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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGAM-P (M) (17 Apr 68) FOR OT RD 681168

24 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96238

AVCA-QN-TC-3

15 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968, (RCS CSFOR - 65) (UIC WPNYTO)

TO: See Distribution

SECTION I
SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

A. COMMAND:

1. The 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) engaged in operations during the entire ninety-two (92) days of the reporting period.

2. Effective 12 November 1967, the 33rd Transportation Company (Light Truck) and 28th Transportation Company (Light Truck) were attached to the 124th Transportation Battalion (Truck).

3. The Company Headquarters and one Truck Platoon of the 585th Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo) were transferred to the 80th General Services Group on 15 January 1968. The remaining two platoons were attached to the 2nd Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo).

4. Assignment:

   a. Lieutenant Colonel Jack C. Utley assumed command of the 54th Transportation Battalion (Truck) VICE Major Joseph C. Buckman on 3 November 1967.


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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968, (US GPOA - 65) (UIC TN#3C)

5. The following is a list of units attached to the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport):

27th Transportation Battalion (Truck)
2nd Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo)
59th Transportation Company (Light Truck)
414th Transportation Company (Light Truck)
505th Transportation Battalion (Trailer Transfer Point)
520th Transportation Battalion (Trailer Transfer Point)
597th Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo)
585th Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo)

27th Transportation Battalion (Truck)
2nd Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo)
414th Transportation Company (Light Truck)
505th Transportation Battalion (Trailer Transfer Point)
520th Transportation Battalion (Trailer Transfer Point)
597th Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo)
585th Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo)

B. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE, AND DISCIPLINE:

1. During the reporting period, the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) was understrength an average of 226 persons.

2. No significant variation of morale or discipline was noted. Morale was high and disciplinary problems were few.

C. OPERATIONS:

1. During the reporting period, task vehicles of this command traveled 4,448,288 miles hauling 305,971 tons of cargo, 2,180,868 gallons of POL, and 4,560 passengers. Expressed in ton-miles the 8th Transportation Group achieved 16,200,144 ton-miles while additionally moving the above POL and passengers.

2. During the Battle of Dak To, the bulk of transportation assets were committed to Dak To. Effectively, the line haul distance was increased by 50% causing an increase in the turnaround time and a corresponding decrease in daily forward movement of cargo originating in Qui Nhon. In order to aid the overburdened transportation system resulting from the increased requirement for combat essential cargo to front line tactical forces, transportation resources consisting of vehicles and/or drivers were diverted to the 8th Group to help
support the line haul mission. The diverted resources added 1,627 vehicle days to the capability of the Group. The effect of the attached personnel and vehicles was to reduce the number of driver-days and the number of shortages experienced in the preceding reporting period.

3. Many problems were met and solved in the usage of the attachments. Several vehicles that were attached were found to be in a poor state of maintenance and were not "roadworthy" for line haul mission. In numerous instances, drivers were found unqualified to drive the vehicles, for example, some reported with drivers licenses dated the day of the levy, some were not licensed to drive, and some had insufficient driving experience. Although the levies were for short time periods, driver training and testing was conducted to qualify as many as possible. The time period allowed for processing and training those that were trained but still did not demonstrate the qualifications for line haul driving dictated by 8th Group standards were utilized in a security role for such positions as machine gunners or in a night driver-maintenance role to release qualified 8th Group driver personnel for line haul purposes. Further, TDY/loan driver personnel were an added burden on Group and units administrative and disciplinary efforts.

4. Another method used to bolster the line haul capability was to release RORO trailers in the Qui Nhon area for line haul use. This had the effect of increasing the trailer fleet. Also, to facilitate unloading and turnaround a temporary truck terminal was set up at Dak To. Personnel to man the terminal were supplied by the Group.

5. On 30 December 1967, the line haul requirements to An Khe consignees were transferred to the 541st Transportation Company (Light Truck), An Khe Sub Area Command, in an attempt to further bolster the overall SUPCOM line haul performance. However, unit moves, remain the responsibility of 8th Group.

6. During the reporting period, the 8th Transportation Group experienced seven ambushes on highway # 19. The results of the ambushes are as follows.

