<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>AD389987</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIMITATION CHANGES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AUTHORITY**

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980
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Best Available Copy
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2d Battalion (175MM)(SP), 32d Artillery

TO: See distribution

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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Commanding Generals
101st Airborne Division (-)
11th Infantry Brigade (Sep)
Commanding Officers
5th Battalion, 46th Infantry
5th Battalion, 12th Infantry
6th Battalion, 31st Infantry
31st Engineer Battalion (Cbt)
5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155mm-T)
2d Battalion (175MM)(SP), 32d Artillery
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
20 BATTALION (175th)(hp), 32D ARtilLERY.
AFO San Francisco 96216

AVGR-20
6 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS-GEOR-(3)(U)

THRU: Commanding Officer
23d Artillery Group
AFO 96289

Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam Artillery
ATTN: AVFB-FA-C
AFO 96277

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVC-DH
AFO 96307

Commander-in-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GCF-MH
AFO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT HEADQUARTERS OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) Administration and Personnel

   a. Normal 5-1 activities have been conducted during the period.

DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD AIR 5200.10

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b. Authorized and proposed TOE strengths:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOE AUTH</th>
<th>TOE + AUGMENTATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>WO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Battery</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery B</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Battery</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Assigned and present for duty strength as of 30 April 1967:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
<th>PHASSED FOR DUTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>WO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Battery</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery A</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery b</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Battery</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. The difference in assigned and present for duty strength shown in paragraph 10 above resulted principally from the fact that Headquarters and Headquarters Battery carries personnel assigned but in transit. The Battalion metro section is assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Battery but attached to Battery C. Similarly, the battalion personnel section, assigned to Service Battery, is attached to Service Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, as part of the 23d Artillery Group Personnel Section. Other variations are due to normal absenteeism resulting from leave, h & k and hospital.

e. Throughout the period of 1 February 1967 to 30 April 1967, h&k shortages have resulted from personnel rotation. h&k's most affected were 15840 and 24920. These shortages, although critical for a period of time, have
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGE-6C 8 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons Learned (RGS-CSGK-65)(U)

been subsequently relieved through normal replacements.

f. Personnel changes during this quarter included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>106</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. Casualties included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in action</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing in Action</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-battle dead</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-battle casualties</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. Awards and decorations presented to members of this command included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (herit)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (herit)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: In addition to these awards, 5 recommendations for awards have been submitted and are pending approval by USARV.

i. H & R program schedules include the following:

1. The in-country H & R consisting of 3 day passes to Vung Tau has been used by 7 personnel.

2. The out-of-country H & R included the following 5 day quotas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>FB</th>
<th>HK</th>
<th>AR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penang</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

j. Unit mail clerks pick up and deliver mail from the nearest aro.

SPO numbers for the units are as follows:

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**AVOS-6Q**

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report - Lessons Learned (MSG-C5P2R-65)(U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ARTICLE 15</th>
<th>SUMMARY COURT</th>
<th>SPECIAL COURT</th>
<th>GENERAL COURT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Battery</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery A</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery B</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Battery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

k. Judicial actions by units included:

l. Pertinent medical service statistics include:

m. Reportable accidents included:

n. The morale of the command is outstanding. This is evidenced by the fact that 12 personnel took advantage of the six-month extension program during the reporting quarter.

o. Educational opportunities for personnel are provided by 25th Division educational services and USAFI extension courses.

p. Religious services: Protestant and Catholic services are held on a regular weekly schedule. Other denominations attend services that are announced in the 25th Division Daily Bulletin. Group Chaplains conduct services for Battery B at Suoi Da.

q. The VD rate within the battalion has not presented a serious
problem as evidenced by a pronounced decrease during the quarter. Battery Commanders, with the assistance of the battalion surgeon, present frequent orientations and lectures on personal hygiene and prophylactic usage. This has been found to be an effective approach to the problem of venereal disease.

r. The S1 Section remained at Cu Chi base camp throughout Operation JUNCTION CITY and conducted normal activities. Daily distribution and mail for all batteries were dispatched to the forward command post by organic aircraft. Some administrative functions moved slower than usual due to limited communications with the forward command post; however, all actions were completed and suspense dates were met. Replacements continued to arrive, to be processed and dispatched to their units with minimal delay, the average delay being, three days.

s. The battalion medical section accompanied the forward command post-on Operation JUNCTION CITY and was manned by the Battalion Surgeon and two medical civilian. A rear aid station at base camp was maintained by the battalion medical sergeant. The 25th Medical Battalion, located within two kilometers of the forward command post, rendered support in the areas of medical treatment and resupply. During the operation three men were evacuated to the rear; one for cellulitis, one for an accidentally inflicted knife wound, and one for second and third degree burns. (In addition, two men from Battery A were evacuated through the 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery, one man for a head wound resulting from a mortar attack, and one man for an accidental shotgun wound which resulted in his death.) The general health of the battalion was excellent. Field sanitation was good and continued to improve as the unit remained in the field.

2. (C) Intelligence.

a. General Activities.

(1) The S2 Section continues to conduct monthly classes for each unit with emphasis on MIDA and CIN.

(2) The Chief of the Counter-Intelligence Section, 25th Infantry Division, gave two security lectures to the battalion. These lectures were interesting and beneficial, since they covered case studies of VC activities on and near the Cu Chi base camp and how the average soldier played a key role in apprehending the suspects. Future plans call for a continuation of guest lecturers for each battery.

