five were common user and seven were sole user teletype circuits.

b. During Operation KALAMATH FALLS, VHF carrier support was provided by the 43d Signal Battalion with twelve circuits, nine of which were common user and three were sole user teletype circuits, and by the 5th Signal Battalion with four VHF circuits, three of which were common user and one was a sole user circuit. Both units provided terminal facilities for communications to higher and adjacent headquarters.

c. During Operation SAN ANGELO, VHF carrier support was provided by an AN/UGC-69 from the 320th Signal Company, 36th Signal Battalion with 12 VHF circuits, eight of which were common user and four were sole user circuits to higher headquarters. Additionally, the 5th Platoon, Company D, 501st Signal Battalion provided an AN/sec row teletype circuit to division headquarters.

2. **Artillery**

1. During Operations WHEELER, KALAMATH FALLS and SAN ANGELO the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery supported the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division by collecting each of its organic firing batteries with each organic maneuver battalion tactical command post. In the fourth phase of Operation WHEELER the battalion was supported by a search light section (two lights) from B Battery, 29th Artillery which was collocated with the tactical command post 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery from 7 to 24 November 1967, and by C Battery, 3d Battalion (155mm) 16th Artillery which continued its mission of reinforcing the fires of the battalion. During Operation KALAMATH FALLS, C Battery, 6th Battery (155mm) 16th Artillery was assigned the mission of reinforcing the fires of the 2d Battalion (Airborne) 320th Artillery while A Battery, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 21st Artillery was placed under the operational control of the battalion and provided support for the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 7th Cavalry and A Battery, 4th Battalion, 50th Artillery (24cm) (SP) provided support for the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division during regular convoy movement from Paktia to Khost (KHOST) to Rahman Kalyan (HRM KALAN) to Buna LOC (ZT7970). In the initial stages of SAN ANGELO C Battery, 2d Battalion (105mm), 11th Artillery was assigned the mission of reinforcing the fires of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery, C Battery, 2d Battalion (105mm) 13th Artillery provided direct support to the 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry and D Battery, 2d Battalion, 27th Artillery (8 inch - 175 composite) was in general support reinforcing the fires of the Division Artillery.

2. Outside of the normal refresher training conducted continually throughout the 2d Battalion (Airborne) 320th Artillery each firing battery conducted live fire training with the MOD-14 Anti-Personnel "Desert" round. The training utilized the oldest rounds in the battery and provided an orientation for the infantry battalions' command post personnel as well as for the firing battery personnel.

3. During Operation KALAMATH FALLS and SAN ANGELO the battalion encountered the following problem: Additional stress on howitzers.

a. Discussion: Due to the large areas of operation, firing batteries were widely dispersed with little or no overlapping fires for mutual support. This situation resulted in the increased use of charge 7 for fire missions, which reduced tube life, created maintenance problems with the recoil system, and, during Operation SAN ANGELO caused the cracking of three base plates.

b. Solution: The problem was alleviated in certain instances by splitting battery operations and establishing mini-fire bases. Organic maintenance elements repaired damaged tubes and an increased preventative maintenance check system on all howitzers was instituted.
1. Company F, 326th Engineer Battalion (Airborne), continued to place one combat engineer platoon in direct support of the organic maneuver battalions and the remainder of the company in general support of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. The platoon in support of a maneuver battalion placed one landing zone clearing and demolition team with each rifle company and kept an emergency team at the battalion tactical command post. Normal missions included demolition of tunnels and bunkers, mine clearing, helicopter landing zone construction, explosive ordinance disposal and bunker construction. The company (-) performed the missions of road and drainage construction, minor structure construction, civic action construction, mine clearing, explosive ordnance disposal, heliport revetment construction, area clearing for unit locations and water supply. The company assessed the following statistics, by operation, during the reporting period.

a. Repair of 8 km of road on Route 337 from Do Lo LC (27/370) to T.N KUN (27/1009) during Operation KLM TH FALLS.

b. TYPE MISSION  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OP WHEELER</th>
<th>FALLS</th>
<th>SAN ANGELO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter landing zone cleared</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy bunkers destroyed</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker construction</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnels and tunnel complex destroyed</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive ordnance demolition</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 # bomb</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 # bomb</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>butterfly bomb M25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120mm</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7 inch</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm</td>
<td>1365</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75mm</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50mm</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77mm</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-90 lbs</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-30 lbs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAW</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M166 mines</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M66 mine</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M26 hand grenade</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chico shaped charge</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chico mine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chico hand grenade</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 rocket</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes entire Op WHEELER as figures were not available at close of last reporting period.

