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  National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Defense Affairs
  Joint Action Control Office
  CG, US Army Weapons Command
  Commanding Officers
    5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155mm-T)
    6th Battalion, 84th Artillery (155-T)
    6th Battalion, 33d Artillery (105 How-T)
AVOK-AI-C

6 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

TO: See Distribution

SECTION 1 (C) Significant Organization or Unit Activities

1. (C) General: a. Headquarters and Service Batteries closed at Tuy Hoa on 8 April 1967, and set up base camp. As of this writing, there is no approved plan for a permanent base camp development. There is only one permanent building within the base camp area. This building is a consolidated mess inherited from a unit that was at this location previously. The reason given, by the Tuy Hoa Subarea Engineer, for not having an approved plan for this area is that all plans for development were cancelled when the 4th Infantry Division units departed the area which we are now occupying. The personnel at base camp are living in WATOC buildings.

2. (U) Intelligence: The Battalion S2 contacts the MACV Advisory Team at Tuy Hoa a minimum of three times a week. Daily contacts are made with the S2 of the 28th Regiment ROKA which is near base camp. Personnel of the TAC CP have daily contact with the MACV Advisory Team and the 9th ROKA Division Artillery at Minh Hoa. These agencies provide the most current intelligence information in our area of operation. Very little information is received from Oasis area where our C Battery has a GSR role in the 4th Infantry area of operation.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities: a. Plans: No significant activities.


   (1) 6 May 1967: Battery A, 4th Battalion 60th Artillery attached. Twin 40's placed with B/6/32. Quad 50's placed with C/5/27.

   (2) 9 May 1967: One section (2 M55's/quad 50's) reported to Tuy Hoa Subarea Command, CQ256346, to escort convoy movement.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

(1) 16 May 1967: A/6/32, detached but organic, attacked by mortars at approximately 0230 hours. Total MLA 4, two of which were from a maintenance contact team and two from A/6/32.

(4) 18 May 1967: Two howitzers (8") from B/6/32 conducted an artillery raid via BP844910. One destruction mission fired plus other pre-planned targets.

(5) 22 May 1967: At approximately 1300 hours, one (1) VC captured on perimeter of C/5/27. He had C4 explosives and blasting caps. VC turned over to local authorities for interrogation.

(6) 23 May 1967: Metro section, 8th Tab 26th Arty, attached to 6th En 32d Arty. Location EN802071.

(7) 31 May 1967: B/6/32 supported ARVN training raid at 0400 hours on an island via CQ0870.

(8) 2 June 1967: C/5/27 (attached) took two howitzers (105) to BQ161128 for an artillery raid on suspected VC location via CQ1023.

(9) 4 June 1967: Battalion personnel received a FADAC briefing.

(10) B/6/32 displaced three howitzers to EP756876 to support ROK and engage targets which are out of range of their normal position.

(11) 9 June 1967: Two M2's (twin 40's) from A/4/60 moved to BP992739 to support perimeter of 29th RCT Recon Company. Two additional M2's moved to BQ893766 to support the perimeter of 9th Company 29th Regiment.

(12) 10 June 1967: B/6/32 fired from BP756876 in support of ROK operation. Two howitzers moved to BQ852864 to fire additional missions.

(13) 13 June 1967: B/6/32 displaced two howitzers to BP 838668 for an artillery raid for ROK operation.

(14) 15 June 1967: Two howitzers from B/6/32 displaced to BP842869 to fire artillery raid in support of ROK operation.


(16) 26 June 1967: C/6/32 closed at Camp Townes 1600 hours.

(17) 27 June 1967: C/6/32 departed Camp Townes for Dak To.
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A/6/32

6 Aug 67

Situation report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

(13) 28 June 1967: C/6/32 closed at location North of Kontum, ZS132320, at 1130 hours. C/6/32 attached to 6th Bn 14th Arty.

