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CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
6TH BATTALION, 27TH ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96307

AVGS-Y

31 July 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-67 (1)

LESSONS LEARNED, Headquarters, 6th Battalion (2)

THRU: Commanding Officer
23d Artillery Group
ATTN: AVGS-C
APO 96289

Operational report for quarterly period
ending 31 Jul 66.

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVG-CA
APO 96227

Commander - in - Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GNP-TH
APO 96307

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

This document contains information relating to military strategy.
Its transmission or disclosure without the permission of the
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(003 650)
1. (C) Significant Organization or Unit Activities.

a. (U) Administration/Personnel

(1) The Battalion Headquarters is physically separated from its Personnel Section by approximately thirty miles. The Personnel Section completed a permanent change of station from Tan Son Nhut to Long Binh on 8 June 1966 and is presently co-located with Service Battery of this battalion. Although this separation causes loss of time in the transmission of paperwork between the two areas, many advantages in the processing of replacements are realized. This separation has not affected timely and accurate reporting procedures.

(2) The replacement of officer and enlisted personnel continues to be particularly effective. Replacements have been received, or are scheduled to arrive, as requested. This is especially noteworthy when considering the personnel turbulence during this reporting period.

(3) A high state of morale continues to exist within the unit. This condition can be largely attributed to maximum participation in the R&R program, three day pass arrangements, and to the availability of Special Service equipment.

b. (C) Intelligence

The following items mentioned in previous reports have been continued during the reporting period:

(1) An aggressive aerial observation program has been conducted, with observers flying 448 hours of visual reconnaissance. Approximately 14.3 per cent of these hours were at night, utilizing the SNOILIGHT Scope when light conditions were favorable. The results of this aerial observation program have been sent in a daily intelligence summary (TECH) to the 23rd Artillery Group and the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. In addition, the results have been posted on the battalion activity overlay. This overlay provides a basis for accurate harassing and interdiction fires on VC base camps and communications routes. Using low level reconnaissance, the exact location of a major east-west supply route was determined in early July.

(2) An Order of Battle (OB) card file and current OB overlay have been maintained to provide the battalion with all available information on enemy troop movements and present locations.

c. (C) Training

(1) In order to deliver accurate and timely artillery fire, both firing battery and fire direction personnel must be completely knowledgeable of their job and fully capable of performing the related duties. To maintain the high level of efficiency necessary to accomplish this task, an intensive and continuous training program was aggressively pursued by
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
Reports Control Symbol CSF06-65 (U)

the battalion. By vigorously following the program, an almost completely
new battalion fire direction center was trained, thus eliminating a pro-
blem created when key personnel returned to CONUS thru normal rotation
and school-trained replacements could not be obtained.

(2) During this period personnel of the battalion were af-
forded the opportunity to re-familiarize with their TO&E weapon, obtain a
new battle-sight zero, and become acquainted with all other small arms or-
ganic to their unit. In anticipation of the unit's TO&E being augmented
with the 81mm mortar, appropriate training was requested from the 1st Bn,
2d Infantry, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division and provided to key firing
battery personnel.

(3) Officers and enlisted personnel received training in
the art of patrolling by participating in both day and night infantry com-
pany-sized patrols around the brigade perimeter.

(4) Under the battalion's direction, batteries established
a two hour orientation program for replacements which explains Vietnamese
customs and traditions in an effort to help the new individuals understand
the complex situation present in Vietnam and allow them to more ably carry
out their assigned duties.

c. (C) Operations

(1) 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (-) continued the mission
of General Support/Reinforcing the 1st Battalion, 5th Artillery. A/6/27th
continued the mission of General Support/Reinforcing the 3rd Battalion,
319th Artillery at Bien Hoa until 9 June 1966 when the battery closed into
a new position at Bear Cat and was given the mission of General Support/
Reinforcing the 1st Battalion, 7th Artillery. The move by A/6/27th was a
permanent change in both location and mission. During the period 1 May
through 31 July 1966, the battalion fired 11,462 missions, expending 10,787
8" and 4,884 175mm rounds.

