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| AGO D/A ltr 30 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr 30 Apr 1980 |

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 716th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to AGSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

C. A. STANFIELD
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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716th Military Police Battalion
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 716TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96243

AVDGE-GC

12 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968, RCS CSFOR-(5); 716th Military Police Battalion - W-BXC-TO

TO: Deputy Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC(DST)
APO San Francisco 96375

In accordance with the provisions of AR 1-19 and USARV Reg 1-19 this unit's Operational Report on Lessons Learned is transmitted herewith.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
ROBERT J. PATTON
CW2, USA
Adjutant

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SECTION I: SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) Mission: During the reporting period, this unit's mission continues to be security and law enforcement in the Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhut metropolitan area, Vietnam. Specific security missions, involving approximately 83% of the military police/security guard resources of the battalion, includes the US Embassy, new MACV Complex, VIP and General's quarters, BOQ's, BFQ's and critical US facilities and installations throughout the city. This security mission is primarily aimed at deterring terrorist acts, both overt and covert. The law enforcement mission involves normal military police functions in a metropolitan area, to include criminal investigations. The battalion supports the requirements of the Provost Marshal, US Army Headquarters Area Command, for military police/security guards within the resources available.


3. (C) Key Personnel Assignments and Departures: Deleted, Hqs, DA.

4. (C) Personnel, Morale and Discipline:
   a. There were no cases of malaria contracted by members of the battalion or attached units.
   b. Personnel of the battalion and attached units were involved in 36 traffic accidents, none of which were fatal. Considering the tremendous volume of traffic in the Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhut metropolitan area and the fact that more than 652,740 miles were driven by members of the battalion during this period, the accident rate is not considered high.
   c. Two hundred and thirteen (213) members of the battalion were granted TDY for the purpose of rest and recuperation out-of-country and eight (8) were granted in-country rest and recuperation at Vung Tau, Vietnam. All personnel who applied were granted TDY for rest and recuperation.
   d. During this period the battalion continued sponsorship of the Saigon Police Boy Scouts Association by providing food, gifts, and candy for 1,000 boy scouts on 23 December 1967 for Christmas party and on 28 January 1968 for a Lunar New Year's party. Boy Scout uniforms were presented on 23 December 1967. Funds were provided to purchase materials that could not be obtained through US Government channels to
construct a building in the first and third precincts to be used jointly as a registration building and a boy scout meeting place. Funds were also provided to train boy scout leaders in all precincts in Saigon. This project has resulted in a much better working relationship and understanding between the two police agencies. Gifts and candy were provided to approximately 600 orphans in the Hai Duc An orphanage in Saigon during the week of 17 December 1967. Gifts were distributed to approximately 360 children of the personnel of the 5th Quan Canh Battalion on 23 December 1967. The battalion provided two men to teach the English language to Cahn Sats at the Cahn Sat Training Center on a full time basis. An average of 140 classes of one hour each were taught each month. Three hundred and six (306) dictionaries were purchased and distributed to those that attended classes on a regular basis. The Cahn Sats in turn have provided two men to teach the Vietnamese language to personnel of this battalion who perform duty with the joint patrol. This project also has proven to be very successful in increasing the understanding and working relationship between the two police agencies. A meeting was held with representatives of the Vietnam Christian Service and other interested parties to discuss the building of a blind hostel which this unit had funds committed to. After discussion, it was decided to drop the project since it was impossible to obtain the necessary land to build it on.

e. There were no congressional inquiries during the period.

f. During the reporting period the Article 15 and Court Martial rate was 7½ per cent of the battalion and attached units.

g. During the reporting period members of the battalion were awarded 16 bronze Stars for meritorious service and 30 Army Commendation medals for meritorious service.

h. Fifty seven (57) members of the battalion and attached units applied for and were granted extensions of their tours in Vietnam.

5. (U) Intelligence and Counterintelligence:

a. During the reporting period 716th Military Police Battalion Regulation 335-12 was revised. The revised edition directed that each assigned and attached company would appoint a Military Police Intelligence Officer. His duties would include: the briefing and debriefing of all unit personnel going on and coming off duty, the establishment of an intelligence collection and dissemination procedure within the unit and immediate notification of intelligence information to next higher headquarters, and membership on the Battalion Military Police Intelligence Council. This council, under the direction of the battalion intelligence officer, would choose specific areas of interest for a particular period. The purpose behind this program is to get the troops in the habit of "seeing" and reporting potential intelligence information. Prior to this time personnel were instructed to report anything of intelligence interest and given an EEI of over one hundred things to look for and
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report. The end result of this program was that little or nothing was reported. It is hoped that this new program, backed with proper training and command emphases, will result in the realization of full intelligence collection potential of the military policemen and security guards on static posts and patrol within the city of Saigon. In order to show the results of this program to the individual military policeman/security guard, a monthly intelligence review will be published by the battalion S2, it will be made up mainly of information collected by the troops.