(3) Since the deployment of the battalion to TAY NINH, the S2 Section has been collecting NI targets from intelligence sources (VERs, covert reports, and Special Forces Reports, etc.). These are given to the Operations Section which schedules them into the daily NI program for artillery units in and around TAY NINH base camp.

b. Aerial Surveillance.

(1) The battalion conducted an active Visual Reconnaissance program during the reporting period.
(2) A class on aerial observation was presented to the battalion aerial observers and interested staff officers. The main topics discussed were:

(a) Principles of aerial observation
(b) Principles of combat intelligence
(c) Recording and Reporting Information
(d) Visual Search Techniques
(e) Artillery Adjustment
(f) Communications
(g) Familiarization with aircraft safety devices and emergency procedures.

(3) The battalion aerial observers located an extensive enemy complex in Grid XT 4170 (Suqit Tbk). This is where one of the largest battles of Operation JUNCTION CITY was fought. Prior to the battle, air observers from this headquarters directed numerous artillery fire missions against fortified bunkers and trench systems in the area.

(4) Total hours flown by the organic aircraft on VHRs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>O-1-D</th>
<th>O-135</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (c) Training and Organization.

a. On the job training and individual cross training continues in all units.

b. The following periods of mandatory training were conducted during the reporting period:

(1) Command Information: 13 hours
(2) Character Guidance: 3 hours
(3) Code of Conduct: 1 hour
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (805-TEMPUR-65)(U)

6 May 1967

(4) Safeguarding Defence Information: 2 hours
(5) Drivers' Training: 3 hours
(6) Physical Fitness: 3 hours
(7) CBR Refresher: 2 hours
(8) Civil Affairs: 1 hour
(9) Survival, Escape and Evasion: 1 hour

c. On 27 February 1967 two enlisted personnel departed for out-of-country special training; returning on 2 March 1967.

d. On 31 March this headquarters published Annex A (Summary Procedures) to its TAC SOP. The purpose of the Annex is to provide guidance and establish standard policies concerning fire direction and firing battery procedures to be followed within the battalion. All firing charts are round, mounted on a "lazy-susan" to facilitate rotation of the chart in a manner which eliminates the necessity of plotting coordinates from a reverse posture. Battery center is plotted at or near the chart center, using only one system of coordinates. The letters E, S, and W are displayed prominently in red at the appropriate edges to indicate direction.

e. The Meteorological Section, while fulfilling its primary mission of furnishing meteor data to artillery units in TAY Ninh Province, is also engaged in several other functions.

(1) Meteorological data is furnished to the Air-Weather-Service (AWS) Detachment at TAY Ninh base camp four (4) times daily. This data is used by the AWS for weather forecasting and air operations of the Air Force over South Vietnam. The AWS Detachment also transmits the data to the AWS Detachment in Saigon which retransmits it worldwide.

(2) Surface observation consisting of temperature, depression, relative humidity, and dew point in made by the section every two hours and the data given to the 55th Surgical Hospital at TAY Ninh. This hospital is the new inflatable and transportable type known as MUST. Hospital technicians use the data for research with the goal of determining possible modifications and improvements to the inflation and air-conditioning systems of the complex.

(3) The Section ships Rawinsonde sounding records to the Atmospheric Science Laboratory at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. The laboratory extracts the desired information and transmits the records to the National Severe Storms Laboratory (NSSL) at Norman, Oklahoma. (NSSL is an agency of the Environmental Science Services Administration (ESSA).) The records being furnished are the Rawinsonde Recorder Chart; which gives a graphic picture of the temperature,
relative humidity, and pressure of the upper atmosphere; the Radiosonde Calibration Chart, which correlates the Radiosonde Recorder Record with pressure heights; and the Control Recorder Time and angle Chart, which is used to determine velocities and directions of winds aloft.

(a) The Atmospheric Science Laboratory at Fort Knoxmouth uses the data in research, with the ultimate goal of improving meteorological data given to artillery units located in tropical climates.

(b) The National Severe Storms Laboratory, a pure weather research organization, is using the data to increase and expand the professional meteorologist's knowledge of local and overall weather conditions existing in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Prior to the Vietnam conflict, knowledge of Southeast Asian weather conditions and phenomena were limited, due to the lack of an established meteorological measurement complex.

(4) During Operation JUNCTON CITY the meteorological section deployed to TRAL BI with Battery C. It provided a met message four times daily to all units operating in the 25th Infantry Division area of operations (times 0030, 0630, 1230, and 1830 hours.) The messages were broadcast over the net and a tape was cut by the battalion NET section and delivered to the 25th Infantry Division artillery to be sent over its AH Command Net.

f. On 31 March 1967 two training films, TF 6-3725, Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer, M-18, General, and TF 6-3726, FADG, M-18, Cannon Application, were shown to the Battalion Commander, Executive Officer, battalion Staff and battalion FDC personnel. The two films were also shown to each of the firing batteries.

g. Survey.

(1) During Operation JUNCTON CITY, the survey section furnished battery center coordinates and two orienting stations for Battery C at TRAL BI and Battery B at SUGDA.

