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| FROM:                  |
| Controlling DoD Organization: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Attn: FOR-OT-RD, Washington DC 20310. |

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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (O.S.)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Operational rept. for quarterly period ending 30 Apr 67.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]
C. A. STANFIEL
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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(Continued on page 2)
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11th Infantry Brigade (Sep)
Commandants
5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155mm)
1st Battalion, 30th Artillery
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HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION 30TH ARTILLERY
APO 96238

AVFA-AT-1/30-C0 1 May 1967


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TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SECTION I (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General.

a. During the period 1 February 1967 to 30 April 1967 the 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery supported Free World Military Assistance Forces in the I and II Corps Tactical Zones, Republic of Vietnam.

b. The 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery, less Battery B and C, and with Battery C, 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery attached, provided general support reinforcing fires to the Capitol ROK Infantry Division Artillery from 1 February 1967 to 14 February 1967. A total of 1142 rounds were expended by the battalion during the 14 day period.

c. The battalion, less Battery B, was placed under operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) on 14 February for participation in Operation Pershing. Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery was attached to the 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery on 7 April 1967. The battery provided general support reinforcing fires to the Capitol ROK Infantry Division Artillery. On 10 April 1967, Battery B, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery was returned to control of the battalion and was deployed in Operation Pershing. On 13 April 1967, Battery A, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery was attached to the battalion. The 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery with attached units remained OPCON 1st Cavalry Division (AM) in support of Operation Pershing through the end of the reporting period. From 14 February 1967 to 30 April 1967, the battalion expended 60201 rounds with the unit receiving credit for 41 NVA/VC confirmed kills by artillery fire and 65 NVA/VC possible kills.

d. During the period from 14 February 1967 through the end of the reporting period, the 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery had the primary mission of general support of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), providing batteries in a reinforcing role to the direct support battalions of the division. In addition to its primary mission, the battalion provided the fire support coordination center for the defense of the LZ English/LZ Dog Complex.

e. On 28 April 1967 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery was attached with no change in operational status or mission to 41st Artillery Group, Camp Townes, Republic of Vietnam.

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670-264

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DOD DIR 5200.10
f. The Annual General Inspection, FY 1967, of the 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery was completed by Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam on 3 February 1967.

g. On 3 February 1967, the battalion suffered its first officer battle loss in Vietnam when 1LT Morton E. Townes, Battery B, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery was killed by a booby trap. 1LT Townes was performing his assigned duty as Forward Observer when his party stepped on a booby-trapped artillery projectile vicinity YT971875 killing 1LT Townes and the two enlisted men in his section. In his honor, the battalion base camp was officially renamed Camp Townes on 21 April 1967.

2. (C) Intelligence.

a. While the battalion was in support of the Capitol ROK Infantry Division from 1 February 1967 to 14 February 1967, liaison was maintained with the Capitol ROK Infantry Division, 22d ARVN Division and Tuy Phu'oc District Headquarters. These have proved to be reliable sources of intelligence.

b. During participation in Operation Pershing, intelligence information was obtained by daily liaison with supported units, the 22d ARVN Division, local district advisors and through aerial reconnaissance with organic aircraft. Using these intelligence sources, the battalion was able to obtain timely and reliable information.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities.

a. Headquarters Battery:

(1) At the beginning of the period, the battery was located at Camp Townes (coordinates BR972252), supporting battalion operations from this location.

(2) On 14 February 1967, the battery displaced a forward element to LZ English (coordinates BS884017) in support of battalion operations in Operation Pershing. The forward element remained at this location through the end of the reporting period.

b. Service Battery:

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period, the battery was located at Camp Townes (coordinates BR972252), supporting battalion operations from this location.

(2) On 14 February 1967, the battery displaced a forward support element to LZ English (coordinates BS884017) in support of battalion operations in Operation Pershing. The forward element remained at this location through the end of the reporting period.
SUBJECT: ORLL for Quarterly Period ending 30 April 1967 (Continued).