   Friendly KIA 7, WIA 39
   Vehicles Damaged 35
   Enemy KIA 56, WIA 5

The high enemy casualty rate is believed to be directly attributed to the "hardened convoy concept" developed as a result of the 2 September 1967 ambush. Basically, the concept provides for a march unit consisting of a 1 ton gun/radio truck and ten task vehicles. In addition,
concept includes for one truck mounted Quad-50 per serial. In the initial concept the gun truck was to serve as a fire base and to draw enemy fire while giving the cargo vehicles a chance to clear the kill zone. During the first ambushes the gun trucks were the first vehicles fired upon. However, their effectiveness proved so great that during later ambushes the gun trucks were allowed to pass through the kill zone and cargo vehicles were attacked. It is significant to note that the presence of security forces at the scene of an unsprung ambush is not necessarily a deterrent to triggering the ambush. In two instances, security forces were within 200-300 meters of the ambush site. Also, the enemy has not always used a good ambush site. He has attacked from relatively flat areas. He has used piles of debris left in clearing a 100 meter strip on either side of the roadway.

7. In addition to ambushes, the Group has been subject to numerous mines and sniper activities on the road. There were 11 sniper incidents and 9 mining incidents during the reporting period. In addition to hostile actions directed against the Group, instances of blown bridges, mining and other activity directed against other personnel using the LOC's have caused the roads to close from a few minutes to all day depending on the severity of the activity. The closures often result in vehicles and personnel being "locked-in" at destinations. It is difficult to calculate the number of potential tons lost as a result of these activities, but it would be in the thousands of tons.

8. From 17 December 1967 to 24 December 1967, this unit was engaged in moving the 11th Light Infantry Brigade from Qui Nhon Port to Duc Pho. The move involved approximately 1170 vehicles moving approximately 1200 troops and 465 short tons a distance of 83 miles. The Group was responsible for establishing a marshalling area for convoys ranging from 150 to 270 vehicles; coordinating and arranging for a staging area for unit vehicles and equipment; providing for the sandbagging (under and behind seats and on the floorboards of cabs) of approximately 600 vehicles; and providing command, control and security vehicles for the convoys.

9. Beginning 29 October 1967, the 8th Transportation Group was committed to transport ammunition for the Capital Hill Republic of Korea Infantry Division to Song Cau. Because of an acute driver shortage, arrangements were made to utilise ROK personnel to drive ten 5 ton cargo vehicles in support of the ammunition requirement. The program was initiated and twelve ROK drivers were billeted with the 54th Transportation Battalion, tested in accordance with army regulations, and issued a US Government Motor Vehicle Operator's Identification Card for the period of the operation. All vehicle operations were in accordance with Group regulations and SOP's. The initial operation ran two and one-half weeks and proved successful. In December, ROK personnel were used again and this time the program lasted three weeks and involved nine 5 ton cargo trucks. Again the operation was carried out successfully.
10. In November 1967, a plan was developed by 1st Floor Support Command to commit fixed tonnage on a daily basis. This tonnage was known as a "Transportation Slice." The intent of the slice was to give the Group approximately 1000 tons of cargo daily which could be loaded before any priorities were available and was meant to be a partial solution to the problems associated with the development of commitments on a daily basis. The "Slice" remained in existence for only a short time because it was quickly discovered that the scheme would not work without the development of a movements program and the needs of the customer were computed on a daily basis.

11. A conceptual program was developed during the reporting period, but it has not yet been implemented. It is considered that only through the use of a movements program will full and efficient utilization of transportation resources be possible.

12. On 6 December 1967, 1st Floor Support Command published a convoy operation regulation. As a result, the Group was given the additional mission of exercising operational control of all CASUPCOM, 1FS line haul unit convoys operating south to Cam Ranh Bay, north to Dac Pho, west to Pleiku, and destinations north, south, and west of Pleiku.

