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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980
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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (8 May 67) FOR OT

23 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st HOWITZER Battalion 30th Artillery

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Operational report for quarterly period ending 31 Jan 67.

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st HOWITZER Battalion 30th Artillery for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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(continued on page 2)
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Dr. Martin J. Bailey
SUBJECT: Operation Report for Quarterly period ending 31 January 1967 (Cont'd)


2. (C) Intelligence:

   a. During participation in Operation Paul Revere IV, intelligence information was obtained by daily liaison with supported units' S2s, local district advisors, nearby Special Forces Installations and through organic aerial reconnaissance. Using these intelligence sources, the battalion was able to obtain timely and reliable information.

   b. Upon return to the 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery base camp, liaison was established with the Capitol ROK Infantry Division, 22d ARVN Division, and Tuy Phu'oc District Headquarters. These have proven to be reliable sources of intelligence.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities:

   a. Headquarters Battery:

      (1) On 1 November 1966, Headquarters Battery, 1st Howitzer Battalion, 30th Artillery closed into field location (coordinates ZA 108 279) for battalion operations supporting the 1st Cavalry Division (A!) for Operation Paul Revere IV.

      (2) The battery returned to base camp (coordinates BR 972 252) on 27 December 1966, supporting battalion operations from this location for the remainder of the period.

      (3) Headquarters Battery received its Annual General Inspection from Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam on 31 January 1967.

   b. Service Battery:

      (1) On 1 November 1966, Service Battery, 1st Howitzer Battalion, 30th Artillery closed into field location (coordinates ZA 108 279) for Battalion operations supporting the 1st Cavalry Division (A!) for Operation Paul Revere IV.

      (2) The battery returned to base camp (coordinates BR 972 252) on 27 December 1966, supporting battalion operations from this location for the remainder of the period.

   c. Battery A:

      (1) At the beginning of the period, Battery A, 1st Howitzer Battalion, 30th Artillery, was OPCON 4th Infantry Division. On 3 November
1966, Battery A was placed under control of its parent battalion, remaining in this status until the end of the period.

(2) Participating in Paul Revere IV, Battery A was located at coordinates YA 850 534 from 30 October 1966 to 3 November 1966. Reverting to control of its parent battalion on 3 November 1966, the battery was ordered to move to coordinates ZA 078 222, closing that location on 4 November 1966. During the period from 4 November 1966 to 27 December 1966, the battery made 12 displacements by land and 2 by air. The battery expended 6896 rounds during the 55 day period.

(3) On 31 December 1966, the battery returned to base camp (coordinates BR 972 252). Participating in Operation Maeng Ho VIII, Battery A made a night displacement to coordinates CR 026 164 on 3 January 1967. Later the same day the battery moved to coordinates CR 027 159. On 4 January 1967 the battery returned to base camp (coordinates BR 972 252). A further displacement was made to coordinates BR 989 096 on 6 January 1967 and then to coordinates BR 851 096 on 8 January 1967. On 20 January 1967, the battery moved to coordinates BR 840 049 and on 22 January 1967, a further displacement was made to coordinates BR 840 048. On 26 January 1967, Battery A displaced to coordinates BR 895 124 and remained at this location until the end of the period. Battery A expended 2572 rounds during the 28 day period.

(4) During the period, Battery A made 21 displacements by land and 2 displacements by air, expending a total of 9468 rounds.

d. Battery B:

(1) At the beginning of the period, Battery B, 1st Howitzer Battalion, 30th Artillery was OPCON 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. On 4 November 1966, the battery was attached less administration to the 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery, OPCON 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Battery B was released from attachment, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery and attached less administration to the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division on 5 December 1966. On 19 January 1967, the battery reverted to control of its parent battalion and on 27 January 1967, the battery was attached less administration to the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. The battery remained in this status to the end of the period.