(2) Three resupply convoys and the following seven tactical
operations other than resupply were supported:

(a) Operation BIRMINGHAM - A/6/27th was attached to the
1st Infantry Division Artillery in support of this operation. (5 May-17 May)

(b) ADELAIDE I. (31 May-9 Jun)

(c) ADELAIDE II. (2 Jun-10 Jun)

(d) ADELAIDE III. (7 Jun-10 Jun)

(e) CEDAR RAPIDS. (18 Jul-24 Jul)
AVG-Y

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966

Reports Control Symbol OSFOR-65 (U)

(f) CEDAR RAPIDS II. (24 Jul-25 Jul)

(g) SPRINGFIELD (28 Jul-31 Jul)

(3) The battalion, with its mission of general support, continued to furnish artillery support to several Special Forces "A" teams. The liaison team stationed at a newly established camp during the last quarter actively enhanced the ability of the battalion to render invaluable support to the camp. During the period the battalion supported three airmobile assault operations conducted by two of the Special Forces "A" teams with preparatory, "on call", and harassment and interdiction fires. As a result of artillery support during one of the operations, the Special Forces team obtained a confirmed twenty (20) body count with a possible forty (40) more.

(4) Other significant events during the period are listed below:

(a) On 8 June 1966 Service Battery (-) completed a move from Bien Hoa to Long Binh, a permanent change of location.

(b) On 19 June 1966 A/6/27th completed the conversion of one 8" Howitzer to a 175mm Gun.

(c) On 23 June 1966 the battalion fired its 30,000th round in Vietnam.

e. (U) Logistics

(1) This organization participated in three resupply convoys in conjunction with the 1st Bde, 1st Infantry Division. In addition ammunition, spare parts and other critical items were received by aerial resupply.

(2) This unit, by active participation in the "Self-help program", has built four Quonset huts, eight pre-fab buildings, five general purpose tent floors, one mess hall, one NCO and IC club, one day room and one transit BOQ. All construction was accomplished by troop labor with technical assistance from Engineer units. Building materials were obtained through normal supply channels after the items were approved by the area Self-help board. All structures were built in accordance with specified plans designed for this area.

f. (C) Aviation

(1) The battalion conducted an aggressive aerial observation program during the reporting period, flying over 448 hours of visual reconnaissance. In addition numerous administrative and command and control missions were flown between batteries of this organization and supported units.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
Reports Control Symbol CSFCN-65 (U)

(2) In general, most day flights yield only indications that activity has occurred within the area of operation and "live" targets are rarely seen.

(3) Night aerial surveillance flights have proven to be the most consistent and reliable source of information. In terms of live targets sighted, night surveillance flights have been far more productive than daylight flights.

(g) (U) Civic Action

During the reporting period, the following civic action projects and activities were accomplished.

(1) Members from Bravo Battery, repaired the classroom furniture at the Phuoc Vinh School.

(2) A box of hospital supplies donated by the Albion Women's Club, Albion, Michigan was given to the Phuoc Vinh dispensary for use in their work.

(3) A box of children's clothing donated by a relative of the Headquarters Battery Commander was given to the S-5, 1st Bde, 1st Infantry Division for distribution to the needy children in Phuoc Vinh.

(4) Vietnamese laborers were utilized to clean the classrooms and police the school yard in preparation for the beginning of classes at the Phuoc Vinh School.

(5) Two hundred pounds of soap were donated to an orphanage in Saigon.

SECTION II

1. (C) Section, Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned).

a. (U) Personnel

(1) Averages in Enlisted Grade Structures.

(a) Item: Enlisted Promotions

(b) Discussion: This battalion departed CONUS with an excess of five E-6's. This situation developed when an augmentation of six forward observer sections, each authorized one Recon Sergeant (E-5), were filled with E-6's. The excess in grade has created a bottleneck in the promotion system and a deterrent to morale.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U) 

(c) Observation: It would be more desirable to fill vacancies with individuals one grade below that authorized by the TO&E, rather than to permit exceptions in the upward direction. 

