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IN REPLY REFER TO
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29 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field
Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appro-
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4th Brigade, 6th Infantry Division
1st Battalion, 82d Artillery
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OPERATIONAL REPORT
ON LESSONS LEARNED
SECRET
# OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 1968

## SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

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## SECTION II - CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
200 San Francisco - 96503
15 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 RSS CSFR-65 UIC CHINH RR I FFORCEN (0)

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SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (S) General:
   a. In November, December 1967 and January 1968, United States and Free World Military Forces (FWMF) with a maximum of 65 maneuver battalions, 27 US and 18 NVA, supported by 39 artillery battalions and Army Vietnam (DIV) with 35 maneuver battalions supported by 6 artillery battalions continued operations in II Corps Tactical Zone (II CTZ) in the west along the Cambodian/Laoism/Republic of Vietnam (RVN) border in Daklak, Da Nang and Kontum Provinces; and along the east coast in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Gia Lai and Gia Lai/Hoai Province. Along the Cambodiam/Laoism/RVN border, combat operations were primarily oriented toward the destruction of enemy forces, interdiction of enemy infiltration routes and surveillance of the western border. On the east coast operations were oriented on search and destroy and cordoning and search operations to destroy enemy forces and support revolution development.
   b. Enemy losses for the period were 8,720 KIA (80), 1,130 captured, 2,687 individual and 297 crew served weapons captured. Additionally, 765 GI accounted for 751 Hoi Chams.

2. (C) Intelligence:
   a. General: During the past quarter there were no major changes in organization or staff activities of the CSFR-65, G2. Increased cooperation between the intelligence staffs and agencies has reduced the number of problems to the point where monthly intelligence staff conferences are unnecessary and only quarterly conferences are warranted. The next quarterly conference will be hosted by II ARVN Corps.
   b. Significant Sources, Agencies and Techniques:
      (1) There were no major changes in sources, agencies or techniques noted during the reporting period.
      (2) The shortage of linguists continued to detract from the overall intelligence effort of this headquarters.
      (3) II Detachment, 1st MI BN (233)
         (a) The detachment has continued its assigned mission of imagery interpretation, reproduction and delivery to field units of tactical imagery. As a result of 1,957 sortie flown, 831,694 feet of photography were processed, resulting in a total of 166,552 prints interpreted and 553 imagery interpretation reports prepared.
         (b) Multi-sensor imagery missions (the simultaneous acquisition of color, camouflage detection and black and white photography with infrared imagery of a single target) have proved of intelligence information that has justified the expense involved.
         (c) Hand-held photography missions increased in importance in intelligence gathering mission. Tactical Exploitation teams

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performed hand-held camera missions in support of Company B, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (5th SFGA) and Kontum Province advisory personnel. A total of 87 hand-held camera missions were flown covering 397 targets and resulted in the production of 2972 prints. Types of missions included construction surveys, verification of aircraft crash location, determination of flood damage to bridges, post-strike analysis of damage to friendly areas, bridge and route security planning, basic coverage of bridges and villages and confirmation of the location of isolated agricultural areas. The missions were flown primarily by the 139th Reconnaissance Airplane Company and were in addition to that unit a primary mission of locating enemy activity. On numerous routine reconnaissance flights, photographers were assigned to photograph targets of opportunity.

(a) G2 Air:

(a) Relocation of I PRCORV O-1 aircraft was accomplished on 13 January 1968. This relocation placed all O-1 aircraft under the staff supervision of the I PRCORV Aviation Officer. Approximately 52% of these aircraft were sub-allocated to G2 for the II Corps Visual Reconnaissance Program. This action left the control of the balance of O-1 aircraft with the Aviation Officer for employment in a combat support role.

(b) The following is a summary of relative surveillance tasks accomplished during the quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>PRCORV</th>
<th>I CR CROV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Photo</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrared</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLAR</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Collection (55th CID): During the quarter, 224 individual weapons, 31 crew-served weapons and 2000 pounds of uniforms, equipment and medical supplies were evacuated to KSC J2 for technical intelligence examination. IFR teams screened and classified 235 detainees and interrogated 206 NAPs. As a result of these interrogations 221 FIBs and IFRs were prepared and distributed. Captured documents were screened and 592 feet of documents were forwarded to CIDC for further exploitation. IFR teams also translated 83 Korean language documents and reports.

(6) The 6th Engineer Detachment (EPHES) processed and distributed 77,100 copies of Tactical Data Overprint maps and 27,000 copies of Terrain Analysis maps.

c. Deviation from Current Intelligence Directorate: No change from previous quarter.

d. Significant Changes from Previous Reports: None.

e. Enemy Order of Battle:

(1) Disposition of NVA, VC Main Forces and VC Local Forces is shown at Enclosure 1.

(2) NVA and VC forces suffered heavy casualties during the reporting period, notably in the Western Highlands and Binh Dinh Province. Enemy activity was possibly the heaviest of the war in the Western Highlands during November. Activity throughout the G2 increased as the Winter-Spring Campaign began and culminated in the coordinated attacks against major population centers on 30 and 31 January. The 49th NVA Artillery Regiment was accepted as a probable new unit in the Tri-
Border area during the period. Current intelligence confirms that at least 1375 personnel infiltrated into II CIZ since 1 November 1967, although estimates of this infiltration run as high as 6000. Of the 1375 infiltrators who were confirmed, 700 went to the 15th Front, 600 went to the 2d VC Regiment and 75 went to the 75th Regiment.

(1) Enemy losses during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>Wounded &amp; Disabled</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>Heavy WPNs</th>
<th>O/S WPNs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1037</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FNWF</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3064</td>
<td>1072</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>117</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>Wounded &amp; Disabled</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>Heavy WPNs</th>
<th>O/S WPNs</th>
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<td></td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1163</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FNWF</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2250</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Enemy strength within II CIZ as of 1 February 1968:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA Troops</td>
<td>17,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Regulars</td>
<td>9,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin Staff</td>
<td>5,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military (VC irregular)</td>
<td>23,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political/Political/Military (Infrastructure)</td>
<td>21,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76,777</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based on HUMINT estimate that for every 100 enemy killed by body count, an additional 35 die of wounds or are permanently disabled.*
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

f. Enemy Capabilities and Vulnerabilities:

(1) Enemy Capabilities:

(a) In the Western Highlands, theEnemy is capable of undertaking multi-regimental size coordinated attacks as indicated.

1. In Kontum Province, attack in multi-regimental strength against Ban Na St Special Forces Camp, with secondary efforts in Dak To District and in multi-battalion strength in the Kontum City area.

2. In Pleiku Province, attack in multi-battalion strength supported by 1P and 1P units. Most likely targets are Duc Co, Plei Bjerong and Pleiku City. Conduct ambushes in multi-company strength along QL 1A and QL 19.

3. Attack Ban Ho Thoct in Daklac Province in multi-battalion strength supported by local forces.

(b) In the coastal lowland provinces of Binh Dinh, Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa attack in multi-battalion strength in conjunction with diversionary attacks by 1P; main force and local force units. Conduct raids against district headquarters and 1P/1F units.

(c) In Binh Thuan and Lam Dong Provinces, attack in up to multi-battalion strength supported by district and guerrilla forces.

(d) Attack isolated outposts, installations and units with up to reinforced battalion strength in any province in conjunction with attempts to ambush relief forces.

(e) Continue harassment, sabotage, assassination and probing activities.

(f) Attack in multi-regimental strength employing any combination of the above capabilities, carried out separately or in coordination with each other.

(2) Enemy Vulnerabilities:

(a) Enemy LOC's are extended and insecure, with the exception of those traversing neutral countries or international waters, where some degree of security exists.

(b) The enemy is generally short of medicine and food.

(c) The enemy's limited capability to engage in conventional warfare for extended periods makes him vulnerable to superior allied firepower in any large-scale enemy offensive.

g. Long Range Patrol (LRF) Company:

(1) Training: Continuing the training program cited in the report for the previous period, the 6th and 21st Patrol Platoons finished the MACV Recondo School in November and the 3rd Platoon graduated on 15 December. Immediately after each platoon finished Recondo School training, they conducted a live patrol FIX in the Duc Long AO, with the Mission Support Station (MSS) established at Plei Do Linh Combat Camp.

(2) Operations: By 22 November, eight days ahead of the programmed date of operational readiness, the 1st patrol platoon was deployed with the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, for 39 days of operations in the Nhan Phung AO. By 1 January all four platoons had
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Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period-Ending 31 January 1968

participated in operational missions. The operational statistics for the months of December and January are as follows:

(a) Number LRP personnel KIA/WIA: 2/3
(b) Number enemy personnel KIA: 6 (30), 2 (Prob)
(c) Number LRP insertions: 78
(d) Number LRP sightings of VC/NVA: 31
(e) Number emergency extractions: 14

h. Weather:

1) Interior: The northeast monsoon prevailed over the area throughout this period and there was very little day to day change in the weather pattern over the interior. Skies were generally fair to partly cloudy with ground fog forming in the high mountain valleys near sunrise. Fog was especially heavy during the period in the Dak To area and hampered some airlift operations during the early morning hours. Very little rain fell over the interior during this period; the only significant amount occurred with a dissipating tropical storm that moved across the central plateau on the 10th and 11th of November.

2) Coast: The northeast monsoon has been very dry this year and precipitation was about half of the normal expected during this period. Skies were partly cloudy to cloudy during November and December but by mid-January skies became mostly fair. During November and December ceilings along the coast from Nha Trang northward to generally 1500 to 2500 feet during the early morning hours but lifted to 3000 to 4000 feet by noon. The coastal ridges in FEBHOK, Capital LOK Division and 9th ROK Division areas of operations were usually obscured with low clouds and light rain between the hours of 0200 to 1000 hours. Very little rain was reported along the coast south of Nha Trang. Typhoon Freda hit the coast between Tra Vinh and Minh Hoa on the morning of 10 November. Winds as high as 65 knots were reported within a 20 mile radius of the storm center. The storm weakened rapidly as it moved inland; however, it deposited 2-3 inches of rain along the coast between Minh Hoa and Quy Nhon and heavier amounts in the mountains to the west of this area.

3) Effects on Operations: The strong winds associated with Typhoon Freda damaged some buildings in the Minh Hoa and Tra Vinh area but did very little damage elsewhere. Monsoon rains washed out several bridges on the highway north of Qui Nhon and 65 Nha Trang. Plans for II and III of Operation manganese were both delayed because of weather. Spooky did not support the area in late November when it was under attack on 24 January due to heavy ground fog. There were a total of 294 TAC Sorties and 87 trail dust missions canceled due to weather. No other effects on operations are known.

4) Detachment 31, 5th Weather Squadron has the mission of supporting I Field Force Vietnam and USAVW tactical units in I CTZ, plus the Americal Division and the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in II CTZ. This support is being provided in the following manner:

(a) I FFV/WK

1. Staff Weather Officer (SSO)
2. Forecast Support Center for II CTZ
3. Climatological Support

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S U N I V E C T; Operations for Quarterly Period Ending
31-January 1968 205 CS-JI-65 UNO WDL:Q HQ II CORPS (U)

(b) 4th Infantry Division
1. SNO and forecast support at base camp
2. Observations at Brigade Tactical CP's
3. Observations at Brigad e Tactical CP's
4. Climatological Support

(c) Balot/Gam By Airfield
1. Observations
2. Forecasts on an as requested basis

(d) An Khe
1. Observations
2. Forecasts on an as requested basis

(e) Americal Division
1. Forecast support at Chu Lai
2. Observations at Brigade Tactical CP's
3. Climatological Support

(f) lst Cavalry Division (airmobile)
1. SNO and forecast support at base camp
2. SNO and forecast support at Division Forward
when operational

2. Observations at Brigade Tactical CP's and
3. Division Forward CP when operational
4. Climatological Support


a. (3) Plans: Based on guidance, intelligence, and the overall strategy, the G3 Plans Division formulated and published four OPLANS and six FRAG ORDERS during the reporting period. In addition, the Combined Campaign Annual Summary for 1967, the 32d Division Assessment for November, and the Annual Assessment for 1967 were published and submitted to HQV.

OPLANS and FRAG ORDERS:

(a) OPLAN 137-67 (PATRIK) is a contingency plan designed to maintain sufficient force in Northern Bien Hoa Province to prevent resurgence of enemy activity and to provide security for the revolutionary development effort. The plan provides for the relief of the 2d Edc, 1st Cav Div (AM) by the 3d Edc, 4th Inf Div for coordination with elements of the 22d MNV Div, the Vietnamese Marine Task Force and the GCF 6th Infantry Division in the PATHOX Area of Operations. This plan was published 20 November 1967 and is to be executed on order.
AVFA-OT
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(b) OPLAN 215-67 (LAUNCH FALLS) was published on 27 November 1967. It provided for the location and destruction of HQ HQS, and opening of HQ-1 from Phan Rang to II/III CTZ Boundary. The operation involved elements of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, TF 2d Bde, 7th Cav, 23d ARVN Div and Co B, 5th SFGA. The operation began 1 December 1967 and terminated 7 January 1968.

(c) OPLAN 101-66 (DECATUR) was updated and republished on 20 January 1968 and is a contingency plan which deploys II CTZ forces to relieve camps, headquarters, outposts and critical signal sites within the Corps Zone. It provides for the employment of forces varying in size from a rifle company to a division (-) and is to be executed on order.

(d) OPLAN 200-63 (KELAHN) is an open end operation which began 20 January 1968. It is a search and destroy operation intended to counter enemy threats, exploit hard intelligence and assist Allied Forces in highway security and revolutionary development efforts. It employs the 31 En, 506th Abn Inn, releasing TF 2d En, 7th Cav to its parent unit. Effective with the relief, the name of the AO was changed from BYRD to KELAHN.

(e) OPLAN 69-67 (JEWSH) employed a Mobile Strike Force of Co B, 5th SFGA in a stay behind role following the extraction of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div from Binh Thuan and Lam Dong Provinces. The operation commenced 7 December 1967 and terminated 19 January 1968.

(f) OPLAN 71-67 (SULTAN) was a 30 day operation employing forces of Project DELTA in a reconnaissance role. The operation commenced 1 December 1967 and was suspended on 23 December 1967. After a stand-down the operation commenced again on 6 January 1968 and terminated on 25 January 1968.

(g) OPLAN 74-67 (KULIL) was a Mobile Strike Force operation which commenced 17 December 1967 north of Phan Rang in Binh Thuan Province. The purpose of this operation was to interdict infiltration routes, to destroy enemy installations and forces and to develop targets for air attack, artillery and conventional forces. Forces utilized in this operation were from Co B, 5th SFGA. The operation terminated on 5 January 1968.

(h) OPLAN 77-67 (SILWESTER) employed a Camp Strike Force of Co B, 5th SFGA in a guerrilla role in Southern Binh Thuan Province. The force was to destroy enemy installations and forces and to develop targets to be attacked by air, artillery and conventional forces. The operation commenced 19 December 1967 and terminated 2 January 1968.

(i) OPLAN 2-68 (SPRINT) was initiated to support Operation SAB ANGELO by placing USSF personnel stationed at Bu Prang under the operational control of IX FORSCV for approximately 45 days. The OPFRD became effective 19 January 1968.

(j) OPLAN 2-69 (BARTON) commenced on 23 January 1968 and terminated 28 January 1968. The operation took place in Southern Binh Thuan Province to destroy enemy forces and installation and to develop targets. The operation was conducted by Co B, 5th SFGA.

(h) Operational Activities.

(i) Operational Activities.

(a) Operation SIM, which began on 25 August 1966, continued until 1 December 1967 in Binh Thuan Province with TF 2d Battalion, 7th Cav, conducting search and destroy operations in support of revolutionary development under SAB B, IX FORSCV, on 1 December.
the operation was temporarily suspended to allow TF 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry to join in Operation MAIN FALLS with 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. The 3d and 4th Battalions, 64th Regiment (AVN) continued to operate in the BHD AO (Incl 2) throughout the period.

(b) In November, there were two separate contacts in the AO. At 0255 hours, 8 November, 3d Battalion, 64th Regiment (AVN) (a) vicinity Ft Hare (E2353) was attacked by an estimated enemy battalion. At 0900 hours, Company C, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry air assaulted to the contact area as guns and artillery supported. Although the enemy had succeeded in overrunning part of the position, the combined AVN and US force was able to drive them off. The enemy was forced to break contact at 0900 hours, withdrawing to the north and northeast pursued by cavalry elements. AVN losses were 28 killed or wounded in this action while US losses were six wounded. The enemy lost 42 killed and five FWs. On 22 November, Company D, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry sighted and engaged a VC company north of Phan Thiet, vicinity AVN127. A reaction force of two AVN companies and elements of the 4th Battalion, 64th Regiment (AVN) were employed on the morning of 23 November and swept the area of the initial engagement. Contact was made with scattered groups of VC but by nightfall all contact had been. The results of this action were 11 US killed, 36 wounded; enemy losses were 21 killed.

