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FOR THE COMMANDER:

RICHARD L. WILLIAMS
Major
Infantry
Adjutant

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Inclosure 1

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## SECTION I

**SIGNIFICANT UNIT ACTIVITIES**

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## SECTION II

**CONSIDERED OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### PART I OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

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### PART II RECOMMENDATIONS

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

TO: See Distribution

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT UNIT ACTIVITIES

A. (U) GENERAL: The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion has been fully committed to combat assault and direct combat support operations throughout the period of this report.

B. (U) MISSION: To augment the aviation support capability available to II FFORCE V and the Republic of Vietnam Forces operating within III Corps ARVN Tactical Zone.

C. (C) ORGANIZATION:

1. The 184th Reconnaissance Airplane Company was assigned to the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion on 13 August 1966.

2. A Company 501st Aviation Battalion was redesignated the 71st Aviation Company (AML), (VOOG 1st Aviation Brigade designating the 71st Assault Helicopter Company), 1 September 1966, by General Order 219, Headquarters, USARPAC dated 31 August 1966.

3. 197th Armed Helicopter Company was redesignated the 334th Aviation Company (AML), (VOOG 1st Aviation Brigade designating the 334th Armed Helicopter Company), 1 September 1966, by General Order 210, Headquarters, USARPAC dated 31 August 1966.

4. Organization of 145th Combat Aviation Battalion during the reporting period included the following units, headquarters located as indicated:

   a. 145th Combat Aviation Battalion Headquarters, Bien Hoa
   b. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Bien Hoa
   c. 68th Assault Helicopter Company, Bien Hoa
   d. 71st Assault Helicopter Company, Bien Hoa
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
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e. 74th Reconnaissance Airplane Company, Phu Loi
f. 118th Assault Helicopter Company, Bien Hoa

g. 184th Reconnaissance Airplane Company, Phu Loi
h. 334th Armed Helicopter Company, Bien Hoa

In addition the 74th Reconnaissance Airplane Company had sub elements located at Duc Hoa and Xuan Loc.

D. (U) Command: Significant changes of command in 145th Combat Aviation Battalion during this period were:


E. (C) Personnel:

1. (U) Administration: One time report requirements during the period have consumed a considerable amount of manhours. Recurring reports are not a major problem as procedures have been established to provide the necessary information through feeder reports from subordinate units and records maintained by battalion headquarters.

2. (U) Awards and Decorations: 2810 decorations were awarded during the quarter. A problem in the awards and decorations area is caused by changes to regulations which are effective upon receipt. When a major change is received, most recommendations which are currently being processed must be returned to the submitting unit for correction. A considerable delay is caused by the time necessary for transmittal and re-typing. Changes to awards and decorations regulations should have either an advanced effective date or exclude recommendations which are being processed. The 1st Aviation Brigade Form 21 provides a significant savings in time and labor in processing recommendations for Air Medals.

3. (U) Special Services: Special service equipment and support have been satisfactory.
4. (U) **Unit Designation and Attachments:**

a. During the quarter, the unit designation of two companies was changed. The change of designation required a considerable number of administrative actions. Although the change was effected without any major problems, a delay in receipt of official notification caused many of the required personnel actions to be accomplished after the effective date of the change.

b. The 184th Reconnaissance Airplane Company was assigned to the battalion and was stationed at Phu Loi. A battalion personnel team was sent to Phu Loi and completed the inprocessing of the new company with a minimum of problems.

5. (U) **Civic Action:** The battalion has continued an aggressive Civic Action Program. The 68th Assault Helicopter Company terminated its program in Vung Tau area upon transfer of the Company to Bien Hoa. In September, the 68th Assault Helicopter Company initiated a new program in the Bien Hoa area for the village of BIH CO. MD CAP II and continuous community support were begun using organic helicopters to transport personnel and material to this remote location. The newly arrived 184th Reconnaissance Airplane Company is planning a Civic Action Program which will be initiated during the next quarter. All other assigned units have established programs in operation.

6. (U) **Information Program:** During this quarter, the following news items were dispatched:

   a. Individual pictures released: 42
   b. Feature stories submitted: 10
   c. Home town news releases: 42
   d. Home town pictures released: 4

Complete coverage of the 68th Assault Helicopter Company civic action program at BIH CO is planned for the next quarter.

7. (U) **Education:** During the quarter, the battalion education program was established and a USAFI Test Control Officer appointed. The program will receive increasing attention in the next quarter.

8. (C) **Personnel Losses and Gains:** The actual and projected gain and loss of personnel during 2d Quarter FY 1967 is as follows:

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<td>November</td>
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<td>December</td>
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b. Enlisted

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<td>December</td>
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F. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

1. Claymore Mines: On 8 October 1966 during the extraction of a battalion of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the 335th Aviation Company reported hearing a loud explosion on climb out at XT 947368. A close inspection of the lift helicopters revealed numerous pellets on the undersides of several helicopters and main rotor blades. The 335th evaluation was that the VC used large claymore mines affixed to the tops of trees or long poles. Aviation Units of the 1st Infantry Division have also reported like incidents with the same evaluation.

2. 37-57mm Anti-Aircraft Fire: There have been no significant reports of 50 cal (12.7mm) antiaircraft fire during the reporting period. However, on 19 October 1966, a light fire team from the 334th Armed Helicopter Company reported 6 airburst at coordinates XT 319080. Airspeed was 100 knots, altitude 900 feet, heading north, and all rounds burst in approximately 3 seconds, evenly spaced in a fairly close cluster in front of the lead helicopter. Caliber of weapon is unconfirmed; however, the fire was estimated to be 37 or 57 mm.

3. River Patrol: Intelligence information pertaining to the Light Fire Team and O-1D aircraft supporting the US Navy in the Hung Sat Special Zone, on a daily basis, is not being disseminated to lower level echelons. This information would be beneficial as well as give due credit to 12th Combat Aviation Group and the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion.

4. Hot Areas: On two occasions during this reporting period, aviation companies of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion received intense automatic weapons fire going into landing zones. Each operation was company size, supporting the same ARVN units and the LZ area was not known prior to leaving Bien Hoa. The results were numerous helicopters hit and a total of 5 KIA (US) and 5 WIA (US). Both incidents were in the same area, but involved different aviation companies of the battalion. The primary cause is the lack of or failure to receive proper dissemination of intelligence information. In an attempt to prevent similar occurrence, the battalion is disseminating probable "Hot Spots" as they appear in the intelligence report.

G. (C) OPERATIONS:

1. Combat Operations: The Battalion is fully committed daily and the tasks assigned vary from single aircraft pigs and rice type operations to reinforced battalion size Combat Assault Operations. Battalion and company
Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966

Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U) (CONT'D)

Size combat assault operations have been standardized to include a Command and Control aircraft that carries the airmobile task force commander, air mission commander, artillery representative and a representative responsible for control of close air support. The battalion and company size combat assault operations vary from operations into landing zones with full preparation by artillery, close air support, helicopter gunships and helicopter troop carrier suppression, to combat assaults with no preparation. The consequences of operations with no preparation has varied from an operation where no fire was received to an operation where 11 out of 15 aircraft received hits.

2. Physical Security: The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion remains responsible for portions of the inner perimeter of both Bien Hoa and Phu Loi airfields. During this quarter, the battalion has gained the responsibility for the physical security of Honour-Smith Compound, located in Bien Hoa. New physical security plans have been written and implemented for the Honour-Smith Compound and the battalion area at Bien Hoa Airfield. A new centralized guard plan has been written to make more effective use of available security guard resources. This plan will be implemented in the near future. The physical security of the battalion has been improved during the past quarter. Twelve new passive defense bunkers and a fortified Battalion Command and Communications Center have been constructed. Revetments for all fixed wing aircraft and revetments for 84 helicopters are presently under construction. To release the badly needed aviation maintenance personnel from guard duties it is necessary that we receive the security guards requested in MTCE 256F.