(19) 2 July 1967: A command detonated mine exploded via CP025920 at 1130 hours. One 5 ton truck from B/6/32 totally destroyed, one US MIA, 3 ROK WIA and 3 ROK KIA. Mine was detonated from West side of road. One US and 5 ROK MIO's were stolen.


(22) 12 July 1967: 05/27 staged an artillery raid via CP042007. No surveillance.

c. Training: Training has consisted mostly of live fire missions in conjunction with primary GSR mission. Proficiency training and training has been completed in direct fire procedures. Battery Commanders have reconstructed personnel bunkers. As of 312100 July 1967, the 6th Battalion 323 Artillery has fired a total of 33,108 rounds. A, B and C Batteries test fire their crew served weapons daily in conjunction with H&I scheduled fires. Headquarters and Service Batteries, located at the base camp, test fire individual and crew served weapons prior to manning night observation posts and/or defensive positions. M71's have been integrated with individual and other weapons on night observation posts. Pending clearance, plans have been made to begin H&I scheduled fires outside night observation posts at base camp. Battalion FDC personnel are now being placed on special duty with the firing batteries. By sending Battalion FDC personnel to the batteries, the batteries are given greater flexibility for a 24 hour capability. In this way, Battalion FDC personnel are able to maintain MOS proficiency under actual firing conditions.

d. Chemical: No significant activities.

e. Psywar: No significant activities.

f. Other: The Battalion Meteorological Section is operational and continues to send metro messages four times a day with six hour intervals between messages. Two are visual and two are electronic. Messages are used by A/6/32, B/6/32, B/5/27, C/5/27, A/3/18 and 9th ROK Division Artillery.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

A. (U) Logistics: a. The problems in logistics are many. Most of the problems could be alleviated or improved upon. For a long period of time, many assigned personnel were without items of equipment, mostly TA 50-901 equipment. For thirty days, or longer, personnel were assigned without individual weapons, ammunition pouches, helmet liners, and pistol belts. This problem is felt to be unnecessary since most of the items are in abundant supply at CONUS installations. Deploying units could be given a ten percent overage to cover excess personnel. The same principle could apply to individual small arms. This would also cover individual arms lost as a result of combat, or items lost, damaged, or destroyed not through carelessness or neglect. A central issue facility seems practical for an installation as large as Tuy Hoa. Having to drive as far as Cam Ranh Bay for TA 50-901 items such as boots, web belts, helmets, helmet liners, etc., should be improved upon.

b. Class V Resupply: It has become necessary to airlift class V into areas not easily accessible by road, either because of remoteness or security reasons. These are some of the items every battalion-size or separate unit should have prior to deploying. As a minimum, the following items are necessary for aerial resupply:

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<th>Nomenclature</th>
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<tr>
<td>1670-753-3972</td>
<td>Sling, cargo, aerial delivery</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1670-090-5354</td>
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</tr>
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<td>4050-185-0490</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3940-829-4375</td>
<td>Sling, cargo not</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Other logistic problem areas are wire, WD/1, DR8's, RL159's, bore cleaner for howitzers and BA 30 batteries. These are, as a rule, very short supply items.

5. (U) Civil Affairs: The Battalion Surgeon is still engaged in MEDCAP program at refugee village and Buddhist orphanage near Tuy Hoa. In the area of public welfare, food was presented to the Tuy Hoa Catholic Orphanage.

   (2) WIA: 3

b. During the period, the following personnel actions occurred:
   (1) Personnel losses: 61
b. Item: Aerial Observers

Discussion: It is felt that an aerial observer should fly everyday and over the same area so that he can be totally familiar with his area of operation and thus be able to detect minute changes. Registrations can be observed from as high as 5,500 feet. This can be advantageous when in mountainous areas where a lower orbit level would preclude observing both the battery and the target. Also, by flying at a higher altitude the pilot can orbit directly over the target which will greatly increase the accuracy of sensing. Aviation support should be assigned those units authorized aerial observers to properly utilize these personnel. Reconnaissance of the area of operation and surveillance of targets fired upon has been severely limited due to lack of aircraft support on a regular basis. When flying with non-English speaking allies, the pilot briefing can be the most important part of the mission. Changes in the mission while in flight are very difficult and can lead to misunderstanding. A very thorough and systematic briefing of the pilot should take place prior to the flight with an interpreter present if possible.

c. Item: Survey - Grid Control

Discussion: Grid control may be scaled from a 1:50,000 map with a reasonable degree of accuracy, usually within 30-50 meters. For scaling purposes, railroad and road intersections, main road junctions, isolated building foundations and permanent bridges will serve as control points.

