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The Role of Military Aid in National Strategy (U)
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The Role of Military Aid
in National Strategy (U)

by

John R. Thomas
Mildred C. Vreeland
19 April 1968

CRDSTA

SUBJECT: RAC-R-44, "The Role of Military Aid in National Strategy."

TO:

1. Transmitted herewith is (are) ____ copy (copies) of RAC-R-44.

2. RAC-R-44, "The Role of Military Aid in National Strategy," was prepared by the Research Analysis Corporation for the Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army. The study will provide a basis for future planning policy.

3. The findings of this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position.

FOR THE CHIEF OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:

[Signature]

RUSSELL D. McGOVERN
Colonel, GS
Chief, Studies and Analyses Division

Published April 1968
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CONFIDENTIAL
Since the inception of military aid, there have been a number of useful appraisals of this US program. In the main, however, they have focused on the effectiveness of the program within a relatively narrow context of military aid policy implementation.

Within the last several years, however, not only implementation but military aid's very existence and the need for the program have been brought into question. Therefore it is timely to examine—as this study does—the relation of military aid to the broader US foreign policy and national security context. This study not only examines the relevance, or equally important the possible lack of relevance, of military aid to current and potential US foreign policy and strategic problems but also suggests a basis for developing guidelines for determining the current and future relevance of military aid to these problems.

Reflecting the fact that the subject of military aid has often been controversial, this study has gone through a number of drafts and revisions. In this process it has benefited in particular from constructive appraisals by RAC consultants, GEN Robert Wood and Ambassador Frederick Bartlett, in their capacity as chairmen of successive review boards. Others who were most helpful in the review process were GEN James Moore, USA (Ret), and Dr. Stanley Harrison of RAC, RAC Consultant COL Lincoln Simon, USA (Ret), and Dr. Harry Shaw, currently of the Bureau of Budget. The authors also wish to thank several staff members of the Strategic Studies Department for their support during the initial stages of the study.

John P. Hordt
Head, Strategic Studies Department
Problem

To provide a basis for developing guidelines for reappraising the rationale for military assistance, evaluating its effectiveness, and analyzing changes that may be called for by such a reappraisal and evaluation.

Facts

This study was undertaken in support of the US Army's reappraisal of US military aid and at the request of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.

Discussion

The analytical guidelines for determining and evaluating the role of military aid in supporting US national objectives are similar to those suggested in earlier studies. However, it cannot be assumed that the guidelines have always been followed in formulating military aid plans, including those for the grant military assistance program. Similarly, whereas the official as well as the implied objectives of military aid are readily defined, there has been a consistent deficiency in the systematic formulation and evaluation of a strategy for military aid from which program guidelines can be derived, priorities established, and control maintained over the direction of country programs.

These analytical guidelines suggest that the fundamental rationale for military aid should not be derived from stated US policy objectives and preferences alone but rather from a continuous interrelation of these objectives with alternative approaches to meeting certain problems and with the resources available to do so. In other words the rationale should be strategic in nature. From this point of view it can be observed that the objectives of military aid remain too general to provide guidelines for program planning; objectives would be more useful for planning if they were stated in terms of the strategy being pursued by the US in the recipient country. Stated in these terms, military aid objectives would also clarify the implications of the strategy being pursued in terms of the time and resources involved and the extent of the US commitment.
Since deficiencies have existed in the planning of military aid it cannot be asserted with certainty, in the first instance, that a close relation exists between the US provision of military equipment and training to certain countries and the requirements of the world situation as it affects US foreign policy goals. Deficiencies in program guidelines have been most apparent in relation to the problems of internal insecurity and the nation-building process in less developed countries, undoubtedly because of the complexity of these problems and the associated difficulties of formulating a strategy to meet them. However, similar deficiencies existed until recently in military aid planning for the forward-area countries around the Sino-Soviet perimeter, where the relative US familiarity with the problems and threats involved suggested fewer difficulties in developing appropriate guidelines. Thus the grant military assistance programs in these countries were the subject of a major reappraisal in 1965, a reappraisal that should have been not a special action external to the normal military aid planning and evaluation process but a continuous, integral part of that planning process.

These deficiencies undoubtedly stemmed from a widely accepted assumption that the importance or the correctness of the overall objectives being promoted by military aid were self-evident, and that this in turn applied equally to the strategy governing military aid, obviating the need to question closely the realism of the strategy to which this aid was contributing. However, recent questioning of the validity and effectiveness of both the objectives and the strategy is reflected in the recent drastic reductions by Congress of the annual appropriations for grant military aid programs and related US efforts. Disturbingly, this decline has occurred in the face of US government insistence that the threats to US interests have not abated and with little indication that other nations are now capable of assuming or willing to assume the burden of supporting US and common objectives without further US support. Consequently a review of the role of military aid and the strategy it has supported is required. Moreover, it is clear that this review should examine whether the strategy supported by military aid over the last 15 to 20 years is likely to remain appropriate in meeting future problems generating the major dangers to US interests and objectives.

POSSIBLE PROBLEMS AFFECTING FUTURE MILITARY AID

Five interrelated problems or issues are likely to affect the strategy and objectives of military aid in the forthcoming decade. These are (a) changes in the nature of the threat, (b) the role of military aid in the modernization process in underdeveloped countries, (c) the role of US military commitments implied by US military aid to recipient nations, (d) changes in the alliance system, and (e) the possibilities for developing new strategies for military aid.
Changes in the Nature of the Threat

It should be noted that, although the principal danger to US interests remains basically the same as in the past 20 years, the problems that generate this potential danger are changing. Thus the principal danger to US interests remains any basic change in the world balance of power that would seriously narrow the alternatives available to the US to promote its preferred goals, but the problems that have to be addressed to maintain this balance have been changing and may change in view of new trends. Moreover, unlike the immediate post-WWII period when the focus of US attention was Europe and East Asia, the problems today are global in scope and are not confined to the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. This development has been accompanied by the steady reduction in the overseas military presence of major US allies.

Among the trends generating new problems are those affecting the communist world, a long-standing concern of military aid. The Sino-Soviet bloc has been split in a fashion that strongly implies that a confrontation with "world communism" is becoming less and less relevant to the maintenance of a world balance of power favorable to US security. Neither Moscow nor Peking is necessarily able to control new communist states in a manner that effectively adds to their world power. Consequently each case now has to be examined on its own merits. At the same time, however, the US has to remain deeply and primarily concerned with the strength and actions of the USSR and Communist China. These two nations are likely to remain the major rivals of the US, and the balance maintained between all three states will help shape the opportunities for other countries to pursue policies of development and security.

Less developed countries face a relatively new and different set of problems arising from their efforts toward national modernization in an unstable political environment. These problems have been officially recognized as generating serious dangers that could threaten US interests and security. In several regions of the world they are already the major threats to the achievement of broadly defined US national objectives. In the next 10 to 20 years the problems in the underdeveloped world may be seriously aggravated by an impending population-food crisis beyond the ability or the resources of the US to solve them. Nor will major US rivals be likely to derive long-term advantage from a resulting inherently unstable and disorderly situation in the underdeveloped world. In at least some regions, therefore, it is possible that some of the dangers may have to be addressed as a direct concern of programs like military aid, but in others the basic problems generating the dangers may have to be dealt with by other and less direct methods.

Role of Military Aid in Modernization

A second major issue in reorienting military aid is its role in the modernization process—the entire process of developing viable institutions that
suppor national welfare and orderly progress—in those less developed coun-
tries that retain a high priority for US efforts by virtue of an intrinsic stra-
tegic importance (e.g., location, potential wealth, size). The role of military
aid here is still the subject of controversy. The modernization process is it-
self highly complex, and the role of military aid in this process is likely to
vary qualitatively as well as quantitatively from country to country. It is there-
fore worth considering the possibility of not only formulating but also present-
ing the role of military aid in the context of a broader program of security and
development. In such a program the role of military aid could vary widely and
would conform not primarily to military criteria but to a broader strategy
adopted as relevant to each country and region.

Role of US Military Commitment Implied
by US Military Aid

A third problem concerns the extent and role of a US military commit-
ment implied by US military aid and, conversely, the extent to which indigenous
forces are substitutes for the use of US forces in distant conflicts and crises.
The existence of a US commitment affects the strategy to be pursued; it strongly
influences the premises and approaches adopted by recipients and thus has a
potential practical impact on the objectives and elements of a military aid pro-
gram. However, aggression by the major US rivals is deterred by their fear of
a US reaction and not by the level of indigenous forces in being. Moreover
the great growth of Soviet military power virtually requires early US interven-
tion in contingencies involving overt Soviet aggression. This situation, to-
gether with the US adoption of a strategy of flexible and controlled response,
requires a reassessment of the roles of indigenous forces in deterring, de-
fending against (should deterrence fail), and possibly limiting an external
attack. It also requires a clarification of US commitments and their effect on
military aid planning. Finally it may require a clarification of those objectives
and contingencies for which it is realistic and feasible to develop indigenous
forces and to rely on them for support, and those for which it is not.

Changes in the Alliance System

A fourth and related problem is the changing usefulness of the free world
alliance system in formulating strategies to meet the problems endangering
US interests and objectives. Although it may be possible to rely on allied sup-
port for some future contingencies this support is likely to arise from inter-
ests and objectives that are not adequately or realistically described by a free
world alliance system. In this context the alliance system—and the treaty
organizations and bilateral pacts that make it up—is less relevant as the basis
for overall US strategy than it was a decade ago. The initial rationale for the
noncommunist alliance stemmed from the presence of an opposite monolithic
and externally aggressive system. With the disintegration of the communist
monolith the noncommunist alliance has also begun to disintegrate. It was designed for military and political aims that are viewed as less relevant for future than for past conditions and is not likely to be revived through possibly counterproductive US pressure on allies. If additional inducements are necessary to revive or ensure allied support, it is reasonable to question the validity of supporting a multinational alliance system through military aid.

It also seems unrealistic to describe the options available to the US in terms of some overall balance of forces supported by military aid. In Vietnam the US has been the hub of the war effort against insurgency; the US commitment there, although it has encouraged contributions from other nations, is not substantially offset by the multinational alliance embodied in SEATO. For similar future contingencies, a sum of all free world military forces supported by military aid does not indicate that all these forces are options realistically available in each case as additions to or substitutes for US forces. Therefore it seems appropriate to reassess the future relevance of any overall system supposedly strengthened and given substance by military aid. It may further be appropriate to reexamine the interests and objectives of other nations as possible bases for different strategic approaches, less ambitious and more sustainable than a free world system.

Possibilities for Developing New Strategies

A fifth problem, and one that flows from those described above, is the possibility of developing new strategies in which military aid can play a realistically useful role. Such a strategy would take into account the compatible, if not common, interests of other nations in the outcome of the many dangerous problems of the future. One possible basis for strategy that is already officially endorsed in the US is regional interdependence through which some affected nations may recognize with time that the solution of dangerous problems requires collaborative efforts. In regions that lend themselves to such an approach, military aid can play a direct role. Another possible basis for strategy could be new configurations of power and interest emerging in a region like East Asia and cutting across the line of East-West containment, which US programs could supplement and support. There may be other strategies; some of these may have to be employed in an ad hoc manner in a crisis, as in the case of UN or multinational peacekeeping actions. Such strategies would nevertheless require the development of forces relevant to such actions as a primary objective of military aid. There is undoubtedly more than one strategy relevant to meeting the problems of the future. However, the extent to which any strategy mitigates the burden of potential US involvement in low-level contingencies depends on what the US defines as a threat and sees as the required solution, and the degree to which other nations agree with these judgments. It also depends on the extent to which a US commitment has become an integral part of the strategies being pursued by other nations.
Conclusions

1. Various changes in the world and in the definable dangers to US interests call for the development of new strategies for military aid, but the planning process for the development of military aid strategies and guidelines has rather consistently suffered from flaws.

2. Since military aid is a servant of policy and since any major changes in emphasis or reorientation of the military aid program will have implications for policy, this study highlights several policy issues that require resolution to clarify the strategic guidelines for military aid programs. In particular the following major policy issues have to be addressed: (a) the degree to which "world communism" (as distinct from actual Soviet and Chinese Communist national power based on their own capabilities and relations with other states) is still and should continue to be regarded as a dangerous entity; (b) the degree to which the US will commit itself to resisting overt and covert threats to recipient countries when the latter do not want to or cannot meet their share of the requirements for appropriate strategies to meet even local threats directly confronting the recipients; and (c) the degree to which the US is willing to assume the risks of leaving the initiative and responsibility for meeting certain problems that affect US interests with other states when their objectives and strategies are not identical with those of the US.

3. The policy issues enumerated may be resolved in part for the US by the possibility that in some areas of the world disorder will be so intense or chronic that few if any strategies can be expected realistically to meet it or to derive long-term political advantage from it.

