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<td>AUTHORITY</td>
<td>AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980</td>
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Best Available Copy
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2D Battalion (175MM)(GP), 32D Artillery

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2D Battalion (175MM)(GP), 32D Artillery dated 1 November 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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APO San Francisco 96353

AVGE-ZC

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

THRU: Commanding Officer
23rd Artillery Group
ATTN: AVGS-C
APO 96289

Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam Artillery
ATTN: AVFB-P-
APO 96227

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVCA-BH
APO 96307

Commander-in-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-NS
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1 November 1966

SECTION 1

(C) Significant Organization or Unit Activities

1. Personnel
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SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned(V)

1 November 1966

a. General: During this period, the unit underwent a complete replacement of personnel with no turbulence involved. It should, however, be pointed out that there are shortages in the critical MOS of mess stewards, cooks, mechanics, supply sargent, and chiefs of section. Replacements were either late in arrival or have not been received to date. This unit is short one (1) aviator, five (5) supply sargent, one (1) mess steward, three (3) cooks, and five (5) senior track mechanics. 23d Group Personnel initiated an emergency requisition for these MOS's.

b. Strength:

(1) Authorized and assigned strength for the period ending 31 October 1966:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery</th>
<th>Off</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eq</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svc</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Off</td>
<td>WO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6**</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes one additional pilot as authorized by 23d Artillery Group
** Includes one officer TDY to Pontang to operate R & R Center

(2) Gains during the period included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Off</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Losses during the period included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Off</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing in Action</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Battle Deaths</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Battle Casualties</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. The morale of the command is excellent.

d. The following out of country R & R's have been used by this battalion:

Incl 1

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LVGR-ZO

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

1 November 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lampur</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponang</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Decorations and awards:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medals (Merit)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medals (Merit)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medals</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Hearts</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Five Air Medals (Merit) are pending.

f. The battalion mail clerk picks up mail at APO 96353 and sorts it by battery. Mail for Headquarters, elements of Btry C, and Service Batteries is then picked up by the respective mail clerks. Mail for Battery B (Lai Kho) utilizing APO 96289, Battery 0(-) (Tay Minh) utilizing APO 96256, and Battery A (Xuan Loc) utilizing APO 96257 is forwarded directly to each battery through APO's.

g. Batteries A, B, and C(-) attend religious services with units in their areas. Headquarters, C and Service Batteries attend regularly scheduled services in the Battalion CP area conducted by chaplains from the 25th Inf Division. In addition, a 23d Artillery Group chaplain visits each battery weekly.

h. Two (2) enlisted men were evacuated out of country. (These individuals were non-battle casualties.) One with a broken arm was evacuated to Japan and one with a cancerous tumor was evacuated to Japan.

i. Judicial and non-judicial actions by batteries included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Btry</th>
<th>Art 15</th>
<th>Summary Court</th>
<th>Special Court</th>
<th>General Court</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eq</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svc</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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j. Recordable accidents by batteries are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Btry</th>
<th>Vehicles</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eq</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

k. Personnel are using USAF and Army Extension courses. Participation by batteries was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Btry</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eq</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svo</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Problem areas:

(1) Mail and distribution: Because of the location of the batteries, the time to move mail and distribution from the battalion to the batteries and vice versa is excessive. The non-dependability of organic and other aircraft schedules, plus the closing of the fixed wing airfield at the 25th Infantry Division for repairs, has also been a contributing factor. The use of organic OH-13 aircraft has been used extensively to expedite mail and distribution.

(2) Movement of replacements: The movement of replacements between units is difficult and often results in personnel not being moved as promptly as they should. Replacements going to Lai Khe or Xuan Loc have posed problems due to the air transportation schedules.

(3) Consolidated personnel section at group level has increased the problems in the battalion administrative field of orders, personnel actions, records, and pay actions.

2. Intelligence

a. During the period of 14-20 September 1966 a security lecture was conducted by the Bn S2 covering these salient points outlined in AR 380-5, AR 380-42 and AR 381-12. Security lectures will be continued on...
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

a monthly basis. The intelligence section receives Current Intelligence Reviews, INSURS, SITRECS, Bulletins and PENETRAPPs, to keep its situation map posted. Other intelligence comes from debriefing observers, pilots and the liaison officer and NCO. The briefing at the 25th Infantry Division provides daily contact with the situation.

b. Aerial Surveillance

(1) The battalion has been assigned an area outlined by coordinates XS 4090, XT 4060, XS 7090 and XT 7060. Air observers have been assigned sectors within our outlined area. They are to be thoroughly familiar with their sector, noting any changes that may occur within it. Pilots and observers are briefed by telephone prior to visual reconnaissance flights. This method of briefing has proven to be unsatisfactory. To improve on the present method of briefing and debriefing, written communications in addition to the telephone calls has been initiated. Since the batteries will remain dispersed from this headquarters, this procedure will have to suffice. It would not be feasible for the S2 to go to their locations or have them stop here.