b. A problem that developed during this reporting period was the duplication of intelligence efforts by the Provost Marshal's Office and the Battalion S2 in the area of intelligence collection. Due to the fact that the 716th Military Police battalion's primary function is support of the PH, USAHAC, primary intelligence effort of both offices is directed in the Saigon/ChoLon/Tan Son Nhut area. Although there is coordination and cooperation between the two offices, much effort is duplicated. This problem could be eliminated by combining the efforts of the two organizations. This would be accomplished by making the entire intelligence effort directed by one person, ie, a fusion of the PH Police Intelligence Office and the S2 of the battalion.

c. During this period much valuable information was gained by having the Battalion S2 made an integral part of the battalion's Civic Action Program. The Civic Action Program consisted of giving support to the Boy Scout Association of the Saigon Municipal Police Directorate. By having the S2 act as precinct level coordinator, information of intelligence value was gained from the precinct chiefs and individual policemen that would have otherwise been totally unavailable. It is suggested that the S2 be directly in charge of, or an integral part of, all civic action projects.

d. Throughout USAHV much intelligence information has been gained by the debriefing of AWOL personnel who have spent extended periods of time hiding within the local community.

Because of their close contact with the Vietnamese, many of these individuals gain knowledge of the interworking of the blackmarket and the attitudes of the local populace. Although no effort should be made to condone such activity, as much information as possible should be extracted from these individuals.

6. (c) Plans, Operations and Training:

a. The 716th Military Police Battalion and attached units were committed operationally throughout the reporting period.

b. During this period the 716th Military Police Battalion came under operational control of USAHV through the Commanding General, United State
Army Headquarters Area Command. Static security requirements, which should have theoretically decreased under the concepts of Operation MOOSE, did not reflect any appreciable change. In an effort to meet the continuing commitment requirement, a directive was published limiting and stabilizing the unit overhead authorization in all assigned and attached sub-units. The first phase of redeployment of the Security Guard Company (Provisional) was accomplished by moving and attaching one full platoon (1 officer and 49 EM) to Company C, 716th Military Police Battalion to supplement that unit's personnel requirements in fulfilling its assigned mission, and releasing 36 other personnel to USAHAC. Contingency plans have been developed, through, staff studies and other written proposals, for the final phase of the deactivation of the Security Guard Company (Provisional) which will release approximately one-half platoon to the 527th Military Police Company, one-half platoon to C Co, 52d Infantry and the remaining personnel to control of USAHAC. Contingency plans were also developed to cover the possibility of the disbanding of the Security Guard Company (Provisional). These plans included provisions for resident self support security on certain installations and billets, redistribution/consolidation of existing commitments, both static security and law enforcement, further reduction of overhead and special duty personnel, conversion to 12 hour shifts on certain law enforcement commitments. During this period the attached USAHAC Security Guard Platoon was reduced in strength to two (2) personnel through normal attrition (DEROS, ETS, etc).

c. There was one major enemy offensive campaign during this period that took the form of a major VC attack on the city of Saigon. The attack commenced on 31 January and continued well into February. (See Inclusion 2; Special Report of ORIL During Combat Conditions - City of Saigon, 31 January to 4 February 1968).

d. During this period the 716th Military Police Battalion was required to furnish additional security guard personnel to replace civilian guards granted authorized absence during the TET Holiday period. The number of additional personnel required did not seriously hamper operations nor did it effect the unit mission.

e. During this reporting period the battalion engaged in 13 days of weapons training and familiarization firing. Weapons fired during this period included the XM-16E1 rifle (continuing), .45 caliber pistol (continuing), M-14 rifle and M-60 machine gun (continuing).

f. Other subjects stressed in unit training were:

(1) Command Information.
(2) Character Guidance.
(3) MP Escorts and VIP Security Techniques.
(4) Map Reading.

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(5) CBN.
(6) Explosive Ordnance Recovery.
(7) Maintenance and Supply Economy.
(8) MP Communications.
(9) First Aid.
(10) Unarmed Defense (Refresher).
(11) Escapes.
(12) Techniques of Apprehension and Search.
(13) Protection of Crime Scenes.
(14) Preparation of MP Forms.
(15) Terrorist Operations and Techniques.
(16) Weapons Safety.
(17) Personal Security.
(18) Refresher Driver Training.
(19) Use of Chemical Munitions.
(20) Sanitation and Personnel Hygiene.
(21) Riot Control and Civil Disturbances.
(22) Defense Against Subversion and Espionage.
(23) Armed Forces Censorship/Civil Affairs.
(24) Others as prescribed by Commanding Officer, 89th Military Police Group, Commanding Officer, 716th Military Police Battalion and Provost Marshal, United States Army Area Command, totaling not less than four (4) hours per week, not including weapons firing or maintenance, care and cleaning of equipment. In addition, a battalion officers call has been initiated during the first week of each month.

7. (c) Communications Activities: The major portion of the Battalion Communications Section's efforts were devoted to maintaining approximately 100 static security net radios. These radios, AN/PRC-10's and AN/PRC-25's, are now distributed on an equal ratio. The average deadline rate for AN/PRC-25's has been one per month, while the AN/PRC-10's have been deadlined or require adjustments at an average rate of two per day.