(2) The survey section conducted field tests of survey computations for direction by the "Simplified azimuth of Polaris," by Commander Herbert W. Keith, Jr., USN, Coast Geodetic Survey Liaison Officer, USN; and "Precise Azimuth in a Pinch" (or Equal Altitude Method of Azimuth Determination) by Mr. Malcolm Shaw, Jr., Survey Division, Target Acquisition Department, USA, Fort Bliss, Oklahoma. The "Simplified azimuth of Polaris" is a valuable check for survey teams. The average time involved is 25 minutes. The "Precise Azimuth in a Pinch" is extremely accurate, but the time required is excessive. Average time was three hours. There is the possibility of misidentifying the star at the second sighting. Weather in RVN is a limiting factor for this system.
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AVUS-00

8 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS-OSVIB-65)(U)

4. (c) Operations.

a. Disposition of units at the beginning of the reporting period was
as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters, Headquarters</td>
<td>CU CHI (XT 644 146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Service Batteries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery A</td>
<td>CU CHI (XT 644 146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery B</td>
<td>LAI KHE (XT 756 373)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C</td>
<td>TAY NINH (XT 167 521)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. At the beginning of the reporting period all firing batteries were
composite (8-inch howitzer and 175mm gun).

c. On 110830 February 1967 Battery A departed the CU CHI Base Camp
to participate in Operation GAKSDEN in TAY NINH Province. At TAY NINH the
battery exchanged its two 175mm guns for two 8-inch howitzers of Battery C,
Battery A departed TAY NINH on 111430 February closing at TAI BI (XT 121 766660)
at 111510 hours. During Operation GAKSDEN, Battery A fired a total of 1085
8-inch rounds.

d. The battalion headquarters (-) and all firing batteries participated in
Operation JUNCTION CITY.

(1) On 190830 February Battery A was attached to the 25th Infantry
Division artillery and further attached to the 2nd Battalion, 35th artillery.

(2) On 191535 February Battery B departed LAI KHE (XT 756 373)
emroute to a new base camp at SU KI Da (XT 345 577) and to participate in
Operation JUNCTION CITY. The convoy arrived at DI AN at 191650 hours and
departed at 192330 hours, closing at SU KI Da on 201510 February.

(3) On 200800 February Battery C departed its base camp at TAY NINH to a firing position at TAI BI (XT 126 666) closing at 203920 hours.

(4) On 201030 February 1967, the battalion headquarters (-), con-
sisting of the S2/S3 section, 1 survey party, communication section (1 radio team,
1 wire team and 1 RTT team), the maintenance section (-), ammunition trains, and
the medical section, departed CU CHI on convoy and deployed as a forward com-
mand post in a position north of TAI BI (XT 125 668). The element closed at
201730 hours. At that time the forward command post assumed tactical control of
Batteries B and C, with a mission of General Support II Field Force Vietnam,
Reinforcing the 25th Infantry and 1st Infantry Division Artilleries, with priority
of fires to the 25th Infantry Division Artillery. The assistant S3 preceded the

Page 9 of 20 pages.

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convey to coordinate the positioning of the forward command post and Battery C, which were to be co-located in a position vacated by the 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery. The 32/33 section operated a tactical fire direction center during Operation JUNCTION CITY, with each firing battery operating its own technical fire direction center. In addition, the forward command post operated the Artillery Air Warning Station for the TRAT III complex (Square Lobster TRAT III). Whenever a firing battery deployed a forward firing platoon and operated two fire direction centers, personnel from the battalion fire direction center augmented the unit's fire direction centers.

(5) On 210300 February Battery A departed TRAI BI and closed at Fire Support Base Charlie (XT 0739 333) at 211015 hours. The battery was co-located with Headquarters and Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery.

(6) On 220300 the 3-inch platoon of Battery D departed SOUI DA and arrived at Fire Support Base Bravo (XT 266 705) at 221605 hours. Small arms and mortar fire were received at the base that night, however, no injuries occurred.

(7) On 230041 February the 175mm platoon and Battery B (-) departed SOUI DA and closed at the French Fort (XT 277 653) at 211025 hours.

(8) On 241100 February the 8-inch platoon of Battery A departed Fire Support Base Bravo and closed with the battery (-) at the French Fort (XT 277 533) at 241205 hours, with the instructions to convert the two 8-inch howitzers to 175mm guns. This was accomplished in four (4) hours.

(9) On 270245 February Fire Support Base Charlie received mortar rounds which resulted in one minor WIA in Battery A and a total of 16 WIA in the fire support base.

(10) On 021000 March a platoon of 175mm guns of Battery B moved to Fire Support Base Alpha (XT 101 562) closing at 021020 hours with a mission of General Support II Field Force Vietnam, reinforcing the 175th Infantry Division Artillery with priority of fires to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(11) On 031515 March Battery D returned to SOUI DA (XT 345 771) and continued to support Operation JUNCTION CITY from its base camp. Battery D fired a total of 175 3-inch rounds and 1399 175mm rounds during Operation JUNCTION CITY.

(12) On 050000 March Battery A departed Fire Support Base Charlie and closed at Base Camp BLACKLEG (XT 034 783) at 050045 hours.

(13) On 080900 March the 175mm platoon of Battery C returned to the battery's location (TRAI EI) closing at 080930 hours.

(14) On 151000 March Battery A closed at TRAI EI and fired the 300,000th artillery round to be fired by II Field Force Vietnam Artillery in-country. After this ceremony Battery A and Battery C exchanged 8-inch howitzers for 175mm guns making each a composite battery.
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AVGEO-ZC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons learned (RCS-CHP-65)(U)

(15) The battalion forward command post remained at TRAI BI until its departure on 151030 March, closing at CU CHI at 151415 hours.