(c) As previously stated, the operation was suspended on 1 December. Operation EBM was reinitiated on 8 December upon termination of Operation MAIN FALLS on 7 January. TF 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry made only minor contacts until the operation terminated on 20 January and the Task Force was redeployed to AO MAIN to rejoin its parent organization. Results of Operation EBM for the quarter: Friendly - 11 KIA, 37 WIA; Enemy - 92 KIA, 8 WIA, 43 small arms and 1 crew-served weapon captured. Cumulative results for the operation (25 August 1966 to 20 January 1968): Friendly - 3d KIA, 335 WIA; Enemy - 649 KIA, 1135 FWs, 297 small arms and 11 crew-served weapons captured.

(2) Operation MAIN.

(a) Operation MAIN commenced on 20 January 1968 as a continuation of Operation EBM. The operation employed the 5th Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry in the AO previously served BHD (Incl 3) Search and destroy operations and operations in support of Revolutionary Development in Binh Thuan Province were the principle missions assigned to the operation.

(b) On 23 January the Hay Hoa hamlet PF platoon made contact with an estimated enemy platoon vicinity E225431. During the battle, 19 PF were wounded and one carbine was lost. Additionally one civilian was killed in the action. Enemy losses in the contact were one VC killed and three small arms captured. A contact vicinity AVN0001 between an estimated VC company and a PF platoon, securing a bridge at that location resulted in two PF killed, nine PF wounded, one command car destroyed. A major contact occurred on 24 January when Go Boi hamlet was attacked by an estimated two VC companies. Results of the enemy attack were 20 PF, two KD and one civilian killed. Additional: 18 PF and four KD were wounded.

(c) The city of Phan Thiet, the province capital, came under enemy attack at 0315 hours 30 January by an unknown size enemy force using small arms and automatic weapons. It was estimated that the major portions of two enemy battalions were involved in the attack which penetrated the city and struck the MACV compound. The 3d Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry supported the action with guns and fireships. The results of the action were six enemy killed (AVN) and 36 wounded (US). Enemy losses were 35 killed by US and 60 killed by AVN forces, 20 FWs (three captured by US), 39 small arms (17 by US) and four crew-served weapons (two by US) captured.

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SUBJECT: Operation PaoNIDING, which began on 12 February 1967, continued during the quarter, with the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (-) Ope.ning in Binh Phu' and southern Qui Nhon. The 3d Brigade with three battalions was deployed to 23 ZT and under OPCON of the Americal Division on 2 October. The brigade was lost to the division for the remainder of the quarter. The 40th and 41st Regiments, 22d Division (Airmobile) (-) were combined to form a battalion Marine Task Force (MTF) continued operations in the PaoNIDING AO (Incl. 4).

(b) On 13 November, the 1st Brigade with two battalions was deployed to Operation PaoNIDING in the Dak To area. Throughout the remainder of the month the division continued operations in the PaoNIDING AO with three battalions and the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry. By necessity operations were conducted on a small scale, the emphasis being placed on the use of air scouts to cover large portions of the AO left uncovered by the departure of the two brigades (the 3d Brigade continuing OPCON to the Americal Division). Combat and search operations conducted by the division with National Police Forces were continued and met with significant success.

(c) The month of December witnessed an upsurge of both friendly and enemy initiated contacts. On 6 December contact was made by 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry with a large enemy force on the Bong Son Plain vicinity 189007. By darkness on 6 December three companies had been inserted into the area and heavy contact had been made. From 6-12 December contact continued in this area as the cavalry and elements of the 1st, 2d and 3d Battalions of the 40th Regiment (- NVN) combined forces to inflict being on the enemy. It has been determined that enemy forces engaged in those contacts were elements of the 22d NVA Regiment to include companies of the 7th and 8th Battalions, the 123d Signal Company and the Regimental Headquarters.

(d) On 12 December the last elements of the 1st Brigade rejoined the division from Operation HwaHahua. On 13 December three companies of the brigade were tasked to contact a village on the Bong Son Plain vicinity 1892105. As the units were moving toward the village they became engaged with enemy forces firing from the village of Binh Phu' vicinity 1891035. Although the three cavalry troops were unable to overrun the village on 13 December, their coordinated attack on the following day's after intensive preparation by air and artillery met with little resistance. As a result of the contacts in this general area from 6-16 December, the enemy lost 114 killed while cavalry losses were 55 killed and 269 wounded.

(e) The cavalry again made contact with elements of the 22d NVA Regiment on 19 December north of the Cay Glop Mountains vicinity 189001. The enemy was engaged by elements of 2d Battalion, 9th Cavalry on 19-20 December resulting in 13 enemy killed without friendly loss. On 22 December, Troop E, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry responded to a report of a large enemy force in the vicinity of the south bank DacK mountains (189/68). Tactical air strikes, gunships, artillery and naval gunfire were brought to bear on the entity resulting in 39 killed. There were no friendly casualties.

(f) On 29 December, 62G elements of the Vinh Tan Camp made contact with an upgraded enemy battalion south of the deep vicinity 188256. Another was rendered as elements of 2d Battalion, 9th Cavalry and 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry reinforced. US artillery
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Curiously Period Ending 31 January 1968

was fired in support of the contact which commenced at 0930 hours and was broken by the enemy at 1815 hours. The results of this action were 17 enemy killed by CIB and 31 killed by cavalry elements.

(g) On 1 January elements of the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry (Mech) conducted a sweep of the contact site located in addition 18 NVA bodies resulting from the contact of 1-2 January.

(h) On 14 January the 2d and 3d Battalions, 40th Regiment (AVN) supported by cavalry elements, made contact with an unknown size enemy force vicinity 1800030. The contact broke after seven-hours with the results of 11 small arms killed and 18 wounded compared to enemy losses of 56 killed and 17 small arms captured.

(i) On 16 January the 1st Cavalry Division (AVN) commenced preparations for its move to 1 GCM for operations with III Marine Amphibious Force. Advance parties embarked on 16 January with the Division Headquarters and 1st Brigade moving from 17-22 January. The 2d Brigade, consisting of four battalions (2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry; 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry; 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry; and 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry), remained in the PHASED 2D under the operational control of IPTFEGY. The Battle of THUNDER, executed on the part of this division responsibility was assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade effective 1100 hours 17 January relieving the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AVN) of this responsibility.

(j) On 21 January Company B, 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry was placed in support of the Capital NVA Infantry Division for operations against the 18th NVA Regiment located vicinity 18 30050. The company remained in support of the NVA forces until 27 January when it returned to parent unit control.

(k) A major contact was made on 23 January vicinity 18056664 when elements of the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry engaged an estimated three VC companies of the 85th Battalion, 2d VC Regiment. The 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry reinforced the action which was supported by artillery, airborne rocket artillery and gunships. The battle broke after seven-hours. The results of the contact were 128 enemy killed, one KIA, 15 small arms, and one crew-served weapon captured.

(l) The results of Operation PHASED for the quarter were: 1,121 killed, 586 wounded; Enemy: 372 killed, 255 WIA, 296 small arms and 45 crew-served weapons captured. Cumulative results for the operation through 31 January are as follows: Friendly: 610 killed, 2564 wounded; Enemy: 5639 killed, 2566 WIA, 1362 small arms and 139 crew-served weapons captured.

(4) Operation BOLLID:

(a) The 173d Airborne Brigade began Operation BOLLID on 19 September 1967 employing its 1st and 4th Battalions, 50th Infantry (Airborne) and the 2d Battalion, 6th Cavalry. The operation was designed to destroy enemy forces located in the high ground west of Tuy Hoa basin and was mounted on the 45th NVA Regiment (disc 5).

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(b) On 1 November, 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) began moving to Dak To from the DOLLING A0, where it became OPERATION MACARTHUR. By 7 November, the brigade headquarters and the 1st and 2d Battalions, 503d Infantry (Airborne) also had been moved to Dak To. The fourth battalion of the brigade, the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) which had arrived in country on 23 October, moved into the DOLLING A0 on 3 November and made its first contact with the enemy the following day. To this encounter the unit took no casualties while killing three VC and capturing their weapons. Contact continued to be light during the remainder of the month as it became obvious from the recently deserted positions that the enemy was evading contact.

(c) The brigade headquarters and the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) were redeployed from Operation MACARTHUR on 16 December closing into the DOLLING A0 that same day. Contact continued light and sporadic throughout the area until 27 December, when the 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) conducted a series of night assaults into the Ky Jo Valley (OP900). Upon landing, elements of the battalion were taken under intense fire. The two assaulting companies were reinforced by two additional companies and contact continued throughout the day with an estimated two companies of enemy. On 27 December, both the 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) and the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) had elements in the contact areas as the brigade attempted to regain contact with the enemy. The search continued until 29 December, yielding small groups of enemy but no significant forces. The results of the actions over the three-day period were 62 enemy killed at a cost of 12 US killed and 34 wounded.

(d) During January, elements of the 4th Brigade continued to make sporadic contact with the enemy in and around numerous base camps. On 16 January a one battalion task force, 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) deployed to replace to assume responsibility for the DOLLING A0. Responsibility was passed from the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) to the 173d Airborne Brigade effective 19 January.

(e) Results for Operation DOLLING for the quarter were as follows: Friendly: 32 KIA, 39 WIA, 3 MIA; Enemy: 237 KIA, 30 MIA, and 60 small arms captured.

(f) Operation MACARTHUR.

(a) This operation started on 12 October as a continuation of the 4th Infantry Division's border protection mission in the Western Highlands. The A0 included Kontum, Plein and portions of Dak Lak and Gia Lai Provinces (Fig. 6). On 1 November, the units in MACARTHUR were positioned as follows. The 1st Battalion consisted of two battalions, operated in Aotum Province vicinity Pak To. Two battalions of the 2d Brigade plus two companies of the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry were deployed north of Ben To. Task Force 23, consisting of the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (-) and the 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry (Kosh), operated in the Don Do, Hail Djereng area.

(b) On 3 November elements of 2d Brigade made several scattered contacts with small groups of enemy—resulting in 23 KIA killed. On 10 November the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry was moved to Dak To in response to an enemy build-up in that area and the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry became OPERATION MACARTHUR on 20 November. The 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, to Dak To and the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry (-) and the 9th Infantry Division, became OPERATION MACARTHUR. Action remained light in the 2d Brigade area throughout the remainder of the month.

(c) On 22 continued to operate west of Plein area to secure highways 14 and 19. A number of mining and sniper incidents occurred along these roads during the month which resulted in limited damage to US vehicles. The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry terminated operations.
operations west of Pleiku and the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry assumed the mission of TF 22. The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry moved south vicinity Benh Mech becoming OCPON to the 2d Brigade.

(a) The 1st Brigade initially commenced operations with two battalions in the vicinity of Dak To. In response to an enemy build up, by 6 November, the 273d Airborne Brigade was moved to the area with three battalions. On 3 - 4 November, the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made the first major contact with NVA forces on a prominent E-W ridgeline southwest of Dak To. On 5 November Mobile Strike Force (MSF) Companies 23 and 26 were inserted north and south of Ben Het. On the same day the 9th ARVN Airborne Battalion arrived at Than Cau. On 6 November the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) became heavily engaged with an NVA battalion southwest of Dak To vicinity of the ridgeline at 989621. Heavy contact continued in this area until 11 November as the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne), 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry and the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry engaged elements of the 23d and 66th NVA Regiments. On 9 November the 9th ARVN Airborne Battalion and the 3d Battalion, 503d ARVN Regiment commenced operations north of Dak To against the 24th NVA Regiment. On 11 November the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry closed Dak To. The 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force and the 3d ARVN Airborne Battalion closed Than Cau on 13 November and started operating north of Dak To. The 1st Battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airborne) closed Peo Kieng on 19 November with the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry and moved south of Dak To on 19 November. From 19 - 20 November, the 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) and the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) were heavily engaged southwest of Dak To. The ARVN airborne units made contact with elements of the 24th NVA Regiment north of Than Cau from 17 - 19 November. An estimated reinforced NVA battalion was contacted by the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) on 19 November at a location eight kilometers west of the Cambodian border on Hill 875. Heavy casualties resulted from this action as the brigade reinforced with the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne). In this action, 7 US were killed while 275 NVA bodies were counted. On 19 November the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was moved to Dak To and the 7th ARVN Airborne Battalion relieved the 9th ARVN Airborne Battalion north of Than Cau. On 24 November, the 1st Brigade of the cavalry and the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry returned to Operation PERSHING. On 29 November, in response to timely intelligence, the 2d and 3d ARVN Airborne Battalions attacked the CP area of the 24th NVA Regiment making contact with an estimated two NVA battalions. Results of the contact were 10 ARVN killed and 109 NVA killed.

(b) During December, contact was light throughout the entire AO. As the enemy threat subsided in the Dak To area, 4th Infantry Division elements were repositioned. On 10 December, the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry was returned to the PERSHING AO and on 11 December, the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry rejoined its parent organization. The headquarters of the 173d Airborne Brigade and the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) returned to Operation BOLD Operation leaving TF 173 with two battalions, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry and the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne). Under the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division. On 27 December this task force was redesignated TF PERSHING and two troops, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, commenced operations southwest of Kontum City.

(c) During January, the enemy stepped up his activity in the MACABER AO combining standoff rocket/mortar attacks with ground assaults in attempts to destroy US equipment and supplies and to harass friendly operations. Fire support bases at Dak To and Ben Het as well as the bases of the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received intensive mortar attacks during the month.

(d) On 1 January, a Camp Strike Force Company from Plei Dien was attacked vicinity 21104338 by an estimated enemy battalion using small arms, automatic weapons and mortars. Friendly losses were three killed and four wounded at a cost to the enemy of 47 dead.
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AVF-46671
SUBJECT: Operation Thanh Son-2 (Twin Horse) Period ending 31 January 1968

(b) Kontum Airfield was attacked by a sapper team on 10 January. The 173d Airborne Brigade assisted the 57th Assault Helicopter Company in repelling the attack. The sappers destroyed four UH-1H and damaged nine. Friendly forces lost seven killed and 24 wounded while killing 14 enemy and capturing three small arms.

(1) On 0740 hours 15 January an estimated three ARVN companies launched a heavy ground attack against a convoy vicinity ZN150120. By 0800 hours Troop B, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry had reinforced and was in heavy contact. At 1100 hours, Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry was inserted into the area. The enemy broke contact at 1300 hours having suffered 21 killed and losing five men as prisoners. Friendly casualties were three killed, 15 wounded, one tank and one OH-6A aircraft destroyed.

(4) From 0400-0530 hours 20 January, Pleiku received 31 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. The new Pleiku airfield, 7th Evacuation Hospital and positions of the 52d artillery were struck. Major damage was inflicted on the hospital where one man was killed and 12 wounded.

(b) At 0247 hours 25 January, Camp Holloway (BY910120) came under ground attack supported by B60 rocket and mortar fire. At least 20 attackers broke through the perimeter and struck the ammunition supply point. The enemy force was identified as elements of the 407th Sapper Battalion. The enemy damaged 29 aircraft in its attack and wounded 15 US personnel.

(c) On 26 and 28 January the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with elements of an enemy battalion vicinity YB830. The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons and 82mm mortars. The results of these actions were 4 US killed and 18 wounded. Enemy losses were 18 killed.

(a) During the early morning hours of 20 January elements of the 407th and 408th Sapper Battalions plus the H-15 local force battalion launched an attack on Pleiku and penetrated the city in several locations. Elements of the 4th Infantry Division supported ARVN Ranger units and cavalry elements through 31 January. Results of the two days fighting were as follows: Friendly: 22 KIA, 83 WIA; Enemy: 123 KIA, 45 WIA and 66 small arms captured.

(1) On 0015 hours 30 January Kontum came under mortar attack with primary target being the H2V Sector Compound. As the mortaring continued, enemy elements commenced ground attacks on various installations within the city. An estimated 100 mortar and rocket rounds were dropped into the city during the last two days of the month. Enemy was identified in the fighting included the K-4 Battalion, 174th ... during the 30th Local Force Battalion and the 407th Sapper Battalion.

(p) Results for the quarter in Operation McCallum were: Friendly: 368 KIA, 1527 WIA, 21 MIA; Enemy: 1810 KIA, 73 WIA, 339 small arms and 110 crew-served weapons captured. Cumulative results for the operation through 31 January were: Friendly: 369 KIA, 3548 WIA, 21 MIA; Enemy: 1213 KIA, 76 WIA, 277 small arms and 111 crew-served weapons captured.

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AVFA-08-07
SUBJECT: Operational update - Lasina L-tnd for quarterly period ending
31 January 1968 Los Ospina-65 UIC 994-64 KS 12/16997 (U)

(6) Operation ELWASH FALLS:

(a) This operation commenced 1 December as a search and destroy operation in Binh Thuan and Long Dong Provinces. The operation was directed against Headquarters, Military Region VI and main/local force units within the two provinces. Friendly forces, including the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and TF 25 battalion, 7th Cavalry, were also tasked to open QL 1 from the II Corps-III Corps boundary to the Binh Thuan-Hinh Thuan Province boundary.

(b) Contact during December was light, but judging from the numerous large base-camps and rice caches discovered, it was obvious that US forces had entered a well-prepared base area. During the period 18-21 December, the 5th Logistic Command (ARVN) conducted a 131 vehicle convoy from Nha Trang to Phan Thiet and back. This was the first successful ARVN convoy to move along this route since 1961. Elements of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry provided security along QL 1 for the convoy.