(2) Requisitioning of blank forms and publications. 

(a) Item: Requirements for blank forms and publications. 

(b) Discussion: Undue difficulties arise when blank forms and publications are not readily available. The delay encountered from the time of submitting a requisition until receipt of these items appears to be excessive, when compared to the situation in CCVS. 

(c) Observation: Units must anticipate their requirements for blank forms and publications by at least three months. 

b. (C) Operations 

Support of Special Forces 

(1) Item: General support artillery long range capabilities can be effectively utilized in support of Special Forces Camps and/or operations. 

(2) Discussion: The battalion continuously renders support to outlying Special Forces "A" teams located in War Zone "D" at a distance of 24 to 29 kilometers from the 175mm gun positions. These teams periodically make contact with Viet Cong units moving through Zone "D" and request the battalion to place fire on the enemy. By immediate response to the calls for fire, the battalion effectively utilized the long range capabilities of the 175mm gun to inflict casualties upon the enemy. Through such cooperation and immediate action, the combined efforts of long range artillery and Special Forces "A" teams have hindered Viet Cong operations in that portion of War Zone "D" encompassed by the range of the 175mm gun, a region formerly used by the VC with impunity. 

(3) Observation: All General Support Artillery units should establish and maintain close liaison with Special Forces detachments located within their range capabilities. 

c. (C) Training and Organization: 

(1) Item: Training of firing battery and fire direction personnel. 

(2) Discussion: Due to normal rotation and lack of school-trained replacements the battalion has found it necessary to conduct an intensive training program for firing battery and fire direction personnel.
AVGEX


(3) Observation: To maintain the high level of efficiency necessary to deliver accurate and timely artillery fire, an intensive and continuous training program for firing battery and fire direction personnel must be aggressively pursued.

d. (C) Intelligence

Accurate and Timely Intelligence.

(1) Item: The lack of accurate and timely intelligence from external sources continues to be a major problem area.

(2) Discussion: The more frequent use of long range patrols by the infantry has increased the number of credible reports received by the battalion. Still, the majority of reports carry a credibility which cannot be judged. The big factor now limiting the battalion's effectiveness is the time lapse between enemy activity and friendly reaction. The battalion has become proficient in reacting immediately to intelligence reports. However, the majority of the reports received are one to five days old.

(3) Observation: A concerted effort must be made at all levels to reduce the time in disseminating reports.

e. (U) Logistics

(1) Wheeled Vehicles.

(a) Item: Vehicle Overload.

(b) Discussion: This unit has learned by experience that the allowable 100% overload for combat vehicles should apply only when they are driven on hard, smooth-surfaced roads. When operating on secondary roads, cargo trucks, loaded above rated capacity, will sustain damage to the frame, springs, and steering linkage. Vehicles used to transport ammunition are of specific concern. Most types of ammunition will overload a vehicle before the volumetric capacity is reached.

(c) Observation: The necessity of taking all precautionary measures to prevent overloading cannot be overemphasized.

(2) M107 and M110

(a) Item: Repair Parts

(b) Discussion: At the present time this organization is still having problems with the M110 and M107 in areas mentioned in previous
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966

Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

reports, eg: leaking hydraulic lines, spade braces cracking and elevation and traversing carrier gears breaking. The non-operational time due to above mentioned failures has been decreased as a result of the increased availability of repair parts since the last reporting period. This non-operational time for lack of repair parts is still considered to be excessive.

(c) Observation: General Support heavy artillery units located in isolated areas should have an ordnance contact team attached. This team should, in addition to having a repair capability, maintain a stockage of repair parts.