(2) The airstrip at Ou Chi has been closed for repair since 12 September 1966. The two O1D aircraft have been operating from Phu Loi since that time. Due to a shortage of O1D pilots, both aircraft have been flown alternately by one pilot.

(3) Hours flown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>O1-D</th>
<th>OH-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Training

a. On-the-job training and cross training have been stressed during the reporting period. This procedure is considered essential for two reasons: first, the recent turnover has resulted in many sections operating with inexperienced personnel; and second, operational requirements demand that each individual approach perfection in his own area of interest. Formal training within the unit has been held to a minimum to allow the bulk of time to be spent, in order of priority, on aforementioned training, maintenance of equipment and personnel protection.

b. Assistance has been obtained from the 25th Infantry Division by allowing our personnel to attend schools on mess management, operation of generators, inspection of small arms, military justice, motor maintenance and operation of projectors.
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

1. A maintenance instruction team from Fort Sill presented instruction on maintenance and operating procedures of M107 and M110 to units in each location during the period 22 through 29 October 1966. The quality of instruction was excellent and the results should prove to be of great value.

2. Training of replacements presents a problem in that batteries are isolated and do not have the ability to conduct formal training. Major units are again providing assistance. Battery B is sending replacements through a formal week-long training cycle conducted by the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division at Lai Kho. Hq Battery, Service Battery and Battery C will soon have the use of the 25th Infantry Division replacement training program at On Chi.

3. Technical proficiency of battery officers is being measured by formal and informal tests on firing battery and fire direction procedures. Informal tests have been given to battery executive officers and fire direction officers by the Battalion Commander. A formal written test will be given to all battery officers during the week of 14 November 1966.

4. Proficiency in technical skills is stressed in all areas. A formal testing of all chiefs of firing batteries, chiefs of sections, gunners and assistant gunners has been announced through the new battalion policy of administering the gunners test semi-annually. The first test is scheduled for early Spring 1967.

4. Operations

b. Disposition of the units at the beginning of the reporting period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq, Svc, C Btry</td>
<td>On Chi XT 644 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Btry</td>
<td>Xuan Loc YT 466 068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Btry</td>
<td>Lai Kho XT 756 373</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Batteries A and C were composite 8 inch howitzer, 175mm gun batteries and Battery B was equipped entirely with 175mm guns. On 8 September 1966 Battery C replaced its two 8 inch howitzer tubes with two 175mm gun tubes. On 12 September Battery B replaced two 175mm gun tubes with 8 inch howitzer tubes. The purpose was to provide a more efficient coverage of each battery sector. In the Battery C sector 8 inch howitzers were available from the 25th Infantry Division, while there were none in the Battery B sector.
AVG-80
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U) 1 November 1966

o. No battalion sized operations were conducted during the reporting period.

d. Battery L was attached to the 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery, 173d Airborne Brigade, from 5 August until 6 September for Operation Toledo. The unit displaced several times while operating in the vicinity of Gia Ray (VT 635 125).

e. On 1 September, Battery C conducted Operation Turkey Shoot II. The concept of the operation was to displace one 175mm gun platoon to Bao Trai (XT 543 046) and fire at targets of opportunity along the Oriental River, heretofore untouched by U.S. artillery. (See enclosure 1)

f. On 19 September Battery C, minus one 175mm gun platoon, displaced to Tay Ninh (XT 167 521) with the mission of General Support of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, reinforcing the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery, 196th Light Infantry Brigade. On 5 October an 8 inch howitzer platoon from Battery D, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery, 23d Infantry Division, was attached to Battery C (-) at Tay Ninh.

g. On 20 October 1966 the 54th Artillery Group became operational, at which time the mission of Battery L was changed. They reverted to the mission of general support, reinforcing the 54th Artillery Group.

5. Logistics

a. Transportation.

   (1) Utilization of Roads: Resupply of units by road continues to be heavy. Any additional vehicles that are required are secured from other 23d Arty Group units and/or the 1st Logistics Command with no difficulty. The need for battalion sponsored ammunition resupply convoys to Battery C should no longer be required since arrangements have been made for the 1st Logistics Command to deliver the ammunition to the unit.

