<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AD NUMBER</th>
<th>AD389876</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIMITATION CHANGES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Document partially illegible.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM: Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 01 FEB 1968. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC 20310. Document partially illegible.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
<td>AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD NUMBER</td>
<td>AD389876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
<td>AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
DISCLAIMER NOTICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to AGFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

DISTRIBUTION
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command

Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Adjutant General School
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Chemical School
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
OPERATIONAL REPORT
LESSONS LEARNED

11TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section I</th>
<th>Table of Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. COMMAND</td>
<td>Page 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. PERSONNEL, HUMAN, DISCIPLINE, L/O, CIVIL PROGRAM</td>
<td>Page 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. INTELLIGENCE</td>
<td>Page 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. HUMAN RESOURCES</td>
<td>Page 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. LOGISTICS</td>
<td>Page 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. HUMAN RELATIONS</td>
<td>Page 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. AVIATION SAFETY</td>
<td>Page 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. SURGEON</td>
<td>Page 25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section II, Part I</th>
<th>Lessons Highlighted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. PREPARE</td>
<td>Page 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. PERSONNEL</td>
<td>Page 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. INTELLIGENCE</td>
<td>Page 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. OPERATIONS</td>
<td>Page 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. TRAINING</td>
<td>Page 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE</td>
<td>Page 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. AVIATION SAFETY</td>
<td>Page 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. SURGEON</td>
<td>Page 37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Section II, Part II | Instructions | Page 38 |

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. (U) General.

a. The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion continued to "Establish the Standard" among combat aviation battalions in Vietnam. The battalion supported the 1st Infantry Division with 22,916 hours, or 67 percent of the total battalion flying hours for this period. The battalion supported the 1st Infantry Division on two major operations, Shenandoah II (which included the "Battle of Loc Ninh") and Lam Son 67. The three UH-1 companies assigned to the battalion averaged 159 percent of the programmed flying hours for the quarter. The two CH-47 companies averaged 147 percent of the programmed flying hours for the same period. The 184th Reconnaissance Airplane Company (O-1), reassigned to the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion on 15 January 1968, flew 7,206 hours during this quarter prior to detachment from this command. As a member of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion, the "Non Stops" of the 184th Reconnaissance Airplane Company flew 29,997 hours from 19 March 1967 to 15 January 1968. Programmed for that period was 16,467 hours. The accident rate based on 100,000 flying hours was 9.9 for the same period (see inclosure 1, General Order 4).

b. The 205th Assault Support Helicopter Company was detached from the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion and attached to the 22nd Combat Support Aviation Battalion on 29 January 1968 (see inclosure 2, General Order 9). The 205th Assault Support Helicopter Company flew 3,717 hours during this quarter before it was detached from this command. From 14 June 1967 to 29 January 1968, the "Geronimos" flew 8,357 hours. Programmed for that period was 6,400 hours. This unit has not had an aircraft accident since its arrival in-country.
SUBJECT: ORIL (RCS-CSFOR-65) For Qtr Ending 31 Jan 68 (VIC WW XTO)(V)

On 3 December 1967, General Creighton W. Abrams, Deputy Commander, MCV, presented to the battalion the Valorous Unit Share during a battalion review at Phu Loi Army Airfield. The award was presented to the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion for extraordinary heroism while engaged in military operations during the period 4 November 1966 to 20 November 1966 in Operation Attleboro between Dau Tieng and Suoi De (see inclosure 3, General Order 4060).

d. The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion is physically oriented to support the 1st Infantry Division. The geographical location lends itself to a close working, as well as social, relationship which adds significantly to the overall accomplishment of the mission. Personnel of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion understand the operating procedures of the 1st Infantry Division, have infinite knowledge of the terrain, know the location of all fire support bases, and understand the timing demanded by the division to insure tactical success on the field of battle. This, we believe, is the key to the COUP DE MISTR in modern day operations. For these reasons we feel it imperative that whenever tactically possible this battalion should support the 1st Infantry Division with its own organic units.

2. (U) Mission. The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion provides:

a. Tactical army aviation support as directed by the 12th Combat Aviation Group to elements of U.S., RVN, and other Free World Military Assistance Forces within the III Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Command, control, administration, and communications to units assigned to the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion.

3. (U) Organization.

a. Current organization of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion is as shown in inclosure 4.

b. Organization of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion during this reporting period is shown below:

HQ and HQ Det, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion - Phu Loi
128th Assault Helicopter Company - Phu Loi
162nd Assault Helicopter Company - Phuoc Vinh
173rd Assault Helicopter Company - Iai Kho
*164th Reconnaissance Airplane Company - Phu Loi
SUBJECT: ORLL (RCS-CSFOR-65) For Qtr Ending 31 Jan 68 ("IC \n")

**205th Assault Support Helicopter Company - Phu Loi
213th Assault Support Helicopter Company - Phu Loi

*The 184th R'C (O-1) came under the control of the 210th
Combat Aviation Battalion, Long Binh, effective 15 January 1968 (see
inclosure 1).**

**The 205th ASHC came under the control of the 222nd
Combat Support Aviation Battalion, Vung Tau, effective 29 January 1968
(see inclosure 2).**

4. (U) Command and Staff Structure.
   a. Current Command and Staff Structure is shown in inclosure 5.
   b. Significant changes in the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion
      Command and Staff Structure during this reporting period are shown
      below.

COMMANDER

(1) On 10 Nov 67, LTC William A. Hobbs replaced LTC Leo
    E. Soucek as Battalion Commander.

ST FF

(2) On 10 Nov 67, LTC Paul L. Stansel replaced LTC
    William A. Hobbs as Battalion Executive Officer.

(3) On 4 Dec 67, MJ Herbert T. Sink, replaced LTC
    Neal C. Petree, Jr., as Battalion S-3.

(4) On 20 Dec 67, CPT Millard Burks replaced MJ Ralph
    E. Naumann as Battalion S-1.

UNIT COMMANDERS

(5) On 22 Nov 67, MJ Robert P. St. Louis replaced MJ
    Herbert T. Sink as Commanding Officer of the 173rd Assault Helicopter
    Company.

(6) On 1 Jan 68, MJ James E. Thompson, Jr. replaced
    MJ Stokely L. Wilson as Commanding Officer of the 162nd Assault
    Helicopter Company.

(7) On 7 Jan 68, MJ William H. McGee replaced LTC
    George W. Adamson as Commanding Officer of the 213th Assault Support
    Helicopter Company.
B. PERSONNEL, MORALE, DISCIPLINE, INFORMATION AND CIVIC ACTION.

1. (U) Personnel.

a. Statistical Summary of Records Processing Activities:

(1) Total Personnel Records Maintained - 1512

(2) Total Gains and Losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>ENGINEER</th>
<th>FTM</th>
<th>SGT/TSgt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GAINS</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOSSES</td>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) FST Extensions Processed: Officers - 3; Enlisted Men - 61.

b. Report of Difficulties Encountered and Action Taken:

(1) Discussion.

During the period 31 October 1967 to 31 January 1968, accumulative errors were discovered in the personnel accounting system of this battalion. As a result of faulty justification of machine prepared unit rosters at the battalion level, and morning report errors at individual unit level, improper strength figures were consistently reported to higher command echelons. This inaccuracy resulted in a much lower input of replacement personnel than should have been programmed, creating a shortage of personnel.

(2) Action.

Upon discovery of these strength reporting errors, a program to correct strength figures was instituted and vigorously pursued. At battalion level, personnel rosters have been corrected as required. Unit commanders are maintaining closer supervision of unit morning report activities. These actions have resulted in a higher influx of replacement personnel and a lessening of the shortage of assigned personnel.

c. Recruitment.

(1) First tour R. & enlistments increased significantly during this reporting period. During this quarter, first tour R. & enlistments stood at over 19.5 per cent compared with 10 per cent for the previous quarter. This upswing can be attributed to increased command emphasis in the ro-up program.
2. (2) During this quarter one individual received the maximum variable reenlistment bonus (VRB) of $10,000, tax free. This was a first for the battalion and possibly Vietnam.

d. Civilian Personnel. The local nationals are hired in two separate categories, permanent hire and daily hire.

(1) Permanent hire. Each unit, after submitting requisitions through this headquarters to 12th Combat Aviation Group, is authorized to employ local nationals on a permanent basis.

(2) Daily hire. Daily hire are employed directly on a daily basis as required. They are used primarily for unskilled labor such as filling sandbags, constructing bunkers, and general police. Battalion allocation for the last quarter was 166,000 $VN per month.

(3) Permanent hires and assistance in kind allocations as of 31 January 1968:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERMANENT HIRPS AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>PERMANENT HIRPS EMPLOYED</th>
<th>LF FUND PER MONTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11th C: B</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>33,000 $VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128th : SHC</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162nd : SHC</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173rd : SHC</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184th E: C</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205th : SHC</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213th : SHC</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>166,000 $VN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (U) Morale.

a. The following awards and decorations were recommended and approved during this reporting period:
1 February 1968

**S U P E R B Y C T :** ORLI (RECOOPSPOM-65) For Qtr Ending 31 Jan 68 (UTC 1968-02-01)

(1) **Recommended**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>MOH</th>
<th>DSC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>LOM</th>
<th>DFC</th>
<th>SH</th>
<th>BS</th>
<th>ES</th>
<th>SH</th>
<th>CM</th>
<th>CM</th>
<th>CM</th>
<th>CM</th>
<th>PH</th>
<th>CO</th>
<th>CM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOV</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) **Approved**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>MOH</th>
<th>DSC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>LOM</th>
<th>DFC</th>
<th>SH</th>
<th>BS</th>
<th>ES</th>
<th>SH</th>
<th>CM</th>
<th>CM</th>
<th>CM</th>
<th>CM</th>
<th>PH</th>
<th>CO</th>
<th>CM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOV</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**b. Awards and Decorations.**

Emphasis is exerted on unit award officers to recognize with appropriate awards the accomplishments of lower ranking personnel. Morale is being brought to an all time high by the selective awarding of the Bronze Star, Army Commendation Medal and Certificate of Appreciation to all deserving individuals.

c. **Athletic program.**

Mission requirements demand extreme flexibility in scheduling athletic events. In spite of cancellations and rescheduled games it was possible to complete a volleyball tournament. Participants are proclaiming the merits of the program, spectator interest was high, and plans are being made to extend this activity into other sports.

d. **Religious and Personnel Services.**

The Battalion Chaplain is available for counseling every Wednesday at 1800 hours in the Chapel of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion at Phu Loi. He is available any other time by appointment. The Chaplain conducts weekly visits to the companies at Phu Loi, i.e., Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, the 128th Assault Helicopter Company, the 184th Reconnaissance Airplane Company, the 205th Assault Support Helicopter Company and the 213th Assault Support Helicopter Company. The Chaplain visits the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company at Phuoc Vinh and the 173rd Assault Helicopter Company at Sai Rue on a bi-weekly basis, remaining with the company for a period of 24 hours.
The purpose of these visits are the following:

1. To become acquainted with the officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men of the battalion.
2. To show the men that the Chaplain is interested in them and concerned about their problems.
3. To counsel the men concerning their complaints, their personal problems, and their religious needs.
4. To assist the commander in promoting morale and spiritual well being among the men of his command.

e. Religious Services.

Religious services of the three major faiths are available to all personnel within the command. Denominational services are scheduled for some personnel.