4. There are possibilities for the development of new strategies in which military aid may play an effective role. These strategies could have a marked effect on the objectives and direction of military aid evident today.

5. The grant military assistance program and other forms of US provision of arms and training to other nations are in need of reassessment. This reassessment could lead to a reorientation of military aid, particularly in view of the impact of the flaws and inadequacies discussed in this study and of the changing problems that generate threats to US national objectives on the rationale for military aid. Even if these problems cannot be solved in toto their implications for US policy in general and military aid in particular can at least be clarified, their impact anticipated, and measures to limit the impact enacted.
The Role of Military Aid in National Strategy
ABBREVIATIONS

CENTO  Central Treaty Organization (former Baghdad Pact)
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SEATO  Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
UK  United Kingdom
UN  United Nations
INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

The intent of this study is to provide a basis for developing guidelines that can be useful in reappraising the rationale for military assistance, in evaluating its effectiveness, and in analyzing changes that may be warranted by such a reappraisal and evaluation. To this end, this study does two things: first, it examines critically the guidelines used to date to determine and evaluate the role of military aid in supporting US national objectives, and second, it identifies the major strategic problems that are likely to affect the role of military aid in US national strategy.

BACKGROUND

This study was undertaken in support of the US Army’s reappraisal of US military aid and at the request of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. At the direction of the Chief of Staff, the Army’s reappraisal was to be made broad-gaged by examining military aid in the context of global strategic, political, and economic developments that have affected military assistance to date and could affect it in the future. This study is similarly broad in scope. It examines the role of military aid in supporting a national strategy or strategies in order to promote US objectives in the coming decade and to suggest the areas in which guidelines should be developed or elaborated in order to increase the effectiveness of military aid in this role.

National and international developments have already called attention to problems directly affecting military aid. In the light of current and future conditions these developments put in question the relevance of some of the present aims of military assistance programs. A requirement for strong indigenous forces that has persisted through changing world strategic context over the last 20 years has continued to be regarded by US administration spokesmen as essential to US security. Nevertheless, annual appropriations by Congress for military aid programs have declined markedly, from approximately $5 billion during the NATO buildup and the Korean War to less than $1 billion in 1966 and possibly less than $500 million in 1967. This reduction has taken place in the face of US government insistence that the threats to US interests have not abated and in the face of no strong indication of a greatly enhanced ability of US friends and allies to protect their own and US interests.
without substantial US involvement. This situation clearly suggests a re-appraisal of the role of military assistance and the strategy it has supported.

**SCOPE**

Military aid in general and specific military assistance programs have been the subject of periodic examination within and outside government agencies during the last 15 years. This study deals with two topics: First, it describes the analytical framework in which military aid can be evaluated as one resource for supporting US strategy and in which the guidelines for specific programs can be developed. Second, the study describes what appear to be the major problems and issues affecting military aid that should be taken into account in formulating a coherent strategy responsive to a changing world situation.

In the context of this study the term "military aid" (or "military assistance") is considered to include all deliberate and overt US provision of military equipment and training to other countries. The study does not consider military arms sales, most of which are directed to Europe, even though the implications of arms sales might be evaluated according to similar guidelines discussed in this study. (A recent Congressional study dealt with some of the issues surrounding arms sales.) The form of military aid provided naturally involves distinct issues and problems: indirect forms of assistance may avoid the careful scrutiny and justification that is supposed to govern grant aid in order to ensure its compliance with overall US strategy and policy. However, this study takes as the most important issue the strategy, if any, to which US military aid—regardless of form—is supposedly contributing in achieving US national objectives. From this viewpoint the fact and methods of providing arms are less important than the purpose and implications of such assistance.

The term "strategy" as used in this study is defined as a plan, method, or course of action in which resources are organized to achieve certain goals. Military aid is regarded as one of these resources or ingredients. As will be discussed more extensively, an evaluation of the role of military aid depends on the strategy being pursued and on the availability and effectiveness of other resources necessary to make the strategy work. Usually the absence of other necessary resources cannot be compensated for by increasing the level of military aid alone. The effectiveness of military aid also depends on the nature of the goal sought and its amenability to being achieved under various conditions of resource availability and time.

The terms "foreign policy" and "defense policy" used here also require elaboration to highlight their relation to the development of alternative strategies. A given policy is the outcome of a choice from among alternative strategies, made in view of given conditions, that is thereafter used to guide decisions. When, as in the authorizing legislation for US foreign aid, it is said that military assistance is authorized to promote US foreign policy, there is an implicit assumption of a choice from among alternative strategies and of a significant strategic role for military aid.

There has been a persistent tendency to separate, administratively and conceptually, defense policy from foreign policy and military aid programs having "defense or military objectives" from those having "political objectives."
By its nature, military aid is relevant mainly to military programs supporting defense policy; its role can be evaluated in the context of the defense policy it promotes. However, defense policy and national security policy are parts of overall foreign policy, and these distinctions are defined and maintained by the wording of the legislative authorization for the military aid program. Moreover, the effective conduct of a defense-only policy invariably involves a corresponding strategy aimed at such political goals as encouraging cooperation among allies. Perhaps more important, if a defense policy becomes bankrupt in the sense that it absorbs resources without promoting its avowed aims, the effectiveness of a given foreign policy is undermined, and a reassessment of the strategy being pursued may be required. Similarly, if the pursuit of a foreign policy demands a defense policy and its related programs that allocated resources do not or cannot support, then the implications of this gap should be exposed and considered; perhaps a policy more commensurate with allocated resources and other constraints may have to be adopted. The interrelation between the different components of US foreign policy bears on military aid programs in another way: one policy can impose constraints on another. These usually take the form of resource constraints; they may also arise from broad policies seeking arms control or nonproliferation agreements or those taking into account the interests or fears of an adversary. Compartmentalization of various policies and objectives may prevent the evaluations and adjustments necessary to meet changing conditions and constraints.

This study does not examine problems associated with the administration and execution of military aid programs since this has been the subject of earlier studies, but reference is occasionally made to certain agencies when their functions bear on some of the substantive topics examined.
STRATEGIC ROLE OF MILITARY AID: A CRITIQUE

INTRODUCTION

The role of US military aid in supporting US policy goals derives from its use as one of the resources available in designing and executing a national strategy to achieve these goals. Hence a judgment of the effectiveness of military aid has to be based on an examination of three major issues: (a) whether the strategy itself is effective and realistic, and whether—as a first step in this regard—it clearly defines the political and military requirements that must be met to achieve stated national objectives by various alternative means in view of changing world circumstances; (b) whether the resource of military aid is carefully and continuously integrated into the overall strategy, giving due consideration to other resources; to political, economic, and budgetary feasibility; to the circumstances peculiar to each country and region; and to changing technologies; (c) whether this integration is accompanied by an examination and definition of its short- and long-term implications.

The objectives of military aid programs have often been presented loosely, and there have been deficiencies in policy guidance and criteria for program development and review. The following point is therefore stressed: military aid is not the means of overcoming a given problem, such as an external Soviet-supported military threat or internal subversion; rather it is one of several resources that can help meet one of several requirements for carrying out one of several possible solutions to a problem that itself may change over time. Hence the requirement for a military aid program and the nature of the program may vary depending on the alternative adopted. They may vary because of a budget constraint or because of the availability or greater utility of other resources, such as US or allied forces, surplus food supplies, or economic aid. They may vary because military assistance has been found useful in carrying out certain political and even economic objectives, and not solely military objectives. They may vary because at some point it may have been necessary to choose a different alternative for certain reasons, such as arms control, establishment of a regional arms balance, support for regional security institutions, or changes in purely military strategy and military technology in the nuclear age. Thus the strategic role of military aid and the forces it is designed to support is not set but is relative to a number of other conditions. Good planning continually evaluates the relation between a military aid program and the alternative it supports as part of an overall national strategy. It reviews the realism and relevance of the alternative chosen compared with...
other possible alternatives, and it spells out the short- and long-term implications so that some policy determination can be made as to whether the implications are acceptable and sustainable.

The overall objectives of military aid are familiar and have remained relatively consistent over the years since the first authorization for a grant military assistance program in 1949. On the other hand, the grant aid program, as well as other forms of US military support for foreign forces, has always suffered from the lack of a systematic formulation and evaluation of a strategy for military aid from which guidelines can be derived, priorities established, and control maintained over the direction of country plans.

Compounding this deficiency is another problem that has a marked impact on the role of military aid—the uncertainty over annual Congressional appropriations for the program. Deficiencies in determining, presenting, and justifying a role for military aid in the defense policy it supports seem to be partly responsible for an inability to convince the Legislature to allocate requested funds; at the same time, however, substantial recent reductions in the program can severely undermine efforts to introduce consistent strategic planning into the program. Cuts in resources have obvious implications for the strategy being pursued. Insofar as present strategy is considered the most effective or the only effective strategy to achieve US objectives, given the likely world conditions, then these cuts directly prejudice US objectives.

MILITARY AID OBJECTIVES

Stated Aims

The general objectives of all US aid are stated in the authorizing legislation for foreign military and economic assistance programs:

In enacting this legislation, it is therefore the intention of the Congress to promote the peace of the world and the foreign policy, security and general welfare of the United States by fostering an improved climate of political independence and individual liberty, improving the ability of friendly countries and international organizations to deter or, if necessary, defeat Communist or Communist supported aggression, facilitating arrangements for individual and collective security, assisting friendly countries to maintain internal security, and creating an environment of security and stability in the developing countries essential to their more rapid social, economic and political progress.

The military assistance program itself has supported more specific objectives over the years. They are to:

(a) Deter and/or defend against external communist aggression.
(b) Prevent and/or defeat communist-inspired internal subversion, thereby maintaining internal security.
(c) Acquire, maintain, and protect US base rights overseas.
(d) Secure and maintain pro-US orientation of a recipient government in order to help achieve a number of aims, such as the offsetting or precluding of a communist aid program, strengthening political ties, or influencing a foreign government to make foreign policy decisions favorable to US policy.
The general objectives stated in the law quoted are largely positive. The more specific objectives of the grant military aid program enumerated subsequently, though ultimately supporting positive aims, are largely negative. In other words they are directed toward overcoming certain problems, threats, difficulties, and dangers that exist or could materialize in countries where the US has interests if US goals are to be achieved.

Both kinds of objectives are too general to offer guidance for the development of country and regional military assistance programs and the more specific program objectives that relate, for example, to military missions of indigenous forces. In particular, statements of objectives are useful as guidance for program planning only if they take into account the interplay between policy on the one hand and the alternative politico-military strategies relevant to each country and region on the other. For example, there is not much value in deriving program objectives in the form of a recommended-force package reflecting a single strategy to meet a particular threat. It may not be US policy to meet that threat through that particular strategy, perhaps because of resource constraints, or because the implications and importance of certain contingencies envisioned by that strategy have been reassessed, or because it is politically unrealistic or unwise to create the forces recommended by the strategy in question. In these circumstances, once a policy is brought to bear in the form of priorities or budget constraints, a planner will be left with two inconsistent guidelines: one envisioned by the proposed strategy and the other by the actual policy adopted. As a result the planner will not have available concrete alternative strategies as the basis for meaningful force planning.

Two Less Obvious Objectives

The first less obvious objective of military aid that is qualitatively different from the others listed previously is:

The development of indigenous forces as substitutes for US forces in overseas conflicts and crises.

This has been an objective of the grant military aid program for a number of years. It is most often alluded to, but sometimes it is stated explicitly in order to justify the program before Congress. There are good reasons for such an objective. First, indigenous forces are designed to defend their own country as replacements for US troops in the same area. Second, the fact that foreign forces generally cost less than US forces is a point often stressed in testimony before the Congress. Third, as a matter of overall strategy, use of indigenous forces is an option that may prevent or at least postpone direct confrontation between the major nuclear powers and minimize the dangerous consequences of US combat troop involvement in crises and conflicts in the remote areas of the globe. There has been a more insistent stress on this objective as reflected in recent Congressional concern over possible overextension of US military commitments, intentionally or otherwise, through such means as military aid programs. Testimony before Congress has strongly implied, for example, that far from establishing a US commitment leading to its involvement in conflicts like Korea and Vietnam, the military aid program in fact minimizes the likelihood of US military involvement in overseas conflicts.
At the same time, it is recognized that the role of indigenous forces often gains its major impact from a US commitment to support them in the event of conflict, particularly a conflict involving major adversaries such as the USSR or Red China. From this point of view, indigenous forces are an extension—at least cost—of US military power overseas. Good reasons are also adduced for this position. First, although indigenous forces tend to be less costly, in some countries it is not politically or economically feasible, or simply not wise, to create or maintain a military capability at the level necessary to meet some likely contingencies. Second, in reality it is the enormous power of the US that provides the balance and deters aggression by major powers like the USSR and Communist China, and not any level of indigenous capability. From this point of view, Congressional desire to curtail US commitments weakens deterrence. Furthermore, only in rare cases are indigenous forces actual substitutes for US forces. Thus the indigenous forces most closely approximate this role in Korea and Europe, even though elsewhere they have missions that US or other foreign forces could never perform on a continuing basis (e.g., maintenance of internal security) or that meet a distinct strategic requirement (e.g., "tripwire" function). However, the most telling point opposing the substitution of indigenous forces for US forces is the political fact that the US does not control the indigenous forces. This means the US cannot use these indigenous forces as it sees fit, either in the indigenous areas or elsewhere.

