### UNCLASSIFIED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AD NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD389971</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>confidential</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### LIMITATION CHANGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 14 FEB 1967. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General, Department of the Army, Washington, DC 20310.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### AUTHORITY

28 Feb 1979, DoDD 5200.10; AGO DA ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
Best Available Copy
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REF: AGAM-P (M) (25 Apr 67) FOR OT
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 54th Artillery Group (M)-8

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Operational report for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967.
Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by
CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective
actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of
covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Com-
mandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the
future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted
for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding General
US Army Combat Development Command
US Continental Army Command
Commissaries
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army War College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Armor School
US Army Chemical Corps School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Medical Field Service School

(Continued on page 2)
CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Security Agency School
US Army Transportation School
US Army Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Civil Affairs School

Copies furnished:
Office, Secretary of Defense, ATTN: Dr. Bailey, SE Asia Forces
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Research Analysis Corporation
Security Officer
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
Office of the Director of Defense Research
and Engineering
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations,
ATTN: JACO
CONFIDENTIAL

14 February 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 20310

SECTION I
SIGNIFICANT HEADQUARTERS OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) Administration and Personnel,
a. This headquarters remains assigned to United States Army Vietnam (USARV) and operates as a major subordinate command of USARV. Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam artillery retains operational control of the 54th Artillery Group.
CONFIDENTIAL
14 February 1967
SUBJECT: Operational report on Lessons Learned (U)

b. Activities of the 31 during the period 1 November 1966 through 31 January 1967 have been normal with emphasis being placed on management and operating procedures.

c. Personnel strength of the command as of 31 January 1967 was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66th, 54th arty gp</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th bn, 9th arty</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d bn, 35th arty</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st bn, 63rd arty</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Personnel changes during this quarter include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CALLS:</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>LOSSES:</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in action</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non battle Dead</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Awards and decorations presented to members of this command:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (Valor)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (Merit)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commendation Medal (Merit)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. R & R program schedules include the following:

(1) The group receives 20 quotas per month for in-country R & R to Vung Tau where the troops stay for three days.

(2) The out of country R & R included the following 5 day quotas for the month of January 1967:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF QUOTAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
S U J E C T: Operational report on Lessons learned (U)

LOCATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of HQs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penang</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. Unit mail clerks pick up and deliver mail at the nearest APC as follows:

(1) HHS, 54th Arty Gp - APO 96257
(2) 7th bn, 9th Arty - APO 96370
(3) 2d bn, 35th Arty

- HHS - APO 96257
- 3 Btry - APO 96257
- C Btry - APO 96257
- A Btry - APO 96291
- Svc Btry - APO 96491

(4) 1st bn, 83d Arty

- HHS - APO 96291
- A Btry - APO 96291
- Svc Btry - APO 96291
- 3 Btry - APO 96370
- C Btry - APO 96257

i. Judicial and non-judicial actions by units included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ART 15</th>
<th>SCH</th>
<th>SPCH</th>
<th>CON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHS, 54th Arty Gp</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th bn, 9th Arty</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d bn, 35th Arty</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st bn, 83d Arty</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

j. Reportable accidents included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>VEHICLE</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHS, 54th Arty Gp</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th bn, 9th Arty</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d bn, 35th Arty</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st bn, 83d Arty</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

k. The morale of the group is excellent.
CONFIDENTIAL

1. Educational opportunities for personnel are provided by USAF extension courses and GED.

2. Religious services are held each Sunday at base camps by both Catholic and Protestant Chaplains assigned to the group. Chaplains visit field locations and conduct services and counseling during the weekdays. The chapel at the group base camp has been erected. Interior work is being completed.

3. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery Base Camp -

Development of the base camp progressed rapidly during the reporting period. C Company, 27th Engineer Battalion stayed in the area until 12 November. Prior to its departure, the company had completed the following buildings:

- 2 Latrines
- 2 Showers
- Operations building
- Mess hall
- HQ building
- Warehouse
- Dispensary
- Orderly room/supply room

Through self-help, the Headquarters Battery constructed the following by 31 January:

- 6 60 billets
- 2 NCO billets
- Communications building
- Club (not completed)
- Officers' Club (not completed)
- Chapel (not completed)
- 5 SQQ buildings (smaller than standard size)

On 24 December a brief ceremony was held to name streets and certain installations in Camp Lee.