(2) Participating in Operation Geronimo I, the battery was initially located at coordinates BQ 839 439. On 5 November 1966, the battery moved to coordinates BQ 878 444, and then to coordinates BR 838 454 on the same date. Upon termination of Operation Geronimo I on 3 December 1966, the battery displaced to vicinity Tuy Hoa South (coordinates CQ 200 420). During the 28 day period, the battery expended 565 rounds.

(3) On 6 December 1966, the battery was airlifted by C-130 to vicinity Kontum (coordinates AR 260 890) in support of the 1st Brigade, 101st
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly period ending 31 January 1967 (Cont'd)

Airborne Division participating in Operation Pickett. On 9 December 1966, one platoon was hell-lifted to coordinates YA 722 871, returning to Kontum on 22 December 1966. On 10 December 1966, the second platoon was hell-lifted to coordinates YA 782 918, returning to Kontum on 23 December 1966. The battery was hell-lifted to coordinates AS 963 027 on 27 December 1966. On 3 January 1967, one platoon was hell-lifted to coordinates AS 851 290, returning to Kontum on 18 January 1967. On 6 January 1967, the second platoon was hell-lifted to coordinates AS 809 019, returning to Kontum on 16 January 1967. Operation Pickett terminated on 19 January 1967. During the 44 day period, the battery expended 1817 rounds.

(4) On 19 January 1967, the battery returned to 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery base camp (coordinates BR 972 252) for a period of intensified maintenance. On 27 January 1967, the battery moved by C-130 to vicinity Phan Rang (coordinates BN 770 833), remaining in that location to the end of the period.


(6) During the reporting period, Battery B made 5 displacements by land and 10 displacements by air, expending a total of 2382 rounds.

e. Battery C:

(1) Battery C, 1st Howitzer Battalion, 30th Artillery was under control of its parent battalion from the beginning of the period until 28 December 1966. On this date, the battery was attached less administration to the 3d Howitzer Battalion, 18th Artillery, OPCON 1st Cavalry Division (AM). On 31 December 1966, Battery C was released from attachment 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery and attached less administration to the 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery, OPCON 1st Cavalry Division (AM). The battery remained in this status to the end of the period.

(2) Participating in Operation Paul Revere IV, the battery closed into field location (coordinates ZA 108 279) on 1 November 1966. During the period from 1 November 1966 to 27 December 1966, the battery made 16 displacements, expending 6647 rounds during the 58 day period.

(3) On 27 December 1966, the battery returned to base camp (coordinates BR 972 252). On 28 December 1966, Battery C was ordered to displace to coordinates BR 880 540 and be prepared for airlift into the operational area of Operation Thayer II. The battery was airlifted to coordinates BR 992 996 on 28 December 1966. On 4 January 1967, the battery displaced by land to coordinates BS 847 947 and on 6 January 1967, moved by land to coordinates BS 882 003. On 7 January 1967, the battery returned by land to coordinates BS 882 996 remaining in this location to the end of the period. Battery C expended 5331 rounds during the 34 day period.
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4. During the entire reporting period, Battery C made 20 displacements by land and one displacement by air, expending a total of 11,978 rounds.

f. Battery B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight) remained attached for rations, quarters and administration to the 1st Howitzer Battalion, 30th Artillery through the reporting period.

(2) On 31 January 1967 the battery received its Annual General Inspection from Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam.

g. The 235th Radar Detachment (CMR) was detached from the 1st Howitzer Battalion, 30th Artillery and attached to 52d Artillery Group on 17 November 1966.

4. (C) Logistics

a. While participating in Operation Paul Revere IV, Service Battery, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery provided, from field location, logistical and maintenance support for attached and organic batteries of the battalion. An average of 520 meals consisting of approximately 96% "A" rations were drawn and issued daily. Class II and III supplies were drawn from the forward support elements of the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and the Pleiku Sub-area Command. Average daily consumption of gasoline was 420 gallons and diesel fuel was 125 gallons. Maintenance support was provided by the 27th Maintenance Platoon, 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and the Pleiku Sub-area Command.

b. Upon return to base camp, logistical and maintenance support was provided by the Qui Nhon Support Command. During the maintenance period for Battery B, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery while at base camp, arrangements were made for contact teams from the Qui Nhon Support Command to conduct thorough technical inspections of unit's equipment. These inspections were conducted in areas of ordnance, small arms, artillery and fire control instruments.