(c) During January contact was light in the AO as the enemy avoided decisive engagement with US forces. The operation was terminated on 20 January.

(d) Results of the operation were as follows:
   Friendly: 28 KIA, 138 WIA; enemy: 156 KIA, 11 WIA, 74 small arms and three crew-served weapons captured.

(7) Operation ROSE:

(a) When the 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry (Airborne) arrived in RVN, it embarked on Operation ROSE, a search and destroy operation in southern Ninh Thuan Province. Operation ROSE was designed as a shakedown operation for the battalion as well as an incursion into WD Base area 35. The operation commenced on 11 November and terminated on 1 December to enable the battalion to join its parent unit, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in Operation ELWASH FALLS.

(b) Action was light during the entire operation. Scattered contacts were made with small groups of VC, usually at long range. Results for the period and the operation were:
   Friendly: four wounded; enemy: eight killed and eight individual weapons captured.

(8) Special Operations: The following USIF-led operations were conducted in the II Corps Tactical Zone during the quarter at the direction of HQ II MFR:

(a) Operation SOUKHOT: This operation began on 15 October to detect enemy infiltration routes and way stations in northeastern Binh Thuan Province. The 27th MSF Company originally was employed in Operation SOUKHOT and was replaced on 16 November by Camp Strike Force (CSF) elements from Trang Fms CIDG Camp. Several small contacts were made during the period and recently occupied camp sites were discovered. The operation was terminated on 31 December.

(b) Operation PESKH: This operation was conducted by CSF units of the 5th Djureng CIDG camp in the lower Plei Trap Valley from 9-13 December. The mission was to screen possible enemy routes of infiltration and to intercept routes of communication in the area. No contacts were made.

(c) Operation SULU: On 1 December Project Field forces entered the SULU AO in Kon Tum Province along the border employing reconnaissance and roadrunner teams to detect enemy movement to the east. The 91st Ranger Battalion (CSF) provided backup for the
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AVFA-GC-07
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned For Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1968 ICS GSPO-65 USD (MA) HQ IPEF/SCV (U)

teams. There was light contact in the area during the month although
valuable data concerning the presence of enemy units was developed.
The operation was suspended on 23 December by JUS directions; it reconn-
enced on 5 January. During January an increased number of enemy sight-
ings were made which led to several light contacts in the AO. The
operation was terminated on 25 January, and the area became the responsi-
bility of the 4th Infantry Division. Results of the operation were:
Friendly: 12 KIA, 48 WIA; Enemy: 26 KIA, one PO and three small arms
captured.

(d) Operation Walla: This mobile Strike Force (MSF) operation commenced 18 December west southwest of Can Laa Bay and ter-
mminated 5 January. There was light contact in the AO but some informa-
tion of intelligence value was gained.

(e) Operation SILKITEH: This MSF operation started on 19 December southwest of Quy Don and terminated on 31 December.
The operation was directed at enemy forces in the vicinity of the Qui
Huu Support Control Ammunition Supply Point. Troops for the operation
were provided from the Can Cao CIBO Camp. There was no contact in the
AO during the operation.

(f) Operation BISKO: MSF 25 commenced a stay-behind operation on 14 December in the KeNh Phu Falls AO. The unit operated
cross the II Corps-III Corps boundary in the suspected location of KA
Military Region VI. There were several light contacts with small groups of
VC in the area and recently occupied, well constructed camp sites
were discovered. The operation terminated on 20 January.

c. G3/ Air Operations:

(3) The number of sorties flown daily varied from 17 to
155 with a mean of 106.6 per day for the period 1 November 1967 through
31 January 1968. The most frequent missions were:

(a) Direct support of friendly forces in contact.

(b) Preparation fires on landing zones and objective
areas.

(c) Harassment and interdiction of enemy base areas,
assembly areas and infiltration routes.

(d) Night illumination and strikes.

(e) Landing zone construction.

(2) During the period, approximately 15,595 of the mis-
sions flown for IPEF/SCV were Combat Skypot. One and six tenths per-
cent of the sorties flown were in support of immediate missions.

(3) There were 9213 Tactical sorties flown in support
of major operations during the reporting period as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>TOTAL SORTIES</th>
<th>BID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOLITIN</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 secondary explosions, 34 mili-
tary structures destroyed, 35 bunkers
destroyed, 26 secondary fires, 2 KIA
confirmed, 15 military structures
damaged, 20 bunkers destroyed and
numerous trenches destroyed, 83 KIA
estimated, 3 trenches destroyed, 2
caves destroyed.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>TOTAL SQRMS</th>
<th>SORTED</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIRD</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4 secondary explosions, 9 secondary fires, 15 bunkers destroyed and numerous tunnels and caves destroyed, 30 confirmed VC/WVA KIA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP ROK</td>
<td>1440</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>25 confirmed KIA, 370 military structures destroyed, 236 military structures damaged, 30 secondary explosions 59 secondary fires, 32 caves destroyed, 2 bridges destroyed, 3 trenches destroyed, 7 bridges damaged, 15 bunkers destroyed and tunnels damaged, 3 KIA estimated 1 WIA, 2 A/H positions destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANIEL BOONE</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>25 KIA confirmed, 2 KIA estimated, 2 military-structures destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAZZLENN</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>56 military structures destroyed, 9 military structures damaged, 26 trenches damaged, 1 mortar position destroyed, 1 enemy OP destroyed, 26 bunkers destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUWAIT PALLS</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>51 bunkers destroyed, 15 secondary explosions, 12 gun-positions destroyed, 1 military structure damaged, 22 KIA confirmed, 1 scorpion destroyed, 4 bunkers damaged, 1 mil structure destroyed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACARTHUR</td>
<td>4362</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>65 KIA confirmed, 16 structures destroyed, 1 military structure damaged, 127 bunkers damaged, 122 bunkers destroyed, 135 secondary explosions, 35 secondary fires, 692 estimated KIA, 16 mortar positions destroyed, 4 trenches destroyed, 1 bridge destroyed, 4 A/H positions destroyed, 1 tunnel destroyed, 3 caves damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MELAZIN</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>No KIA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSHING</td>
<td>1109</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>51 confirmed KIA, 45 military structures destroyed, 86 military structures damaged, 436 bunkers destroyed, 121 bunkers damaged, 59 secondary explosions, 2 A/H positions destroyed, 2 caves destroyed, 4 bridges destroyed, 20 tunnels destroyed, 1 rice cache destroyed, 10 KIA estimated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PILGRIM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No KIA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT ECHO</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>No KIA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9TH ROK</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>3 confirmed KIA, 5 KIA estimated, 4 secondary explosions, 7 secondary fires, 26 military structures destroyed, 36 military structures damaged, 34 caves destroyed, 1 bridge destroyed, 4 caves damaged.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Operational Report—Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

**SUBJECT:**
Operational Report—Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

**RCS GTF 015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>TOTAL SORTIES</th>
<th>ROYAL ROM</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROSE</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>No EDAs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SULTAN</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>12 secondary explosions, 2 secondary fires, 4 EDAs confirmed, 1 ED, 4 AW destroyed, 7 AW damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIR</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>No EDAs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(A) B-52 Support: There were 457 B-52 sorties flown during the quarter, compared to 169 sorties last quarter, in support of ground operations and on suspected enemy concentrations as indicated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
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**CONFIDENTIAL**
## OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 1968

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AVFA-46-07
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1968 RCS CPFR-65 USC SULHA: J0 IFFORCE (“U”)

DATE     NAME   OPER. NAME  STATION  OPERATION
310800Z Dec HA 12-14     S-68    9    MAOER
020633Z Jan Ba 20-1     S-53    9    PERSHING
050532Z Jan DB 04-1     S-09    6    9th Bnk
060532Z * HA 1-1       S-86    9    MAOER
070445Z * HA 1-2       S-05    9    *
071912Z * Ba 23-8      0-39    3    PERSHING
080605Z * HA 1-5       S-58    9    MAOER
131103Z * Aa 1         S-06    9    SUDAN
152152Z * HA 1-6       S-79    9    MAOER
180914Z * HA 1-7       S-34    9    *

d. (c) Army Aviation Operations:

(1) The major objectives in employing the aviation assets available to IFFORCE are:
   (a) Provide mobility to combat elements of Free World Forces in II Corps Tactical Zone.
   (b) Support the aerial reconnaissance and surveillance programs (Staff supervision of G-3 allocations changed from G-2 to Aviation).

(2) Resources Available:
   (a) Assault helicopter companies (AHC):

   COMPANY     UNIT SUPPORTED
   37th AHC     GS, Highlands
   119th AHC    BS, Prairie Fire
   120th AHC    DS, 4th Inf Div
   129th AHC    DS, 4th Inf Div
   155th AHC    BS, ABN
   192d AHC     BS, 2/506th AEC
   52d AEC      GS, Coastal
   281st AEC    BS, Special Forces
   48th AEC     BS, WEIRD
   129th AHC    BS, SAND
   134th AHC    GS, Coastal
   61st AHC     GS, Coastal
   355th AHC    BS, 173d Abn
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(b) Assault support helicopter companies (ASHC):

- 179th ASHC 1st Cav Div (AM)
- 243d ASHC GS, Coastal
- 180th ASHC GS, Coastal/highlands
- 196th ASHC GS, Coastal/highlands

(c) The 183d, 185th, 203d, and 219th Reconnaissance Airplane Companies support the II CTZ program and provide GS II CTZ.

(d) The 225th Surveillance Airplane Company is employed throughout the II CTZ in a surveillance role.

(3) Major accomplishments:

(a) Airmobility was provided to the following US operations for the period indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>SUPPORTED UNIT</th>
<th>ARM UNIT</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRESHION</td>
<td>1st Cav Div (AM)</td>
<td>Organic</td>
<td>1 Nov-31 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HILLTOP</td>
<td>173d Abn</td>
<td>33d Abn</td>
<td>1 Nov-31 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLAMATH FALLS</td>
<td>3rd Abn</td>
<td>243d ASHC</td>
<td>1 Dec-8 Jan</td>
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<tr>
<td>KENAI FLR</td>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>1/4th Abn</td>
<td>1 Nov-31 Jan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The daily ROKA support was provided by the 150th and 129th ARCs and the 160th and 196th ASHCs. Additional support was provided, on a mission basis, for major ROKA operations. Major operations supported with additional aircraft were:

1. **GRID:***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SO IDAM 67-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAE SANDY 1</td>
<td>9 Dec - 17 Dec 67</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAEXE NO 9-1</td>
<td>17 Dec - 31 Dec 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIEKING NO 9-2</td>
<td>9 Jan - 30 Jan 68</td>
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2. **WIRE:***

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<td>22 Nov - 23 Nov 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAIJOO 3</td>
<td>19 Dec - 22 Dec 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOO MA 3</td>
<td>20 Dec - 21 Dec 67</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAK GEU</td>
<td>20 Dec - 21 Dec 67</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1968 ACS CSFOC-65 UIC UDILCIA HR IPFORCEV (U)

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<td>SANG HA 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA CHUNG SAN</td>
<td>6 Jan - 13 Jan 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHUL HA 1</td>
<td>14 Jan - 19 Jan 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOX POONG</td>
<td>27 Jan - 1 Feb 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) Throughout the period CH54 support was provided to I and II CTZs on a mission basis by the 1st Cav div. (AH) aircraft.

(d) In addition, special requirements directed by MACV were supported. These included Recona School, Prairie Fire, Delta, and DSA IX Corps support.

(4) During the period, all UH-1H helicopter replacements for UH-1Ds in all AHs by 2 Feb 68 and complete exchange in all AHs by the end of the next reporting period. Presently ten of the thirteen (-) AHs have completed exchange to UH-1Hs and two of the remaining three companies are in the exchange process as stated above.

e. (U) Organization and Training activities:

(1) All units that are assigned, attached or under operational control of this headquarters as of 31 January 1967 are listed at Inc 7.

(2) The command relationship of major US, ARVN and MACV units within II CTZ is at Inc 8.

(3) The following units were assigned, attached, or became OCONUS to IPFORCEV during the period:

(a) 5th Battalion (175mm)(SP) 22d Artillery assigned by USAV GO 6456, 18 December 1967.

(b) 241st, 242d, 243d and 244th Field Artillery Detachments (Radar) assigned by USAV GO 5791, 10 November 1967.

(c) 3d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry (1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division) OCONUS by USAV message (2) MACVCC 6121, 151130Z January 1968, ENSD MO (U).

(4) 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, OCONUS during the period 1 December 67 to 8 January 68.

(4) The following units were reasigned from IPFORCEV to the 108th Artillery Group in support of III MAZ in I CTZ during the period:

(a) 8th Battalion (175mm)(SP) 8th Artillery.
(b) 1st Battalion (105mm)(SP) 40th Artillery.
(c) 1st Battalion (60mm)(SP) 44th Artillery.
(d) 2d Battalion (175mm)(SP) 94th Artillery.
(e) Battery G (Searchlight) 29th Artillery.
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SUBJECT: Operational Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (OS GP/1968 250 AB/An 12IFFORCEN Y)

(c) 235th FA Detachment (January).

(g) 238th FA Detachment (January).

(b) 239th FA Detachment (January).

(k) 240th FA Detachment (January).

(5) Manpower Authorizations: Effective 15 January 1968, the infantry battalions of standard infantry divisions, mechanized infantry battalions and armor battalions were reorganized into standard configurations as recommended during US-NE Phase 1 Standardization Conference in August 1967 and submitted to DA.

(6) Training:

(a) Training inspections of all assigned and attached units, less artillery groups and battalions, were conducted during the quarter. All units were rated satisfactory. Future inspections will be conducted semi-annually.

(b) IFFORCEN Y Regulation 350-2 was published 3 January 1968. It prescribes policy and provides guidance for all units assigned and attached to Headquarters IFFORCEN Y in planning, conducting and supervising military training. Emphasis is placed on the conduct of replacement training and weapons familiarization.

(7) Research and Development (R&D) activities: requests for information on various R&D items from US, NE and AEF were monitored by this headquarters. No R&D items requests were received from OP PER units.

(f) (6) Psychological Operations:

(1) General:

(a) Psychological operations (PSYOP) were conducted by GVN, US and ROY Forces in the II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) supported by the 8th PSYOP Battalion, the 9th Air Commando Squadron (ACS), I Ha Trang and Pleiku, the 4th PSYOP Group, Saigon, the 7th PSYOP Group, Okinawa, the 2d US Coastal Zone “Junk and Swift Boat” Fleet, the ROY Forces Civil Affairs/PSYOP Company, the 20th PSYOP Battalion (Airborne) and the 114th Liaison Squadron (VNAF).

(b) The operations involved disseminating 503,734,000 leaflets, of which 45,895 were printed by the 8th PSYOP Bn and 1,237 hours of aerial loudspeaker time directed against targets in enemy areas. In addition, leaflet, loudspeaker and other propaganda activities were conducted before, during and after tactical and revolutionary development operations in friendly areas.

The objectives of PSYOP prior to tactical and revolutionary development operations were to:

1. Explain the Chu Hung Program to VC/NVA and local populace including specific instructions on how to rally, repeated assurances of good treatment, and attempts to reach the VC through appeals to their families.

2. Persuade the populace in VC/NVA controlled areas to expose VC/NVA personnel including members of the infrastructure, rice to VC/NVA elements.

3. Persuade the populace to deny supplies and rice to VC/NVA elements.

4. Build popular support for the GVN in contested areas.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1968 RSO CS705-65 U02 WD-1 E4 F408007 (U)

2. Foster population control by dissemination of safety instructions and other measures.

3. The objectives of PSYOP during tactical operations were to:

a. Demoralize VC/NVA troops.

b. Stimulate defections in VC/NVA ranks.

c. Exploit Hoi Chanh to increase the appeal of the "Open Arms" program.

d. Alienate the VC/NVA forces from the population.

e. Create a fear of impending doom in VC/NVA personnel should they continue to fight.

2. The objectives of PSYOP subsequent to tactical operations were to:

a. Secure control of the population and orient it towards support of the GVN.

b. Exploit recent combat casualties and pressures as a means of stimulating VC/NVA defections.

(c) Examples of leaflets printed by the 9th PSYOP En during the period:


3. A Pacification Health Leaflet. Inc1 11.

(d) Emphasis on coordination and integration of the myriad of PSYOP activities conducted and planned was the preeminent theme in the military PSYOP/Chieu Hai field. Consolidation of the Military PSYOP and Chieu Hai functions was completed with the formation of a Chieu Hai/Military PSYOP Division under one chief. The interrelated phases of the Chieu Hai/Military PSYOP Program, inclusion, reception, exploitation, training, resettlement, and follow-up became unified.

1. On 27 December 1968 EFF0026 published a plan for Chieu Hai/Dai Docn Ket Programs during the 1968 Tet season. A salient feature of this plan was that the Province Senior Advisors and their staffs were given the responsibility for centralized planning, coordination and advisory assistance for the entire US PSYOP Tet Campaign. Leaflet stocks made available through the 6th PSYOP En were allocated to the provinces. All operators were required to coordinate their efforts with the Province Advisory Team. This new approach resulted in a substantial decrease in duplication of effort and improvement in consistency of themes targeted against a given audience. Additionally, greater emphasis was placed on the use of information channels to convince US personnel that intelligence and PSYOP benefits would accrue from the proper treatment and rapid reporting of Hoi Chanh.