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8. (U) Logistics and Maintenance:

a. During this period seventeen (17) M-151A1 jeep mounted rifle racks for M-14/16 rifles were installed. The rifle rack that was developed is a suitable replacement and an improvement over the existing rifle holder. The weapon rack developed is fabricated from one (1) inch angle iron and quarter (¼) inch steel rod. It is mounted between the front seats of the M-151A1. It is capable of carrying two rifles, either M-14 or M-16 and does not hinder the operation of the vehicle in any manner. More racks were not constructed due to the unavailability of one (1) inch angle iron and ½ inch rod.

b. Additional PLL for sedan type vehicles were received during this period. This has enabled the Battalion Maintenance Section the capability to perform 3rd echelon maintenance on the sedan in the battalion (i.e., the Provost Marshal's vehicle).

c. The shortage of flak vests reported in the last ORLL has been corrected. The Security Guard Company has been reduced in strength and a corresponding amount of equipment turned-in. A large amount of shortages exist in the battalion due to the large number of personnel killed or wounded on 31 January 1968. The equipment was either destroyed or lost through no fault of the men concerned. (See Inclosure 2; Special Report of ORLL During Combat Conditions - City of Saigon, 31 January to 4 February 1968).

d. Deadlined vehicles continue to be a problem in the battalion. The reasons for deadline vehicles are voltage regulators and batteries. Combat lost vehicles include seven (7) ½ tons and one (1) 2½ ton.

e. There still exists a shortage of foot lockers as reported in the last ORLL.

SECTION II: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I: OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED):

1. (U) PERSONNEL: See Inclosure 2; Special Report of ORLL During Combat Conditions - City of Saigon, 31 January to 4 February 1968; Section II.

2. (C) OPERATIONS: See Inclosure 2; Special Report of ORLL During Combat Conditions - City of Saigon, 31 January to 4 February 1968; Section I. paragraphs I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI, and XIII.

ITEM: Radio Sets, AN/PRC-25

DISCUSSION: This battalion is charged with physical security responsibility for a large metropolitan area. The military policeman/security guard who man the numerous static posts throughout the area must be provided an adequate communications capability with the military police desk.

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OBSERVATION: The best radio set for this type of communications is the AN/PRC-25. AN/PRC-10 radios do not have sufficient transmitting power or range in metropolitan areas. Experience factor indicates a far greater amount of maintenance man hours are spent on repairing AN/PRC-10 radios than the AN/PRC-25 radios. Units with security missions should be authorized a sufficient quantity of AN/PRC-25 radios to achieve effective communications and lessen maintenance requirements. Recommend that AN/PRC-25 radios be incorporated into the standardized MTOE's currently being drafted by 18th Military Police Brigade.

3. (C) TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION: See Inclosure 2; Special Report of ORLL During Combat Conditions - City of Saigon, 31 January to 4 February 1968; Section I, paragraphs X, and XII.

4. (U) INTELLIGENCE: None

5. (C) LOGISTICS: See Inclosure 2; Special Report of ORLL During Combat Conditions - City of Saigon, 31 January to 4 February 1968; Section II.

ITEM: Maintenance Problems

DISCUSSION: The problem with support maintenance continues. Vehicles remain deadlined at support maintenance, for periods exceeding 30 days.

OBSERVATION: Recommend the procedures outlined in the last ORLL, that is to assign the necessary personnel to perform proper maintenance and to allow units to stock some support maintenance parts and tools.

6. (U) OTHER: None

PART II: RECOMMENDATIONS:

That the observations listed above making item recommendations be adopted.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for the Reporting Period ending 31 January 1968 for the 716th Military Police Battalion, UIC: WRCSTO

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 89TH MILITARY POLICE GROUP, APO 96491, 28 February 1968

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Reference item concerning Radio Sets, AN/PRC-25, Section II, Part I, page 8. Concur that there is a need for a greater communication capability in units with physical security missions. A MTCE was submitted to USAV on 19 October 1967 which will increase the communication capabilities. AN/PRC-10 radios are being eliminated from the system by the Army Selected Tactical Radio Conversion program. The AN/PRC-25 is the authorized replacement subject to availability. Also authorized in lieu of the PRC-10 are the VRC-125, which can either be man packed or vehicle installed. Military Police Battalions in Vietnam have a low priority on the availability list for receipt of these conversion radios. In view of the 716th Military Police Battalion's mission, an effort to obtain a higher priority will be initiated by this headquarters.

2. (U) Reference item Logistics and Maintenance. Section II, Part I, page 8, paragraph 8a. This headquarters will assist in obtaining material for construction of gun racks.

3. (C) Reference item, Personnel, Operations, Training and Organization, and Logistics, Section II, Part I. The referenced Special Report of Lessons Learned was forwarded by indorsement with concurrence of all recommendations on 9 February 1968.