2. Training: The enemy use of captured M-16 anti-personnel mines necessitated a mine study and training program to lessen casualties and eliminate misconceptions.

Q. TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY

The tactical air control party from the 21st Tactical Air Support Squadron (21 TASS) provided tactical air support for the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division during the entire reporting period. The support rendered the brigade is listed below per operation:

a. Operation WHEELER: US Air Force and Marine pilots flew 426 tactical missions totaling 873 sorties. Of those sorties, 453 were immediate requests which were processed through the Air Force I Corps Direct Air Support Center (IACDASC)
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(M) with an average reaction time of twenty minutes. In addition, 201 Combat Skyspot sorties, 41 fire support (AC-47) sorties and 168 transport sorties were flown. Forward Air Controllers flew 341 sorties in forward air control, artillery adjustment and visual reconnaissance missions. A total of 1,163,975 tons of ordnance was expended consisting of 88,450 tons of general purpose bombs, 229,125 tons of napalm, 2,660,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, 273,000 rounds of 20mm ammunition, 28 CBU's and 1,513 rockets.

Includes entire Op WHEELER as figures were not available at close of last reporting period.

b. Operation KLOWTH FALLS: US Air Force pilots flew 118 tactical fighter missions totaling 236 sorties. Of these 98 were immediate requests which were processed through Direct Air Support Center AFRICA (RCA ROIC) with an average reaction time of thirty minutes. In addition, 23 Skyspot sorties, 9 fire support (AC-47) sorties and 283 transport sorties were flown. Forward Air Controllers flew 172 sorties in forward air control, artillery adjustment and visual reconnaissance missions. A total of 395,235 tons of ordnance was expended consisting of 330,750 tons of general purpose bombs, 290,125 tons of napalm, 323 flares, 97,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, 66,000 rounds of 20mm ammunition and 76 rockets.

c. Operation WHEELER: US Air Force pilots flew 68 tactical fighter missions totaling 123 sorties. Of these 21 were immediate requests which were processed through 3d Direct Air Support Center (LONG DING). In addition, 7 Skyspot sorties and 208 transport sorties were flown. Forward Air Controllers flew 84 sorties in forward air control, artillery adjustment and visual reconnaissance missions. A total of 178,6 tons of ordnance was expended consisting of 151,9 tons of general purpose bombs, 26,5 tons of napalm, 38,100 rounds of 20mm ammunition and 174 rockets.

d. Operation JIFAX: US Air Force pilots flew 118 tactical fighter missions totaling 236 sorties. Of these 98 were immediate requests which were processed through 3d Direct Air Support Center (LONG DING). In addition, 23 Skyspot sorties, 9 fire support (AC-47) sorties and 283 transport sorties were flown. Forward Air Controllers flew 172 sorties in forward air control, artillery adjustment and visual reconnaissance missions. A total of 395,235 tons of ordnance was expended consisting of 330,750 tons of general purpose bombs, 290,125 tons of napalm, 323 flares, 97,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, 66,000 rounds of 20mm ammunition and 76 rockets.

e. Operation JIFAX: US Air Force pilots flew 68 tactical fighter missions totaling 123 sorties. Of these 21 were immediate requests which were processed through 3d Direct Air Support Center (LONG DING). In addition, 7 Skyspot sorties and 208 transport sorties were flown. Forward Air Controllers flew 84 sorties in forward air control, artillery adjustment and visual reconnaissance missions. A total of 178,6 tons of ordnance was expended consisting of 151,9 tons of general purpose bombs, 26,5 tons of napalm, 38,100 rounds of 20mm ammunition and 174 rockets.

R. ARMY AVIATION

1. General Concept of Operations: Aviation assets under operational control of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division were placed in direct support of the maneuver elements. With this aerial fire support and lift capability, the ground commander maintained the means of rapid deployment, reinforcement, close air support, resupply, reconnaissance and emergency medical evacuation.