Despite countervailing arguments, both views—that indigenous forces should be developed as substitutes for US forces and that they can only be an extension and not a replacement of US forces—have merit. The problem arises because official testimony and Congressional reviews have failed to distinguish clearly the cases in which one view applies as opposed to the other. In particular there has been a failure to distinguish between situations in which indigenous capabilities realistically minimize the risk of direct US combat involvement and those situations that carry almost certain or high risks of US involvement. This point will be discussed more extensively in the next section, "Problems Affecting Future Military Aid Objectives and Strategy." Here it is suggested that the deterrence of or defense against powerful US adversaries such as the Soviet Union or Red China will always entail the risk of US involvement. Against such adversaries, indigenous forces necessarily have to be regarded as extensions of US forces and cannot be regarded as capabilities that can eliminate or substantially reduce the risk of US involvement since this risk is implicit in any strategy designed to meet a direct Soviet or Chinese threat. Moreover, the question of whether or not indigenous forces are substitutes for or options to US involvement cannot be adequately answered by pointing out that if the indigenous divisions did not exist they would have to be replaced by US divisions. There should also be the reasonable certainty that the strategy in which indigenous forces are designed to play a role is appropriate to the threat, that all other elements needed to make the strategy effective are also present, and that when contingencies arise they are likely to remain limited and local.

Despite these obvious caveats, planning for military aid programs has been heavily influenced by a view that indigenous forces are a substitute for US forces. This situation hampers the development of realistic strategies.
and has given rise to unwarranted Congressional expectations and justifiable criticism regarding the value of US-supported foreign forces. The actual role of foreign forces can be better ascertained in the framework of each country strategy that meets important problems through a combination of political, economic, and military resources.

The second less obvious objective of military aid implicit in all the preceding objectives is:

To establish and preserve regional balances of power.

This objective, however, is rarely stated as such. In regions outside the Middle East this objective is not stated in military aid program guidance as possibly calling for distinctive requirements but is rather assumed to be achieved through pursuit of the objectives described previously. Thus the questions of what constitutes a regional balance of power, what strategies might achieve it, and what role military aid might play in this strategy have not been explicitly addressed.

In summary, the objectives of military assistance are too general to serve as guidance for program development. Moreover, until recently the guidance issued did not distinguish the primary objective sought by the US in a recipient country so that a planner was able to identify areas in which incremental resources could best be applied to strengthen, orient, or supplement foreign forces in support of explicit strategy. It is naturally difficult to define military aid program objectives in a fashion that conveys substantive and controlling strategic guidance without running the risk of further undesirable centralization of the planning process. There is, however, an analytical process through which the generalized objectives of military aid can be translated into programs, guidance derived, criteria for evaluation established, and the strategic implications of programs perceived.

NATURE OF ANALYSIS REQUIRED

The general objectives of US foreign policy and of foreign assistance are presumably translated into specific regional and country programs and program changes through an analytical process that:

(a) Defines the dangers or threats confronting US aims and interests and their relative importance and likely imminence.

(b) Defines the specific problems requiring solution in order to deal with the dangers.

(c) Develops alternative measures that can be taken to solve these problems.

(d) Defines the requirements (e.g., estimated military requirements) to make the measures effective.

(e) Defines the implications of the measures in terms of cost, time, and possible US commitments.

(f) Determines the feasibility of meeting these requirements including sustaining their implications and obtaining the necessary resources.

(g) Lays down reasonably specific guidance for drawing up practical and effective country programs that—in their elements, emphasis, and size—are capable of supporting the alternative measure adopted.
It is sometimes assumed that the US military assistance programs over the last 15 years have invariably been drawn up and maintained on the basis of a careful and continual appraisal of the analytical elements noted above. But a review of the record and the system in which the role of military aid has been specified and guidance for country programs elaborated reveals that planning has not always followed the above procedure. Moreover, planning has tended to break down at important points in the steps summarized above, and the needed interrelation and coordination of various planning elements were not made. As a result at least some of the programs have grown somewhat at random (Ref 2, pp 9–10). By 1959 analyses suggested that not all programs had even an initially well-conceived strategic basis.

Insofar as an analytical process similar to the above is followed annually in determining the objectives of military aid programs, the role of military aid in a national strategy could be judged to be effective. Priorities, as indicated in the direction and character of country programs, would reflect the realistic and urgent requirements needed to promote overall US objectives in a changing world. The relation between country program objectives and elements on the one hand and the broad aims of national strategy on the other hand could be traced and its implications determined. Since, however, there are deficiencies in actual practice it is difficult to say that current military aid programs are based on a rationale derived from a systematic interrelating of objectives with alternative approaches and resources. Nor is it possible to say with certainty that a closer relation exists between military assistance programs and the requirements of the world situation as it affects US foreign policy goals.

**DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES AND PROGRAM OBJECTIVES**

Military aid can contribute to the achievement of a number of different objectives. These objectives as described earlier are not all purely military. Grant military aid programs are authorized to serve the general aims of US foreign policy as well as the purely security and defense policies related to military, quasi-military, and subversive threats. It is not possible to make a clear-cut distinction between political programs and defense programs. In some instances, of course, the distinction is quite clear: political programs are those established for such aims as helping to ensure the tenure or pro-US orientation of government leaders, preempting a Soviet aid program, preventing an accommodation between the recipient and the USSR, or establishing a US presence for some limited and short-term purpose. But even defense programs have very important political aims: cementing bilateral ties and broadening the area of shared objectives and strategies through an essentially political process of influence. Military aid may even be used to achieve economic objectives. In any given grant military aid program it is likely that several country objectives are being pursued simultaneously.

For the purposes of establishing guidance for and control over the direction of country programs, however, it is necessary to state as policy those objectives that are regarded as primary or dominant from the US point of view (Ref 2, pp 26–30). Adjustments and interrelations may be made between military aid and other US programs in the framework of the overall country plan.
These can take the form of constraints (e.g., minimizing the undesirable effects of one program on another) or reinforcement (e.g., maximizing the contribution of one program to another). The possible impact on economic development of channeling a recipient's resources into military expenditures is an example of the former. Civic-action programs and some kinds of military construction are examples of the latter. There is, however, usually one major reason for providing military aid, in the absence of which it would not be authorized. This reason reflects or should reflect the importance attributed by the US to certain indigenous force roles in a strategy that promotes US objectives. Responsibility for detailing a military aid program and relating it to other US programs in a particular country is preferably placed on the local country team, whose first-hand appreciation of the circumstances peculiar to the recipient country can ensure the most effective and appropriate use of US resources. However, this responsibility has to be properly guided and reviewed in substantive as well as in budgetary terms. This in turn requires identification of primary US objectives and of possible changes in these objectives in response to changing conditions and strategic priorities.

To be most useful, such guidance has to be stated in terms that are more specific than the generalized objectives often provided (e.g., to deter external aggression) but still sufficiently general that a country team is able to make adjustments to meet local conditions. It should indicate the desired direction of a program without governing its content in detail, except of course with regard to certain weapons, such as nuclear, which are prohibited by policy.

Guidance in the form of alternative strategies seems most likely to strike a balance between necessary guidance and control and undesirable centralization of detailed program development. Guidance couched in the form of strategy can help overcome several deficiencies that have affected military aid programming in the past. First it would relate all budgetary and other policy constraints with requirements to meet specified dangers and threats. Second it would spell out the problems that were regarded from the US point of view as the most important impediments to overcoming these dangers and threats through alternative approaches. Third it would assist in determining when and where military aid is the best available instrument to support US military strategy and foreign policy, since such a determination hinges on the kind of strategy selected as being most effective and relevant in each recipient country. Fourth it would expose more clearly the implications of the strategy adopted—especially in relation to time, costs, and possible US force commitments. And fifth it would assist the planner in grasping the strategic implications of program changes, in evaluating the effect on the strategy of reduced or increased aid allocations (including allocations by other allied countries), and in developing alternative programs still within the limits of policy.

From a review of the principal guidance documents and of official testimony to the Congress, it was hard to determine—at least until 1966—answers to several important questions about the strategy supported by grant military assistance programs and other forms of US support for foreign forces. These questions are:

(a) What alternative strategies were considered in formulating military aid programs?

(b) What strategy was selected as being optimum, and why?
(c) What problems were considered to be the most urgent from the US viewpoint in formulating the strategy?

(d) What primary objectives through this strategy were to be promoted by foreign forces supported by military aid?

(e) What are the implications of the adopted strategy and the options it provides in terms of:

1. The probability that the strategy will be successful and the time and resources needed to make it so?  
2. The importance to the US of the objectives that are feasible?
3. The role to be played by US and other external allied forces in the strategy?

In some forward-area countries these questions have been more readily answerable, following a reappraisal in the fall of 1965 of US military assistance programs in these countries. Here the answers are more determinable because for the forward-area countries—which continue to absorb almost all US military grant aid—the military problems are more familiar, the US commitment for planning purposes is more clear-cut, the interrelation between US and indigenous forces for certain contingencies is better understood, and the range of appropriate and alternative military strategies and their requirements can be more easily related. In addition a long US association with several of the forward-area countries in question contributes to a better understanding of requirements and strategies as seen by the host governments; US planners are therefore better able to define areas in which marginal US aid allocations can be employed to achieve US aims.

For other recipients of US military aid, those in the less developed areas of the world, the answers to the questions enumerated above are not readily apparent. In particular the fundamental question of what strategy is being pursued in these countries, under which both military and economic US aid resources are being employed, has not yet been clearly resolved. Where the threat is conceived as being primarily internal—as is the case in most of these developing countries—there has been a persistent tendency to regard the problem as one requiring a relatively narrow technical answer of economic development programs rather than as one requiring a broader solution of distinctive strategies and programs combining all resources necessary to meet the goals of national modernization and orderly change. Always in the background, currently highlighted by the Vietnam conflict, is the issue of what US commitments to the recipient nations are involved.

RECAPITULATION

In summary, an evaluation of the role of military assistance in promoting US national objectives is difficult to make because in many instances the strategy under which resources and requirements are related remains unclear. This deficiency affects two principal areas: (a) the development of an overall strategy that defines the most urgent problems and threats preventing the achievement of US national objectives (e.g., as defined in Congressional and Executive statements of intent), that establishes necessary and realistic priorities between countries and regions, and that defines the implications of these priorities; and
(b) the development of flexible strategies appropriate to the problems in less developed countries in which the role of military aid can be determined on a case-by-case basis in conjunction with other US resources.

The lack of an overall strategy has accompanied and in large part stems from deficiencies in planning organization and structure that have prevented systematic and objective programming. It is apparent that the grant military assistance program and other forms for provision of US arms have over the years and until quite recently grown somewhat at random. Thus not all programs had even an initially well-conceived strategic basis, and, although other programs may have had an early strategic basis, this may well have been undermined subsequently by more or less arbitrary changes. Under the assumption that at least some military aid programs are no longer in tune with the real or foreseeable world conditions, the next section describes several elements that may affect the development of a strategy for military aid in coming years.
PROBLEMS AFFECTING FUTURE MILITARY AID OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

Several problems may affect the future role of military aid in US national strategy and the objectives the country aid programs are designed to promote. Five of these problems are examined: (a) changes in the nature of the threat, (b) the role of military aid in the modernization process in less developed countries, (c) the relation of US commitments to security strategies and programs, (d) changes in the alliance system, and (e) the development of regional approaches to security. Each of these problems has a potential impact on military aid planning. The problems may affect the level, character, and duration of programs necessary to achieve US foreign policy goals. Furthermore they may influence the priorities attached to certain objectives and countries.