Observation: Fourth order survey control has recently been established in our area and it is our plan to correct all previous surveys still in use to the accurate grid control.

d. Item: Survey - Azimuth Control

Discussion: We have had excellent results using the azimuth gyroscope. Astronomic observation (altitude method - sun) has also been used to some extent, mostly as a check at certain points in the survey scheme.

Observation: Prior to departing CONUS, it would be advisable for one party to be especially well trained in the use of the azimuth gyroscope. We have one survey party whose primary mission in any survey is the establishment of azimuth control.
(2) Personnel gains: 97

(3) Present for duty strength at end of period: 22 Off.

4 Wo, 539 Em.

(4) Promotion allocations:
   (a) 14-11 (52 special allocations for May)
   (b) 15-13
   (c) 16-3

7. (U) Artillery rounds expended during period:

<table>
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<th>FUZE</th>
<th>AMOUNT EXPENDED</th>
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8. (U) Other: No significant activities.

SECTION 2 (C) Commanders Observations and Recommendations

Part I Observations

1. (U) Operations. a. Item: Forward Observers

   Discussion: Each firing battery has been augmented with two ground forward observer teams, but only the officer personnel have been received. The enlisted men have not been received. Since the last reporting period, the majority of equipment for the forward observer teams has been received.

   Observation: The lack of personnel makes it necessary to pull personnel from other sections. This situation causes mal-utilization of men and equipment and prevents sections from performing to maximum capacity. The forward observers were augmented using TOE 6-706T, Headquarters & Headquarters and Service Batteries, Field Artillery Battalion, 105mm towed, Air Mobile Division. The fact is the observers are still with the battalion, but they are without vehicles because the TOE doesn't authorize vehicles. It would seem that when authorizations such as these are made, consideration would be given to issuing the necessary equipment, if not more. It seems here that the wrong assumption was made.
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6 Aug 67

SUBJECT: Operational Report for (quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967)

e. Item: Survey - Care of Equipment

Discussion: Optical instruments, especially aiming circles, will be a problem unless they are safeguarded from moisture.

Observation: A hot box may be constructed from a wooden cabinet with a burning light bulb or bulbs to keep the lenses clear. Firing batteries, especially, have been plagued by moisture problems and the Survey Section has supported them in this regard while repairs were made.

Discussion: We have had no problems with the Azimuth Gyroscope, but repair of this instrument will be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain while in country. Preventive maintenance is the key.

Observation: When transporting the Azimuth Gyroscope in a 3/4 ton vehicle, it is advisable to lash the container securely in place. Periodically, the case of the control panel should be removed and the components cleaned with a camel's hair brush.

f. Item: Survey - General

Observation: The unit departed combat with only one of the three theodolites authorized which was unfortunate. Five months after deployment we were brought up to our TOE. Wild T-16 instruments are far superior to the Brunson version, and every attempt should be made to acquire the Wild T-16 version before departing CONUS.

Observation: The addition of four DME's (electronic distance measuring equipment) would greatly enhance the battalion survey capabilities. Permanent fourth order control would have been established months earlier in our area had they been available to us even for a short period of time.

g. Item: Artillery Liaison

Observation: By having a Korean liaison representative at the firing battery, the fire mission could go directly to the battery. While the mission is being computed and/or prepared, clearance could be obtained. An unnecessary delay results when the mission has to go through a TAC CP and/or liaison first. While the missions are being cleared the targets can be cleared. After the missions are cleared, they can be fired immediately.
h. Item: FDC Personnel

Discussion: FDC personnel are required to maintain a 24 hour capability. The present TOE does not provide sufficient personnel to support adequately, this type operation. Personnel must be taken from other sections in order to augment the FDC.