4. Medical section activities included the following:

    (1) During this period two battalion aid stations and the 54th Group Headquarters dispensary became fully operational within wooden buildings. These buildings were constructed along similar lines, providing space for efficient, modern handling of routine and emergency medical problems. In addition, space has been provided in all the dispensaries for overnight care of patients on quarters.

    (2) Preventive medical activities have continued to receive emphasis with excellent results. Environmental sanitation within the
CONFIDENTIAL

14 February 1967

Subject: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

Group has been superb. It is felt that the low incidence of gastro-intestinal diarrhea disease is a direct result of this. The malaria prophylaxis program has had notable success, as units from this command have operated within endemic malaria areas with extremely low incidence of disease.

(3) A cooperative venereal disease control program has been initiated in the Xuan Loc area. This program involves US and ARVN medical corps officers, the Provincial medical chief, a health police medical assistance team, and utilizes the facilities of the Long Khanh Province Hospital. In addition venereal disease information lectures are conducted by medical corps officers.

(4) All medical units of this command have participated in "MEDCAP" activities. Attacks have been made to always include Vietnamese nationals in these activities either as interprters, nurses, or aid-men. Activities have included school physicals on grade school children, medical visits to outlying villages, emergency medical treatment of injured Vietnamese, and assignment of men who have received QP training in radiology and laboratory techniques, to Vietnamese Province Hospitals.

(5) Effective and beneficial liaison has been established with Vietnamese civilian doctors, 18th ARVN Division doctors, and Phillipine doctors in the Xuan Loc area. Two medical society meetings have been held with lectures and discussions of common medical problems.

2. (C) Intelligence.

a. The 54th Artillery Group conducted a one hundred percent semi-annual inventory of classified documents during the month of November. There were no short-comings.

b. The group was provided three QL type aircraft each day for visual reconnaissance, adjustment of artillery fires, and convoy coverage. An average of 42 visual reconnaissance missions were flown each week with an average of 15 hours per day in the air. In the month of January a total of 174 "all adjust" missions were fired using these three QL's. An average of 10 hours per week were flown in convoy cover missions. The group headquarters also received an average of five out of seven days, one QL-13 type aircraft for the use of the group commander.

c. When night reconnaissance missions were flown, only two aircraft were available during day light hours. This, plus the large areas to be covered, prevented optimum surveillance. In spite of this limitation, the QL program was the single most responsive target acquisition asset available to this group. WJ flights furnished WJ target information, allowed for observed target-of-opportunity missions, and provided the capability for registrations.

3. (C) Training.
CONFIDENTIAL

SLOT: Operational report on Lessons Learned (U) 14 February 1967

a. The 1st bn, 83d Artillery arrived in country with 8" SP 110 howitzers. The mission of the battalion and location of batteries necessitated replacing 6" types of echelon firing, but with 175mm tubes. The change took place with relative ease and very little training was necessary to bring the crews up to the proficiency known with the 110.

b. When the battalions assigned to the 54th Artillery Group arrived in country they were using several different systems of fire direction computation, primarily in the method of chart operation. A standard system employing the MM-10 firing chart technique as explained in Fort Belvoir Control and Coordination Information Letter 21 is being adopted.

c. The 54th Artillery Group requires a system of dual checks for all steps in the computation and specification of firing data. There have been no incidents of injury to friendly personnel by units of this command.

4. (C) Operations

a. Since the last report period, the 54th Artillery Group has had two artillery battalions assigned in addition to the already assigned 2d bn, 35th Artillery. The 7th bn, 9th artillery (155mm towed howitzers) commanded by LTC Wallace J. Dickel arrived in country on 31 October 1966. The battalion became operational on 14 November 1966 with b as Coop at Saipulat (see 7th bn, 9th Artillery Operational Report - Lessons Learned). The 7th bn, 9th artillery is organized under TUs 6A-4OS; the 1st bn, 83d Artillery is under TUs 64456.