5. (U) Civil Affairs

A. Medcap II program has been initiated by the battalion surgeon. The actual operation of this program is dependent on the receipt of medical supplies from 70th Medical Base Depot. Other civil affairs programs were hampered by the unit's absence from base camp during the months of November and December 1966.

6. (C) Personnel

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(1) Officers:

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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>WO - 2</td>
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(2) Enlisted:

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<tr>
<td>Gr E2 thru E6 - 128</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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b. Awards and Decorations: The following awards and decorations were made during the reporting period.

- Legion of Merit: 1
- Bronze Star: 3
- ACM: 17
- Air Medal: 1
- Certificate of Achievement: 9

SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part 1, Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (U) Courier Service

a. Item: Need for Daily Courier Service between forward and rear elements.

b. Discussion: Units deploying to field locations normally establish a light administrative element at the forward location with the responsibility to provide immediate service to the commander and staff. S1 rear continues to function as the office of record and handles all administration which does not, because of short reaction time, require immediate action by the forward element. In order to insure continuous processing of administrative matters, there must be daily courier service established between the S1 forward and rear element regardless of the distance separation.

c. Observation: Courier service for distances exceeding 60 miles is best established by selecting a meeting point approximately equidistant between forward and rear elements. The courier vehicles from forward and rear should depart their respective locations in sufficient time to junction with each other at the specified time and place. Courier packets are then exchanged and the vehicles return to their base camps. Distances less than 60 miles
can be serviced by one courier vehicle, making a round trip daily.

2. (U) S1 Liaison Visits
   a. Item: Need for frequent liaison visits between S1 forward and rear.
   b. Discussion: When units are deployed to field locations establishing forward S1 elements, administration matters in the S1 area require close coordination between S1 forward and rear.
   c. Observation: Frequent visits by the S1 officer, normally acting as the rear detachment commander, to the battalion forward position, facilitates the close coordination required to complete administrative matters. Visits should occur every 7 to 10 days.

3. (U) Rear Detachment
   a. Item: Instructions for personnel remaining at the base camp location.
   b. Discussion: Unit base camp locations require maintaining a rear detachment when units move to field locations. Base camp strengths are considerably reduced during the time, requiring a greater need for coordination and control. Specific problem areas that arise are:
      1. Personnel turbulence caused by constant movement of personnel between forward and rear elements.
      2. Adequate guard force for base camp area.
      3. Effective use of personnel in rear area, to include personnel returning for DEROS and R&R.
      4. Security of unit area, to include individual clothing, equipment, and personal items.
   c. Observation: Base camp installations should prepare an adequate SOP for rear detachment operation. Coordination should be made in the following areas:
      1. Establishment of permanent guard force for base camp area.
      2. Notification of adjacent FWMAF installations of unit departure time and duration of absence.
      3. Existence of adequate security measures made by individual unit commanders prior to departure from base camp.
4. (U) Intelligence

a. Item: Timely and accurate reporting of intelligence information.

b. Discussion: If intelligence information is to be of any value it must be reported as soon as possible. Intelligence officers should establish daily contact with advisors at Sector Headquarters, District Headquarters and Special Forces Camps, if available in the area of operation. As a reliable source of information, these personnel are in constant contact with the people, their leaders and the Popular Forces. These are the people who know what the enemy situation is in the area, especially in the initial phases of the operation. If daily contact is not maintained, intelligence information received through normal military channels may be two or three days old and the situation may have changed considerably.

c. Observation: Initial establishment of contact with all available sources of intelligence information must be accomplished as soon as units move into new areas of operation. These contacts must be maintained on a daily basis.