CHANGES IN THE NATURE OF THE THREAT

From the perspective of military aid, it is necessary to examine the threat to US goals in terms of the problems that have to be solved if the threat is to be dealt with effectively. In turn these problems have to be examined for (a) the urgency and importance of the specific dangers the problems generate, (b) the extent to which the solution of the problems would remove the danger, and (c) the degree to which military aid would contribute to their solution. Because the grant military aid program and other forms of military aid have developed somewhat at random since the early fifties (see the preceding section) a reappraisal of the strategic role of military aid should include a new look at the fundamental threat to the US and the problems associated with the threat. Such a look would indicate that, although the fundamental danger to the US can be defined in the same terms as earlier, the problems that may have to be solved in dealing with the danger have changed.

The Post-WWII Era

It is sometimes forgotten—or at least it is rarely stated explicitly—that the basic threat to US interests arises primarily from major changes in the composition of world power (e.g., shifts in regional or overall balance of power) and from other trends shaping future developments in ways that would prevent the achievement of broadly defined US goals (Ref 8, pp 255-56). When the grant...
military aid program was first established\textsuperscript{10} the US government was concerned with threats to the balance of power as these manifested themselves initially in Europe immediately after WWII. The US goal then—first spelled out as one of the US post-WWII objectives\textsuperscript{19} and incorporated in the basic objectives of US assistance to Europe—was to establish a balance of power in that region to prevent its domination by the major US rival, the USSR.\textsuperscript{20}

At that time the possibility of a marked shift in the global balance of power stemmed from an obvious political fact: the nature of international communism then clearly indicated that any seizure of power by a communist party in Europe meant an extension of the Soviet Union's political and economic power and an increment in its international position; i.e., communism in Europe was in Stalin's days synonymous with control from Moscow. With the establishment of Communist rule in China, supported by the USSR, further shifts in balance of power appeared imminent. And with the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950, it appeared that the communist powers sought even further shifts, not only by political and subversive tactics but also by open military aggression. Consequently one of the central problems that US assistance soon had to address was shoring up weak political and economic institutions—in areas where an ability to sustain democratic governments was in question—and weak military defenses against external attack. In Europe, economic aid under the Marshall Plan was soon accompanied by substantial infusions of military aid designed to create strong conventional capabilities allied with those of the US through NATO. This was in pursuit of the aim of containment, viz, the prevention of any further territorial expansion by the USSR-led communist bloc.

Post-WWII policy was stated by the President in 1947. Often referred to as the “Truman Doctrine” and applied initially to Europe, it had potentially far-reaching implications: “... it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed Soviet minorities or by outside pressures.” In the strategy adopted to carry out this policy, military aid had a natural role since it was believed that the Sino-Soviet bloc would seek to alter the balance of power through military aggression or, as in Greece, through encouragement of large-scale internal subversion and insurgency. Particularly after the Korean War the military aspect of the threat loomed large, and all measures to meet it were regarded as essential. There was then substantial agreement between the US and its European allies, not only on the threat posed, but also on the nature of likely contingencies and appropriate military strategies to meet them. In addition, because of the significance of the military aspect of the threat, the building of national confidence required the creation of at least some military capability to accompany the strong US commitment embodied in NATO.

During the early fifties the US applied somewhat the same strategy to other regions around the Sino-Soviet bloc. Mutual security treaties, buttressed in some cases by broader multilateral alliances, were concluded with several nations for the purpose of containing the communist nations. In each case, military assistance was provided, and at least implicitly the policy expressed in the Truman Doctrine was extended. Until at least 1965 the policy of containment provided the basic rationale for military aid, and the principal threat to US interests was defined largely as communist expansion threatening to bring large areas of the world under communist control.
New Factors Affecting the Threat

Since 1960 and even earlier in some regions, there has been a change in the world developments regarded as most important in influencing future events. Thus, although the basic threat to the US can still be defined as an adverse change in the world balance of power, the specific problems that might generate this threat have changed. This change implies that, whereas military aid may continue to be concerned primarily with the military aspect of the threat, its importance may be affected by these two developments: (a) the military aspect of the threat may change, and (b) the role of military aid in US strategy to meet changing conditions may be altered.

Expansion of Problems and Programs to Global Proportions. The first and most obvious change in the world affecting military aid programs has been the post-WWII disintegration of the prewar colonial empires. This has produced a rapid increase in the number of new nations in the world: the number of sovereign nations has more than doubled through decolonization; this process may still be incomplete because of new federations or ethnic and religious divisions. Most of these new nations are underdeveloped economically with weak political institutions at the national level and are susceptible to radical internal governmental changes and hence to similar changes in foreign policies. In this situation the major rivals of the US, the USSR and Communist China, sought to extend their political domination to some of these nations. Hence the threat, once confined largely to the Sino-Soviet periphery, assumed global proportions. The impact of this change has been reflected in the increase in the number of grant military aid programs: between 1950 and 1965, even though appropriations declined, the number of recipients of US military aid roughly tripled.

Not only has the area of US concern expanded, but this expansion has been accompanied by two additional developments. First, the capability and willingness of major US allies—i.e., the UK and France—to maintain a military presence overseas has steadily diminished. Consequently the circumstances in which the objectives of US military aid were initially formulated have changed; US allies, such as the UK and France, have withdrawn their support and resources from some areas of the world and from some treaty organizations. Since this change has not been accompanied by corresponding major changes in US strategy (and indeed the changes that have been made tend to increase rather than reduce the need for nonnuclear forces) the retrenchment by US allies implies the possibility of increased US and/or indigenous military capabilities.

Second, the problems and dangers in the expanded area of US concern imply a potentially greater US involvement in the threatened nations in terms of more military commitments and resources. In the early years of the program, military aid was envisaged as generating local resources that would ultimately meet two requirements of the US strategy directed to containing communist aggression, viz, subversive insurgency and indigenous forces able to fight a limited war. Direct US military involvement was viewed as being required only at higher conflict levels such as general war. Thus a role for military aid in the lower end of the conflict spectrum could, at least theoretically, be envisioned and defined. However, as suggested by the conflict in Vietnam and also by the weakness of central political institutions in many underdeveloped
countries, essential political as well as military elements appropriate to counterinsurgency and limited-war strategies may well be absent. This situation may therefore limit the effectiveness of military aid in some countries and, by requiring external (e.g., US) efforts to meet such threats as insurgency, imply the possibility of greater and deeper involvement than was originally anticipated. At the same time, efforts to create and develop essential indigenous political and economic preconditions, without which the military ingredients of the strategy would not be fully effective, tend to involve the US in tasks very different from those foreseen in the fifties. The relatively recent emphasis on nation building as a prerequisite for effective indigenous military efforts reflects this development.

Breakup of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. A second clear change affecting military aid programs relates to the specific threat with which the grant military aid program has been traditionally concerned: the Sino-Soviet bloc can no longer be considered a monolithic global force. The implications of this change for the objectives and strategy for military aid programs are less obvious. They merit some discussion in order to highlight a fundamental issue that may affect program development in coming years.

Until very recently the grant military aid program was grounded on a firm belief in a bipolar world. In such a world it was feared that, unless the US took some offsetting action, the communist bloc (or “the communists”) would be able to absorb and control more and more weak states and would thus further enhance its global power. Eventually the free world would cease to be viable. The argument concluded therefore that an armed and ready free world under US leadership was essential.

The view of a bipolar world supported the adoption of objectives in the grant military aid program of (a) preempting the USSR or Red China in any political vacuum that might develop in any region of the world and (b) responding more or less automatically to any Sino-Soviet initiatives around the world and especially around the Sino-Soviet periphery. In practice, US policy has not been as preemptive as these objectives would suggest, in part because the world was less controllable than was assumed. Nevertheless these views have had a marked impact on military aid program objectives in seeking to draw nations into a free world alliance against communism.

Since 1963 these views have been substantially modified by developments. The implications of the trends evident in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the disintegration of a world communist movement under exclusive guidance and direction from Moscow, and the emergence of national communism have been widely discussed. The US itself has traveled back and forth across the line of containment, seeking areas of common or parallel interests with the USSR, which nevertheless continues to be the most powerful competitor of the US. In addition, shifting Soviet tactics and strategy have made some of the earlier aims of territorial containment of the USSR less relevant to the problems currently facing the US. For example, the USSR has jumped over the northern tier countries and has acquired influence in the Middle East. Similarly, Communist China has penetrated Africa and elsewhere without having to establish physical dominance in the area or to expand its territorial control around its immediate periphery.
These changes have made it increasingly difficult to sustain a cohesive free world alliance that derives its major rationale and support from the existence of an opposite and aggressive alliance. Thus, while the overall world balance of power can still be described in terms of an equilibrium between the great powers, it has become less and less possible for the great powers to dominate their respective associates and thus dictate their active participation in maintaining this equilibrium.  

It is therefore very possible that the implications of the Sino-Soviet schism may extend beyond mere recognition of its existence and beyond recognition that the strategy and tactics of the USSR have changed. One of the most significant implications of the schism is the likelihood that the view of the world as an arena for competition between communist and capitalist or noncommunist systems may be relegated by developments mainly to the ideological field and have less relevance to matters of power and security based on the once-assumed monolithic communist bloc or of a nearly equally unified free world. Since neither Moscow nor Peking is able to control the actions and policies of lesser communist states and to obtain thereby a real increment in its own power, it can be concluded that the emergence of new communist states will not necessarily result in a change in the balance of power between the US and the two communist states, adverse to long-term Western interests. In this connection each case would have to be evaluated on its own merits as to both the losses the West might sustain from such a situation and the gains that the USSR or Communist China might obtain. Indeed, relations between the USSR and noncommunist states like France, Greece, Iran, and Egypt may be of greater potential importance to the US than the emergence of a regime proclaiming itself to be communist.

To elaborate, either the USSR or Red China is most likely to gain considerable, if not complete, control over a new or existing communist state when four conditions exist: (a) geographical proximity, (b) the absence of strong indigenous nationalist sentiment and a local leader responsive to it, (c) a lack of alternative means of establishing interdependent relations with other nations, and (d) a state that has territorial ambitions that the West refuses to support. The East European states, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba represent varying degrees of these four conditions; and Soviet and Communist Chinese control over these states varies accordingly. A minor communist state may have a tendency to ally itself with a major one. At a minimum, this is one way a small nation may believe it can acquire a greater role in international affairs; at a maximum, it may derive concrete material and political benefits from an alliance with a great power. In some instances such a relation may be transformed into a substantial dependency, as in the case of Eastern Europe to a great degree, and to some degree in Cuba, North Vietnam, and even noncommunist Egypt. But with changing world conditions, such dependence is not inevitable or lasting. Moreover, even those dependent do not lose complete freedom of action; indeed, because of the Sino-Soviet schism some communist and noncommunist states have even acquired greater freedom, up to and including opportunities to play off one against the other. And, of course, all along and particularly in recent years, many states have had the chance to reduce their dependence by playing off the East against the West. Close ties of noncommunist states with the USSR or Red China may be cut.

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abruptly and unexpectedly because of internal changes, as illustrated by recent developments in Ghana and Indonesia.26

Nevertheless the US must continue to appraise the significance of shifting relations between various communist and noncommunist states and particularly the impetus that a particular relation may give to the regional ambitions of states like Cuba, Indonesia, and Egypt. Such an appraisal, moreover, should be related to the primary US concern over a world balance of power that takes into account first and foremost the strength of its major rival, the USSR, given the superiority both have over all other nations. But competition for effective power and the maintenance of a favorable world balance may, in view of changing conditions, be described in terms other than communist vs noncommunist.

This development has obvious implications for military aid objectives since they have been customarily defined in terms reflecting the notion of a bipolar world between communist and noncommunist groupings. Program objectives may have to make much finer distinctions than those apparent in many programs. By 1966 it appeared that some account was being taken of not tying military aid exclusively to containment of an undifferentiated, monolithic communist threat. Major threats to world peace are being redefined to include such areas of concern as instability and disorder in the underdeveloped world; the objectives of military aid programs are being affected accordingly. In the spring of 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara, in an exchange with Senator Pell, made a distinction between the threat of instability and the threat of communism. In describing the number of political disorders that had occurred since 1960, McNamara said:

Perhaps no more than half of those have been caused by Communists, but all of them are a danger to us because all of them disrupt the peace of the world; and when the peace of the world is disrupted, nations can very easily come into conflict one with another. It is extremely difficult for the great powers to separate themselves from those conflicts.26a

The same point was made by McNamara in his Montreal speech in May 1966. The implications of orienting military aid toward this threat may be profound: it is possible that the requirements to support orderly change in the underdeveloped world may be beyond the resources of any US program and certainly considerably different from those applicable a decade ago.

The Population-Food Crisis. The complex problems of revolutionary change and public disorder, the entire problem of national modernization in an unstable political environment, and the military and economic requirements these pose for US aid programs have more or less consistently escaped comprehensive analysis (Refs 8, p 261; 16, pp 12, 13). Yet it is precisely these problems that generate the dangerous circumstances underlined by McNamara as one of the principal threats to world peace. His statement further implies that at least some aspects of this threat are the proper concern of the grant military aid program. The role of military aid in the modernization process is discussed later. Here the problem of instability is discussed as a major threat to US interests and aims.