b. During the reporting quarter units of this command have participated in operations in support of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, 35th Infantry Division, 1st Australian Task Force, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, 173d Airborne Brigade, and the 10th BCT Division, including operations Jalmarque, Atlanta, Hartleby, Hayman, Ingham, Bun Tam 61, Canvey, Waco Glenn Farms, and Cedar Falls. The operations are covered in detail by the Operational Reports - Lessons Learned from each battalion. The 54th Artillery Group also supported special forces operations of short duration with artillery fires and forward observer teams.

c. During the reporting period the 54th Artillery Group maintained a permanent liaison officer in the Combat Support Coordination Center of the 18th A&B Division (formerly 10th A&B Division) and a permanent liaison officer with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The liaison officer with the 18th A&B Division had the duties of clearing artillery fires in the 33d Division Tactical Area with A&B ground personnel and helping to maintain and operate the Aircraft Warning Control Center.

d. The group instituted a method for expanding the fire program which could be best described as observed H&I fires, both confirmed and
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

14 February 1967

suspected locations were targeted and recommended for attack under the control of an air observer. A card file system was used for historical data and compared with current intelligence reports to select the daily targets. Targets of opportunity took precedence over the pre-planned observed H&I's.

e. The 54th Artillery Group has been pursuing a program to provide artillery support to HF/PP outposts within range of group artillery. The program is designed to:

(1) Establish liaison with the outposts.

(2) To establish a basic system of artillery adjustment to outpost personnel.

(3) Insure that communication means are available to call for HF and HF artillery fire in defense of positions.

(4) Guarantee accurate fire support by firing in defensive concentrations.

The 54th Artillery Group, in coordination with II Field Force Vietnam artillery taught a class in adjustment to representatives from HF/PP outposts in Long Khanh Province. Visits to two outposts have been accomplished and initial liaison has been established with the Revolutionary Development Cadre school in Vung Tau, to include a class on artillery adjustment in the school curriculum. A class was taught in late January to the Vung battalion commanding the Vung Tau sub-area. Plans are being developed for group units to support this program within their respective areas.

f. The group was given one UH-1D helicopter daily and a second helicopter by every third day on an average to transport command and staff, perform liaison visits, move personnel replacements, and transport critically needed repair parts and equipment. An average of 25 personnel per day were moved among the battalion base camp areas and field positions. During the latter part of the reporting period, the second helicopter was available an average of 2 out of 3 days.

5. (b) Logistics.

a. During the period 1 November 1966 to 31 January 1967, Class I, III, IV, VI supply has been excellent. Class II has been issued sporadically and most subordinate units are lacking in this area. Medium sized fatigue and cover have been difficult to obtain in quantity, but the situation is improving. The group has a sizable stockpile of ditty boxes and cots. Poncho liners have not been issued to the group.

b. Maintenance support for units has been erratic. This was due to a new battalion assuming the support mission without an established pool and experienced personnel. These deficiencies are being corrected as the new battalion gains experience. Some of the group's...
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational report on Lessons Learned (U)

14 February 1967

Major potential problems in the area of maintenance have been alleviated by the establishment of a C.I.F. unit that conducts four-hour-notice inspection of the unit's equipment. Commanders have shown a pronounced interest in their equipment status and are experiencing little down-time at present.

c. The shortage of repair parts has been somewhat of a problem. The various components of the M107 and M110 elevating mechanisms are difficult to obtain. Careful training of gun crews and proper maintenance of the assembly has reduced the down-time of the weapon considerably. Artillery down-time because of sights has been eliminated in the group. This was accomplished by obtaining float sights at the group level that are flown immediately to the gun location when sight problems are imminent. Other maintenance problems have been solved by close liaison with the supporting ordnance. Experiences has proven that by consolidating maintenance teams at the group level, firing the main parts to the sites of trouble, facilitates the immediate detection and correction of problems.

d. The short tube life of the M107 has presented a problem in the past. If the new tube was on hand it required a trained team with proper equipment from three to six hours to replace a tube. Nitrogen has proven difficult to obtain and a great percentage of the containers have less pressure than required to refill the equilibrators after they are drained. It has been found that by fabricating a bracket assembly that will hold the cradle at zero elevation without draining the nitrogen, the tubes can be exchanged and the weapon can again be operational within two hours. The supporting maintenance battalion has fabricated an adequate supply of these brackets and now experiences little down-time due to tube change.