5. (U) Defensive Targets

a. Item: Selection of Defensive Targets.

b. Discussion: Maneuver elements normally request artillery defensive targets for protection of perimeter while in field locations. Selection of these targets occasionally has been accomplished after dark. In order to minimize danger to friendly troops and to assure that the targets selected give the desired coverage, the defensive targets should be adjusted.

c. Observation: Planning for defensive targets must begin early and be selected in sufficient time to allow firing in before darkness. First round adjustment should always be a smoke round to minimize danger to friendly troops. Location of the gun-target line must be considered when selecting targets that would cause the gun-target line to pass through the position.

6. (U) Air Advisory

a. Item: Artillery Air Advisory.

b. Discussion: Due to the large number of aircraft normally employed in areas of operation, maximum ordinate and direction of fire must be computed for each artillery mission fired. This information must be disseminated quickly and accurately to the appropriate headquarters in order not to delay the processing of the mission.

c. Observation: Construction of an acetate overlay depicting directions of fire and maximum ordinates in feet for various charges can be placed on FDC firing charts. This procedure allows rapid computations of information for air advisorys without delaying the processing of the fire mission.
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7. (U) Fire Direction Procedures
   a. Item: Preparation of firing charts and use of the check system.
   b. Discussion: Under present tactical situations, firing batteries have the requirement to maintain a 6400 mil capability at all times.
   c. Observation: Preparation of firing charts in accordance with Ft. Will Fire Control and Coordination Information Letter 1vdescribes a procedure for preparing firing charts with a 6400 mil capability. The preparation of the chart under this system has proven to be rapid and accurate.

8. (U) FDC Facilities
   b. Discussion: The battalion is authorized in the battalion operations section a M109 Van for use as a battalion FDC. The van is suitable for short term operations and as a jump FDC. Due to the limited space, it has not been suitable for extended periods of time.
   c. Observation: Once a unit has initially set up operations in a field location, battalion FDC should be transferred to a bunker or tent, G.P. Small. A combined operations/fire direction center using two tents G.P. Small has been found to be adequate and practicable.

9. (U) Training
   a. Item: Unit Training Program.
   b. Discussion: Reliance on operational missions to maintain individual and unit proficiency in all required areas cannot be considered sufficient. Under the present tactical situation, there exists a rapid turnover of personnel; new procedures are continually being adopted and several basic procedures are seldom used. Violations of sound artillery procedures are more apt to occur when the individual soldier is not constantly reminded of them.
   c. Observation: Unit commanders must determine the minimum training requirements of their respective units. Daily formal training must be conducted in basic firing battery and fire direction procedures. Other subject areas, such as individual weapon proficiency, perimeter defense, small unit tactics and safety should be included as minimum training requirements. All units should prepare a unit training program and once disseminated, comply with its requirements.

10. (U) Message Center Operation
   a. Item: Use of DD Form 173.
b. Discussion: DD Form 173 is the proper form to initiate an electrically transmitted message. AR 105-31 requires this form to be completed, not to burden the sender but to expedite the message and to eliminate "misquotes" and incorrect messages. Failures to use this form requires message center personnel to type the message on the form thus impeding the entire message processing system.

c. Observation: All messages should be typed or printed on the appropriate forms in accordance with AR 105-31. Only in the case of an emergency "flash" message should this practice be circumvented.

11. (C) Communications Economy

a. Item: Message Precedence.

b. Discussion: Routine personnel matters transmitted by message are occasionally given a precedence of "priority" when they have been "routine". This breaks down the precedence system and causes an unnecessary up-grading of messages. In the extreme case, this misuse of precedence could have caused a delay of a priority message and seriously affected an operation.

c. Observation: Message precedence should be assigned in accordance with AR 105-31.

12. (C) Communications

a. Item: Communications Security.

b. Discussion: Violations of units operations codes has occasionally occurred under the "heat of battle". Unit locations, designations and names of commanders have been transmitted in the clear. Failure to realize that the enemy is most likely monitoring the net and has the capability to intercept every transmission can cause the success or failure of a mission.

c. Observation: Transmitting stations must "stop and think" before transmitting. Continued emphasis should be placed on communications security and continued classes and briefings should be conducted by unit commanders to insure that all personnel are aware of their responsibility.