(3) Service Battery received its Annual General Inspection from Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam on 1 February 1967.

c. Battery A:

(1) At the beginning of the period, Battery A was under control of its parent battalion in a general support reinforcing role of the Capitol ROK Infantry Division Artillery. The battery was located at coordinates BR895124 from 1 February 1967 to 14 February 1967. Battery A expended 818 rounds during this period.

(2) Participating in Operation Pershing, Battery A displaced to LZ Uplift (coordinates BR923754) on 14 February 1967. On 28 March 1967 the battery was heli-lifted to LZ Geronimo (coordinates BS887173), remaining at this location until 7 April 1967 when it moved by helicopter to LZ Montezuma (coordinates BS808378). On 22 April 1967, the battery was heli-lifted to LZ Two Bits (coordinates BR843945) where it remained through the end of the reporting period. The battery expended 25,733 rounds during the period.

d. Battery B:

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period Battery B was located vicinity Phan Rang (coordinates BU770835) under operation control of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division participating in Operation Farragut.

(2) On 1 February 1967, 3 howitzer sections of the battery were moved by C-130 to vicinity Bao Loc (coordinates BN282128) in support of elements of the 101st Airborne Division participating in Operation Gatling I and II. On 18 February 1967 the split element rejoined its parent battery as Gatling II was concluded. During the 18 day operation, the three sections made three displacements and fired 482 rounds.

(3) Operation Farragut terminated on 23 March 1967 and the battery returned to vicinity Phan Rang (coordinates BN770835). While participating in Operation Farragut, the battery made 21 displacements and expended 1187 rounds.

(4) On 28 March 1967, the battery moved by road to vicinity Khanh Duong (coordinates BQ260140) in support of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division participating in Operation Summerall I.

(5) Orders were received to transfer personnel and equipment between Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery and Battery B, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery which effectively would reverse the designations of these two units. On 10 April 1967, this changeover of personnel and equipment was completed. Battery B, with personnel and equipment formerly of Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery was deployed under control of the parent battalion in support of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) in Operation Pershing. Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery with personnel and equipment formerly of Battery B, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery was released from attachment to the 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery for deployment with the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
(6) On 10 April 1967, the battery moved by road to LZ Uplift (coordinates BR923754). On 24 April 1967, one platoon of the battery with one platoon of Battery C attached displaced to LZ Crystal (coordinates BR893661). The battery remained in these locations through the end of the reporting period. During the period, the battery expended 8297 rounds.

e. Battery C:

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period, Battery C was attached less administration to the 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery, OPCON 1st Cavalry Division (AM) participating in Operation Thayer II. The battery was located at LZ Dog (coordinates BS882997).

(2) At 070150H February 1967, Battery C received an intensive mortar attack lasting for approximately 80-minutes. Approximately 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire fell into the position occupied by the battery. The battery had 19 enlisted personnel wounded with damage to equipment primarily consisting of punctured tires, ruptured fuel tanks and holes in radiators.

(3) On 13 February 1967, the battery was returned to control of its parent battalion and displaced to LZ English (coordinates BS884007) in support of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) in Operation Pershing. On 10 March 1967, the battery displaced by road to LZ Two Bits (coordinates BR847947). Battery C, less two howitzer sections, moved by heli-lift to LZ Sandra (coordinates BS923754) on 4 April 1967. The two howitzer sections remained at LZ Two Bits (coordinates BR847947) until 12 April when they moved by road to LZ English (coordinates BS884007), on 20 April 1967 to LZ Uplift (coordinates BR923754) and then to LZ Crystal (coordinates BR893661) on 23 April 1967. On 24 April 1967, the two sections were heli-lifted to LZ Laramie, remaining at this location through the end of the reporting period. During this period, Battery C expended 24,304 rounds.