2. During this period the Province Senior Advisors reported that the civilian PSYOP activities in the information and nation building fields, the Military PSYOP effort against enemy units and the Chieu Hai Program were being carried forward as an integrated effort.

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Although the degree of coordination between these programs varies between provinces, an increasing number of Province PSYOP Committees and Province PSYOP sections headed by a US advisor should provide an increasingly favorable impact.

2. Planning commenced during this period for establishment of a Nha Trang based Combined Propaganda Support Center (CPSO) for the Coastal Provinces. The CH-34, US and RNK manned, will initially coordinate requests for PSYOP aircraft support. In order to reach its full potential plans call for the CPSO to include GVN forces and undertake the coordination of PSYOP printing and tape production requests.

(f) Renewed efforts were made to assure more complete exploitation of Hoi Chanh (palliers) for intelligence and PSYOP purposes.

1. A coordinated list of PSYOP interrogation requirements was distributed to US OPCON units for use in interrogation of Hoi Chanh and PNs.

2. The Chief, Chieu Ho\Military PSYOP Division of COMS越 was appointed a member of the IX Corps Intelligence Collection and Exploitation Committee (ICEX). The province Military PSYOP advisors were also appointed to the province ICEX Committees. These arrangements should improve the integration of the PSYOP and intelligence communities in the attack on the infrastructure.

(g) On 20 January 1968 a 50 kw radio station targeted against VC/VA units began operating at Pleiku as a six month test of this propaganda media. Programming for this station is provided by the ANW General Political Warfare Department. Technical support for operation of the radio, transmitting Set 26/122-22 and associated equipment is provided by a detachment from the 7th PSYOP Group, Okinawa. Mini radio-receivers with a fixed frequency of the station have been distributed by hand and air drop in target area. Arrangements have been made to evaluate the project through interrogation of PN and Hoi Chanh. This evaluation will seek to determine whether a propaganda radio capability should be an integral part of US PSYOP support units in Vietnam.

(h) At the outbreak of the enemy's Tet offensive, IFFORCEV directed a saturation PSYOP effort to exploit new vulnerabilities presented as the enemy's drive failed. Special leaflets were produced emphasizing the failure of the enemy to receive popular support, his failure to honor the Tet holiday and the violation of his self-proclaimed truce. The Chieu Ho\Military PSYOP Division operated a PSYOP Tactical Operation Center to receive and process requests for PSYOP media and aircraft support. Desk officers coordinated the requests of tactical units and provinces. This system enabled the 8th PSYOP BN to concentrate solely on production and dissemination of material.

(2) Support:

(a) On 1 Dec 67 the 8th PSYOP BN was activated to replace the 215th PSYOP Co as the principal military PSYOP agency supporting operations within IX COR. The battalion has 24 officers and 63 enlisted men. Co A is located in Nha\Trang and operates together with 0 Flight, 9th ATC to provide PSYOP support for the Coastal provinces. Co B was organized at Pleiku to work with 8 Flight, 9th ATC on supporting the Highland provinces. By the close of the reporting period a battalion staff was functioning, a Propaganda Development Center had been established, and construction of a new battalion headquarters was nearly completed. This upgrading of the military PSYOP support agency to battalion status should markedly improve the quantity and quality of the PSYOP efforts.
(b) The 8th PSYOP BN maintained a total of five loudspeaker (HB) and five audio-visual (HE) field teams for support of operations. For the first time an HE team was attached to a Province Advisory Team. This arrangement enabled the audio-visual team to support US tactical units, cordon and search operations and a variety of revolutionary development programs.

(c) The 9th ACS flew 884 missions, disseminated 450,518,000 leaflets and provided 1102 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts. Fifteen night missions were flown by O-47 aircraft. The full potential of the 9th ACS to support night missions has not been realized because of the non-availability of navigational equipment required for the O-47 to have a night capability. The diversion of PSYOP O-47 aircraft to flare missions has also had an adverse effect.

(d) The 1966 II CTZ Tet Plan provided for use of HU-1 helicopters to augment aircraft support during the high intensity Tet period. At the end of January two helicopters rigged with ABS-4, 1,000 watt loudspeaker systems, were rendering invaluable support to the Tet Program.

(e) The 8th PSYOP BN has received and employed one Modular audio-visual unit (HAVU). This equipment has performed successfully in a variety of field conditions. It provides substantially the same capability as the audio-visual jeepster (except for the vehicle) at a substantially lower cost. This readily transportable equipment is particularly suitable for support of nation building PSYOP efforts.

(f) Chemical:

(1) General:

(a) Herbicide Operations have been characterized byordinate delay from initiation of the request until the mission is executed. This has prolonged to aerial spray missions in particular. A new apparatus has been introduced into the II CTZ which will facilitate and expedite crop damage or defoliation missions in approved areas which are too small for C-123 strikes. The Agavanco Sprayer, originally designed to disperse insecticides has been found to be effective in herbicide operations. The Agavanco sprayer is a relatively simple apparatus and can be quickly and easily mounted in a UH-1 helicopter. It will spray an area of approximately 20 hectares.

(b) Riot Control agents received wide acclaim for their effectiveness in the battles of Tan Quin and Dak To. A shortage of most types of CS munitions still exists because of their experimental status. The latest allocation to I FORCES was for 25 E-128 CS Canister clusters, 160 E-8 Tactical CS Launchers, and 179 40mm CS Grenades to be suballocated to the 1st Cav Div (all), the 4th Inf Div and the 173rd Abn Bde. The Capital III Corps Division used CS extensively in Operation MAITNOI No 9.

(c) Personnel Detectors are continuing to provide commanders with valid information on the location of enemy personnel.

(2) Herbicide Operations:

(a) The results of Air Force, C-123, herbicide missions are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>10.76 Acres</th>
<th>10.76 Acres Depleted</th>
<th>Crop Destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>336</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>NO. OF SORTIES</th>
<th>HECTARES DEPOLITIZED</th>
<th>METRIC TONS DESTROYED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thuan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontum</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1,968</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lam Dong</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2,101</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Yen</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>684</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>12,023</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Duc</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>7,494</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The results of US Army, Uh-1 and CH-47, herbicide missions are as follows:

1. 1st Cav Div (A): Thirteen CH-47 and 12 Uh-1 helicopter sorties were flown to defoliate the Camp Radcliffe perimeter, various Landing Zones (125) and possible ambush sites along Highway 19.

2. Two Uh-1 helicopter sorties were flown to destroy rice seedlings in the an Lao Valley.

2. 4th Inf Div: Five uh-1 helicopter sorties were flown to defoliate possible ambush sites along Highway 73 in Northwest Phu Bon Province and highway 512 west of Dak To.

(3) Riot Control Agent (RCA) Operations:

(a) Friendly Employment:

1. The 1st Cav Div (A) reported the expenditure of the following CS munitions:

a. During the battle of Tam Quan, 1,728 M7A3 grenades and four E-158 CS canister clusters were employed, followed with air strikes, artillery and ground troops.

b. In addition to the battle of Tam Quan, 18 E-158s were employed followed by air strikes, artillery and 1,152 M7A3 grenades were fired in support of troops in contact.

c. Approximately 7,680 lbs (96 drums) of bulk CS-1 were dropped from CH-47 helicopters to contaminate enemy fortifications and restrict the use of trails.

d. CS employment contributed directly to 26 enemy KIA by artillery and aerial rocket artillery.

2. The 4th Inf Div reported the expenditure of the following CS munitions:

a. During the battle of Dak To, approximately 6,000 lbs (60 drums) of bulk CS-1 were dropped from CH-47 helicopters to contaminate possible exfiltration routes. The drops were followed by conventional artillery. Eight E-158 CS canister clusters were employed and followed with gunships, air strikes and an arc light strike.

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1. In addition to the CS employed in support of troops at Dak To, 14 S-53s were dropped from UH-1 helicopters and followed by conventional artillery and air strikes. Two hundred thirty-nine drums (19,129 lbs) of bulk CS-1 were dropped to contaminate infiltration routes near the Cambodian border.

2. Republic of Korea Forces. The Capital ROK Division dropped approximately 36,000 lbs (160 drums) of bulk CS-1 and employed 100 E-8 Tactical CS Launchers during operation Ha-Ng 9.

(b) Enemy Employment:

1. On 28 December 1967, the enemy attacked the Trang Phu Special Forces Camp (vicinity 2V 02966) with eleven mortar rounds containing a mixture of riot control agents CS and CN.

2. A document captured on 11 January 1968 by Delta Company 2/503 ABN (vicinity AR 97309) included a request to the chemical section of the 23 Front from the Gia Lai Provincial Headquarters for the distribution of 2,000 protective masks to various units within the Gia Lai area (all of Gia Lai Province and the mountainous areas of Binh Dinh Province). They further requested chemical mines and grenades for issue to guerrilla units in the area. The Provincial Headquarters recommended that a semi-professional antichemical operations net be established in districts and villages, and that each district or concentrated Battalion be authorized to have a cadre in charge of chemical operations.

(a) Personnel Detectors:

(a) The 1st Cav Div (all) has two Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD) and 12 Manpack Personnel Detectors (MPD). Twelve APD missions were flown. The locations of maximum readings which were verified by aerial reconnaissance were attacked by artillery and air strikes resulting in four NV, killed and three automatic weapons positions and 135 bunkers destroyed. Manpack Personnel Detector missions are flown by the Brigades.

(b) The 4th Inf Div has two Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD) and eight Manpack Personnel Detectors (MPD). During this reporting period 169 APD missions were flown. The coordinates of maximum readings were reported to the Bn S-2s and the Division G-2. On 4 December 1967, an APD ship was downed by ground fire, resulting in four US personnel KIA. All MPD missions are flown by the brigades.

(c) The 173d Abn Bde has one Airborne Personnel Detector and four Manpack Personnel Detectors. Missions are flown daily with maximum utilization of personnel and equipment.

(d) USAV has requested that operational quantities of Airborne Personnel Detectors be made available to tactical units. Manpack Personnel Detectors will be phased out of the system as APD's become available.

(5) Summary:

(a) Herbicide Operations:

1. There were 227 herbicide C-123 sorties flown resulting in 24,633 hectares of forested area defoliated and an estimated 650 metric tons of enemy crops destroyed.

2. Units under Headquarters, I FORCEN are continuing to attack enemy rice sweding beds and to perform perimeter

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defoliation using organic locally fabricated sprayers flown in UH-1 and CH-47 Helicopters. Agusvo Sprayers will replace these locally fabricated sprayers.

(b) Riot Control Agent (RCA) Operations:

1. The battles of Tam Quan and Dak To proved the effectiveness of RCA (CS) employed to force the enemy from fortified positions. Once the enemy was out of his bunker, artillery and air strikes were more effective.

2. Munitions containing CS are still in short supply, requiring units to use them mainly against confirmed enemy troop locations.

3. The enemy employed RCA (CS and CN) against a Special Forces Camp. A captured enemy document indicated the enemy plans to distribute 2,000 protective masks and to acquire chemical mines and grenades for issue to units in the Gia Lai area (all of Pleiku Province and the mountainous areas of Binh Dinh Province).

(c) Personnel Detectors:

1. Units under headquarters, I FFORV OrCON have a total of five APD's and 21 IFPD's. There are eight IIPD's in the I FFORV float. Missions are flown daily to assist in locating the enemy.

2. MFPD's will be phased out as APD's are received in operational quantities. This is tentatively scheduled for November 1968.

4. (C) Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.

a. General:

(1) During 1967, significant improvements occurred in the area of pacification planning. As the year began, there was little integration of planning efforts between US civil and military elements and even less between US civil elements and RVN. By the end of the year, constant and close contact had evolved between COMUS and 23 planners, I FFORV. Close coordination also exists between ARVN II Corps and the US Advisory staff. In addition improved liaison between all planners, US, GVN and RVN is now an accomplished fact. At the province level, pacification is now being accomplished by consolidated efforts which results in GVN pacification programs being coordinated with RVN forces.

(2) The 1968 II CTZ Combined Campaign Plan (CCP) was developed as a combined document in every sense of the word. Although it was not signed formally by US, RVNIVPVC, his staff participated fully in its development and he has accepted in principle its provisions as they apply in his TACR. Further, a RVNIVPVC plan for CT 1968 has been published which parallels the US/GVN document. Combined planning has been extended to the province level. For example, the RD Guidelines and the CCP have been incorporated into a provincial plan which covers all aspects of pacification and nation building. This provincial plan is the blueprint by which support provided by the USAID Country Assistance Program can be used fully integrated into the efforts of II CTZ, during 1968.

(3) RVNIVPVC Support of Pacification emphasized increasing quantity and improving effectiveness of RF/RF units. At end CT 1967 Regional Force (RF) companies in direct support of RD had been increased from 80 to 74 and Popular Force (PF) platoons from 130 to 229. Efforts
to improve effectiveness centered around Mobile Training Teams provided from US units. The objective is to have these US teams give each RF company and 75 percent of the PF platoons in direct support of RD an intensive training course in small unit tactics by 30 June 1968. Also, the program of RF/PF units receiving on-the-job training with US units will continue with increased emphasis.

4. The US and FMF primary support of RD has been and will continue to be that of providing an overall umbrella of security. This is accomplished by maintaining constant pressure on NVA and VC main force units to prevent their massing for coordinated attacks of battalion size or larger. In the event the enemy does mass, the mission of US and FMF forces is to destroy him before he can execute planned attacks.

b. New Life Development (NLD)

In the long range aspects of pacification and nation building, the various field programs such as Agriculture, Public Administration, Engineering, Education, Self-Help, Youth Affairs, Ethnic Minority Affairs, Warehouse and Transportation, suffered from the same basic problems:

1. Lack of trained cadre
2. Inadequate GVN transportation for personnel and movement of commodities and supplies
3. Lack of cooperation between GVN technical services in the performance of allied functions and general apathy
4. Lack of overall security on a continuous basis. Travel to and operations in numerous areas are a must if NLD Programs are to be fully effective.

c. Civil Affairs Operations.

1. Staff responsibilities include the monitoring of all civil affairs activities and specifically the civic action programs of all OPCON units, advisory teams and installation coordinators in III CTZ. The Civil Affairs Branch maintains a civic action fund to support the advisory effort.

2. HMH participation in military civic action is a matter of continuous and special advisory emphasis. The recent emphasis on PF housing has yet to bear fruit, but should improve PF participation in civic action projects throughout III CTZ.

3. Command emphasis has been placed on US units to coordinate their civic action programs with the Province Senior advisor concerned. Coordination with local FSEOPS officer is encouraged to publicize and support all CA projects with credit to HMH whenever possible.

4. 41st Civil Affairs Company.

Significant operations during the period included detaching one civil affairs team from the 1st Cavalry Division (3d) and employing it in an area support of the Binh Dinh Province Senior Advisor. The unit now has two teams in a command support role. Both are attached to the 1st Infantry Division. Four teams are attached to III M.F. and are not available for use in II Corps. The nine remaining teams are in an area support role in the following provinces: Binh Dinh (4), Binh Thuan (1), Pleiku (1), Phu Yen (1).

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The notified unit 70, received during the period provides for 16 generalist teams rather than the 16 V. refugee oriented teams. Current problems of inadequate equipment and maintenance facilities should be alleviated by implementation of the notified ROE.

(5) Refugee Operations:

(a) At the end of the quarter all provinces which need a fulltime refugee officer had at least one assigned and present for duty.

(b) When the GVN Special Commissioner for Refugees was absorbed by the Ministry for Social Welfare and refugees some fluctuation occurred among GVN personnel and added new advisory responsibilities in the Social Welfare area.

(6) The results of the streamlining mentioned in the last quarterly report are being realized in more rapid communications and response thereto. Reporting and the validity of the statistical base has improved and membership of programs is more positive.

3. Public Safety Division

(1) National Police (NP) and National Police Field Forces (NPFF). Recruitment increased dramatically during the latter part of November and December and indications are that this increase will continue through January. Increased pay and allowances and the General Mobilization Decree which liberalized the draft laws, are the principal reasons for the favorable recruitment picture.

(2) NPFF strength in the three provinces now approximately 1,100 and organized into 12 companies (eight operational, one in training and three being recruited). Four additional companies are authorized but they have not progressed beyond the training stage.

(3) The assignment of a full-time US advisor to each NPFF company is the principal reason for recruiting increases.

1. National Identity Card (NIC) Program. Discrepancies in inventory numbers have delayed the issuance of the NIC at the national level which resulted in a corresponding delay in Corps Level. The additional time generated by delays in Saigon will be used to allow the Corps to complete inspections and thereby ensure that all is in readiness when the program is implemented. The current estimate for the start of the II Corps NIC program is mid-May 1968.

(5) Resources Control Operations. By decree, the ROE, Saigon establishes a Resources Control Site and reduces it to the status of a section within the Uniform Branch. This accomplishment is a step forward in implementing the concept of overall police action rather than specialized methods in resources control. Advisers are closely monitoring the transition to ensure compliance at the lower echelons.