13. The initial degrading factor of Group capability as compared with TO&E standards is the average number of trips per vehicle made on a daily basis. Listed below are the average trips per vehicle per day in the various types of commitments:

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<th>Type of Commitment</th>
<th>Average Trips Per Vehicle Per Day</th>
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<tr>
<td>Port and Beach Local</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Port and Beach Line</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Haul</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line Haul</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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For planning purposes, it is considered that the average trips per vehicle per day should be 1.0 in line haul and port and beach line haul. This takes into consideration effects of enemy activity and the lack of movement programming.

D. Training and Operations:

1. Due to the increase of enemy activity during the reporting period, a corresponding emphasis on actions to be taken to counteract the effects of these incidents was demonstrated in the training program. Visual aids in the form of charts depicting results of ambushes and appropriate "Lessons-Learned" by Group personnel during ambushes were constructed and distributed to subordinate units. Actual photographs lent realism to these charts.

2. Although range facilities continue to be limited, subordinate
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968,
(RCS CSP01-65) (UIC 4FNS3T0)

units have met weapons familiarization requirements. In addition, these
ranges were used to familiarize and qualify personnel with the M-16 rifle
in anticipation of its receipt by this command.

3. Gas chamber exercises were conducted by this command during
the reporting period.

4. A drivers training program continued to be conducted within
this command to properly train and orient newly arrived personnel to the
environmental conditions of Viet Nam and the lines of communication trav-
cled by this organization.

E. Intelligence and Security:

1. The extensive LOC traveled by this command continues to provide
a source of intelligence data. Information concerning road and bridge
conditions, suspected enemy locations and anticipated enemy activity is
passed to convoy commanders on a daily basis.

2. Increased enemy activity was directed against units within the
Sub-Installation area of responsibility of 8th Group - particularly toward
the end of the reporting period. These incidents have taken the form of
sniping and mortar attacks resulting in US personnel and equipment casualties.
A high state of readiness to counteract these incidents is maintained by units
located within the Group's area of responsibility.

f. Logistics:

Since last reporting period there has been an ever greater decline
in the issue rate of primary mission equipment. This is especially true
with the Truck Tractor 5 ton M52 series and the Semi-Trailer Stake and
Platform 12 ton M127 series. The high wash-out rate for these vehicles in
Vietnam and non-available replacement ratio appears to be the primary cause
of this problem. At the close of this reporting period this command is
short sixty-eight (68) Semi-Trailers 12 ton and eighty (80) Truck Tractor
5 ton. These shortages hamper the Group's mission performance in that the
high wash-out rate coupled with non-availability of replacement vehicles
reduces tonnage capability. Requisitions for other supplies and equipment
are being filled at the normal rate.

G. Maintenance:

1. During November 1967, the program to armor plate forty (40)
M35A2 trucks was completed. Subsequently, it was noted that, in addition to
the armor plate, pedestal mounts for the M-60 machine guns were required.
To date, thirty (30) M35A2 trucks have two (2) each pedestal mounts installed.
The mounts are welded to a sheet of steel approximately three feet by three
feet and weighted down with sandbags. Also, the armor plate located
immediately in front of the mount is seven (7) inches lower than the
remaining armor plate. Additionally, sandbags are placed behind the

plate at the same height and width, to offer additional protection to the gunner. These sandbags are secured through the use of wood cribbing.

2. Additional armor plating within the 6th Group is planned with an objective of five (5) "gun trucks" per company and two (2) for separate platoons, also seven (7) M151A1's "gun jeeps" per company to be equipped with machine gun mounts and armor plating is planned. The completed program will include armor plating the cabs of all task vehicles. The priority for armor plating is:
   a. M35A2 - Gun Trucks
   b. M151A1 - Gun/Radio Jeeps
   c. Task vehicle cabs

3. The use of 1½ ton trailers to haul heavy cargo, such as ammunition, has resulted in an increase in organizational and support maintenance. The 1½ ton trailer is not sufficiently durable to withstand the shocks encountered on rough roads.

4. In an effort to find a satisfactory means to secure cargo on the 12 ton semi-trailer and, at the same time, eliminate the costly damage to trailer sideboard assemblies, a semi-trailer has been equipped with hinged sideboards and tailgate. There are two sideboards on each side, 172 inches wide and 16 inches high. The tailgate is also the same height. Each sideboard can be easily raised or lowered by one man, thus eliminating the damage that is frequently caused by fork lifts in removal of the standard sideboard assemblies. This trailer has been placed in regular service, for test purposes, for an indefinite period. During this time, a weekly condition report is submitted. If proven successful, it will be the subject of an Equipment Improvement Report (EIR).