(16) On 151045 March Battery C departed TRAI BI after exchanging two weapons with Battery A closing at its base camp at Tay NINH at 151150 hours. Battery C fired 1850 175mm rounds in support of Operation JUNCTION CITY.

(17) Battery A departed TRAI BI on 151100 March and closed at CU CHI base camp at 151445 hours. Battery A fired a total of 2478 8-inch rounds during Operation JUNCTION CITY.

e. On 230930 March Battery A departed CU CHI base camp for DUC HOa with a mission of General Support II Field Force Vietnam, Reinforcing the 25th ARVN Infantry Division Artillery and the Capitol Military District. It closed at DUC HOa (XS 599 963) at 1245 hours.

(1) On arrival at DUC HOa, Battery A coordinated with the US sector advisor and Special Forces and coordinated defensive fires area the Special Forces Camp at TRAI CU (XS 478 964). The Battery registered in the area and from 2 April until its departure, it fired a check round on a different concentration each night.

(2) On 070400 April mortar rounds were received in the battery area. One man received a slight injury while closing the hatch to his TRM. Six rounds were received on the east side of the battery position. One round landed near the mess truck, causing no damage.

(3) On 10 April the mission of the battery was changed to General Support II Field Force Vietnam, Reinforcing the 25th Infantry Division Artillery.

(4) On 181100 April Battery A returned to CU CHI and its new base camp location at XT 635 155, having fired 1625 missions for a total of 1460 8-inch rounds and 1149 175mm rounds.

f. On 091915 April this headquarters was directed to deploy a forward command post to Tay NINH to assume artillery control of Tay NINH base camp in the absence of the 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery, which was deploying for Operation Gideon. Staff coordination was immediately begun, and on 100830 April the S2, S3, Operations Sergeant, Communication Officer, Headquarters Battery Commander and Service Battery Commander departed by UH-1D for the 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery to begin immediate coordination. Later in the afternoon they were joined by the assistant S3, Chief Computer and Intelligence Sergeant. (All remained with the 2nd Battalion, 11th artillery, except the Communications Officer and the two Battery Commanders, who returned to base camp to coordinate the movement of the forward command post to Tay NINH.) At this point the movement of the headquarters to Tay NINH was to be a temporary deployment until this unit could be relieved in place.

(1) On 111200 April, the Operations Section of the 2nd Battalion, 32d Artillery assumed Tay NINH artillery control from the 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery, with the following responsibilities:

CONFIDENTIAL
(a) Control of all U.S. Artillery firing out of TAY NINH base camp.

(b) Artillery Defense of TAY NINH base camp to include the HAI and counter-mortar (BLACKJACK) program. In the BLACKJACK program all U.S. artillery units, mortars, platoons, dusters, and the PHILADELPHIA 105mm howitzer Battery are scheduled.

(c) Acquiring U.S. and/or ARVN ground clearance for all artillery, mortar and duster fires in TAY NINH Province.

(d) Operating an artillery air warning station (TAY NINH Control).

(c) On 14 April 1967 this headquarters was directed to deploy the Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters Battery and Service Battery to TAY NINH as a permanent location. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery completed its move to TAY NINH on 26 April 1967. Service Battery completed its move on 30 April 1967.

(3) Two Liaison Teams were organized and deployed.

(a) One team is co-located with the TAY NINH Sector Headquarters and Detachment B-32, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). This team operated on a twenty-four hour basis and coordinates clearances with both headquarters.

(b) One team is co-located with the ARVN 155mm Howitzer Platoon stationed at PHN CAO (XT 251 432). This team operates on a twenty-four hour basis. The team passes requests for HAI fires to the ARVN Platoon. Most of the HAI targets are to the south and west of TAY NINH. When the ARVN 155 Platoon fires them, it eliminates the necessity of large numbers of Zono III 175mm HAI targets in those directions.

(g) On 22 April 1967, this headquarters published CORD 1-67 (QUICK REF)) which lists organic firing battery responsibilities for MACVCON in support of US/ARVN installations and outposts within range capabilities of their weapons.

(h) On 141965 April, the Special Forces Camp at TRIN BICK received enemy mortar rounds. Batteries B and C were alerted and directed to lay down the defensive concentrations around TRIN BICK. A Forward air controller controlled the fires of Battery B in firing the preplanned defensive concentrations. Battery C was unable to fire because aircraft were orbiting on its trajectory. Battery B fired defensive concentrations in grids XT 2800 and XT 3378. Upon the initiation of firing the mortar fires ceased. Battery B fired a total of 45 175mm rounds in defense. On 22 April 1967, the Liaison Officer with the ARVN Ranger Battalion at TRIN BICK visited this headquarters and informed the G3 that the rounds that landed in grid XT 3078 were right in the open area where the mortars had been set up, and that there was evidence of casualties in the area. (The battery continued to fire HAI's that night and HAI's were scheduled on possible trails and avenues of withdrawal for the next two days.)
1. On 181135 April 1967 Battery C fired 27 8-inch rounds in support of an ARVN CIDG element in contact with an estimated VC platoon. On-the-ground surveillance credited the unit with 2 VC KIA by body count with an estimate from parts of bodies of 6 more VC KIA. (Location of activity was scheduled for H&I fires for the next two days.)