2. The following aviation support was provided:

a. Operation WHEELER: The 14th Combat Aviation Battalion provided the brigade with aircraft for troop lift, combat support and resupply missions. The 176th Assault Helicopter Company was employed in a direct support role and provided helicopters for gunship, troop lift, and resupply missions. The 161st Assault Helicopter Company, in general support of the brigade, flew gunship support, troop lift and resupply missions. The 178th Aviation Company (Medium), in general support of the brigade, provided CH-47 aircraft on mission support basis for troop lift, heavy resupply and displacement of artillery units.

b. Operation RSVP: The 177th Assault Helicopter Company in direct support of the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry provided helicopters for gunship support, troop lift and resupply missions.

c. Operation KLOWTH FALLS: The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion provided the brigade with aircraft for troop lift, combat support and resupply missions. The 17th, 20th, 22nd, 23rd, 24th and 24th Assault Helicopter Companies were employed in a direct support role and provided helicopters for gunship support, troop lift and resupply missions. The 243rd Aviation Company (Medium) in general support of the brigade, provided CH-47 aircraft on mission support basis for troop lift, heavy resupply and displacement of artillery units.

d. Operation SAN ANGELO: The 101st Aviation Battalion, 101st Airborne Division supported the brigade on a daily mission request basis. Helicopters for gunship support, troop lift and resupply missions were utilized from companies A and B, 101st Aviation Battalion. II FF/ACE V provided CH-47 lift capability on a daily mission basis.
3. Problem Areas

a. Aircraft Maintenance

(1) Discussion: Initial dispatch of aircraft provided for a release time of one and a half hours prior to darkness in order for maintenance to be performed during daylight hours. Ground unit commanders frequently requested extension of release time. This reduced aircraft availability the following day.

(2) Solution: Command emphasis was placed on the meeting of release time. Aircraft which continued to be utilized past the release time were grounded for maintenance the following day.

b. Landing Zone Selection and Maintenance

(1) Discussion: Poor selection of landing zones and failure to re-appraise consistently current requirements and locations of helicopters in the tactical areas result in both injury to personnel on the ground and destruction of aircraft due to the lack of understanding of requirements of aircraft.

(2) Solution: Conducting a joint reconnaissance of tentative landing zones by both the ground commander and the air mission commander based on the ground tactical plan assures a well-coordinated combat assault. This system not only allows for invaluable assistance to the ground commander but it also allows the air mission commander to issue his orders and properly brief the aviation elements.
Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. Item: Enemy Pattern of Observation
   a. Observation: When operating in a new area of operations, emphasis should be placed, initially, on determining the pattern of activity of the enemy forces in the area. For instance, if the initial contacts with the enemy are made on the military crest of hills and the enemy is in fortified positions, it can be assumed that the enemy will be in similar positions on other hills in the area. Once this information is obtained or information indicates otherwise, it can be assumed that the pattern is universal in the area and methods of operations can be modified accordingly.

   b. Discussion: The methods of operation, location of base camps and caches, and positioning and use of defensive positions vary among the enemy in different areas of operation. Knowing this pattern in a particular area of operation is vital to the successful conduct of combat operations.

2. Item: Securing Landing Zones
   a. Observation: Commanders must ensure that both the landing zone and approach are secure to be reasonably sure that enemy forces are not along the approach into the landing zone. If it is impossible to secure the approach or the enemy situation along the approach is not known, this information must be reported so that gunships can accompany the resupply or medical evacuation helicopter.

   b. Discussion: During or after an enemy contact when emergency resupply or medical evacuation is required, it is not sufficient to secure only the actual location where the helicopter is to land.

3. Item: Defense Against Enemy Mortars
   a. Observation: Resupply of units was conducted as rapidly as possible and units then displaced to a new location. This rapid shift, plus minimizing the flights in and out of a unit location, decreased the enemy's ability to pinpoint a unit location and reduced the effectiveness of his mortar attacks.

   b. Discussion: When resupply of units is required by helicopter, unit locations are compromised by the flights of resupply aircraft into the area. The enemy in the area of operation frequently employed mortars against the unit at the resupply location.