13. (U) Radio Maintenance


b. Discussion: In many instances during an operation personnel would travel out of the headquarters area before drivers would make a radio check and a visual inspection of the radio. Thus, when they finally made their call to the net station, they found that their radio was not operating and they had to return to the area.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly period ending 31 January 1967 (Cont'd)

c. Observation: This situation could be avoided if the driver performs his first echelon maintenance and makes a radio check with the net station before the vehicle departs the area.

14. (U) Wire Communications

a. Item: Laying wire to subordinate units.

b. Discussion: Under certain tactical situations, it has been possible to establish wire communications between battalion headquarters and organic firing batteries. Under these situations the battalion communications section can lay wire lines to future battery locations and communications can be established immediately upon occupation.

c. Observation: Maximum coordination between the battalion operations section and communications section will result in pre-established land line communications with organic and attached batteries upon the occupation of a position.

15. (U) FM Communications

a. Item: Field Expedition Antennas

b. Discussion: Communications requirements during tactical operations require firing batteries to monitor 3 radio nets. Due to the dispersion of units and to effectively maintain satisfactory communications on all the nets, the use of an RC 292 antenna is mandatory. Units are authorized 2 RC 292 antennas each. In addition, to relieve the heavy volume of radio traffic to the battalion operations section an administrative station to handle all supply and personnel matters was established. This station also required the use of a RC 292.

c. Observation: Field Expedition RC 292 ground plane antenna, constructed in accordance with instructions on page 134 of FM 31-73, obtained results equal to those of the conventional RC 292. The materials to construct the antennas are readily available and the complete antenna can be constructed in approximately 30 minutes.

16. (U) POL Contamination

a. Item: Contamination of Aviation POL under field conditions.

b. Discussion: The dry season in Vietnam presents aviation maintenance difficulties comparable with desert conditions. An O-470-11 engine was changed on an O1-A operating under these conditions at half its scheduled life. Examination of the oil disclosed heavy grit indicating that sand and dirt had gotten into the engine or into the oil causing internal failure. Examination of the records also indicates that carburetor life is shortened under these conditions.
c. Observation: Procedures for desert conditions as outlined in the aircraft operators maintenance manuals must be adhered to during the dry season. Increased intervals of engine oil analysis will aid in detection of engine wear caused by sand contamination. Proper storage of lubricants and precautions to prevent the introduction of dust into the lubrication system will greatly increase the availability of Army aircraft.

17. (U) Area Support Facilities
   b. Discussion: Units within Vietnam are frequently required to make tactical displacements a considerable distance from their normal area of operation. Supply and Maintenance Support facilities have established direct support facilities in most of these areas. In a unit's normal area of operation, these facilities have the capability of providing adequate supply and maintenance support for a unit's peculiar-type items of equipment. These facilities normally are not present in forward support areas unless a similar type unit is already operating in the area.
   c. Observation: When units receive orders to displace outside their areas of operation, coordination must be made with the local support command elements to insure that the forward support areas are prepared to support the peculiar-type items of equipment with the unit.

18. (U) Unit Stand-down Periods
   a. Item: Maintenance periods for units returning to base camps.
   b. Discussion: Battery B, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery returned to base camp on 19 January 1967 for a seven day period of intensified maintenance. The battery had been committed to tactical operations for the last 13 months.

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5 February 1967
Operational Report for Quarterly period ending 31 January 1967 (Cont'd)
Operational Report for Quarterly period ending 31 January 1967 (Cont'd)

(8) Technical inspections by 2d echelon battalion teams and 3d echelon support maintenance teams of:

(a) Artillery
(b) Fire Control Instruments
(c) Small arms and crew served weapons
(d) Vehicles

A command inspection of the unit was conducted by the battalion commander and his staff.

Observe: An intensified maintenance period for all units after lengthy periods of field operations is extremely beneficial to the unit. Any such program must be thoroughly planned and coordinated before the arrival of the unit. Inspection teams should be formed and should visit the unit before its arrival at base camp to determine the needs of the unit so that preparation for its arrival can be complete.