1. Roman Catholic Chaplains from adjacent units provide services for our Roman Catholic personnel in all units of the battalion. Roman Catholics in Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, the 126th Assault Helicopter Company, the 184th Reconnaissance Company, the 205th Assault Support Helicopter Company and the 213th Assault Support Helicopter Company may attend Confession at 0900 hours and Mass at 0930 hours in the Chapel of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion at Phu Loi. Roman Catholics in the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company may attend at 0800 or 1000 hours at the Chapel of the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division at Phuoc Vinh. Roman Catholics in the 173rd Helicopter Company may attend at 0730, 0915, 1015, and 1100 hours at various chapels of the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division at Lai Khe.

2. Jewish personnel may attend services whenever the II Field Forces Jewish Chaplain comes to their vicinity. At present the Jewish Chaplain holds services on a monthly basis.

3. Protestant personnel may attend services conducted by the Battalion Chaplain at 1030 hours in the Chapel of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion. In addition to the regular Sunday worship service, the Battalion Chaplain provides Bible Study on Sunday, Wednesday, and Friday at 1900 hours; religious motion pictures and a hymn service on Monday at 1900 hours, and choir rehearsal and a hymn service on Friday at 2000 hours. All of these activities are held in the Chapel of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion at Phu Loi. Protestants in the 173rd Assault Helicopter Company may attend services at 0800, 0915, 1015, and 1100 hours at various chapels of the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division at Lai Khe. Bible study for
Protestants at IaI The is hold at 1830 hours each Sunday at Hibbs Memorial Chapel.

(4) The denominational services available are:

(a) Episcopalian Holy Communion: 1900 hours, Sunday, on a monthly basis at the 1st Division Artillery Chapel at Phu Loi.

(b) Church of Latter Day Saints: 1430 hours each Sunday and 1930 hours each Thursday at the Chapel of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion.

f. Special Services.

Two USO shows were sponsored within the battalion during this reporting period. Improvements on the swimming pool remain a continuous project. A new diving board and water system are being installed. One day room has been completed and construction has started on a second. The emphasis that is placed on securing, distributing and maintaining special service equipment is instrumental in keeping morale at a high level within the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion.

g. Club Facilities.

Officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men clubs are currently in operation in all company size units of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion. These facilities are constantly expanding in their effort to provide the maximum in services for the welfare of the members of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion.

3. (U) Discipline.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary Court</th>
<th>Special Court</th>
<th>General Court</th>
<th>Art 32 Inves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. (U) Information.

a. Information personnel attempt to provide press coverage for all noteworthy events occurring within the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion. Submitted during the reporting period were 92 daily summaries, 104 hometown news releases and ten feature stories. Continued liaison with news media has given the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion greater recognition in radio, television and newspaper coverage.
CONFIDENTIAL

Tho Viet Cong (VC) has employed a new tactic during the last three mortar attacks against this installation. The weapons were set on top of the ground as opposed to digging firing pits.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVG-AC

SUBJECT: ORLL (RCS-CSFOR-65) For Qtr Ending 31 Jan 68 (USC WPKTO)(U)

February 1968

To apparent attempts were made to conceal muzzle flash, or the location of the weapons while firing. The Viet Cong move in quickly, fire a short, intensive volume of fire and depart the area immediately. Unless the muzzle flash or the movement of personnel is observed, the firing position cannot be located by aerial observation.

2. (C) Production of Intelligence.

The battalion intelligence section (S-2) maintains close liaison with 5th Infantry Division (ARVN) G-2 and 1st Infantry Division Base Defense at Phu Loi to exchange timely and essential elements of information. This has proven valuable to the defense of this installation, during Viet Cong "TET" offensive. Enemy efforts have been to reconnoiter, attack, and overrun this base camp. We have furnished 1st Infantry Division Base Defense with current order of battle (OB) studies concerning VC/NVA reconnaissance tactics and techniques, VC/NVA night operations, VC/NVA attacks on fixed installations and VC/NVA deployment of supporting weapons in the attack. The 5th Infantry Division (ARVN) G-2 has been furnished current OB concerning reorganization of the Viet Cong Military Region IV plus OB Viet Cong Dong Loi Regiment, which is a constant direct threat to the security of Phu Loi Base Camp.

3. (C) Perimeter Security.

a. The battalion perimeter defensive bunker line has been substantially reinforced in depth. Secondary and blocking positions, with overhead protection, have been incorporated into the perimeter defensive plan. The perimeter is echeloned in three distinct lines; the battalion primary perimeter defensive bunker line, secondary position bunkers and blocking position bunkers respectively. Primary positions are manned by the battalion security platoon. Secondary and blocking positions are manned by the battalion composite rapid reaction force (RRF). The RRF furnishes a dismounted reserve in addition to manning defensive positions. Division of 11th Combat Aviation Battalion 4/67 reflects these changes.

b. Two or more fougasse positions have been emplaced in front of each primary bunker in the battalion's sector. They are command detonated, electrically, from the bunkers. Each fougasse position consists of a sealed 55 gallon drum of thickened fuel, laid broad side facing the target area. Two HE grenades and 2 1/2 pounds of TAT are placed at the broad side base to propel the thickened fuel over the target area. Sandbag tamping of the 55 gallon drum on three sides, leaving the target area side untamped, controls the direction of the blast. Eight turns of primary (detonating) cord is wrapped around the center of the 55 gallon drum to insure rupture. The blast area covered from one fougasse position is approximately 70 by 70 meters.
SUBJECT: OBIL (RCS-CSFR-65) For Qtr Ending 31 Jan 68 (UIC WATTO)(U)

D. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

1. (C) Plans.

a. The Battalion Operations Center (BOC) operates on a 24 hour basis. One officer and one enlisted man is on duty at all times during this period. Missions are received from the II Field Forces V Army Aviation Element (AAE) and are assigned to the units of the battalion by BOC. To aid in the performance of their mission BOC has to have quite an extensive communication network to include radios and telephones. The primary means of communications to battalion units stationed at Phu Loi is telephone, with FN radio as a backup. For the two assault helicopter companies located at Lai Khe and Phuoc Vinh, the primary means being FN radio, with telephone as an alternate. Additionally the BOC has a sole user telephone circuit with the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion liaison officer stationed with the 1st Infantry Division in the Army Aviation Control Center (AACO) at Lai Khe.

b. BOC responsibilities:

(1) Receive and screen missions from higher headquarters.

(2) Assign missions to appropriate organic units within the battalion.

(3) Maintain a constant knowledge of available resources and the progress of scheduled missions.

(4) Maintain a detailed journal of daily events.

(5) Initiate the procurement of recovery aircraft for extraction of downed aircraft.

(6) Receipt of aircraft hit reports, casualty reports.

(7) In the event of enemy ground, mortar or rocket attack:

(a) Alert all units of alert status, type attack, and keep abreast of the situation.

(b) Launch one light fire team (LFT) and put one LFT on five minute standby.

(c) Submit situation reports to higher headquarters.

2. (C) Operations.

a. Operations during the past quarter ranged from platoon
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGC-AC
1 February 1968
SUBJ: ORL (RCS-OSFOR-65) For Qtr Ending 31 Jan 68 (RCF LARPC)(U)

through battalion size. The majority of which are ten ship company
time operations. There were several battalion controlled 20 and 30 ship
operations. In all of the company and battalion size operations conducted
with the 1st Infantry Division, the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion did not
have a ship receive a single hit from enemy fire. This period included
the Loc Linh operation. This is attributed to the outstanding preparation
of all landing zones by the 1st Infantry Division and the training and
skill of the aviators of this battalion.

b. Thorough planning and coordination has proven to be the key
in each operation. The control for each battalion size operation is pro-
vided by two separate instrumentalities, the Battalion Operations Center
(BOC), and the command and control aircraft. BOC coordinates the liaison
between aviation and ground units and, in conjunction with the Battalion
Commander and his S-3, designates the aviation assets which will support
a given ground unit. The command and control element supervises the
execution phase and normally includes the aviation battalion commander
and his S-3. Installed in the command and control ship is an All/ASC-10
consolo. This allows the ground commander tremendous communications
intuitues heretofore impossible. He has at his disposal two FI-I trans-
civers and one UK-1 transmitter. With this array of communications
equipment, the ground commander has the capability of uninterrupted
communications to higher and subordinate headquarters.

c. During the past 90 days, the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion
participated in the following 1st Infantry Division major combat
operations - Lam Son 67, Shenandoah II and Attalla.

(1) Operation Lam Son 67 was a continuous operation con-
ducted jointly by the 1st Infantry Division and the 5th ARVN Division
throughout the reporting period. Units of the 11th Combat Aviation
Battalion conducted 59 assault operations and numerous administrative
lifts in support of this operation. Total support for this offensive
by the three assault helicopter companies and the two assault support
helicopter companies consisted of 9,070 sorties, 31,094 passengers,
4,556 tons of cargo and 2,638 hours flown.

(2) Operation Shenandoah II terminated 19 November 1967.
The most significant event of this offensive operation was the "Battle
of Loc Linh" and its carryover into the Bu Dap and Song Be areas.
Several North Vietnamese Army regiments surrounded the Loc Linh airfield
with the overall objective to overrun and occupy. They were successful
in the destruction and occupation of the ARVN Compound but failed to
penetrate the Special Forces Compound. At dawn, units of the 1st Infantry
Division and the 5th ARVN Division were air assaulted into the battle area
where they instantly closed with and destroyed the enemy, killing over
1,000 and forcing the remainder to retreat. Estimates of WIA's and
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGC-AC 1 February 1968
SUBJ: URLL (UCS-CSFR-U-5) For Qtr ending 31 Jan 68(UIC U/AMTO)(U)

KIA's dragged away by a defeated enemy doubled the body count figure.
Fifteen combat assaults were supported by units of this battalion during
the battle period 29 October through 8 November 1967. Chinook requirement
from this battalion continually exceeded the normal daily commitment of
12 aircraft and reached a total of 20 on one day. Total support for
Operation Shenandoah II consisted of 5,769 sorties, 16,573 passengers,
3,253 tons of cargo and 2,000 hours flown.

(3) Operation Attalla began 10 January 1968 and terminated
on 27 January 1968. The highlight of this operation was 25 January when
the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion performed several combat assaults.
This was a battalion effort utilizing 30 lift aircraft, all from the 11th
Combat Aviation Battalion. CH-47's from the battalion provided logistical
support for the troops that were inserted. In support of these lifts,
2,818 troops and 235 tons of cargo were flown in 383 hours. To date,
support given the 1st Infantry Division for Operation Attalla is as
follows: 8,567 sorties, 20,865 passengers and 2,869 tons of cargo
flown in 2,283 hours.

(4) Operation Overwatch was initiated on 19 November
1967 and terminated 10 January 1968. Aviation support from the 11th
Combat Aviation Battalion totaled 16,241 sorties, 37,953 passengers,
7,338 tons of cargo and 4,509 hours flown.

(5) "Operation Holly" was one of the most pleasant missions
assigned to this battalion during this quarter. This consisted of the
air lift of the Bob Hope Show from Long Binh to Lai Khe on 24 December,
and to Bear Cat on 25 December. The 205th and the 213th Assault Support
Helicopter Companies and the 128th Assault Helicopter Company transported
elements of the 1st Infantry Division from field locations to Lai Khe to
view the show on the 26th of December. The three companies flew 150
sorties, 59 hours, 2,500 passengers and three tons of cargo during this
operation.