(6) A site for constructing an in-service training academy is being prepared at Phu Hin. Construction will be done on a self-help, non-tax funded basis and when completed the academy will be used both as a pre-academy training center to provide instruction for new basic training recruits prior to attending the R. basic school as well as in-service training for NPs.

(7) Prisons and Detention Centers. A bid for new construction at the Halat prison has been accepted and work should begin early in
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The first quarter of 1968. Special attention has been given to the An Tuc Detention Center in Binh Dinh and a US army 109 is on site to monitor construction. The Center is expected to be completed by 1 February 1968.

5. (c) Logistical activities:

a. The primary US logistical effort during this period was devoted to distribution, fuel, rail, building, ERMD, KLaTH Falls and HCMC.

b. A major logistical problem developed in Nholo at Dak To on 15 November 1967 when the Forward Support Area (FSA) ammunition storage area was destroyed by enemy fire. Intensified resupply of Class V by land and air prevented curtailment of combat operations.

c. AFHQ C4 continued to monitor the material and supply posture of units assigned, attached and garrisoned to this headquarters. The stock status and scheduled resupply of the following FSA's was monitored daily:

(1) Leng Co FSA, in support of Phu Yen
(2) Dak To FSA, in support of KLaTH Falls.
(3) Phan Thiet FSA, in support of ERMD (subsequently renamed KLaTHN).

d. During the reporting period, the C4 staff identified problems and initiated remedial action intended to improve the logistical support systems of Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/FF), Army of Vietnam (ARVN) and REEFP forces within II Corps Tactical Zone. Examples of these actions include:

(1) Continued assistance of REEFP Forces, Vietnam in requesting real estate in the Nha Trang area for base development.

(2) Conceptual approval and schedule of quarterly visits for composite team visits to provinces to discuss and solve administrative and logistical problems. The team will include representatives of operational and logistical advisors and Vietnamese counterparts, and staff officers from this headquarters. The composite team will allow for a rapid solution of problems and reduction of coordination by electrical means.

(3) Establishment of a program to inspect maintenance and supply contact assistance teams at various levels to visit all RF/FF and ARVN units to improve their logistical posture.

(4) Closely monitor RF/FF and ARVN logistical posture and infuse US logistical assets where appropriate and critically needed.

(5) Eliminate bottlenecks in Government of Vietman military dependent housing improvement programs.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1968

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(6) hasten availability of barrier materials within II Corps Tactical Zone to a responsive level.

(7) Monitor camp conversions from Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) to HP units.

a. Supply: There are no existing shortages which impair the operational capability of this command significantly. However, shortages of all/PRC-25 radios, aircraft cargo sling and fire fighting equipment cause serious concern, and should be alleviated as soon as possible.

(1) Classes I, II, III, IV and V supplies are adequate to support all operations.

(2) Emphasis placed on the turn-in of unneeded M16/M16 equipment resulted in the reporting of 274 line items and supply action on 730 separate items ranging from 2 1/2 ton trucks to lensatic compasses.

(3) Changes that occurred to the Available Supply Rate (ASR) control of ammunition expended during the period were:

(a) Additions:

1. Cartridge (CTG), 40mm, HE, B568
2. CTG, 81mm, Illum, C226.
3. CTG, 81mm, HE, 0246.
4. Grenade, Smoke, Yellow, G945.
5. Rocket, 2.75", HE, K490.
6. Mine, AP, M38, K143 ( Claymore).
9. Chemical agent, CS-1 (bulk), K764.
10. CTG, 60mm, HE (B626 added 24 Jan 68, even though weapons are not authorized).
11. CTG, 60mm Illum (B627 added 24 Jan 68, even though weapons are not authorized).
12. CTG, 60mm HP (B630 added 24 Jan 68, even though weapons are not authorized).

(b) Deletions:

1. CTG, 40mm, HE, B568.
2. CTG 60mm, Illum, B627 (because weapons were not authorized).

(c) End of period:

1. CTG, 81mm, Illum, C226.
2. CTG, 81mm, HE, 0246.
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SUBJECT: Operational Results Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

1. CSO, 105mm, HE, CS45
2. Projectile, 175mm, HE, D572
3. Grenade, Hand, Sack, Yellow G945
4. Rocket, 2.75", HE, H490
5. Mine, AP, M18, KL13 (Claymore)
6. Chemical Agent, CS-1 (Bulb), K764
7. Signal, Ground; White Star Cluster, LS07
8. Signal, Ground; White Star Parachute, LS12
9. Flare, Trip, H49, K495
10. CIG, 60mm & (B626)
11. CIG, 60mm 8P (B630)

(1) All major critical items of equipment have been issued to Company E, 20th Infantry (Long Range Patrol) except tool kits. Of the 189 requisitions submitted, 26 remain unfilled and six are only partially filled.

f. Services: Nothing significant to report.

g. Transportation:

(1) Highway CL-21 was opened again during December 1967, for the resupply of Ben Ho Thuot by US convoys from Cam Ranh Bay and SVN convoys from Phu Quoc. Highway CL-1 has been opened between Phan Rang and Phan Thiet and remains in a Green (open) condition.

(2) The tempo of daily airlift operations throughout II Corps Tactical Zone has raised the daily airlift requirements to a new high. The daily averages of emergency airlift for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 compared with daily averages of the previous quarter as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Short Tons</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August - October</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1967 - January 1968</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. (c) MEDICAL:

(1) Hospitalizations: The 571st Evacuation Hospital at Pleiku became fully operational in October just prior to the heavy combat at Dak To. The hospital received nearly all of the casualties from that action.

(2) Evacuations: The 571st Medical Company (air ambulance) arrived in Vietnam during the quarter bringing the total helicopter

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I. FFORCEN

Ambulances in 44th Medical Brigade units in the II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) to 49. A few of these are not available for support of I FFORCEN units as the 55th Medical Group has a mission of providing evacuation support. Many units in the CTZ and the detachment in I CTZ must be augmented to accomplish the mission. The increase in helicopter ambulances has brought about a much more satisfactory situation.

6. (C) Personnel and administrative action

a. Maintenance of Unit Strengths:

1. HQ I FFORCEN key personnel and FIDW senior commanders are at Incl 12.

2. Personnel strengths of assigned and attached units have been satisfactory throughout the reporting period. Key shortages in the 55th Signal Battalion were partially alleviated through USAV-directed priority fill in M5 AM (Radio Relay and Carrier Attendant) and M5 05B (Radio Teletype Operator). The artillery strength declined during the first month of the reporting period due to non-availability of qualified artillery replacements arriving in-country. USAV directed a diversion of personnel with M5 AS (Armor Crewman) and M5 11B (Infantry Direct Fire Crewman) for duty and training as automatic weapons artillerymen. Through an extensive, on-the-job training for these personnel, a high level of combat readiness was maintained. A problem still exists in obtaining qualified radar personnel for 8th TAB, 26th artillery. This has been reported to USAV, and that headquarters has given this command priority fill in M5 12B (Radar Crewman) until the problem is eradicated. The 5th Battalion, 22d artillery arrived on 25 Dec 67 at full strength. The infusion plan of this battalion with other artillery battalions within I FFORCEN was forwarded to USAV. The I FFORCEN infusion program has merged into the USAV controlled infusion plan and is progressing smoothly.

3. Personnel strengths of assigned, attached and units under operational control are at Incl 13.

b. Personnel Management:

1. Since August 1967, I FFORCEN has experienced difficulty in obtaining sufficient artillery lieutenant colonels recommended for command at qualified for key staff positions. The Artillery and I FFORCEN staff, in a Do-USARV message exchange, artillery Branch stated that it can, in a twelve month period, provide command recommended artillery lieutenant colonels on the basis of one per battalion and only an additional 90 percent for other assignments. On this basis, the I FFORCEN allocation of command recommended 0-5's is: one per battalion (12) plus 5 (for staff positions) for a total of 37. However, I FFORCEN is authorized 26 artillery 0-5's for all positions including staff assignments. Unless DA increases the basis for assigning command recommended officers or preferential treatment is afforded, I FFORCEN can anticipate assignments of 17 officers suitable for command and approximately 9 artillery 0-5's who are not recommended for command. In order to maintain the required quality of staff officers at this headquarters it will be necessary to reject artillery 0-5's who are not command recommended and to fill staff positions with officers from other branches.

2. Due to the critical shortages of Infantry Captains, it has become necessary to fill some infantry positions in the headquarters staff with other combat arms officers. Some enlisted MOS imbalances.
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exist as a result of the measures taken to alleviate the artillery shortages mentioned in paragraph 6a (2). As on-the-job training progresses, these imbalances will be overcome.

(3) Lack of timely receipt of copies of DA Form 66's for officers has precluded prompt duty assignments, appointment of sponsors and dispatch of letters of welcome. This headquarters has requested that USAV attempt to obtain an early dispatch of copies of Form 66's from DA. As an interim measure, each incoming officer is being requested through use of a welcome letter to send his headquarters a copy of his Form 66 and assignment preferences. The receipt of timely assignment instructions for personnel nearing rotation also continued to be a problem. Such delays cause personal hardship and morale problems among those individuals leaving the command. This area should be investigated and continued follow-up action taken by all headquarters to insure prompt and timely action with regard to reassignment instructions.

c. Civilian Personnel Management: Civilian personnel management during the period was generally satisfactory in both administration and pay. Coordination was maintained throughout the quarter between the area civilian personnel officer and all levels of command. USAV regulation 660-1, dated 3 Dec 67, designated .ACP as staff officers for all areas in order to support the delineation of responsibility in this regulation will assist in more efficient civilian personnel administration. During the reporting period justification for Permanent Local National Direct Hire requirements were submitted based on the revised USAV work unit yardstick guide. Actions were taken to transfer 24 authorized spaces from this headquarters to the 17th asm Gp. These spaces were transferred upon assignment of the 203rd asm Co and 7/17 Cav to the 17th asm Gp. This headquarters currently has 290 spaces authorized and justification submitted for 296 spaces. Actions are being continued to convert non-align wage scales to job descriptions in non-appropriated fund activities to conform with wage scales and grade standards presently used in appropriated fund activities. Controls and guidelines on overtime payments were emphasized. Command inspections and those conducted by the Inspector General will inquire into and examine the units concerned for compliance with guidance furnished.

d. Enlisted promotions: Promotion allocations for assigned and attached units are at incl 14. Utilization of promotion allocations is adequate.

e. Development and Maintenance of Harbo:

(1) The MIA Trang area is very much in need of a Special Services Recreational Center. At the present time, Special Services supports a beach facility, but there is an additional need for a recreation center such as the facility at Long Binh, a one or two story building with game room, movie room, reading alcove, snack bar, etc. With the exception of the USO located in downtown MIA Trang, the only facility in the MIA Trang area that resembles a special services center is the Red Cross building at Camp Mackenna. It is desirable to support this facility descriptively until the Special Services Office can provide similar facilities of its own and follow the Red Cross of its requirement to operate a club. Difficulty has been experienced in getting adequate logistical support (i.e., musical equipment, pool tables, tape recorders, game room equipment, etc.) for the Red Cross. This problem has been brought to the attention of the USAV and HAV Special Services officers but no solution has yet been developed.

(2) Utilization of 12% quotas for assigned and attached units were distributed and utilized as shown at incl 15. There were no significant difficulties experienced during the quarter.
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(3) Awards and decorations approved during the period are at enclosure 16.

(4) Chaplain Activities:

(a) There were no significant personnel changes.

(b) II CTZ has 159 US military chaplains:

139 US Army: 103 Protestant, 35 Catholic, 1 Jewish
20 US Air Force: 13 Protestant, 7 Catholic

(c) Religious Services:

1. Protestant services in OPCON units and in combat support and service support units are adequate. Services for advisory teams on a regular basis is a practical impossibility. Chaplains assigned to advisory teams do the best they can and depend on neighboring units to render services.

2. Catholic services in OPCON units are adequate.

3. Jewish services are inadequate. Services are conducted by the Jewish Chaplain in 9 locations once a month and in Nha Trang every week on the Sabbath. Lay Leaders conduct weekly Jewish services at nine locations. Coordination is no problem. One Jewish Chaplain assigned to this headquarters has responsibility for II CTZ. Chamukah services were conducted in the II CTZ for all Jewish personnel during this period.

4. In Nha Trang the following services are scheduled:

a. Sunday, 17 Protestant, 13 Catholic, 1 Lutheran, 2 Episcopal.

b. Friday evening, Jewish Sabbath Services

g. Daily, 3 Catholic services.

Services are conducted at the following locations:

HQ II FFQOEV
44th Sig En
459th Sig En

27th Army Group
5th Special Forces Group
US Air Force Base
1st Field Hospital
Hon Iro Island
Beach Chapel
Harbor Defense Site

f. Safety and Accident Prevention:

(1) Increased emphasis was placed on safety and accident prevention during the quarter. The military injury rate was lower and the motor vehicle accident rate higher than the previous quarter. However, both rates were lower than the established US Army expectancy ceilings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>MV Rate</th>
<th>MVR Rate</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul, Aug, Sep</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct, Nov, Dec</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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31 January 1968

(2) Injury and motor vehicle accident rates for the quarter are at Enclosure 12.

6. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order:

(1) Crime Prevention: The Nha Trang area Post Exchanges inventory for the period 11 September 1967 to 10 January 1968 indicates a significant reduction in the percentage of losses to gross sales. Losses during the previous period, 11 May 1967, ranged from 3.5% to 1.8% of total sales with an average loss of 2.2%. For the four exchanges involved in the survey, the results for the four months ending 10 January 1968 show an overall reduction of average losses ranging from 13.3% to 8% with an average loss of 3.5%. The reduction of losses can be attributed in part to the control and accountability measures implemented by store managers as a result of crime prevention surveys conducted on the four exchanges.

(2) VIP Security and Special Events Operations:

(a) Continuing requirements for personal security of VIPs and Military Police support of special events operations necessitated the adoption of an agreement between this office and coordinating agencies in the Nha Trang area. A meeting held 11 December 1967, representatives from G3, Protocol, G5 Commandant, Adjutant and Provost Marshal, I PFORGEV, US-MF Security Police and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) USN Harbor Defence, 5th SFG (ubm), Provost Marshal and Public Safety Advisor, Nha Trang, met to discuss and approve a basic plan to provide personal security of VIPs and coordinate planning of special events to include parking and traffic control, safeguarding of property and security of personnel. The plan was agreed upon by all participants and adopted as an SOP to guide in the planning and execution of combined operations.

(b) During the reporting period, security was provided for twelve VIP visits without incident. A joint operation for personal security of Chief of Staff, US Army, General Harold K. Johnson, was coordinated with the 9th SFG Division and both the Colonel and Division Commander of Northern Provinces, General Johnson visited several revolutionary development projects in the 9th SFG Division. Three special events conducted in the Nha Trang area required the combined efforts of US and Vietnamese military and civilian agencies. These events were Vietnamese National Day ceremonies, 1 November 1967, Commanders Conference held at H., 5th SFG (ubm) on 3 December 1968 and a Christmas celebration at the Sergeant Major Villa attended by CofS US Army and DG, I PFORGEV and staff.

(3) Installation Security Inspection and Practice Test Exercises (PTE): I PFORGEV Regulation 525-3, subject as above, dated 15 November 1967, requires that a PM representative accompany the I PFORGEV inspection team on quarterly inspections of ten major US installations in II CTZ. Installation security inspections of all ten major installations were conducted during the period 1 November 1967 to 31 January 1968. PTEs were conducted at Hue, Phi Cat and Nha Trang. During the PTE phase of the inspection the PM representative observed local military police and US-MF security police operations in the area of control of personnel and material entering the installation, traffic control within the installation and on roadways in the area of operation, control of indigenous, third country nationals and FDCP personnel, security of sensitive areas and personal security of GO/VIP. The security inspection phase of the inspection immediately

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SUBJECT: Operational Insight - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

follows the PIS. It is during this phase that the MI representative surveys physical security measures throughout the installation, with emphasis on defensive measures such as perimeter barriers, control of local employees and perimeter lighting. Through these inspections installation commanders are presented a realistic picture of their reaction capability during an announced alert and given a thorough inspection of physical security measures.

(a) Prisoners of War:

(1) Processing and Evacuation of POWs: On 12 December 1967 the N Cam at the Tai closed for the receipt of POWs, having reached its maximum established capacity of 2000 POWs. The camp remained closed for a nine day period. During this period evacuation of POWs continued to GVN and MACV units from capturing units to collecting joints at brigade/division level. At no time during the closure did overcrowding exist within the collecting points. Coordination by this office with MACV-M and GI advisor, USA II Corps, resulted in the reopening of the Phu Tai IV camp on 20 Dec 67, upon the transfer of 117 civil defendants (CD's) from the camp to the Binh Dinh Jail. The CD's were transients awaiting return to GVN civil channels.