   (2) Utilization of Rail: Railway facilities have not been utilized since the last report.

   (3) Utilization of Aircraft: Air resupply of Class I supplies to Battery L continues 3 times weekly. Organic aircraft are also being utilized in support of firing batteries when possible.

b. Supply Operations.

   (1) The following items of equipment considered combat essential, were received during the reporting period:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

(a) Truck, Wrecker, 5 ton, M543
(b) Truck, Cargo, 5 ton, M542
(c) Truck, Cargo, 2½ ton, M352

(2) The following items of equipment, considered combat essential, were not received during the reporting periods:

(a) Tank, Truck, Fuel Servicing, 2½ ton, 1 each
(b) Radio Set, Control Group, LN/GL-39, 7 each
(c) Installation Unit, LN/VED-46 for recovery vehicle, M88, 1 each
(d) Intercom Set, LN/U10, for recovery vehicle, M88, 1 each

(3) A follow-up on about 23 July 66 indicated that the requisitions had a hold action by 34th Group. The requisitions have been released for action and another follow-up action was submitted on 7 November 1966.

c. Maintenance

(1) Availability of critical repair parts for the M07's and M10's has improved greatly during this reporting period. The average down time has been reduced from 5-7 days which was reported last quarter to 2-3 days for this period. Support maintenance units have been stocking more critical items therefore reducing the down time.

(2) During this reporting period this unit has received numerous visits from Ordnance Technicians sent out from 185th Ord. These visits have been very beneficial in resolving maintenance problems.

(3) The biggest problem this unit has on the M07's and M10's is the loader-runner housing. The housing is not strong enough and bends quite easily. Though this does not deaden the gun, it slows down the calibration. The housings at the present time are not available in supply channels.

(4) Maintenance down time during the reporting period:

(a) M07 O 175mm

1. Possible days 736

CONFIDENTIAL Page 8 of 13 pages.
CONFLICT

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

1. Non-available days 59
2. Deadline rate 8%

(b) M10 - 8 inch Gun
1. Possible days 366
2. Non-available days 21
3. Deadline rate 8%

(c) The following parts for both weapon systems have caused the most down time.
1. Hydraulic Motors
2. Traversing Mechanism (Gears & Housing)
3. Gun Mounts

SECTION 2

Part I Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. Personnel.

Distribution

a. Item: Difficulty of distribution to batteries

b. Discussion: The great distances between batteries and the limited use of road nets make it mandatory that distribution be transported by aircraft. A regular schedule is flown by a fixed wing aircraft to accomplish this. For the past 6 weeks the fixed wing airstrip at Cu Chi has been closed. An OH-13 from this unit has been used for distribution during this period.

c. Observation: A back up helicopter should be scheduled for this purpose in the event an airfield is closed.

Mail

d. Item: Erratic mail delivery.

c. Discussion: Delivery of mail to outlying batteries has not
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

been satisfactory. Mail has been received by this unit at PO 96353, broken down by batteries, and some of it returned through postal channels to outlying batteries. Sometimes mail has been returned to this unit several times before being properly sent to a battery.

f. Observation: Batteries separated from parent unit for long periods of time should use the nearest postal facilities, thus changing the address to that of the local PO.

Personal Actions

g. Item: Delay and errors in personnel actions.

h. Discussion: Batteries are separately located from the battalion which increases the processing time of all personnel actions, financial matters, and publication of orders. This problem is further amplified by personnel consolidation at group level. Time lapse, distances involved and limited courier schedules are factors inherent from battery to battalion and finally to group consolidated personnel section in processing all administrative actions.

i. Observation: The battalion personnel section should be returned to the battalion, thereby increasing the efficiency of its operation.

j. Item: Difficulty of promoting radio teletype operators.

k. Discussion: The operation of the AM/GRC-46 radio teletype requires a high degree of technical training and proficiency. Three (3) additional radio teletype units were issued this unit without a corresponding authorization of personnel. Operators must be drawn from other sections and trained on the job. A proficient and competent operator who must take on the added responsibility of team chief may then be properly rewarded by a promotion which is based only upon the authorization of the equipment.

l. Observation: Three radio teletype teams should be authorized to operate the AM/GRC-46 radio sets.