j. On 212203 April Battery A converted two (2) 175mm guns to 8-inch howitzers, thereby becoming an 8-inch battery in preparation for Operation MANHATTAN. On 221200 April Battery A departed CU CHI, closing at XTN 457 268 with a mission of Reinforcing the 25th Infantry Division artillery.

k. The following number of missions were fired with total amounts of ammunition listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NO OF MSNS FIRED</th>
<th>8-inch EXEXPENDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battery A</td>
<td>2666</td>
<td>6447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery B</td>
<td>3324</td>
<td>2537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C</td>
<td>3840</td>
<td>2145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (c) Logistics.

a. Transportation. Prior to Operation JUNCTUIN CITY, the ammunition trains were sent to LAM KH to assist Battery B in its move to its new base camp at SUC G4. Battery C required no assistance since it remained in a stabilized firing position with a forward ammunition supply point (FAS) in its immediate area. The trains were used during JUNCTUIN CITY to stockpile fire support bases and assist in moving batteries. During the dead time in which the ammunition trains were not resupplying the batteries, organizational maintenance was performed in the forward CR area.

b. Supply Operations. The following items considered combat essential were not received during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DOCUMENT #</th>
<th>FOLLOWED UP ON</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRUCK, 5 ton, w/wm, 1 ea.</td>
<td>AT 8149-6341-7561</td>
<td>7076</td>
<td>BL - Okinawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECOVERY VEHICLE, full-track, M579, 2 ea.</td>
<td>7032-002(w/USARV Form 478)</td>
<td>7110</td>
<td>Request submitted 1 February 1967</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Maintenance.

(1) The average down-time for the 9107 and 9110 remained at 2 days during this reporting period.

(2) On 26 March 1967, three (3) weapons in Battery A were dead-lined for sheared engine mount screws (Screw, CEP, Hexagon Head, FSN 5305-558-7357). It was necessary to replace three (3) engines, two (2) transmissions and two (2) transfer cases in the firing battery. This problem was caused by...
improper installation of the engines, specifically, either one or both of the Engine Mount Shock Pads (PSN 2815-870-2107) were not installed and when the Hexagon Head Cap Screw (Engine Mount) (PSN 5305-841-6490) were installed, proper torque could not be applied and excessive vibration sheared off the screws. All weapons in the battalion were immediately inspected and deficiencies corrected. Closer supervision in the installation of engines will prevent recurrence of this problem.

(3) The lack of direct support maintenance contact teams for Batteries A and B during Operation JUNCTION CITY contributed to the longer than usual deadline time for parts. Organic aircraft were used to shuttle parts to maintenance support units. No major problems were posed in Battery C, since a forward support team from the 546th IM Company was located in the TRAIBI area.

(4) The operation gave further justification to the necessity for an M-578 VEH to be assigned to each firing battery as organic equipment. Due to the wide deployment of the battalion during JUNCTION CITY, the wrecker and VEH assigned to the battalion maintenance section were constantly on the road between firing batteries. It was impossible to provide timely service to each battery with only one M-578 VEH and one M-543, 5-ton wrecker.

(5) During the reporting period the availability of weapons was as follows:

(a) M167, 175mm Gun (SP)

1. Possible days available: 512
2. Days deadline: 39
3. Available days: 474
4. Deadline rate: 7%

(b) M110, 8-inch Howitzer (SK)

1. Possible days available: 556
2. Days deadline: 86
3. Available days: 470
4. Deadline rate: 16%

(c) Critical parts during this period that were difficult to obtain were:

1. Elevating motors
2. Swing cylinders
3. Traverse Gear Housings
4. Lockout cylinders
5. Elevation Gear Housings

(6) There were numerous problems with sights during Operation JUNCTION CITY. Each time a sight became inoperative it was necessary to call the weapon out and evacuate the sight for repairs. This points up the necessity for a "float" sight in each firing battery to eliminate downtime. This battalion has submitted a requisition with appropriate justification for float panoramic telescope M15, 3 ea., on the basis of one per firing battery. The following information is provided:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MUSTRIP REF NO</th>
<th>QTY</th>
<th>TDP</th>
<th>FOLLOW UP ON</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT 80-EZ-7032-1008</td>
<td>3 ea</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>7094</td>
<td>Passed to Okinawa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. (U) Aviation,

a. The following aviation missions, listed by sorties, were flown during this reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cmd &amp; Con</th>
<th>Recon</th>
<th>FAC</th>
<th>Admin</th>
<th>Maint</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Geo</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing (CH-13)</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing (O-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>190</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>674.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) When the battalion was in base camp at CU CHI, one firing battery was located at TAY NINH and one at SUOI Da.,. When an aircraft flew to the battery location to conduct a VR, it dropped off distribution etc., at each firing battery. A typical schedule would be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FLIGHT</th>
<th>SORTIE</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) CU CHI to SUOI Da</td>
<td>1 (admin)</td>
<td>20 n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) SUOI Da to SUOI Da</td>
<td>1 (VR)</td>
<td>120 n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) SUOI Da to TAY NINH</td>
<td>1 (admin)</td>
<td>5 n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) TAY NINH to TAY NINH</td>
<td>1 (VR)</td>
<td>120 n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) TAY NINH to CU CHI</td>
<td>1 (admin)</td>
<td>25 n</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although this schedule shows 3 administrative sorties and only 2 VR sorties, the hours reflect 240 minutes of VR and only 50 minutes of administration (one fifth the total hours flown).