(b) Work Program: The implementation of work programs within II Corps POW camps was stressed by GVN MACV during October 1967. Through painful employment of POWs, the security hazards posed by idleness and collision is greatly reduced, in addition, health and morale of POWs has improved by keeping them occupied with useful tasks. Statistics received from the military police advisors to the Tai and Thu Tai IV Camps show that the employment rate is high in II Corps POW camps. At the Tai Camp, average figures for December show that of 792 POW's employed, 579 were employed daily for an average of 73%. At the Tai IV Camp for December, 507 POWs were employed on a daily basis for an average of 67%. Non-employable POW's at both sites include officers, physically handicapped and elderly personnel. Both II Corps camps have an overall work program whereby local US and GVN units utilize POW labor on a daily basis. In-camp work includes projects to better living conditions through repair, existing facilities and making small items of apparel such as shoes and uniforms. A gardening project exists at the Tai where rations are supplemented by self grown fruit stones.

(5) Highway Operations Improvement Program:

(a) The incidence of traffic accidents, injuries and fatalities in II Corps has risen. Some reasons can be given to explain the rapid rise in the accident rate; some examples are; marked increase in traffic volume, poor convoy discipline and control, lack of courtesy and adherence to safe driving practices on the part of individual drivers, failure of Vietnamese authorities to control VN military and civilian traffic, failure of VN nationals to understand either the nature or the magnitude of the problem presented by modern vehicular traffic and problems occasioned by (5a) third country nationals.

(b) A conference was held on 5 Jan 68, to formulate plans for the improvement of highway operations. Convening interest and emphasis was received. List of conference included GI and GI representatives, Transportation Corps personnel, engineering personnel, MACV military police and US military police representation from the Provost Marshal Office, USAV, Provost Marshall's Office, MACV Corps, 16th MACV Division Provost Marshals and and Provost Marshals.

(c) The formulated MACV Highway Operations Improvement program is bringing into play the concerted and coordinated
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AVFA-GC-OT
SUBJECT: Operational report-lessons learned for quarterl upperiod ending 31 January 1968 RCS CSFO-65 U20 UNCLN. 92 FA 043C-12 (5)

efforts of all military police assets in II CTZ. Although insufficient time remained in the reporting period to result in a noticeable improvement in traffic safety, the forthcoming quarter will prove whether or not our approach is sound and effective. "Actual stops to be taken include, but are not limited to: more stringent enforcement, traffic studies in major cities and other congested areas, coordination with VN civil police agencies in order to influence them to increase their efforts in traffic enforcement, integration of the Traffic Control Plan with the Highway Regulation Plan, increasing to the degree possible the use of combined patrols utilizing US, IORFY and VN personnel.

7. (c) Artillery:

a. During the period 1 November 1967 through 31 January 1968, I Field Force Vietnam artillery continued to support United States, Vietnamese and Free World military assistance forces (FIMA) in II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ).

b. I Field Force Vietnam artillery units, totaling two artillery groups, eleven battalions, five separate batteries and six detachments, supported all major operations in II CTZ to include Operations BULSH, Ende (EHNLH), MCDUFF and MMVU. Support was rendered Republic of Korea Forces in the 9th and Capitol Infantry division areas of operation during Operations M19, Hagu BO 9, Hagu Bo 17 and H25 CAV Div. Support to RVN forces was rendered throughout II CTZ to units of the 2nd and 23rd Division, the 24th Special Tactical Zone and provincial defense units.

c. Positioning of Heavy Artillery: An extensive study of heavy artillery assets within FFORC-1 artillery resulted in a basic positioning plan which utilizes fully the firepower, accuracy and long range interdiction capability of heavy artillery in II CTZ. From primary firing positions located near major road arteries all heavy artillery batteries have the capability of displacing to supplementary firing positions on short notice, thereby extending coverage and bringing fires on enemy positions considered previously as sanctuaries.

d. Support of Special Forces: FFORC-1 artillery groups established liaison with special forces B detatchments in II CTZ to insure that adequate artillery support is provided special forces camps and operations. Thus far, support has included training assistance at those camps equipped with artillery for forward observers, gun crews and fire direction personnel; providing forward observers and quick fire channels for operations; and exchanging intelligence information.

e. Support of ARVN: FFORC-1 artillery provided training support for both ARVN artillery and maneuver units during the reporting period. Forward observer training courses were presented to company grade officers of the 40th, 41st, and 47th ARVN regiments; maintenance and survey courses were presented; and ARVN artillery fire missions were being processed through US artillery FIML in operating fires of adjacent units.

7. (d) Surveillance:

(1) Aerial Surveillance: An increase in allocation of surveillance aircraft (OSB) to FFORC-1 artwy from 9 to 17 during the reporting quarter has enabled a significant increase in the visual reconnaissance effort of Force artillery units. This increase resulted in increased target acquisitions and improved target surveillance.

(2) Ground Surveillance: A program of ground observation from within or near a firing battery position has been initiated.
SUBJECT: Operational Impact-Loss as Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

The objective of the erotik surveillance program is to watch for enemy movement and to obtain general battlefield intelligence. Well fortified observation posts are constructed from which observers are able to provide timely and accurate data on enemy firing positions during mortar or rocket attacks.

The 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175mm gun, self-propelled) arrived in-country on 24 December 1967 and was attached to 52d Artillery Group effective 1 January 1968. 41st Artillery Group hosted the unit during their in-processing period. The battalion was assigned the mission of General support of the US/MVN/MXR in II CI on 15 January 1968. Battalion base camp was established at An Khe.

h. Situation Report (SITREP):

(1) On 25 December 1967, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery initiated a revised system for reporting artillery, naval gunfire and tactical air ammunition expenditures. The new SITREP provides more meaningful data regarding the same, in which fire support resources are being employed. All expenditures are now reported by target category as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artillery and Naval gunfire</th>
<th>Tactical air</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Landing Zone Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquired</td>
<td>Only/Zone preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterbattery</td>
<td>Preparatory Fires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
<td>Convoy cover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Purpose</td>
<td>Known enemy locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Suspected Enemy locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interdiction missions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Support given to SVN Forces is monitored on a monthly basis.

(2) The purpose of developing a more definitive report and analysis of a system is to provide a vehicle for channeling the efforts of all fire support agencies toward common objectives, which are: To direct firepower against the enemy so as to make the most efficient and coordinated use possible of integrated fire support resources and to obtain maximum utilization of all ordinance expended.

(3) Initial indications are that the system has begun to channel efforts of fire support agencies in the right direction and that it will provide an excellent management and evaluation tool by:

(a) Inducing a growing awareness of the requirement for expanded target acquisition efforts.

(b) Focusing attention on the need for coordinated integration of all fire support means.

(c) Illustrating the necessity for adherence to proper fire support procedures.

(d) Providing an accurate and definitive indication as to which elements are using fire support most effectively.
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AWP-GC-OT

SUBJECT: Operational Report-lessons learned for Quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 ACS CSFCE-65 UAC WDLA HK IFORVM (U)

(a) Adding tactical commanders in their evaluation of specific firing units, naval gunfire resources and use of tactical air when redeployment or realignment of forces is being considered.

(a) This concept and basis system for reporting expenditures by target category was adopted by Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, all Artillery units in South Vietnam began reporting under this format 1 February 1968.

1. Intelligences: The first IFORVM Arty Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) was dispatched on 6 January 1968. The INTSUM contains significant artillery intelligence reported by units attached to IFORVM Arty, intelligence reported is consolidated by the IFORVM Artillery S2 section and disseminated to IFORVM CS, 5th Special Forces Group and all artillery units including the Division artillery and separate brigades. Increased emphasis on artillery target intelligence is expected to result in more timely and accurate target acquisition and will increase the effectiveness of artillery fires.

J. Training:

(1) To increase professionalism within the artillery and to insure a safe transition into combat operations for newly arrived personnel, two courses of instruction for IFORVM artillery and divisional artillery units were initiated beginning 8 January 1968.

(a) Forward Observer Training Course (FOTC): This course is conducted four times per month at 2d BN, 17th Arty for a maximum of 12 students/class. FOOC consists of eight hours classroom instruction and 24 hours service practice and tactical application. FOOC covers duties of the FO team, equipment, map reading, consultation, mission of artillery, fire planning, rules of engagement, coordination and clearance of fire, TAC air, aerial rocket artillery, naval support, night firing and lessons learned.

(b) Forward Observer Training Course (FOOC): This course is conducted four times per month at 3d BN, 6th Arty for a maximum of 12 students/class. FOOC covers organization of the FDC, duties of personnel, rules of engagement, coordination and clearance of fires, equipment, determination of short data, friendly elements, computation of firing data, completion of forms, registrations, metro, FB, FIBG, deflection and fuse corrections, data for replan, high-angle fire, observed and surveyed firing charts, safety, extensive practical applications and lessons learned.

(2) Operation of these courses is not expected to be a panacea but should prove a step forward in insuring the timely and accurate delivery of devastating artillery fires on the enemy. Continued and vigorous training at the lowest levels for all elements of the gunnery chain is still required to insure traditional artillery professionalism.

K. 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery (-) departed II CTZ on 7 January 1968 and deployed to III CTZ with 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Battery B (Provisional), 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery remained in support of TF 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry in the Khanh Diêt area.

L. On 7 January 1968, Battery A, 32d Battalion, 10th Artillery was relieved from attachment with 6th Battalion, 10th Artillery and rejoined its parent battalion in I CTZ.

M. The 1st Cavalry Division (mechanized) artillery (-) completed its move to I CTZ on 22 January 1968. The remaining division Artillery units in II CTZ support the divisions 2d Brigade.
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AVAIGOT
SUBJECT: Operational report-Lessens lived for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1968 w in OSF 61-62 bldg 4FLP & 1 PTCM (B)

n. 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (-) completed movement to 1
CTZ on 25 January 1968 when elements from battalion head
& Battery 3 joined Battery 4 in support of the 1st Cavalry
(AirMobile) in the Hue/Bien Gi area.

c. Statistics for US artillery in I Corps Tactical Zone
for the reporting quarter:

(1) Missions fired:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HX</td>
<td>30618</td>
<td>39500</td>
<td>49964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBSERVED</td>
<td>8247</td>
<td>10537</td>
<td>5790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOBSERVED</td>
<td>5953</td>
<td>4870</td>
<td>8694</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(2) Ammunition Expenditures:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>105</th>
<th>155</th>
<th>205</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOA</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>75,111</td>
<td>29,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMP</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subtotal: 899,154

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>105</th>
<th>155</th>
<th>205</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOA</td>
<td>230,148</td>
<td>24,606</td>
<td>21,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMP</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Subtotal: 313,603

<table>
<thead>
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<th>155</th>
<th>205</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOA</td>
<td>158,277</td>
<td>21,496</td>
<td>23,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMP</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subtotal: 253,999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>105</th>
<th>155</th>
<th>205</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOA</td>
<td>158,277</td>
<td>21,496</td>
<td>23,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMP</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subtotal: 253,999

Artillery Strength. The following table reflects artillery
strength by caliber for US, 155mm and 155mm artillery units in I
CTZ at the end of the quarter.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 to 16 CSFOR-65 VIC MilDev K; I FFORCEV (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>105mm</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>8 Inch</th>
<th>175mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Divisional</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40K Divisional</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Force artillery</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M119 Artillery</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

q. US artillery units of I Field Force Vietnam at the end of the reporting period were:

(1) Non-Divisional

I FFORCEV artillery

5th Battalion, 27th artillery (105mm T)
6th Battalion, 32nd artillery (175/8 inch Sr)
41st Artillery Group

7th Battalion, 13th artillery (105mm T)

Battery C, 1st Battalion, 30th artillery (155mm T)
7th Battalion, 15th artillery (175/8 inch Sr)
Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th artillery (155mm T)
24th Battalion, 17th artillery (150mm T/155mm T Prov)
1st Battalion, 30th artillery (-) (155mm T)
4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (dict)

Battery A, 29th Artillery (Sgarchlight)
Battery E, 41st Artillery (D3)

Headquarters Battery, 6th Target acquisition Battalion, 26th artillery

77th Field artillery Detachment (radar)
237th Field artillery Detachment (radar)
241st Field artillery Detachment (radar)
2421 Field artillery Detachment (radar)
243d Field artillery Detachment (radar)
244th Field artillery Detachment (radar)

524th artillery Group

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Subject: Operational Unit List

Ending 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (173-mm 8-inch)
5th Battalion, 22nd Artillery (175-mm)

1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155-mm)

(2) Divisional:
4th Infantry Division Artillery
5th Battalion, 24th Artillery (155-mm 8-inch)
6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105-mm)
4th Battalion, 101st Artillery (105-mm)

2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Armored)
1st Battalion, 77th Artillery (Controlling M only)
Battery G, 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery (105-mm)
Battery H, 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery (3.7-mm)
Battery A, 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery (105-mm)
Battery A, 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery (105-mm)

1st Brigade, 1st Airborne Division

Battery D (Provisional), 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery
(105-mm)

173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)

3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (105-mm)

8. (c) Signal Operations.

a. Routine operations and upgrading of I FORCNRV communications continues to be the major activity of the Signal Section.

b. The 54th Signal Battalion provided communications support for Operations HQ, 12th HAM, 13th HAM, KLAMC, and DOLLNG.

c. On 21 Dec 67, Headquarters I Field Force published a communications services directory. This directory provides in one reference document useful locator and communications service information pertaining to advisory, WOS, I pEF, MDS, and Special Forces units in the II Corps Tactical Zone. Many small groups and detachments are located throughout the II Corps with whom it is possible to communicate but the means of communicating with them are little known. Since its publication there have been numerous requests for additional copies. This publication will be updated and expanded periodically.

d. In November, Typhoon Frieda moved through the II Corps area, causing some damage to communications equipment. Several antennas were damaged or destroyed at Vung Ro Mountain and Toy Hac. Restoration operations continued as soon as high winds diminished sufficiently to permit personnel to work without undue risk. All communications were restored within approximately 48 hours.

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During this quarter major subordinate units have been fragmented, and I FFONGV has extended communications to brigade and battalion size units. In addition, because of the lack of communications resources of smaller units, additional internal unit support has been provided from I FFONGV resources. Thus far, those additional requirements have not proven unmanageable.

The 31st Signal Group began to parallel I FFONGV Tactical systems with army area communications systems, down to and including brigade size base camps. This effort relieved some of the burden placed on I FFONGV tactical communications systems, and by virtue of being the only means available in some areas, carried administrative and logistic circuits to non I FFONGV combat service support units. As this concept becomes more fully implemented, I FFONGV communications can be applied to strictly tactical command and control communications.

Programmed circuit requirements constitute a special item for study:

1. The tactical situation often requires changes in plans during the planning area. The planning for Operation -NOAH (KIA - MBT Falls) pointed out the difficulties encountered by the head quarters attempting to program circuits requirements within the 30 day time frame desired by USMCW and MCB. Planning started on 26 Aug 67. Between that time and a day, 1 Dec 67, numerous major changes were made in the task organization, the concept of operation and the time frame during which the operation would be conducted. For example, major changes in the concept of the operation and in the task organization were made as late as 22 Nov and 25 Nov. The time parameters were again changed twice while the operation was in progress. This is a classic example of attempting to program communications support for a "planned" operation. In order to program circuits well in advance of an operation on the planners must have firm knowledge of what the task organization is going to be, the area of operation involved, and the dates that the circuits will be required.

2. Conversely, numerous unit redeployments are made with little or no prior notice in the II Corps Tactical Zone. This necessitates a rapid response by communications personnel at all levels. As long as the fluid tactical situation causes frequent changes in operations plans and results in short notice deployment or major troop units, a requirement to preplan circuits 30 days in advance is unrealistic. To date the Southeast Asia Wide Band System and WBS has responded extremely well to immediate requirements for emergency circuits. It is anticipated that this method of requesting circuits will, of necessity, continue to prevail for the foreseeable future.

9. (C) Engineer:

a. The majority of the effort of the engineer section during the reporting period was devoted to planning, coordination and supervision of the engineer combat support provided by the 18th Engineer Brigade units in support of I FFONGV, 5th SBW, USMCW and 29th operations. The organic engineer units, 4th Engineer Battalion, 8th Engineer Battalion, 1/34th Engineer Battalion and the 173rd Engineer Company, of the units under operational control of I FFONGV were fully committed in support of their parent organizations throughout the period. Their activities were monitored by the engineer section. Tactical operations supported during the period were SOUMADO, BAI, KULIN, LIZZEM, N.OARKHU, TOVISO, SULLA, KIAITH PALS, KOSB.
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AVP-A-G-07
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1968 a 06 GSTGt 65 (NC DDD3 DOD 11111 11111

1. OVERVIEW and FINDINGS. Specific engineer combat support effort expended by units of the 28th Eng Bde and divisional and brigade engineer units in support of current and future tactical operations are discussed in the following paragraphs.

b. Support of Tactical Operations:

(1) Operations 3-331 and 4-351: The 45th Engineer Group is in general support of these two operations. Support includes upgrading and maintenance of roads, repair of airfields and general engineer support.

(2) Operation K-151: The 337th Engineer Group is in general support of this operation. Support included bridge construction, maintenance of roads and airfields, and general support. During this period a considerable engineer effort was required to keep roads and airfields in the northeastern portion of the AO-open. This area was the scene of large and heavy enemy contact. Routes 512, 511 and 509 were upgraded during this period.