3. Flight Standardization:
   a. Training Memorandum 66-2, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, dated 23 July 1966, subject: Aerial Gunnery Training, has proven beneficial to the units of this battalion.

   b. 12th Combat Aviation Group conducted an armed helicopter standardization meeting, 15 September through 22 September 1966, in which all helicopter companies from the 11th and 145th Combat Aviation Battalions participated. The 118th and 68th Assault Helicopter Companies won first and second place awards respectively for the best armed helicopter crew during the gunnery competition.

   c. The large turnover of personnel, both aviators and enlisted, has required a tremendous amount of standardization training in conjunction with daily operations. This training has been accomplished with a minimum amount of interruption. After initial orientation has been completed for newly assigned personnel, units of this battalion conduct much of the standardization training while participating in combat operations.

4. Special Missions:
   a. Fire Fly:

      (1) The mission is the employment of two helicopter gunships and one helicopter equipped with a cluster of powerful searchlights along rivers.
and highways, during the hours of darkness, to interrupt VC operations, destroy material, and kill the enemy. This mission was previously named Lightning Bug.

(2) There is a definite requirement for more "Fire Fly" teams in the III Corps area. This is evidenced by the assignment of three missions each night to the one team requiring 5.5 to 8.0 mission hours plus time to objective areas. Flying night combat time in excess of 5 hours reduces the effectiveness of the team and imposes a safety hazard on the crew. The scheduled time in each area requires a hasty search so that the reporting time to the next area may be met. This procedure precludes the thorough and systematic search pattern required to locate targets. For example, it requires approximately 5 hours flying time to thoroughly search the 25th ARVN Division's area of responsibility.

(3) Fire Fly Delays and Cancellations:

(a) Missions delayed due to weather 5

(b) Missions cancelled due to weather 13

(4) The light ship of the Fire Fly team received its first hit on 23 September 1966, wounding the pilot in the left arm. This is the first time the light ship has taken a hit in the history of the Fire Fly.

b. Border Patrol: This mission provides for visual reconnaissance of the Vietnamese-Cambodian border along the primary enemy infiltration and resupply routes to detect indications of enemy activity. The mission was flown every other day during the first part of the reporting period and daily the last part as directed by HQ. 0-1 Birddog aircraft are used for this mission.

c. River Patrol: This mission provides for overhead cover and visual reconnaissance of the shipping channel from Saigon Port to the South China Sea. This is accomplished by two light fire teams with one on stand-by at Bien Hoa and one on station, and by two 0-1 Birddogs with one on stand-by at Phu Loi and one on station. This mission was initiated to stop the VC from attacking ships in the shipping channel after two ships were mined and attacked in broad daylight. There is constant overhead reconnaissance by the 0-1 Birddog and the fire team is available at Nha Be and is airborne at all times when shipping is taking place.

d. Smoke Mission: The M-3 rocket system utilizing smoke grenades is presently being used to smoke LZ's and PZ's. This system works very good when the target area is not flooded, however it is not satisfactory where the grenades are dropped in water. The battalion is being issued one helicopter mounted smoke generator at present and expects five more in December or January. These generators will be tested on Combat Assaults and Extractions at that time.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966

Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U) (CONT'D)

5. Progress on Goals Reported in Last Quarterly Report:
   a. Goals:
      (1) Standardization of Airmobile Operations: The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion Airmobile Operations SOP will be utilized by all companies of this organization to insure standardization of airmobile operations.
      (2) Physical Security Goals were:
         (a) To construct passive defense bunkers for all personnel, both in his living and working areas.
         (b) Consolidate and publish a new active defense plan for Bien Hoa Air Base. Battalion plan to be an annex to the Wing/AF Defense Plan.
         (c) To transfer control of the Battalion Security Guard from the individual companies to a Battalion Officer of the Guard.
         (d) To reorganize all Battalion Security Guard Posts.
   b. Progress:
      (1) The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion Airmobile Operations SOP has been utilized by all companies of this battalion to insure standardization of airmobile operations.
      (2) Physical Security:
         (a) Passive defense bunkers have been constructed in work and billeting areas to provide protection for all personnel.
         (b) New physical security plans for Bien Hoa Air Base have been written and implemented for Bien Hoa Air Base.
         (c) A battalion consolidated guard plan has been completed. Implementation has been delayed due to the shortage of security personal assigned to the battalion.
   H. (U) Training:
      1. Mandatory Training: Mandatory training is being accomplished during breaks between flights and at night. Instrument flight training and aerial gunnery training is accomplished en route to and from missions with emphasis during single ship missions.
      2. Assigned Training Tasks:
         a. The training of US Naval aviators and Naval enlisted man to assure the Sea Wolf/Market Time mission was completed on 15 September 1966.
b. **Training of four VNAF aviators started 21 August 1966,** and will be completed on 7 November 1966. The purpose of this training is to train VNAF aviators in the UH-1 aircraft, prior to UH-1 aircraft becoming part of the Vietnamese inventory.

c. **Training and examinations for the award of the pathfinder badge has been completed successfully by all members of the pathfinder team.**

d. **Cross-training of US Army and US Air Force aviators in FAC procedures and Army type missions respectively started in May 1966 and will continue as new aviators arrive.**

e. **Training Memorandum 66-2, Headquarters, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, has been published which established an aerial gunnery firing range in a free strike zone and an aerial gunnery program.**

f. Training on the operation and use of the URC 4 and URC 10 emergency radios has received continued emphasis. All companies presented classes on this subject, and as new personnel arrive they will receive this training.

g. **All assigned personnel were required to attend driver’s training and pass an examination in order to retain their military driver’s license. This refresher training should reduce the accident rate for this command.**

I. **(C) LOGISTICS:**

1. **(C) Summary of S-4 Activities.**

   a. **(C) The 184th Aviation Company (S-4) was received in country and based at Phu Loi during August 1966. An advance party arrived at Can Kanh Bay AB on 6 August and was transported to Phu Loi by US Army CV-2 on 6 August 1966. Most TOL equipment was unloaded and transported to Phu Loi by road convoy during the period 7 - 9 August. Aircraft arrived at Saigon Port on 9 August. Aircraft were transported to Tan Son Nhut, assembled by 56th Transportation Battalion and unit personnel, and flown to Phu Loi as assembly was completed. The main body of personnel arrived Can Kanh Bay on 13 August, were flown to Bien Hoa AB by AF C-130, and transported to Phu Loi by truck. Minimum essential equipment, which accompanied the main body, was flown to Bien Hoa AB and transported to Phu Loi by truck during the period 15 through 25 August.**

   b. **(C) Transportation, handling equipment and storage space for five Jungle Canopy Platform Systems was provided ACTIV. Systems arrived at 8th Aerial Port on 10 September 1966, were transported to and stored in the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion area at Bien Hoa Air Base. Transportation was provided at a later date to have one system to Tan Son Nhut for air shipment to the 1st Cav Div (M).**

   c. **(U) Sandbagging and improving aircraft revetments has been expedited by temporarily employing 50 civilian laborers.**
a lack of sand in the immediate area and the inability to obtain security clearances for the laborers to work on Bien Hoa Air Base, sandbags are being filled off base and transported approximately five miles. An average of 6,500 sandbags are being filled daily. Total overall requirement is approximately 200,000 bags. The overall project is approximately 50% completed.

d. (U) A dust control program for helicopter landing and parking areas was initiated during September. Areas involved were treated with pentaprime by the 79th Engineer Group and this method appears to be working well.

e. (U) On 25 September the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion received five Mini-Port aircraft Refueling Systems. The refueling systems were positioned at III a/WI Corps prestock points as follows:

    (1) Song Be     1 system
    (2) Han Guan    1 system
    (3) Tay Ninh    2 systems
    (4) Han Tan     1 system

The systems were assembled and personnel at the prestock points were trained in the operation, care and maintenance, by the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion POL Section.