Observation: The drawing of personnel from other sections to augment the FDC is detrimental to the depleted section. A SSG E6 and two SP4 E4 computers should be added to enhance the productive capabilities of the FDC. This is especially so since platoons occasionally have

i. Item: Reconnaissance of Positions

Discussion: Advance parties should continue to make thorough reconnaissance of new position areas if time permits. In many instances the terrain does not offer the most ideal location for heavy artillery.

Observation: A thorough reconnaissance, if made, will usually permit the commander to better select his section locations prior to occupation. Duplication of efforts by changing locations after the unit arrives could be cut to a minimum.

j. Item: Aircraft

Discussion: The air section that was organic to the 6th Battalion 32d Artillery was withdrawn by General Order. Presently, the unit receives a UH-1D every other day. The firing batteries are still spread out over a considerable distance. The great distances combined with the fact that some of the roads are quite unsafe for vehicle travel make air travel very necessary.

Observation: Having the use of a UH-1D helicopter every other day helps considerably. If the battalion were to have its own aviation section, much more could be done, i.e., visual reconnaissance, registration of each battery, resupply missions and command and control.

k. Item: Organization of Battery Positions

Discussion: Battery installations should be selected for the best possible drainage to circumvent floods. Care should also be taken during the dry season because of the unseasonable rains.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

Observation: Battery installations should be built above ground with heavy reinforcements rather than dug in underground to prevent having flooded bunkers.

2. (U) Training and Organization

Item: Firing Battery Operations

Discussion: Firing batteries most frequently operate independently in Vietnam.

Observation: In CONUS, emphasis should be placed on battery training. Battery training tests should be more strongly emphasized. Headquarters Battery personnel and Service Battery personnel should receive mortar training, either 81mm or 4.2 inch. The Headquarters Battery personnel could operate either mortars or 105mm towed howitzers for illumination of the base camp area. Howitzers could be utilized for illumination and possibly for defense of base camp area. There are available personnel in Battalion FDC within the two batteries to perform the additional duties which would usually be in the evening after normal operations cease. In our area, fire requests for illumination are sent to ROK units. More often than not, a language problem causes considerable delay. As a bare minimum, Headquarters and Service Batteries personnel should receive some type of weapons training, i.e., mortars or 105mm howitzer.

3. (U) Intelligence

a. Maps: Units should be permitted to open and inventory maps prior to departing CONUS.

b. Item: Intelligence Sources

Discussion: Intelligence summaries through normal distribution still arrive too late to be of any real value.

Observation: Our fastest and most reliable means of obtaining intelligence information is through daily contact with MACV Advisory Teams and ROK battalion, regimental and division headquarters, which are located nearby.

4. (U) Logistics

a. Item: Fuel Resupply

Discussion: With the batteries spread such distances from the battalion, resupply of fuel to some areas remains a critical problem.

Observation: Each battery should have a fuel tanker and a 1 1/2 ton trailer with 600 gallon pod. This would work out well since
the batteries have to make daily resupply trips to various logistic points.

b. Item: Clothing and Equipment

Discussion: I Field Force Vietnam patches are not readily available.

Observation: Bulk issue of patches should be available for issue to units immediately upon arrival in country.

c. Item: Individual Small Arms

Discussion: Most frequently, units go over strength in personnel gains. Weapons should be available for issue.

Observation: If each unit were issued as much as ten percent overage in small arms, this would take care of sudden increases in personnel gains and combat losses.

5. (U) Personnel. a. Item: Personnel Actions

Discussion: Delays in receipt of USARV publications has greatly hampered the normal processing time of personnel actions, reports and correspondence.