(d) The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion augmented the 269th
Combat Aviation Battalion support of the 25th Infantry Division on
Operation Yellowstone. The three assault companies of the 11th Combat
Aviation Battalion were committed for ten lift aircraft and a heavy
fire team each, plus a maintenance spare, while the two assault support
helicopter companies committed ten CH-47's each. Total battalion support
for the first day of this operation was 709 sorties, 1,148 passengers and
476 tons of cargo flown in 339 hours.

(e) During this reporting period, two special operations were
supported by the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company. On 2 through 11
November 1967, Operation Rapid Fire III was conducted with the 5th
Special Forces, using a base of operations at Ham Tan. During the
period 14 to 26 November 1967, Operation Rapid Fire IV was conducted in
an area southeast of Phuoc Vinh, which allowed the "Vultures" to
continue the operation from their home station. This was the only
time an aviation company of this battalion deployed to a field location
and operated independently during this quarter. It is worthy to note
that the move went smoothly. This operation was an excellent change
of pace for the "Vultures" which previously had been oriented to ten
aircraft landing and pickup zones and large scale operations. The
general concept of operation was based on the insertion and extraction
of reconnaissance teams consisting of six men each and of ambush
teams consisting of 20 men each. In almost all cases, the landing zones
were only large enough for a single aircraft. On occasion, the teams
had to be extracted by McGuire rigs at night from openings in the
jungle canopy while under enemy fire. This operation put a keen fighting
dge on an already spirited flying outfit. The after action re-
port was submitted by the 5th Special Forces. The following statistics
were extracted from that report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Time</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>UH-1D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 hrs</td>
<td>45 hrs</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

AVG-4.C 1 February 1968
SUBJ: ORL (HCS-CSFR-65) For Qtr Ending 31 Jan 68 (UIC加以TO)(U)

f. 11th Combat Aviation Battalion Statistical Summary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Tot.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOURS FLOWN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>7,478</td>
<td>8,440</td>
<td>8,472</td>
<td>26,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CK-47</td>
<td>2,423</td>
<td>2,620</td>
<td>2,419</td>
<td>7,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-1</td>
<td>2,620</td>
<td>2,947</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>6,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,521</td>
<td>14,407</td>
<td>12,034</td>
<td>38,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SORTIES FLOWN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>21,429</td>
<td>28,211</td>
<td>26,685</td>
<td>76,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CK-47</td>
<td>7,401</td>
<td>7,855</td>
<td>8,295</td>
<td>19,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-1</td>
<td>1,907</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>9,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30,737</td>
<td>38,266</td>
<td>38,044</td>
<td>105,047</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                  |     |     |     |      |
| Supported UH-1    | 42,180 | 63,018 | 56,678 | 161,876 |
| CK-47             | 28,208 | 30,665 | 27,206 | 86,075 |
| Total             | 70,388 | 93,683 | 83,884 | 247,355 |

|                  |     |     |     |      |
| Cargo Tons Hauled |     |     |     |      |
| UH-1             | 899 | 703 | 483 | 2,085 |
| CK-47            | 12,657 | 11,819 | 12,916 | 32,422 |
| Total            | 13,556 | 12,522 | 13,399 | 39,477 |

|                  |     |     |     |      |
| Medical Ev. Cases | 114 | 157 | 133 | 404 |

|                  |     |     |     |      |
| Aircraft Recovered|     |     |     |      |
| UH-1             | 21 | 14 | 28 | 63 |
| OH               | 4 | 0 | 2 | 6 |
| O-1              | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| AH-1G            | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Total            | 27 | 15 | 30 | 72 |

|                  |     |     |     |      |
| Ammunition Expended|     |     |     |      |
| 7.62mm           | 625,674 | 705,376 | 674,775 | 2,006,225 |
| 2.75mm           | 2,417 | 4,642 | 3,376 | 10,435 |
| 40mm             | 8,230 | 9,055 | 8,875 | 26,160 |

|                  |     |     |     |      |
| Enemy Losses     |     |     |     |      |
| VC KIA (CONF)    | 26 | 50 | 22 | 98 |
| VC KIA (EST)     | 24 | 27 | 17 | 68 |
| Structures       |     |     |     |      |
| Destroyed        | 9 | 10 | 45 | 64 |
| Sunk             | 5 | 2 | 0 | 7 |

|                  |     |     |     |      |
| Friendly Summary |     |     |     |      |
| US KIA           | 3 | 5 | 3 | 11 |
| Aircraft Hit     | 7 | 6 | 23 | 36 |
| Aircraft         |     |     |     |      |
| Destroyed        | 2 | 3 | 4 | 9 |

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVOC-1C
1 February 1968
SUBJECT:  UNL (AGS-CASCR-65) For Qtr Ending 31 Jan 68 (UIC MAINT)(U)

3. (c) Training.

a. The specialized training of the men of the battalion is a continuing process. Fourteen enlisted men have advanced their knowledge of the technical aspects of helicopter maintenance during this reporting period, through attendance of the "M" courses in B, C and D model UH-1 helicopters. Twelve enlisted men attended "M" courses in CH-47 maintenance. Three quotas were also filled for the "M" supply course.

b. Four quotas were filled for Jungle Environmental Survival School held in the Philippines. One allocation went to each of the following units; Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion, the 126th Assault Helicopter Company, the 193rd Assault Helicopter Company and the 124th Reconnaissance Airplane Company.

c. A 16 hour block of instructions was conducted by the Battalion Surgeon on Field Sanitation. These classes were attended by 18 enlisted men.

d. Aviator standardization and training.

(1) Each newly assigned aviator is given an area orientation flight and individual instruction on the techniques peculiar to the combat environment in Vietnam. He is then given a proficiency check ride by a unit instructor pilot before being cleared for operational flight. The orientation and proficiency checkrides are accomplished at unit level by the unit instructor pilots.

(2) Standardization is maintained in each unit through 90 day standardization check rides. Every 90 days, each aviator is checked by the unit instructor pilot to insure that all habits and techniques he has learned in the preceding three months are in keeping with all safety practices.

(3) A comprehensive check ride is given to an individual before he is designated as aircraft commander, to insure that he possesses the knowledge, ability and sound judgment necessary to perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of this important position.

e. In-country orientation of the 101st Airborne Division.

(1) During the past quarter, the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion was assigned the mission of giving in-country training and orientation to the subordinate units of the 101st Airborne Division. Training effort went primarily to the 3rd Brigade, but was also given to the 2nd Brigade and 2/17 Cavalry. Helicopter pilots from the 101st Aviation Battalion were temporarily assigned to the various assault companies of this battalion for in-country orientation and training in air mobile techniques.
(2) The assault helicopter companies and the Pathfinder Detachment of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion received the mission of training the infantry units of the 101st Airborne Division in helicopter assault techniques under combat conditions. These techniques included extractions, load management, formations, combat assaults, use of gunships, eagle flights, and on loading and off loading techniques.

(3) A Mobile Training Team from the 205th Assault Support Helicopter Company gave classes to representatives of the 101st Airborne Division on sling load techniques, radio procedures, utilization of CH-47 type aircraft, organization of landing and pickup zones and limitations and capabilities of various type nets and slings.

(4) The Pathfinders provided on the spot supervision while the units were practicing the techniques under actual combat conditions.

(5) A statistical summary of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion's training program is as follows:

(a) The assault helicopter companies of this battalion flew 4,616 sorties, 12,373 troops and 775 hours while working with the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division.

(b) The assault helicopter companies of this battalion flew 1,870 sorties, 4,831 troops and 367 hours while working with the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division.

(c) While working with the 2/17 Cavalry, the assault helicopter companies flew 139 sorties, 319 troops and 27 hours.

(d) The assault support helicopters of this battalion flew 622 sorties, 1,487 troops, and 958 tons of cargo and 101 hours in general support of the 101st Airborne Division.

(6) The training and combat supervision given to the subordinate units of the 101st Airborne Division was so intensive that within three weeks (18 December 1967 thru 7 January 1968) from their arrival in-country, they were considered combat ready and were participating in combat operations.

E. LOGISTICS.

(1) Actual supply and logistical transactions within the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion are primarily company level activities. Each company maintains its own property books, to include separate property books for each of its detachments. Each company deals directly with the supply support activity, using their own unit identification code and

CONFIDENTIAL
AVOC-AC
1 February 1968

SUBJECT: UGRC (RCS-CSPUR-65) for Qtr ending 31 Jan 68 (UG RC spU(U)

submitting their own requisitions. The battalion S-4 serves primarily
to supervise, consolidate reports, advise and assist the units, provide
liaison to higher headquarters, and to keep the battalion commander in-
formed of the status of the units in the areas of supply, motor main-
tenance, ammunition, POL, weapons, and base development.

2. (U) Supply,

a. Supply procedures by class.

   (1) Class I: Battalion S-4 operates a ration breakdown
       point for battalion units located at Phu Lai. Other battalion units
       are supported directly from the Class I point at their base camp locations.

   (2) Class II & IV: All units of the 11th Combat Aviation
       Battalion receive Class II and IV support from the 256th Supply and
       Service Battalion at Long Binh. This presents a problem to the 162nd
       Assault Helicopter Company at Phuoc Vinh and the 173rd Assault Helicopter
       Company at Lai Khe due to the distance and convoy requirement.

   (3) Class III: During tactical operations, the units
       refuel at the most convenient POL dispensing point in the operational area.
       Refueling at the unit base camp is accomplished by organic tankers.
       The units at Phu Lai receive Class III from the 758th Supply and Service
       Company. The 162nd Assault Helicopter Company and the 173rd Assault
       Helicopter Company are supported by the 101st Airborne Division and the
       1st Infantry Division respectively.

   (4) Class V: All units of the 11th Combat Aviation
       Battalion receive Class V support from the 3rd Ordnance Battalion
       ammunition point at Long Binh. Once again, the transportation is a
       problem for the units at Lai Khe and Phuoc Vinh.

b. Camouflage uniforms were requisitioned for the pathfinders.
   Since this is a new item in the supply system, early arrival of this
   uniform is not expected.

c. A shortage of body armor exists within the battalion.
   Body armor was collected from the assault support helicopter companies
   of this battalion and turned in to 12th Combat Aviation Group for
   issue to new units arriving in-country. The assault support helicopter
   companies presently have enough armor for only six complete crews. This
   creates a problem when over six CH-47's are committed from each unit.

d. Classes were set up at battalion level for each company PLL
   clerk. During the period 20 November 1967 through 2 December 1967, classes
   were given on Monday through Friday mornings. The classes were
   very worthwhile and are planned again in June or July.
AVCG-JC

 SUBJECi: FILL (JCS-CoPR-65) For Qtr Ending 31 Jan 68 (UIC UNCLASS)(U)

 e. Seventeen reports of survey were initiated during the period
1 November 1967 to January 1968, of which six were administrative type
surveys. Most of the equipment lost or damaged during this period was
flight gear or weapons belonging to pilots or crew members. Of the 18
weapons lost, damaged, or destroyed, ten were .38 caliber pistols.
Hostile fire and aircraft accidents continue to be the major cause of
lost or damaged equipment.

 f. Ballistic helmets continue to be in short supply, especially
for men that wear a size seven hat or larger. Some men are still wearing
APH-5's as a result of this shortage.

g. Reports. Fourteen different recurring reports were processed
through the S-4 and forwarded to higher headquarters. These reports
were broken down as follows: one daily, eight monthly, three quarterly,
and two semi-annually.