(4) On 3 February 1967, Battery C received its Annual General Inspection from Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam.

f. On 13 April 1967, Battery A, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery was attached to include administration, military justice jurisdiction and officer efficiency reporting to the 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery and remained in this status through the end of the reporting period. At time of attachment, the battery was located at LZ Pony (coordinates BR801831) supporting elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) in Operation Pershing. On 22 April 1967, one platoon of 175mm guns displaced by road to LZ Tom (coordinates BS899091) and then to LZ English (coordinates BS876015) on 24 April 1967. On 29 April, the battery (-) moved by road to LZ English remaining in this location through the end of the reporting period. During this period, Battery A expended 3541 rounds.

g. Battery B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight) remained attached for rations, quarters and administration to the 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery throughout the reporting period.
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AVFA-AT-1/30-CO  1 May 1967
SUBJECT: ORLL for Quarterly Period ending 30 April 1967 (Continued)

4. (C) Logistics. During participation in Operation Pershing, Service Battery, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery provided the necessary logistical and maintenance support for all elements of the battalion. With the firing elements of the battalion often located at distant and remote LZs, the logistical support was based heavily on aerial capabilities. An average of 439 meals, consisting of approximately 95% "A" rations were drawn and issued daily. Class II and IV supplies were drawn from the 2d Support Brigade, 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Element located at LZ English and also from the Qui Nhon Depot. Average daily consumption was 360 gallons of gasoline and 80 gallons of diesel fuel. Class V supplies were drawn from the ammunition supply points of the Forward Support Element. Over 3000 tons of ammunition were delivered to the firing elements with approximately 45% being delivered by air. Maintenance support was provided by the 618th Maintenance Company.

5. (U) Civil Affairs.
   a. Upon receipt of medical supplies, the battalion actively participated in the MED CAP II Program. A total of 1367 Vietnamese civilian patients were treated by the battalion medical station. Major conditions treated included nutritional deficiencies and tuberculosis.
   b. In the near future, material and technical assistance is to be provided to the local civilians for construction of a two classroom building to be erected for use of the Vietnamese children. This has been approved by the District Chief of Tuy Phu'oc District.

6. (C) Personnel.
      (1) Officers:

      |                         | Losses | Gains |
      |-------------------------|--------|-------|
      | MAJ                     | 1      | 1     |
      | LT                      | 4      | 4     |
      | Total                   | 5      | 5     |

      (2) Enlisted:

      |                         | Losses | Gains |
      |-------------------------|--------|-------|
      | Gr E7 thru E9           | 5      | 2     |
      | Gr E2 thru E6           | 211    | 243   |
      | Total                   | 216    | 245   |

   b. During February 1967, the battalion lost 100 enlisted personnel and gained 135 replacements. This approximates a 20% turnover of the command in a one month period.

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c. Award and Decorations: the following awards and decorations were awarded during the reporting period:

Silver Star ------------------------ 1 (Posthumous)
Bronze Star with V ------------------- 2
Bronze Star ------------------------ 4 (2 Posthumous)
Air Medal ----------------------------- 2
Army Commendation Medal ------------------ 2
Purple Heart ------------------------ 15

SECTION II (C) COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned).

1. (U) Artillery Survey.

   a. Item: Rapid establishment of a Surveyed Direction for Artillery Positions

   b. Discussion: Artillery units in Vietnam have been called on to displace to locations where no survey control is available. Many of these locations are inaccessible by road and the artillery unit is lifted in with helicopters. It is not always possible for survey personnel to accompany the firing elements on the initial displacement but rather are usually brought forward two or three days later. The need for establishment of accurate location and direction is immediate to provide accurate fires.

   c. Observation: Firing battery officers and senior NCO's should know the various methods of establishing and improving location and direction. Instruction on three point resection and astronomical observation should not only be given to survey personnel but also to the above mentioned personnel in firing batteries. These methods, when used by firing batteries, will provide more accurate data until survey personnel can be brought to the location.