(3) Operation K-151: The 337th Engineer Group was in general support of Operation K-151. Support included maintenance of roads and airfields, construction of FOB and FOB facilities, clearing base camp areas, application of dust suppressants and general engineer support.

c. AirfieldUpgrading and/or repair:

(1) Tan Chuc airfield (U 004569). The 20th AFR began upgrading of this field from T-17 to Type II in January 1968. When completed in late February, the field will be rated as Type II, 0-150.

(2) Gia Long airfield (U 041933). The upgrading of this field from T-17 to Type II was completed on 15 January 1968. When completed in late February, it will be rated as Type II, 0-150. The battalion also provided engineer support to Operation SHADOW at Gia Long by constructing helicopter facilities, defensive emplacements and structures and by furnishing technical engineer assistance.

(3) Tan Hoat GOC Camp and Airfield Complex (U006583). The 337th Engr in continued its construction efforts and during this period completed clearing the camp, area, airfield site and area surrounding the camp site with those low cost concrete construction of the Type II, 0-76 airfield surfaced with blacktop, and initiated construction of the firebase complex adjacent to the GOC camp. The requirement to construct the airfield in such a manner that it could be expanded to a C-150 capability was recinded by HCM. Current ESC of this project is 1 Feb 68.

(4) English airfield (U 072383). The 49th Engr in commenced repairs to the middle 500 feet of the runway on 3 Nov 67. Repairs were completed on 24 Nov 67 and included removing the old blacktop, repairing the existing subgrade, placing a new subgrade consisting of crushed rock, overlaying it with T-17 macadam, placing a sand blower over the macadam and finally laying down new blacktop. Repairs to the existing apron are now in progress.

(5) Nieuwkoop airfield (U 022635). The 20th Engr in is furnishing engineer support to the 5th SFG in support of Operation FLOIDA, which directs the construction of a GOC Camp and a Type II.
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AARFUT-Y
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C-7a airfield at Pak To 11. Commanded on 20 Dec 60, the 20th Engr
in airfield personnel, sqn. 111, and equipment into the site. Since
the orig site is inaccessible by road, construction will be
accomplished utilizing airmobile equipment from the 299th Engr
Sq, 1st Cav Div and the 5th SFG. The present lod is 1 Mar 61.

(6) Kontum airfield (22 710390). The construction of a
second parking apron at Kontum airfield was completed by the 299th
Engr En on 27 Nov 60. This second apron of 500 ft x 50 ft will
serve as a simultaneous parking at both ends of the field.

(7) Lao Lao airfield (22 654765). The upgrading of
the runway at Lao Lao was completed by the 299th Engr En on
27 Nov 60. The 1st Cav Div has now taken over the field and has
been conducting operations from it.

(8) Van Loi airfield (22 647403). The 299th Engr
completed construction of a new 650-ft runway, parallel to the exist-
ing runway at Van Loi airfield on 17 Dec 60. This will be an HMA
project and has a current lod of 30 Mar 61.

(9) Lao Lao airfield (22 647403). The upgraded
runway at Lao Lao was completed by the 299th Engr En on
27 Nov 60. The 1st Cav Div has now taken over the field and has
been conducting operations from it.

(10) T-17 comeback. Small repair teams
were employed on the T-17 hangar and runway areas for periods in
excess of one week during this period. The areas included the
runway, taxi areas, and approach zones. The hangar was
completely repaired during this period.

(11) Future airfield improvements. The following
airfields are scheduled for repair or upgrading during the next three month period:

(a) Lao Lao (22 647403). To be upgraded to Type II,
C-130 capability. The 20th Engr En will accomplish this upon the com-
pletion of the new taxiway. The new taxiway will be 500 ft in
width and will be completed in the next three months.

(b) Van Loi (11 233120). The new runway will be
completed and put into service. The new runway will be
C-130 capable and will be completed by the 299th Engr En.

(c) Lao Lao (22 647403). To be repaired with no
change in existing classification (Type II, C-130). The 20th Engr
En will accomplish this through maintenance of the existing
runway.

(d) Van Loi (11 233120). To be repaired with
no change in existing classification (Type II, C-130). The 20th Engr
En will accomplish this through maintenance of the existing
runway.

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SITUATION Report: Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

30TH Engineers

a. Land Clearing Operations. The 30th Land Clearing Team continued under CWOON of 2 FPOG II. During the past three months approximately 9,920 acres have been cleared along routes 19, 21, 50, 51, 52, 512, and 191. The following routes have been cleared or are being cleared at present:

(1) Route 512: Cleared from 5 km west of Hen Nhat east to junction with CL-14.

(2) CL-14: Cleared from junction with route 512 south to junction with route 60.

(3) VL-19: Cleared from Loc Ha to the An Khe Pass.

(4) Route 509: Organic dozers from the 397th Engr Cp cleared from Loc Ha west to Ia Liang.

(5) Route 14D: Cleared from junction with route 509 south to junction with route 134.

(6) Route 193: The 4th Engr In cleared from base Co east to junction with CL-14.

(7) Route 60: Cleared from Ia Liang northeast to junction with CL-14.

(8) CL-1 (II/III Corps boundary to Han Thiet): Cleared by II FPOG II on 30 Jan 68.

(9) CL-1 (Man Thiet - Ia Ham): Now being cleared by one lane flow section with an end 266 of 10 Feb 68. At present the section from Man Thiet to EN 6566 has been completed.

(10) CL-1 (Man Lang - to Ngoc): Organic dozers from the 30th Engr In commenced clearing along CL-1 during Dec 67. At present 300 acres to the north of Ia Ham has been cleared.

(11) Combat Trails: Organic dozers from the 4th Engr In cleared a dry weather road from site 191 (EN 45509) north to site 509 (EN 999135).

(12) CL-21: The Lane 21 Low Section now clearing along CL-21 via Ia Lang, will be moved to CL-21 a/a 15 Feb 68. Initiating land clearing operations along CL-21, (Man Hoc - Ban Ho Thuet).

(13) Route 71: One of the Lane 71 Low Sections now clearing via Bao Bang will start clearing along site 72 a/a 30 Feb 68 from the junction of CL-34 and into site 73 to Chua Khe.

b. Route Upgrading: The II FPOG II objective has been to open roads first to CL-10 to permit movement of troops and supplies, then to CL-31 to permit movement of gasoline tankers and self-propelled artillery, and finally to upgrade to MCV standards, which is an all-weather, 2-lane, 2-way roadway with permanent bridges of CL-35, two-way and CL-39, one-way.

(1) CL-13: Cu Long Rws (EN 0313) to Tuy An (QG 1069) initiated joint US-NVN upgrading from CL-13 to CL-31, two-lane, all-weather.

(2) CL-11: II/III CIV boundary (EN 150X) to Phan Lang (EN 7706) upgraded from closed to CL-11, all-weather.

(3) CL-1: Tuy Hoa (QG 1549) to Vung Ho (QG 2722) initiated upgrading from CL-31 towards MCV standards.

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OPERATION

Operational report-lessons learned for quarterly review ending 31 Jan 1967

380th Engr CP

1. TL-21: Minh Binh (Z-93957) to Lam Ha Tho (43004) completed joint US-VN effort to reopen route to CL-50 one-way limited all-weather status.

2. TL-22: Kontum (Z-6679) to Luc Tho (Z-5772) to Luc Djereng (Z-6676) upgraded from CL-12, fair-weather to CL-50, limited all-weather status.

3. TL-23: Quan Son (Z-9861) to La Ha (Z-6004) completed joint US-VN effort to reopen routes to CL-50 on all-day limited all-weather status.

4. TL-24: Ulu to (Z-4775) to Slui Dien (Z-8646) upgraded from CL-12, fair-weather to CL-31, limited all-weather capability.

5. TL-25: Kontum (Z-2289) to Luc Kanh (Z-0393) to closed to CL-45, limited all-weather status.

6. TL-26: Dien Bien Phu (Z-0422) to Nui Phu (Z-9171) to Camp Holloway and on QL-1 from Nui Phu to Dan (Z-9867).

7. TL-27: To (Z-1465) to Dien Bien Phu (Z-0422) to closed to CL-50, limited all-weather capability.

8. TL-28: Dien Bien Phu (Z-0422) to closed to CL-12, no weather capability.

9. TL-29: Dien Bien Phu (Z-93957) to closed to CL-50, limited all-weather capability.

10. TL-30: Dien Bien Phu (Z-0422) to closed to CL-50, limited all-weather capability.

11. TL-31: Dien Bien Phu (Z-0422) to closed to CL-50, limited all-weather capability.

12. TL-32: Dien Bien Phu (Z-0422) to closed to CL-50, limited all-weather capability.

Miscellaneous Projects:

1. Dien Khanh bridge (ext 93957), 800 ft timber pile bent bridge at Dien Khanh was partially destroyed by high water on 22 Nov 67. On 1 Dec 67 the 26th Engr in initiated repairs which consisted of replacing the entire superstructure. Repairs were completed on 4 Dec utilizing 24 hr/day operations.

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AVN-02-07

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(2) Chu Van Aqueduct (O-07353). On 20 Nov 67 an artillery round struck one bank of the aqueduct causing about 13,000 cu yds of aqueduct embankment to collapse, before the water could be diverted. The Vietnamese Irrigation Service requested US assistance in accomplishing repairs on the aqueduct; therefore, commencing on 1 Feb 68 the 97th Engr Bn will improve roads, install a MARK V ferry and furnish and erect approximately 400 tons of blast rock to form the toe of the embankment and prevent erosion by the river. The remainder of the work will be accomplished by Irrigation Service with assistance from the 97th engineers.

(3) Chu Cat Training Center. The 45th Engr Co has been supporting the renovation of the training center by furnishing engineering equipment and technical assistance.

(5) POWER plant construction. A total of 54 runways for FAC aircraft were constructed during this period at Song My, Dau Hoa, Tuy Hoa, Phuoc Ho, 11th-12th, Chu Loc, No Ne Tho (City), Chinh Sue, 13th, 16th, 46th, 5th, 14th, and 15th Airfields.

(6) Base at S8 (02-07). The 699th Engr Co commenced construction of a new 20 ton AWZ adjacent to Tuy Hoa Airfield on 16 Nov 67. The work was completed on 19 Jan 68.

10 (U) Information Office

a. Representatives of the Information Office provided publicity coverage for numerous award and promotion ceremonies as well as for special events during this period, including:

(1) Arrival of Major General Keith L. Ware, assigned as Deputy Commanding General, I FFBAEW, 7 December 1967.


(3) Presentation of the Meritorious Unit Commendation to Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I FFBAEW artillery, by Lieutenant General William R. Rossen, 6 January 1968.


b. Photographic coverage was provided for the visits of numerous distinguished visitors, including:

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c. The following media representatives were granted an interview with the commanding general and/or a G2/G3 briefing during the period covered by the report:


(2) Mr. Robert Kaylor, UPI, 3 November 1967.


(4) Mr. Charles W. Bailey, White House Correspondent, Minneapolis Tribune, and Mr. Ronald M. Ross, Far East Correspondent, Minneapolis Tribune, 29 November 1967.


(8) Dr. Waldo Stephens, News commentator and analyst, KFYV, Oklahoma City, 30 December 1967.

(9) Mr. Don Obendorfer, Washington Correspondent, Knight Papers, 18 January 1968.

d. The 5th Public Information Detachment, under the supervision of the DO, I FFOWAV, published and distributed its "Morning News" on a daily basis, and published the November, December and January issues of the I FFOWAV magazine, the "Typarum".

e. The 11th Public Information Detachment continued to provide transportation, escort, billets and other aid to correspondents and visiting information personnel, handling US personnel during the period covered. A major renovation project on the Press Camp in Pleiku was completed, vastly improving the facilities available for correspondents. The Pleiku Press Camp moved into its permanent buildings and work is continuing to improve the facilities.

II. (6) Inspector General Activities:

e. Colonel Gordon D. Reed arrived on 11 Dec 67 and assumed the duties of Inspector General, this head-quarter. Colonel Reed was previously assigned to the United States Army Material Command where he served as the Liaison Officer for the United States Army Air Defense Command.

f. During the period 10 complaints and 24 requests for assistance were received. Four of the complaints were justified, but none of the complaints indicated any evidence of trends, widespread irregularities or problems detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of this command.

g. Command inspections of the following units were conducted during the period on the dates indicated:
AVFA-WC-OT

SOUTHWESTERN OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 1968

I & S CSFOR-65

U.S. MILITARY HQ, IFFTHACV

UNIT                           DATE
1st Civil Affairs Co          17 Nov 67
11th Public Information Bn    22 Nov
5th Military Intelligence Bn  22 Nov
6th Engineer Bn
Headquarters Company, 1 Field Force Vietnam      15 Dec 67
272d Military Police Bn       22 Dec 67
297th Transportation Bn (OAK)  29 Dec 67
24th Signal Battalion         19 Jan 68
209th Signal Detachment

(1) All units inspected were rated as Satisfactory and were found to be accomplishing their mission in an efficient and economical manner.

(2) The 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery was inspected by USARV during the period 2 - 6 Jan 68. The unit (commanded by LTG John G. Elofs) was given a personal commendation by the Acting Commanding General, USARV for an outstanding performance of duty.

(3) During the period, two investigations were conducted by the Inspector General.

(a) The Inspector General maintained liaison with the Acting Inspector General of units assigned/attached to this headquarters. Acting Inspector General positions vacated due to R & R, reassignment, etc., were filled as indicated below:

(1) Major Jim A. Glisson 7th Bn, 13th Arty
(2) Major Raymond E. Gatti 7th Bn, 15th Arty
(3) Major Elbert L. Harrison 2d Bn, 17th Arty
(4) Major Omar J. Calciola 5th Bn, 27th Arty
(5) Major Warren J. Brown 1st Bn, 30th Arty
(6) Major James J. Scalise 6th Bn, 32d Arty
(7) Major Richard J. flavasaki 4th Bn, 60th Arty
(8) Major Norman L. Barnes Hq, 1st Arty Gp

(b) Two staff visits were conducted as indicated below:

(1) On 25 - 27 Dec 67 the IG visited Hq, 1st Arty Gp and the 1st Bn, 30th Arty to discuss the USARV annual general inspection which was conducted on 2 - 6 Jan 68.

(2) 15 - 16 Jan 68 the IG visited the HQ 32d Arty Gp, 1st Bde/4th Inf Div, II Corps, and the 4th Inf Div HQ for the purpose of staff liaison.

12. (U) STAFF ADVOCATE ACTIVITIES:

(a) There were eight trials by General courts-martial convened by the Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, during the quarter compared to three in the previous quarter. The offenses involved in all the cases were military type offenses. Eighty-seven special and 38 summary
courts-martial records of trial were reviewed for legal sufficiency.
This reflects an increase of 36 special and six summary courts-martial cases over the previous quarter.

b. Thirteen claims of Army personnel for loss of, or damage to, personal property incident to service were adjusted and paid, compared to 16 the previous quarter. The claims totaling $1358.07 were approved for payment in the total amount of $1358.07.

c. The legal assistance office provided advice and assistance on civil matters to 828 individuals during the quarter compared to 768 the previous quarter.

d. No significant problems were encountered during the quarter in the Judge Advocate functional areas of responsibility.

SECTION II - COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I - OBSERVATIONS

a. Item. Installation of Army Area Communication System Circuits.

Discussion: During combat operations it is highly desirable to keep the communications systems installed by Field Force Signal units free for command and control circuits. To accomplish this it is necessary for the Field Force Signal Officer to undertake direct coordination with Army Area Communications System Personnel, to accommodate administrative and logistic support elements present in forward areas.

Observation: When possible, Army Area Systems to the tactical units should be installed simultaneously with Field Force command and control systems. Ideally this action will result in freeing the Field Force system from the initial burden of providing administrative and logistic circuits and will make them more available and responsive to the needs of command.

b. Item. Agavenco Spray System.

Discussion: Two 200 gallon capacity, Agavenco Spray Systems were received by DSA, II Corps in January 68. One sprayer has been loaned to the 4th Infantry Division and the other to the 173d Air Bde. The sprayers, mounted in UH-1 Helicopters, are being used to attack rice seedling beds in approved herbicide areas and for perimeter defoliation. There are certain precautions which must be observed when using the Agavenco:

(1) The helicopters must fly at speeds in excess of 50 knots to activate the system and to provide enough pressure to dispense the herbicide properly.

(2) The sprayer must be turned off while the helicopter banks in order to prevent herbicide from spraying against the sides of the aircraft. Herbicide is harmful to paint.

(3) The spray system should be mounted after the helicopter has been fully fueled, since the spray boom on the right side must be removed to allow refueling.

(4) A filter should be placed over the mouth of the intake tube to prevent sludge from being drawn into the spray tank.

Observation: Proper utilization of the Agavenco sprayer in a crop destruction role could maintain great pressure on the enemy's food resources. Operators and pilots must be familiar with precautions to be observed while spraying.
c. Item: Targeting of Interdiction Fires.

Discussion: Targeting of interdiction fires has not always made the best use of current intelligence. Interdiction fires have sometimes been planned based on intuition and experience, on trails, stream junctions, etc., instead of on areas where there is a high probability of enemy presence. The fragmentation of artillery units has also contributed to the situation, as more and more interdiction fire planning is done at lower echelons which do not have rapid access to intelligence agencies. Intelligence available to targeting agencies at all levels has tended to be too stale for targeting purposes.