4. (C) Referenced item concerning Maintenance Problems, Section II, Part I, page 9, paragraph 5. Nonconcur: Possible consolidation or at least assistance from the Saigon Support Command Motor Pool should be explored. Liaison with that unit will be established and a mutual assistance agreement negotiated for emergency contingencies. A request to stock additional or double basic load and parts would be favorably considered by this headquarters.

F. E. Payne
LTC, MFC
Commanding

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1 - CO, 18th MI Bde
2 - MG/FSr, DA
1 - CO, 716th MI En

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AVHGC (12 Feb 68) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: ORLL for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
(AGS-CSF-065) (ULC WMCTO)

HEADQUARTERS, 1STH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, APO 96491

TO: See Distribution

1. (U) Reference Format: The ORLL is a letter signed by the unit commander; there is no need for a letter of transmittal.

2. (U) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5: Attention is invited to 1st Ind. This Special Report of ORLL during combat operations has already been addressed by this headquarters.

3. (U) Reference item concerning Radio Sets All/PhC-25, Section II, pages 8 and 9 and 1st Ind: Concur with 1st Ind. The HTO's Standardization has been forwarded to DA; no changes can be made. All All/PhC-25 radios can be requested on a 180 day temporary loan. New HTO's will not be submitted until the above mentioned HTO's have been approved.

4. (C) Reference item concerning Maintenance Problem, page 9 and 1st Ind: Concur with 1st Ind. Closer coordination and follow up action with the support activity is required. There is an overall shortage of mechanics throughout this command, and additional mechanics cannot be made available. Emphasis on 1st Echelon (user) maintenance and close monitoring of PLL's will facilitate the reduction of maintenance problems.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

J. W. MITCHELL
CPT, AG
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

1-CG, USAV, ATTN: AVHGC-DST

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AVHGC-DST (12 Feb 68) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968, RCS CSFOR-65; 716th Military Police Battalion - W-BXC-TO

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 25 MAR 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 716th Military Police Battalion (WBXCAA) as indorsed.

2. Concur with report as indorsed. Report is considered adequate.

3. Correct Unit Identification Code is WBXCAA.

4. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ 716th MP Bn
HQ 18th MP Bde
GPOP-DT (12 Feb 68) (U) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 716th MP Bn for Period Ending
31 January 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558  23 APR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. SHOUITT
CPT, AGC
Assi AG
716th Military Police Battalion

Commanding General
Headquarters Area Command

Commanding Officer
89th MP Group

Commanding Officer
716th MP Battalion

S1
S2/3
S4

HHD Co A Co B Co C C Co, 52d Infantry 527th MP Co SG Co (Prov) * 90th MP Det

Operational Control

*Attached to 716th MP Battalion for administration, logistics and military justice.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS 716TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION

APO San Francisco 96243

AVSGGC 8 February 1968

SUBJECT: Special Report of ODAI During Combat Conditions - City of Saigon

31 January to 4 February 1968

SECTION I

OPERATIONS

I. (C) Alert Disaster Team Organization and Equipment Concept

Needs Revision.

OBSERVATION: The current emergency mission for this battalion is to provide support for US Army Headquarters Area Command (USAHAC) in the conduct of disaster recovery operations in the Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhut area by providing security, damage control, and prevention of pilferage. The concept of operations envisioned a disaster or enemy destruction such as the blowing up of a US billet (similar to the Victoria Hotel destruction) by VC personnel. After confirmation of a disaster by the Provost Marshal, the 716th Military Police Battalion dispatches a twenty-five man alert force to the affected area. The team is organised into a control and cordon team which seals off and clears the damaged area of all unauthorized personnel; a rescue team which evacuates casualties from the building; a search team assists EOD personnel in locating other bombs or explosives. There is no provision in the plan for use of battalion military policemen as fighting units.

The experience gained from the combat operations conducted by this battalion from 31 January to 4 February 1968 indicates that the present "disaster force" concept needs revision to handle the combat type actions that were placed upon the unit. Twenty-five men dispatched all at once into an unknown situation in a built-up area such as Saigon proved unwieldy and dangerous. Tactics were changed in that 11 to 13 man teams (one half an alert force) were dispatched to make contact, explore enemy strength capabilities, and/or to "sweep" the area prior to commitment of further forces. An infantry squad sized formation is about correct.

Inclosure 2

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AVLGE-GC

SUBJECT: Special Report of OAL during Combat Conditions - City of Saigon
31 January to 4 February 1968

The use of 2½ ton trucks for the dispatch of troops proved incorrect. One of our first 25 man teams was almost totally destroyed in a 2½ ton truck hit by an initial explosion followed by automatic weapons fire, grenades, rockets, satchel charges, and intense small arms fire. Too many men in one vehicle in a combat action operation can be a very inviting target, and potentially too great a loss of men at one time. A ½ ton or 3/4 ton vehicle should be the maximum size used. Tactics were changed immediately to reflect this consideration. Twelve men teams were dispatched in three ½ ton trucks wherever possible, thus gaining dispersal and mutual fire support.