2. (C) Searchlight Deployment.

   a. Item: Use of Infra-red searchlight in H&I program.

   b. Discussion: Illumination programs for surveillance around LZs, perimeters and base camps are being conducted by many units using several different methods. Artillery and mortar illumination fires have been employed in nightly H&I program. Searchlight white light has also been frequently used. All of these methods in some degree illuminate friendly positions to the enemy.
c. **Observation:** The 23" Xenon searchlight has an infra-red capability to a range of approximately 850 meters. Use of the infra-red option eliminates exposure of the defended position while maintaining surveillance of the perimeter. The jeep-mounted searchlight can be rapidly moved to different positions giving complete surveillance of the position.

3. (U) Artillery Illumination.

a. **Item:** Safety precautions when firing artillery illumination.

b. **Discussion:** The firing of artillery illumination creates additional safety measures that must be considered when using this type of illumination. The point of impact of the expended projectile must be computed, plotted and compared with the location of friendly elements. In addition, another hazard is created when, at the point of detonation, the metal sleeves encasing the illumination flare and the projectile base plate are ejected. The impact point of these metallic objects cannot be accurately computed and do create a safety hazard.

c. **Observation:** Danger zones do exist when firing artillery illumination and can be computed by the fire direction center. Fire direction officers and forward observers must be aware of the safety hazards created when firing illumination and these must be considered when selecting units to fire and the point of detonation. A danger zone from the point of detonation to the point of impact with a 300 meter safety zone left and right of the gun target line can be computed and plotted. Units falling within this zone can be warned of the impending danger and the decision on the type of fire to be used can be better determined.

4. (U) Minimum Quadrant Elevation.

a. **Item:** Check System for Minimum Quadrant Elevation.

b. **Discussion:** The computation of minimum quadrant elevations is a standard procedure used by all artillery units. Battery executive officers and chiefs of sections maintain this data to insure that all rounds fired are above the minimum quadrant elevations. The requirement to provide a 6400 mil capability necessitates the establishment of minimum quadrant elevations throughout the 6400 mil circle.

c. **Observation:** Based on traverse capabilities of the particular weapon involved, the 6400 mil circle is divided into segments for which minimum quadrant elevations are computed. Minimum quadrant elevations cards established for each sector of fire are bulky and detailed. A simplified method may be used in the fire direction center to obtain an additional safety check. On the firing chart, sectors can be marked off and the minimum quadrant elevation by charge for each sector posted to the chart. The check chart operator, in addition to checking the range and deflection to the target can then check the announced quadrant against the minimum quadrant elevation posted on the firing chart.
5. (U) Destruction of Fortified Positions.
   a. Item: Use of concrete piercing fuzes against fortified positions.
   b. Discussions: NVA and VC units have shown an increased use of heavily fortified bunkers and command posts for protection against artillery, bombs and aerial rockets. Double and triple layers of logs, dirt and sandbags are used in preparing these positions. Destruction of these positions by light artillery and other light explosives has not been successful.
   c. Observation: Recent use of concrete piercing fuzes with their extended delay action has proven successful against fortified positions. 155mm howitzer shells with CP fuzes have destroyed bunkers with heavy overhead cover and intricate tunnel and trench complexes.

6. (U) Artillery Adjustment by Air Observer.
   a. Item: Orientation aids for artillery air observers.
   b. Discussion: One of the more difficult aspects in the conduct of artillery fire by aerial observation is the establishment of the gun-target line on the ground.
   c. Observation: A simple method of orienting both the aerial observer and the aviator is to have the fire direction center announce to the observer the gun target azimuth in degrees. This will allow the aviator to plan his flight path parallel to the gun-target line enabling the observer to rapidly determine the gun-target line on the ground.