 3. (U) Inspection Trips.

 a. An inspection team from the S-4 section inspected each of
the units during the month of December. These inspections pointed out
short-comings or deficiencies in the following areas: supply, motor
maintenance, POL, ammunition, conex utilization, material readiness, POL,
and weapons security. A follow up inspection is planned for February.

 b. Host units were found to have an excessive number of conex
containers on hand. Instructions were given on disposition of excess
conex containers.

c. Some units were having problems computing their basic
load of ammunition. P 101-10-1 does not provide information on many
weapons systems used by aviation companies. These units were instructed
to use quantities as they were computed prior to leaving CONUS. In
these cases where there had been a change in weapons or weapons systems,
or previous computations proved inadequate, the unit commanders were
instructed to establish their basic load based on a usage factor until
information could be received from higher headquarters.

d. The accumulation of unauthorized weapons was a problem
within the battalion. The most common weapon found was the M1 carbine,
however, all types of U.S. manufactured weapons were accumulated. The
unit commanders were informed of the proper method of turning in un-
authorized weapons.

e. As a result of the fire and explosion of the Lei Khe
ammunition storage area a detailed inspection of unit ammunition storage
areas and their POL storage areas was conducted. Detailed instructions
were given to the units on corrective action to be taken.

19
AVGC-AC 1 February 1968
SUBJECT: ORLL (RCS-CSF-JR-65) FOR QTR ENDING 31 JAN 68 (UIC T/AX/TO)(U)

4. (U) Motor Maintenance.

a. The lack of qualified personnel continues to be a problem in the area of motor maintenance. Four units do not have qualified motor sergeants, and all the units are short mechanics and engineer equipment repairmen. Only 25 per cent of the motor maintenance people within the battalion are school trained.

b. Certain repair parts and direct exchange items have been in short supply, among these have been brake shoes, wheel cylinders, wheel bearings, universal joints, and starters. Brake lining was found on the local economy and purchased through the Imprest Fund.

c. The deadline rate of the 2 1/2 t. and 5 ton multifuel trucks is approximately 25 per cent. However, we had been alerted to expect a shortage of repair parts for multifuel engines some two months ago.

d. Inspections reveal that the lack of first echelon or operator maintenance is probably the biggest and most unnecessary problem in motor maintenance. This is even more of a problem in these areas such as the PUL sections where the vehicles are not returned to the motor park. Command emphasis was placed in this area and all units have a sound system of motor maintenance.

e. Training, close coordination with direct support units, periodic inspections of all units, and strong emphasis on maintenance has been stressed to reduce and eliminate some of the problems encountered in the motor maintenance area.

5. (U) Construction.

a. The 173rd Assault Helicopter Company at Lai Khe received their first permanent billets after two years in tents. The buildings were built by the engineers with the assistance from the 173rd Assault Helicopter Company. The billets are of tropical design with wooden floors.

b. The 205th Assault Support Helicopter Company completed their KQO quarters and started construction on their BQ’s. These buildings were constructed entirely by self help.

c. The 128th Assault Helicopter Company and the 213th Assault Support Helicopter Company have new aircraft maintenance hangars. Both were designed and constructed with interior lighting. Floodlights were installed as an interim measure for the 128th Assault Helicopter Company and the supplies are on requisition for the 213th Assault Support Helicopter Company.
LVSC-AC
1 February 1968
SUBJECT: Cld. (DCS-SR-65) for Qtr ending 31 Jan 68 (U) (U) (U)

6. An aircraft maintenance hanger for the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company is under construction with a completion date of April 1968. They also had two tropical billets constructed which houses all their enlisted personal in permanent type billets.

a. Headquarters Detachment constructed a tropical building for the Pathfinder Detachment and a new day room. Improvements were made in the Battalion Headquarters building and the adjacent bachelor officers quarters.

7. MAINTENANCE.

(U) Significant activities.

1. During the past three months, the battalion has experienced higher total flying hours, utilization rates, and average hours per aircraft than in previous reporting periods. During this reporting period the utilization of UH-1D helicopters averaged 189 per cent and C-47 helicopters, 149 per cent based on 60 and 50 flying hours per aircraft per month respectively. UH-1B and C aircraft averaged 89 per cent on 60 hours per aircraft per month.

2. The UK-1 companies received nine UH-1D's replacement aircraft in an effort to maintain a level of 21 UK-1D and eight UH-1B and C aircraft per company. At the end of the period, the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion was shown a total of 11 UK-1D's and one UK-1B. Adequate UK-1D and UK-1C fleet aircraft in the supporting aircraft maintenance company exists and replacements for aircraft down for extensive maintenance have been available.

3. One UK-1D and one C-47 safety of flight inspection was received during the period of November 1967 thru January 1968, which required temporary grounding of the aircraft. The inspections were completed without adverse effect on operational conditions.

4. There has been considerable improvement in the availability and application of preventive around unit maintenance areas and hangars. Dust continues to remain a serious maintenance and safety problem, as aircraft operate daily in areas of loose dirt and sand.

5. Due to an increase in the number of aircraft being supported by the supporting aircraft maintenance battalion, the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion is experiencing a slower turn around time on aircraft work ordered to the transportation direct support company.

6. Project ZYR (Avionics Retrofit Program) was initiated in November 1966 with a projected completion date of December 1967. The program has now been extended until 30 June 1968. At the present time,
the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion has 21 UH-1D, 8 UH-1B, 14 UH-1C, and 23 CH-47 aircraft completed, and 15 UH-1D, 2 UH-1C, and 9 CH-47 aircraft remaining to be retrofitted by June 1968.

7. Hanger facilities under construction for two of the four presently assigned companies, will materially increase maintenance productivity during the rainy season.

8. The 605th Direct Support Company supplied a listing of special management items issued to each unit technical supply, for reconciliation on repairable turn-ins.

9. The HOS-66200 (Sheet Metal Repairmen) will not be available in abundant quantities for some time to come. Authorization for two civilian contract sheet metal repairmen per transportation detachment has been approved. This augmentation of the civilians should greatly reduce the sheet metal workload.

10. The 213th Assault Support Helicopter Company aircraft are approaching the 12th periodic inspection. A civilian contract team will be in-country on or about 15 February 1968 to assist in the 12th periodic inspection of all CH-47 aircraft. They will be in-country for approximately 120 days.

11. USAF SOAP (Spectrographic Oil Analysis Program). Units within group have been designated to participate in a 30 day test phase with the Bien Hoa Air Force Base SOAP Laboratory. If the test is completed satisfactorily, the units will have access to closer test facility and fast turn around of samples.

12. Statistics for the summary of performance for the period of this report are attached as inclusion 6.

C. AVIATION SAFETY

1. (U) Plans and Programs. The present safety program within the battalion differs little from any other safety program with the exception of the outstanding degree of command emphasis and support given to it. The basic thought behind the program is that every man in the battalion is a safety officer. The validity of this thought is evidenced by the constant awareness and participation of every individual in the safety program and has resulted in a sharp reduction of accidents from the month of October, with six major accidents, to January, when only one major accident occurred.

2. (U) Procedures. Safety is a command responsibility. The Aviation Safety Officer of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion works
directly for the Battalion Commander as a Special Staff Officer. The Battalion Commander has given his full support, and actively takes part in the Aviation Safety Program. During his Commander's Conferences a portion of the time is regularly allotted to the discussion of safety, cause factors, recent accidents, and preventative measures to be taken to eliminate needless waste of lives and equipment. In all operations, whether it be combat assaults or administrative missions, he demands the highest standards of discipline and professionalism at all times. Working directly for the commander, the battalion aviation safety officer is involved in every facet of the battalion's operations. He maintains close liaison with the Flight Surgeon, maintenance, training, and operations, just to name a few. He flies regularly with all units of the battalion to monitor aviator and crew standardization and in-flight procedures. Regular staff visits acquaint the units with the latest changes and updated flight safety information.

3. (U) Publications. The Aviation Safety Officer has begun publishing a monthly letter, in conjunction with the Battalion Aviation Maintenance Officer, which includes notes and tips on aviation safety, latest changes in procedures, safety slogans, etc.

4. (U) Training. Each individual company has an outstanding standardization program, conducted in accordance with applicable regulations, to qualify newly assigned pilots for in-country missions and eventually as aircraft commanders.

5. (U) Inspections. A minimum of once each quarter, the Battalion Safety Officer conducts a survey of subordinate units utilizing the United States Army Board for Aviation Accident Research (US.AAR) Safety Survey Check List. These surveys are made a matter of record and follow-up action is taken on all deficiencies. Informal spot inspections are made weekly by the aviation safety officer whenever he visits a unit.

6. (U) Accidents. A total of six major accidents were sustained during the reporting period. Four of the accidents resulted in fatalities. The following is a summary of occurrences sustained during the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCIDENTS</th>
<th>INCIDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tail rotor strike</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost H/PK</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine Failure</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFK in dust</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sling load struck ground</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: U.S.A. (RCS-OSFM-65) FOR QTR ENDING 31 JAN 68 (VG2 MR HU)(U)

Problem Log: Causes of Incidents

- Engine failure: 6
- Low side governor failure: 1
- Short shaft failure: 1
- Fuel control failure: 1
- Contaminated fuel: 1
- Lost xmsn oil pressure: 2
- FOD: 2
- Hydraulic failure: 3
- Tail rotor drive shaft failed: 1

7. (U) Accident Cause Factor. During this reporting period the accidents sustained by the battalion can be grouped into three main cause factors, all of which were pilot induced.

   a. Loss of RPM: Due to poor pilot technique, overloading, and downwind takeoffs and landings.

   b. Tail rotor strike: Caused by abrupt flare coupled with a fast rate of closure close to the ground.

   c. IFR in dust: With the advent of the dry season causes an increase in dust. Landing in a dusty area and improper pilot technique on takeoff causing loss of visual reference to the ground.

8. (U) Preventive Measures to Eliminate Cause Factors.

   a. Basic loads were prescribed by the battalion for all type aircraft and are strictly adhered to.

   b. The trail formation with its inherent dangers is only used when the tactical situation dictates. When it is used, the aviation commander is required to brief the supported ground commander in the inherent danger of this formation and place emphasis on the advantages of heavy right, heavy left, and staggered trail formations. If the trail formation is used, greater distance between aircraft and a slower rate of approach into the landing zone will be used.

   c. A specified minimum of two rotor diameters between aircraft while in any type of formation is mandatory.

   d. A hover check is made by each aircraft prior to a takeoff. The only exception to this is on a combat assault. The four, ten and 20 foot hover checks are the ones prescribed. In addition, each aviator is required to demonstrate his proficiency during each 90 day check ride.

   e. When an air mission commander decides that a landing zone or a pickup zone is unsafe, he assures that the supported ground unit commander is BRIEFED, UNDERSTOOD, AND IS WILLING TO ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITY for using the landing or pickup zone.
SUBJECT: URM (KCS-CSFOR-65) for Qtr ending 31 Jan 68 (UIC WM...TO)(U)

1. February 1968

9. (U) The safety goal established by the Battalion Commander for the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion is zero (0) accidents. This goal is felt to be obtainable, but not without the help of every man in the unit. The safety program is established and is maintained in this battalion by constant example, education, and discipline as evidenced by the continued lowering of the accident rate. The rate for this reporting period is 14.4 as compared to the previous reporting period's rate of 27.3 per 100,000 flying hours.