After reforming our alert force in the desired configuration, it soon became evident that each team should be equipped with a M-60 machine gun and M-79 grenade launcher. The M-79 proved invaluable in numerous situations during the combat situations in Saigon. Once our teams were issued these weapons they were often able to extricate themselves from "pinned down" positions, and were able to perform much more effectively, and were also in several instances, capable of initiating offensive operations.

RECOMMENDATION: Additional 1½ ton trucks with AM/VRC-46 radios should be allotted to infantry units involved in combat-in-cities operations. Attached infantry companies should be comparable in vehicular and radio strength to the regular 97F military police company (physical security). The alert teams should be similarly equipped as an infantry squad to include a M-60 machine gun and a M-79 grenade launcher.

II. (C) Single Vehicle Military Police Patrols.

OBSERVATION: Military police units usually have one-vehicle military police patrols, or dispatch one-vehicle military police units to respond to "trouble spots." This concept is ingrained into military police operations world wide. However, as a result of the experience gained in Saigon, it was necessary to change this concept once hostilities were in progress. One military police vehicle can do little good in a fire fight and if it's knocked out, cannot even provide intelligence information via radio. One military police vehicle has no mutual fire support.

The "police" tactics were changed to reflect the combat posture. All military police patrols consisted of two ½ tons with crews of at least three armed military policemen each. They were treated as an integral unit. Single vehicles have been allowed to move in Saigon. This applied to administrative runs as well. Armed, escorted movements have been the "order of the day." All military police patrol units are armed with automatic weapons
SUBJECT: Special Report of Casualties During Combat Conditions - City of Saigon
31 January to 4 February 1968

and in some cases the M-79 grenade launcher. At the present time there is still considerable sniper fire in many portions of our patrol areas. To date we have received no casualties as a result of this revised patrolling technique.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that all military police units operating in potential trouble spots in built-up areas be able to switch to the two vehicle concept immediately in case of open hostilities.

This same principle applies to machine gun jeeps. Our singly dispatched machine gun patrol jeeps sustained heavy casualties and damage. Once these vehicles were put in matched pairs, no further casualties or damage was sustained.

III. (c) Poor Organisation and Fire Discipline Among US Billet Occupants in Saigon.

OBSERVATION: A problem peculiar to Saigon exists where numerous BOQs, BBQs (over 100 buildings) exist in clusters and in isolated positions throughout all sections of the city. A great majority of these billets received automatic weapons fire. Personnel residing in these structures were not equipped to defend themselves against VC attack. Eventually the occupants received weapons of numerous sizes and descriptions from various and sundry sources. Then the problem arose when nervous (often untrained civilians) occupants started firing at anything that moved - to include one another! There have been many nights when indiscriminate, uncoordinated fire was directed at streets, buildings, roof tops, vehicles, alleys, friendly troops, National Police, military Police, from US billets and from civilian hotels occupied by US and other out-of-country personnel. At times there was greater danger from these sources than from the VC. This was especially true during the hours of darkness. It was necessary to continually send military policemen to the various billets to warn the occupants to stop indiscriminate firing. They were told of friendly troops, National Police, etc., "sweeping" their area. They were admonished not to fire, and were instructed to fire only when there was a threat. They were to use extreme caution because of friendly troops in the area. We found it impossible to get the "word" to everyone, and indiscriminate fire would continue even after warnings were issued. This procedure committed military police that were required elsewhere and was often dangerous just getting to these people. This problem was never fully solved. Some billets were just too inaccessible, and/or too many VC in the area.

RECOMMENDATION: An immediate effective individual billet defense plan should be implemented. All occupants should be fully briefed of local conditions, and their part in the defense plan. Each billet should have an internal weapon and ammunition source. It should be secured and strictly
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8 February 1966

SUBJECT: Special Report of OML During Combat Conditions - City of Saigon 31 January to 4 February 1966

controlled by the senior occupant. All occupants, regardless of rank, should be required to be familiarized on these weapons. It is not intended that there should be a weapon for each billet occupant. The amount of weapons should be based on a percentage of the building occupants. Consideration would have to be given to the size and location of the building. A 10% percentage factor might be an optimum figure.

In addition there should be a radio in each billet on a common intelligence and/or administrative net. Information could then be passed to billet occupants without sending troops. This net should not be the military police operational net (WACO).

The defense plan should include strict fire control procedures. It will probably never be known how much firing was directed toward friendly troops.

IV. (C) Unknown billets.

OBSERVATION: After the start of hostilities there were numerous calls from many sources requesting military police protection. Calls came from unknown government billets, civilian villas, civilian billets, hotels, and other private dwellings. In many cases the location, and even the existence of these structures, was unknown. There were several instances of the military police coming under hostile fire just trying to locate and gain entrance to these billets. Trying to give protection to these and the regular guarded billets was a tremendous drain on manpower.

RECOMMENDATION: Civilian personnel who are paid to have the privilege of living in non-government defended quarters should not be given valuable manpower to defend their living quarters.