4. Item: Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (FADAC)
   a. Observations: By maintaining two manual charts, one primary and one check, in each fire direction center (FDC) and using the FADAC every other day required the FDC to use the manual method, thus maintaining manual proficiency and allowing maintenance time for the computer.

   b. Discussion: With the inception and successful utilization of the FADAC, a tendency existed to rely completely on the computer with consequent adverse effects on the firing battery’s manual capability.

Part II Recommendations

1. Visual tracking: The biggest problem in fighting the enemy in Vietnam is finding him in order to fight him. A definite need, therefore, exists at the rifle platoon level for personnel familiar with and trained in the art of visually tracking the enemy. When contact is made with the enemy, often several of the enemy are wounded and manage to escape. Blood trails are followed because they are relatively easy to locate, but once the enemy has time to bandage himself, the average riflemen loses the trail. A by-product of knowing the principles of tracking is the ability to detect quickly things that are out of place or unusual such as enemy signs used to designate booby traps, mines, punji pits or other
CONCERNING

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Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. The "Daisy Cutter" has proven to be an extremely effective bomb for landing zone preparation in advance of assaulting troops and for land zone construction. It is recommended that this bomb be standard issue in Vietnam to insure adequate supply to fulfill its required use.

2. It is, therefore, recommended that the art of visual tracking be taught to riflemen prior to their arrival in Vietnam.

J. W. Collins III
Col, Infantry
Commanding

Incl 1-Brigade Organization

Netf: Operation WHEELER published separately as CAAR 67X161

Distribution:
2-CINCPAC, ATTN: MOPP-OT APO 96559
2-HQ USAFRV, ATTN: AVHCC-DS, APO 96222
2-CC, 101st Abn Div, APO 96383
2MCC, 22rd Mil Hist Det APO 96383
1-ca Staff Section, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
1-83 Record File
1-83 Reference File

CONFIDENTIAL
AVFGC-EX-I (12 Feb 68)

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1968. (ECS CSFOR-65) (MIC WAJ-170) (U)

TO: HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 23 MAR 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GFOP-QT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This command has reviewed the attached ORLL of the 1st Brigade,
101st Airborne Division and concurs with the report with the following
exceptions:

a. Page 3, para 4a. Operation San Angelo was conducted in the
Phuoc Long Province.

b. Page 8, para 3a. Helicopters for Personnel Detector and
visual reconnaissance missions are normally furnished by the organic
aviation battalion. The 101st Airborne Division was allocated four O-1
aircraft daily. The O-1 companies commit a specified number of aircraft
daily in order to meet the ground unit requirements. Aircraft that are
grounded for maintenance are replaced. The problem results from internal
scheduling arrangements and not from a lack of aviation support.

c. Page 25, para 8, 2d. Operation San Angelo: Helicopters for
gunship support, troop lift and resupply missions were allocated from
12th Combat Aviation Group units during this operation.

d. Page 26, para 3a. In the case of II FFORCEV helicopter units,
1800 hours has been established as normal release time. This is approximately
one hour prior to darkness. If the tactical situation dictates, a one hour
extension can be granted normally without delaying the reporting time for the
helicopter company the following day. It is not a requirement that aircraft
be grounded the day following an extension of the unit beyond the normal
release time. Maintenance is performed at night to provide the required
number of aircraft for the next day. In cases of extreme battle damage, a
company can be allowed to perform maintenance the following day or removed
from the combat assault role until damage has been repaired.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

E. M. McGRATH
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (12 Feb 68) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
(RCS CSFOR-65)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 22 MAR 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, AITN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters,
1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (WABA4AA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comment follows: Reference item concerning visual track-
ing, page 27, paragraph 1. Visual tracker training for each rifleman is not
feasible. In October 1967, DA was requested to provide 1,200 visual tracker
trained personnel for assignment to small combat units. The basis of assign-
ment recommended was one individual per LRP, reconnaissance platoon,
rifle platoon, and armored cavalry platoon. Status of DA action is unknown
at this time.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit
through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. S. NAKATSUZUKA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
HQ II FFORCEV

GROUP 4
upgraded at 3 year intervals
classified after 12 years
DIR 5200.10 Applies
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division for Period Ending 31 Jan 68 (RCS ZS5FOR-65) (UIC: WAB4AA)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 12 APR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C.I. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Ann AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (1)

Experiences of unit engaged in counter-insurgency operations, 1 Nov 67-31 Jan 1968

CO, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

12 February 1968

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