3. Engineer support of the group has been excellent. The construction of drainage facilities, mess halls, showers, and latrines has been completed in all of the units base camps. Class IV engineer supplies have been excellent. Sand bags, bunker material, and self-help material have been provided. Wooden gun pods are currently being constructed in the group's area.

6. (C) Civil Affairs

a. The group is assigned a major with primary duty as S-5. Each battalion has S-5 duties assigned to an officer as an additional duty. Civil affairs have been coordinated with the following units and/or officials throughout the group's area:

1. 10th MWH division (and G-5 advisor)
2. Long Khanh province Chief (and sub-sector advisor)
3. Juan Loc District Chief (and sub-sector advisor)
4. Phouc Tuy Province Chief (and sector advisor)
CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (O)

(5) Long Thanh District Chief (and sub-sector advisor)

(6) 9th Infantry Division

(7) 11th A.C.

(8) 1st Australian Task Force

an active program of visits to and from GU officials within the 33d Sf. has been instituted. on Christmas day, over 100 orphans and school children from the Xuan Loc area were guests of Group units located in Xuan Loc. Battalion of the 2d battalion, 35th artillery, and the 7th battalion, 9th artillery, did limited civic action projects in conjunction with exercise Jan Tan 63 in the Vinh Loc, Vo Van, and Vo Van areas. Plans have been coordinated with the Long Khanh Province USAID and RD Cadre advisor to support the RD Cadre Team at Xuan Loc and the Contingent Cadre Team at Xuan Loc.

b. The group has supported the RDCAP program extensively. In the Xuan Loc area, the 1st Battalion, 35th artillery, has made 13 RDCAP visits in conjunction with the 1st Australian Task Force, treating 413 Vietnamese. The 2d battalion, 35th artillery, has made 8 RDCAP visits in conjunction with the Long Khanh sector medical, treating 1010 Vietnamese. The Group surgeon and the battalion surgeon from the 2d battalion, 35th artillery, have worked extensively with the Long Khanh Province hospital and the Philippine World Medical Team in Xuan Loc. They have assisted in numerous surgical operations and have been instrumental in setting up a Xuan Loc medical society and a Xuan Loc VD control program.

c. Three English classes were started on 30 January 1967 at the Long Khanh public school taught by officers of the 34th artillery Group Headquarters.

d. During the reported period the group has employed an average of 184 Vietnamese workers daily.

(9) CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

14 February 1967

SLOT II

Part One, Observations (U)

1. (U) Personnel

a. ITI: Accumulating Pay.

(1) DISCUSSION: Many enlisted personnel were taking the pay option where they received only a part of their pay and left the remainder to accumulate as credits with the finance section. This money did not gain any interest for the personnel concerned. In most cases the money is saved in this manner for R & R purposes.

(2) OBSERVATION: Personnel are being encouraged to put their money in a bank account or into some other savings plan where their money will collect interest and still be available for them for R & R purposes. Banking facilities are available in country and once an account is open at the bank, an individual can bank by mail or have finance send a check to the bank monthly for him.

b. ITI: Personnel with Improper MOS.

(1) DISCUSSION: Replacements from CONUS have been received from the replacement depot that have been assigned improper MOS's; i.e., a cook that can't cook, a radio typist operator who can't operate a radio, etc. A check of individual records revealed that some personnel in this category have had their MOS changed for promotional purposes in CONUS.

(2) OBSERVATION: Personnel of this type should be retrained in the MOS assigned before assignment to a combat area.

c. ITI: Use of Chaplains in Field Positions.

(1) DISCUSSION: During a recent operation, the assistant group chaplain accompanied the 2d bn, 35th artillery, to the field. The units in the field prior to this time had been without the services of a chaplain. During the operation, the chaplain conducted four worship services, one troop "in line", counseled eight troopers with personal problems, and set up a counseling session for two Catholic soldiers with a Catholic chaplain.

(2) OBSERVATION: Whenever the availability of a chaplain and the situation permits, there should be a chaplain with field units to meet the mental and spiritual readiness of the combat soldier.