V. (C) Excessive Billet Dispersion.

OBSERVATION: One of the major problems during the VC attack on the Saigon metropolitan area was the number and dispersion of 13 military and civilian billets and facilities. The 716th Military Police Battalion was guarding 130 of these facilities during the initial stages of the attack. Before the fifth day was completed the battalion had either sent reaction forces or was providing security for an additional thirty facilities. This dispersion of facilities and the resulting dispersion of our own personnel caused two difficulties. First, the manpower and tactical problems in
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sending reaction forces to every part of the city to reinforce the facilities as they were attacked. Second, the logistical problem of resuppling these personnel with rations, ammunition, and relief. In many cases personnel remained on a static post for 36 hours because hostile fire made it impossible for us to get to the post.

Recommendation: To alleviate a future recurrence of this problem the following actions should be taken as soon as possible:

1. The MOSS program be fully activated to get as many personnel out of Saigon as soon as possible.

2. The remaining personnel be consolidated in properly defensible areas.

3. Each of these consolidated facilities be provided with a guard force from squad to platoon size, depending on the size of the facility. This force would be billeted in the facility and would have enough ammunition and rations to sustain itself for an extended period of time.

4. Each of these facilities would have a building defense plan with a security guard force of its own.

This plan would alleviate the problem of sending reaction forces to a large number of places scattered throughout the city and the problem of resupply and relief.

VI. (C) Lack of Proper Maps.

Observation: This battalion's combat operations pointed up another fact. Our city maps are not detailed enough, nor accurate enough. It was difficult to effectively pinpoint locations. There are numerous roads, alleys, streets, buildings, etc., not shown in sufficient detail.

This factor became more prevalent when we dispatched and/or deployed infantry and/or less city-experienced military policemen.

Detailed up-to-date maps are beneficial to any military operations, but in a combat-in-cities situation they are an absolute necessity. It was extremely difficult at times to pass and receive pertinent information via radio pertaining to the location of hostile forces in buildings, alleyways etc., direction and source of enemy fire; best vehicle approaches to certain critical areas.

Recommendation: Update our own maps until new ones are obtainable.
VII. (C) Utilization of V-100’s.

Observation: 89th Military Police Group dispatched two V-100 Commando Cars to our unit for use as required. They were used in areas where sniper and automatic weapons fire was prevalent and the necessity existed to accomplish the following:

1. Amo resupply to isolated units and company basic loads.
2. To extricate friendly units pinned down or cut off.
3. Convoy escort of priority one items (ie. am mo, gasoline.)
4. To draw fire from suspected sniper positions.
5. To destroy or neutralize VC sniper or light machine gun positions, especially those located in elevated positions.
6. To extricate dead or wounded personnel.

The V-100’s were not employed where the enemy was firing heavier type weapons (ie., rockets, 50 caliber machine guns). The armored cars were instrumental in delivering ammunition to Alpha, Bravo, C/52 Inf companies when the Capitol Block was under enemy fire, and the companies were critically low on ammunition.

They conducted many escort trips for gasoline tanker truck convoys supplying various critical points throughout the city (power plants, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, etc.). On these convoys they were used in conjunction with two machine gun jeeps.

The V-100’s showed their excellent potential when they were dispatched to help extricate two Joint Patrol Jeeps (military police - National police combined patrols) that were pinned down by an enemy machine gun post located in a room on the upper floor of a Vietnamese dwelling. Upon their arrival at a large four way intersection (traffic circle type) they discovered the JP patrols and some VN troops held down by the machine gun post. The vehicles “buttoned up” and proceeded toward the building, drawing the fire from the VC position. They opened up with their 30 caliber machine guns and fired into the room from which the fire was directed. A crew member on one vehicle fired his M-79 grenade launcher directly into the window and it exploded and set fire to the room. All firing ceased. The VN soldiers jumped up and stormed the building. The V-100’s returned to battalion. A successful mission.
They were also in a fire fight in the Cholon PX area, and were instrumental in neutralizing automatic weapons fire coming from a window of a VN house. In addition they helped in the extrication of a wounded Transportation Corps officer and his dead driver from the same area by providing firecover.

It cannot be over emphasized that the V-100's are an extremely valuable addition to a military police battalion operating under combat conditions in city or similar built-up areas. Our experience brings this fact out most poignantly. It has excellent combat-in-cities capabilities; good size, shape, and excellent maneuvering ability. In addition, it approaches the psychological deterrent factor inherent of armored vehicles, without the limitation of excess size, noise and street destructive limitations of armored track vehicles.

The only improvement the V-100's might have is a larger caliber weapon. Possibly twin 50 caliber machine guns, or twin 20mm cannons.

RECOMMENDATION: The Military Police Corps obtain and use more of these vehicles.