An examination of the probable environment in which the threat of instability is likely to persist suggests that the threat may be far greater in scope and much less remediable through external efforts, such as aid from the US alone or even in combination with others, than has been indicated so far in
official documents pertaining to the military aid program. This condition emerges from what has been called the population-food crisis, which has recently become a topic of official interest. This crisis, which is already apparent in India, is destined to spread to other countries and regions during the coming decade. Although authorities are not in complete agreement on the likely extent and depth of the problem or its likely duration, considerable evidence supports a highly pessimistic judgment that the problem will deeply affect many areas of the world before technological advances in food production and checks on population growth can reestablish a reasonable balance after approximately 1985.

In many regions of the world, instability and domestic insecurity are already the most important threats to the achievement of US objectives. Although this situation has been recognized officially, there has been little cogent analysis of the military requirements that this threat poses (Ref 16, p 13), and certainly little agreement between the US Administration and the Congress on the necessity of meeting these requirements through the US military aid program.

When these threats are considered in conjunction with the population-food crisis, they become considerably aggravated. Thus there is serious question whether it is feasible for the US to satisfy either the military or the economic requirements to meet these problems in the next two decades and to respond to all outbreaks of violence and all challenges to its interests (Ref 28, p 3). Therefore the US may find it necessary to be highly selective in establishing policy and aid priorities between countries and regions in both the developed and less developed areas of the world.

Since under foreseeable conditions it is reasonable to assume that the problem of chronic disorder will extend beyond both US control and resources to solve, it may also be necessary for the US to take a somewhat different approach to meeting the problem than the bilateral approach hitherto taken by the grant military aid program. For example, the problem will be regional in its scope and effects. At the same time, regions and countries will pose different requirements in terms of their ability to cope with the problems of both national modernization and the population-food crisis. Thus it may be advisable for the US to develop distinctive and diverse strategies and objectives founded on a regional approach whereby the region itself, or a group of nations within it, is encouraged to assume the leadership in attacking these problems. If the US takes this approach, it may have to be prepared to accept an inability to control the development of strategies to which it nevertheless contributes its resources. Yet at the same time the US may retain some influence over the general shape of the strategies adopted by allocating its resources to support, for example, regional interdependence.

An approach of this kind is already being tried in Latin America. Its progress is being impeded by the nationalistic aspirations of several Latin American republics and by their purchases of advanced and sophisticated military weapons with little or no relation to the major problems of the region. It is a political fact of life that nationalism—the same force that has undermined the cohesion of the world communist movement—tends to retard the adoption of more appropriate strategies, particularly in the short term. Nevertheless, from the view of allocating its resources, US interests may be better served by continuing efforts in support of a regional approach.
The Development of Soviet Military Power. Even assuming a diminishing relevance of a generalized communist threat to the world balance of power in the next decade—an assumption that would undoubtedly be close to the mark if the US maintained its strategic lead and did not permit the Soviet Union to attain military parity or superiority (defined by some realistic qualitative or numerical criteria)—the USSR and to a lesser extent Communist China would continue as the major rivals of the US in that period. In the context of the balance maintained between these three powers, sometimes referred to as the “overall balance” or the “central balance,” other nations seek to protect their own security and realize their own ambitions or pursue policies designed to promote the progress and stability of the regions in which they are geographically located. With occasional and perhaps temporary exceptions, many major nations below the level of the superpowers no longer consider it their responsibility to participate actively in maintaining the overall world balance, particularly as this applies to its military components, although they may contribute independently even military capabilities to the solution of crises in a regional context only. The same nations are nevertheless concerned with trends in the overall balance. Until the international system is transformed in some manner that will enable it to relax its concern, the US will continue to be concerned with possible extensions of effective control over other nations by its major rivals, in particular the USSR, and with any increases in their military strength.

This concern provides the basis for the continuing validity of one major role for indigenous forces supported by US military aid in the forward area bordering the Soviet Union, Red China, and East Europe, viz, the deployment of indigenous forces far enough forward so that a potential aggressor will be on early and immediate notice that these forces will act as triggers for a US military reaction. The validity of this role, however, does not necessarily mean that the forces supported by US military aid in the forward area have fulfilled or could fulfill this role effectively. In order to evaluate their relevance and effectiveness, it is necessary to consider another major factor: the strategy under which these forces could be effective.

By 1965 the strategy governing the forward-area military forces and the feasibility of their fulfilling their role under that strategy were both in need of reevaluation. Improvements in Soviet capabilities, changing military technology, new military strategies and political developments, and the implications of all these changes for likely contingencies had undercut the validity of the original programs and assumptions. This necessitated a review of the problem of external attack on the forward-area countries in terms of (a) the likelihood that the weakness of indigenous capabilities could in itself trigger open and direct aggression and (b) the contribution that stronger indigenous capabilities might make in removing or meeting this danger. Any buildup of indigenous forces, however, had to be related to (a) the nature and likely course of an external attack, (b) the role, including military actions, of the US and/or allies in alternative contingencies more likely than open and massive aggression, and (c) the practical feasibility and political desirability of developing stronger indigenous capabilities.

The tremendous growth of the Soviet Union’s military power, in particular its nuclear-missile capabilities, has made some solutions to contingencies
postulated 15 to 20 years ago less credible or even irrelevant today and in the foreseeable future. Above all, the contingency of overt aggression by the USSR, employing its massive military power directly, is likely to be so grave as to require early and direct US reaction. A buildup of indigenous conventional capabilities to meet this contingency, beyond levels designed to hold until the US can bring early effective power to bear, would be either inadequate or irrelevant to the kind of conflict that could result from Soviet involvement. For example, if a Soviet attack produced a nuclear conflict, indigenous forces—equipped and prepared mainly for conventional battle—would be marginal or ineffective in meeting such an attack. Similar considerations apply in the event of East European aggression: it is very unlikely that any East European country would mount an attack on the West without Soviet backing; such an attack could then be viewed as foreshadowing Soviet involvement. Contingencies such as these would be tantamount to the start of World War III, a condition that fundamentally affects the current and future relevance of contingency plans originally developed during the period of anticipated small-scale Soviet “salami tactics.”

Given these considerations, the roles and missions of indigenous forces involved in territorial containment of the USSR can continue to be used to hamper initially, or at least clarify, an external attack and prevent an unopposed fait accompli. But these considerations also suggest that the burden of actual defense in the face of improving Soviet capabilities may have to be shouldered by US forces since others cannot realistically match US capabilities. This may have to be accepted as a major premise for future planning.

There is another question of strategy for indigenous forces facing the Soviet and Communist Chinese threats. This is their role in a strategy of flexible and controlled response; in other words, their use as a means of controlling or limiting the scope and intensity of a conflict. This question has received less attention in planning documents (including Annex J to the “Joint Strategic Objectives Plan,” where military strategy is most appropriately discussed) than have the more traditional roles of deterring and defending against external attack, even though the question is at the root of NATO debates over what kind of military strategy is applicable to Western Europe. Generally, indigenous forces, insofar as they are regarded by the US as options to either US involvement or a US-Soviet nuclear exchange, can be considered as contributing to a strategy of flexible and controlled response. In each country, however, the question is more complicated than that.

How indigenous forces react to enemy military moves can either limit or expand a conflict or crisis. Moreover, which US capabilities, if any, are brought to bear in a contingency can vary from country to country. If the US is concerned not only with deterring an initial attack but—should it nevertheless occur—also with limiting its expansion, then the US has to consider the nature of its military reaction. Some reactions may immediately escalate to a crisis; others may preempt further expansion. In this connection, indigenous forces may play a crisis-limiting role. Being continuously on the scene and being familiar with the terrain and its strategic possibilities, these forces could play an important role in controlling a conflict if appropriate doctrine and training have been provided and missions defined accordingly in advance.

The US may therefore find it desirable, appropriate, and feasible to expand the objectives of indigenous forces in the forward area to include not only
the deterrence of and control of aggression but also control over the course of possible conflicts and crises. This objective would require more explicit consideration in military aid planning documents of the training (including doctrine), equipping, and military strategies (including deployment) of indigenous forces, with the stated purpose of developing responses to contingencies in ways that control or limit their scope, intensity, and duration. At the same time, planning cannot stop at the development of indigenous forces to meet initially the more likely contingencies. Unless equal attention is paid to the strategic question of how these contingencies are to be handled beyond their initial stages, turning over responsibility for meeting them to indigenous forces may be ineffective or actually dangerous to US interests, e.g., in some cases involving the employment of West German or Chinese Nationalist forces.

ROLE OF MILITARY AID IN THE MODERNIZATION PROCESS

A second major issue affecting the future objectives and strategy of military aid is the role of military aid in the modernization or nation-building process in less developed countries of the world. Even if priorities are established between regions and countries according to the principal criteria of US economic, material, strategic, and related political interests and resources, the question of how military aid can contribute to modernization is still unresolved in a broader context. Thus it is clear from the questions raised at Congressional hearings and the constraints imposed on allocations since 1965 that Administration spokesmen have failed to convince Congress that military aid may have an essential role in supporting modernization and development in several countries if major US objectives are to be achieved, including the objective of "... creating an environment of security and stability on the developing friendly countries essential to their more rapid social, economic and political progress." In part this situation exists because military aid programs are presented to Congress as a separate aid package, even though at the level of the country team and at the level of coordination between the Departments of Defense and State (Agency for International Development), a strategy is (or should be) developed that interrelates all US aid programs to the goals of modernization. In this presentation, domestic instability associated with a country's groping toward nationhood and material progress is largely identified in the inadequate context of internal security. In this context the aims of civic-action programs or those associated with beneficial economic side effects of military projects are marginal considerations for military aid planners—and justifiably so, given the military context in which the programs are developed. To be sure, internal insecurity is a potential threat in less developed countries. But as a basic purpose (identified in the "Military Assistance Manual") now served by military aid programs, internal security does not provide guidance for consideration and adoption of measures that encourage orientation of military leaders and institutions toward national modernization and regional stability.

It may therefore be desirable to both develop and present to Congressional consideration a combined program encompassing all US efforts in which
the role of military aid in the modernization process can be evaluated—not as a separate functional package seemingly little related to broader policy—but as part of a fully developed strategy pursued by the US in a less developed country. The relative responsibilities of different US agencies in developing and administering such a program would undoubtedly vary from country to country; e.g., the military element of the strategy may be more significant in a recipient country where internal insecurity or public disorder are more urgent problems. In such cases the economic and socio-political side effects of military missions and projects would be considered marginal. In other cases these effects would become the primary objectives of military aid in ensuring that the military establishments and their activities are included in the process of nation building through, e.g., training programs designed for that purpose. 

As in other US military aid programs, the relative weight given to certain national institutions and projects should be decided according to the alternative strategy adopted as being most appropriate and effective in each recipient country (see the preceding section, "Strategic Role of Military Aid"). In this regard, as mentioned earlier, there has been a persistent tendency to establish a distinction between purely military problems, i.e., those requiring military aid and hence the responsibility of the Department of Defense, and internal security problems, i.e., those requiring economic aid and hence the responsibility of the Department of State Agency for International Development. Given the interrelated economic, social, political, and military problems associated with the modernization process, such a marked distinction may hamper a flexible approach to developing appropriate country strategies.

The rationale for a combined program derives from the complexity of the problems attending the modernization process and from the length of time involved in the process, which permit new problems to emerge even as others subside. Hitherto when the problem of weak local governments and institutions vulnerable to subversion and insurgency has been approached solely in the context of military aid it has proved to be extremely difficult to identify specific guidelines for program planning. Moreover, without an overall context in which problems and solutions could be identified in all national areas, it is not possible to identify two other strategic implications: the time and resources necessary to carry out a strategy and the possible US commitments that might be involved in the strategy.

US experience in such disparate cases as the Congo and Vietnam suggests only an imperfect grasp by the US of the difficulties involved in solving these problems, of the time and resources required, and of the implications of failing to solve them. Even when specific problems can be identified—such as the need for a reasonably adequate police and intelligence service—and appropriate remedial measures are available, it has been very difficult sometimes to convince recipient governments to work energetically on the problems before they reach major proportions.

Moreover, unlike the possible responses to external attack, the development of internal security is not normally susceptible to a clear-cut division of labor or relating of roles and missions between indigenous and US forces. The measures necessary to attack the problem have to be identified in the context of a recipient's own national development and needs. Unless the US
is willing to assume semicolonial responsibilities it cannot develop and sta-

bilize the country for the recipient; this must be the recipient's task. Indeed

for external and political reasons the problem requires that a direct US role
be deliberately minimized, except perhaps to discourage intervention by

another power. This point is already reflected in official US documents.