(2) During Operation JUNCTION CITY, the organic aircraft flew 243 sorties for a total of 221 hours. Seventy-five percent of the total time
was spent conducting visual reconnaissance and fire missions, the remainder for Command and Control and administrative flights. The aircraft were stationed at CU CHI at night for maintenance. (No aircraft were allowed to remain in the THAI BI area overnight.) This facilitated the use of the aircraft for administrative runs. Distribution, mail, personnel, and parts were shuttled back at night and returned on the morning flights. Aircraft and maintenance facilities at CU CHI afforded the use of the aircraft for administrative runs without detracting from visual reconnaissance and fire missions.

b. On 20 April 1967 the aviation section deployed to TAI MINH in conjunction with the redeployment of this headquarters.

c. The main problem area encountered by the aviation section during this reporting period was engine down-time due to dust. Strict adherence to proper maintenance procedures, to include cleaning and changing the air intake filter daily and changing the oil every 12 hours, greatly reduced engine downtime.

7. (C) Communications.

a. Throughout the entire duration of Operation JUNCTION CITY, FM radio communications were maintained with all firing batteries. There were intermittent periods of interference and/or jamming on the CMD/FD net, especially during the early evening hours. On the third day of the operation it was necessary to switch to the alternate command net and eventually receive a new primary frequency became a major unit moved into the area utilizing the alternate command frequency of this headquarters, FM radio communication was established with Batteries A and B and remained operational approximately 70% of the time. Difficulty was experienced between the Forward Command Post at TAI BI and Battery B upon its move to SEC DA, because of the lack caused by NUI BA DEN, attempts to establish BAT communications with the 1st Infantry Division Artillery Group at MINH THANG failed, although a strong voice signal was established, the strength never increased enough to establish teletype phasing and solid copy was never received. FM communication with the 23d Artillery Group Liaison Section with the 1st Infantry Division Artillery at MINH THANG was intermittent and usually had to be relayed through Battery B. At times when FM communications became difficult, organic aircraft were used as airborne relays. At times, the 1st Infantry Division Artillery relay station on NUI BA DEN was used, but this proved unsatisfactory due to the amount of administrative traffic on the channel. The battalion switchboard operated efficiently with lines to the 25th Infantry Division Artillery, Battery C, and Metro Section and other internal elements. Land line communication was not available to Batteries A and B, except for the period when Battery A was deployed at Fire Support Base BLACKHAWK. Communications by VHF were available to CU CHI and FNU LOL through the 25th Infantry Division and the 25th Infantry Division Artillery.

b. This battalion has experienced an unusually high deadline rate of radio Set AN/GRC-45 which has seriously limited its capability for timely communications, particularly of classified messages. Three out of five authorized sets in the battalion are down-lined for major components, all of which are in support maintenance.
CONFIDENTIAL

May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFCR-65)

(1) List of deadlined items:

(a) Transmitter (T-195), Serial number 5630, was turned in on 21 March 1967 (7080) to the 61st HEM Company on work order S0091 for a burned out Dynamotor. It has been evacuated to the Rice Mill.

(b) Transmitter (T-195), Serial number 1282, was turned in on 24 March 1967 (7083) to the 61st HEM Company on work order S0093 for a burned out Dynamotor. It has been evacuated to the Rice Mill.

(c) Teletype (T-76), Serial number 174, was turned in on 3 April 1967 (7093) to the 61st HEM Company on work order S0116. Feelers are worn on teletype dispenser and it sends garbled.

(d) Teletype (T-76), Serial number 945, was turned in on 5 April 1967 (7095) to the 61st HEM Company on work order S0123. Feelers are worn on teletype dispenser and it sends garbled.

(e) Teletype (T-76), Serial number 905, was turned in on 6 April 1967 (7096) to the 61st HEM Company on work order S0124. Feelers are worn on teletype dispenser and it sends garbled.

(2) An analysis of signal work orders plus visits to the 61st HEM Company, the direct support unit, indicate that most components submitted for repair take from three to six weeks to return. The 61st HEM Company supports 27 units in the CU CHI area and if it does not have the needed PLL items or direct support repair parts, the equipment is evacuated to the 79th maintenance Battalion at the Rice Mill in Saigon.

(3) The AN/GEC-46 Radio Set is essential to timely receipt of current classified information, coordinating fire support and submitting reports. This battalion is doing everything possible to lower the deadline rate and keep a maximum number of sets operational.

(4) On 19 April 1967, this headquarters submitted a letter to the 23d Artillery Group requesting authority to be authorized to turn in equipment directly to the 79th maintenance Battalion at the Rice Mill in Saigon. At least a week of transportation and handling time could be saved and items could be picked up as soon as they are repaired.

(5) On 30 April 1967 the 548th LEM Company became the direct support unit for this battalion (except Battery A). This will alleviate many of the problems mentioned above, but does not alleviate the problems for Battery A, based at CU CHI. The 23d Artillery Group Communications Officer will handle any required direct turn in at the Rice Mill as well as monitor and arrange for transportation when required to move components from the Direct Support to the General Support Battalion which is located at PHU LOI.
PART I. OBSERVATIONS

1. Personnel and Administration.

None

2. (C) Intelligence.

a. ITEM: Periodic Aerial Observer Refresher Classes.