2. (U) Supply

a. The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion continues to have the mission of supporting eight III a/WI Corps prestock points. This battalion provides and maintains POL dispensing equipment, monitors class III A and V stock levels and requisitions all class V supplies for the prestock points.

b. Although flight gloves are becoming available, some units continue to have difficulty in obtaining sufficient amounts to meet requirements.

3. (C) Construction.

a. The battalion has been notified that Bailey Compound must be vacated and turned over to VNAF by 15 December 1966. The battalion currently has 550 personnel (two companies and supporting detachments) located in Bailey Compound. Adequate billeting, shower, latrine, and administrative facilities for these units have been requested to be constructed in the Project 78D area at Bien Hoa Air Base. The 79th Engineer Group has been tasked with the construction project by the 18th Engineer Brigade. Construction was initiated on 8 October 1966. Some site preparation, drainage, and layout for eight two story barracks has been accomplished. The construction has progressed very slowly due to the limited number of engineer personnel and equipment committed and non-availability of construction materials.
b. The units moving from Bailey Compound will be required to erect and move into tents since programmed barracks will not be completed by 15 December 1966. A total of 82 tents will be erected to provide billeting, administrative and storage facilities.

c. Project 78D (cantiment and flight line facilities for two companies at Bien Hoa Air Base) is approximately 95% complete.

d. Construction on Project 521 (a 50 helicopter parking hardstand, maintenance hardstand, two administrative/operations buildings and two maintenance hanger) was initiated during the quarter. Approximately one half of the helicopter parking hardstand is nearing completion. Additional construction on the project is pending relocation of the security fence and perimeter road.

4. (C) Aircraft maintenance:

a. During the past quarter the availability of armed UH-1B helicopters has been near an availability mark of 50%. The last third of the period has shown a marked improvement to a current availability of near 70% and prospects of going higher. This rise has been accomplished primarily through an increased in parts supply, maintenance in areas of historical failures and 540 rotor system modifications.

b. Continuous problems with UH-1 fuel boost pump failures exist in Vietnam. A large percentage of this battalion's aircraft have been operated daily with one pump out of commission. This brought up the question of how much of the fuel can be used after fuel boost pumps had failed. It was apparent that no existing document provided complete answers for the three UH-1 models in this unit. A request has been forwarded to Bell Helicopter Company to provide specific usage factors for combinations of pump failures by aircraft model. In the meantime a field fix to supply electrical power to the left pump side has been temporarily approved to substitute for bleed air driven pumps that are not available.

c. There had been a high rate of transistorized communications equipment failures due to loose or corroded battery electrical circuits. Special emphasis has been necessary to insure cleaning, tightening and lubricating these items during this last quarter, the end of the wet monsoon season.

d. No outstanding LIR requirements exist on the above listed information.

5. (C) Progress on Goals Reported in the Last Quarterly Report:

a. (C) S-4

(1) Goals: To obtain approval for construction of the FY67 Base Development Plan.

(2) Progress: Th. FY66 funded portion of project 78D is nearing completion. Lack of funds has precluded approval of the FY67 proposed.
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b. (U) Maintenance

(1) Goals: T h r o u g h t h e c o n d u c t o f q u a r t e r l y s e r v i c e i n-
spections, w i t h i n c r e a s e d e m a s h i s o n s u p p l y p r o c e d u r e s , t h i s b a t t a l i o n
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a d e q u a t e f o l l o w - u p a c t i o n s a r e b e i n g t a k e n .

(2) Progress: T h e f l y i n g t i m e p e r m o n t h f o r U H - 1 B - D
a n d O - 1 D - C a i r c r a f t i n c r e a s e d e a c h m o n t h o f t h e r e p o r t i n g p e r i o d a n d t h e
a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a l l t y p e a i r c r a f t w a s i n c r e a s e d d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d .
T h e c o n t i n u i n g r i s e i n a v a i l a b i l i t y w a s p r i m a r i l y d u e t o b e t t e r p a r t s
s u p p l y a c t i v i t y .

J. (C) S I G I A L :

1. (C) E m e r g e n c y C o m m a n d P o s t : F o r t h i s r e p o r t i n g p e r i o d , g r e a t
e f f o r t a n d f i r s t p r i o r i t y h a v e b e e n d e v o t e d t o c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a n e m e r g e n c y
command p o s t f o r u s e i n e v e n t o f a n e n e m y a t t a c k . F o r t h i s p u r p o s e , t h e
A N / H C 8 - 9 s h e l t e r w a s c o n v e r t e d t o a c c o m m o d a t e t h e n e c e s s a r y c o m m a n d
communications e q u i p m e n t w h i c h i n c l u d e s a l l p r i m a r y m e a n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t o
u n i t s o f t h i s c o m m a n d a n d n e x t h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s , a s w e l l a s t a c t i c a l r a d i o s
f o r a l r t m e a n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . T h e s h e l t e r w a s h e a v i l y f o r t i f i e d w i t h
s a n d b a g s s o a s t o w i t h s t a n d c o n v e n t i o n a l n o r t a r a t t a c k . A n e m e r g e n c y
s u p p l y o f r a t i o n s a n d n e c e s s a r y p o r t a b l e g e n e r a t o r s a r e m a i n t a i n e d t o m a k e
i t s h e l t e r s e l f c o n t a i n e d f o r t e m p o r a r y o p e r a t i o n .

2. (C) S e c u r e T e l e t y p e : S e c u r e t e l e t y p e i s n o w f u l l y o p e r a t i o n a l
t o n e x t h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s , a l t h o u g h o c c a s i o n a l i n t e r r u p t i o n s o c c u r d u e t o u n-
r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e V H F c a r r i e r s y s t e m b e t w e e n t h i s f u n c t i o n a n d S a i g o n ,
installation o f t h i s c i r c u i t h a s b r e a d e n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s c a p a b i l i t y
w i t h i n t h i s b a t t a l i o n . T h i s m u l t i p o i n t s o l e - u s e r t e l e t y p e n e t w o r k p r o v i d e s
f o r f a s t e r h a n d i l i n g o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t r a f f i c t h a n t h e u s u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n
channels .

3. (C) S u r v i v a l R a d i o s : R e c e n t e m p h a s i s p l a c e d o n u s e o f t h e
U R C - 4 a n d U R C - 1 0 s u r v i v a l r a d i o , e s p e c i a l l y f o r s i n g l e s h i p m i s s i o n s , h a s
de c l a i m e d m o r e r e s p o n s i v e m a i n t e n a n c e s u p p o r t a n d m o n t h l y o p e r a t i o n a l t e s t i n g
o f t h e s e r a d i o s . S i n c e s p a r e m o d u l e s , r e p l a c e m e n t p a r t s a n d t e s t e q u i p m e n t
a r e n o t r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e t h r o u g h A r m y s u p p l y c h a n n e l s , c o o r d i n a t i o n h a s b e e n
e f f e c t e d w i t h t h e U . S . A i r F o r c e a t B i e n H o a f o r t e m p o r a r y l o a n o f a T - 9 0 6
T e s t S e t w h i c h i s u s e d f o r t e s t i n g w a t t a g e o u t p u t a n d b a t t e r y o f U R C - 4 s
a n d U R C - 1 0 s . U n t i l A r m y h a s i n h o u s e c a p a b i l i t y , a n n e r g y h a v e b e e n
m a d e w i t h A i r F o r c e f o r d i r e c t e x c h a n g e o f m o d u l e s a n d m a j o r c o m p o n e n t s .
T h i s s y s t e m i s q u i t e a d e q u a t e a n d i s a m a r k e d i m p r o v e m e n t . A s i n t h e p a s t ,
n o t h i n g w a s d o n e i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n t h e s e v e r y e s s e n t i a l i t e m s .