II. SURGEON.

1. (U) Treatment. Medical resources of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion remain relatively unchanged. The work load has been reduced somewhat since the 50th Medical Clearing Company has been stationed at Phu Loi. Hospital and X-Ray facilities are now available on post and this increases the effectiveness of medical units. The battalion dispensary continues to provide 24 hour medical coverage for all aviation personnel.

2. (U) Preventive Medicine. An active preventive medicine program is in operation and involves the following areas:

   a. Malaria prophylaxis.
   b. V.D. Control.
   c. Immunizations.
   d. Vaccination of dogs and other pets.
   e. Sanitation. Through monthly inspections of mess halls, clubs, latrine facilities, etc.
   f. Monitoring of flight hours as part of the fatigue control program.

There has been no problem in this battalion with any of the major communicable diseases.

3. (U) Construction. A medical bunker has been constructed adjacent to the battalion dispensary. This has been equipped with medical supplies and provides a secure area for emergency medical care during mortar and rocket attacks.
SUBJECT: #61 (KSC-OSPR-65) P JR Qtr Ending 31 Jan 68 (UIC) (TO)(U)

S. CURR. II, PRT I

LESSONS LEARNED

A. (U) PRELIMINARY

Found in this section will be the new and different experiences of this battalion which are unique to this reporting quarter. The previously reported lessons learned will not be restated unless a new technique or innovation has come to light during this reporting period.

B. (U) EXECUTION

C. (U) INTELLIGENCE

D. (C) OPERATIONS

1. (C) Item: Employment of 24-Flare from UH-1D Aircraft.

   a. Discussion: The 162nd Assault Helicopter Company had the opportunity to experiment with and evaluate the 24-Flare employed from a UH-1D command and control aircraft. While working on a special mission which required immediate availability of illumination to extract troops in contact at night, it was found that in many cases the United States Air Force C-47 flare aircraft arrived too late to insure tactical success. It was apparent that an interim measure had to be devised which would fill the gap between the time the UH-1D helicopters arrived and the arrival of an air force flare aircraft. Initially, the hand-held L312 White Star parachute flares were employed from the command and control aircraft. They were fired from an altitude of 800 feet above the terrain by the gunner or crew chief. The results were marginally effective, the disadvantages being that: the duration of light is only 30 seconds; the command and control aircraft must fly at a low altitude to employ these flares; the short duration of light requires the use of many flares; and that the crew chief or gunner could accidentally fire the flares into the helicopter rotor blades. The second flare tested was the 24 Aircraft parachute flare. These were employed from the command and control aircraft at an altitude of 2,000 feet above the terrain. Both timers were set at their lowest setting, five seconds and ten seconds respectively. The flare ignites at an altitude of 1500 feet and burns out at approximately 400 feet. Fifteen of the 24 flares were carried on the command and control aircraft. This is equal to almost 40 minutes of illumination when employed singly, or 20 minutes when employed in pairs. The flares were dropped from the aircraft by one man in the cargo compartment. The lanyard was secured to a snap link which was fastened to a cargo tie-down ring on the floor of the aircraft. There were no disadvantages found in this method of employment.

   b. Observation: The methods used here have proven extremely successful. The main employment considerations are to insure that the
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGC-4C
1 February 1968
SUBJECT: UACC (HCS-C3FR-65) for 3r ending 31 Jan 68 (UIC W/M/TO)(U)

Fires are released on the downwind side and to the rear of the landing aircraft to ensure that the flare does not blind the pilot while on final and that the parachute portion of the flare does not become a hazard to flight.


a. Discussion: Based on the splendid results obtained while using the command and control aircraft as a flare ship for night extraction, the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company further amplified its employment by using this aircraft in an aggressive posture rather than in a defensive one. It has been stated that the terrain belongs to US Forces during the day and to the Viet Cong during the hours of darkness. The question then arises, "How do we interrupt the movement of supplies, equipment, and personnel during the hours of darkness?"

A method used by the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company was as follows: known enemy river crossing points, well-used Viet Cong roads and trails, and probable cache sites, were plotted on a map. In conjunction with the security force commander, an order of priority was assigned to each location. The pilots and the crews were briefed. The general concept of the operation was that the command and control (C&C) aircraft, with MK 24 flares aboard, enters the area of operations at 3,500 feet, all flares set to ignite at 1,500 feet. The C&C aircraft is followed by a light fire team flying at 1,000 feet above the terrain, followed four minutes later by four UH-1Ds which contain the 20 man security force. The C&C aircraft proceeds to the first target area and drops a flare from 3,500 feet. As the flare ignites, the gunships roll in to take under fire any enemy that may be in the open. If the force taken under fire is a small one, the security force is inserted using full doorgun suppression and gunship protection, to retrieve prisoners and intelligence information.

b. Observation: This tactic was used on two different nights. Although no specific enemy were killed or wounded, it is felt that this particular concept could be employed with a high probability of success if the time and a free-fire area of operations could be established.

3. (C) Item: Utilization of the Assault Support Helicopter.

a. Discussion: The demand for CH-47 support is increasing daily. This is primarily due to an increase in military ground units, the inaccessibility of forward area locations which dictate movement by air, and the greater distances involved that preclude the use of ground transportation. As a result of the great demand and the limited availability of assets, it is imperative that our present resources be utilized to the maximum extent possible. To insure effective utilization of CH-47 aircraft between the 1st Infantry Division the 101st Combat Aviation
SUBJECT: ORL (RCS-030MI-65) for Qtr Ending 31 Jan 68 (UIC 13870)\(U\)

Battalion "key" is revised nightly. The "key" is a printed form which
states the assigned aircraft, mission number, reporting location, number
of sorties, and reporting time. The aircraft commander responsible for
the mission advises his unit of his progress, reporting start time and
completion time of each mission (see enclosure 7, Sample "key").

It is prepared in the following manner. All chinook requests from
subordinate units of the 1st Infantry Division are submitted to the
Division Army Aviation Control Center (AAC) daily. The request in-
cludes the reporting location, time, frequency, call sign, number
of sorties, type, cargo, and name of the responsible individual. The
requests are then checked to insure that it is in fact a mission suitable
for the CH-47. After all requests have been received by AAC, a consoli-
dated aircraft request is submitted to the Army Aviation Element (AAE)
at II Field Forces, Vietnam. AAE determines the number of CH-47
aircraft to be allocated for support of the 1st Infantry Division, the
"key" is finalized. All reporting times and locations are listed, each
sortie is assigned a number, and each CH-47 mission is placed on the
"key", accounting for an hour by hour breakdown of aircraft. Addition-
ally, it allows for refueling every hour and thirty minutes and a shut-
down every three hours and fifteen minutes for a maintenance check.

b. Observation: The "key" utilized by the 1st Infantry Divi-
sion insures proper utilization of the aircraft by insuring that valuable
time is not lost through faulty scheduling and non-productive back hauls.
The tremendous hauling capacity of a CH-47 makes it a resource that can-
not be wasted.

5. (C) Item: Dust Control in Secure Landing Zones and Pickup Zones.

a. Discussion: During the dry season in Vietnam, there is a
definite need for some type of dust control apparatus to suppress or
eliminate the dust problem which exists in pickup zones, landing zones,
night defensive positions, and fire support bases. This problem was
encountered daily by the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion while supporting
the 1st Infantry Division. The division's mission of securing Highway
13 necessitated the location of numerous fire support bases and night
defensive positions along the highway between Lai Chau and Quan Loi. The
nature of these bases eliminated the possibility of the pickup zone or
landing zone being located within the perimeter. The highway was the
logical choice for the landing zones and pickup zones. The narrow
road bed dictated a trail formation for the assault aircraft and the
unpaved surface compounded the dust problem. The 11th Combat Aviation
Battalion has partially solved this problem by equipping a CH-47
helicopter ("Oiley") with an apparatus to be used as a dust suppressor
in designated areas (see enclosure 8, Dust Control Apparatus "Aerial").

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

1 February 1968

SUBJECT: ORLL (RCS-CSFOR-65) For Qtr Ending 31 Jan 68 (UIC WAKTO)(U)

b. Observation: This apparatus is new and has been employed by this battalion 12 times to date with outstanding results. It has been found that maximum spray time is approximately 4 1/2 minutes. Due to the limited spray time, close coordination is needed between “Oily” and the ground unit. Smoke grenades are used to mark the extremities of the area to be sprayed. The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion will continue to use “Oily” whenever tactically possible. We have not had the opportunity to employ this apparatus in a dust suppressor role. Continued evaluation of this system will be reported in future ORLL’s. We have also tested this apparatus in a ground role; i.e., lifting the equipment and personnel to a designated area, discounting the helicopter, and spraying a specific area (see enclosure 9, Dust Control Apparatus ‘Ground’).

5. (c) Item: Prevention of Accidental Fires in Fire Support Bases Caused by Smoke Grenades.

a. Discussion: During the current dry season there have been two serious incidents, where fires have destroyed or partially destroyed fire support bases. The fires were caused by smoke grenades being blown into areas of dry vegetation by the rotor wash of assault and assault support helicopters. A number of tests were conducted to determine the feasibility of landing helicopters without the use of smoke grenades. Guides wearing brightly colored jackets proved ineffective because they could not be seen at sufficient distances. Sandbags covered with panel markers were also ineffective for the same reason. It was determined that smoke was absolutely essential to positively identify pickup and landing zones from an altitude of 3,000 feet and a distance of three to five kilometers. This is absolutely necessary when the aviator is unfamiliar with the area. Additionally, this is the only feasible way to provide specific guidance to CH-47 pilots when they are expediting loads such as artillery pieces or Class V that have to be landed at pre-selected points. One method tested to reduce the hazard was to dig holes in the ground and place the smoke grenade in them. This technique proved impractical due to the fact that in most areas the ground is too hard to be penetrated with an entrenching tool and in a fast moving situation the number of holes necessary precluded their use. A smoke holder was then developed. It was formed from a 12 inch section of eight inch howitzer casing, welded to a 12 inch square of 1/8 inch sheet metal to provide a stabilized base. The smoke grenade is dropped into the mouth of the shell casing which contains the sparks and flames that are emitted. The container satisfies the requirement of identifying the landing zone from a distance and eliminates the fire hazard. The sheet metal base prevents the shell casing from tipping over due to rotor wash.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

1 February 1968
SUBJECT: U.S. (OS-CFROS-66) for 3rd landing 31 Jan 68 (U)(U)

b. Observation: The Pathfinders of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion have made extensive use of this container since its development. It is felt that this has prevented the recurrence of fires in landing zones and pickup zones, while allowing the best method of marking to be used.

6. (c) Item: Use of Smoke Pots when Screening Landing Zones.

a. Discussion: The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion was supporting the 1/26th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, on a combat assault in the vicinity of Quan Loi. The battalion smoke ship, "Jacko", was being used to screen one side of the landing zone. The airborne task force commander directed that smoke pots be dropped at intervals along the side of the landing zone to augment the smoke screen. Initially, the smoke drifted away from the landing zone; however, there was a wind shift and it became evident that the smoke was not moving away from the landing zone but instead was drifting back over the landing zone.