Despite the heavy US involvement in Vietnam—or perhaps because of it—the
feasibility and utility of a direct US military role in ensuring 'internal security
in underdeveloped countries are rightly discounted.

It is therefore difficult to develop an appropriate strategy to meet even
the purely military aspects of internal security in a military aid context alone.57

As has been authoritatively stated,38 the problems involved are in large part
those of national development, transition, and modernization; these can be
 summed up as nation building. Thus the problem of internal security basically
consists of two interrelated problems: (1) to maintain law and order and gov-
ernmental authority and (2) to modernize and develop social, political, and
economic institutions. The role of military aid may best be determined in a
strategy that seeks to solve both problems.

A significant implication associated with a strategy designed to support
an orderly modernization process is that of the time span involved. The time
necessary to complete such a process, at least to the point where domestic
disorder and instability cease to pose serious obstacles to orderly change and
progress, is likely to vary from country to country and from region to region.
In general, however, the time is likely to absorb years and even a decade or
more of patient effort—even in nations where conditions support a reasonable
expectation that the application of US resources will be effective.39

A final major implication of a strategy designed to support the modern-
ization process in less developed countries relates to possible US commit-
ments to the defense of recipients. This issue is discussed at greater length
later. Here it is pointed out that because the problems in less developed coun-
tries require solution over a long time period, a US commitment to the recip-
ient may develop at least implicitly over a period of years. This possibility
may require clear statements regarding US interests and commitments in
recipient countries. It may also require explicit attention to (a) the occasional
need for stopgap measures labeled as such and (b) means for relating stopgap
measures to long-term programs and the different requirements for each.

IMPACT OF US COMMITMENTS

A third major issue, affecting the US military aid program at the present
time and likely to affect it in coming years, relates to US commitments to re-
cipient countries and the relation of such commitments to the fundamental ra-
tionale underlying the provision of military aid.

Some Preliminary Observations

Before various elements involved in this issue are discussed, it should
be pointed out that the potential relation between a US military aid program
and a long-term US commitment of both material resources and combat forces
as needed has often escaped close analysis. This potential relation has been further obscured by the rapid increase in the number of grant aid programs. What began as a relatively clear-cut commitment under the Truman Doctrine was at least implicitly extended to other programs by virtue of a stated aim of protecting the noncommunist world from communism. This ambiguity pre-dated the US combat involvement in South Vietnam. But this war, as well as the increase in the number of grant military aid programs, has brought this issue to a head, at least in Congress.

A relation between a grant military aid program and the possibility of US involvement is not inevitable or automatic. Past experience in Korea, Berlin, Lebanon, the Taiwan Strait, Cuba, the Congo, and the Dominican Republic indicates that US involvement or restraint stem from US interests at the time and the strategy chosen to promote these interests, and not from the presence or absence of a military assistance program per se. Nevertheless the military aid program is, for a very practical reason, a natural source for allowing the issue to arise. In many poor countries with weak governments it may not be feasible to create any or sufficient indigenous forces to meet even local contingencies of substantial proportions; this situation therefore leads to a logical question of what external forces, in the absence of sufficient indigenous forces, are to fill the gap in the event of an armed conflict.

The decisions regarding what external forces are to fill this gap and what strategy is to be followed can have an important influence on the objectives and elements of a military aid program. For example, in terms of the more likely contingencies being planned for and the strategy adopted to meet them the US can better support some indigenous capabilities and missions than others, if a US commitment can be used as a planning premise. In the NATO countries, the US commitment is relatively clear-cut. In these countries the US might stress in its military aid programs the creation of infrastructure or perhaps improved reconnaissance capabilities that would support a more rapid and effective US intervention if the contingency arises, rather than larger conventional forces or improved firepower. Conceivably, had the contingency that now exists in Vietnam been foreseen and had the present US commitment been adopted as a planning premise, the emphasis on certain elements and objectives in the US grant military aid program in South Vietnam over the last 5 years might have been different. Thus the existence or absence of a US commitment not only constitutes a policy issue but has a direct and practical influence on the objectives of military aid programs and on the effectiveness of indigenous forces in contributing to the strategies adopted.

Shifts in the Rationale Underlying Military Aid

In the generation since WWII, the US has borne the major burden of filling the gap between the level of indigenous capabilities and that needed to meet the contingencies of two major conflicts and several lesser crises. The US has regarded this burden as part of its assumed responsibilities as the leader and protector of the noncommunist world. In this very general sense the US has indeed assumed the role of "gendarme" of the free world, even though it has not always chosen to play it (notably in its abstention from the conflicts ending Europe's colonial position). Recently the US has disclaimed this role
and has authoritatively concluded that such a role is no longer feasible or desirable. 44 This partial withdrawal from the position as leader and protector of the noncommunist world marks a departure from the views largely prevailing during much of the fifties and endorsed in 1959 by the Draper Committee. It suggests that a change has taken place or may take place in official views regarding the appropriate strategies to be pursued by the US in coming years. As a result, some confusion is evident in the rationale underlying the military aid program.

In the rationale that has prevailed until recently, the main purpose of military aid has been to ease the burden on the US by assisting other friendly nations to achieve a capacity for assuming part of the burden that is rightly theirs to carry and to contribute to the defense of their allies. 45 Through the military aid program the US government sought to create options in the form of substitutes for its own involvement in distant conflicts. In terms of this rationale the issue of US commitments hardly arose, since such commitments were assumed to be confined to the very high and unlikely levels of conflict intensity such as a massive and overt Soviet aggression in Europe.

Beyond their role as substitutes for a more costly US military presence around the globe, indigenous forces were also regarded as integral elements of deterrence against communist aggression. They were viewed as so integral to deterrence that any reduction in recommended force levels around the periphery of the USSR and Communist China was considered an open invitation to communist aggression.

During the late forties and early fifties this rationale was politically relevant to conditions at the time. Most if not all recipients of US military aid regarded the Sino-Soviet bloc as the principal politico-military threat to their survival. They urgently required and welcomed US military assistance to enable them to rebuild a military capability. As the allies recovered from WWII losses and acquired economic and military strength, they became less vulnerable and more confident actors on the world scene and thus made a significant contribution to the containment of both communist powers.

Nevertheless in reality it appears that since the mid-fifties overt aggression by the USSR and Red China has been deterred not by local forces but rather by US power; thus Soviet military and nuclear-missile capabilities have outpaced all others in the West save US. Consequently it is primarily if not exclusively the fear of a direct conflict with US power that has deterred Soviet aggression. From this viewpoint, allied indigenous forces and their deployment, missions, and force structures should be regarded primarily as elements extending the US deterrent and implying a US commitment. In this context a US commitment is also inherent in the provision of military aid, particularly to the forward-area countries. And, as Soviet military power has grown beyond levels at which indigenous military capabilities could reasonably be maintained, the latter are becoming increasingly more important as symbols of US commitment and deterrence and less important as forces able to resist Soviet aggression without major US involvement.

Neither, with some exceptions, can military aid program—supported indigenous forces be realistically considered as substitutes for US forces in several of the likely “hot” contingencies for which military aid has been

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granted, including local and limited wars and internal insurgencies. This reality does not mean that the US should revert to unilateral actions or dependence on its own resources, but it does tend to undermine the officially accepted view that indigenous forces supported by military aid on the whole greatly reduce the chances of US involvement in every local or limited war.

The reality undercutting the intentions to reduce direct US involvement would not be substantially altered if military aid appropriations were suddenly increased to the high levels of the fifties. Rather, the frustration of US intentions arises from (a) the very broad US objective of containing communism on a global scale, (b) the apparent fact that this objective was not carefully evaluated as to its full implications for increasing military requirements in a world rapidly spawning new nations, and (c) the practical condition that many recipients cannot absorb enough military aid or pursue strategies at the level that would eliminate entirely the need for external military forces.

In a period of foreseeable dangers to world peace the broadest objective of military aid—to encourage indigenous forces to meet these dangers alone, bilaterally, or multilaterally—remains valid. However, official claims for the success of the grant military assistance program in general have been over-stated or overgeneralized in specific instances. Over the years, Congressional expectations were raised by claims that subsequently proved unjustified. One of these expectations concerned the benefits to be derived from collective security arrangements and the alliances formed against communist aggression.

CHANGES IN THE ALLIANCE SYSTEM

A major aim of US military aid is the strengthening of Western and pro-Western alliances and not solely the strengthening of individual countries. The use of military aid to support collective security has been an objective since the inception of a military aid program in 1949, and most US military assistance over the years has gone to members of the major treaty organizations [NATO, CENTO (Central Treaty Organization, former Baghdad Pact) and SEATO]. These organizations have been regarded as forming a line of containment around the Sino-Soviet bloc. Although excluding some important countries around the periphery (e.g., India) they were theoretically linked by dual membership of some countries (UK, Turkey, and Pakistan).

Beyond this the treaty organizations, buttressed by bilateral agreements between the US and member countries and supplemented by similar agreements between the US and nonmember countries, have been regarded as forming a free world defense system against the Sino-Soviet bloc. The US has been considered the hub of the system, and its military aid has been regarded as providing the spokes to give the system strength and cohesion (Ref 49, p 141).

This alliance system had three important effects: First, to a considerable extent the free world strategy supported by military aid was based on a firm assumption of the system’s political cohesion in the face of a common threat. Moreover, the allies were expected to assist others in the event of a communist-launched aggression. Secretary of Defense McNamara gave this view its most recent articulation:

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As I told our NATO partners last December, deterrence is no more than the shadow cast by the actions we are prepared to take—and would have to take—should deterrence fail.

The "we" in that statement is collective: it means the United States and all other free and independent nations which share our determination to resist Communist expansion. [Ref 4, p 627]

Second, the options created through US military aid have been similarly defined in the context of a free world system, as indicated by the Secretary of Defense in 1966:

The governing principle of our military assistance program has been and is that the vital interests of this country in the defense of the free world are dependent upon the strength of the entire free world and not merely upon the strength of the United States. The United States is the focus of power in the free world struggle for national independence and economic progress; but the United States cannot be everywhere at once, doing everything the best. The balance of forces and the options necessary in today's challenging world can be achieved only with staunch friends, well armed and ready to do their parts of the job. . . . Military assistance provides essential arms, training, and related support to some 5 million men in allied and other friendly forces, who help us hold the line against aggression in all its forms and guises. . . . It would be un-bearably costly to the United States in both money and human resources to maintain a credible force by itself along all of the great arc of forward positions to the west, south, and east of the U.S.S.R. and Red China. Still, the free world cannot leave large gaps in that arc. The solution to the problem has been a combination of forces—a mix of local forces in the homelands and of U.S. and other friendly forces ready for rapid deployment. [Ref 5, pp 160–61]

And third, the system was regarded as an essential deterrent to communist aggression anywhere around the perimeter below the level of nuclear war (Ref 49, pp 160–61, also pp 8–9, 141, 145).

The continued insistence that the three substantive matters enumerated above—strategy, the definition of options, and the problem of deterrence—be considered on the basis of a free world alliance system stands in marked contrast with developments putting the validity of such a system in question. Administration spokesmen acknowledge this inconsistency. With the exception of NATO (and even it is experiencing considerable strain and faces the prospects of being transformed into a much different instrument of Western policy), it is acknowledged rather bluntly that some treaty organizations have little actual military value. Moreover, it is admitted that it cannot be realistically expected that the free world members will—unless they are themselves attacked directly—assist each other in the event of aggression, particularly in ambiguous conflicts such as insurgencies, without considerable pressure, urging, and inducement from the US. 50

In this connection it is worth pointing to the slight contribution by most Asian states to US efforts in South Vietnam and distinguishing this contribution from the expectations embodied in SEATO. To be sure, several nations in the regions have, parallel with the US, responded to Southeast Asia security requirements; then too, once a substantial US commitment for support of its policy was forthcoming in 1965, these nations built their own policies further around a US presence in the area. This development, although it supports the potential for a regional approach to security, is not the same as the original expectations associated with SEATO a decade earlier. For example, the current
situation requires rather than offsets a strong US military presence; it includes some SEATO members but excludes others. SEATO was not the operating mechanism that triggered this development, even though military assistance granted to some SEATO countries (e.g., Thailand) has supported their role in South Vietnam.

Under these circumstances the US may be required to recognize two changes that affect the relevance of the alliance system to the problems of the future. First, several of the organizations making up this system represent not so much coherent politico-military regional units as a series of unilateral US guarantees to each member nation (this is already evident in the cases of CENTO and SEATO). Second, several of these organizations are unlikely to be strategically useful in providing the political and military basis for meeting all communist threats in a way that either minimizes the US role or substantially increases the effectiveness of that role.