Part II, Command Recommendations

1. (U) Courier Service


   b. I recommend that units establish procedures commensurate with their individual requirements to insure that daily courier service is maintained between forward battalion command posts and base camps.

2. (U) S1 Liaison Visits

   a. Reference Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned) S1 Liaison Visits.

   b. I recommend, in view of the importance of proper processing of administrative matters, that unit S1's, when used as rear detachment commanders, attempt to make frequent liaison visits with unit forward CP's.

3. (U) Rear Detachment

   a. Reference Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned) Rear Detachment.

   b. I recommend that installations review their SOP's for safeguarding base camps to insure that security measures and perimeter defenses manned by rear detachments are adequate in event tenant units are deployed into tactical operations.
4. (U) Intelligence
   a. Reference Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned) Intelligence.
   b. I recommend that the procedures described in reference a above be fully exploited by units in order to assure use of all intelligence gathering sources.

5. (U) Defensive Targets
   b. I recommend that the procedures described in reference a above be incorporated into unit procedures for selecting and adjusting defensive targets.

6. (U) Air Advisory
   a. Reference Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned) Air Advisory.
   b. This unit has prepared acetate overlays, when necessary, for use in compiling information for artillery air advisory. The procedure as described in reference a above has proven accurate and reliable. I recommend that artillery units consider use of similar procedures.

7. (U) Fire Direction Procedures
   b. This unit, with minor modifications, has adopted this procedure for use in all batteries. I recommend that artillery units review the procedures described to establish adaptability to their respective needs.

8. (U) FDC Facilities
   a. Reference Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned) FDC Facilities.
   b. The battalion has established a workable combined FDC/Operations center in static field operations to assist in the smooth functioning of battalion operations.

9. (U) Training
   b. A comprehensive training program has been established in this unit to ensure continued high standards of individual and unit proficiency.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly period ending 31 January 1967 (Cont'd)

10. (U) Message Center Operation
   b. Proper message writing procedures as outlined in AR 105-31 have been continuously emphasized within the unit.

11. (C) Communications Economy
   a. Reference Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned) Communications Economy.
   b. I recommend strict compliance with AR 105-31, when assigning message precedence, be emphasized at all levels.

12. (C) Communications
   b. Communication security violations are a matter of concern to all commanders. I recommend continued command emphasis be placed on this matter.

13. (U) Radio Maintenance
   b. Emphasis on 1st Echelon Radio maintenance is continual throughout the unit. Procedures on entering and leaving the radio net have been standardized within the unit.

14. (U) Wire Communications
   b. I recommend when the tactical situation permits, units plan and install wire communications as soon as possible.

15. (U) FM Communications
   a. Reference Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned) FM Communications.
   b. Reliable field expedient antennas have increased the communications capabilities within the battalion. I recommend that units employ these expedients and be familiar with their construction and purpose.

16. (U) POL Contamination
   a. Reference Part I, Observation (Lessons Learned) POL Contamination.
b. Maintenance procedures vary with the different climatic conditions found throughout the Republic of Vietnam. I recommend that units use the procedures as prescribed according to their particular region.

17. (U) Area Support Facilities
   b. I recommend that support commands be made aware of planned displacements of units they are supporting to ensure that the necessary support facilities are available in new areas of operations.

18. (U) Unit Stand-Down Periods
   a. Reference Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned) Unit Stand-Down Periods.
   b. I recommend when tactical commitments permit, the procedure described in reference a above be made available for all units. The intensified maintenance program for Battery B of this battalion proved to be extremely beneficial to the unit. Support contact teams gave complete cooperation and the standards of maintenance in the unit were greatly increased.

1 Incl
   Organizational Chart of
   1st Bn, 30th Arty

DISTRIBUTION:
  4 - CG, II FORC EVC Arty
  3 - HQS, USARV
  2 - USARPAC

HORACE L. HUNTER, JR.
LTC, Arty
Commanding

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-O&M, APO 96350

1. (U) Concur with comments and recommendations contained in basic communication.