The lift of 20 ships had landed prior to the landing zone becoming completely obscured. The JMC commander felt that his troops on the ground were in jeopardy and instructed the air mission commander to land the second lift of 20 ships 400 meters to the east. This necessitated using a landing zone that had not been prepared by tactical air or artillery fire, and required the troops to have a greater distance to link up.

b. Observation: The use of "Jacko" in conjunction with smoke pots must be thoroughly evaluated prior to actual use. The advantages and disadvantages must be recognized to prevent a similar incident. The smoke pots burn for 15 minutes and create a smoke screen that is of greater density than the screen from the smoke ship. The "no-wind" condition allowed the smoke to remain in one location, thus obscuring the landing zone. The recommended wind conditions for the employment of smoke is three to five knots. This allows the smoke screen to move with the wind but is not fast enough to disperse the screen. Smoke pots should be used only to augment the smoke screen by "Jacko" when there is a prevailing wind and a smoke screen of greater density and longer duration is required.

7. (C) Item: Mortar Watch Flying Time.

a. Discussion: The 164th Reconnaissance Airplane Company was required to perform an average of four mortar watch missions per night. On numerous occasions, the flying time per mission exceeded nine hours. While flying this mission, a pilot and observer sometimes flew 3 1/2 hours per sortie with little more than a refueling break before the next takeoff. This schedule left no time for aircraft maintenance; also the pilot and observer efficiency decreased toward the end of the mission. In January, II Field Forces AAE recommended that O-1 aircraft not be flown in excess of six hours during a 12-hour period of time.
CONFIDENTIAL

1 February 1968

SUM CT: OIC (MAC-05046-66) FOR 3rD WING 31 JAN 66 (OIC WEISO)(U)

In turn, the supported units began to program the flying time of the O-1 aircraft so that the aircraft would be flying only during the most critical hours of the night. At other times the aircraft were maintained ready for take off should an attack occur.

b. Observation: By flying shorter flights, the efficiency of both pilots and observers remains high throughout the mission and the aircraft were maintained in a higher state of readiness. In case of an enemy attack the aircraft is ready to take off and has maximum station time so that refueling in the middle of a mission will not be necessary.

8. (C) Itay: Observers in the O-1 During Night Operations.

a. Discussion: In some cases little or no instructions are given to observers pertaining to the mission they are required to perform. An unqualified or inexperienced observer in an O-1 aircraft on a night mission can impair the ability of a unit to react to enemy action. On one occasion, during an attack on a night defense position, an inexperienced observer was unable to direct the artillery fire and had a great deal of trouble spotting his own. The pilot who was both familiar with the area and trained in observing fires and adjusting artillery, execution the mission. Since this incident the pilots flying the night mission unless sure that the observers know how to operate the radios and is familiar with the aircraft safety features, parachute, and procedures for their use. All supported units have been advised to use only experienced observers on night missions, to brief them thoroughly and to familiarize them with the area of operations and the techniques of artillery adjustment. The observers are encouraged to plot friendly locations on their maps. Supported units have also been urged to train observers in daylight so that they will be proficient in normal daylight operations before attempting night observation.

b. Observation: Since realizing the complexity of night observation, supported units are insuring that observers are familiar with their mission and the area of operations. The observers and pilots are now working in a better spirit of cooperation, realizing that they are both part of an essential night operations team.

9. (C) Itay: Extensive Preparation of Landing Zones.

Discussion: For the past year it has been standing operating procedures within this 1st Infantry Division to extensively prepare all planned landing zones but in the insertion of helicopter forces. The usual preparation consists of three air strikes with 650-lb napalm, 500 and 750 pound bombs. The duration of the strikes are from 20 to 40 minutes. At the termination of the tactical air strike, there is an extensive artillery preparation lasting between 15 and 25 minutes.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

1 February 1968

SUBJECT: OIHL (RCS-OFPH-65) For Qtr Ending 31 Jan 68 (UIC USvtv)(U)

Immediately following the artillery and smoke before the troops are
landed, there is a two minute gunship preparation. As a direct result-
of this extensive preparation the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion has
not received any hits, or had an aircraft shot down in the landing zone
in the past year, while working with the 1st Infantry Division.

b. Observation: The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion has a
great deal of experience working with other divisions in Vietnam. It
has been our observation that s-log because of the extensive preparation
of the landing zones by the 1st Infantry Division, the 11th Combat
Aviation Battalion has had fewer combat losses of skin and aircraft. It
is realized that the area methods of employment of air, artillery and
gunships in the Delta area would have a different effect due to the
longer range fields of fire and concealed areas (see inclusion 10,
Combat Operation After Action Report)

10. (C) Item: Selection of Landing Zones.

a. Discussion: During a recent operation in the Delta Region,
a company of this battalion received numerous aircraft hits from concealed
positions surrounding the landing zone. This occurred in spite of the
fact that an extensive preparation of the landing zone was made by tacti-
cal air, artillery and gunships. The aircraft hits and subsequent damage
were a direct result of landing in close proximity to an area which af-
forded the enemy cover and concealment when other suitable landing zones
were available close to the one selected. In this particular case the
enemy was deployed in extremely well built and well camouflaged bunkers
which were not detected.

b. Observation: On each combat assault, consideration must
be given to the point of contact in relation to the concealment
afforded the enemy. If the ground tactical plan allows for a choice of
landing zone, the air mission commander must select an area of open
terrain which affords a greater degree of protection to the troops and
landing aircraft (see inclusion 11, Combat Operations After Action Report).

B. (C) TRAINING

Item: Use of Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to Train New Units in
Proper Utilization of CH-47's.

1. Discussion: The MTT has been used by the 11th Combat Aviation
Battalion to train new units and personnel in the proper utilization of
CH-47 helicopters with outstanding results. The team consists of two
aviators from one of the CH-47 companies, a team of pathfinders, and a
couple of rigging equipment used in the Republic of Vietnam. The
instruction covers capabilities and limitations of the CH-47, proper
rigging and loading techniques and means of utilizing the aircraft to its maximum potential. After classes are hold, practical exercises in the rigging and loading of all types of loads are conducted. The pathfinder personnel are extremely important in the practical exercise portion. Their knowledge of rigging techniques and solutions to everyday problems enhances the instruction tremendously. These classes are usually conducted at battalion level and attended by battalion S-4 and company personnel who are responsible for resupply. This training is not conducted on a one-time basis; it is recurring instruction that helps the supported units chassis of new development ideas. It also provides for training of new personnel in the units.

2. Observation: Units that have used the ITR for training of their personnel are considerably better oriented toward CH-47 operations. They receive the maximum performance from their aircraft as shown by more tonnage carried and less hours flown. These mobile training teams are available to any supported unit on request.

7. (C) LOGISTICS and MAINTENANCE.

There are few new problems in the field of logistics. Most problems in this area are recurring and will probably continue. However there are several worthy of note.

1. (C) Item: Ration Support at Forward Locations.

Discussion: It has been the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion experience that when a unit is operating from a forward location it might be more feasible to open a new ration account than to transport rations over great distances. For example, when the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company moved from Phuoc Vinh to Han Tan, rations were not available at Han Tan and the distance from home station precluded the unit from flying in rations on a daily basis. Therefore the S-4 established a ration account at the nearest Class I point which was at Vung Tau. Arrangements were made for the 222nd Combat Support Aviation Battalion to deliver the rations from Vung Tau to Han Tan daily.

2. (C) Item: Care and Cleaning of Individual Weapons.

a. Discussion: We have found that frequent inspections is the only reliable method of ensuring that personal and proper care of their individual weapons. Some units have built armories and require all weapons to be secured there when not in use. Where the tactical situation permits, we recommend that this method be used. In those cases where the tactical situation dictates that individual weapons be readily available, the unit commanders must require frequent inspections of all weapons. The assumption that an in a combat zone does not have to told to keep
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: URLIQ(RCS-CSMP-65) FOR Qtr ending 31 Jan 68 (VIC WALT)(U)

his weapon clean is wrong. There are always those individuals that will neglect their weapons even to the point of allowing them to become inoperable.

b. Observation: Frequent inspection of individual weapons is an absolute must.

3. (C) Item: Shortage of Aviation Supply Parts.

a. Discussion: The 605th Direct Support Unit (DSU) has an average demand satisfaction rate of 50 per cent. Demand satisfaction reflects the number of requests received which match the authorized stockage list (ASL) and that are filled immediately from stock on hand. This we believe is not an acceptable figure. The 605th Direct Support Unit has an average demand accommodation rate of 80 per cent. This information indicates that 80 per cent of the items requested are authorized for stockage by the DSU. This indicates how well the DSU is managing its stocks to satisfy their customers requirements. A low fill of the number of requisitions matching the ASL indicates that the DSU is not requisitioning in a timely manner and/or is not receiving replenishment stockage supplies to satisfy the customers initial demand. During this period, the low demand satisfaction is due to the increased number of requests which is directly related to the number of hours flown. The UH-1D aircraft have flown 189 per cent of the flying hour program, the UH-1G aircraft have flown 103 per cent of the flying hour program, and the CH-47 aircraft have flown 149 per cent of the flying hour program.

b. Observation: The shortage of parts is primarily due to the hours flown in excess of the programmed flying hours. These hours have placed a greater load on the supply than it is designed to accommodate.

4. (C) Item: Low Power Engines.

a. Discussion: A study of low power has been made in-country over the past year. The data obtained on this study indicates that at least 90 per cent of low power problems can be contributed to foreign object damage and dirty engines. Some engines have been cleaned by using a solvent. This has been accomplished by dumping solvent in the compressor and considering it a cure all, with no follow up inspection. This may or may not be enough to clean the backed up grease in the compressor. In many cases solvent alone is not enough to clean the compressor and walnut shells must be used to complete the job. The best time to clean the engine is when oil and dirt first begin building up in the compressor. This can happen anytime during engine operation. When grease or oil begins to leak into the inlet of the engine, a light film of oil is left which collects dirt and over a period of time this results in a power loss.
CONFIDENTIAL

1 February 1968
SUBJ: UH-1 (HOS-GSFV-65) for 30 days ending 31 Jan 68 (U) MF-KTO(I)(U)

b. Observation: The engine inlet must be kept clean and free of oil and dirt at all times. This is accomplished by daily inspections and regular cleaning.

5. (C) Item: Armament Direct Exchange System.

a. Discussion: Sufficient armament direct exchange (DX) systems are not available to replace systems turned in on work order. Consequent-ly when a system is turned in on work order you may or may not receive a replacement. Procurement action has not kept pace with the need and a mounting shortage of systems for exchange has resulted.

b. Observation: A lack of replacement armament systems and repair parts takes the aircraft as well as the gun systems ineffective. A ready source of direct exchange of complete systems should be available. Use or broken systems shall be turned in and new or rebuilt systems immediately placed on aircraft.

6. (C) Item: Turn in of Crash Damage Aircraft.

a. Discussion: If an aircraft has received extensive combat damage or crash damage, which takes over 30 days to repair, the aircraft should be turned in immediately to SSU backup maintenance. The turn in will make the unit eligible for the issue of a replacement aircraft and clear the property books.

b. Observation: Units have been slow in the turn-in of crash damage aircraft thereby denying themselves the use of that aircraft and/or the replacement aircraft. Timely turn-ins will keep a unit with more flyable aircraft. During the last month of the quarter the turn-in of aircraft from the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion was outstanding; in every case the turn-in was accomplished in less than 24 hours.