The free world alliance system itself is likely to become a casualty of a changing world. The bipolar confrontation between East and West that served as the mainspring for the development of this alliance system during the early fifties no longer accurately describes the pattern of interstate relations. Although bilateral security pacts and commitments are likely to remain valid, they are less and less likely to constitute a cohesive overall system for containing the communist powers politically, economically, or militarily. In addition, the smaller states can now pursue their own parochial interests in the knowledge that, because of the nuclear-missile standoff between the superpowers, they will run little risk of provoking a major war between the great powers or little risk that the USSR and even Communist China will take advantage of a local crisis to launch their aggression. From the point of view of these smaller nations the balance of power in the world is coming to rest on elements that no longer demand their active participation in one camp or another. In particular the US and USSR are believed stalemated by their substantial nuclear capabilities and technological superiority, even though in US and Soviet eyes the superpower relation is considered to be dynamic and not stable.

Even when the alliance system could have been considered relevant to world conditions—as during much of the fifties, the US always tolerated greater diversity in its alliance system than did the USSR; for the latter, such diversity was tantamount to treason. The US government was certainly aware that the primary objectives of some recipients (e.g., Pakistan) differed from those of the US and realistically did not demand an exact coincidence of objectives. So long as the recipient's objectives and his role in the strategy based on the alliance system were consistent with and essential to US aims at the time, the military aid program could be directed toward supplementing the recipient's forces in ways that improved his strategic contribution to US aims. However, as the alliance system becomes less relevant because of changing political conditions and military technology, the recipient's forces may be regarded as less essential to US aims; at the same time the objectives of some of the present recipients may become markedly inconsistent with any new strategy that the US may want to adopt.

The potential impact of these developments on the strategy and objectives of military aid are difficult to determine because the US continues to support
the treaty organizations by military aid under basically the same free world rationale despite changing conditions; as yet there is little evidence that sizable official attention is being given to designing a new strategy on a different international basis and with new priorities derived from such a strategy.

POSSIBILITIES FOR A NEW STRATEGY

The development and definition of objectives of the grant military aid program are based on current US policy and strategy; consequently these objectives are circumscribed by the approach of the US to date in meeting the threats to its interests. Nevertheless there are some indications of possible changes in the US approach, or at least a shift in the strategic elements making up overall US policy. Therefore it is appropriate to consider the possible ways in which military aid might be used as a resource in support of a new strategy that the US might adopt.

In early 1966 Secretary of Defense McNamara made the following statement:

The plain truth is the day is coming when no single nation, however powerful, can undertake by itself to keep the peace outside its own borders. Regional and international organizations for peace-keeping purposes are as yet rudimentary; but they must grow in experience and be strengthened by deliberate and practical cooperative action. . . . The organization of the American states in the Dominican Republic, the more than 30 nations contributing troops or supplies to assist the Government of South Vietnam, indeed even the parallel efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Pakistan-India conflict—these efforts, together with those of the United Nations, are the first attempts to substitute multinational for unilateral policing of violence. They point to the peace-keeping patterns of the future. We must not merely applaud the idea. We must dedicate talent, resources, and hard practical thinking to its implementation.

And later that same year President Johnson said:

Our purpose in promoting a world of regional partnerships is not without self-interest. For as they grow in strength inside a strong United Nations, we can look forward to a decline in the burden that America has had to bear in this generation.

These statements are noteworthy for their concern over the shape of future dangers, for their implication that the US today has even fewer resources or less ability to control fully the shape of future events, and particularly for their note of the diverse political elements that may be integral to a new strategy for the future. These statements are different, at least in general tone, from those made on similar subjects in the fifties: they now speak of "peace-keeping patterns" and "regional partnerships" rather than a "free world system of collective security."

Indeed, by implication these statements suggest that the earlier assumed political framework of a free world system that should have underpinned cohesive multilateral intra-allied efforts has proved to be inadequate or ineffective in meeting changing conditions or in providing a basis for developing new strategies. On the contrary, conflicting interests within the assumed free alliance system and parallel US and Soviet efforts—in the case of the Pakistan-India conflict of 1965 cited by McNamara—have even led to actions cutting across
the East-West line of containment. The emerging patterns are more diverse and fluid than that of a free world system vs a communist system. The changes reflect increasing assertion of national interests; although diverse interests could alter the previously assumed alignments of some nations the interests of others could also draw them together in selective instances in support of a strategy to meet specific crises. Thus, in the Kashmir conflict, Pakistan and India—both noncommunist, a fact that should presumably have provided a basis for common orientation against an extraregional Soviet or Chinese threat—had more differences, as reflected by the conflict, than the ideologically opposed US and Soviet Union, which united on this occasion to dampen the conflict by parallel actions.

Another aspect of the recent administration statements noted previously is the identification of the crux of a major issue in US policy: the US seeks to develop different peace-keeping strategies that would ease the burden on its own resources and military forces. Nevertheless, even if such strategies were possible, a major US interest as now defined would not be advanced unless the US can convince the participating nations that world communism continues to represent the most serious threat to their national independence and progress. To convince these nations may be difficult. Some prefer to deal with communist nations as they would with others, i.e., by establishing a traditional state-to-state relation in which factors such as ideology are considered unimportant or irrelevant. For many other nations the threat of communism may be completely overshadowed by the fact of their proximity to what is viewed as a great power and the influence it might exert on the domestic political scene, particularly if they adopt nonconciliatory attitudes based on hostility toward that power’s ideology. Still other nations may be reluctant to assist in meeting a communist insurgency in their region because of the possibility that such involvement could lead to a direct confrontation with one of the major communist nations.

Consequently, until these nations are convinced of the validity of the threat in the form depicted by the US, their rejection of US pleas for common action may offer the US few alternatives in general to a continuing need to carry the major burden of defending the noncommunist world against communism.

But in specific instances and up to a regional level, the elements for fashioning a new strategy—qualified by some continued divergence between the views and interests of the US and other participants—may be present. These elements may vary widely from case to case and region to region. For example, in the unstable political environment of the less developed areas in particular, it may be difficult to isolate uniform politico-military elements that could yield guidelines for military aid programs that would be relevant for the long term; yet there is one element, the element of nascent interdependence, that might provide the basis for strategies designed to meet one foreseeable danger in the future—chronic instability and disorder.

At least some nations in the major regions of the world may with time be persuaded, through debilitating experience or otherwise, to regard instability and public disorder as intolerable, retarding progress and inviting great power intervention. As a result they may eventually be encouraged to deal with these problems in a regional framework. Some of their remedial measures may involve military or paramilitary requirements. These requirements might
conceivably grow if regional development led to such increased confidence that with indirect US support a regional response could also be made to low-level externally led or supported contingencies.  

As discussed earlier, the problems of instability and public disorder may be too great to be remedied in a regional or even an international framework. However, depending on the priorities established for programs having long-term aims—as distinct from the short-term aims—US support for regional interdependence may markedly affect its military aid strategies and objectives. Thus it would call for the gradual transfer of a portion of individual country programs to a multinational institution or direct support for jointly used facilities (e.g., bases, intelligence networks) and training programs. Cost-sharing arrangements may be introduced into program funding, thus involving several countries in the region as a whole as well as the individual aid recipients and the US. Provision may be made for the manufacture in the region of some weapons, consumables, and spare parts and for the construction of repair and overhaul facilities. In some instances of grant military aid programs, measures similar to those mentioned have already been undertaken. So long as this is done with relatively modest and long-term expectations and so long as the ideal US objective of a regional confederation in which the US exerts influence directly or indirectly is avoided, it is possible that military aid can be used to support regional interdependence favoring the ultimate requirements of US security. The primary requirement is the preservation of viable regional and national independence against external control and domination.

Other strategic approaches may be possible. Major states such as Japan and Australia that have an interest in the political and military events affecting the balance of power in their own or neighboring regions can be encouraged over time to give support to a development that would help protect this interest. New configurations of power and interest, compatible if not identical with US interests, are already apparent in East Asia. These can be taken into account as providing possible guidelines for the direction and purposes of military aid.

RECAPITULATION

Five major problems are likely to affect the future role of military aid in a strategy designed to achieve US objectives. These problems are closely interrelated. For example, the split in the Sino-Soviet bloc and the emergence of national communism, uncontrolled by the two major communist centers of Moscow and Peking, permit the US to consider new strategic approaches, not only to the problem of preventing single-nation dominance over a region but also to the new dangers intrinsic to the less developed countries. Nationalism can similarly be regarded as having two divergent effects: first, preventing the extension of effective Soviet or Chinese power but, second, preventing the ideal development of complete regional cooperation among nations. To maximize its interests in the face of the foregoing developments the US support for regional interdependence can provide the basis not only for a new strategy dealing with problems involving the noncommunist areas but also one relating to some of the communist states. Thus a regional effort supported but
not dominated by the US may offer a minor communist state a major alternative
to complete dependence on Moscow or Peking.

These five problems—(a) changes in the threat, (b) the disorder and in-
stability in underdeveloped countries accompanying the modernization process
and deeply aggravated by the population-food crises, (c) the changing roles of
US and indigenous forces, (d) the diminishing relevance on reliability of several
treaty organizations as strategic bases for US, and (e) the possibilities for new
strategic approaches—are very likely to present military aid planning with a
serious problem of choice and priorities. These problems would probably exist
even if future appropriations for military aid were increased, an unlikely devel-
opment if present allocation trends persist. These problems also seem to re-
quire a new basis for planning, the development of diverse strategies appropriate
to the different problems posed in different areas of the world.

The formulation of these strategies would involve choices based on what
can be realistically expected in the way of achievement, given the magnitude of
the problems involved and the resources available to meet them. Within the
context of these strategies, decisions can then be made regarding short-term
objectives of military aid and long-term objectives.
CONCLUSIONS

Several implications for both the planning and substance (i.e., program objectives and elements) of military aid in the forthcoming decade can be derived from the preceding discussion.

1. Most important, various changes in the world and in the definable dangers to US interests seem to call for the development of new strategies for military aid, but the planning process for the development of military aid strategies and guidelines has rather consistently suffered from a number of deficiencies.

2. The development of new strategies for military aid seems to require a prior resolution of some major policy issues: (a) the degree to which world communism (as distinct from actual Soviet and Chinese Communist national power based on their capabilities and relations with other states) is still and should continue to be regarded as a dangerous entity; (b) the degree to which the US will commit itself to resisting overt and covert threats to recipient countries when the latter do not or cannot meet their share of the requirements for appropriate strategies to meet even local threats; and (c) the degree to which the US is willing to assume the possible risks of leaving the initiative and responsibility for meeting certain problems with other states when their objectives and strategies are not identical with those of the US.

3. The policy issues enumerated above may be resolved in part for the US by events, namely, the possibility that in some areas disorder will be so intense and chronic that few if any strategies will realistically be able either to meet it or to derive long-term political advantage from it.

4. Finally, the development of new strategies could have a marked effect on the objectives and direction of military aid evident today. It may require reconsideration of the implications of some objectives (e.g., internal security) in terms of short- and long-term requirements. In the less developed areas, it may require an entirely different program to meet the still relatively unfamiliar problems of national modernization in an unstable political environment. It may require different terminology. And, in particular, it may require more flexible and diverse approaches to developing strategies and priorities and the abandonment or significant modification of the rigid framework of the past 20 years based on a view of a bipolar world.

The foregoing conclusions should serve as guidelines for an examination in depth to determine the validity of the conclusions and the feasibility of the general remedies suggested in this study for reorienting US military aid policy and programs. Short of such an examination, current military aid rationale

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should be examined in the light of the impact on the rationale of the flaws and inadequacies identified and discussed in this study. If these inadequacies cannot be remedied, there should at least be an awareness of them to mitigate their impact on US policy in general and on military aid in particular.
REFERENCES AND NOTES

CITED REFERENCES AND NOTES


2. These faults have been described in an earlier study: Harold M. Hochman and Angus M. Fraser, "The Military-Assistance Planning Process, Critique and Recommendations (U)," IDA Study S-206, Institute for Defense Analyses, Economic and Political Studies Division, Sep 65. CONFIDENTIAL


4. For example, the Secretary of Defense said in 1965: "We can either help our partners help themselves in the development of an agreed military posture, which will minimize their need for outside assistance, or we must be prepared, in the case of emergency, to assume the whole burden ourselves, deploying U.S. forces and accepting the consequences which may result from our direct interventions." US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (89th Congress, 1st Session), "Hearings, Foreign Assistance Act of 1965," US Govt Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1965, Pts 1 to 9, p 627.