2. (C) Operations.

a. ITI: Group units were employed outside of the group area of responsibility on numerous occasions.
CONFIDENTIAL

14 February 1967

(1) DISCUSSION: The 54th Artillery Group has the mission of providing general support, II Field Force Vietnam, reinforcing 1st cav Division Artillery, IAT Field Regiment Royal Australian Artillery, howitzer batteries of the 11th Armored Cav Div Artillery, and 9th Infantry Division Artillery, in addition, the group is responsible for visual reconnaissance, artillery support of A&P and divisional forces/Facultative Force units, and the preparation of operation plans for the artillery support of special forces units in an area approximately including the 33d Division Tactical Area, plus the Phu Dieu and Thu Dau Mot districts of the Capital Military District.

Missions assigned to group subordinate units have hastened the group in performing its missions within its area of responsibility. Attachments of group units to other organizations included 50 battery days in November, 79 in December, and 129 in January. Most of these battery days were spent outside the 33d Div.

(2) CIRCUMSTANCES: because attachments and other commitments have drawn the light and medium batteries away from group control, the group has been forced to turn down requests for artillery support from reinforced units and to perform close support missions with heavy batteries. Maintenance and proper administration have become problems for the 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery, which is spread over more than a hundred miles from Tuy Phinh to Hue, and for the 7th Artillery, though spread to a lesser degree. Commanders have not felt sufficiently confident of continuous US artillery support to proceed with plans for the integration of all artillery coverage. Group units have been less able to establish sound combat relationships with reinforced and supported units in the 33d Division Tactical Area. Civil action programs in the vicinity of unit base camps could not be pursued vigorously.

b. IT'S DIFFICULTY OF CONTROLLING NONASSIGNED HELICOPTERS.

(1) DISCUSSION: This group receives its helicopter support from numerous units under the control of II Field Force Vietnam Arm Division Artillery. Request must be made, with mission justification, for specific hours of usage by 1500 hours on the day prior to the requirement. Missions include operational control of units, moving critical repair parts, delivering mail to units in the field, and transporting replacement personnel. All of the group's three battalions are supported from the same one or two OH-2 helicopters provided drill. At the present time the control of these helicopters is necessary to ensure effective utilization requires an average of four officer non-hours and fifteen enlisted man-hours per week.

(2) CIRCUMSTANCES: Much of the control difficulty arises from the fact that different pilots from different units are assigned to support of the group with OIC. Some pilots have never previously visited or the area where group units are located. Personnel have been in the situation of waiting for a helicopter on end of the airfield, while the other pilots at the other. Units and pilots have not been able to

(11) CONFIDENTIAL
contact such other because neither knew the other's frequency and call sign, nor did the unit know from which aviation company the helicopter was to come. Helicopters have been diverted from their assigned missions by unauthorized personnel because the pilots did not know the person for whom they were working by name or face.

e. ITDS: Difficulty of obtaining surveillance information on artillery missions fired.

(1) DISCUSSION: The majority of missions fired by units of this group are unobserved and consist of HAI's, blocking fires, defensive concentrations, and fires for effect missions on unobserved, suspect VC locations which have been located by intelligence sources. The unobserved nature of these fires is due primarily to the enemy's tactics which emphasize use of natural cover and concealment, night operations, and the dispersion of forces. Even when an observer is adjusting artillery, it is often impossible to get meaningful surveillance because of the severe limitations on visibility caused by heavy vegetation. Artillery is often adjusted by sound alone. The observer can see the impact of his rounds, but the prevalent triple canopy jungle makes it extremely difficult to observe the actual effect on the ground. As a result, the artillery observer is frequently limited to a surveillance report of "good coverage of target area." Much of the target surveillance is of a delayed nature and comes from agents, HAI's or defectors at a later date. This data tends to be incomplete and of a general nature which makes it difficult to tie to specific missions.

(2) OBSERVATION: Insufficient target surveillance is a continuing problem due to the nature of the enemy and the restrictions placed on visibility by heavy vegetation.

d. ITDS: Observed HAI fires program.

(1) DISCUSSION: Movement of the Viet Cong under the multiple canopy jungle is not detectable in most cases. To deny and limit freedom of movement to the VC, this unit has implemented an observed daylight HAI fire program. Known and suspect locations are selected based on correlation between VC fires or accepted and suspect locations and current intelligence reports. The fires are adjusted to insure adequate over coverage. In many cases a target of opportunity has developed.