   b. Discussion: 155mm propellant charges are normally issued from ammunition supply points in a palletized carrier. Aerial delivery of these propellants is accomplished by slinging the pallet beneath a helicopter. Upon the arrival at the artillery position, normal practice has been to break down the pallet and individually store the propellant. In order to back-haul the empty propellant cannisters from the position, ammunition nets are required. At the present time, there is a short supply of ammunition nets in the Republic of Vietnam. This shortage can cause a serious backlog of expended cannisters to accumulate at the battery location.
   c. Observation: It has been found practicable to leave the 155mm propellants in the palletized container, moving this container directly to individual howitzer positions. Propellant charges can be directly removed at the howitzer position without breaking the pallet. When ready for back-haul, the entire pallet, now empty of all but the empty cannisters, can be returned to the ASP with the same aerial delivery equipment required to deliver it originally.
SUBJECT: ORLL for Quarterly Period ending 30 April 1967 (Continued)

8. (U) Protection from Mortar Attacks.

a. Item: Vehicle protection from mortar attacks.

b. Discussion: During the mortar attack on Battery C at LZ Dog on 7 February 1967, there was no damage to vehicles and howitzers due to direct hits. Most of the damage was caused by mortar fragmentation which punctured tires and damaged radiators.

c. Observation: By placing sandbags on front bumpers of vehicles and stacked along side of tires, partial protection can be provided from mortar fragmentation.

Part II. Commander's Recommendations.

1. (U) Artillery Survey.


b. This unit has conducted training of firing battery officers and non-commissioned officers on the procedures for three-point resection and astronomic observation. These methods used by the firing battery personnel permit the rapid and accurate establishment of location and direction. I recommend that a similar type training program be considered by other artillery units and methods be considered for use as standing operating procedures.

2. (C) Searchlight Deployment.


b. I recommend that the infra-red capability of the 23" Xenon searchlight be fully exploited by commanders for use in their mighty surveillance programs.

3. (U) Artillery Illumination.


b. The US Army Artillery and Missile School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, has been informed of potential hazards of firing artillery illumination and is presently conducting tests to arrive at data which can be used to predict points of impact of the illumination shell debris. I recommend that, until further information is made available by the Artillery School, that all commanders and other personnel be made aware of the potential risks involved.
4. (U) Minimum Quadrant Elevation.


   b. I recommend that this additional safety check to preclude firing below minimum quadrant elevations be considered for adoption by all artillery commanders.

5. (U) Destruction of Fortified Positions.


   b. The use of M78A1 CP fuzes against bunkers and tunnel complexes has proven to be extremely effective. I recommend that use of this fuze be brought to the attention of all individuals concerned. Consideration should also be given to the use of the white phosphorus shell with CP fuze.

6. (U) Artillery Adjustments by Air Observers.

   a. Reference Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned) Artillery Adjustments by Air Observers.

   b. I recommend that the announcement of the gun-target line in degrees by the FDC to the observer be included as a matter of standard practice in adjustment of artillery by aerial observers.


   b. The procedure of keeping propellant cannisters in palletized carriers eases the requirement for ammunition nets. I recommend that, if units are faced with similar type problems, that this method be considered for use.

8. (U) Protection against Mortar Attacks.

   a. Reference Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned) Protection against Mortar Attack.

   b. I recommend that for initial protective measures against mortar attacks, the method described in above reference be used by all units.
1 May 1967

SUBJECT: ORLL for Quarterly Period ending 30 April 1967 (Continued)

s/ Horace L. Hunter Jr.

T/HORACE L. HUNTER JR.
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

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SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967. Reports Control Symbol (CSPOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96238, 16 May 1967

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Artillery, APO 96350

1. (U) In compliance with USARV Reg 1-3, dated 23 March 1967, the Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Period Ending 30 April 1967 from 1st Bn, 30th Arty is approved and forwarded.

2. (U) Regraded Unclassified when separated from classified inclosures.