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4. (U) Communications Security: Considerable improvement in communications security has been realized throughout the battalion resulting from instructional classes given by personnel from 17th RAU to all pilots of this command. After monitoring for two weeks all forms of organic communications, the 17th RAU rendered a favorable final report that generally praised this battalion for practicing good communications security.

5. (C) Battalion Command Net: A battalion FH and UHF command net has been established as an alternate means of communications. This network has proved to be very useful for passing traffic - especially urgent requests for gun teams or other quick reactionary elements needed for airborne operations. The net is constantly monitored and is used as an alternate means for administrative traffic when land lines are either out or busy.

K. (U) SAFETY:

1. Accidents, Incidents, and Losses: During the reporting period the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion Safety Officer reviewed, analyzed, and recorded:

   10 Accidents
   13 Incidents
   1 Forced Landing
   4 Precautionary Landings
   1 Combat Loss
   1 Other Type Mishap

   The safety officer conducted safety inspections of all units within the battalion and conducted an airfield survey of Phu Loi Airfield.

2. Significant Events During This Quarter:

   a. Dust became a problem in unpaved helicopter parking areas at Bien Hoa as the monsoon season began to subside. Penetone was applied to these surfaces and care was taken to keep down vehicle traffic on these areas. The result has been a major reduction in dust in the entire area and greatly improved working conditions.

   b. Lighting at Frizzell Field has been and continues to be a problem area. A relatively new system using lighted luminous strips was used to mark the revetments and this was not proven satisfactory. Portable bean-bag lights are put out at night to light the H. This has not completely solved the problem but it is a vast improvement for night operations.

   c. Numerous aviators of this command continue to fly an excessive number of hours. In an attempt to equalize flying time among all aviators and prevent aircraft accidents due to aviator fatigue, every pilot exceeding 90 hours of flying during any 30 day period must be examined by

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the flight surgeon. The aviator will resume flying when cleared by the flight surgeon.

d. A most unfortunate accident occurred when a UH-1B (A) crashed and burned, killing all crewmen on board. The accident investigation revealed that improper bolts had been used in the initial installation of the gun system. The loss of one of these bolts caused the accident. A message containing details of the accident was dispatched to USAR, higher headquarters, and all units of this command. A one time inspection was performed on all UH-1B (A) helicopters in this battalion and several other improper bolts were found. All aircraft are now being inspected prior to each flight until the correct bolts, washers and nuts are received.

I. (U) MEDICAL:

Summary of Medical Activity:

1. The approaching re-location of the 71st and 118th Assault Helicopter Companies with attached units has created a necessity to consolidate the three (3) medical detachments supporting the 165th Combat Aviation Battalion. This consolidation had been planned previously on a long range basis in accordance with ATC authorization. A 100 foot by 200 foot tropical quonset building will be used. This facility will accommodate two (2) of the medical detachments, laboratory, pharmacy and treatment facilities. This will only partially alleviate the problem in that it does not provide facilities for the third medical detachment, dental facilities, battalion surgeons office, and X-ray facilities. Additional space and better medical equipment is needed in the battalion.

2. Excessive amount of flying time and fatigue among the aviators continues to be a major problem. One noticeable aspect of this problem is the disparity of total time among the aviators. Directives have been issued demonstrating the method of calculating total flying time. This directive also requires examination by the flight surgeon when 90 and 120 hours are exceeded.

3. Construction of water supply points to produce potable water has been a problem. The existing point consists of two (2) deep wells but facilities for chlorination or filtration are not available. Though this is our main source of water it has been designated non-potable water by the 20th Preventive Medicine Team. Attempts to correct this situation have not been successful.
SECTION II

COMMANDETS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNEHD)

1. (U) PLUSORD:

   1. Inter-Theater Transfer:

      a. ITM: Inter-theater transfers of officers with dependents in CONUS.

      b. DISCUSSION: Undoubtedly due to significant operational requirements placed upon Department of the Army, a problem has developed which involves serious morale implications. Officers in Vietnam are receiving assignments direct to Europe. Receipt of assignment instructions is often quite late, usually within 40 to 60 days prior to DdOOS, and in some cases, within a week or two of DdOOS. Consequently, members cannot submit applications for concurrent travel of dependents in time to receive confirmations prior to their departure from Vietnam. During one 30 day period of the quarter, 16 officers received assignments to USJUR-Germany. Only two of them received approval of concurrent travel. Two have sufficient time remaining in the command to receive concurrent travel approvals. Twelve have departed or will soon depart Vietnam without an answer from CINCUS/JUR concerning both their unit assignments in Germany and concurrent travel for their dependents. This situation adversely affects the morale of an officer and his dependents.

      c. OBSERVATION: Suggest that a plan be put into effect similar to the plan described in AR 612-105, which provides for personalized officer assignments for officers being called to active duty and assigned directly to United States Army Europe.

2. Direct Commission:

   a. ITM: Direct Commission in the US AR.

   b. DISCUSSION: During the quarter, several Warrant Officers and one enlisted man applied for direct commissions as 2d Lieutenants in the USA under the new program in which USJUR has been delegated the authority to make such appointments. Within six weeks of making their applications, two young Warrant Officers were recently commissioned and appointed 2d Lieutenants of Infantry.

   c. OBSERVATION: The rapid action at all levels of command was outstanding. The thorough, timely and personalized handling of these applications was in the best traditions of the Army's personnel system. The action accomplished in the cases of the two new lieutenants has inspired many
other talented Warrant Officers and enlisted men to seek direct commissions. The program itself offers one of the greatest opportunities the Army has ever made available to energetic young men, who aspire to pursue a career in the Army.

3. Maintenance Warrant Officers:
   a. ITM: Aviation Warrant Officers with Maintenance MOS.

   b. DISCUSSION: Due to an apparent shortage in the Warrant Officer MOS 671C, Aircraft Repair Technician, this command has been forced to fill TOL vacancies with aviators who possess only the MOS 062B or 061B contrary to the provisions of AR 611-112.

   c. OBSERVATION: Due to the close relationship between MOS 062B and 671C, it is suggested that AR 611-112 be changed to authorize unit commanders the authority to utilize rated aviators as maintenance technicians and to recommend the award of MOS 671C after suitable on the job training.

B. (C) OPERATIONS:

1. Pick-up Zones:
   a. ITM: Pick-up Zone Coordination and Preparation.

   b. DISCUSSION: Coordination for air mobile operations is a recognized requirement for all air mobile operations. However, in all cases the coordination with and the organization of the units to be moved is not always done properly, due to insufficient time being allotted for this extremely important part of the operation. In cases where the troops on the ground were not properly prepared to be moved, Pathfinders were not used or when employed they were not given sufficient time to properly organize the troops. Unnecessary casualties and damage to equipment have resulted when insufficient time has been allotted for preparation, and the Viet Cong have chosen to contest the operation.

   c. OBSERVATION: Sufficient time should be allotted to this extremely important part of the operation. When the troops on the ground are not properly organized consideration should be given to delay the operation.

2. Staging Areas:
   a. ITM: Secure Staging Areas.

   b. DISCUSSION: Secure staging areas are a must for air mobile operations. The non-availability of secure primary or alternate staging areas can be a serious limiting factor. When the unit's home field is not being utilized as the staging area the tactical situation may require the use of an alternate for short periods of time. Weather can make the use of an alternate necessary regardless of where the primary is located. On operations where large numbers of aircraft would make a lucrative target for the Viet Cong it may be desirable to use alternates. The prolonged use of a staging area that does not have adequate defense may give the Viet Cong time.
to plan and execute an indirect fire attack. Therefore it is desirable to select and prepare alternate staging areas when any of these factors can influence the primary area. Failure to appropriately consider the plan for alternate staging areas has resulted in losses and undue concern to commanders in the past.

c. OBSERVATION: Suggest appropriate consideration be given to the tactical situation, weather, creation of lucrative targets, and prolonged use of staging areas without adequate defense in selecting primary and alternate staging areas for air mobile operations.