(2) OBSERVATION: This program of observed HAI fires cannot be given a positive evaluation; however, VC propaganda campaigns against these artillery bombardments suggest a definite effectiveness.

e. ITDS: Operation of Aircraft Warning Coordination Center (A CC).

(1) DISCUSSION: The method of providing protection from friendly artillery; for US and F.A.I.F. aircraft was promulgated by II Field Force Vietnam Regulation 385-2. In this regulation, the III Corps Military
CONFIDENTIAL

14 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational report on Lessons Learned (U)

The advisory group is charged with establishing a CC at Van Loc. The
adviser team E7 has been unable to provide adequate resources, which
include a minimum four radio operators and one 5/60X46 radio. As a
result, the headquarters has been forced, in the interest of safety,
to supply the required radio end to divert liaison personnel from their
primary mission. This headquarters currently uses the a CC 112 hours
per week.

2. (CONFIDENTIAL) Through coordination, a plan providing
some relief for the problems is being worked out by including liaison
personnel from the 11th Amored Cavalry Regiment in the duty roster for
manning the a CC, but neither is the mission of those personnel,
a CC's in some other areas are manned by aviation sections personnel.
There is no organizational aviation section at Van Loc. The 11th Amored
Cavalry Regiment Aviation Section must operate from Long Giao to control
the regiment's aircraft, and the a CC must remain in the 18th ARVN Division
GCCC to maintain the bilingual capability and to retransmit notice of
artillery fires in an expeditious manner.

3. (U) Training and Organization.

(a) Regional Force/popular force outposts are generally
unaware of how to call for or adjust artillery fire.

1. DISCUSSION: There have been times when RF/PF outposts
were hit and did not request artillery support even though .37mm and/
or 57mm artillery support was available. The main causes for this failure
to call for available artillery support were:

(a) RF/PF personnel were not aware of the artillery
available to support their outpost.

(b) They were not aware of what communication means
were available to call for supporting fire.

(c) Defensive concentrations have not been fired in.

(d) Personnel were not familiar with procedures to
adjust artillery fire.

(2) OBSERVATION: a concerted effort is being made by this
group to contact RF/PF outposts within range to:

(a) Determine communication channels available to call
for both .37mm and 57mm artillery support.

(b) Teach personnel a basic artillery adjustment
procedure (polar plot method).

(c) Show them how to construct and orient a single
direction finding device.

(3) CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

14 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

(a) Determine requirements for defensive fires, and if at all possible, fire in the defensive concentrations.

(b) Maintain liaison with sector and sub-sector advisors to coordinate and implement the above.

4. (U) Logistics.
   a. ITEM: Generator M-91-A.
      (1) DISCUSSION: The use of rectifiers for the conversion of 120 volt AC electricity into 28 volts would eliminate the dependence on the 3 kw 28 volt generators for radio operations.
      (2) DISCUSSION: The use of small direct current generators causes a power supply problem, since the smaller generators are subject to frequent failure.

5. (U) Medical.
   a. ITEM: Medical supplies.
      (1) DISCUSSION: Medical supplies for use at battalion level have been difficult to obtain. Initial procurement is projected, and subsequent requests are received sporadically with a high percentage of 90-95% of them. The battalion surgeons have had to resort to personal, weekly trips to medical supply depots to obtain basic supplies. This condition has existed for nearly all types of medical supplies, from antibiotics and biologicals to bandages and surgical sponges.

      (2) DISCUSSION: Sufficient drugs should be brought by incoming unit medical sections to sustain the unit for at least 60 days.

   b. ITEM: Penicillin.
      (1) DISCUSSION: Penicillin injection, 400,000 units in Oil (American 1-0-6-0-8-0-1-9) has only limited use in Vietnam, due to the cartridge size of only 600,000 units per injection. Routine treatment of acute gonococcal urethritis requires at least 1.5 million units of procaine penicillin.