5. The adverse effects of heavy dust condition on maintenance standards has been offset by rotating air filter elements on a daily basis. This has been made possible by doubling the PLL level for this item.

SECTION 2 PART 2

OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

A. Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline: None
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968, (RCS CSFOR - 65) (UIC WFN3TO)

3. OPERATIONS:

1. ITEM: Use of Other Than Assigned Resources

DISCUSSION: Many problems arose during the Dak To battle as a result of transportation resources being "loaned" to the Group for a period of a few days to several weeks. The cause was two-fold: (1) Lack of prior planning to support an emergency transportation situation, and; (2) Lack of minimum standards of vehicle and personnel to be "loaned" and the enforcement thereof when commitment was necessary within hours after their reporting to the Group.

OBSERVATION: Contingency plans in being and minimum standards for personnel and vehicles are a must for any emergency diversion of resources to be timely and effective.

2. (C) ITEM: Convoy Security

DISCUSSION: Although the Group has been reasonably successful in retaliating against hostile forces as a result of the development and employment of certain techniques and equipment it is not believed that success can be measured by "kill ratio", alone, especially considering that the last few ambushes were poorly timed and that the enemy personnel made errors. The results of the Group's efforts might be termed lucky and could account for the success in retaliation. The real success or failure of hostile actions against transportation must be considered in the light of the impact on primary mission. Because of the enemy activity, several major changes have occurred in the Group operations. The operating hours on the LOC's were reduced by the tactical commander, approximately ten percent of the task vehicles have been diverted to convoy security, and approximately thirteen percent of the total assigned driver strength is involved in convoy security. During the reporting period sixteen (16) trucks were counted as combat losses, seven men lost their lives, and thirty-nine were wounded. Many other vehicles that were damaged were returned to service but not before the loss of their use was felt. Each action that the enemy takes against transportation, whether it be mines, sniper fire, ambushes, or blown bridges, cuts the operating time on the road from minutes to hours resulting in loaded vehicles unable to reach the consignee or empties unable to return for loads. Against a very determined enemy, as history has proven him to be, the security that transportation itself can provide is not adequate, nor can it be made adequate within the resources of the Group. The equipment was not designed to be used in a security role, the men are not experienced combat arms soldiers.

OBSERVATION: Lasting security for transportation must be in the form of special combined arms teams organized and trained to accompany and protect convoys through insecure areas. The size and composition of the security force would vary with the situation. These considerations should be at the discretion of the tactical commander concerned.

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AVCA-QM-TG-3

15 February 1968


C. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION: None

D. INTELLIGENCE: None

E. LOGISTICS:

1. ITEM: MTOE's

DISCUSSION: Equipment necessary to perform mission requirements within this theater of operations is continually changing due to terrain, climate and tactics used by the enemy. Therefore, it is essential that equipment authorization be modified as tactical situation demand through the media of Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment.

OBSERVATION: Experience gained relative to equipment requirements for units within this command and theater of operations should be used as an aid in determining future equipment requirements of units deployed to this theater of operation. Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment have been submitted during this reporting period for all units assigned to this command. MTOE's are currently pending approval.

2. ITEM: Cantonment Mess Equipment.

DISCUSSION: The Cantonment Mess Equipment Program as scheduled for implementation during last report period has not been implemented at the close of this report period. This program was to provide installed mechanical kitchen equipment and allied food preparation and serving equipment. This equipment itself is deemed to be of the utmost importance to morale and welfare of troops within this command. Further installation and use of this mess equipment has additional tangible benefits which are brought out in the observation.