2. (c) Section 2, Part II, Recommendations.

a. Self-propelled heavy artillery units in Vietnam should be furnished a school trained maintenance officer who has recently attended the Maintenance Officer Course at Fort Knox.

b. Self-propelled heavy artillery units located in isolated areas should have an ordnance contact team attached. This team should, in addition to having a repair capability, maintain a stockage of repair parts.

c. An increasing use of long range patrols should be made to provide accurate and timely intelligence from U.S. sources.

d. All intelligence reports should be disseminated immediately to action agencies rather than processed through normal channels. This battalion has provided support for Special Forces patrols on numerous occasions. In each case, the call for fire came directly from the Special Forces unit to the battalion. With confirmed intelligence and dissemination time minimized, the results were excellent.

ROBERT J. KAY
ITC, Arty
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
Reports Control Symbol GSPR-65 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96289, US Forces, 13 August 1966

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO US Forces 96227

1. (U) The quarterly report submitted by the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery is adequate.

2. (U) Ref Section 2, part II, para 2a. Concur.

3. (U) Ref Section 2, part II, para 2b. Concur. The stationing of ordnance contact teams with heavy artillery units at the battery level would be an ideal arrangement.

4. (U) Ref Section 2, part II, para 2c. Concur.

5. (U) Ref Section 2, part II, para 2d. As a rule Special Forces are isolated and their requests for fire directly to US artillery has been discouraged. Otherwise intelligence reports should be processed expeditiously through channels for proper interpretation.

6. (U) This page regraded UNCLASSIFIED when separated from basic document.

THOMAS H. SAKES
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding
AVFB-PAC (31 Jul 66) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, RCS-CSPOR-65 (U)

DA, HQ, II Field Force, APO 96266 AUG 29 1966

TO: Condonning General, II Field Force, Vietnam, APO 96266

1. (U) The quarterly report submitted by the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery adequately covers the battalion's activities during the period.

2. (U) The following comments are made on the recommendations/problems discussed in the report:

   a. Ref Section 2, Part II, para 2a. Concur. The US Army Artillery and Missile School has a Maintenance Officer Course that would better suit the needs of battalion level maintenance officers. Maintenance officers should all be graduates of this course before being sent to RVN.

   b. Ref Section 2, Part II, para 2c. Concur.

   c. Ref Section 2, Part II, para 2d. Concur. All II Field Force Artillery units are immediately responsive to the artillery units which they reinforce. Coordination is constantly being made between US and ARVN units. II Field Force Artillery units have exchanged callsigns and frequencies with ARVN units which are within range so that they may be responsive to requests for fire support. This headquarters is aware of the necessity to disseminate target intelligence to firing units and is continually striving to reduce delays.

George R. Allin, Jr.
Colonel, Artillery
Acting Commander
AVFBC-H (31 Jul 66) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, HQ II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 20 SEP 1966
THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVC-DH, APO 96307
Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MDC, APO 96558
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

(U) The Operational Report for Period Ending 31 July 1966 submitted by the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, as indorsed, is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT L ALDERMAN
Major, AG
Asst AG
AVHGO-DH (31 Jul 66) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1966 (RCS CSPUR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPO-CT
    APO 96558

1. The Operational Report—Lessons Learned submitted by the 6th
   Battalion, 27th Artillery for the quarter ending 31 July 1966 is for-
   warded herewith.

2. Concur with the comments contained in the basic report and
   the preceding indorsements.

3. Reference Section II, Part I, Paragraph 1a(2), Page 6: This
   headquarters is unable to evaluate properly the comments made in the
   discussion. Difficulties alleged are vague and not specific. Unit
   will be required to furnish particulars and specific instances where
   publications and blank forms were not readily available for issue.

4. Reference Section II, Part II, Paragraph 2c, Page 8: The
   feasibility of implementing this recommendation is presently under
   study at 1st Logistical Command and this Headquarters.

5. Reference Section II, Part II, Paragraph 2c, Page 8: A
   study is currently being made on the employment of Long Range Patrol
   Units in the tactical organizations of this command (US&V).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. J. THORNTON
1st Lt, ACC
Asst Adjutant General
GPOP-OT(31 Jul 66)  5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT:  Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558  13 DEC 1966

TO:  Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

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J. L. McMAHAN
CPT, AGC
Asst AG