      (2) DISCUSSION: Large amounts of Procaine Penicillin for aqueous injection, 1.5 million units (American 1-0-4-0-7-1-1) should be brought by incoming units, and be substituted for the penicillin in oil contained in the STACO drug sets.

   c. ITEM: Federal Supply Catalog, Department of Defense Section, Medical Materiel, and Medical Kit's.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

1. DISCUSSION: The Federal supply catalog has not been available in Vietnam.

2. DISCUSSION: All incoming unit should obtain these items prior to shipping.
   a. ITIN: GT for Indies.

   (1) DISCUSSION: Many medics arrive in Vietnam without the benefit of any practical experience. Many have never seen severe injuries or mass casualties. Often these men are overwhelmed by their initial exposure.

   (2) DISCUSSION: Upon arriving in country and while staying, the group has been able to assign medics to GIT bases to various surgical and evacuation hospitals, to assist in surgery rooms, see mass casualties, and become familiar with basic surgery and medical care. In addition, medics have been sent for GIT to the 96th Medical Lab for instruction in basic bacteriology, parasitology, and microbiology. Both these programs have worked out exceptionally well. There is no organized plan for such training but must be accomplished by the individual unit. In addition, one medic has received GIT training in radiology and now assists at one of the Vietnamese Province Hospitals.

   6. (U) Tube, 17.5mm Gun/6 Inch Howitzer.
      a. ITIN: Changing 17.5mm Gun and 6 inch howitzer tubes.

      (1) DISCUSSION: In changing the tubes on the 110 and 1107 self propelled weapons, para 40, TM 9-1000-218-35 requires that the nitrogen pressure in the equilibrators be reduced to zero so that the orifice will remain at zero elevation during the removal and installation of the tube. During refilling, the equilibrators require special tools and gauges which are in short supply in Vietnam. Nitrogen is stored under pressure from a bulky cylindrical tank that is difficult to transport by supporting any aircraft. Nitrogen periodically has proven difficult to obtain in Vietnam. Even then the proper equipment, tools and personnel are available, changing a tube requires from 3 to 5 hours in the field.

      (2) DISCUSSION: Neutralizing the equilibrator force without draining the nitrogen can be accomplished by not chining or shot assembly around the equilibrators. These brackets are held in place by steel 1/2 inch rods that are welded to the brackets. The bracket assembly holds the orifice at zero elevation while the tube is being changed. Experience has shown that this method reduces the operation to 3 maximum of 2 hours and completely eliminates the waste of nitrogen. A drawing of the brackets used is attached as enclosure 1.

7. (C) AN/VIC-12 Series Radios.
   a. Intent: High mobility units of AN/VIC-12 Series Radios.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJ.: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

14 February 1967

1. (1) DISCUSSION: It has been discovered that some units experience high rates of functioning of WRC-12 series radios, with the primary reason of cause being careless or lack of knowledge. KT-524's are frequently damaged due to radio sets not being turned off prior to starting either the vehicle or the auxiliary generator, thereby causing a sudden surge of voltage which knocks out diodes and transistors. Another common mistake which causes damage to KT-534's is the practice of transmitting on high power with antenna lead wires not connected to the radio set, thus burning out circuits or power-amplifiers.

2. (2) OBSERVATION: Delay rates can be reduced through simple indoctrination of radio operators by qualified communication personnel and through watchful observation by unit officers and section chiefs.

3. (c) SECURITY EQUIPMENT.

a. ITA: Issue of KY-8/TSOC security equipment installation kits.

(1) DISCUSSION: Although KY-8/TSOC security equipment is requisitioned through crypto channels, many organizations also believe that the same procedures hold true for installation kits. This is not the case; installation kits must be requisitioned through normal supply channels. Considerable delay and inconvenience will be encountered if requisitions are placed through crypto channels.

(2) OBSERVATION: The following installation kits are available through normal supply channels:

- FOH: K-151 or Shop Vans - - - - - - - 5810 070 5958
- 3/4 Tons or 2½ Tons - - - - - 5810 070 5959
- M77 Tracked Veh - - - - - 5810 070 5560

9. (U) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT.

a. ITA: Maintenance support of an artillery group in Vietnam.

(1) DISCUSSION: The 54th artillery group subordinate battalions and batteries have been employed separately throughout the 3d Corp, Corps Tactical Zone. Batteries have sometimes been separated a distance of seventy miles from their assigned direct support ordnance. Artillery organic maintenance sections have had to split up in order to give even second echelon support to batteries. Direct support maintenance company or battalion is normally assigned an area mission and cannot be tailored to give immediate support to widely separated supported unit operating out of their normal support areas. The direct support maintenance units that support a given area may or may not have the ASL to render support to an artillery unit that is operating temporarily in its area.