Observation: This can be attributed directly to lack of couriers between higher headquarters and subordinate units and none receipt of directives from immediate major command which require reports. A unit on D-1 status should be permitted to send a personnel representative to the necessary overseas command for the express purpose of coordination, obtaining general and specific information and securing publications and administrative procedures in the major overseas command. Directives and forms issued by the Department of the Army, such as DA Form 428 (ID Cards), GED test material, battery test, identification tags and printing machine, should be made standard TOE for all D-1 units. These and other items are hard to come by in SVN and, in many cases, individuals must travel a great distance in order to obtain ID cards, dog tags, educational testing, etc. Personnel section must be prepared to send teams to various batteries at least once a month. The express purpose is to render direct service to elements in the field such as pay problems, assignment and reassignment information.

b. Item: Finance

Discussion: Each individual must be served. Although it is the responsibility of each individual to start and stop his allot-
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

mants, the pay section of the unit personnel must spend much more time explaining pay adjustments, allotments, and savings programs. Many pay problems could very easily be avoided if both the individual and pay clerks would ascertain the true facts regarding any financial arrangements desired by the individual, making absolutely certain that address or recipient of allotment is correct, that the total amount of allotments does not exceed gross pay. The initiation of changes of address on allotments is another source of hardship cases being undertaken by these men because it was not done at the proper time. A thorough review of each month's Military Pay Voucher must be undertaken by all personnel. Timely submission of allotment changes greatly reduces hardship to dependents. The individual soldier must be aware of all these facts.

Observation: During the training periods, D-1 units should conduct an information session at least once each week to cover finance and personnel matters.

c. Item: Management

Discussion: An acute problem arises in personnel management when personnel clerks and supervisors are unaware of policies and procedures to follow in complying with command requirements. This would include submitting reports which affect the status of the individual and unit, such as AOR, ORR, Reduction of Rotational Humps, Quarterly Rotates Report, transportation travel reports (seat reservation for personnel returning for PCS), timely submission of requisitions for shortages of officer and enlisted personnel and MOS tests and promotion policies. All these administrative requirements should be made readily available to the D-1 unit prior to deployment.

Observation: Up to date publications, directives and other procedures should be made available to the D-1 unit. General Orders attaching and detaching units should be coordinated through all staff elements of that unit. Field campaign information should be made available to the S1 for posting to M/R as required by AR 335-60.

6. (U) Other. a. Item: M578 or M543 Recovery Vehicle

Discussion: The firing batteries still have no organic recovery or lift capabilities. With the batteries spread out as they are, a constant problem exists especially with the rapid rate of resupply of Class V.

Observation: During artillery preparations in support of operations, the Class V resupply rate is frequent and enormous. Something with lift capability is mandatory. An M578 recovery vehicle or an M543 wrecker would solve the problem.
AVGK-A1-2
6 Aug 67
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

b. Item: Maintenance

Discussion: Because of the difference in temperature over a twenty-four hour period, fuel tanks and fire control instruments have a problem with condensation. Observation: Fuel tanks should be kept as full as possible. During periods when fire control instruments are not in use, they should be kept in a fabricated hot box. Deploying units should make hot boxes before arriving in country.

Discussion: Being located on the coast where sand is abundant, equipment must be lubricated more frequently.

Observation: Units should attempt to obtain additional lubricating equipment before arrival in country.

Discussion: Due to the extremely high temperatures, seals, gaskets, flexhoses and fluid carrying hoses crack and/or wear out more quickly than normal.

Observation: Deploying units should be permitted to increase stockage levels of seals, gaskets, hoses, flexlines, brake shoes, wheel bearings and radiators.

Discussion: More personnel should be trained as generator operators and on many different types of generators, i.e., 1.5 KW, 3 KW, 10 KW, 100 KW and 125 KW respectively. More personnel should be trained as heavy equipment operators, i.e., bull dozers, forklifts and front and scoop loaders.