S.H. WHEELER
COL, Artillery
Commanding
AVFA-A7-D (1 May 67)  
2nd Ind 
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period  
Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (1st Bn, 30th Arty) (U)  

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96350, 24 May 1967  

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-O&T, APO 96350  

1. Concur in observations and recommendations contained in basic communication.  

2. Reference Section 2, Part II, para 3: Training in characteristics, employment, and safety factors in firing of artillery illumination is prescribed by I FFORCEV Arty Training Memorandum Nr 3.  

3. Reference Section 2, Part II, para 4: This procedure will be publicized in a future I FFORCEV Arty Newsletter.

LEO E. ELLIS  
LTC, Arty  
Adjutant
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, APO 96307

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the contents of this report, and the preceding indorsements with the following comments.

2. (U) Reference Section II, Part II - Recommendation: Concur.

a. Paragraph 1b - Artillery Survey: Paragraph 4d and 4e (4), USARV Regulation 350-1, dated 28 July 1966, authorize major unit commanders to delegate authority and responsibility for planning, conducting and supervising training to the lowest command element that has the ability to conduct effective training. In addition, the regulation allows training time for subordinate commanders to include subjects considered essential by them.

b. Paragraph 2b - Searchlight Deployment: The primary purpose of acquiring an infra-red capability is to improve the night surveillance capability of the command. When the lights are available, the equipment will be employed in that manner.

c. Paragraph 3b - Artillery Illumination: Application of the procedures outlined in Section II, chapter 13, FM 6-40, and an accurate appraisal of the tactical situation will prevent accidents as a result of debris from the employment of illumination ammunition.

d. Paragraph 4b - Minimum Quadrant Elevation: This is a practical recommendation which serves to lessen the possibility of firing from incorrect data.

e. Paragraph 5b - Destruction of Fortified positions: The M78A1 CP fuze is primarily designed to be employed against reinforced concrete and heavy masonry complexes as described in paragraph 563d (3), FM 6-40.

f. Paragraph 6b - Artillery Adjustment by Air Observers: Recommended method provides an additional means of maintaining orientation relative to the gun target line which would be beneficial to the pilot of the aircraft as well as the aerial observer.

g. Paragraph 7b - Ammunition Back-haul: This recommendation merits consideration by other units confronted with similar problems.

h. Paragraph 8b - Protection Against Mortar Attacks: Method described has proven effective in combat operations in II CTZ.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning use of illuminating shell, paragraph 3b, page 7 and paragraph 2c, 3d Indorsement: Concur. The use of an illuminating shell must be treated with additional safety precautions over and above those employed for normal (HE) missions. The proper FDC procedures for employment of illuminating shells will be found in Change 2, Chapter 25, Section II, FM 6-40. Drift is an important factor when employing illuminating shells and debris impact areas must be computed. A safety zone left and right of the gun-target (GT) line should be established to ensure that all friendly elements are protected from the side effects of these rounds. I Field Force Artillery has taken steps to ensure adherence to the proper observer and FDC procedures for the employment of illuminating shells.

b. Reference item concerning protection against mortar attacks, paragraph 8b, page 9 and paragraph 2b, 3d Indorsement: Concur. The method described for vehicle protection against hostile mortar attacks has merit and should be used whenever vehicles are in a static posture. Sandbags should, however, be removed from front bumpers during operation to prevent overheating. Headquarters, I Field Force has initiated appropriate action to inform all units of this procedure.

c. Reference item concerning minimum quadrant elevation, paragraph 4b, page 8 and paragraph 2d, 3d Indorsement: Concur. The recommendation forwarded by this unit is practical and will serve to lessen the possibility of firing below minimum safe quadrant elevation. However, it cannot be overemphasized that the chief of section must check each QE setting to ensure that the section will not fire below minimum safe QE. Headquarters, I Field Force Artillery has taken adequate steps to ensure procedure is brought to the attention of all artillery units in I Field Force.

FOR THE COMMANDER:
GPOP-DT(1 May 67) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 from HQ 1st Bn, 30th Arty (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 26 AUG1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

HEAVRIN SIEBER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG