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<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 30 JAN 1968. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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<td>31 Jan 1980, DoDD 5200.10; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980</td>
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
Best Available Copy
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation KIEN GIANG 1-9, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period 15-19 November 1967 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded as inclosure for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

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Major General, USA
The Adjutant General
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3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division
1st Battalion, 82d Artillery
CONFIDENTIAL

30 January 1968

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
APO US P.O. 96234

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (H&V/GRS/36/32)(v)

1. (v) Name of Operation: Kien Giang 9-1


3.(c) Location: Base area 170 and specifically sectorized by AB0 020593, AB0 3543, AB0 3543, XR10443, XR106553, and XR131514.

4.(c) Commanding Officer: 3d Bde 9th Div.

5.(c) Supporting Officer:
   a. Colonel George W. Everett, Commanding Officer 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.
   b. Lieutenant Colonel William S. Hinton, Commanding Officer 2d BN, 60th INF, 3d Brigade.
   c. Lieutenant Colonel William B. Steele, Commanding Officer 5th BN, 60th INF, 3d Brigade.
   d. Lieutenant Colonel George Blaisdell, Commanding Officer 3d BN, 47th INF, 3d Brigade.

6.(c) Task Organization:

   2-60 INF:
   2d BN, 60th INF (-)
   B Co, 3-39 INF
   C Btry 3-4 Arty DS
   Plat, C Co 15 Engr BN (DS)
   9th Inf Det (SPT)

   5-60 INF:
   5th BN (v) 60th INF
   B Btry, 2-4 Arty DS
   Plat, C Co 15 Engr BN (DS)

   Bde Con
   2-4 Arty DS
   C Co 13th Engr (-) (DS)
   3d Plat 9th INF (-)
   3d Plat Co 3 9th Sig BN (-)

   Bde Con
   Co B, 709th Eng Det (SPT)
   Co C, 9th Med BN (SPT)
   9th Inf Det (SPT)
   6th AIF, 22 Co Co (SPT)

7.(c) Supporting Forces:

   a. 11 Field Foggy, Army Aviation Units

   b. 7th USARF

   a. 1st Logistic

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DOD DIR 5200.10

DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS AFTER 12 HRS
8. (C) Intelligence:

9. (C) Action: The 31 Bde conducted airmobile assaults, search and destroy operations, interdiction trails, and established blocks within base area to destroy VC forces, their supporting elements and base installations.

10. (C) Concept of Operations:

a. Phase I (15 Nov 67): The 31 Bde "Leo Daviau" deployed to staging area at Dong Tam, 17 Dec, with the 31 Bde CP moving by cox-convoy from Tan An at 1300 and arriving at Dong Tam at 1500. 2-60 Inf was moved by helicopter from Tan Trau at 1315 and closed Dong Tam at 1500. 3-60 Inf was moved by helicopter from Tan Trau at 1315 and closed Dong Tam at 1530. 3 May 2-6 Inf was moved by helicopter from Tan Trau at 1530 and closed Dong Tan at 1600. 3-60 Inf was moved by helicopter from Tan An at 1600 and closed Dong Tam at 1630.

b. Phase II (16 Nov 67): 3-60 Inf (Tigers) conducted Co sized airmobile assaults and search and destroy operations via X508365. 3-60 Inf was moved by helicopter from Tan Trau in 3 lifts at 0845 and inserted on LZ Blue X508365 on 0915. The Co returned to the north and secured F5/30 Doil 1520081702 at 0915 without incident. 2 Co was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam in 1 lift at 0845 and inserted on LZ Blue X508365. The Co maneuvered north along the Truong River searching for choppers 9-8 X507844 and 9-2 X507835 without encountering contact. The Co established the CP at X507835 and conducted two night search and destroy patrols in the vicinity of 9-8. 4 Co was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam in 1 lift at 0945 and inserted on LZ Blue X508365. The Co maneuvered to the south and executed a patrol X5-909510, 50-2 X507844 and 50-2 X507835 without contact. The Co established its CP at X507844 and conducted 1 night search and destroy patrol at 2330 via X507835.

The contact point (21 Dec) engaged and killed 8 VC (LZ 145) moving north in a stream on the 3-60 CP Con. 3-60 Inf 2-4-6 arty was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam at 1415 and inserted on Phong Coais at 0900. The battery was ready to fire at 0900. 3-60 Inf 2-4-6 arty was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam at 1400 and inserted on F5/30, 8-Viet Cong at 1530. The battery was ready to fire at 1105. 3-60 Inf 2-4-6 arty in 1 lift at 1005 and inserted on LZ Green A5081702. The Co maneuvered north and along with sides of the Truong River searching for choppers through 20-24 X5061702 at 1205 and X5061702 at 1205. The Co captured 1 VC camp with 2 check point engagements. The element continued its sweep without further incident and established a block point at the east X5061702. 3-60 Inf 3-60 Inf 2-4-6 arty was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam in 2 lifts at 1005 and inserted on LZ Green A5081702 at 1000. The elements maneuvered north and executed a patrol X508365 and the element continued contact with an VC Co resulting in 2 US KIA, 4 US WIA, and 4-6 VC KIA and 35 VC WIA. The Co established its CP at X508365. 3-60 Inf was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam in 1 lift at 1000 and inserted on LZ Blue X508365. The Co maneuvered north and secured F5/30 Blue via X508365. The Co established its CP on F5/30 Blue. 2-60Inf returned to F5/30 Blue with a Co at 1600 and established its CP. 3-60 Inf was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam at 1600 and inserted on F5/30 Blue at 1200. The battery was ready to fire at 1300. At 2230 the F5/30 Blue came under enemy mortar and ground attack. The battery launched a two-pronged attack from the east and west utilizing an ext 2 VC Co as attacking force. 3-60 Inf was returned to urgent action, arty, gunships, tactical air, and 1 by battery. Contact was broken at 2300 resulting in 6 US WIA and 11-16 VC KIA and destroyed 5-60 Inf conducted patrol and 3-60 Inf conducted patrols and 3-60 Inf moved by helicopter from Dong Tam in 1 lift at 1100 and inserted on LZ Blue X508365. The Co maneuvered south and closed Dong Tam at 1130. The Co established contact with an ext 2 VC Co. The Co returned in contact varying from light to heavy until 1800 and sustained 2 KIA and 15 WIA and lost an ext (count not confirmed) 5 LMG, 1 12.7mm, 1 81mm, 4 1.15 in. pilots. VC losses
were 6 VC KIA (39) and 2 probable as verified by soldiers in contact. Recon platoons was moved by helicopter from Dang Tan in 1 lift at 1500H and inserted via X096061 at 1530H. The platoons reached Co in its defense at 1508H and provided security for a chopper that was delayed due to an engine failure at 1259H. Co was moved by helicopter from Dang Tan in 1 lift at 1145H and inserted on LC base 2X303864 at 1152H. Immediately upon landing, the Co established contact with an on-foot platoon via X096061. The Co remained in contact varying from light to heavy until 1839H and sustained 7 KIA, many losses were 20 VC KIA (probable as verified by soldiers in contact). The Co established a blocking pan centered to the west via X099596. A Co and recon platoon were moved by helicopter (CH-47) from Dang Tan at 1215H to via LZ 2002. At that time, while attempting to land one of the CH-47's received 7 hits from 5c fire which damaged 2 crew members. The insertion was aborted and the helicopters returned to Dang Tan. At 1500H a Co was once again moved by helicopter from Dang Tan in 1 lift and inserted via X100061 at 1530H. The Co maneuvered to the west along the north side of the Tong Do Lai Canal sweeping through obj's X5095598 without incident and established a blocking pan centered to the east via X099596. The B Co of the 3rd battalion, Dang Tan by convoy at 0800H and established its CP via X2286504 at 0910H. The platoon provided security to the CP without incident. 6 VC KIA were 15 VC KIA (confirmed), 36 bunkers, 2 structures and 6 M16 pan being destroyed, 2 secondary exploations and 5 wounded elites. All ops: at 0700H the 3-11 MIA was lifted by helicopter from Ph 20 2X776650 and inserted on LC base X3156002 and 12 elements 2X755598 at 0730H. Once inserted they proceeded to sweep the area with 3,500M and inserted on LC base X3156002, 45 X3175597, 46 X3155597, 47 X3155997, and 32 X3175997. The days ops results in no, contact and the elements set up in night location at 1700H via X094650 at 0800H. The 2-11 was lifted by helicopter from Ph 20 X277650 into Le Danh Ph 2X135600 and Le loss 2X1155670 at 0830H. They swept 50 elements 1500H and inserted on LC base X21559502, 19 X3155502, 20 X31755502, 21 X3155550 and 22 X3155550. At 1030H via obj 18 the 2-11 captured the Diery security chief of the local base area and led them to 1 chicom rifle, 75 booby traps, plus numerous documents. They continued to sweep without incident and established night location via Obj 21 at 1930H. The third element of CP II (1-12) was lifted by helicopter from Ph 20 X076050 into LC 2106 X3155060 and Ph 21 X3175995. The 1-12 after insertion swept south 50M along both sides of the north Dn La through obj's X2155590, 45 X3155050, 55 X3150590, and 56 X3155597. Shortly after landing in the LZ, gunships spotted 8 VC and my or their resulting in 8 VC KIA (60) were killed. The 1-12 continued sweeping without further incident and established its night location via obj 57 at 1700H. 6 Co's of CIDG participated in ops sweeping along the northern bank of the Soch Ca River through check points X275552, 32 X3150552 to the junction of the Soch Long Darn. Ops resulted in capture of 1 chicom carbine near obj 72 at 1300H and capture of 1 VC POW and 1 VC KIA on checkpoint 10 at 1230H. The elements established their new locations on checkpoint 12 and near obj 69.

(1) US LOSSES:
(a) Personnel: 3 KIA, 42 WIA and 2 MIA.
(b) Equipment: Destroyed/missing 6 5c. M16 rifles, 2 37MM's and 1 M19 Cold War radio.

(2) VNK LOSSES:
(a) Personnel: 6 VC KIA (confirmed), 7 VC KIA (confined), 2 VC POW and 1 VC KIA (confirmed)
(b) Equipment Captured: VN-KIA 2 chicom carbines.

(3) Enemy LOSSES:
(a) Personnel: US 1 soldier, 26 bunkers, 2 structures and 6 M16 positions.

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AV82-883

30 January 1969

SUBJ: Combat Operations After Action Report (K905/906/51/282) (C)

o. Phase III (12 Jan-17): The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted an LTA and 3-7 Inf (15 cups) conducted 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

a. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

b. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

c. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

d. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

2. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

3. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

4. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

5. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

6. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

7. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

8. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

9. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

10. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

11. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

12. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

13. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

14. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

15. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

16. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

17. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

18. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

19. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

20. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

21. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

22. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

23. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

24. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

25. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

26. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

27. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

28. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

29. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.

30. The 3/1 Cav/1st LSA conducted Co A 3/1 Cav/1st LSA and Co A 3/1 Cav in the 2500-3000 area.
of the Cong Doc in a tank unloading to the west toward Co 2-60 without incident. The Co was extracted in 2 lifts at 1335h and closed PS/PB L3055520 at 1400h. The Co continued to provide security for the lift to Co 2-60 and closed PS/PB L3055520 without incident. The Co Devils hit 6 supporting airstrikes resulting in 10 bunkers being destroyed.

1. US LOSSES:
   a. Personnel: 3 TKB
   b. Equipment Destroyed/Supply: None.

2. RVN LOSSES:
   a. Personnel: US: 0 VC KIA, RVN: 3 KIA, 6 Wounded.
   b. Equipment Destroyed: 48 handgrenades, 20 tons of rice, 20 20MM enemy actions, and 3 grenades to CT troops - 4 Wounded, 1 Wounded.

The Co moved forward and linked up with the 1st rifle platoon at 1340h. The Co Devils conducted a patrolling action to the west of the CP and closed PS/PB L3055520 at 1400h. The Co Devils were extracted from the blocking point in 3 lifts at 1440h and inserted on obj 25 PS/PB L3055520 at 1430h without incident. The Co Devils closed PS/PB L3055520 and closed PS/PB L3055520 at 1400h and closed PS/PB L3055520 at 1440h. The Co Devils moved forward and closed PS/PB L3055520 at 1440h. In addition to its earlier mission, the Co Devils conducted a patrolling action to the west of the CP and closed PS/PB L3055520 at 1440h. Personnel were extracted from the blocking point in 3 lifts at 1440h and inserted on obj 25 PS/PB L3055520 at 1430h without incident. The Co Devils closed PS/PB L3055520 and closed PS/PB L3055520 at 1400h and closed PS/PB L3055520 at 1440h. The Co Devils moved forward and closed PS/PB L3055520 at 1440h. The Co Devils conducted a patrolling action to the west of the CP and closed PS/PB L3055520 at 1440h. Personnel were extracted from the blocking point in 3 lifts at 1440h and inserted on obj 25 PS/PB L3055520 at 1430h without incident.
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checkpoint 31 to 123.56 E 143.523. They started to Ord 37.231.2550. From there they were lifted from the N. 1540.1 and inserted in 143.523.4550 at 105501. They then proceeded to Ord 24.50 where they were to remain as a reserve unit. At 02001, the 3rd inc Vct Bn to checkpoint 31, 2810777 and were the Bonbys to 143.523.4550 where they proceeded to Ord 24.50 as a reserve unit. The 4th Company was extracted from their Pk at checkpoint 10 am. closed their bases camp in the and sealed their phase of the ops.

(1) US LOSSES:

   a) Personnel: 7 HN, 7 W.

   b) Equipment Destroyed/Unaccounted For: 2 M16

   (a) Enemy's pocket the 3rd inc Vct Bn to checkpoint 1, 2810777 and were the Bonbys to 143.523.4550 where they proceeded to Ord 24.50 as a reserve unit. The 4th Company was extracted from their Pk at checkpoint 10 am. closed their bases camp in the and sealed their phase of the ops.

(2) NVA LOSSES:

(1) *DELAYS*

(c) Personnel: 5 VC KIA (7), 72 WIA (possible) and 80 VC KIA (possible).

(b) Equipment Destroyed: 50-75 BKs, 3-5M mortars, 1 grenade body trap, and 3 landmines.

(c) Personnel: 5 VC KIA, 72 WIA (possible) and 80 VC KIA (possible).

(b) Equipment Destroyed: 50-75 BKs, 3-5 M mortars, 1 grenade body trap, and 3 landmines.

1. Phase I (19 Dec 68): The 3rd inf Div moved from 143.523.4550 to Ord 24.50 and was inserted in 143.523.4550 at 105501, 1 GCC was moved by helicopter from 25.10000 at 121501 and closed the Pk at 115101. 1 GCC was moved by helicopter from 25.10000 at 121501 and closed the Pk at 115101. 1 GCC was moved by helicopter from 25.10000 at 121501 and closed the Pk at 115101. 1 GCC was moved by helicopter from 25.10000 at 121501 and closed the Pk at 115101. 1 GCC was moved by helicopter from 25.10000 at 121501 and closed the Pk at 115101.

(1) US KIA:

   a) Personnel: 2 HN, 12 W.

   b) Equipment Destroyed/Unaccounted For: 1 Stray 82mm, 2 M16s, 50 laits (rifles), 110 laits, 1 9MM

   c) Personnel: 2 HN, 12 W.

   d) Equipment Destroyed/Unaccounted For: 1 Stray 82mm, 100 laits (rifles), 110 laits, 1 9MM

   e) Equipment Destroyed: US: 31 VC KIA (25), 75 VC KIA (confirmed), 148 VC KIA (possible), 50 VC KIA (confirmed), 1 M14, and 9 VC KIA (confirmed), 5 M14, and 5 cannisters.

   f) Equipment Destroyed: US: 76 bunkers, 2 tanks, 23 body traps, 50-75 BKs, 20 WIA, 50-75 BKs, 6 and 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   g) Equipment Captured: US: None. \[1000:3] 3 mlas, 4 wins and 20 tons of rice.

   h) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   i) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   j) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   k) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   l) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   m) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   n) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   o) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   p) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   q) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   r) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   s) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   t) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   u) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   v) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   w) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   x) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   y) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   z) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   a) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   b) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   c) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   d) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   e) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   f) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   g) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

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   r) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.

   s) Personnel: 50-75 BKs, 20 tons of rice; 8 rounds 30mm can; 75 body traps.
AVRO-500 30 January 1968
SUBJ: Combat Operations After Action Report (DCY/BSC/23/52) (1)

(a) Discussion: Such close-in patrol will limit the enemy's ability to launch friendly unit defensive pressure and prevent the enemy from taking cover to the perimeter. In addition to subject possibly, eventually, planned evacuation. Defensive fires provide an excellent method of ensuring the VC has effectively chance in reoccupation of defensive positions.

(2) Countertack;

(a) Item: An aggressive countermarch plan with maximum use of supporting fires must be developed to prevent the enemy from polluting the battlefield or a resupply, its follow-up.

(b) Discussion: The enemy often after a vigorous and sustained attack will disengage by suddenly calling fire. If the friendly units also step quickly, the VC will seek theull in the battle to his advantage to (1) kill friendly soldiers, (2) capture equipment and (3) recover his own. The counterattack must be developed by a strong and vigorous counterattack. If the unit has been hit extremely hard a counterattack may not be practical, however, the best to the enemy of pollute the battlefield can be the sudden, sharp, methodical, well planned and employed forces on the battlefield to obtain maximum enemy casualties.

(3) Maintain Contact;

(a) Item: Once contact has been established, pressure on the enemy must be maintained to keep him off balance.

(b) Discussion: The VC are experts in the use of delaying tactics. The situation must be developed rapidly or else the enemy will withdraw leaving the VC with a demoralized enemy and the advantage of friendly units. An entrenched enemy is obviously at an advantage over friendly forces maneuvering through open terrain. The enemy can be defeated at his own game, by occupying a defensive position he has given allied forces an opportunity to apply massive supporting fires to both. Careful consideration must be given to both the fire support available to the task force employed to maintain the earliest opportunity in the suspected enemy location and likely avenues of escape, friendly units will be able to achieve fire superiority and prevent enemy infiltration. Light fire teams have proven invaluable when first units. Recognize new, open areas and likely avenues of withdrawal. Order to units of the task force the original position to provide maximum cover for maneuver forces. Once fire superiority has been achieved rates of withdrawal have been cut off friendly forces can become their own. Although maximum use of daylight is pursued the commander must plan the attack after dark to create an additional advantage. Units have tendency to attempt to box the enemy in one darkness has fallen and continue the battle the next day... Although perhaps thought about it heavily, this approach seldom if ever works. Consequently, the commander must maintain to press the enemy through the night using artificial light to illuminate the battle area.

(4) Air Fire Plan;

(a) Item: The success or failure of the air fire plan is determined by the amount of detail carried given to that plan.

(b) Discussion: Air/2-3 air's must be facilitated with (1) type and effects of ordnance, (2) types area for directions and (3) return-to-target areas for directions. Regimental directions are desirable from the viewpoint of efficient utilization, since ordnance can be precisely directed to the target and the mission can been taken into the operation plan. In the absence of this, likely candidates in the air of intelligence. The use of numerous regiment air fire does not create problems if (1) the F0's are briefed on the scheme of maneuver and are assigned specific targets prior to time-off, (2) ground units are prepared to brief the F0's and work their position, and (3) the F0's and FGO have coordinated use of air, artillery, and mortars gunships.

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(5) Artillery Support:

(c) Use of artillery by maneuver units.

(6) Movement in Front Zones:

(a) Continued areas is hindered due to the lack of key areas.

(b) Discussion: When in the objective area, friendly ground forces should be assigned areas to support the maneuver units.

(1) During the first six hours, the enemy controlled the operation from a CCF ship until the artillery OP was established. The division OP was mobile and in contact with the front-line units on the forward location. During the operation, the following radio stations were operated at the division OPs:

(a) Division General - 42

(b) Division General - 81 (Secure).

(c) Division Operations and Intelligence - 42 (Secure). 47

(d) Brigade General Net - 42.

(e) Brigade General Net - 81 (Secure) only to Brigade rear and battalion rear base.

(f) Brigade General Net - 47 (Secure) only to Brigade rear and battalion rear base.

(2) Operations:

(a) WIP Team - Equipment operated by personnel of 3d Platoon "B" Company, 9th Signal Battalion gave brigade access to reliable 24-hour bullet-proof circuits. The line between Division TOC and Brigade TOC was open.

(b) Message Center Section - The 3d Platoon, Message Center provided secure radio control only to Battalions and Brigade rear base. Secure 81 net was available to pass traffic to higher headquarters.

(c) Switchboard and Wire Section - The division switchboard consisted of one SS-22, providing eight (8) local telephone circuits and three (3) trunk circuits. An average of over 100 calls were made per hour period. Only internal voice communications were established.
30 January 1969


(d) II Indic Section - The primary means of communication with subordinate units was FM radio. The Brigade Combat Net (FC) was used to pass all traffic in the first 12 hours of the operation and after a considerable amount of staff coordination and the use of the Brigade Main and Log Net the amount of traffic passed over the Combat Net was reduced tremendously. An automatic retransmission station for the 3rd Main and Log Net was located with the 3rd Main CP to relay for any unit having difficulty transmitting to the 3rd Log Base.

(vi) Maintenance Section - 2nd echelon maintenance was available to the maintenance platoon at the 3rd Main CP. One radio RT-524 and one T-195 radio had to be evacuated to 3rd echelon maintenance shop.

(3) Recommendations:

(a) All radio in GSC ship should be checked out 12 hours prior to reporting to requesting unit. This is necessary to allow any technical problems to be taken care of prior to the operation.

(b) Alternate location for retransmission station should be planned for all operations. This will allow the Brigade retransmission station more flexibility in support of other Brigade radio nets.

(c) Reverse SOI's must go forward with Brigade or battalion CP. The availability of aircraft and the conditions that can prevent aircraft from flying could cause a long delay in getting the reverse SOI flown into a 2nd CP when needed.

(d) All (OSI) net control stations and radio retransmission stations must use the antenna T-30-309 when operating in a stationary position for long periods (2 or more hours).

(e) The Brigadii 3 Company (maintenance) should have a signal maintenance team at the 3rd Log Base with a capability of direct exchanging major signal items, such as: RT-524, RT-504, TT-76, TT-6, and T-195. On many occasions these items cannot be repaired within a period of 8-10 hours it can effect the mission of the unit. Furthermore, if the team is so-located at the 3rd Log Base, imperative signal equipment could be evacuated and returned in a much shorter period because of the continuous resupply ships going in and out of the log base.

(f) The 3rd S-1 should be issued a radio to operate in the 3rd Log and Main CP. This radio could be taken from the S-5 section. This radio should be better utilized if assigned to the 3rd S-5 section.

(g) Four AN/PRC-55 radios should be kept in the S-5 section to use as boost-up equipment for radios in GSC ship. Then if the GSC ship becomes ineffective any other SU-1D helicopter can be used as a GSC ship for the assigned group.

a. Psyops:

(1) The Psyops Audio-Visual Team, with its organic w.m. equipment displaced to the Tactical Command Post to undertake supervision of the Psyops support and to react to situations which could be successfully exploited on an immediate basis. During the operation, the team was employed in force-to-force Psyops using both projection equipment, loudspeakers and hand-disseminated leaflets. One situation presented itself which could have been exploited immediately with a limited degree of success. This was not accomplished because of a lack of photographic equipment in the field. Such equipment is organic to the infantry battalion, in the form of a Polaroid Land camera, but is not organic to the Infantry Brigade or supporting Audio-Visual Team.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) Installations should habitually carry into operational areas the Polaroid Land camera, for use in immediate reaction situations.
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AVDC-200
30 January 1968


(b) Security should be planned in advance so that the audiovisual unit is able to enter insecure areas to ply its trade. In the tactical environment, use of this team in a secure village on a recurring basis provides only limited advantage. For greater benefits are to be derived from operations in insecure or contested areas, both by the message delivery and by the physical presence of GVN/PAF personnel. To the greatest extent possible, the security element should be Vietnamese.

FOR THE CONSIDERATION:

LESLIE R. HULBERG JR.
MAJOR, INfanTRY
ADJUTANT

Inclusions:
1-Overlay of Area of Operation

SECRET

RECLASSIFIED AT 3 YR
INTERVALS RECLASSIF-
1969 AFTER 12 YRS
SUBJECT 5200.10

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AVDE-BCO

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (AVDE/BCO/32/32) (U)

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**CO, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division**

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**ABSTRACT**

**TOTAL NO OF PAGES**
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12