Observation: Generators are utilized more than normal. As a result, more maintenance is required. Personnel should be highly trained. A unit should have additional heavy equipment operators since much work is done in loading, off loading, building fortifications, base camp roads and firing positions.

Part II Recommendations

1. (U) Operations: a. Recommend that forward observer sections be complete prior to arrival in Vietnam. Forward observation section should be authorized a 1/4 ton vehicle with trailer. A different type TOE should be used, preferably a 105 towed.

b. Recommend that distance measuring equipment be available for use by battalion teams.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

a. Recommend that base camp elements be issued mortars or 105mm howitzers for purpose of illumination and defense of base camps.

d. Recommend that firing battery TOE's be increased to add one E6 and two 4 computers to the fire direction center.

e. Recommend that one UH-1D aircraft be made available on a daily basis.

2. (U) Recommend that the Headquarters and Service Batteries personnel receive mortar training or 105mm howitzer training prior to departure to Vietnam.

3. (U) Intelligence: Recommend a better courier service be established. Intelligence, as a rule, are one week late. Under normal conditions, it takes seven days for courier service from major command headquarters to our battalion.


b. Recommend that certain TOE and TA 50-901 items be issued at least a ten percent overage in certain items, i.e., web gear, helmet, helmet liner, ammo pouches, first aid packets and individual weapons.

c. Recommend that each battery be issued an extra water trailer.

5. (U) Other: a. Recommend that each heavy firing battery be issued an M578 recovery vehicle or an M543 wrecker.

b. Recommend that certain PLL items be stocked in greater quantities than normally authorized, i.e., seals, gaskets, fluid carrying hoses, wheel bearings, brake shoes and radiators.
AVGK-CO (6 Aug 67)  1st Ind  
SUBJECT:  Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967  
RCS CSFOR-65  

HEADQUARTERS 4th ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96368  11 August 1967  

TO:  Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350  

1.  (C) The Operational Report from the 6th Bn 32nd Artillery is forwarded with the following comments:  

a.  Section 1, par 1.  The organization has submitted a new plan through command channels.  

b.  Section 1, par 4a.  The logistical problems reported were the results of overstrength.  These problems have been followed up by the reporting organization and all personnel have been issued weapons and appropriate field gear.  In some cases, M14 rifles have been issued in lieu of M16's.  

c.  Section 1, par 4c.  Wire WD 1 and bore cleaner remain in short supply.  Appropriate action is being taken through supply channels.  

d.  Section 2, part I, par 1j.  Organization has had use of an O-1 on an every-other-day basis.  Its use has been limited by adverse wind conditions.  Non-concur in recommendation that a UH-1D be provided on a daily basis.  Unit should be authorized aviation section of one fixed wing and one rotary wing aircraft.  Request for action on this recommendation is included in MTOE being compiled.  

e.  Section 2 part II, pars 1a, b, c, d; 4a, c; 5a.  Recommendations herein are included in MTOE being drafted by reporting organization.  

2.  (U) GP-4.  

S/  S. H. Wheeler  
t/  S. H. WHEELER  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding
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AVFA-AT-D (6 Aug 67) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 July 1967, (RCS CSFOR-65) (UIC WALTA) (6th Bn, 32d
Arty) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96350 26 August 1967

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT,
APO 96350

1. Concur in the observations and recommendations contained in the
basic communications.

2. Reference Section 2 part I paragraph 1g. This item will be re-
solved at group and battalion level.

3. Reference Section 2 part I paragraph 4b. 6th Bn, 32d Arty was
issued 2272 regular I Field Force Vietnam shoulder insignia on 10 August
1967. Patch was officially adopted for wear in December 1966 and required
procurement. Subdued insignia issued through Headquarters, I Field Force
Vietnam Artillery was from a one time procurement contract arranged by I
Field Force Vietnam with issue made to units based on time in-country.
Normal requisitioning channels are to be used to obtain the subdued insignia.
Information of procedures to obtain the insignia was furnished all units with
fills dependent upon availability. I Field Force Vietnam has a due-out for
9000 subdued shoulder patches for artillery units attached to Headquarters,
I Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