Observation: Division and Corps-Level FSO's have the personnel and the resources to overcome these shortcomings. It is necessary to establish a direct channel of communication between the FSO/FSOs and the FSO to insure current intelligence in the form of prisoner interrogation, agent, aerial and ground reconnaissance reports is made available for targeting use while it is still valid. By targeting on a daily basis and utilizing the most current intelligence available, the FSO/FSO can produce interdiction programs which do not waste artillery ammunition and which will result in a higher probability of inflicting significant damage on the enemy.

d. Item: Targeting of B52 strikes.

Discussion: Targeting for B52 strikes has been accomplished many times without an adequate analysis as desired. B52 targets should meet the following criteria:

(1) The target must be of sufficient importance to warrant the expenditure of great amounts of ordnance.

(2) It must be a target that will remain in position long enough to allow complete coordination of the strike.

Observation: Effective targeting requires that all intelligence be screened and analyzed to determine if the area under study meets the above criteria. In addition to the location, nature, size and shape of the target, the following information must be determined:

(1) Vulnerability of the target, e.g., bunkers with overhead cover, foxholes, etc.

(2) Capability: Does the target pose a major threat to friendly troops? Does the target have the capability of moving rapidly?

(3) Recuperability: Can the target recuperate soon after the strike to pose a continued threat to friendly troops?

(4) Terrain: Hilly, flat or heavily wooded terrain will affect the level of damage that can be accomplished.

(5) Proximity to friendly troops, religious monuments, national shrines or friendly civilians must be considered.

After considering all the above, the target box must be planned to inflict maximum damage on the enemy while holding the level of risk to all friendly personnel and installations at a minimum. Once a target is chosen it must be updated continually to determine continuing validity. With proper analysis and targeting techniques the B52 strike can yield better results.

e. Item: Logistical resupply to advisory troops in areas not readily accessible by land LOC.
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1968

(1) Efficiency scheduling of dedicated aircraft, such as C-130, which are made available to Field Force Headquarters. Thus many users are satisfied more efficiently and within their relative priorities.

(2) Use of space available aboard U.S. aircraft.

The cooperation of the COHS staff opens this possibility.

(3) Use of US Army aircraft for resupply. This method should be employed only in an emergency because these aircraft are in demand for urgent support of combat troops or their required maintenance services.

Observation: Wherever possible the Field Force Headquarters should have been to ten dedicated C-130 aircraft allocated daily for retail movement of urgent patients and cargo. In addition, proper coordination should be maintained between 6th and COHS for efficient interchange between U.S. military airlift and air projects of large and small cargo.shuttle capabilities.

f. Issues: Employment and naming of clearing stations.

Observation: The necessity for utilizing clearing stations rather than relying on direct evacuation to a hospital when units are operating at the extended distance encountered in II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) was demonstrated during the heavy fighting in the area to area during November 1967. Even if aircraft had been available to fly the patients directly to the hospital area of the 6th AFG THQ, no doubt the patients died during the trip, whereas none of the 229 wounded in action who were admitted to the clearing stations of the 173d Air Evac and the 4th Inf Div at Link to during the month of November died either in the clearing stations or enroute to the hospital. Several factors seem to have contributed to this success were:

(1) Skilled personnel. Each of the clearing stations had a medical officer with approximately three years of residency in a surgical specialty.

(2) Whole blood. Approximately 175 units of blood were given by the two clearing stations during the month.

(3) Availability of X-ray. X-rays done on several patients with chest wounds resulted in the use of chest tubes when the clinical picture did not adequately indicate the extent of the hemotorax. The surgeons felt that none of these patients would have developed respiratory difficulty during evacuation had the drainage not been established.

Observation: Air evacuation has not made the clearing station obsolete. Clearing stations with well trained personnel and adequate equipment provide a life saving link in the evacuation chain in II CTZ. Medical personnel of chest units operating in areas away from the immediate vicinity of a hospital should be named with at least one experienced surgeon and be equipped with X-ray facilities satisfactory for making chest films.

* Morbidity reports, 6th Inf Div & 173d Ath Inf, November 1967
** UB 2: Monthly Medical Scan Reports, November 1967

2. Issues: Augmentation of division medical service.

Discussion: During January 1968 two occasions arose in which help had to be requested from the 4th Inf Div elements to provide division level medical service for 1 FRB/CVB combat units.
AVC-00-07

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1966

(1) At Phan Thiet TP 3/7, a reinforced battalion, had been supported by an entire medical company of the 45th Medical Battalion. Changes in distribution of troops made it desirable to utilize this company more fully in support of a brigade instead of the smaller task force. The 43d Medical Group of the 44th Med Div responded to a request for help with a clearing element.

(2) The area of operations of the 4th Inf division became extended to the point that clearing stations had to be split to provide division level support to those units deployed at the extended distance. Because of the limited manning that the division medical service was working under in compliance with a USMC message (Unclassified AVCM 6473, 22DEC65, Subjects: Medical Service) it was found that the split clearing stations could not be adequately supported; therefore assistance was asked of the 43d Med Grp, 44th Med Div. A clearing element was placed at Ban Ho Thiet by the 43d Med Grp.

Observation: Medical elements organic to combat units are not manned or equipped to support the multiple units deployed over the extended distance that have been encountered in IF ORS. Any level medical resources should be kept available to augment the medical elements of combat units when they become overextended.

h. Item: Medical civic action programs (MICAP).

Discussion: Emphasis should be placed on the integration of US medical civic action program (MICAP) with Vietnamese health efforts. The manner in which restraint and proper channeling and coordination of MICAP efforts can contribute to the long term improvement of the Vietnamese health care was demonstrated during an outbreak of plague in November in the an Thon Subsector of Ben Duong Province. The initial reaction to the outbreak was for the US, military units to rush in and quickly institute control and treatment measures, but tempering this effort and coordinating it with the province and district health resources resulted in the outbreak being an excellent training vehicle for Vietnamese health workers and for the village. The key coordinator in this case was the US/VC Assistant Health Officer, Region II. Similar results can be obtained at the province level, if care is taken by US, military units to ensure that the medical assistance they wish to render in a community is coordinated through and used to augment the existing Vietnamese health system. This system does have more potential than is frequently realized.

Observation: Although it may be easier and more efficient for US, military units to handle epidemics and other disease problems than it is for them to coordinate with and assist the responsible Vietnamese health workers, the latter course offers more for the long-term upgrading of Vietnamese health care. MICAP and other medical assistance programs should be geared to training and augmentation whenever possible rather than to treatment by US personnel.

i. Item: Operation of helicopters in the immediate vicinity of airfields surfaced with 7-17 membrane or H-30-19 matting.

Discussion: The operation of helicopters, especially the OH-58 and OH-59, immediately adjacent to an airfield surfaced with H-30-19 or over ones surfaced with 7-17 membrane presents a definite hazard to the field's operational capability as the upwash from the helicopter will tend to lift the surfacing material and to carry it along with the helicopter for a short distance. This results in a displacement of the runway alignment, wrinkles in the calking, failure of the anchorage systems and possible ripping of 7-17 membrane surface. The 7-17 membrane held at Ban Lep was recently damaged by a OH-59 that took-off from the parking apron. Its rotor wash lifted up a large number of the anchorage stakes, thereby raising the portion of the apron unserviceable. A field jury-rigged a OH-58 lifted up an entire section of the H-30-19 runway causing a major displacement in the runway's alignment. This incident is mainly attributable
to insufficient anchoring of the KH-19 to the subgrade, thereby allowing the rotor-wash to get under the matting causing the matting to lift up.

**Observation:** Large helicopters, such as OH-1 and OH-6, should be landed away from P-17 and KH-19 airfields and should avoid, if at all possible, hovering at low altitudes near the runway or parking apron. Anchorage systems for KH-19 must secure the holding down to the subgrade and be of sufficient strength to withstand the lifting effects of low flying helicopters.

**i. Items:** Use of culverts in place of bridges along insecure routes or in areas where enemy incidents are frequent.

**Discussion:** Use of culverts in these situations is desirable as culverts are simple to construct, easy to repair, difficult and costly to destroy and built using noncritical materials and equipment. A certain risk must be expected in areas of heavy run-off as washouts may occur during the monsoon season.

**Observation:** The use of culverts whenever feasible will result in an overall saving of engineering resources.

**k. Items:** Current reference concerning bunker or shelter design.

**Discussion:** The current field manual on bunker or shelter design, FM 5-36, Field Fortification, Feb 65 does not contain adequate material to meet combat requirements as it does not provide data on the method to design a specific sized bunker to withstand the effects of a specific weapon. Each unit within III CTF designs bunkers based upon its own design concepts, whereas the best design is often not selected or considered. A testing program should be conducted to determine what designs should be employed and a publication covering them distributed.

Standard designs should consider economically used bunker sizes such as the four man fighting bunker (8' x 16' x 6'-0"); company Gr bunker (16' x 16' x 6'-0"); battalion Gr bunker (16' x 24' x 6'-0") and the brigade or division 100 (16' x 48' x 6'-0"). Commonly used designs in III CTF are based upon providing protection from 62 m mortar, 120 m 103 m rocket and 105 m arty.

**Observation:** A manual or publication is immediately needed to provide a standard method of designing both above and below ground protective bunkers, to furnish design data and to provide effective bunker designs based upon defense against specific weapons.

**ll. Items:** Matting failures under heavy usage.

**Discussion:** The failure of R-31 matting from heavy usage by 4-Dr craft supporting a brigade base was observed at loco loco airfield during Operation KIAWEN FALLS. This airfield was completed on 20 Nov 67 just prior to the start of this operation and was in excellent condition. At the conclusion of the operation on 22 Jan 68 the field had received over 1000 C-130 sorties and two points of weakness had developed in the R-31 matting. First, the welds cracked on either side of the cover plate allowing the connecting pins to come loose and the ends of the matting to turn up. Over 15% of the matting planks sustained at least one failure of this type. Secondly, heavier duty locking lugs are needed as numerous problems were encountered due to locking lug failure which allowed the matting to shift and become disengaged from the adjacent piece. It is suspected that these failures may be attributable to the effects of a C-130's impact during touch-down, landing and prop reversal. This impact may cause each panel to expand minutely, thereby causing the R-31 matting to roll up in front of the C-130. This rolling effect may exert sufficient stress on the welds to cause them to fail. These failures forced the engineers supporting this tactical operation to devote
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31 January 1963

a portion of their resources in performing constant maintenance on the
matting by welding the matting each night in preparation for
the next day's traffic.

Observation: Reinforcement or redesign of connecting pin cover plates
or locking lugs would greatly increase the life span of the matting
and reduce the welding maintenance required. The use of expansion
panels at specific distances along the runway would reduce or elimi-
nate the rolling effect and the effects of temperatures on the matting,
thus reducing the stress on the welds,

PART II (C) - RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That a comprehensive design manual be prepared and distributed
to furnish design criteria for the type of protective bunker required
in Vietnam.

b. That an engineering study be instituted to determine what im-
provements can be made to mat matting to reduce its maintenance re-

FONE THE CONCLUSION:

[Signature]

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - DA, AGFSM
2 - CECOM/ERAC
6 - USAF
1 - CO, II FROCEV
1 - CO, 6th Inf Div
1 - CO, 4th Arm Div
1 - CO, 1 FROCEV Army
1 - EDA, II Corps
1 - AGC, 61
1 - AGC, 62
1 - AGC, 63
1 - AGC, 64
1 - US Army War College, ATMB Library Q-2119
1 - US Army, USA CESC, Ft Leavenworth
1 - 13th Mili Hist Det
1 - CECOM

Incl

1. Location of Enemy Forces, II Corps *10. I FROCEV Summary

* 11. I FROCEV Strength

* 12. Enlisted Promotion Allocations

* 13. RAR Statistics

* 14. Medical Statistics

* 15. Medical Statistics

* 16. Medical Statistics

* 17. 4th Inf Div

7. I FROCEV Task Organization

8. I FROCEV Organisational Structure

8. 1 FROCEV Organisational Structure

* 9. Payroll-Local

* 11. Payroll-Local

* 12. Payroll-Local

* Denotes: Withdrawn, HQs, DA
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 28 FEB 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam (DDLA).

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning bunker or shelter design, page 57, paragraph k, section II, part I; and page 58, paragraph a, section II, part II. Tests are being conducted by a number of agencies [e.g., Combined Material Exploitation Center (CMEC) and III MAF] to determine the effects of typical VC/NVA weapons against prototype bunkers. To date, results are incomplete. In practice, bunkers are designed to utilize locally available materials and their construction is dependent upon the tactical requirements. A typical design is capable of protecting the occupants from the burst of a mortar or light artillery shell impacting 15 meters from the position.

b. Reference item concerning M8A1 matting failures under heavy usage, page 57, paragraph l, section II, part I; and page 58, paragraph b, section II, part II. The design loading for M8A1 matting is 200 applications of a 25,000 pound single wheel load, or the equivalent of 200 C-130 takeoffs or landings. One thousand sorties is equal to two thousand loadings, thereby exceeding the design stress by a factor of ten in less than two months for the case in question. Failure of the matting under these conditions must be expected, and extensive maintenance is required to keep the airfield operational under unusual traffic conditions.
AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 68)

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 UIC WDDLAA HQ I FFORCEV (U)

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C.S. NARVITPRASAI
Capt, USAF

Copy furnished:
HQ I FFORCEV
GPOP-DT (15 Feb 63) 2d Ind (V)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, I Field Force
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 Jan 63,
RCS CSFOR-63 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96585

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and
forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as
indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

\[Signature\]

K. P. O'ROURK

USA, ASC

[Date]
## CONFIDENTIAL

**HEADQUARTERS 1 POOLING TASK ORGANIZATION**

**AS OF 31 JANUARY 1968**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSIGNED UNITS</th>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
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**NOTES:**
* Unit is in support of units OPOCN to III MAF.

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AVIATION SUPPORT

MCV Letter No. 007, dated 23 June 1967, Subject: Army Aviation Allocation (U) Places
The following allocations (current under control of the 12th Aviation Group) in support of Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam.

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(1) Includes HQ, I PFGEST, Bn Company, I PFGEST, 6th Art Engr Det (Terrain), 5th Fld Det, 11th Fld Det, Press Gp, 41st Military History Det and 132d INF.

(2) Includes HQ INYV Arty, 5 En, 27 Arty and 6th En, 22 Arty.

(3) Includes HQ Btry 52d Arty Gp; 3d Battalion 6th Arty; 6th Bn, 11th Arty; 1st Bn, 52d Arty; 9th Bn, 22 Arty; 77th Fld Radar Det and 237th Fld Radar Det.

(4) Includes HQ Btry, 1st Arty Gp; 7th En, 13th Arty; 1st Bn, 30th Arty; 4th Bn, 6th Arty; 16th Bn, 6th Arty; 25th Arty; Btry B, 39th Arty; 1st Btry, 3d Bn, 15th Arty; 7th Bn, 15th Arty; 25th Arty; 212d, 213 and 214th Radar Det.

(5) Includes 56th Sig Bn, 167th Sig Co and 209th Det.
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**Total All Grades:** 847, 841, 846
## Military Disabling Injuries by Unit

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<td>4,284</td>
<td>54th Sig En</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5,568</td>
<td>I/60 Arty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Expectancy Ceiling</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$4.50</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| 0 | 0 | 2 | 5,568 | I/60 Arty | 4.50 |
| 0 | 2 | 6,568 | 2/27 Arty | 4.89 |
| 0 | 0 | 2 | 8,508 | 2/27 Arty | 3.02 |
| 0 | 3 | 3 | 12,556 | 1/60 Arty | 5.02 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 58,224 | 1/62 Arty | 5.83 |
| 0 | 0 | 2 | 22,832 | 2/62 Arty | 5.83 |
| 0 | 3 | 3 | 12,852 | 2/27 Arty | 6.25 |
| 0 | 4 | 1 | 17,236 | 7/23 Arty | 8.24 |

| 2 | 2 | 325,32 | I FP FORGV Total | 3.57 |

### Notes
- Includes all injuries resulting in death, permanent impairment or disability necessitating hospitalization beyond midnight of the day following accident.
- Based on empirical data contained in DA Cir 385-16. Fatality: $42,000
  Non-Fatal: $5,284.
- Reflects disabling injury rate as compared with established expectancy rate ceiling.

**Note:** Above data is a compilation of the accident reports and exposure data as reported to this headquarters by the units shown.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIL TM</th>
<th>VN TM</th>
<th>No. Accidents per 100,000 Miles Driven</th>
<th>Unit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>HDR. 1 F/FOREST 0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5th F/F Det 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11th F/F Det 0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>131 APU 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>69th Eng. Det 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29th SI Det 0.00</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>228th MP Co 0.00</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>297th Trans Co 0.00</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>144th CA Co 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1st Arty 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3-4 Arty 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5-37 Arty 0.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5-37 Arty 0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6-38 Arty 0.46</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6-38 Arty 0.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Killing</th>
<th>1.00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Army Killed or Injured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident experienced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army vehicle accident rate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Above data is a compilation of the accident reports and exposure data as reported to this headquarters by the units shown.
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, I Field Force Vietnam (U)**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 67-31 Jan 1968

CG, I Field Force Vietnam

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