   (1) DISCUSSION: Aerial observers like drivers and pilots must periodically be given a refresher class to re-orient them as to their mission and proper techniques. Latest techniques and principles of aerial observation, plus discussions of ideas help to stimulate new ideas and improve standard procedures.

   (2) OBSERVATION: Effectiveness of aerial observers is increased by periodic refresher classes on proper techniques of aerial observation, recording and reporting timely intelligence.

3. Training and Organization.

None

4. (G) Operations.

a. ITEM: Check Fires for Friendly Aircraft.

   (1) DISCUSSION: Friendly aircraft flying in the area of Tay Mink Control (Artillery Air Warning Station) have frequently "demanded" a blanket check fire of all artillery firing no matter in what direction. Invariably, questioning by the artillery air warning station determines that the aircraft is flying from point "A" to point "B", and a check fire for that area would suffice. Most pilots accept a check fire for their flight pattern if it is necessary. However, there have been pilots who have demanded the name, rank, and serial number of the operator at the station when a blanket check fire is not given.

   (2) OBSERVATION: Pilots should be informed that the purpose of the artillery air warning station is to broadcast the direction and maximum ordinate of artillery so that aircraft can avoid those areas. If the mission of the aircraft is such that it must fly the most direct route (Dustoffs, resupply, etc.) then a check fire will be initiated for that route. But under no circumstances should a blanket clearance be given for a routine flight.

b. ITEM: Circular Firing Charts for the 175mm Gun.
(1) DISCUSSION: To avoid double plotting of grids and possible fire direction errors when using the standard plotting table and grid sheets with the 175mm gun, it was found that a circular 1:50,000 meter plotting chart measuring 57 inches in diameter allows for complete 6400 mil weapons coverage. The battery center is plotted at or near the chart center. Only one system of coordinates is used. The letters N, E, S and W are displayed in red at the appropriate edges. To allow the circular charts to be used in the field in the CFC (M-577) Extension, the circular charts are mounted on "lazy-zeams" that allows the chart operator to bring the working area to himself, rather than walking around the chart.

(2) OBSERVATION: The circular chart using 1:50,000 meter grid sheets eliminates many possible plotting error procedures and facilitates rapid and accurate fire direction procedures.

c. ITEM: Artillery Air Warning Net.

(1) DISCUSSION: There are several procedures used by the Artillery Air Warning Net in the 25th Infantry Division. The common procedure is "This is Square Lobster ________ we have artillery firing west of the airstrip, direction 307°, max ord 1600 feet, range 7.1 miles". Some stations include "...firing from Grid 2730 into Grid 3565..."

(2) OBSERVATION: These procedures state an undue amount of information which if intercepted gives the enemy time to take cover or move out of the area. A better procedure is given in Section II, Part II, para 40, of this report.

5. (U) Logistics,

a. ITEM: Transportation of 175mm Gun Tubes.

(1) DISCUSSION: During Operation JUNCTION CITY it became necessary to convert two 8-inch howitzers to 175mm Guns in order to accomplish the battery’s mission. Since the organic transport of the ordnance support unit was being used at the time, and the conversion had to be accomplished immediately, the motor officer after checking the load capability of the H-34 VTB and the condition of the road to the battery’s location, had the two tubes strapped to either side of the M-88 VTR and transported them to the battery.

(2) OBSERVATION: Knowledge of loading capabilities and field expedients may determine whether a unit can accomplish its mission in a timely manner.

b. ITEM: Float Sights.

(1) DISCUSSION: During Operation JUNCTION CITY there were numerous occasions when a weapon had to be deadlined because of a problem with its panoramic sight.

(2) OBSERVATION: A "float" sight in each firing unit that could be used while the deadlined sight is repaired would reduce operational downtime.
SECTION II

PART II: RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Personnel and Administration.

NONE

2. Intelligence.

NONE

3. Training and Organization.

That the "Simplified Azimuth of Polaris" computation for direction be disseminated to all survey teams as a rapid check of survey computation of direction.


a. That consideration be given to the construction and issue of color-coded firing charts, 1:50,000 meters, as a standard item of issue to VII and IX Divisions.

b. That pilots be instructed in the proper use of check fire requests to Artillery Air Warning stations.

c. That a standard Artillery Air Warning Procedure be established in II Field Force Vietnam.

1. The aircraft should call the station and state what route it is flying.

2. The station should answer:

   a. "Clear"
   (b) Or, if not clear, give the aircraft a route on which it would be clear.

5. Logistics.

That one (1) "flight" sight be issued to each firing unit as requested on MSDAIP at 892-KK-7072-1006.

6. Aviation.

NONE

7. Communications.

NONE

LELAND A. WILSON
LTC, Artillery
Commanding
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEADQUARTERS, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96289,  
18 May 1967

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96277

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 2nd Battalion, 32d Artillery is approved.

2. (C) Section I, paragraph 5c(6). Concur. There is a definite need for each heavy battery in this Group to have this spare sight and requisitions with appropriate justification have been submitted.

3. (C) Section I, paragraph 7b. This comment is no longer valid, though valid at time of this report. The unit has changed base camp location and coordination effected among the Battalion and Group Communications Officers, 5th Light Equipment Maintenance Company at Tay Ninh and the 610th Maintenance Company at Phu Loi has improved this support picture considerably.

4. Section II, Part II, paragraph 4b & c. Concur. This Headquarters has reviewed a proposed revision to II Field Force Vietnam Regulation 385-2 that when implemented will accomplish the battalion recommendations.