OBSERVATION: Surveys conducted within this command of existing mess facilities reveal that cantonment mess equipment which is available within theater depot system can be easily installed at nominal cost with no additional structure modifications necessary. The nominal expense for electrical wiring will be offset by the reduction in costs for TOE replacement parts and equipment which from experience has proven that replacement parts for field range cabinets and fire units are not immediately available to this command as need requires. Furthermore organizational (TOE) mess equipment constantly used for cantonment mess operations over-taxes this equipment will reduce overall replacement and operating costs within this command and facilitate providing the optimum in food preparation and service to assigned personnel. It is further considered that installation and utilization of cantonment mess equipment by increasing food quality will increase morale within the command.
F. MAINTENANCE:

1. ITEM: 5 ton engine failures

**DISCUSSION:** In N 40 has been applied to the LDS 465-1 engine to limit the maximum RPM to 2000 under load and 2900 without load. The HRO is not being applied to any engine with over 3,000 usage miles. New engines have the HRO applied before arriving in-country.

**OBSERVATION:** It is still too early to determine whether limiting the RPM will prolong the life of the LDS 465-1 engines. However, the reduction of maximum RPM's has had no serious effects on the vehicle's capabilities.

2. ITEM: Semi-trailer (cargo) rebuild program

**DISCUSSION:** Damage and loss of sideboards and landing legs continues to occur at a high rate. An average of fifteen (15) trailers per day have been deadlined due to damaged landing legs. It is becoming more and more difficult to provide customers with STP's when desired.

**OBSERVATION:** While it is felt that the adoption of the 16 inch high hinged sideboard may help relieve this situation, there still remains the requirement for sideboards with high sideboards for transporting loose cargo.

3. ITEM: Loss of vehicles through wear-out

**DISCUSSION:** Mileage and age are beginning to cause an increase in the number of vehicles that are being "washed-out" of the system. This is especially true of the medium truck companies, which are operating with approximately 65% of TRO authorized vehicles. This vehicle strength is further degraded by maintenance factors.

**OBSERVATION:** The types of roads travelled in Vietnam shorten the life of vehicles, mainly through the structural failures of the frame and body. Also, with operations requiring maximum use of available vehicles, the multi-fuel engine reaches its life expectancy of 8,000 miles in a short period of time.

4. ITEM: Tires and tubes for the 2½ and 5 ton vehicles

**DISCUSSION:** The condition of the roads over which the vehicles of the 8th Transportation Group travel are such that thirty (30) to fifty (50) tires and tubes are damaged, on a daily basis.

**OBSERVATION:** The demand for tires and tubes exceeds the supply of same to such a degree that, on occasion, vehicles, especially 12 ton semi-trailers, have been deadlined for the lack of replacement tires and/or tubes.

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SUJG 2. - FACT II

A. PERSONNEL: None

B. OPERATIONS:

1. That contingency plans should be developed for emergency utilization of transportation resources.

2. That combined arms teams should be organized with the mission of convoy protection.

3. That a movement program should be approved and implemented.

C. INFANTRY: None

D. UTILITIES: None

E. AVIATION:

1. Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment submitted by the 5th Trucn (35) be expeditiously reviewed, approved and published. This action will rectify numerous equipment variations and provide the Group, with that equipment required to accomplish its mission within this theater of operation.

2. Armored Reconnaissance Assault Vehicles, cited in last report, are still deemed necessary for operation over insecure roads and as quick reaction vehicles. Recommend that these vehicles, in the quantity previously requested, be issued; thereby affording this command a means of conducting actual combat tests which may possibly result in their adoption as authorized equipment for units of this type in future deployment to like tactical zones.

3. Installation of cantonment mess equipment within this command's mess facilities thereby reducing operating and placement costs for TOE equipment and improvement in quality of food for personnel within this command.

F. EQUIPMENT:

1. That sufficient armor plate and materials to fabricate pedestal mounts be made available in order to complete the extensive armor plate program.

2. That a trailer rebuilding program be established within Vietnam. The program should include the replacement of sideboards and headboards.

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S/CA-j.:TG-3
15 February 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Support for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968, (RUS 2916R - 65) (US 491376)

3. That sufficient landing legs for the 12 ton semi-trailer be made available at Direct Support Unit Level, to replace those lost through damage.

4. That an increase in the ASL for tires and tubes 11.00 x 20 and 9.00 x 20 be made to enable Direct Support Units to fill requisitions with the least practical delay.