3. Combat and Control Aircraft:

a. ITLM: Battalion Command and Control Aircraft.

b. DISCUSSION: The Battalion Command and Control Aircraft is the center of control on all battalion operations and is the most important aircraft on the operation. The C & C is staffed with the Air Mission Commander, his S-3, the Airmobile Force Commander, his Artillery Officer and his Air Force Air Liaison Officer. The Air Mission Commander and his S-3 control the Army air and fly the C & C. The Airmobile Force Commander and his staff control the ground forces, artillery fires and close air support. This aircraft is the operations center that can adjust any phase or change the entire operation and direct it through to completion. To permit the C & C to maintain positive control the operation should be planned so that the C & C is not required to be over two locations at the same time. To prevent the operation from being delayed excessively or becoming bogged down, due to the loss of the C & C through maintenance trouble or damage caused by enemy fire, an alternate C & C should be available. This Battalion has an alternate C & C on stand-by at the Battalion Forward Command Post during all operations. A radio call will get the alternate C & C in the air and on the way to where it is needed. Due to the possibility of C & C personnel becoming casualties, alternate commanders are designated prior to the operation.

c. OBSERVATION: Suggest provisions be made for an alternate command and control aircraft and an alternate commander selected in the preparation phase of air mobile operations.

4. Observation Aircraft Covering Night Attacks:

a. ITLM: Use of 0-1 Aircraft in Reaction to a Night Attack.

b. DISCUSSION: When the enemy attacks a compound or outpost at night we have found that the best plan is to send two 0-1 aircraft to the area. One aircraft will have a pilot and an ARVN artillery observer on board, the pilot will monitor the air-ground advisory frequency, and the observer will adjust ARVN artillery to insure it is used to maximum advantage. This aircraft will also furnish directions to helicopter gunships if they are employed. It is flown at an altitude of approximately 1,500 feet with all lights out. The other aircraft will have a pilot and a US observer or another pilot on board if available. It will be flown at 2,000 feet or higher
depending on the weather, and the crew will control the flare ships and adjust US artillery. In addition they will direct the lower aircraft to keep clear of clouds and parachute flares. These two aircraft use their UHF radio for air to air control. Two aircraft are necessary to assure control of all supporting fires and to give maximum support to the ground forces.

c. OBSERVATION: This concept provides better control of aircraft and insures maximum support to the ground forces.

5. Frequency Interference.

a. ITEM: Frequency Interference

b. DISCUSSION: The most prevalent problem experienced during the last quarter, was FM frequency interference. Per information received from II FFV, the RVN Government has authorized the U.S. Army to use only seventy three (73) FM frequencies under 51.9 Kc for all of III Corps area. Of the seventy three (73) frequencies, forty (40) of these are assigned for exclusive use. The remaining available frequencies are inadequate to supply the needs of all the tactical units operating throughout the III Corps area. Receipt of the new VRC-12 radios that can operate in the higher frequency spectrum where an unlimited number of usable frequencies are available will alleviate this problem.

c. OBSERVATION: Issue and supply of the new family of radios to the U.S. Forces Vietnam must be expedited to meet the urgent requirements for equipment capable of using additional frequencies.

6. Land Line Communications:

a. ITEM: Inadequate Land Line Communications.

b. DISCUSSION: During this quarter as in the previous quarter, the telephone service or land line communications between this battalion and its next higher headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group, has been inadequate. The primary system necessitates going through three switchboards. Bien Hoa ID Switchboard, which serves all Army elements in the Bien Hoa area, has only three lines to Hurricane Switchboard at II FFV which in turn serves all the 12th Group elements. On a peak day, many more telephone calls are initiated by subscribers than the switchboards are capable of handling. However, there has been some relief to this problem by use of radio and teletype as an alternate means of communications.

c. OBSERVATION: Signal support and equipment availability are not keeping pace with the troop build-up.

C. (U) TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION:

1. Aircraft Commander and Pilot Training:

a. ITEM: Aviator Training

b. DISCUSSION: During the first week of December 1965, an
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Armed helicopter of this battalion was performing a mission four miles east of Saigon. At an altitude of 1500 feet, the pilot was killed instantly by a single rifle shot. The aircraft went out of control and lost some 500 feet in altitude before the copilot regained control. In May 1966, the flight leader of a company making an extraction of troops from an LZ in War Zone D was shot in the leg as his aircraft cleared the trees on takeoff. The aircraft wallowed through the sky, flipped and Banking before the copilot regained control. In July 1966, an armed helicopter was making a firing pass at about 200 feet as it protected a troop-carrier flight on a mission six kilometers south of Saigon. The aircraft commander reported that he had a hit. The helicopter was seen Banking sharply. It plunged into a rice paddy and all aboard were killed. It was later determined that only one pilot had been hit by enemy ground fire, the aircraft commander who had made the radio call. Although no one lived to explain the circumstances, it is possible that when the aircraft commander was hit, the copilot was not able to gain control of the helicopter before it crashed. It is also possible that the controls were damaged, but the former possibility could well have been applicable, especially in the light of the two other examples pointed out above.

c. OBSERVATION: It is suggested that during aviator training at flight school and in other training situations the instructor pilots should simulate being "hit" by ground fire just as they simulate engine failures and tail rotor failures. Aviators flying in combat must be constantly aware of the possibility that they may have to assume control of the aircraft instantaneously, just as they are aware of the possibility that the engine may quit or the tail rotor may fail. This type training would have to progress from high altitude simulations to simulations of being hit on final approach or on takeoff. This training would be particularly difficult for armed helicopter crews. The copilot-gunner is often preoccupied with naming his weapons systems and handling the sight. But, through repetitive application, he should be made conscious of the fact that he might have to grab the controls in an instant. Training of this type would require exceptional skill and judgment on the part of the instructor pilot. He could not be "hit" when the aircraft was in such a precarious attitude or altitude that an excited student would possibly aggravate the situation and cause an accident. The instructor pilot may "hit it up" a little, but he could not get too far away from the controls himself in order to preclude the consequences of inaccurate reactions on the part of the student.

2. Visual Reconnaissance Training:

a. INTRO: Low Passes on Airborne Visual Reconnaissance.

b. DISCUSSION: When on a visual reconnaissance mission and a low pass is required to accomplish the mission the low pass should be well planned, since not more than one low pass should be made. It has been observed that fire is not normally received on the first low pass over a target, but is received on the second and successive passes. The reason fire is not normally drawn on the first pass is that the VC do not have time to react, but by the time you make the second pass they are ready and waiting. A letdown for a low pass should be made away from the target area and approach to the target should be over the route that furnishes the
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Cover and concealment. When more than one low pass is required consideration should be given to making the second pass from a different direction to keep the VC off balance.

c. OBSERVATION: Aviators should be made aware of the dangers of overflying an area at low level more than once.

3. GHB Training:

a. ITEN: Gas Chamber Exercise.

b. DISCUSSION: Appendix III, USAV Regulation 350-1 is quoted, "Each individual will be subjected to either CN or CS at least semi-annually for the purpose of insuring proper fit and serviceability of the protective mask and to instill confidence." CN or CS capsules are not stocked in Vietnam, and it will take three or more months for a requisition to be filled. 12th Combat Aviation Group, chemical officer has advised against using CN grenades for a gas chamber, because carbon dioxide gas is emitted when the grenade is activated. If grenades are used in lieu of capsules the exercise must be conducted outside. Training space at Bien Hoa Air Base is limited, and the use of CN grenades in the open could cause political repercussions.

c. OBSERVATION: CN or CS capsules could be stocked in Vietnam. CN capsules are being requisitioned for this battalion. Training areas are not adequate for CN grenade to be used in the open. The requirement for semi-annual gas chamber exercise must be postponed until CN capsules are available.

D. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

1. Reduced Effectiveness of "Fire Fly":

a. ITEN: Reduced Effectiveness of "Fire Fly"

b. DISCUSSION: The effectiveness of "Fire Fly" is greatly reduced by the number of areas required to cover and the number of hours night combat flying. It is realized that vast area coverage is somewhat a deterrent to VC sampans' movement, however, it does not prevent him from moving supplies by sampans. The VC can see as well as hear the "Fire Fly" coming, hide the sampans and continue to move once the light has passed, knowing it will not return. Where-as a thorough search of an area will normally lead to the destruction of sampans, VC and supplies. The "Fire Fly" does not have to cover every area each night to be effective. Night combat flying in excess of five hours causes the crew to become ineffective and sets up a potential safety hazard.

c. OBSERVATION:

(1) Schedule "Fire Fly" arbitrarily, based on current intelligence and not more than two areas per night.

(2) Incorporate additional "Fire Fly" teams for use in the III Corps area.
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2. Hot Landing Zones:
   a. ITEM: "Hot" Landing Zones
   b. DISCUSSION: On two separate occasions assault helicopter companies have gone into landing zones which have not been properly prepared and the units had not received proper briefings. Both incidents resulted in helicopters being shot down and personnel being killed and wounded. Although two different companies were involved, the area and the supported ARVN unit were the same.

   c. OBSERVATION: Known or suspected "Hot" areas are plotted and disseminated to companies on a weekly basis. US Advisors should be able to evaluate their intelligence and give a more detailed and accurate briefing. This can also be accomplished within the battalion when operations are known in advance.

E. (C) LOGISTICS:

1. (C) Pre-stock Point Operations:
   a. ITEM: Pre-stock Point Operations
   b. DISCUSSION:

   (1) In June 1965 the III Corps Advisory Group, in conjunction with the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, established POL and ammunition prestock points throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone for use by the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion when supporting ARVN operations.

   (2) As initially established, with relatively small stocks and frequent use by a minimum number of aircraft, it was within the capabilities of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion and the III Corps Advisory Group to maintain and operate the prestock points. With the influx of US ground and airborne units and the increased size and frequency of helicopter supported operations, both US and ARVN, there has been a corresponding increase in the utilization of prestock points by all helicopter units in the III Corps Tactical Zone. In addition to the original use, the prestock points now support operations of US as well as ARVN units and service aircraft from all aviation units within III Corps Tactical Zone. As a result, it has been necessary to increase stock levels substantially.

   (3) In addition to monitoring class III A and V supplies at the prestock points and requisitioning Class V supplies, the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion currently provides and maintains fuel dispensing equipment at all prestock points in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Personnel to operate fuel dispensing equipment positioned at III Corps prestock points are not available within the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion. As a result, it is necessary for the equipment at most prestock points to be operated by Vietnamese civilian personnel. These personnel do not perform proper
preventive maintenance. The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion Maintenance Section continuously flies mechanics and parts to the various prestock points to perform emergency and/or scheduled maintenance. First echelon maintenance is so poorly performed that it cannot be assumed that the equipment will be operational on any given day. Since the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion requisitions ammunition for the prestock points, higher headquarters frequently assume that this battalion is expanding the ammunition as well. This is not the case. This matter becomes significant when ASA's are involved.

(4) If maintenance deficiencies on H-49 and H-49C tankers are of such a complex nature that they cannot be corrected in the field, the tankers are returned to Bien Hoa where the required maintenance is performed. Before returning a tanker to Bien Hoa for maintenance the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion sends a serviceable tanker to the prestock point in order to ensure that the prestock point is provided a continuous capability for servicing aircraft. Transporting tankers to and from some of the prestock points presents security and airlift requirements problems.

(5) The fuel dispensing equipment currently maintained at III Corps prestock points is adequate to support routine traffic, but will not support rapid refueling for flight elements. It is necessary that rapid refueling for flight elements be provided if optimum efficiency of aircraft utilization is to be achieved. When the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion is required to perform rapid refueling operations in areas where 500 gallon bladders are not prepositioned, it is necessary to call ahead and determine if adequate fuel and ammunition are on hand and attempt to arrange for 2½ ton trucks to support the operation. If 2½ ton trucks can be provided by the ARVN personnel at the prestock point, a small team of specialists (usually 4 or 5 men) and fuel pumping equipment are flown from Bien Hoa to the prestock point. Upon arrival at the prestock point, it is necessary for these men to load 55 gallon drums of JP4 on the 2½ ton trucks and set up pumping equipment to pump fuel from the drums into aircraft. If materials handling equipment is not available at the prestock point it is necessary to load drums on trucks by rolling them up a ramp. It is necessary for aircraft to shut down when refueled from 2½ ton trucks loaded with JP4 drums. If 2½ ton trucks are not available at the prestock points, a lift involving more than one air mobile company cannot be adequately supported.

(6) At prestock points where 500 gallon bladders are prepositioned, this battalion has the capability to provide rapid refueling for flight elements by flying POL handling personnel and fuel dispensing equipment to the location prior to a lift. This capability only exists when the bladders are filled and positioned prior to the time that their use is actually required. Elements of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion are not the only units in the III Corps Tactical Zone that utilize the prepositioned bladders. It is not uncommon to visit a prestock point and find that several of the 500 gallon bladders have been emptied by a unit not assigned to the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion. For this reason, it can never be assumed that rapid refueling can be provided at these locations.
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(7) Efficient, safe operation of the prestock points is now beyond the capabilities of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion and III Corps Advisory teams, which do not have the necessary personnel, materials handling equipment and POL dispensing equipment to support the increased operations.

c. OBSERVATION:

(1) That an aviation support unit be organized and assigned to 1st Aviation Brigade or II FFV. This unit should be organized with sufficient personnel to provide a five man team to be stationed at each prestock point. In addition to five man teams, unit should possess a capability to perform second echelon maintenance on assigned equipment. Unit should be equipped with adequate supply handling and fuel dispensing equipment to operate prestock points. The mission of the Aviation Support Unit should be:

(a) Store and maintain Class III A and V supplies at III Corps prestock points and requisition these supplies when needed.
(b) Operate and maintain fuel dispensing equipment at the III Corps prestock points.
(c) Provide simultaneous rapid refueling for 16 aircraft with two hours prior notice.

(2) That an aviation unit at each airfield where aviation units are permanently stationed be designated and equipped to provide simultaneous rapid refueling for 16 aircraft with two hours notice. In most cases it will be necessary to provide personnel as well as equipment augmentation to the designated unit. Personnel and equipment will be approximately the same as for prestock points.

2. (U) Compressor Stalls:

a. ITIN: Clamping of UH-1 Air Bleed Valve Strainers.

b. DISCUSSION: In several cases compressor stalls have occurred when UH-1 air bleed valve strainers became clogged.

c. OBSERVATION: It is required that these strainers be inspected and cleaned every 100 operating hours. This inspection requirement has been submitted to US.VCQN for approval and TR 55-1520-210-20 change.

3. (U) Excessive Oil Consumption:

a. ITIN: O-1 Engine Change Due to Excessive Oil Consumption.

b. DISCUSSION: This problem is prevalent in Vietnam due to excessive flux of dirt and sand into the engine and in some cases excessive clearances between cylinder rings and walls.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U) (CONT'D)

c. OBSERVATION: Engine oil changes have been stepped up to twelve hour intervals.

4. (U) Tail Rotor Failure:
   a. ITLM: UH-1 Tail Rotor Failures.
   b. DISCUSSION: Many of our tail rotor failures, during this period, were traced to a loss of torque by the grip nuts and yoke bearing with at breaking the safety.
   c. OBSERVATION: A 100 hour inspection has been initiated by maintenance until a "fix" is issued to support and using units.

5. (U) Motors:
   a. ITLM: Truck Hounded Transistorized Communications Equipment Failures.
   b. DISCUSSION: These failures have been traced to loose and corroded battery electrical circuits in many cases.
   c. OBSERVATION: Emphasis has been placed on cleaning, greasing and tightening terminals and connections regularly.