2. Intelligence.

Security Clearances

a. Item: Difficulty of granting and validating security clearances.

b. Discussion: During this reporting period, this section has encountered several problems granting and validating clearances. They arise from the fact that the personnel section is separated from the battalion.
1 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

headquarters. A local files check using USARV Form 261 is required in order to have a clearance granted or validated. In the process of sending the USARV Form 261 to the personnel section, the forms have become lost or delayed for an excessive period. There are many instances where individuals have been assigned to the battalion without having their secret or top secret clearance validated shortly after their arrival. The reason for this is that all personnel assigned to the battalion do not report to the battalion headquarters prior to being assigned to a battery. If the individual's 201 file were sent to the battalion, this would aid in the matter. A trip to the personnel section is made every month by the S2 or Intelligence Sergeant to check on validations and to make local files checks. Medical records checks are also required. With the records being maintained in each of the existing batteries, this also slows down the process of granting and validating clearances.

- Observation: The personnel section should be physically available in order that the necessary checks can be made.

3. Training and organization.

Status of Training

a. Item: Many battery officers and NCO's are inexperienced in standard artillery techniques.

b. Discussion: Junior officers arrive with very little training in artillery techniques. The rapid turnover of personnel moves them rapidly upward in the chain of command with little opportunity to gain the necessary experience. A shortage of chiefs of sections has resulted in poorly trained personnel operating the weapons. The combination of the above two factors demands immediate attention to determine the best possible personnel and to adequately train many others.

- Observation: A minimum standard for battery officers has been established and a formal test designed to determine whether officers meet the criteria. Similarly, a policy of administering the gunner's test to chiefs of firing batteries, chiefs of sections, gunners and assistant gunners has been announced.

d. Item: Many NCO's and enlisted personnel lack sufficient training in maintenance and operation of track mounted weapons.

e. Discussion: All personnel trained to be cannoniers receive their instruction primarily on the towed 105mm howitzer. Almost no time is spent operating a self propelled weapon. The difference between the weapons is obvious. A maintenance instruction team recently presented an

CONFIDENTIAL Page 11 of 15 pages.
Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

Informal but highly effective period of instruction on the basic requirements for the proper operation and maintenance of the M107 and M10 self-propelled weapons. A large amount of this material, though basic, was new to many personnel.

f. Observation: A distinction should be made in the training, and thus the MOS, of cannoners for self-propelled weapons as opposed to those trained on towed weapons.

4. Logistics.

Maintenance

b. Item: Sling are not available for use in changing gun tubes.

d. Discussion: A special sling is required to be used to change tubes on the M107 and M10. One sling is on hand in this unit and one at the 185th Ordnance Company. Operational requirements necessitate changing of tubes as soon as possible. As a result, expedients, such as ropes and chains, are used, creating a safety hazard.

Observation: Supporting Ordnance units should have slings on hand to use for frequent tube changes.

d. Item: AN/GRC-46 radio sets break down continuously.

e. Discussion: Apparently high operating temperatures are causing the radio teletype sets to malfunction. In spite of fans and cautions taken to limit operating periods, the sets continue to break down.

Observation: Air conditioners, component parts of the AN/GRC-46, should be issued on the basis of one per radio set.

Maintenance Records

h. Item: Difficulty of maintaining TABRS records.

Discussion: Conforming to the Army Equipment Records System requires extensive handling of forms. A battery motor sergeant is not capable of performing his job of supervising motor pool activities and maintaining the records. Neither are the mechanics capable of performing their job properly and filling out the necessary forms.

Observation: A parts clerk should be authorized each battery to handle TABRS records.
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AVGE-ZC

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (J)

Part II  Recommendations.

1. Training an organization.

   a. That increased emphasis should be placed on the training of junior officers in CONUS in the field of gunnery and firing battery techniques. At the time of their arrival in a combat unit they must be technically proficient so that they may be qualified to properly perform the duties of any position in the battery.

   b. That an immediate authorization be made to provide three teams, each consisting of the following personnel:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team Chief</td>
<td>05E40</td>
<td>E-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTT Operator (2 ea)</td>
<td>05C20</td>
<td>E-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   The above change was incorporated in a MET which was submitted on 25 September 1966.

   c. That distinction be made between cannoners trained in self-propelled weapons and those trained on towed weapons.

   d. That each battery be authorized a parts clerk for the maintenance section.

2. Logistics: Air conditioner equipment should be issued on the basis of one per radio set AN/GRC-46.

   1 Incl; as

   PHILIP D. HAYISLEY
   LTC, Artillery
   Commanding

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AVOE-C (1 Nov 66) 1st Ind
SUBLECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U).