VIII. (C) 90mm Recoiless Rifle.

OBSERVATION: This battalion had no authority to stock and store 90mm ammunition for our assigned weapons. After the initiation of hostilities we were able to obtain supplies of this needed item. Fire teams were formed consisting of a 90mm crew and a 1/2 ton truck, accompanied by a M-60 machine gun crew and 1/4 ton truck. These fire teams were kept on a standby basis in the battalion area to be dispatched when a need existed for a large caliber weapon. These units responded to numerous requests for assistance. On one mission they succeeded in blowing two large holes in a building containing numerous VC personnel and automatic weapons. These VC were holding numerous ARVN and National Police from taking their position due to the fact there was no entrance way into the building. After the 90mm crew "opened up" entrance ways, followed by M-79 grenades fired thru the holes, the ARVN's were then able to gain entrance to the buildings and route the remaining VC. If this ammunition had been available at the beginning of hostilities our fire teams would have been of measurable help.

RECOMMENDATION: That 90mm ammunition be authorized for storage in the battalion ammo dump.
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IX. (C) attached Combat Units.

Observation: In combat-in-cities operations it is quite evident that one of the best sources of intelligence of enemy activity is the military police patrol units and the radio equipped stationary guard posts located throughout the city. However, during periods of prolonged activity resulting in doubling of military police patrols for added protection and fire power, extra guard commitments etc, the reaction posture of the battalion is diminishing both in available personnel and vehicular resources.

X. (C) Provost Marshal - battalion Tactical Command Deployment Concept.

Observation: In a situation as existed in Saigon from 31 January to 4 February 1966 it would be of greater benefit, and tactical advantage, if a more definitive command structure was implemented. Under the current circumstances that developed in Saigon, it became evident to the battalion Commander that a tactical situation existed and "police" methods were neither adequate nor appropriate to cope with situation. Due to the cumbersome and completely inadequate command structure that existed, the battalion Commander was compelled, on his own initiative, to assume control of the employment and configuration of this unit. No where is the battalion included or involved in any "plan" for the defense of Saigon under such circumstances, nor does the battalion, as such, have a definitive command and control posture for such contingencies, nor a designated communication channel to any higher or supervisory channel. Information obtained was from monitoring of the military police operational net and calling various agencies/units for information. The Provost Marshal is a staff officer only, does not have a command function, and is unfamiliar with the capabilities and limitations of the unit.

It should be noted that reinforcements and resupply of this battalion came from 85th Military Police Group, 18th Military Police Brigade. Here, in the administrative and logistics areas there were clearly defined channels of communication, and these channels worked extremely well. Initially supplies were brought in by helicopter. Subsequently supplies were delivered via escorted supply vehicles furnished by Group. Due to the excessive amount of manpower commitments, two platoons of military policemen were
brought in from the 92nd Military Police Battalion (arranged through the 69th Military Police Group) to reinforce Company C at MACV Headquarters.

as tactical commitments began to diminish on or about 4 February 1966 the remainder of these troops were released to the 92nd Military Police Battalion.

This battalion again became overcommitted due to requests for extra guards, armed escorts, TCP's, etc. Again we went to the 89th Military Police Group for and received, help and reinforcements from the 92nd Military Police Battalion.

If the operational channels had been as clearly defined as our administrative and logistics channels, the battalion would have achieved a far better combat posture.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That the Battalion Commander assume the dual responsibility of Battalion Commander and Provost Marshal, or, if not feasible, a clearly defined chain of command and assumption of dual responsibilities be clearly defined.

2. The battalion be assigned a specific mission and be incorporated into the overall OOD defense plan, and not have to operate "on its own" and in a vacuum.

3. A tactical communications net and command structure be defined and designated. This should NOT be infused into the existing military police communications net.

XI. (C) Communications.

OBSERVATION: All telephone communications terminated between battalion headquarters and the Capitol BBQ (three companies) soon after the start of hostilities. Jeep radios and power sources had to be used at the companies in order to communicate with battalion. All communication had to be primarily by radio. All military police 37F and especially the INFANTRY 7-18E companies attached for military police operations need additional radios of the AN/PRC-25 capability. This is especially true in Saigon where many static posts have radios. To maintain communications with units at the Capitol BBQ this battalion set up a special administrative net assigned by 18th Military Police Brigade. When new commitments
materialised the radio capability was spread too thin through the city. An/PRC-25 pack mounted radios would have been an invaluable addition during the US Embassy fight. Commanders had to leave their vehicles in order to control troops and secure the Embassy. Immediate radio information was not then available to battalion.

RECOMMENDATION: Attached infantry companies need to be brought up to a common military police - infantry equipment status. Additional pack mounted AN/PRC-25s should be added to each company. In addition a radio intelligence net should be established between battalion and higher headquarters. With most telephones out, and the few remaining hopelessly overworked, intelligence information was non-existent outside of our own internal sources. If the VC had managed to overrun parts of Saigon there would have been a critical lack of communication.

XII. Training.

OBSERVATION: Combat-in-cities involves different techniques of employment and different use and allocation of available supplies, weapons, and resources. Special operational methods must be employed that differ considerably from regular infantry combat methods.

RECOMMENDATION: Combat-in-cities training as outlined in FM 31-50, part two and augmented by instruction from experienced personnel should be given military police and infantry units stationed in Saigon, and similar built-up areas.