5. Section II, Part II, paragraph 5. Concur. See paragraph 2 above.

ROBERT J.KOCH  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding
AVFB-PAC (8 May 67) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RGSC-GSPUR-65) (U)

Department of the Army, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery,
APO 96266 10 Jun 1967

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH,
APO 96307
Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery adequately
reflects the operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.

2. (C) Reference Section II, paragraph 5b(6), and Section II, Part II,
paragraph 5, Float Sights. Concur. Although records at this headquarters do
not reflect excessive downtime of M-107 and M-110 self-propelled howitzers attri-
butable to the sight M-115, float sights are desired because of the frequent
failure experienced at unit level and the travel distance involved due to wide
dispersal of units. The unit's request for float sights (USARV Form 47R) was
approved for issue; however, the sights were never received. Follow-up action
has been initiated.

3. (C) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph 4b and 4c, Artillery Air
Warning Procedures. This headquarters is revising its Regulation 385-2 which
when published will include the stated recommendations.

4. (U) Concur with other comments, recommendations, and observations
in basic document and first Indorsement.

RAYMOND P. MURPHY
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

Declassified after 12 years
DOD Directive 8530.10
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-H (8 May 67) 3d Inf

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, 30 April 67 (RGCS CSFOR-67)

DA, HQ II FFORCEN, APO San Francisco 96266 21 JUN 1967

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96307

Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-3d, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Subject report is forwarded.

2. (C) Reference Para 4, Pg 18, item: Check Fires for friendly Aircraft. The present II FFORCEN Reg 385-2, 18 Nov 66, states, "When a pilot declares an emergency flight condition (i.e., Med Evac, May Day, etc) and requests suspension of fires, the Aircraft Warning Control Center (AWCC) will direct suspension of those fires interfering with the flight." The rewrite of the regulation will state, "The AMCC will direct suspension of fires when requested by a pilot because of emergency flight conditions except when such a suspension would endanger the mission of the supported forces." This change was published on 15 Jun 67 in the II FFORCEN "Commander's Notes" disseminated to all subordinate commanders.

3. (U) This headquarters concurs with the comments, recommendations, in the basic report and the two preceding indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E.M. McGrath
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

1 Incl
22

Downgraded at 2 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
AVHGC-DST (8 May 67)

4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSPOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

6 AUG 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—
Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion (175mm) (SP), 32d Artillery as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning check fires for friendly aircraft
and artillery air warning net, paragraph 4b and c, page 20; paragraph
4, 1st Indorsement; paragraph 3, 2d Indorsement and paragraph 2, 3d
Indorsement: Concur. The action taken by CG, 2d FForcE in publishing
2d FForcE Regulation No 385-2, as changed, adequately eliminates the
confusion that existed between pilots and artillery personnel with res-
spect to check fires for friendly aircraft and the artillery air warning
net.

b. Reference item concerning circular firing charts for the
175mm gun, paragraph 4b, page 18, and paragraph 4a, page 20: Concur. By
separate correspondence unit has been requested to submit requirements
for circular firing charts to this headquarters.

c. Reference item concerning float sights, section I, part I,
paragraph 5b, page 19; section II, part II, paragraph 5, page 20; para-
graph 2, 1st Indorsement, and paragraph 2, 2d Indorsement: Concur: A
spare sight per firing battery would reduce operational downtime. By
separate correspondence unit has been advised to prepare MTOE, with jus-
tification to authorize a spare sight per firing battery.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

R.L. KENNY

Cpt, AGC

Asst Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-DT (18 May 67)  5th Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
from HQ, 2d Battalion (175mm)(SP), 32d Artillery (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (C) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report, as indorsed, subject to the following
comments:

   Giving coordinates (or range) of the firing area to the aviators not only
   furnishes information to the enemy, but it is cumbersome for the aviator
to handle. A direction from the code name facility to the nearest 10
   degrees with an approximate range to the nearest mile would not compromise
   the target and would be adequate for the aviator. Many, if not most,
aviation missions involve more than simply flying from A to B. Examples
are command and control, observation, reconnaissance, eagle flight and fire
fly missions. It would be most difficult for an artillery station to
recommend a clear route for the aircraft. The aviator knows his exact
position and the requirements of his mission. If he knows where the fire
is located, he can select a safe route that will permit him to accomplish
his mission. Broadcasting the aircraft route of flight would also furnish
information to the enemy.

b. Reference para 2, 3d Indorsement and para 2a, 4th Indorsement.
   (1) The rewrite of II FEV Reg 385-2 places the responsibility
on the Aircraft Warning Control Center for determining when artillery fires
will be suspended and states that fires will be suspended "when requested
by a pilot because of emergency flight conditions except when such a
suspension would endanger the mission of the supported forces." Such a
determination should be based on the relative urgency and importance of the
mission of the artillery and the aircraft. Since the AWCC is aware of the
urgency of the artillery mission, provision should be made to inform that
agency of the nature of the aircraft mission. In the event that fires are
not suspended, the AWCC should be required to inform the aviator.

   (2) The dissemination indicated in para 2, 3d Indorsement
is inadequate for RVN. A standardization of artillery air warning
procedures for all the CTZ is needed and should be established and easily
identifiable to aviators of all US military and friendly forces.
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2. (U) A copy of this correspondence is being furnished to HQ USARV
for appropriate action with regard to para 1b(2) above.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

Copy furnished:
CG USARV