HEADQUARTERS, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96289, US Forces, 16 November 1966

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO US Forces 96227

1. (U) The quarterly report submitted by the 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, is adequate.

2. (U) Ref Section I, Part I, para 5b (3). The Battalion supply section submits requisitions directly to Technical supply agency and not through this headquarters. Therefore, any follow up action on requisitions is directed to supplying agency and not thru administrative channels. The battalion has been so advised.

3. (C) Ref Section I, Part I, para 5c (2). Unit's comments concerning failure of loader-receiver housing for M107/110 are valid and EIR's have been submitted on this component.

4. (U) Section II, Part I, para 1a. Distribution. Concur in the discussion of problems involved with distribution during the time Cu Chi airstrip was closed to fixed wing aircraft. Under unusual circumstances such as this, it is the group policy to give maximum support to affected units.

5. (U) Ref Section II, Part I, para 1d. Mail. Mail distribution is considered a command responsibility, and with command emphasis at any level, the USARV Postal Officer responds instantaneously. The unit experienced difficulty in using one (1) APO number and then routing to Lai Khe and Xuan Loc. A change was initiated as indicated in Section I, Part I, para 1f, to ship mail directly to Lai Khe and Xuan Loc and is working satisfactorily. SI monitors mail and checks with adjutant daily to see if mail is delivered to decrease unwarranted congressional inquiries. Comment is valid but problem no longer exists.

6. (U) Ref Section II, Part I, para 1g. Personnel Actions. Specific examples are not listed. Timely actions would not be accomplished even if personnel section was at Cu Chi, with units at Lai Khe and Xuan Loc. Transmission times would be exactly the same. Teletype contact and telephone contact are available for emergency and immediate action. Additionally, a consolidated personnel section decreases the amount of processing an individual must accomplish. Since all incoming personnel are assigned to the group, he would still report to the Group and be shuttled to a battalion, then to a battery. This type operation decreases the number of units reporting to USARV and group personnel sections. Promotions and other personnel actions are executed in the same time frame (7-14 days) as in normal CONUS operations (in consolidated sections).


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AVOE-C  (1 Nov 66)  1st Ind  16 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

Without the individuals duty assignment and a request from the S2, a local files check will not be accomplished as an automatic process. Form (USARV 281) is forwarded to the Personnel Officer for initiation and results of a local files check. Validations and requests for local file checks should be completed in less than a week. Medical records would remain with outlying batteries regardless of where the battalion personnel section was located.

8. (U) Ref Section II, Part II, para la. Concur. This headquarters has corresponded with higher headquarters and USAAMS concerning this problem. USAAMS has been advised that due to the deployment of batteries separate from their battalion headquarters, and the necessity of operating battery FDC's, all firing battery personnel must be thoroughly trained in every aspect of gunnery. Therefore, instruction in gunnery given to junior officers and/or gunnery personnel at Fort Sill must emphasize thorough knowledge of FDC procedures, stressing in particular the techniques of conducting simultaneous missions on different azimuths. All aspects of 6400 mil coverage and employment must be stressed. This headquarters has published a letter on Gunnery Procedures to provide guidance and establish policies to be followed by battalions assigned to this headquarters. This headquarters has published a Fire Direction Center and Firing Battery Checklist to be used in measuring the competency of Battalion and/or Battery FDC's and Firing Battery Operations, further emphasizing that no checklist is a substitute for sound judgement, alertness and a comprehensive knowledge of applicable Field and Technical Manuals.

9. (U) Ref Section II, Part II, para lb. Authorization of RTT Teams. Concur with need for augmentation. However unless authorization can be effected without delaying action at higher headquarters on MTOE submitted 25 September 1966 in its entirety, recommend deferral.

10. (U) Ref Section II, Part II, para la. Concur.

11. (U) Ref Section II, Part II 1d. Battery Parts Clerk. Concur with qualification. The need for a parts clerk at battery level to handle TAERS records requires detailed study. The unit has been instructed to conduct such study to determine if there is a valid requirement.

12. (U) Ref Section II, Part II, para 2. Concur. Battalion has been advised to submit a request for air conditioners on a USARV Form 47 (Request for Items in Excess of Authorized Allowances) for approval.

THOMAS H. SAYES
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

DA, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96266

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

1. (U) The Quarterly Operational Report submitted by the 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery is considered adequate.

2. (U) Reference Section II, Part I, para 1g and para 1i and para 6, 1st Indorsement. Concur with the comments made in the 1st Indorsement. Consolidated personnel sections are performing satisfactorily in both the 23d Arty Gp and the 54th Arty Gp.

3. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, para 1a and para 8, 1st Indorsement. Concur. The decentralization of fire direction in this environment places a heavy tactical and technical FDC responsibility on junior officers. Additional schooling in these duties is most desirable.


5. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, para 1c concur. It is recognized, however, that separate advanced individual training on SP weapons may not be feasible. If this is the case, then recommend that two or more days instruction in the AIT program be devoted to SP weapons.

Charles M. Mizell
Colonel, Artillery
Acting Commander
AVFBC-H (1 Nov 66)  3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 October
1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, HQ II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266  2 JAN 1967

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVG-DH, APO 96307
    Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH, APO 96588

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the
    Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report for Period
Ending 31 October 1966 submitted by Headquarters, 2D Battalion
(175MM)(SP), 32D Artillery and concurs in the comments contained both
in the basic document and the 1st and 2nd indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl

WILLIAM K. HAGY
Maj ARMOR
Act Asst AG.

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AVHC-OH (1 Nov 66) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RC5 CSPOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APC San Francisco 96307°C FEB '67

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-CT
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion (175mm)(SF), 32d Artillery as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

a. Reference Paragraph 4c, Part I, Section 2, Page 12:
A minimum of two slings is required to perform this function. In con-sonance with this requirement, the supporting unit has been advised to submit a request to this headquarters authorizing the additional sling required.

b. Reference Paragraph 4f, Part I, Section 2, Page 12; Paragraph 2, Part II, Section II, Page 13; and Paragraph 12, 1st Indorsement: The requirement for air conditioners to be used with the AN/GRC-46 will be evaluated by this headquarters upon receipt of USAV Form 47 as directed in paragraph 12, 1st Indorsement.

c. Reference Paragraph 11, Part I, Section 2, Page 9; Paragraph 4i, Part I, Section 2, Page 12; Paragraphs 1b and 1d, Part II, Section 2, Page 13; Paragraph 9, 1st Indorsement; and Paragraph 4, 2d Indorsement: MTOS was returned on 31 December 1966 for identification of trade off spaces and corrections.

PCL THE COMMANDER:

/Signature/

M. V. THORN

Incl
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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES.
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GPOF-OT (1 Nov 66) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS GSMO-65) , HQ 2d Bn (175MM)(SP), 32d Arty

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 18 MAR 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. McMULLEN
CGC, AGO
AG

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HQ H滩ERS
2D BATTALION (175mm), 32D ARTILLERY
AIO San Francisco 96633

AVD-24
10 September 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (10/07/20/33/32)(U)

20: Commanding Officer
2d Artillery Group
AIO 96633

1. (U) Name of Operation: Turkey Shoot II

2. (U) Date of Operation: 010830H September 1966 to 011615H September 1966.

3. (C) General: Command headquarters for this operation was 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery.
   a. Reporting officer: LCC Philip J. Minkley
   b. Task organization
      (1) Battery C (-), 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery
      (2) Unit commanders:
         (a) Battalion Commander: LCC L.C. deCarrevent
         (b) Battery C Commander: CPT Bored Fealer

4. (C) INTELLIGENCE: Target list was provided by Liaison Officer to 25th Inf Div (ARC).

5. (U) ING: 2d Howitzer Battalion, 32d Artillery conduct independent operation to engage special targets.

6. (C) OBJECT OF OPERATION: Battery C, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery displaced one 175mm gun platoon via Doc Trail to engage targets of opportunity along Van Go Bay River. Unit provided observers.

7. (C) EXECUTION:

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10. (c) Operations at mission report (10/02/35/35/32/11)

a. Organic OI aircraft were not available and were provided by other units. Aircraft arrived just as operation was beginning which allowed very little time for briefing of pilots. One aircraft had to return to parent unit by 1230 hours causing problems in maintaining one observer airborne at all times. This resulted in one ten minute period when neither observer was in the air.

11. (c) Mission Briefs

a. Vehicles should be loaded with extra sandbags. This provides additional protection against mines and provides for fortification in position area.

b. Flak jackets should be removed while performing work in a secure area because they result in undue fatigue and interfere with the efficient performance of battery personnel.

c. The 175mm gun is ineffective for destruction missions at extreme ranges.

d. Assigned fire direction nets should be employed as designed thus eliminating the use of the command net for other than administrative or command messages.

P.M.D. H. HALEY
LSC, Artillery
Commanding

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