XIII. (c) Battalion Disposition in Saigon.

OBSERVATION: Three of this battalion's companies are located in an extremely poor and untenable location (Capitol/St George DE Complex). These billets are located in an area that does not lend itself to good ingress and egress for a 24 hour operational unit. Its vehicle parking area is small and extremely congested. It has only one entrance/exit and if it was blocked or brought under fire, no vehicles could get out. They would then become a prime target. If the billets were destroyed or overrun, three fifth of the battalion would be cut off. There is only one approach road into and another narrow 1-way route out of the area. It was extremely fortunate the area was not hit by "sapper" squads.

In January Co C, 716th MP BN, at CV Annex, Tar Son hut, was reinforced with a platoon from our security guard company. On the afternoon
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of 31 January Charlie Company was reinforced by two platoons of officers, men, and vehicles from the 92nd Military Police Battalion. These platoons were eventually released to their parent unit. Again on 6 February one platoon (1) with vehicles was obtained from 89th Military Group to reinforce this battalion due to overcommitments, with the aspect of MACV, and MACV Annex area growing in size and importance, and considering that communication and road access between the north and south of Saigon was blocked during several periods of time, there is every indication that an additional company is needed in the Tan Son Nhut area. Further, as the MODS program progresses, more of our commitments will be in the northern area of the city, and less in Saigon/Cholon.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. Two companies be located at Tan Son Nhut.
2. Two companies be located at the International Hotel.
3. One company be located at the Ky Son Annex which is adjacent to a secured sub motor pool of this battalion.
4. Completely vacate the Capitol/St George Bldg.

If these recommendations were implemented the battalion would be in a better defense posture, and would have access to several ingress and egress routes.

SECTION II

PERSONNEL

CASUALTY REPORTING

1. USARV Regulation 600-1 requires that a telephone report be made to the USARV Casualty Branch not later than 12 hours after the time of a casualty. Due to the tactical situation in the first twenty-four hours it was impossible to recover the remains of many of the KIA's, thus the deadline imposed could not be met. In addition, there were instances where immediate identification could not be made pending identification by members of the deceased's unit which was delayed due to the inadvisability of going through insecure areas.
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2. Once identification of deceased had been received and contact was established with the hospital/mortuary, as applicable, it was impossible to get information on cause of death for several hours because of the number of casualties being processed.

3. Wounded personnel were evacuated from the hospital and the hospital wasn't able to furnish this headquarters with a diagnosis, prognosis, or place evacuated until a much later time which caused several casualty reports to be delayed pending further information.

4. 18th MP brigade letter AVG5-G, subject: Casualty reporting, Graves Registration and mortuary procedures, dated 1 January 1968 which quotes USAV letter dated 25 December 1967, same subject, states in paragraph 3c that health and dental records would be evacuated through graves registration channels without delay, however, when this headquarters attempted to turn them over to graves registration they were refused. This letter is in contradiction to Army Regulations 40-403 and 640-10 which require health and dental records to be forwarded with the military personnel records jacket.

SECTION III
LOGISTICS

ITEM: Ammunition Storage and Supply

DISCUSSION: Previous procedure has been for each unit to store their ammunition in company bunkers (all located in one supply point) and to resupply their own needs.

OBSERVATION: Units became so committed during the VC attack on Saigon, that supply personnel were used as guards or put on the road as military policemen. In addition all supply movement needed armed escorts. It was impossible to have an accurate count of ammunition or to know the needs of the units.

RECOMMENDATION: That the S-4 be given control of all basic loads and be responsible for supplying to the units during periods of ammunition expenditure. However, each company should have a portion of their basic load at their individual location for emergency purpose.

ITEM: Rations

DISCUSSION: Previous procedure was for each unit to maintain their own basic load and to initiate the basic load.
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OBSERVATION: After the basic load was committed, units failed to control
the issue and waited until the last minute before requesting rations.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That a system be established for control of issue of
rations and that timely requests be forwarded to S-4 for replacement.

ITEM: Maintenance Float

DISCUSSION: The 716th Military Police battalion maintains only the equip-
ment authorized by TOE.

OBSERVATION: During the period of loss due to hostile action a maintenance
float was needed to replace equipment lost or damaged.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That the 716th Military Police battalion be authorized a
maintenance float.

ITEM: Support of National Police

DISCUSSION: It has been assumed that the National Police would support
themselves during any emergency.

OBSERVATION: During the VC attack on Saigon, the National Police requested
and received the following items:

a. Rations 160 cases
b. Hand grenades 4 cases
c. 5.56mm ammo 4 cases
d. Two cases carbine ammo
e. Four cases claymore mines

RECOMMENDATION: That the responsible agency stock a sufficient amount of
rations and ammunition for emergency issue to the National Police.

ITEM: POL located at only one supply source

OBSERVATION: During the course of hostilities the POL Point was under
attack. It became impossible to obtain POL.

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RECOMMENDATION: At least two POL Points should be established in the city.

GORDON D. ROWE
LTC, HPC
Commanding
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, 716th Military Police Battalion (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations. 1 Nov 67-31 Jan 1968

CO, 716th Military Police Battalion

12 February 1968

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