2. (U) The following additional comments are submitted:

a. Reference section 2, part II, para 6: This procedure will be disseminated to all I FFORCEV Arty units in the next newsletter published by this headquarters.

b. Reference section 2, part II, para 11: The I FFORCEV Arty monthly newsletter has been used to reemphasize the precedence system.

c. Reference section 2, part II, para 17: Information copies of correspondence directing unit displacements are forwarded to the appropriate support commands as soon as plans are finalized.

d. Reference para 18, part II, section 2: Success of a standdown period is contingent on detailed prior planning and close coordination, as far in advance as possible, with the support facility.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

LTC, Arty

Adjutant

Enclosure
AVFA-GC-CT (5 Feb 67) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 1 FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350 17 MAR 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96307

1. (U) Concur with the contents of the Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 of the 1st Howitzer Battalion, 30th Artillery, and the preceding indorsement with the following comments:

2. (C) Reference Section 2, Part II - Recommendations.
   a. Reference paragraph 1b: The arrangement for courier service is a matter of organizational concern within the purview of the commander concerned.
   b. Reference paragraph 2b: Visits of rear detachment commanders to organizational forward command posts are entirely a matter of command prerogative.
   c. Reference paragraph 3b: Appropriate directives have been published which require frequent inspections by installation coordinators of perimeter defenses, and administrative directives that establish security procedures. This headquarters performs frequent inspections of all base camp installations in II CTZ.
   d. Reference paragraph 4b: The force commander in the area of operation establishes and maintains liaison with US, other FWMAF, and ARVN elements before and during an operation. Selection of personnel, coordination, and the frequency of these contacts are determined by the major US headquarters participating in an operation.
   e. Reference paragraph 5b: The manner of selecting defensive targets described is considered standard procedure.
   f. Reference paragraph 6b: Use of acetate overlays for compiling information for artillery air advisory is noteworthy and merits the attention of other artillery units.
   g. Reference paragraph 7b: The requirement for all artillery firing batteries to maintain firing charts with a 6,000 mil capability is continuous. Several methods have been developed to fulfill this requirement. This system has the advantage of standardizing the procedure which would facilitate training in that appropriate training directives are available for issue at the Artillery School.
Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

h. Reference paragraph 11b, 12b, 14b and 15b: Compliance with communication directives, communication security, plans for and installation of wire circuits, and improvement of communications are considered matters of command. Commanders must continue to emphasize the importance of maintaining good communication.

i. Reference paragraph 16b: Aircraft operators maintenance manual reflects prescribed preventative maintenance procedures, which may be modified to permit improvement based on unique local conditions.

j. Reference paragraph 17b: 1st Logistical Command is informed of all planned operations and changes thereto. Appropriate logistical commands are duly informed of logistical requirements.

k. Reference paragraph 18b: Stand-down periods present an excellent opportunity to perform maintenance of equipment, to conduct inspection of units, and to improve the morale and welfare of personnel. However, care must be taken to insure that a rigid program is maintained on a continual basis to accomplish these matters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CHARLES L. JOHNSON
CPT, AGC
Aamt AG.
AVHGC-DH (5 Feb 67)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSPOR-65)  

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APC San Francisco 96307  

To: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GMC-IT  

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Howitzer Battalion, 30th Artillery, as indorsed.  

2. (U) Reference Paragraph 6b, Page 8: The procedure established by the 1st Howitzer Battalion, 30th Artillery, of using acetate overlays to compile information for artillery air advisories merits consideration of other field artillery units in RVN, and will be disseminated by this headquarters.  

FIR THE COMMANDER:  

1 Incl  

nc  

2LT/AGC  

ATT AG  

APR 04 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSPOR-65), HQ 1st How Bn 30th Arty

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

1 MAY 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

CPT. AGO

Anne AG

1 Incl

nc
Inclosure 1, Organization Chart, to basic letter, ORL 1st Bn, 30th Arty dated 5 February 1967.

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