7. (C) Item: Flying Hour Program.

a. Discussion: The flying hour program for the UH-1 aircraft in the Republic of Vietnam is 60 hours per month per aircraft and the CH-47 aircraft flying hour program is 50 hours per month per aircraft. This program has not been adhered to because of mission requirements. The problem is just how long can and how much can it be exceeded without adversely affecting availability. The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion has averaged 189 per cent utilization on UH-1D aircraft and 103 per cent utilization on UH-1B and CH-47 aircraft and 149 per cent utilization on CH-47 aircraft during the past quarter. The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion has been able to support the mission by 24 hour maintenance, cannibalization, and extensive lateral search for aircraft parts with sister units and other support areas. There is a daily requirement for
technical supply office to fly to another unit in search of parts, after
following manual supply channels. The response of the logistical system
has not been fast enough to keep up with the accelerated flying operation.
Requirements are being placed directly in the logistical system, in the form
of demands. Until the logistical system can match the requirements,
there is a definite need for a realistic flying hour program which can
be flown and maintained. The aircraft are accumulating hours at an
accelerated rate which often leads to longer scheduled maintenance and
increased unscheduled maintenance. The maintenance personnel work an
average daily shift of 12 to 15 hours. Once a flying hour program has
been established, it should be flown. General emphasis in this area is
very important and necessary. The flying hour program of 60 hours per
month for UH-1 aircraft and 50 hours per month for C-47 aircraft
appears to be low based on present utilization figures.

b. Procedures: In order to support the present flying
hour program, a 24 hour maintenance schedule is required. To accomplish
this maintenance schedule the personnel are divided between the day
and night shift. The night shift and part of the day shift personnel are
freely reduced further due to the requirement for personnel to per-
form company duties such an interior and bunker guard. Also with a
split maintenance shift, the requirement for base facilities to
operate on a continuous basis exists. The present flying hour program
for the UH-1 aircraft is 60 hours per month and the C-47 is 50 hours per
month. At the present utilization of 189 per cent, the UH-1 companies
are required to perform a minimum of 28 periodic inspections (P2) per
month. The C-47 company operating at the present utilization of 148
per cent is required to perform 17 periodic inspections per month. To
perform the periodic inspections three days are required for the UH-1.
The C-47 requires 1 1/2 days on 17 periodic inspections and
three days on even periodic inspections. In addition, the 6th and 12th
periodic inspections are extensive. To perform the 6th periodic in-
spection requires ten days and the 12th periodic inspection requires
15 days. The availability of parts is less than desired there-by
causing cannibalization to be a vital method of securing
requested parts. As necessary as the cannibalization program is,
it also increases the workload of mechanics on time required to
return the aircraft to a mission ready status. The increase in the
current flying hour program increases the rate of scheduled maintenance
and also the rate of unscheduled maintenance is increased proportionately.
Within this realm of increased flying hours, frequency of scheduled
maintenance has increased almost ten fold while the required time to
canibalize maintenance has not increased proportionately. The work team’s
effectiveness has decreased due to increased requirements such as company
interior and bunker guard duties.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVG-66
SUBJ: ORL (RG-SPQR-65) For Qtr Ending 31 Jan 68 (UK WP/AT)(U)

G. (C) ALL THE SAME

Item: Night Safety at Poorly Lighted, Uncontrolled Airstrips.

1. Discussion: Some airstrips utilized by reconnaissance airplanes during the course of a night mission are poorly lighted, have tower operations only during daylight hours, and have a refueling crew. On a night mission in November a pilot made a hard landing on a 1,500 foot pierced steel planking (PSP) strip that had only eight lights randomly spaced, including taxi lights. Permission was obtained to use a lighted strip 20 minutes away until the runway lighting could be improved. When the ground controller learned that his nocturnal watch ship was no longer based at his headquarters, the runway lighting system was improved. When a fixed-wing pilot asked for directions to a refueling area on an airfield, the tower was closed and no fuel crew available. An airfield service refueling crewman familiar only with rotary wing aircraft came to assist. After guiding the pilot to the fuel point, the refueler walked into the propeller and cut his arm seriously. All night missions were then scheduled to start in daylight hours so that a pilot flying to a field for the first time would have tower control for landing and could reconnoiter the field before dark, familiarize himself with the location of fueling points and any potential safety hazards.

2. Observations: By arriving for the mission before dark, the pilot can contact the tower and make necessary arrangements to take care of any contingency while everyone concerned with the airfield is still on duty and the airfield is fully operational. This means of preparing the field crew for the night mission has resulted in less time lost for refueling and a safer operation for both pilot and ground crew.

H. (U) SIGNED, DATE

37

CONFIDENTIAL
AVCC-2-C

SUBJECT: ORLL (RCS-GSFOR-65) FOR QTR ENDING 31 JAN 68 (UIC WFAKTO)(U)

SECTION II, PART II

RECOMMENDATIONS

NOTE:

11 Incl

1. 12TH-C.A.G.-CO-1
2. 12TH-C.A.G.-CO-9
3. USARV-CO-4060
4. Current Organization
5. Command and Staff Structure
6. Maintenance Statistical Summary
7. Sample "Key"
8. Dust Control Apparatus (Aerial)
9. Dust Control Apparatus (Ground)
10. Cbt Opn After Action Report, 13 Jan 68
11. Cbt Opn After Action Report, 21 Jan 68

DISTRIBUTION:

2 copies to CO 12th Combat Aviation Group
1 copy to CG 1st Aviation Brigade
3 copies to DCG USARV
2 copies to CG USARPAC
2 copies thru CO 12th Combat Aviation Group to ACSFOR DA
1 copy thru channels to ACSFOR DA
1 copy to CO 145th Combat Aviation Battalion
1 copy to CO 214th Combat Aviation Battalion
1 copy to CO 222nd Combat Support Aviation Battalion
1 copy to CO 269th Combat Aviation Battalion
1 copy to CO 308th Combat Aviation Battalion
1 copy to CO 270th Combat Aviation Battalion
1 copy to CO 3d Armed Sqdn, 17th Air Cav
AVC-SC (1 Feb 68)  1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) for Period
Ending 31 January 1968 (RCS CSPOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96266  10 March 1968
THRU: Commanding General, II FFOCEN, APO 96266
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C.  20310

1. (U) One copy of 11th Combat Aviation Battalion's Operational
Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) (RCS CSPOR-65) for the period ending 31
January 1968, is forwarded in compliance with USARV Regulation 1-19,
dated 3 November 1968.

2. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and the fol-
lowing comments are made:

a. Reference: Section I, paragraph S 4a, page 20: Motor
sergeants and mechanics. The Personnel Inventory Report submitted as of
31 January 1968 reflects an auth of 21 and assigned 23 for E03 633 and C.

Engineer Equipment Repairman. Subject report reflects 9
authorized and 4 assigned as of 31 January 1968. This figure is com-
parable to the other units within this Group.

School Trained. The end results of school trained personnel
versus on-the-job training is not considered of significant importance
since adequate supervisors are assigned.

b. Reference: Section I, paragraph H 9, page 22: The B03
Inventory for 31 January 1968 reflects a shortage of 5 Sheetmetal repair-
men out of an authorization of 24. This has been a shortage throughout
the Group but the addition of 2 civilians per maintenance detachment
should help to alleviate this problem.

c. Reference: Section II, Par. I, paragraph D 5, page 28:
Dust suppression continues to be a major problem, particularly during the
dry season. It is apparent that dust suppression in forward areas is un-
satisfactory. USARV UNCLASSIFIED message AVHAV-S 32604, dated 16 Jan 68,
directed all commanders to "Review their priorities for soil stabilization
to assure timely and continuing dust control in accessible forward oper-
ating areas as well as helicopter base areas." Every effort is being made
to eliminate this problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES E. LYMBA
Major, Infantry
Asst Adjutant

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96307
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DS, APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This command has reviewed the attached ORLL of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion and concurs with the report with the following exceptions:

   a. Page 30, para 7a. Non-concur. The last sentence should read:
      In January, II Field Force AAE recommended that O-1 aircraft not be flown in excess of six hours during a 24 hour period of time.

   b. Page 31, para 9a. Repetitive extensive preparation of Landing Zones eliminates any surprise effect and also gives the enemy an indication of intentions. Preparations are desirable but not to the extent that they become stereotyped.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

E. M. McGrath
CPT. AG

TO:        Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
            Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This command has reviewed the attached ORLL of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion and concurs with the report with the following exceptions:

   a. Page 30, para 7a. Non-concur. The last sentence should read:
      In January, II Field Force AAE recommended that O-1 aircraft not be flown in excess of six hours during a 24 hour period of time.

   b. Page 31, para 9a. Repetitive extensive preparation of Landing Zones eliminates any surprise effect and also gives the enemy an indication of intentions. Preparations are desirable but not to the extent that they become stereotyped.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

E. M. McGrath
CPT. AG
CONFIDENTIAL

AVB-A (1 Feb 68) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (OELL)(RCS-CSFOR-65)
For Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (UIC WFAKT0)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 MAR 27 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GOF-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report, considers it
to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed with the
following comments.

2. (C) Sec II, para 5a, page 29: This headquarters dispatched a
message, AVBA-P 127098, subject, Grass Fire Hazards, dated 21 December
1967, that provides suggestions to eliminate this hazard. The use
of a pit, dug in the vicinity of the sling load, to hold the grenade
in nonflammable surroundings is a simple solution not requiring special
equipment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

FRED B. ZIMMERMAN
Major, AGC
Adjutant General

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96575 20 MAR 1968

TO: Commander inChief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion (WFAKAA) as indorsed.

2. Concur with report as indorsed. Report is considered adequate.

3. Correct Unit Identification Code is WFAKAA.

4. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ 1st Avn Bde
HQ 11th Cbt Avn Bn
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion, for Period Ending 31 Jan 68 (RCS GSFOR-65) (UID: WFAKTO)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 12 APR 68

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

CPT, AGC
Asst AG
### MAINTENANCE STATISTICAL SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE / AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HOURS FLEW</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1B, C</td>
<td>1025</td>
<td>1422</td>
<td>1317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>5853</td>
<td>6673</td>
<td>6414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td>2421</td>
<td>2403</td>
<td>2365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-1</td>
<td>2891</td>
<td>3212</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>AVAILABLE (PER CENT)</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1B, C</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-1</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>EDM (PER CENT)</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1B, C</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>EDP (PER CENT)</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1B, C</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incl 6

45
### KEY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0730</td>
<td>Da.</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0730</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1030</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1130</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>XT715334</td>
<td>0830</td>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>0900</td>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>1015</td>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>Da</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0745</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>0815</td>
<td>XT745395</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>XT860227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0730</td>
<td>XT709381</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>0900</td>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>0730</td>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>Da</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0745</td>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>0815</td>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>0915</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>0945</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>1345</td>
<td>QL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>Da.</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>0945</td>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>1015</td>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>Da</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

incl 7
DUST CONTROL APPARATUS (AERIAL)

1. Equipment required for aerial spray/defoliation:
   a. Two military standard 100 GPM pump
   b. Two 500 gallon fuel bladders
   c. One spray apparatus (see included photographs)

2. The rig is connected to the cargo hook and secured to the hook beam with 2 tie down straps.

3. One fuel bladder is loaded first, then one pump, the second pump and the last fuel bladder (see diagram).

4. Crew requirements:
   a. Aircraft commander and pilot
   b. Crew Chief
   c. Gunner
   d. Pump men (2)

5. Flight techniques:
   a. The rig is horizontal to the bottom of the fuselage, secured in place by a rope. Once the aircraft is airborne the rig is lowered to hang vertical below the aircraft.
   b. Approach the area (road) to be sprayed into the wind. Flying low enough to cause the rig to be 3–5 feet above the ground. Distance above the ground will be judged by the flight engineer.
   c. The flight path over the area should be sprayed one side of the road at a time, thereby covering both ditches.
   d. The air speed should be 3 – 10 knots.
   e. The best time of day to spray is early morning while the moisture is still in the air.