4. Reference Section 2 part I paragraph 5a. USARV AG Publications
normally sends a complete set of regulations to all incoming units prior to
their departure from CONUS. A personnel representative should be included
in the advance party for the purpose of establishing liaison with higher
headquarters concerning reports and administrative procedures prior to the
arrival of the main body. GED test material may be obtained by applying
in accordance with USARV Reg 625-1. Identification tags and printing machines
should not be made standard TOE for all D-1 units since all personnel arriving
in Vietnam are required to have these items in their possession.

5. Reference Section 2 Part II paragraph 4b. Units are authorized
to stock 5-25% overage on selected items of equipment. Arrangements should
be made with the DSU to support the requirements when justified.

6. Reference Section 2 part II paragraph 5b. USARV Reg 750-11 outlines
procedures to increase PLL stockage levels. 6th Bn, 32d Arty has been advised
to consult cited regulation.

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DOD DIR 5200.10

7. The requirements outlined in paragraph 12a (1) AR 1-19 and paragraph 5a (1)(a) USARV Reg 1-19 will be reemphasized for future reports.

8. 6th Bn, 32d Arty UIC is WA1TA.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

t/ LEO EL ELLIS
LTC, Artillery
Adjutant
TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96375

(U) This headquarters has reviewed the 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery Operational Report of Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1967 and pertinent comments are as follows:

(C) Reference Section II, Part II (page 9) - Commander's Recommendations:

a. Paragraph 4a: Fuel tankers are in short supply throughout the RVN. Some units authorized these items by TOE have not yet received the authorized quantity.

b. Paragraph 4b: AR 310-34 authorizes the submission of MTOEs for up to 10% average of web gear and related items. There is no provision in that regulation for additional weapons. However, all overstrength personnel are authorized a weapon. At the present time due to a strike at the Colt Plant in CONUS, the issuance of M16's has been suspended. However, each man may still be issued an M14.

c. Paragraph 4c: I FFORCEV Artillery has submitted to USARV a request for approval of an additional water trailer for each battery not collocated with the battalion or another battery. However no action has yet been taken by the approving headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/ B. L. Chenault
2LT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General
AVHGC-DST (6 Aug 67) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS 73SPOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96275

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (AMCO) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning personnel actions, page 10, paragraph 5a. Concur with recommendations contained in 2d Indorsement, paragraph 4. USARV Directives and pertinent MACV Directives were furnished the 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery on 23 December 1966. Timely resupply of DA Regulations and DD, DA, and SF blank forms can be obtained by establishing publications accounts with publications centers in CONUS and the Printing and Publications Center, Japan. Reference AR 310-1 and USARV Regulation 310-3.

   b. Reference item concerning fuel tankers, page 9, paragraph 4a and 3d Indorsement, paragraph a: Concur. Unit observation seems valid; however, tankers cannot be issued until a change to MTOE is approved.

   c. Reference item concerning small arms, page 10, paragraph 4c: Nonconcur. Units are authorized their TOE strength in individual weapons plus a weapon for every man overstrength. Since units seldom have 100% of their TOE strength PDY (Leave, R&R, wounds, etc) this should constitute no problem.

   d. Reference item concerning additional water trailer, page 13, paragraph 4c and 3d Indorsement, paragraph c. Appropriate action related to water trailers and other equipment is being initiated as stated in paragraph 1e, 1st Indorsement. This action documents requirements stated in 3d Indorsement, paragraph c.
AVHOC-DST (6 Aug 67) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGL
Assistant Adjutant General

cc: HQ, 6th Bn, 32d Arty
    HQ, I FFW

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DIR 5200.10
GPOP-DT (6 Aug 67)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 from HQ, 6th Bn, 32d Arty (UIC: WALTAA) (RCS CCFOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 1 DEC 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
HEAVRIN SEYDER
CPT, AGO
Asst AG

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