6. Qualitative distinctions between the role of foreign forces and that of US forces have been difficult to introduce into the planning process, and this situation is largely responsible for the inability to regard military aid programs in a strategic framework. Improvements in planning and greater insight over the years have overcome most though not all of the earlier "mirror-imaging" problem, i.e., an effort to structure foreign forces (in command institutions, missions, field equipment) along exactly the same lines as US military forces. Nevertheless as pointed out in an earlier study, military aid programming has been persistently governed by guidelines in the form of force packages, units, and items of equipment—guidelines that implicitly assume substitutability—rather than strategy, character, purpose, and mission. A military aid program is better planned as a whole unit rather than through its components because it is (or should be) responsive to a distinct strategy peculiarly appropriate to the recipient country.

7. Except for programs in the Middle East that rest on this objective as well as those of maintaining US base rights and pro-US orientation. This objective was recently mentioned in connection with Southeast Asian programs.

8. This process was described in a 1959 evaluation of the military assistance program, the Draper Committee Report, as the kind of analysis required to determine whether military aid was part of a long-term national strategy responsive to future dangers and presenting the best possible use of resources for the purpose: The President's Committee To Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Vol II, "Supplement to the Composite Report," Annexes (hereafter cited as Ref 8), Washington, D. C., 1959, pp 255-60. The Draper Committee was the sixth of seven Presidential committees.
since 1950 that have looked into the US military and economic aid program. Es report, including supporting anneces, was the most comprehensive and thoughtful of those reviewed in the preparation of this study.  

9. "By and large, the sheer weight of MAP [Military Assistance Program] documentation, and the impressive rank and experience of those who plan and review military assistance, encourage the presumption that existing programs are based on cogent, thorough analysis appropriate to the need. But this presumption rarely survives critical scrutiny. Viewed over a span of time and in the light of pressures and incentives to meet changing situations with changed commitments and procedures, neither the organizational structure nor the analytic foundation seems cogent or appropriate." (Ref 2, p 4) A somewhat similar comment was made in 1958: "It is easy to be misled by precisely stated force missions and specifically defined force objectives into assuming that such missions and objectives are always the product of the kind of analysis outlined at the outset of this chapter. They may or may not be, and it is often difficult to determine whether they are." (Ref 8, p 264) 

10. Compare, for example, the following comment made in 1959: "The development of national strategy has been weakest at the point where the marriage of requirements and resources was necessary. In spite of repeated efforts, the budget-making process has never been adequately related in broad terms to the process of substantive policy determination." (Ref 8, p 262) 

with this comment made in 1965:  
(c) "The elements of the MAP budgeting and planning process—the definition of its budget guidance, statements of objectives on which its plans are based, and translation of these objectives into missions and force requirements—seem to be separate operations, whereas they should be considered jointly." (Ref 2, p 34) 

11. This point was made in one of the annexes to the Draper Committee Report (Ref 8, pp 264–66, 272–78). 


14. Such a determination is less applicable to one-shot programs having short-term political objectives, so long as the program is not transformed into something of longer duration. In 1967 the "Military Assistance Manual" issued explicit guidance regarding programs designed to achieve primarily political purposes; this was more explicit than the guidance issued for programs with primarily military and security aims. 


17. The first two requirements are cited in Ref 8, p 256. 

18. The Mutual Defense Assistance Program was authorized Oct 49. 


22. Since 1955, 35 new nations have been formed in Africa alone. 

23. This point of view was well summarized in the Annexes to the Draper Report and was reflected in the Report itself: "Some have argued that the bipolarity of the world political situation will give way to a wider dispersal of effective power; that neither we nor the Russians will be able to dominate our associates to the degree that we have in the immediate postwar world; and that a more fluid and shifting multinational balance of power situation will arise. Two comments on this hypothesis seem pertinent. In the first place, it assumes an eventual break between Moscow and Peking; if there is no such break and if there is fluidity only among the non-bloc countries, the outlook would seem to
be certain disaster for our side. In the second place, even if a break between Peking and Moscow is assumed, some leadership toward world order will be necessary if the conflicts to be anticipated in such a fluid international political situation are not to lead to a general nuclear war. We are then right back to our initial question: if we falter, who is apt to supply leadership, and of what kind? The answer seems to be reasonably predictable. If we falter, it will be Communists of one stripe or another who will supply 'leadership.' " (Ref 8, p 26)

24. This objective has been sought by the grant military aid programs aimed at developing a pro-US orientation, even though in 1963 a President's study group discouraged the use of foreign aid to compete with the communist bloc for influence:

"It can always be said that in fragile newly developing countries, the United States must provide aid lest they accept it from Communist nations with the resulting political penetration and eventual subversion. We cannot accept this view. We believe these new countries value their independence and do not wish to acquire a new master in place of the old one; there already have been instances on the continent of Africa to corroborate this belief. While our aid programs in this area are generally new, experience has shown they tend to increase . . . ." US Department of State, The Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World, "Report to the President of the United States, The Scope and Distribution of United States Military and Economic Assistance Programs," Washington, D. C., 20 Mar 63, p 9.

25. For further discussion of this topic see Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems," RAND-P-2993, The RAND Corporation, Feb 65. UNCLASSIFIED


27. In 1966 this topic was the subject of Congressional hearings. [US Congress, Senate, (89th Congress, 2d Session), "Hearings, Population Crisis," Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Committee on Government Operations, US Govt Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1966.] A yearlong study, submitted in the summer of 1967, was undertaken under the auspices of the President's Science Advisory Committee.


29. See as examples, Strategic Studies Department, "Environmental Trends in Latin America (U)," Research Analysis Corporation, in preparation (SECRET); and "Tropical African Environment in the Decade Ahead," Research Analysis Corporation, in preparation. UNCLASSIFIED


31. It may be transformed in the next three decades, as suggested by the speculative observations on the future in the studies by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Commission on the Year 2000. See the articles by Eugene V. Rostow, Samuel P. Huntington, and Ithiel De Sola Pool in Daedalus, 96 (3): 922-36 (summer 77).

32. This reevaluation was undertaken in the 1965 Hoopes reappraisals.

33. This point is somewhat different from but related to another point developed later: it is the US, and not indigenous, forces that deter external Soviet attack.

34. For a discussion of possible politico-military techniques for deterring or limiting crises, see John R. Thomas and Mildred C. Vreeland, "Show-of-Force Concepts," RAC-TP-203, Research Analysis Corporation, Feb 68. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
35. The objective of controlling conflicts and crises acquires greater relevance if the trend continues toward overt but politically controversial or ambiguous uses of conventional military power in aggression or war threats, e.g., North Vietnam's employment of its forces in South Vietnam.\(^4\)

36. In many underdeveloped countries the role of military institutions in the society and their historically based political activities are already so large that the military would have to be included in the modernization process. However, this is not to say that these institutions should be deliberately strengthened to provide the principal leadership in the modernization process, but only that they should not be excluded from the process.

37. Such a limited context, moreover, may discount the possibility that "military objectives can sometimes be achieved by political or economic means; political objectives with military and economic tools; and economic objectives with political and military resources or techniques." (Ref 8, p 257)

38. By Secretary of Defense McNamara in the term "security is development," in the course of his Montreal speech on 19 May 66.

39. See, for example, Ref 24, pp 11-12; and the testimony of GEN Robert W. Porter, then Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command, regarding the requirements of national development in the Latin American Republics. (Ref 5, pp 450-51)

40. For example, one of the studies associated with the Draper Report made the following comments:

"We should be careful (and we have not always been), whenever we are deciding whether to extend aid for a short-term political purpose (including aid as a quid pro quo for bases), to analyze the longer term commitment that may actually be involved." (Ref 8, p 237)

41. In 1963 a study made of US military commitments included a discussion of military assistance programs. The following illuminating passages are quoted from that study:

"...The United States is not committed to provide military forces to these countries, nor to engage its forces in a conflict in these areas. If a major internal or external attack occurred, however, the afflicted country might request such assistance, indicating perhaps the precedent of American interest in the country by virtue of an existing military assistance arrangement.

"...the United States is committed to the possible use of force in only those countries to which it is allied by treaty. These two types of assistance must not be confused.

"...President Truman stated that he believed 'that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed Soviet minorities or by outside pressures.' Although he went on to say that 'our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes,' the implication remained that the United States might be called on to do more than what the impending Congressional Resolution specified." (Institute for Defense Analyses, "U.S. Military Commitments," Jun 63, pp 35-36)

42. Congressional concern is indicated by the following amendment attached to the 1966 authorization law for foreign aid:

"The furnishing of economic, military, or other assistance under this Act shall not be construed as creating a new commitment or as affecting any existing commitment to use armed forces of the United States for the defense of any foreign country." (Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, PL 89-585, Sec 101, US Govt Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1966)
43. For example, the primary objectives of the program might have been not the general development of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam counterinsurgency forces but improvement in specific support services such as intelligence and military support of improved public administration in rural areas or, in case of need, in support of US combat forces.

44. These conclusions were stated in Secretary of Defense McNamara's Montreal speech on 19 May 66, in which he not only discounted the view that the US is the world's gendarme but also said that the "...day is coming when no single nation, however powerful, can undertake by itself to keep the peace outside its own border."

45. In the case of one category of conflict—insurgency or internal war—it has long been recognized that indigenous forces and governments had to carry the major burden because external military forces had little or no relevance to the underlying problems giving rise to such conflicts.

46. However, the rationale that has prevailed until recently has rarely taken direct and explicit account of the US need to engage at times in unilateral military operations to achieve objectives that could not be met by indigenous forces, regardless of their availability, because of overriding political considerations. Thus in a show of force or some military interventions the US is directly expressing its national interests to an adversary, and this message cannot always be conveyed by indigenous troops acting alone. Similarly the US may wish to convey, through military action or demonstration, deterrent messages to Communist China; in this context the use of Nationalist Chinese forces could distort US intentions.

47. For example, Secretary of Defense McNamara said in 1965:

"We can either help our partners help themselves in the development of an agreed military posture which will minimize their need for outside assistance, or we must be prepared, in the case of emergency, to assume the whole burden ourselves, deploying U.S. forces and accepting the consequences which may result from our direct interventions." (Ref 4, p 627)

Similarly in 1966, David E. Bell, Agency for International Development Administrator, made the following statement regarding the aims of all US foreign aid programs:

"...They are essentially insurance policies by which we try to avoid getting into this kind of situation [Vietnam]. But in this case we were not able to do so." (Ref 5, p 38)

It seems that, in taking out insurance policies identified by Mr. Bell, the US is not only the policyholder but also the company guaranteeing the policy. Without a clearer statement of the kinds of contingencies for which indigenous forces can reasonably be prepared and be effective and without assurance that these contingencies can be kept limited in their conflict intensity, it should not be claimed that the military aid program reduces the risk of US combat involvement in distant crises and conflicts.

48. This is implied in the critique of strategic planning for military aid programs contained in the first section of this paper.


50. The formation of these views predated the US experience in Vietnam; the declining importance attributed to CENTO and SEATO as strategic instruments is apparent in recent testimony before Congress (Ref 4, pp 978, 743; Ref 5, p 233). In 1966 it was admitted that...

51. For a stimulating discussion of changes in the alliance system see Ref 25.

53. For a study of the elements supporting a regional approach in Southeast Asia, see Bernard K. Gordon, "Asian Regionalism: Implications for US East Asian Policy," RAC-R-43, Research Analysis Corporation, Apr 68, UNCLASSIFIED. The possibilities for such an approach in Latin America are discussed in "Strategic Analysis of Latin America 1965–1975, (SALA)," RAC-T-466, Research Analysis Corporation, May 68. SECRET—SPECIAL HANDLING


55. This was implicit in the offer made by President Johnson to North Vietnam in Apr 65:

"The first step is for the countries of Southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development. We would hope that North Viet-Nam would take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible." [Dept of State Bull., LIII(1548): 608 (26 Apr 65)]

The moves by the US to help Yugoslavia when it first broke with Stalin in the forties are an earlier example of US alternative to a breakaway communist state.

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Mozingo, David P., "China’s Relations with Asian Neighbors," RAND-P-2947, The RAND Corporation, Jul 64. UNCLASSIFIED
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Since the inception of military aid, there have been a number of useful appraisals of this US program. In the main, however, they have focused on the effectiveness of the program within a relatively narrow context of military aid policy implementation. Within the last several years, however, not only implementation but military aid's very existence and the need for the program have been brought into question. In such a changed context, the study examines the relation of military aid to broader US foreign policy and national security considerations. This study not only examines the relevance or, equally important, the possible lack of relevance, of military aid to current and potential US foreign policy and strategic problems but also suggests a basis for developing guidelines for determining the current and future relevance of military aid to these problems.
basis for military aid reappraisal
changing political and strategic environment and
US military aid
military aid and national strategy
military aid reappraisal guidelines
military aid and US foreign policy