Incl 8
DUST CONTROL APPARATUS (GROUND)

1. Equipment required for ground spray.
   a. One 100 GPM pump.
   b. Two 500 gallon fuel bladders (spray apparatus see enclosed photographs).
   c. Spray apparatus (see enclosed photographs).

2. Bladders are carried externally to the area and placed in center of the area to be sprayed; 150 feet of hose is attached to the spray rig.

3. Mixture: 50% pentane and diesel fuel. For a more permanent pad use a second application of 60% pentane and 40% diesel.
INTERNAL LOADING
OF
PUMPS AND BLADDER
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO 96289

"DEUPLA PROTOCOL"

13 January 1968

AVOC-9C

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (U)

THRU: Commanding Officer
12th Combat Aviation Group
ATTN: AVOC-9C
APO 96289

TO: Commanding General
1st Aviation Brigade
ATTN: AVR-C
APO 96384

1. (U) Type Operation: Insertion Reinforcing

2. (U) Date: 8 January 1968

3. (U) Location: XS 873677

4. (U) Reporting Unit: 173rd Assault Helicopter Company, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion

5. (U) Supported Unit: 9th Infantry Division

6. (C) Intelligence Information: Enemy were concealed in well-built bunkers. They had very good fire discipline and held their fire until the slicks landed. Their fire was devastatingly accurate. There were at least five bunkers with automatic weapons, small arms, and RPG's.

7. (U) Mission: Insertion

8. (C) Concept: "B" Co., 2/60 Infantry Division was inserted into a rice paddy area 25 miles South of Saigon at 1800 hours, 8 January 1968 by 14 OH-10 helicopters to reinforce 9th Division units in contact.

Degradaed at 5 year intervals
Reclassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

Incl 10
13 January 1968

SUBJ: Combat Operation After Action Report (U)

9. (C) Execution: Ten (10) UH-1D lift ships, a spare, a C&C and a heavy fire team from the 173rd Assault Helicopter Company departed Lai Kho on a tactical emergency for the 9th Infantry Division at approximately 1400 hours 8 January 1968. In the vicinity of Tan Tru, Barring 6, the Battalion Commander of the 2/60 Infantry, was contacted and the 173rd Assault Helicopter Company proceeded to extract "B" Co, 2/60 Infantry from field positions vicinity coord XS 685 598. During the extraction, UH-1D 851 suffered a tail rotor failure caused by enemy fire and crashed causing some damage. The Pipe Snake recovery ship was summoned and made a routine recovery shortly thereafter. During this time Cougar 6 contacted Robin Road 6 and instructed him to contact EMU 6 who was APC for the assault helicopter company lift of "B" Company into a LZ vicinity coord XS 875 673 from French Fort. Upon arrival at French Fort it was determined that Cougar 6 had designated himself AOC at 1800 hours. Fourteen UH-1D helicopters departed French Fort for the insertion under the control of Cougar 6. Two heavy fire teams consisting of the Crossbows and the Taipans were to prep and cover. Same 6 was unable to adjust the artillery on the LZ and called for a check fire. He instructed Cougar 6 to prep with the fire teams. The Crossbows made one pass but did not hit the LZ. Immediately thereafter, the ships were directed to land. On touchdown, heavy fire was received on all sides by automatic weapons and rockets (RPG). UH-1D 866 after off loading its passengers was hit in the left front door by an RPG round, critically wounding the pilot. In the ensuing ground action the other three crew members were wounded. UH-1D 893 was hit and lost oil pressure. The LC landed about a mile NE of the LZ. The crew was picked up by UH-1D 687. UH-1D 981 was hit in the cyclic and the pilot received a hit in his foot. UH-1D 5982 was hit in the left windshield. UH-1D 866 was hit seven times and lost all hydraulics and the pilot was hit in the right leg by fragments. UH-1D 090 was hit in the leading edge of the main rotor blade. All ships but 866 and 893 were instructed to fly to Tan An for refueling and standby. Subsequently, about 2130 hours, they were released. All ships were inspected and flown back to Lai Kho except 866 which was left in the LZ, 875 673 of the LZ, and 893 and 090 which were not flyable and were left at Tan An. These four aircraft were extracted the following day. The Crossbows were retained on station by Cougar 6 until approximately 0130 hours 9 January 1968 and were then released.

10. (C) Results:

a. Personnel Losses:
   KIA None
   WIA Nine

b. Material Losses:
   UH-1D 866 and 851 turned in to 605th Field Maintenance

C. Enemy Losses:
   Unknown
CONFIDENTIAL

LVG1-LS
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (U)

13 January 1968

11. (C) Administrative Matters:
   a. Duration of Operation: 1445, 8 Jan 68 - 0130, 9 Jan 68
   b. Communications were excellent
   c. Medical evacuation could not be started before 2100 due to heavy enemy fire in the LZ.

12. (C) Lessons Learned: The LZ was not prepped because of poor organization and control. An hour was wasted before the C&C lifted off to make the insertion and by then it was almost dark in spite of the fact another C&C ship was available. Apparently because of darkness setting in and troubles in coordinating the prep, no prep was made on the LZ. Because the LZ was not prepped, the ships were caught in a murderous crossfire.

13. (C) Recommendation: Troop ships should not be allowed to land in an insecure area without adequate suppression and preparation.

WILLIAM A. MOORE
LTC, Infantry
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

D.P.RIVAL OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH COMBAT AVIATION REGIMENT
APO San Francisco 96289

"CONFIDENTIAL: PROPERLY" 

AVGC-AC 21 January 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (U)

THRU: Commanding Officer
12th Combat Aviation Group
ATTN: AVGC-30
APO 96266

TO: Commanding General
1st Aviation Brigade
ATTN: AVBA-C
APO 96384

1. (U) Type Operation: Insertion.

2. (U) Date: 17 Jan 68.

3. (U) Location: XS567935

4. (U) Reporting Units: 162nd Assault Helicopter Company and
173rd Assault Helicopter Company, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion.

5. (U) Supported Unit: 4/49 Infantry, 25th Infantry Division.

6. (C) Intelligence Information: At least two (2) machine guns
and numerous small arms were fired from well-fortified bunker positions.
The enemy was concealed along the tree lines and held their fire until
the slices were on short final. Fire was accurate and many hits were
taken.


8. (C) Concept: 70 sorties of the 4/49 Infantry, 25th Infantry Division,
were inserted into the vicinity of coordinates XS 567935
about one mile SW of Due Hoa at 0745 hours, 17 Jan 68 by ten (10)
UH-1D aircraft.

Incl 11

57

Downgraded at 9 year Intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 8200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVOC-48

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (II)

21 January 1968

9. (C) Execution: Ten (10) OH-1D lift ships, a spare, a C&C, two (2) light fire teams from the 173rd Full Bull Co, and a smoke dispensing ship departed C&I Base in support of the 4/29 Infantry, 23rd ARVN Division. On 17 Jan 68 at 0745 hours the 173rd Full Bull Co made a combat assault in the vicinity of coordinates XS 569933. Preparation of the LZ consisted of tactical air (a flight of F-4s) dropping napalm, 500-lb bombs, and 20-mm suppressive fire on the tree lines and stream lines around the LZ. This was followed by a 15-minute artillery prep (6-105mm and 2-155mm howitzers) surrounding the LZ. Two (2) LTs were employed on a 3-minute prep on both sides of the LZ and then led the first flight of five (5) slicks into the LZ. Saucy, the smoke dispensing ship, suppressed along the stream ahead of the slicks. The gunships put out the mark twice and did not receive fire, nor did Saucy. Landing direction was north. The slicks received fire primarily from the west when they landed. Four of the five ships were hit; one ship, although hit, radically executed evasive maneuver to the 12th Evac Hospital at Cu Chi. The second flight of five was instructed to go around and orbit. A second air strike of three (3) was employed along the stream from which the fire had been received, again dropping 500 lb bombs. All ordnance was on target. Immediately following, Saucy laid another smoke screen and the second flight of five landed in the LZ to reinforce the troops in contact. Again four of the five slicks were hit and wounded were radically evacuated to Cu Chi. The other aircraft landed at Duc Base. One OH-1D (66-16081) that had been hit while in the LZ and flown back to Duc Base, exploded in the engine-transmission area and flying debris damaged 173th Full Bull Co. This left three slicks (including the spare) flyable in addition to the C&C. Based on the lack of flyable aircraft, the 173rd Full Bull Co was released to the RRF company, the 162nd Full Bull Co, was committed. A tactical emergency was called and the 162nd Full Bull Co reported to Duc Base at 1100 hours. In coordination with the ground commanders the RRF company inserted a blocking force of twenty (20) sorties at XS 577947 after a 10-minute artillery prep, a 2-minute prep and a smoke screen laid down by Saucy on the northeast side. Saucy was employed on the left (SL) side and in front of the slicks. The ground troops came into contact after the first five sorties were on the ground in both locations. The aircraft were fired at; however, no aircraft hits were taken by any of the 162nd Full Bull Co ships at 1100 hours. Two A-1s were called on static by the ground commander to extract RRF ships and K/Ls. However, neither aircraft could land because of hot LZs. They departed the area at approximately 1200 hours. Using Bo Trai (MT 527043) as a pickup area, a blocking force was then inserted at XS 538972 and XS 539972. There were ten (10) sorties inserted into each location after a 10-minute
artillery prop and 2-minute gunship prop. Both LZs were cLc. Smoke was used to screen the left flank and front of the landing aircraft. The RRF company was released at 1430 and returned to Phuoc Vinh.

10. (C) Results:
   a. Personnel Losses:
      KIL: None
      WIA: 8
   b. Material Losses:

   8 aircraft hit and damaged. Of the 8 aircraft hit each received from 2 to 13 rounds. The majority of the rounds were received in the forward cockpit area with a few rounds in the transmission and tail boom sections. Five of the aircraft required Pipasea recovery. Two of the aircraft that received hits were further damaged when the transmission and head of UH-1D #66-16081 separated from the aircraft. Part of the debris hit and damaged UH-1D #66-10092.

   c. Enemy Losses:

      Unknown

11. (C) Administrative Matters:
   a. Duration of Operation: 0730 - 1430 hours, 17 Jan 68.
   b. Communications were excellent.

12. (C) Lessons Learned: The VC have extremely good fire discipline. They did not fire at the gunships that made two passes to mark the LZ nor did they at the smoke ship, but waited until the slicks were on the ground. They occupied bunkers which were well constructed and well concealed requiring direct hits from heavy ordnance to destroy them.

WILLIAM L. ROBBS
LTC, Infantry
Commanding
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 67-31 Jan 1968

CO, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion

1. Originating Activity (Corporate Author): OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
2. Report Title: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion
3. Date: 1 February 1968
4. Total No. of Pages: 60
5. No. of Refs:
6. Contract or Grant No.: N/A
7. Project No.: N/A
8. Originator's Report Number(s): 681161
9. Other Report No(s): (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)
10. Distribution Statement: N/A
11. Supplementary Notes: N/A
13. Abstract: N/A