(16) CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U) 14 February 1967

(2) OBSEV. TECH: Consolidating ordnance support teams near the group S-4 where deadline information for the entire group is immediately available has proven very beneficial. When information is received by the group S-4 that a specific piece of equipment is being sent to a given port, a team that specializes in that area is dispatched by air with the part, and is returned to the centralized location when the problem is solved to await another call. Experience has shown that this method of support for artillery units is superior to an area support mission in Vietnam.

Part II, recommendations (C)

1. Unit commanders should make special efforts to assist and advise their troops in landing and saving enemy with facilities available in country, in accordance with current US Army policy.

2. ADOPlncements should be properly trained in their MOS's before arriving in country.

3. Chaplains should accompany troops to the field on prolonged operations.

4. In employment of artillery, area responsibility requirements should be given more significance, especially as the enemy's capability to mount regimental and battalion size attacks decreases.

5. Helicopter support for units should be provided from assigned sections; barring that, aviation companies should be given direct support missions to specific units.

6. Ground units and artillery units should work closely with special forces personnel, ARVN units, and agents to produce surveillance information on artillery fires.

7. ARVN advisory teams should be authorized and furnished additional personnel and equipment to operate and maintain a CC for the units located in the proper manner.

8. US artillery commanders should make every effort to work with US advisors in contact and HP/FP outposts within artillery capabilities, and give them instructions in the proper use of artillery fire.

9. Group headquarters should be equipped with three each rectifier, F-111-1 for basic operation of radios.

10. A air advisors indoctrination program for medics should be established, assigning all medics without previous combat experience to surgical and evacuation hospitals as surgeons, room assistants for a short period of time.
11. Design analysis of the equilibrator bracket shown in Inclosure 1 should be performed and procurement action be initiated.

12. Continued emphasis should be given to standard procedures for avoiding abuse to antenna-12 series radios.

13. Units should check the summary in which they have made requisition for installation kits for their authorized KY-6/T36C security equipment.

14. Contact support teams should be co-located with the group S-4 for responsive specialized support.

Charles K. Higell
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

DA, HQ, II FFOMZV ARTY, APO 96266 21 WAP 357

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington D. C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report submitted by the 54th Artillery Group is considered adequate.

2. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph 2a. Artillery units of II Field Force Artillery are employed where necessary in the III Corps Tactical Zone to support operations. Because of the limited number of units available, battalions are frequently employed at considerable distances from their base camps. As more units are received during CY 1967, this situation will improve somewhat; however, units will continue to be employed on the basis of greatest need for fire support.

3. (U) Reference Section II, Part II:

   a. Recommendations 1, 3, 6, 12 and 13. Actions recommended can be taken by the 54th Artillery Group. No action by higher headquarters is indicated.

   b. Recommendation 2 refers to the discussion at Section II, Part I, paragraph 1b. Instances of replacements being received with an improper MOS have been infrequent. These individuals are diverted to assignments for which they are trained. This is not considered to be a matter requiring attention by higher headquarters.

   c. Recommendation 4. See paragraph 2 above. No action required by higher headquarters.

   d. Recommendation 5. Concur. Recent Operational Reports of this headquarters have cited the adverse effect on the operational effectiveness of the 54th Artillery Group caused by lack of organic aircraft.

   e. Recommendation 7. Concur. This matter requires solution within MACV.


   g. Recommendation 9. The need for rectifiers has been satisfied in the 54th Artillery Group and that unit is preparing to recommend change to its TOE for these items. Units preparing for deployment to RVN may wish to request this equipment in excess of authorized allowances prior to movement.
AVFB-FAC (14 Feb 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

h. Recommendation 10. Rather than establishing a centralized program, the training of medical personnel can be arranged by the group surgeon in the nearest medical facility. No action by higher headquarters is indicated.


j. Recommendation 14. In some instances this may provide more responsive maintenance support, in others not. Units have been requested to coordinate with their support maintenance battalions in order to achieve the most responsive support. No action by higher headquarters is indicated.

W. D. CRITTENDEN, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding Officer