6. (U) Support Equipment:
   a. ITEM: Generators.
   b. DISCUSSION: It became apparent during this period that a combination of extra long operating hours and the harsh climate of Vietnam was more than normal maintenance could overcome. Generators were found in poor condition and declined for parts.
   c. OBSERVATION: It was necessary to take aggressive action to:

   (1) Affect adherence to the provisions of TM 38-750.

   (2) Affect supervisions over increased operator activities by use of DD Form 314.

   (3) Frequent staff and command inspections.

F. (U) SAFETY:

1. Dust Control:
   a. ITLM: Dust Control in Aircraft Parking Areas.
   b. DISCUSSION: Dust was a major problem in several helicopter parking areas at Bien Hoa. Aircraft have frequently gone IFR when coming to a hover. Engines and moving parts are subject to early wear by injection
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966

Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U) (CONT'D)

of dust. Penetron was applied in all areas affected by dust.

   c. OBSERVATION: Dust was effectively controlled, but penetron
       will not stand up under vehicular traffic.

   2. Airfield Lighting:

   a. ITEM: Lighting Problem at Frizzell Field, Bien Hoa.

   b. DISCUSSION: Lighting has been a problem at Frizzell Field.
       Many of the surrounding areas were lighted and Frizzell Field was not.
       Electrically powered luminous stripes were installed down each row of
       revetments the length of Frizzell Field. An H was marked with bean bags.

   c. OBSERVATION: Frizzell Field is now more easily located
       at night and the lighted H reduces the hazard of possibly striking a parked
       helicopter during landing.

   3. Improper Installation:

   a. ITEM: Improper Installation of Weapons System on UH-1B(A):

   b. DISCUSSION: After losing the tail boom in flight a UH-1B(A)
       crashed and burned. All 4 crewmembers suffered fatal injuries. The sub-
       sequent accident investigation revealed that improper bolts had been used
       in the original installation of the weapons pylon. One bolt came loose,
       2 hard points failed, and the pylon pivoted down and to the rear striking
       the tail boom. A one time inspection was performed on all UH-1B aircraft
       in the battalion and several other improper bolts were found. All aircraft
       are now being inspected before each flight until proper bolts, nut, and
       washers can be obtained.

   c. OBSERVATION: No further trouble has been experienced
       in this area.

   4. Aviator Fatigue:

   a. ITEM: Aviator Fatigue a Safety Hazard.

   b. DISCUSSION: In an attempt to curb the excessive number of
       hours being flown by numerous pilots, it is now mandatory that every pilot
       exceeding 90 hours flying during a 30 day period must see the flight surgeon.
       At this time the flight surgeon will determine whether the pilot is capable
       of continuing to fly or should be grounded for rest. This policy will
       compel commanders to try to keep aviators flying times relatively even.

   c. OBSERVATION: Companies are able to keep aviators time
       at closer levels. The flight surgeon can maintain a more realistic ob-
       servation of flying time and levels of fatigue.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U) (CONT'D)

a. ITEM: Side Effects of Malaria Prophylaxis Drugs.

b. DISCUSSION: Regular malaria prophylaxis is recognized as necessary in this geographical location. It has been found that the side effects of the Chloraquine-Primaquine tablet often causes hesitation and failure to take the tablet on the part of many of the personnel. Side effects of the combination drug are gastrointestinal cramps, diarrhea, insomnia and dermatoses. These side effects have not been observed with the Chloraquine Phosphate tablet.

c. OBSERVATION: Failure of military personnel to take the malaria prophylaxis tablet (Chloraquine-Primaquine) is often related to the unpleasant side effects. This problem can be solved by advising these persons to take the Chloraquine Phosphate tablet as a substitute.

2. Hepatitis:

a. ITEM: Possible Source of Infectious Hepatitis.

b. DISCUSSION: There were six (6) cases of infectious Hepatitis within the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion over the past eight weeks. Four of these patients admitted to eating on the local economy and two did not. All six admitted to drinking soft drinks or beer on the local economy.

c. OBSERVATION: It is felt that the source of hepatitis occurring in the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion is from the local economy food, especially the beer.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. (U) PERSONNEL: A plan be put into effect, for aviators being assigned from Vietnam to Europe, similar to the plan described in AR 612-105 which provides for personalized officer assignments for officers being called to active duty and assigned directly to United States Army Europe.

B. (U) OPERATIONS:

1. The necessity for proper planning and preparation of pick-up zones be re-emphasized at all levels of command.

2. Issue of new tactical radios to US Forces Vietnam be increased to relieve the congestion on the present frequencies.

C. (U) TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION: Pilot training at the Aviation School include recovery training in helicopters that simulates the pilot or aircraft commander having been hit by fire at low level and high level flight.

D. (U) INTELLIGENCE: None.

E. (U) LOGISTICS: That the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion be relieved
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U) (CONT'D)

of the mission of supporting III MAVN Corps prestock points.

F. (U) SAFETY: None.

G. (U) MEDICAL: Personnel should be informed about the possible side effects of the malaria drug and advised to see their flight surgeon.

ANNEX A:

145th Cbt Avn Bn Statistics

1 copy thru channels to ACSFOR, DA
2 copies thru 12th Cbt Avn Gp to ACSFOR, DA
1 copy to CINCUSRPAC
3 copies to DCG, USARV
1 copy to 1st Avn Bde
1 copy to 12th Cbt Avn Gp

DISTRIBUTION:

WALTER F. JONES
LTC Artillery
Commanding

28
### 145th Combat Aviation Battalion Statistics (C)

**Operational Hours**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R/W</th>
<th>F/W</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25,131.3</td>
<td>8,978.5</td>
<td>34,109.8</td>
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**Sorties Flown**

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>F/W</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>68,120</td>
<td>11,106</td>
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**Passengers Carried**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>R/W</th>
<th>F/W</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>88,797</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>89,345</td>
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**Cargo Transported (Tons)**

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<th>R/W</th>
<th>F/W</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,812.4</td>
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**Aircraft Hit by Ground Fire**

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<th>R/W</th>
<th>F/W</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
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<td>111</td>
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**Combat Loses**

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
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<td>4</td>
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**Ammunition Expended**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>7.62</th>
<th>40 MM</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3,079,530</td>
<td>15,798</td>
<td>19,914</td>
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</table>

**Enemy Losses/Damaged Inflicted (C)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KBA (Conf)</th>
<th>KBA (Est)</th>
<th>Structures Damaged</th>
<th>ShMP/NS (Dam/Sunk)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>220</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Confidential**

29
Casualties Medically Evacuated (ARVN & U.S.) (C)

Combined Totals: 268

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Warrent Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted (EM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA/WIA 1/3</td>
<td>KIA/WIA 4/10</td>
<td>KIA/WIA 1/25</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</table>

Confidential
SUPTSCT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

THRU: Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam
APO 96266

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. One (1) copy of Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966, of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion is forwarded in compliance with USARV Regulation 870-2, dated 1 July 1966.

2. Observations and recommendations contained do not adequately indicate actions taken by the battalion to resolve problems or implement changes although formal requests have been submitted in most cases.

3. PERSONNEL:

   a. The recommendation concerning inter-theater transfers is unnecessary since considerable improvement in expeditious receipt of concurrent travel authorizations has been noted since 1 October 1966. However, if receipt should be delayed an individual can get information on the status of his concurrent travel request from the nearest military facility upon his arrival in CONUS.

   b. I do not concur in the observation (page 15) that there is a shortage of Aircraft Repair Technicians, MOS 671C. The apparent shortage of school trained technicians was due to inadequate requisitioning procedures, since corrected. A maintenance technician requires comprehensive and extensive training in all types of rotary wing aircraft and a recommendation to change the regulation is not considered advisable. Very few people have a maintenance background comprehensive enough to warrant the direct award of MOS 671C.
AVGC

SUBJECT: Operational report for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966, Reports Control Symbol GSA-65 (U)

4. OPERATIONS:

a. New series tactical radios are programmed for issue as soon as available. A retrofit program is in progress to replace ARC 44 radios with new series ARC 54 radios.

b. Smoke generator equipped helicopters (page 6) were used with excellent results during the reporting period.

c. The comment on selection of alternate staging areas (page 16) may have merit but this headquarters knows of no case where an alternate staging area was required.

5. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION: Suggestions for more realistic training of aviators will be forwarded to the Army Aviation School. It is standard practice for pilot and co-pilot to physically handle the controls together while operating CH-47's in suspected hot areas. Flying with the force trim in the "on" position should give the surviving pilot time to take control before an uncontrollable aircraft attitude is reached. Initial transition of the aviator into UH-1 and CH-47 helicopters should stress the use of force trim at all times in order to develop a habit which could save his life in combat.

6. INTELLIGENCE: Problems in operating FIREFLY (page 19) are being resolved. Only one illumination system was operable in the Group during the reporting period. Fifteen additional systems will be distributed, one to each assault helicopter company, by mid-January, 1967. The issue of additional systems and an improved understanding of FIREFLY tactics by supported units will solve the problem.

7. LOGISTICS: Plans are being developed to increase the numbers of people and equipment for operation of Class III A re-fueling points in III Corps Tactical Zone. Three (3) PCL Teams (KD, 10E-10-500H) are now authorized with personnel and equipment on request. Present operating conditions will improve when these items are received. 12th Group will assume operational responsibility some time after 1 January 1967.
S. MEDICAL: A discussion of Hepatitis (page 25) points out the need for sanitary controls over civilian eating establishments and civilian food products. A policy should be established by USARV to have area coordinators devise an inspection and approval system to protect the soldier from disease.

RAYMOND F. CAMPBELL, JR.
Colonel, Armor
Commanding
AVFBC-H (30 Nov 66)  
1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96307

The enclosed Operational Report on Lessons Learned submitted by the 145th Aviation Battalion has been reviewed by this headquarters for information and is forwarded to your headquarters for comment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

1 Incl
nc

JAMES A. ULVENES
Capt, ACC
Asst. AG

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBA-C (30 Nov 66)  2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96307 16 DEC 1966

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVMAV, APO 96307

The enclosed operational report submitted by the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion has been reviewed and the additional comments submitted.

a. Reference section II part 1 A1 Personnel (U), and paragraph 3a, 12th Combat Aviation Group transmittal letter with additional comments dated 30 November 1966 (attached).

   (1) Agree with comments made by 12th Combat Aviation Group regarding improved concurrent travel to USAREUR. Individuals that have not received concurrent travel instructions upon arriving in CONUS should contact their branch in DA.

b. Reference section II part 1 paragraph B6.

   A new local switchboard with improved outside plant is scheduled for installation at Bien Hoa by 15 January 1967. An additional multichannel communication system is to be installed between Bien Hoa and Saigon and between Bien Hoa and FFV II during the same time frame. This should relieve some of the telephone communications problems.

c. Reference section II part 1 paragraph D2 Hot Landing Zones.

   The necessity for time to recon and prepare landing zones must be reemphasized. We have taken our biggest and most expensive losses in personnel and equipment because time was not allocated for recon and sufficient preparation. Recommend that action be taken to educate the tactical ground commander of this requirement.

d. Reference section II part 1 paragraph E1 and paragraph 3a, 12th Combat Aviation Group transmittal letter with additional comments dated 30 November 1966 (attached).

   In addition to the three POL KD teams referenced in paragraph 7, action is currently being taken to assign one ammunition detachment (BB), consisting of 1 WO and 28 EH, to the 12th Group for use at class V pre-stock.
AVBA-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RGS CSFCB-65) 16 DEC 1966

points. A general order activating this detachment is expected from
Headquarters, USARPAC, in December 1966.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. RIVERA
Captain, AGC
Asst Adjutant General
1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

   a. Reference Paragraph E2, Section I, Page 2: USARV Regulation 672-1, Awards and Decorations, dated 12 November 1965, has been revised and is presently being published. This regulation contains no major changes that have not been publicized to the field during the month of November 1966, which would require return of recommendations for awards for correction. To preclude such action this headquarters published a Circular containing the major changes on 7 November 1966, to be effective 1 December 1966. The change in format of the recommendation (USARV Form 157-R) was further publicized by a message to all major subordinate commands, 12 November 1966, advising of the requirement for use of the new form effective 1 December 1966.

   b. Reference Paragraph G2, Section I, Page 5: MTOE 256P which contains the request for security guards has been received by this headquarters and is presently being processed.

   c. Reference Paragraph B1, 2, and 3, Section II, Pages 15 and 16: Both the aviation unit and the ground unit should have SOP's prepared which outline the minimum requirements to conduct successfully airmobile operations. The selection and preparation of staging areas and pick up zones must be a joint venture so that each unit can insure that its requirements are met. Coordination and liaison should be established between the two units as soon as possible after receipt of the mission and should be maintained throughout the operation. The designation of an alternate Command and Control (C&O) ship and an alternate mission commander should be standard procedure.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DH (8 Nov 66)

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (DCS GFOR-65)

d. Reference Paragraph A1, Part I, Section II and Paragraph A, Part II, Section II, Page 25; and Paragraph 3a, Letter, Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Groups: Concur. USARV msg 38217, 1 December 1966, to USARV units furnished information and guidance to Army aviators in receipt of orders to USAREUR. This message stated that aviators transferred to Europe would receive concurrent travel. If specific assignment instructions are not on hand at DERS, officers concerned should contact their career branches on arrival in CONUS. Career branches will do all possible to obtain necessary information.

e. Reference Paragraph G1, Part I, Section 2, Pages 24 and 25; and Paragraph G, Part II, Section II, Page 26: The Chloroquine-Primaquine tablet used in malaria prophylaxis is recognised as causing side effects in some individuals. Most of these are mild and transient, frequently disappearing when the individual continues his prophylaxis. The Chloroquine-Primaquine tablets should never be taken any more frequently than 4 days apart because of expected side effects. These are generally mild and should not relieve the responsibility of command insurance that this prophylaxis is taken. The substitution of Chloroquine for the Chloroquine-Primaquine prophylaxis should only be done on the recommendation of a Medical Officer because of more serious side effects or reactions that threaten individual's health or cause ineffectiveness in his duties.

f. Reference Paragraph G2, Part I, Section 2, Page 25 and Paragraph 8, Letter, 12th Aviation Groups:

(1) The instance of six cases of infectious hepatitis in one battalion in eight weeks suggests a common source of infection. A preventative medicine investigation should have been accomplished at that time as to sources, especially among cooks or food handlers in the unit, as well as a check of the unit's water source.

(2) Command emphasis is necessary to discourage eating on local economics and educating troops in the hazards as well as how to avoid possible infectious foodstuffs and non-potable water and ice. Drinking from cans or bottles that have been cooling in non-potable water and non-potable ice, or using non-potable ice in glasses washed in non-potable waters for soft drinks are common sources of potential hepatitis infection.
AVHOC-DH (8 Nov 66)
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

(3) The inspection of civilian eating establishments is beyond the scope of authority of the US agencies in RVN, as a unilateral action. Such inspections could be conducted under the provisions of the Medical Civil Assistance Program (MEDCAP II) in coordination with Vietnamese authorities by any headquarters battalion level or higher. Requisite actions to initiate such a program are outlined in USARV Regulation 40-39, Medical Civil Assistance Programs, 8 March 1966. A letter is being addressed to the 12th Combat Aviation Group advising remedial actions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

R. J. THORNTON
1st Lt., AGG
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl

39
GPOP-07 (8 Nov 66) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 145th Cbt Avn Bn

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

G. L. McMULLIN
CPT, AG
Asst AG

RECEIVED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE(S)