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3 - Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Viet Nam, ATT: ABJTC-DET, APO 96375
12 - Commanding General, United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APO 96233
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

The Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 from the 6th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) (UIC: 16366) has been reviewed and is considered adequate with the following comments:

a. SECTION II, PART II, Sub-Section B, Paragraph 1: A contingency plan of the type recommended has recently been developed by this headquarters for port and beach clearance. A similar plan is under consideration to meet other contingencies which require the development of provisional truck units and will establish responsibilities and minimal standards for loading vehicles and drivers. To support such contingency plans, a program which will train drivers and wide in as many types of vehicles as possible has recently been initiated.

b. SECTION II, PART II, Sub-Section D, Paragraph 2: Numerous requests have been submitted to higher headquarters concerning tactical escorts for convoys through insecure areas.

c. SECTION II, PART II, Sub-Section B, Paragraph 3: A draft for a movement program has been developed, however, due to recent priorities in other areas and the current imbalance of requirements over capabilities, a movement program could not be followed. As soon as it is deemed feasible, the movement program will be finalized and implemented.

d. SECTION II, PART II, Sub-Section E, Paragraph 2: Recommendations for equipment over and above that which has requested in proposed ITCE's are not considered valid.

e. SECTION II, PART II, Sub-Section E, Paragraph 3: Units desiring of having contingency mess equipment must submit requisitions through normal supply channels. Based on availability and priority, the item will be issued and arrangements can be made for installation.

f. SECTION II, PART II, Sub-Section F, Paragraph 1: The availability of an or plate and pedestal mount materials has been a recurring problem within the command. These requirements have been brought to the attention of 1st Logistical Command.

g. SECTION II, PART II, Sub-Section F, Paragraph 2: Maintenance activities have neither the facilities nor the capability for side board and headboard rehld. A requirement exists for rapid response of the supply
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1963

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VCA GC-0 (15 Feb 68)  2nd Ind
S0R0T: Operational report for quarterly Period ending 31 January 1968
(U: Carta-66) (U/C: W/3160) (U)

Lt, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, NFO 56384

To: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVGC-Got,
NFO 56375

1. (U) The Operational report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 5th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) (U/C: W/3160) for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 is forwarded.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Section 2, Part I, paragraph 41 and Section 2, Part II, paragraph 41. The HMC's are currently being reviewed by this headquarters.

b. Reference Section 2, Part II, paragraph 41 and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 1: Concur with observation. Armor kits have been requested and a quantity of kits were obtained from the 50th Depot (AWC) for installation on 1st Logistical Command vehicles.

c. Reference Section 2, Part II, paragraph 43: Concur with observation. TN 9-2330-207-2AP indicates that the landing leg assembly is authorized as an organizational replacement item but not an authorized stockage item. Source code "P" identifies it as a high mortality item to be stocked at depot level.

d. Reference Section 2, Part II, paragraph 44. The requisitioning objective (not ASL, as stated in reference paragraph) has been reviewed and increased to alleviate the chronic shortage of tubes and tires.

e. Reference 1st Indorsement, paragraph 4. Tactical security has been requested for convoys passing through insecure areas.

f. Reference 1st Indorsement, paragraph 4g: Concur. This command has been authorized to evacuate sideboards for L127 semi-trailers to Okinawa for repair and return.

3. (U) Concur with basic report as modified by indorsements. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER

Tel: LEC 2684

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8th Trans Grp

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AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 66) 3d Ind (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 15 Jan 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GFOR-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) (WPN3AA) as indorsed.

2. Concur with report as indorsed. Report is considered adequate.

3. Correct UIC is WPN3AA.

4. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASÁ
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
HQ, 1st Log Comd
Hz, 8th Trans Gp (MT)
GPO-DF (15 Feb 68) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 8th Trans Gp (Motor Transport) for Period Ending 31 January 1968 (RCS CSPGR-65) (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 29 MAR '68

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AG
Assi AG
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group (U)**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 67-31 Jan 1968**

**CO, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)**

**Report Date**: 15 February 1968

**Contract or Grant No.**: N/A

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**Abstract**

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